SEC 3- PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which
Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
Recording of conversation through a tape recorder
The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY
ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private
respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a
confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages.
In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of
ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the confrontation.
Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES.
The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY
ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored
by the use of the qualifier "any".
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written
or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused."
In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in
the law (Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape
recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an
offense.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity,
and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable,
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from
forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in
court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public
safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Ople vs Torres GR No 127685 23 July 1998
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System was issued by
President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a
petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He
contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds,
(1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes
the citizens right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit
raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch
not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make
laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance and cannot be allowed.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
570 SCRA 410 Political Law Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress
Representative
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R.
No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-
election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five
(5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be
certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165
is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates
any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no
act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not
tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresas College
Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Right to Privacy Online
Privacy (Social Media)
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Writ of Habeas Data
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College
(STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates
(Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher,
Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded
said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge
for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and
banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order)
granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in
the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers
filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the
school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at
Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights
by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court
all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a
case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an
entity engaged in the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in
the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like
Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools,
then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and
protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned
made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post
(status) on Facebook were published as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users
posts on his wall (profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends
can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy,
then he must choose any setting other than Public. If it is true that the
students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that
only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In
fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never
use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the
school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it
was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their
teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal
purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of
the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this
case:
1. United States v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the
Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
2. United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is,
the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at
large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): The law has to take
into account the changing realities not only technologically but also
socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is
imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom.
This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to customize their
privacy settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission,
thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and
her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is
proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the states
interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right
to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to
the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he
state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding
by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
SEC 4- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the
peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary
servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved.
But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and
one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for
personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt
acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them
to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by
Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants
appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were
true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in
evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming
the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in
advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the
expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There
were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos
Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet
Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. It also said the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of
the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who
know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty
it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of
privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may in
some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the
unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie
which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made
in good faith against a public officials conduct having a duty in the matter.
Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege
may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a
sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty,
is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would
be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the
absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning
we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been
proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not
true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to
think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office
of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a
frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a
grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was
given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the
justice of the peace was proper.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR ALARCON, ET AL.
Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first
Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the
Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein
except one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory
letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
herein respondent, Federico Magahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an
article published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937.
On 29 September 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the
Court of First Instance of that province to cite Federico Mangahas for
contempt. On the same date, the lower court ordered Mangahas to appear
and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed an answer, alleging, among
others, that the publication of the letter in question is in line with the
constitutional Narratives (Berne Guerrero) guarantee of freedom of the
press.
Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for contempt
inasmuch as the robbery-in-band case is still pending appeal.
Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitutes criminal contempt, which is summarily punishable by the
courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however,
clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and
embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be
shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important
duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.
Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense (Lee Yick Hon vs.
Collector of Customs, 41 Phil., 548), and in considering the probable effects
of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable
inference consistent with the theory of defendant's innocence will be
indulged (State v. New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N. M., 102, 177 p. 751),
and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one
of constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of
justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted.
Ayer Production PTY Ltd. V Capulong (1988)
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of
Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day
Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground
that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie
would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist
from making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This,
this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce
motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by
the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners.
Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression, a weighty
presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge
should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet
uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger." The
subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce
Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful
historical account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in
the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a
reckless disregard of truth.Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the
4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming
because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC
lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it
amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the courts
than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.In
Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of
history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used
so long as only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although
Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the
public and private lives of Moises Padilla.
Borjal v. CA
Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court
against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are
allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking
among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted
with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of
the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court
ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before
the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to
be the subject of the published articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites
have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of
identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was
the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would
not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press and that privileged communications must be protective of public
opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens
to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared
objective of the conference, the composition of its members and
participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no
doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest.
Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is
involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is
constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or
remarks."
Tulfo v. People
GR Nos. 161032 and 16117616 September 2008Facts:Atty. Ding So of the
Bureau of Customs filed four separateInformations against Erwin Tulfo,
Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, JocelynBarlizo, and Philip Pichay, accusing them
of libel in connection with the publication of articles in the column Direct
Hit of the daily tabloid
Remate.
The column accused So of corruption, and portrayed him as anextortionist
and smuggler.After trial, the RTC found Tulfo, et al. guilty of libel. The
CAaffirmed the decision.Issues:
1. Why was Borjal v. CA not applied to this case?
2. W/N the assailed articles are privileged.
3. W/N the assailed articles are fair commentaries.
1.Borjal was not applied to this case because: a.Borjal stemmed from a
civil action for damages based onlibel, and was not a criminal case. b.The
ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficientidentification of the
complainant.c.The subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the
present case, the subject is a public official.d.It was held in Borjal that the
articles written by Art Borjalwere fair commentaries on matters of public
interest.
2.NO. The columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, andcannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because thetarget was a public
official.a.Even with the knowledge that he might be in error, evenknowing
of the possibility that someone else may haveused Atty. Sos name, as
Tulfo surmised, he made noeffort to verify the information given by his
source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he wasaccusing.
b.Although falsity of the articles does not prove malice, theexistence of
press freedom must be done consistent withgood faith and reasonable
care. This was clearlyabandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject
articles.This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a caseof a
journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify hisstory and instead
misinforming the public.c.Tulfo had written and published the articles with
recklessdisregard of whether the same were false or not. The testlaid down
is the reckless disregard test, and Tulfo failedto meet that test.d.Evidence
of malice: The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting Atty. So
after the commencement of anaction. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause
to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming Atty. So.This is a
clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So,no matter the cost, and is
proof of malice.
3. NO. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or evenattempt
to verify his story before publication.a.The provided no details o the acts
committed by thesubject. They are plain and simple baseless accusations,
backed up by the word of one unnamed source. b.Not fair or true
because fair is defined as havingthe qualities of impartiality and
honesty. True isdefined as comfortable to fact; correct; exact;
actual;genuine; honest. Tulfo failed to satisfy theserequirements, as he did
not do research before making hisallegations, and it has been shown that
these allegationswere baseless. The articles are not fair and true reports,
but merely wild accusations.
Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):a.That it is a fair
and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidentialnature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered
insaid proceedings, or of any other act performed by a pulicofficer in the
exercise of his functions; b.That it is made in good faith;c.That it is without
any comments or remarks.Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin
of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand
to cover every defamatoryor injurious statement they may make in the
furtherance of their profession,nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility.The mere fact that the subject of an article
is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not mean it is a fair
commentary within the scope of qualified privileged communication, which
would automatically exclude theauthor from liability.The confidentiality of
sources and their importance to journalists areaccepted and respected.
What cannot be accepted are journalists making noefforts to verify the
information given by a source, and using that unverifiedinformation to
throw wild accusations and besmirch the name of possibly aninnocent
person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and indoing so
must at least investigate their stories before publication, and beable to
back up their stories with proof.Journalists are not storytellers or novelists
who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as
reality. There must be somefoundation to their reports; these reports must
be warranted by facts.Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the
press may not beunrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly.
Soriano vs. La Guardia
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks
against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.
Issue: Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang
Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within the protection of
Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and
considering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers
fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a
public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted
that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free
speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the
public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the
State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language
be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language.
Social Weather Stations v COMELEC
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-
profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On
the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two
days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters
and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting
process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast
media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to
the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary
voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are
relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of
R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of
the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before
the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational
connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the
debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys,
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet
the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e.,
the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a
local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results
but only require timeliness.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the
press.
Held: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of
expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held
that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and
(3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of campaign
materials on PUV and public terminals, captive-audience doctrine
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental
right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the
right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express
ones preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to
free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince
others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of
invalidity.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with
the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. During the campaign
period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in
private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of
the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries,
pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals,
airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for
the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner
and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an
election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented
by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application
of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned public utility vehicles
(PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election
campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied
the petitioners request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are prior restraints on speech
 Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people
to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to
express their preference, through the posting of election campaign
material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an
election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility
franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free
expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of
the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and
effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with
the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible,
even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:
The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-
neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election
campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites
for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC
under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely
no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not
the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election
period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants
COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation, inter alia, of
transportation and other public utilities. The COMELECs constitutionally
delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise
or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate
the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an
act of ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to
operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be
restricted. The captive-audience doctrine recognizes that a listener has a
right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which
the communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of
censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others.
Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it
either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine
may not be justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid
exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified
under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the
messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they
may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehmans case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of
election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political
advertisements on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space
on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement
space on government-run buses, although incidental to the provision of
public transportation, is a part of commercial venture. In the same way
that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of
advertising from the general public, the citys transit system has the
discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by
the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the
right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles,
i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that
would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their
properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse
political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were
involved were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the
appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason
to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election
campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul
of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of
the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally
to the members of the purported class. However, the classification
remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial
distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction
exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and
other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to
secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate.
Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per
se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any
manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport
terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of
PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If
owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express
their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on
their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right
to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the
distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by
the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from
private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign
material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be
seen by many people. However, election campaign materials posted on
private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no
reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations,
which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and
are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space
and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free
speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as
there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise ones
political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression.
A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the
most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public
view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring
to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains
the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH)
Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners
as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team
Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians
who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is
a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts
power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin
in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies
in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is
the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a
court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message
and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners
speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation
of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate
the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority
to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that every citizens expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid
for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party,
or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue, fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech has
been defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates
where decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon
by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely
on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion
into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Notes Affiliate program commission Candidate Bill of rights Search
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged
by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and
in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the
peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section
provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the
streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets.
Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may
be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
Respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such
permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein
stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger
of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely
critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process.
There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non
academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their work because
of noise created. They were asked to explain why they should not be held
liable for holding an assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year
was violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free
speech?
Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present
danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such
request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time
and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Luzviminda dela Cruz v CA, et. al. 305 SCRA 303 (March 25, 1999)
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro
Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and
eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the
administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective
principals for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently
defying the return-to-work order by DECS constituting grave misconduct.,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of
Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a
peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their
grievances in the exercise of their constitutional right and insist their
assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of
classes.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercise of their right to freedom to
assembly and petition were valid.
Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that
public teachers in the exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by
petitioning the government for redress should be done within reasonable
limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass
protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial
to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are
penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble
but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going
on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various
schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students
for whose education the teachers were responsible.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right
is superior to property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of
constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free
assembly and rights of petition
FACTS:
March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration as a valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers
in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the
morning and afternoon where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which
has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for work
the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA
Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that
there is no violation since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a
mass demonstration for strike against the company.
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
PBMEO officers directly responsible for ULP losing their status as
employees
September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration dismissed
since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition
of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the
petitioners.
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality
and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life,
to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection
as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers
and employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester
and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the
day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a
ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by
reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One
day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to
support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the
right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently
being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6
of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees
of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being."
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for
... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long
after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of
the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration.
It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in
the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And
in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel
who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as
he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services
enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an
accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require."
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of
the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant
to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions
in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion,
protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance
shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be
consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments,
the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions,
withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly
those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas
Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a)
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere
of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not
absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction
that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P.
No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies
that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in
of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more
particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are
DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the
public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied
with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN
from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED