Review of General Psychology 2016 American Psychological Association

2016, Vol. 20, No. 2, 155170 1089-2680/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000067

On the Autonomy of Psychology From Neuroscience: A Case Study of

Skinners Radical Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis
Diego Zilio
Federal University of Esprito Santo

The main goal of this article is to discuss the place of psychology in the domain of natural sciences as
an autonomous endeavor from neuroscience. However, given that psychology is not a monolithic field,
it is necessary to specify which particular psychological approach is being taken into account. Here, I take
B. F. Skinners radical behaviorism and behavior analysis as a case study. The focus on Skinners
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behaviorism can be justified for at least 2 reasons: (a) Skinner is one of the most influential psychologists
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of the 20th century, and (b) he is well known for his defense of the autonomy of behavior analysis from
neuroscience. The first part of this article is dedicated to the analysis of Skinners arguments for the
autonomy of behavior analysis from neuroscience in 73 of his works, published between 1933 and 1993.
In the second part of this article, I analyze Skinners arguments by taking into account contemporary
neuroscience. Incredible advances occurred in neuroscience since the 1930s, and even the late 1980s,
period in which Skinner developed his ideas. Therefore, it is important to discuss the pertinence of his
arguments in light of todays neuroscience in order to evaluate the validity of his autonomy position.
I argue that the relation between behavior analysis and neuroscience can shed some light on the more
general debate about the relation between psychology and neuroscience by presenting an interesting
nonreductionist alternative free of the problems faced by cognitivist theories.

Keywords: Skinner, behavior analysis, neuroscience, autonomy, reductionism

It has been almost 20 years since Gazzaniga (1998) announced
the death of psychology in his book, conveniently entitled The
Minds Past. He wrote in the preface,
Psychology, which for many was the study of mental life, gave way
during the past century to other disciplines. Today the mind sciences
are the province of evolutionary biologists, cognitive scientists, neu-
roscientists, psychophysicists, linguists, computer scientists you name
it. . . . Psychology itself is dead. (p. xi)
Gazzaniga was not saying that there were not psychological
problems anymore, therefore making psychology an obsolete sci-
ence. The supposed death of psychology would be a conse-
quence of those psychological problems being approached by
sciences other than psychology, particularly neuroscience. In fact,
Gazzaniga was not the first to defend such an idea. Paul and
Patricia Churchlands eliminative materialism is another good
example (P. M. Churchland, 1981, 1989; P. S. Churchland, 1986)
of the effort to reduce or eliminate psychological conceptual
framework in favor of the conceptual framework of a matured
neuroscience (P. S. Churchland, 1986, p. 396). Kandel and Hawk-
This article was published Online First February 11, 2016.
The writing of this article was supported by FAPESPSo Paulo
Research Foundation (2009/18324 1, 2013/17950 1). Parts of this article
were presented at the Association for Behavior Analysis Theory & Phi-
losophy Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 2012.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Diego
Zilio, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, Federal Uni-
versity of Esprito Santo (UFES), Fernando Ferrari Avenue, 514, Goiabei-
ras, VitriaES, Brazil 29075-910. E-mail: dzilioufes@gmail.com
155
ins, in turn, also presented a reductive model with their cell-
biological alphabet of learning (Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, 1984b;
cf. Gold & Stoljar, 1999). The reductive approach is clearly stated
in their goal: Our purpose in this brief theoretical review is to
illustrate that several higher order features of classical condition-
ing can be derived [emphasis added] from our current understand-
ing of the cellular mechanisms of habituation, sensitization, and
classical conditioning (Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, p. 376). More
recently, Bickle (2003) made the case for what he called a ruth-
lessly reductive approach to psychology, according to which
scientific practice in cellular and molecular neuroscience refuses
to grant the psychological any genuine causal explanatory role
once a real neurobiological successor is firmly in place (p. 115).
The main issue surrounding those ideas is the possibility of
reduction or elimination of psychology (or psychological explana-
tions) in favor of neuroscience (or neuroscientific explanations).
Hence, what is at stake here is the possibility of psychology as an
autonomous science not reducible to or eliminated by neurosci-
ence. There are at least two ways of approaching the autonomy
between domains of knowledge (cf. Abney et al., 2014; Bunge,
1990; Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009). The first one is what I
call strong autonomy, according to which psychology and neu-
roscience are fully independent scientific endeavors, meaning that
their subject matters, explanations, theories, and laws are insulated
from one another. The second kind of autonomy is the weak
autonomy. By weak, I mean that psychology and neuroscience
are both part of the natural sciences. They are not insulated
disciplines, which mean that they can influence each other. How-
ever, psychology is not reducible to or eliminated by neuroscience
because they essentially deal with different variables that are
equally responsible for the production of behavioral phenomena.
 156
My goal in this article is to defend that there is a place for
psychology in the domain of natural sciences as an autonomous
endeavor in the weak sense of autonomy. The problem, however,
is that psychology is not a monolithic field. There are psycholog-
ical systems with divergent epistemologies, ontologies, and meth-
odologies. Perhaps the most common example of divergence lies
in the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate (Baars, 1986).
Therefore, we cannot simply treat psychology in general, being
paramount to restrict our analysis to one particular psychological
approach. Here, I will discuss B. F. Skinners behavior analysis
based on the philosophy of radical behaviorism. Besides the ne-
cessity of restricting our analysis, the focus on Skinners behav-
iorism can be justified for at least two more reasons: (a) Skinner is
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one of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century
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(Haggbloom et al., 2002), and (b) he is well known for his defense
of the autonomy of behavior analysis from neuroscience (e.g.,
Baer, 1996; Bradnan, 1982; Bunge, 1990; Garca-Hoz, 2004; Ilardi
& Feldman, 2001; Kandel, 1976; Konorski, 2013; Loucks, 1941;
Machamer, 2009; Panksepp, 1990; Razran, 1965; Reese, 1996;
Staddon & Bueno, 1991), to the point of even being wrongly
accused of defending an antiphysiological position (Zilio, 2015, in
press). In sum, in Skinner, we have a prominent figure in psychol-
ogy who discussed the relation between the science of behavior
and neuroscience in a systematic way (as we will see throughout
this article), and who defended the autonomy between both sci-
ences.
A key element in Skinners attempt to establish an autonomous
science of behavior was his justifications for the independence of
behavior analysis from physiology. According to Skinner (1989b),
this was something inherent to radical behaviorism: A declaration
of independence from physiology was essential to radical behav-
iorism, . . . and I argued the case strenuously (p. 129). Of course,
the independence from physiology was essential to behavior anal-
ysis in its early years so it could fortify its position as a viable
science of behavior. However, consequences of Skinners justifi-
cations are present until this day, existing in behavior-analytic
literature that still argues for the autonomy of behavior analysis
despite the changes both sciences passed through since Skinner
presented his justifications (e.g., Baer, 1996; Greenberg, 1983;
Greenberg & Lambdin, 2007; Reese, 1996), or in the critical
literature that still maintains that behavior analysis is antiphysi-
ological for denying any role to neuroscience in the explanation of
behavior (e.g., Bunge, 1990; Machamer, 2009; Panksepp, 1990;
Staddon & Bueno, 1991).
Considerable changes happened since Skinner first proposed his
justifications for the autonomy of behavior analysis in the 1930s.
Today, we have a well-established science of behavior under the
domain of behavior analysis and a neuroscience that advanced
remarkably since Skinners writings on the subject, which lead us
to question this autonomy. Are Skinners arguments still relevant
to justify the autonomy between behavior analysis and neurosci-
ence in the search for explanations of behavior? Is Skinner de-
fending a weak or a strong form of autonomy? To answer these
questions, first we need to analyze the very arguments used by
Skinner to justify the autonomy of behavior analysis. This analysis
will allow us to understand what kind of autonomy he is defending.
This is the first goal of this article. His arguments were divided
into four categories. The first, definition of the subject matter,
includes arguments focusing on the differences between the phe-
ZILIO
nomena studied by behavior analysis and neuroscience. The sec-
ond category, explanation of behavior, presents arguments related
to characteristics of neuroscientific and behavior-analytic expla-
nations of behavior. The third category, concepts and philosophy
of science, contains Skinners philosophical and conceptual argu-
ments that would justify the independence of behavior analysis.
The fourth category, practical issues, deals with arguments that
highlight the practical advantages of behavior analysis and neuro-
science dividing the labor in the process of explaining behavior.
However, analyzing Skinners arguments by itself is not enough to
provide an answer to our question concerning the pertinence of his
autonomy position. We need to evaluate Skinners arguments
taking into account the advances of contemporary neuroscience.
This is my second goal in this article. As I said earlier, incredible
advances occurred in neuroscience since the 1930s, and even the
late 1980s, period in which Skinner developed his ideas. There-
fore, it is important to discuss the pertinence of Skinners argu-
ments in light of todays neuroscience. Based on this analysis, I
argue that the arguments that may indicate the defense of strong
autonomy are quite fragile, whereas the ones associated with weak
autonomy are still relevantmore than that, they can shed some
light on the debate about the relation between psychology and
neuroscience by presenting an interesting nonreductionist alterna-
tive.
Method
The same method described here was also used in Zilio (in
press), including the keywords (see Table 1) used to select the
material. I started with the references gathered by Morris, Lazo,
and Smith (2004), because the authors reviewed all the primary-
source works that Skinner published during his career and selected
the ones in which he addressed issues related to the role of biology
(including neuroscience) in behavior. Morris et al. focused their
analysis only on Skinners constructive comments, which may not
necessarily include Skinners arguments for the independence/
autonomy of behavior analysis from physiology. That being the
case, I added additional secondary-source works (mainly Skinners
collections of papers, like Cumulative Record and Recent Issues in
the Analysis of Behavior) to complement the bibliography selected
by them. In addition, I did not adopt any restriction privileging
Skinners constructive comments: All comments, critical or not,
that could be interpreted as justifications for the independence/
autonomy of behavior analysis were selected. As a result, I started
the analysis with a total of 148 texts, among books, chapters, and
articles. The first reading (titles, abstracts, and the text itself) was
to select material that contained keywords related to neuroscience
(Table 1).
From the 148 texts, only 73 contained the keywords (see Zilio,
in press, for the complete list). A second reading of the remaining
73 texts was made to select excerpts that could be interpreted as
justifications for the independence/autonomy of behavior analysis
from physiology or, more specifically, neuroscience. The results
are in Table 2.
Definition of the Subject Matter
According to Skinner, behavior analysis is independent from
neuroscience because their subject matters are distinct (Skinner,
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE 157

Table 1
Keywords and Parts of Words Related to Neuroscience

Keywords Parts of words

Anatomist Neuro Anato

Antiphysiological Neurologist Physio
Autonomic Nervous system Neurology Bio
Biological Neurological Neur
Black box Neurones Nerv
Black-box Neuroscience Physico
Biochemical system Neuropsychology Synap
Biological Neurophysiology Stor
Body-cum-brain Neuroanatomy Copy
Bodily state(s) Nerve(s) Proprio
Body state(s) Nerves going to the right places Intero
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Brain Nerve impulse Mechani

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Brain science Nervous

Central nervous system Nervous impulses
Central Processes Nervous system
Cerebral Three nervous systems
Cerebral cortex Physiological
Conceptual nervous system Physiologist(s)
Cortex Physiology
Cortical states Physico-chemical neurology
Inner state(s) Physical or chemical
Internal states(s) Psychobiology
Inside story Psychopharmacology
Mechanisms Psychophysiology
Neural Sensory nerve(s)
Neural events Synapse(s)
Neural homunculus Synaptic
Neural science Reflex physiology
Neural structure Representation
Storage
Copy theory

1959/1961e, p. 253; 1938/1966a, pp. 423 424; 1969b, p. 60;
1986a, p. 716; 1989a, p. 56; 1989c, p. 18; 1990a, p. 1208). Skinner
(1938/1966a) presents this argument when dealing with the prob-
lem of neural correlates of behavior:
The very notion of a neurological correlate implies what I am here
contendingthat there are two independent subject matters [empha-
sis added] (behavior and the nervous system). . . . I am asserting, then,
not only that a science of behavior is independent of neurology but
that it must be established as a separate discipline whether or not a
rapprochement with neurology is ever attempted. (pp. 423 424)
The vocabulary used to describe behavioral and neurophysio-
logical phenomena indicates differences in subject matter. Neuro-
scientists study neural processes that are correlated in some way
with behavioral process and those who study the correlate of
something do not necessarily study the something itself. Skinner
(1986a) reiterated the distinction in subject matter, while discuss-
ing the causal chain between environmental events, physiological
events, and organisms actions:
Behavior and physiology are not two ways of approaching the same
subject [emphasis added]. In a given episode the environment acts
upon the organism, something happens inside, the organism then acts
upon the environment, and certain consequences follow. The first,
third, and fourth of these events is the field of a science of behavior,
which undertakes to discover how they are related to each other. What
happens inside is another part of the story. (p. 716)
Skinner (1953/1965) defines environment as any event in the
universe capable of affecting the organism (p. 257), which means
to produce physiological changes (something that happens in-
side). The modified organism, in turn, acts on the environment,
which is then modified by those actions. According to Skinner
(1986a), behavior analysis deals with the functional relations be-
tween environmental events (antecedent and consequent) and the
actions of the organisms, which, by definition, constitute the
three-term contingency (cf. Skinner, 1969a), the basic relational
unit of operant behavior analysis. The second link in the causal
chain, the physiological changes, would be the subject matter of
neuroscience. Skinner (1989a) develops this idea in another pas-
sage:
When human behavior is analyzed in its own right as a function of
environmental variables, however, rather than as the expression of
feelings and states of mind, the nervous system is seen to play a
different role. Behavioral scientists observe three things: the action
of the environment on an organism, the action of the organism on
the environment, and changes which then follow. There are gaps in
that account which only neurologists will eventually fill with their
different instruments and techniques. Brain processes are not an-
other aspect of behavior; they are another part of what an
organism does. (p. 56)
This passage brings up several questions. It starts with the
environmental-centered approach (Hineline, 1990), according to
 158
which behavior would be controlled by environmental variables
rather than being a mere symptom of internal events, such as
feelings, mental states, and, more importantly, physiological states.
In Skinners words (Skinner, 1959/1961e), In an acceptable ex-
planatory scheme the ultimate causes of behavior must be found
outside the organism (p. 253). Later, Skinner (1988) notes that
this is only a hypothesis: It is certainly only a hypothesis, testable
only in principle, to say that all behavior, whether controlled by
internal or external stimuli, is determined by external contingen-
cies (p. 380). Given that behavior is not an effect whose causes
we must search for in internal events, the role of neuroscience is to
study the physiological processes related to organisms interaction
with the environmentin other words, the aforementioned second
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link in the causal chain. Precisely because it does not deal with this
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second link, behavior analysis has explanatory gaps to be filled by
neuroscience.
In addition, Skinner states that neural processes are not aspects
of behavior but constitute a different kind of process. This point is
important and leads us to the very definition of behavior. Skinner
(1938/1966a) defines it as only part of the total activity of an
organism, specifically, behavior is what an organism is doing . . .
is that part of the functioning of an organism which is engaged in
acting upon or having commerce with the outside world (p. 6). In
this definition, we find evidence of the Skinnerian division of the
events that make up the causal chain between environmental
events, physiological events, and an organisms actions. In this
description, behavior is defined by its functional relations with
environmental events (antecedent and consequent). Physiological
events are absent in this definition, which leads to the conclusion
that peculiar properties which make behavior a unitary and
unique subject matter follow from this definition (Skinner, 1938/
1966a, p. 6).
The argument that behavior analysis and neuroscience possess
distinct subject matters is also present in the thesis that the former
would be the science of variation and selection:
Two established sciences, each with a clearly defined subject matter
[emphasis added], have a bearing on human behavior. One is the
physiology of the body-cum-braina matter of organs, tissues, and
cells, and the electrical and chemical changes that occur within them.
The other is a group of three sciences concerned with the variation and
selection that determine the condition of that body-cum-brain at any
moment: the natural selection of the behavior of species (ethology),
the operant conditioning of the behavior of the individual (behavior
analysis), and the evolution of the social environments that prime
operant behavior and greatly expand its range (a part of anthropol-
ogy). The three could be said to be related in this way: Physiology
studies the product of which the sciences of variation and selection
study the production. (Skinner, 1990a, p. 1208)
Ethology, behavior analysis, and a part of anthropology would
study, respectively, the phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural
processes of variation and selection responsible for the origin and
maintenance of behavior, whereas neuroscience would study the
physiological changes caused by and integral to such processes.
Because behavior analysis and neuroscience deal with distinct
subject matters, it is logical to assume, as Skinner did (Skinner,
1931/1961c, p. 336; 1956/1961g, p. 214; 1957/1961d, p. 116;
1959/1961e, p. 253; 1983a, p. 367; 1985, p. 297; 1986a, p. 716;
1987, p. 782; 1988, p. 53; 1989a, p. 56; 1989c, p. 18; 1989d, p. 11),
ZILIO
that they also have different goals and techniques. According to
Skinner, the goal of behavior analysis is to study functional rela-
tions (contingencies) between the actions of an organism and the
environment (Skinner, 1953/1965, 1966b); it is to study the onto-
genetic processes of variation and selection of behavior (Skinner,
1981, 1990a, 1993). By contrast, the goal of neuroscience is to
study the physiological processes that make behavior possible
(Skinner, 1963a, 1983b). In Skinners (1990a) words,
The body works as it does because of the laws of physics and
chemistry; it does what it does because of its exposure to contingen-
cies of variation and selection. Physiology tells us how the body
works; the sciences of variation and selection tell us why it is a body
that works that way. (p. 1208)
The thesis that behavior analysis and neuroscience have differ-
ent subject matters is the starting point for Skinners declaration of
independence of behavior analysis from neuroscience. Such a
distinction is also important to understand the supposed limits of
neuroscientific explanations of behavior as posed by Skinner to
justify the autonomy of his science of behavior.
Explanation of Behavior
Based on the principle that behavior analysis and neuroscience
have different subject matters, Skinner (1938/1966a, pp. 418 419;
1959/1961e, pp. 253254) proceeded to argue that a science of
behavior free from neuroscience is possible. In his words (Skinner,
1938/1966a),
The science of neurology achieved a degree of experimental rigor
long before a science of behavior could do so. . . . But the historical
advantage has not been conserved. It is now possible to apply scien-
tific techniques to the behavior of a representative organism in such a
way that behavior appears to be as lawful as the nervous system. I
know of no experimental material, for example, concerning the central
nervous system which consists of smoother or more easily reproduc-
ible curves than are illustrated in many of the figures of this book.
Accordingly, if we are to avoid historical influences in arriving at a
modern verdict, we must discount the priority of the science of
neurology; and in recognizing that the two sciences are of, let us say,
equal validity, we may no longer subscribe to a point of view which
regards a chaos of behavior as reducible to order through appeal to an
internal ordered system. (pp. 418 419)
The history of physiological research dates back to a time when
psychology did not exist as an autonomous scientific area, but only
as a part of philosophy (cf. Finger, 1994, 2000; Kantor, 1963). It
is natural, then, that neuroscience ended up developing scientific
and methodological rigor earlier than psychology. Add to that the
conception of behavior as a mere effect of what happens inside the
body, an ephemeral phenomenon that seems chaotic if taken by
itself, and you have the rationale Skinner is trying to discard. For
Skinner, behavior is not a mere effect of what happens inside the
body, but an object of study in itself. The chaos is put into order
when behavior is studied through methods and techniques of
behavior analysis. The experimental data that comprise The Be-
havior of Organisms would be irrefutable evidence that behavior
analysis reached a degree of scientific and methodological rigor
matched to physiology. Underlying all Skinners arguments was
the assumption that an independent science of behavior was pos-
sible.
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE
Another reason given by Skinner for an autonomous science of
behavior was the incompleteness of neuroscience (Skinner, 1954,
p. 302; 1938/1966a, p. 4; 1969b, p. 25; 1974, pp. 213214; 1975,
p. 42; 1984, p. 949; 1987, p. 784; 1988, pp. 120 121; 1946, p.
169). Clearly, this is not a problem in itself. After all, we are
dealing here with two areas of research that still are in constant
developmentand would there be, in fact, any science that has
been properly completed? behavior analysis and neuroscience.
The problem would be to explain behavior based upon events
which little is known about. Skinner (1946) argued as follows:
The abundance of wrong theories about behavior is due to the
practice of keeping an eye on the nervous system. An unwarranted
specificity is thus introduced, and this frequently proves to be in error
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because our present knowledge of the nervous system is deficient. (p.
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169)
That is, a theory of behavior may be proven wrong just by being
grounded in an incorrect neurophysiological theory. The chances
that this may occur are significant because the knowledge we have
about brain function is incomplete. One could contest that Skin-
ners argument is dated. After all, many advances have occurred in
the field of neuroscience since 1946. However, the author (Skin-
ner, 1988) presents a similar position in the late 1980s:
I readily agree that the appeal to neurology is at the moment pretty
much an article of faith. I do not have any way of observing the
nervous system or its action, but I have reasonable confidence . . .
that we shall eventually know much of what we need to know about
the underlying explanation of behavior. (pp. 120 121)
It is interesting that, even assuming the incompleteness of neu-
roscience and the risk of invoking it to explain behavior, Skinner
seems to suggest that this is a temporary situation to be surpassed
by the development of neuroscience; it is, therefore, an empirical
matter.
In addition to the argument of incompleteness, Skinner (1938/
1966a, p. 425; 1956/1961g, pp. 212213) also states that neuro-
science does not provide simpler explanations of behavior. The
following passage is enlightening:
The clinical practice of looking into the organism is carried over in the
widespread belief that neurological facts somehow illuminate behav-
ior. If my statement of the relation of these two fields is essentially
correct, the belief is ill-founded. It obviously springs from the ancient
view of behavior as chaotic. . . . The same statement of the relation
between neurology and behavior will serve to dismiss the claim that
neurology offers a simpler description of behavioral facts. This view
is again reminiscent of the belief that simplicity is not to be sought for
in behavior itself. (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 425)
Complementing the idea of neuroscience being an incomplete
science that would not necessarily provide simpler explanations,
Skinner (1953/1965, pp. 28 29, 3334; 1974, pp. 10 11, 213
214) was also critical of the possibility of prediction and control of
behavior through the manipulation of neurophysiological pro-
cesses. On this topic, he (Skinner, 1953/1965) wrote,
Eventually a science of the nervous system based upon direct obser-
vation rather than inference will describe the neural states and events
which immediately precede instances of behavior. We shall know the
precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, say, the
response, No, thank you. These events in turn will be found to be
159
preceded by other neurological events, and these in turn by others.
This series will lead us back to events outside the nervous system and,
eventually, outside the organism. . . . We shall consider external
events of this sort in some detail. We shall then be better able to
evaluate the place of neurological explanations of behavior. However,
we may note here that we do not have and may never have this sort
of neurological information at the moment it is needed in order to
predict a specific instance of behavior. It is even more unlikely that we
shall be able to alter the nervous system directly in order to set up the
antecedent conditions of a particular instance [emphasis added]. The
causes to be sought in the nervous system are, therefore, of limited
usefulness in the prediction and control of specific behavior.
(pp. 28 29)
What Skinner seems to be defending is that, given the real
neuroscience (that is, what we really know about the brain), it
is possible to achieve a higher degree of prediction and control
of behavior by manipulating contingencies instead of neuro-
physiological processes. This condition, however, can change;
the development of neuroscience may enable an increasing
degree of control and prediction of behavior by the manipula-
tion of neurophysiological events. Maybe one day a complete
neurophysiological theory will tell us the exact events that take
place during ones particular action; perhaps one day neurosci-
ence will be able to provide means for controlling behavior, and
we will no longer need to manipulate environmental variables,
but only rearrange organisms neurophysiology, to create new
behavioral classes in his repertoire.
Skinner also pointed out problems that are supposed to be
inherent to neuroscientific explanations of behavior not dependent
on empirical matters related to possible advances in the field. The
first one is that neuroscience would not explain the origin of
behavior (Skinner, 1957, p. 459; 1959/1961e, p. 253; 1971, p. 14;
1983a, pp. 278 279; 1988, pp. 204, 245, 434; 1989c, p. 18; 1989d,
p. 11; 1990a, p. 1206; 1990b, p. 104; 1993, pp. 3 4). In Skinners
(1989c) words, No account of what is happening inside the
human body, no matter how complete, will explain the origins of
human behavior. What happens inside the body is not a beginning
(p. 18). For Skinner (1990b), this is a limit inherent to neurosci-
ence, because as a structure that obeys the laws of physics and
chemistry, the brain is not a promising candidate for creator [of
behavior] (p. 104). By contrast, selection by consequences, the
process responsible for the novelty and origin of behavior (Skin-
ner, 1981, 1988), would not be mechanical. Skinner (1990a) is
incisive on this point:
The two sciences observe very different causal principles. The body-
cum-brain obeys the laws of physics and chemistry. It has no freedom
and makes no choices. No other vision of man a machine (in this
case a biochemical machine) has ever been so well supported. . . .
[But] the more we know about the body-cum-brain as a biochemical
machine, the less interesting it becomes in its bearing on behavior. If
there is freedom, it is to be found in the randomness of variations. If
new forms of behavior are created they are created by selection.
(p. 1208)
Thus, even if we come to know, in a hypothetical future,
everything there is to know about neurophysiological mechanisms,
this knowledge does not enable us to explain the origin of
behavior. The genesis of behavior is a question addressed to the
 160
sciences of variation and selection (Skinner, 1989c, p. 18; 1993,
pp. 3 4).
However, the impossibility of explaining the origin of behavior
is not the only limit inherent to neuroscience. Skinner (1933, p. 20;
1953/1965, p. 35; 1969b, p. 60; 1975, pp. 42 43; 1988, p. 184;
1989b, p. 130) goes one step further and argues that they are not
even necessary and/or relevant in behavioral explanations. For
example,
We can analyze a given instance of behavior in its relation to the
current setting and to antecedent events in the history of the species
and of the individual. Thus, we do not need an explicit account of the
anatomy and physiology of genetic endowment in order to describe
the behavior, or the behavioral processes, characteristic of a species,
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or to speculate about the contingencies of survival under which they
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might have evolved, as the ethologists have convincingly demon-
strated. Nor do we need to consider anatomy and physiology in order
to see how the behavior of the individual is changed by his exposure
to contingencies of reinforcement during his life-time and how as a
result he behaves in a given way on a given occasion [emphasis
added]. I must confess to a predilection here for my own specialty, the
experimental analysis of behavior, which is a quite explicit investi-
gation of the effects upon individual organisms of extremely complex
and subtle contingencies of reinforcement. (Skinner, 1975, pp. 42 43)
This passage brings up two characteristics of Skinners philos-
ophy of science: the notion of explanation as description of func-
tional relations between variables (Skinner, 1947/1961a, 1931/
1961c, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a, 1966b), and prediction and control
being the criteria for evaluating explanations (Skinner, 1953/1965,
1938/1966a). Behavior analysis studies functional relations be-
tween environmental events (antecedent and consequent) and the
actions of the organism, that is, contingencies of selection. The
knowledge produced by this analysis allows behavior scientists to
predict and control their subject matter with reasonable accuracy.
Thus, neurophysiological processes that occur within the body
while they are interacting with the environment would not be
relevant if our goal is to predict and control behavior:
The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they
are not relevant in a functional analysis [emphasis added]. . . . Unless
there is a weak spot in our causal chain so that the second link is not
lawfully determined by the first, or the third by the second, then the
first and third links must be lawfully related. If we must always go
back beyond the second link for prediction and control, we may avoid
many tiresome and exhausting digressions by examining the third link
as a function of the first. Valid information about the second link may
throw light upon this relationship but can in no way alter it. (Skinner,
1953/1965, p. 35)
Skinner seems to be applying the logical rule of transitivity
(Salmon, 1984/1993) on causal relationships: If Event A causes
Event B, and Event B causes Event C, then A causes C. Putting in
the language of Skinners causal chain: If environmental contin-
gencies (Event A) cause certain changes in the organisms neuro-
physiological configuration (Event B) and such neurophysiologi-
cal changes result in a given behavioral pattern (Event C), then,
assuming that there is an orderly relation between these events,
environmental contingencies are ultimately responsible for the
behavior pattern. Summarizing Skinner (1969b), we can predict
and control behavior without knowing how our dependent and
independent variables are connected (p. 60). However, the pos-
ZILIO
sibility of explaining behavior based only on functional relations
between events studied by behavior analysis does not imply that
such an explanation is complete. It is not, and Skinner (1989b) was
aware of this fact: We can predict and control behavior without
knowing anything about what is happening inside. A complete
account will nevertheless require the joint action of both sciences,
each with its own instruments and methods (p. 130).
Complementing the idea that neuroscience is not necessary to
predict and control behavior, Skinner argued that the difficulties in
accessing neurophysiological events directly makes it impossible
to predict and control behavior through their manipulation. In his
words,
Physiology and, particularly with respect to behavior, neurology, have
of course made great progress. Electrical and chemical properties of
many neural activities are now directly observed and measured. The
nervous system is, however, much less accessible than behavior and
environment, and the difference takes its toll. We know some of the
processes which affect large blocks of behaviorsensory, motor,
motivational, and emotional but we are still far short of knowing
precisely what is happening when, say, a child learns to drink from a
cup, to call an object by its name, or to find the right piece of a jigsaw
puzzle, as we are still far short of making changes in the nervous
system as a result of which a child will do these things. It is possible
that we shall never directly observe what is happening in the nervous
system at the time a response occurs, because something like the
Heisenberg principle may apply: any means of observing neural
mediation of behavior may disturb the behavior. (Skinner, 1974, pp.
213214)
In quantum physics, Heisenbergs uncertainty principle asserts
that in order to predict the position and velocity of a particle
at time t2, it is necessary to know its position and velocity at time
t1. The problem is that it is not possible to measure the velocity
and the position of the particle at time t1 simultaneously. The
experimental manipulation necessary to observe the particles ve-
locity with a certain degree of accuracy would decrease the accu-
racy of observing that same particles position and vice versa. For
Skinner, an analogous situation occurs with behavioral and neu-
rophysiological events. Applying the logic of the uncertainty prin-
ciple to behavior: To predict the action of the organism at time t2,
it is necessary to know the history of its interaction with the
environment or its brain state at time t1. Behavior analysis pro-
vides knowledge of an organisms history, and by doing so, it
gives us probabilistic indications about how the organism might
behave at t2 without needing any kind of manipulation at t1.
Neuroscience, in contrast, can provide knowledge of organisms
current brain state at time t1. However, to get this information, one
must manipulate the organism, which can influence the very oc-
currence of the behavior under study. In other words, it is impos-
sible to measure simultaneously the neurophysiological events
mediating a specific behavioral relation without affecting the be-
havioral relation itself in the process.
Finally, Skinner also argues that neuroscience does not add
anything new to behavioral explanations (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p.
424; 1969b, p. 63; 1980, p. 307; 1988, pp. 184, 470; 1989c, p. 18).
For instance, the following quotations illustrate this idea:
The point at issue is not the possibility of successful correlation but its
significance. Although the discovery of a lesion may be of first
importance for diagnostic or prognostic purposes, a description of the
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE
phenomena of aphasia, in their relation to normal verbal behavior, is
aided very slightly if at all by this added knowledge [emphasis added].
It is wholly a matter of the interests of the investigator, whether he
makes this excursion into the nervous system. (Skinner, 1938/1966a,
p. 424)
A machine which simulated human behavior in detail would indeed
tell us the Inside Story. We should have only to look at the blueprints
to see what entered into the creation of man. Like the Inside Story of
physiology, however, it would tell us nothing new about behavior
[emphasis added]. Only when we know what a man actually does can
we adequately simulate his behavior. The Outside Story must be told
first. (Skinner, 1969b, p. 63)
If sleep is a kind of behavior or even the absence of behaviorthen
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has physiology told us something we didnt know? Only by ampli-
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fication. REM is observed behavior. So are reports of dreaming.
Electroencephalo-grams are physiology. Do they throw any light on
the behavior? Not on any explanatory mechanism [emphasis added].
Not on any bridging of past experience with current action. (Skinner,
1980, p. 307)
We now know much more about the chemistry and the architecture of
the nervous system, but I believe it is still true, as I said in 1938 in The
Behavior of Organisms, that no fact about the nervous system has yet
told us anything new about behavior [emphasis added]. It has, of
course, told us much that is new about the relation between the
nervous system and behavior and has indicated things to be done to
the nervous system to change behavior. We have not yet learned
anything about the behavior of an organism in an experimental space
from its physiology [emphasis added]. (Skinner, 1988, p. 470)
Presenting these quotes together serves to highlight the fact that
Skinner remained relentless in his position over the years. In the
1930s, he argued that eventual discoveries about the correlation
between behavioral relations and neural lesions, as in aphasia
studies, would not be relevant to understanding the behavioral
processes itself. We would know that a behavioral problem had a
physical causea brain lesion but this does not provide any
information about the behavioral functions affected by the lesion
or the fortuitous behavioral patterns that might emerge as a result
of it. To understand, for example, aphasia as a verbal behavior, we
should study the behavior of aphasics and not the lesions in their
brains. A similar idea was presented in the early 1980s, when
Skinner discussed the role of the electroencephalographic expla-
nation of sleep, which tells us nothing about sleeping as a behav-
ior.
By the late 1960s, Skinner had put the neuroscience and the
computational cognitive science side by side in his criticisms. He
contrasted the internal and external histories in the explanation of
behavior. The knowledge of neurophysiological mechanisms (i.e.,
internal history) could serve as a basis for building machines that
would accurately simulate the behavior of organisms. But this
knowledge would not tell us anything new about the behavior
itself. The explanation of behavior should focus on organisms
history of interaction with its environment (i.e., external history).
Moreover, we could say that the machine built would actually be
simulating human behavior only if we knew how humans behave.
Thus, the external history, or behavioral explanation, must precede
the internal history, that is, the neurophysiological explanation, to
be able to make sense of it.
161
Finally, in the late 1980s, Skinner reiterated his position pre-
sented 50 years earlier: No fact about brain function presents any
new information about behavioral principles. Skinners conclusion
is a direct consequence of the argument with which I began this
article: Behavior analysis and the neuroscience have different
subject matters. If this is the case, then it is to be expected that
nothing we can learn about the one will tell us anything about the
other. In short, to understand behavior, we must study behavior,
and to understand the brain, we must study the brain. However, to
understand the relations between brain and behavior, we must
collect data from both sciences.
Concepts and Philosophy of Science
The thesis that behavior analysis and neuroscience have distinct
subject matters probably had its origin on Skinners (1931/1961c)
historical analysis of the reflex concept. Skinner found that the
term reflex always figured in physiological studies, and the very
justification for its use indicated the influence of physiology: A
stimulus causes a disturbance in the organism, which, in turn,
passes through the central nervous system to finally be reflected
in the muscles (Skinner, 1953/1965, 1938/1966a). Because for
Skinner (1931/1961c), reflex was the appropriate concept to de-
scribe behavioral relations, here we find one more justification in
favor of the thesis that behavior should be considered as an object
of study in itself, apart from neurophysiological events. The prob-
lem is that a great deal of physiological research was actually
dealing only with correlations between stimuli and responses. The
nervous system appeared only as a conceptual apparatus inferred
from these relations (Skinner, 1931/1961c, 1938/1966a, 1975).
The relevance of the relational definition of reflex for the inde-
pendence of behavior analysis is manifest, because it was the
starting point for definitions of other behavioral phenomena free
from physiological references. Skinner (1931/1961c) made the
following comment on this subject:
The paper argued for the solid status of behavioral facts apart from
imagined physiological counterparts. An important point is that op-
erational definitions are suggested not only for reflex, but for drive,
emotion, conditioning and other terms appropriate to the intact organ-
ism. (p. 319)
Having different subject matters of analysis meant, for Skinner
(1935/1961f, p. 365; 1947/1961a, pp. 232233; 1938/1966a, pp.
428 429), that behavior analysis and neuroscience were on dis-
tinct levels of analysis. Therefore, behavior analysis and neurosci-
ence demands concepts proper to their subject matters and level of
analysis (Skinner, 1950, p. 193; 1959/1961e, p. 253; 1974, pp.
232233). This is what Skinner seems to suggest when he says
more than once that behavior must be studied on its own terms
(Skinner, 1956, p. 223; 1957/1961b, p. 195; 1959/1961e, pp.
253254; 1938/1966a, pp. 440 441; 1986b, p. 208 209; 1988,
pp. 460 461; 1989a, p. 56; 1989b, p. 122; 1993, p. 3; 1980/1998,
p. 295). Skinner (1947/1961a) develops this point in the following
passage:
The appeal to what we may call naive physiologizing, like the appeal
to psychic determiners, is made in an attempt to explain behavior by
shifting to a different level of observation [emphasis added]. These are
outside theories, which account for one thing by pointing to some-
thing which is going on somewhere else at the same time. For this
 162
reason they cannot fill the need for a theory of behavior [emphasis
added], no matter how carefully they may be extended or repaired.
What is emerging in psychology, as it has emerged at some point in
the history of most sciences, is a theory which refers to facts at a
single level of observation [emphasis added]. The logic of this is
simple enough. We begin with behavior as a subject matter and
devise an appropriate vocabulary [emphasis added]. We express the
basic protocol facts of the science in the terms of this vocabulary. In
the course of constructing a theory we may invent new terms, but they
will not be invented to describe any new sort of fact. At no time will
the theory generate terms which refer to a different subject matter
[emphasis added], to mental states, for example, or neurones [empha-
sis added]. It is not the purpose of such a theory to explain behavior
by turning to outside determiners. (pp. 232233)
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Simply put, to say that behavior analysis and the neuroscience
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are at different levels of analysis is equal to saying that both are
interested in distinct variables. Remembering the causal chain
proposed by Skinner mentioned earlier in this article: environmen-
tal events (Variable 1) affect the organism by causing physiolog-
ical changes (Variable 2); those changes eventually lead to actions
(Variable 3), which, in turn, are responsible for modifying the
environment (Variable 4). Behavior analysis is interested in Vari-
ables 1, 3, and 4, whereas neuroscience deals with Variable 2.
Scientific concepts are abstractions established through functional
relations between scientists verbal responses (the terms used by
them) and the conditions that establish the occasion in which they
occur (Skinner, 1945, 1957). It is a verbal relation called tact.
For Skinner (1957), tact may be defined as a verbal operant in
which a response of given form is evoked (or at least strengthened)
by a particular object or event or property of an object or event (p.
82). In other words, tact is the verbal operant that has objects or
events as discriminative stimuli. Concepts are extensions of tact
known as abstractions. Again, with Skinner (1957), any property
of a stimulus present when a verbal response is reinforced acquires
some degree of control over that response, and this control con-
tinues to be exerted when the property appears in other combina-
tions (p. 107). Thus, for example, the concept of reflex is used to
indicate the functional relation observed between stimuli and re-
sponses. There are endless combinations of stimuli and responses
that can be classified as reflex, but all of them must have at least
one thing in common: They must be functionally related. Scientists
can observe stimuli of various intensities, forms, and durations,
and responses of various magnitudes and topographies, but if
stimuli and responses are functionally related, then the concept of
reflex applies. However, because behavior analysis and neurosci-
ence focus their research on different variables, the events that
establish the occasion for tact responses and, consequently, pro-
vide the bases for the proposition of concepts are distinct. As a
result, behavioral concepts relate only to behavioral events and
neurophysiological concepts refer only to neurophysiological
events. Finally, in his definition of explanation, Skinner (1931/
1961c) adopts a Machian point of view (cf. Marr, 2003) by stating
that behavior analysis must describe the event not only for itself
but in its relation to other events; and, in point of satisfaction, it
must explain (p. 337). As I said earlier, to explain is to describe
functional relations between variables that are subject matters in a
given science (Skinner, 1947/1961a, 1931/1961c, 1953/1965,
1938/1966a, 1966b). Based on those considerations, Skinners
logic goes as follows: (a) behavior analysis and neuroscience have
ZILIO
different subject matters; (b) consequently, they are at different
levels of analysis; (c) by being on different levels, their concepts
refer to distinct events; (d) given the fact that to explain is to
describe functional relations between events, neuroscientific ex-
planations and their concepts say nothing about behavior because
they relate to events other than the behavior itself. As a conse-
quence, a behavioral science with its own vocabulary composed by
concepts derived solely from behavioral events and that explains
behavior by taking into account the contingencies of selection,
seems to be a welcome endeavor. The fact that they have distinct
subject matters adds to the idea that behavior analysis and neuro-
science act on different levels of analysis and that their concepts
must refer to events that constitute their specific levels of analysis.
Here we find another argument in favor of the independence of
behavior analysis from the neuroscience. According to Skinner
(1938/1966a),
The first of these is hygienic. A definition of terms in a science of
behavior at its own level offers the tremendous advantage of keeping
the investigator aware of what he knows and of what he does not
know. The use of terms with neural references when the observations
upon which they are based are behavioral is misleading. An entirely
erroneous conception of the actual state of knowledge is set up. (pp.
426 427)
Adhering to behavioral concepts in the explanation of behavior
is advantageous because it keeps the scientists explanation con-
cise, without references to events that are not part of the behav-
ioral universe (Skinner, 1938/1966a, pp. 426 427; 1966b, p.
217). Furthermore, using neurophysiological concepts in the ex-
planation of behavior may generate an illusion of explanation,
blurring the line between what we know and think we know about
behavior.
There is still another argument related to these ideas that seems
to justify an autonomous science of behavior: For Skinner, the
facts of behavior analysis would be insulated from the facts of
neuroscience (1959/1961e, p. 253; 1953/1965, pp. 35, 54; Skinner,
1938/1966a, p. 432; 1969b, p. 60; 1974, pp. 214 215; 1975, p. 43;
1988, p. 128; 1989c, p. 18). This relates to the idea, presented in
the previous section, that neuroscience would not add anything
new to a behavioral explanation. If neuroscience has nothing to say
in the context of behavioral explanations, then the laws, concepts,
and theories that comprise those explanations would remain un-
changed despite the advances and new findings in neuroscience.
This is so because the concepts, laws, and theories presented in
behavioral explanations refer only to events that constitute the
behavioral level of analysis. This seems to be Skinners (1989c)
conclusion: The analysis of behavior need not wait until brain
scientists have done their part. The behavioral facts will not be
changed, and they suffice for both a science and a technology
(p. 18).
The last argument of this section is perhaps one of the most
important presented by Skinner: To have an autonomous science
of behavior is paramount because behavior analysis is responsible
for establishing neurosciences research agenda, it informs the
neuroscientist what to look for in the nervous system, or it gives
meaning to neurophysiological processes (Skinner, 1935/1961f, p.
365; 1938/1966a, pp. 422, 429; 1969b, pp. 60, 63; 1974, pp.
210 211; 1975, p. 43; 1980, p. 341; 1983a, p. 367; 1985, p. 297;
1986c, p. 235; 1988, pp. 60, 128, 245, 470; 1989c, p. 18; 1993, pp.
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE
3 4). Behind this argument is Skinners idea that behavioral
concepts precede neurophysiological concepts. He made this point
clear when discussing the construction of reflex arc concept:
We may note . . . that the description of a reflex in functional terms
(as a correlation of stimulus and response) is always prior to the
description of its arc. In any available procedure the anatomical
inference must always be drawn from an experiment in which the
integrity of a function is critical. (1931/1961c, p. 333)
The definition of reflex as a functional relation between stimuli
and responses always precedes the delimitation of its physiological
correlateits arc. It is possible to generalize the argument to any
behavioral relation: The specific contingencies that make them
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unique will always precede the delimitation of its neurophysiolog-
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ical correlates. The argument is robust and simple: In order to
understand the neurophysiological processes related to a given
behavioral relation, it is necessary to first understand and have a
clear definition of the behavioral relation. It is precisely for that
reason that behavior analysis would present to neuroscience its
research agenda: It establishes the behavioral parameters that
guide the search for neurophysiological correlates of behavior.
Skinner presented this idea several times along his career:
What is generally not understood by those interested in estab-lishing
neurological bases is that a rigorous description at the level of
behavior is necessary for the demonstration of a neurological corre-
late [emphasis added]. The discovery of neurological facts may pro-
ceed independently of a science of behavior if the facts are directly
observed as structural and functional changes in tissue, but before
such a fact may be shown to account for a fact of behavior, both must
be quantitatively described and shown to correspond in all their
properties. (Skinner, 1938/1966a, p. 422)
This passage indicates that only an analysis of behavioral vari-
ables provides the appropriate parameters for searching the neu-
rophysiological correlates of behavior. Skinner also argues that
both sciences have autonomy. Although a behavioral science in-
dependent of neuroscience is possible, a neuroscience independent
of behavior analysis is possible as well. In this case, Skinner seems
to suggest that such science would be interested in neurophysio-
logical mechanisms as an end in itself. The problem emerges if
neuroscience wants to go a step further and try to understand the
correlations between neurophysiological mechanisms and behav-
ior. At this moment enters behavior analysis. Continuing with
Skinners comments on the subject,
It is often implied that behavior cannot be adequately de-scribed until
more is known about the nervous system. A science of behavior is
called highly phenomenological and is said to show a studied
indifference to brain mechanismsto what is inside the black box.
But we cannot say that what goes on inside is an adequate explanation
until we know what the black box does. A behavioral analysis is
es-sentially a statement of the facts to be explained by studying the
nervous system [emphasis added]. It tells the physiologist what to look
for. (Skinner, 1969b, p. 60)
Skinner argues just the opposite that is normally said (at least
according to him) about the necessity of neuroscience to validate
a science of behavior: It is impossible to know the function of
neurophysiological mechanisms and its relation to behavior until
we know exactly the relevant behavioral facts. It is inconceivable,
163
for example, to search for the neurophysiological mechanisms
related to operant learning without having clear knowledge of
behavioral facts on operant relations. Skinner (1986c) concluded,
I think the experimental analysis of behavior can best proceed as it
started, until the control of the behavior of an organism in an exper-
imental space is very nearly total. A science of behavior will then have
given neurology its clearest assignment [emphasis added]. (p. 235)
Practical Issues
In this section, I address some arguments that, although related,
are not necessarily conceptual and/or philosophical. These argu-
ments are practical in the sense of indicating the practical
advantages of establishing an independent science of behavior.
First, if we accept the autonomy of behavior analysis, the next
logical step is the division of labor between behavior analysis and
neuroscience: Each science would be in charge of answering
different but complementary questions about behavior (Skinner,
1935/1961f, p. 365; 1956/1961g, p. 214; 1983b, p. 15; 1985, p.
295; 1990a, p. 1208). As Skinner wrote (1985), How organisms
are changed by contingencies of reinforcement is the field of a
behavioral analysis. What is happening inside is a question to be
answered by neurology, with its appropriate instruments and meth-
ods (p. 295). Moreover, the chances of faster progress in both
areas are greater if the autonomy is accepted. The argument is
simple: If each discovery about behavior is followed by the pursuit
of its neurophysiological correlates, behavioral research will stop
after each behavioral discovery (Skinner, 1938/1966a, pp. 427
428, 429; 1979, pp. 166 167; 1989c, p. 18). This seems to be
Skinners (1979) idea:
The argument against physiology is simply that we should get more
done in the field of behavior if we confined ourselves to be-havior.
When we rid ourselves of the delusion that we are getting down to
fundamentals when we get into physiology, then the young man who
discovers some fact of behavior will not immediately go after the
physiological correlates but will go on discovering other facts of
behavior. (pp. 166 167)
Finally, the last practical justification for the autonomy is that
behavior analysis provides technological and experimental back-
ground for neuroscience research (Skinner, 1956/1961g, p. 203;
1957/1961b, p. 197; 1957/1961d, p. 122; 1963b, p. 514; 1988, p.
128). Again, with Skinner,
The extent of the prediction and control which has been achieved is
evident not only in smoothness of curves and uniformity of results
from individual to individual or even species to species, but in the
practical uses which are already being made of the techniques for
example, in providing baselines for the study of pharmacological and
neurological variables [emphasis added], or in converting a lower
organism into a sensitive psychophysical observer. (Skinner, 1956/
1961g, p. 203)
Another field in which important variables affecting behavior are
studied is neurology. Performances under various schedules of rein-
forcement supply baselines which are as useful here [emphasis added]
as in the field of psychopharmacology. The classical pattern of re-
search is to establish a performance containing features of interest,
then to remove or damage part of the nervous system, and later to have
another look at the behavior. The damaged performance shows the
 164 ZILIO

Table 2
Skinners Arguments for the Autonomy of Behavior Analysis From Neuroscience

Categories Arguments Texts

1. Definition of 1.1 Distinct objects of study Skinner (1938/1966a, 1959/1961e, 1969b, 1986a, 1989a, 1989c, 1990a)
the subject 1.2 Behavior analysis: variation and selection Skinner (1990a)
matter 1.3 Different goals and techniques Skinner (1931/1961c, 1956/1961g, 1957/1961d, 1959/1961e, 1983a,
1985, 1986a, 1987, 1989a, 1989c, 1989d)
2. Explanation of 2.1 A science of behavior is possible Skinner (1938/1966a, 1959/1961e)
behavior 2.2 Knowledge of the nervous system is deficient Skinner (1938/1966a, 1946, 1954, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1984, 1987, 1988)
2.3 Neuroscience does not provide a simpler explanation Skinner (1938/1966a, 1956/1961g)
2.4 Prediction and control through neuroscience Skinner (1953/1965, 1974)
2.5 Neuroscience does not explain the origins of Skinner (1957, 1959/1961e, 1971, 1983a, 1988, 1989c, 1989d, 1990a,
behavior 1990b, 1993)
2.6 Neuroscience is not relevant or necessary to the Skinner (1933, 1953/1965, 1969b, 1975, 1988, 1989b)
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explanation of behavior
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2.7 Uncertainty principle and the manipulation of Skinner (1974)

brain
2.8 No fact about the nervous system adds anything new Skinner (1938/1966a, 1969b, 1980, 1988, 1989c)
about behavior
3. Concepts and 3.1 The analysis of reflex concept Skinner (1931/1961c, 1938/1966a, 1953/1965, 1975)
philosophy of 3.2 Different levels of analysis Skinner (1935/1961f, 1938/1966a, 1947/1961a)
science 3.3 Behavior should be studied by its own terms Skinner (1938/1966a, 1950, 1956, 1957/1961b, 1959/1961e, 1974, 1980/
1998, 1986b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1993)
3.4 Advantages of using only behavioral concepts and Skinner (1938/1966a, 1966b)
theories
3.5 Behavioral facts are immune to neurological facts Skinner (1938/1966a, 1953/1965, 1959/1961e, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1988,
1989c)
3.6 Behavior analysis establishes the research program Skinner (1935/1961f, 1938/1966a, 1969b, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1983a,
of neuroscience 1985, 1986c, 1988, 1989c, 1993)
4. Practical issues 4.1 Division of labor Skinner (1935/1961f, 1956/1961g, 1983b, 1985, 1990a)
4.2 Faster progress in both sciences Skinner (1938/1966a, 1979, 1989c)
4.3 Behavior analysis provides support for neuroscience Skinner (1956/1961g, 1957/1961b, 1957/1961d, 1963b, 1988)

effect of the lesion and helps in inferring the contribution of the area
to normal behavior. (Skinner, 1957/1961d, p. 122)
The techniques and experimental designs of behavior analysis
provide baselines of behavioral patterns stable enough to be used
as a parameter in experiments that involves neurophysiological
manipulations. Research that employs brain lesions or administra-
tion of drugs, for example, would be less informative if there were
not a behavioral technology that provides satisfactory degree of
control of behavior in experimental contexts. Skinner (1988) syn-
thesizes the argument as follows: The use of operant techniques,
in the brain science laboratory is the best demonstration I can offer
of the contribution of an independent science of behavior in
making the task of brain science clear (p. 128).
Against Strong Autonomy
Table 2 contains all Skinners justifications for the autonomy of
behavior analysis, divided into categories as well as the texts in
which he presented his arguments. It is clear that Skinner presented
arguments for the autonomy of behavior analysis during his entire
career. It was, as he said, a crusade for the declaration of inde-
pendency of behavior analysis from neuroscience (Skinner, 1980/
1998, p. 295).
The first thing to notice is that substantial part of his arguments
remained constant along his entire career, indicating that his po-
sition did not change over time even with the advances in neuro-
science during this period. The second point worth notice is that at
least part of Skinners arguments seems to support the strong kind
of autonomy, according to which behavior analysis and neurosci-
ence would be fully independent scientific endeavors, and, as a
consequence, their subject matters, explanations, and theories
would be insulated from one another. This seems to be, for
instance, the position defended by Reese (1996): Real physiology
has so far not helped behavior analysts to explain the behavioral
phenomena they study. Therefore, ignoring physiological pro-
cesses seems unlikely to be an obstacle to progress in behavior
analysis (p. 68). In this section, I argue that Skinners arguments
that may support strong autonomy are quite fragile. As a conse-
quence, they can be easily disregarded as valid points in defense of
strong autonomy.
To start, some of Skinners arguments are simply outdated; they
do not quite capture the current zeitgeist among sciences and
scientists dedicated to the study of brain and behavior (Craver,
2007; Kandel, Markram, Matthews, Yuste, & Koch, 2013; Wilson,
1999). The following arguments fall in this category: division of
labor (4.1 in Table 2), faster progress in both sciences (4.2),
different goals and techniques (1.3), behavior analysis provides
support for neuroscience (4.3), and behavior analysis establishes
the research program of neuroscience (3.6). Division of labor is
still a good strategy if it means different sciences studying differ-
ent variables related to the production of a phenomenon (cf.
Craver, 2007). The problem is to transform an arbitrary division
into a qualitative distinction between different domains of inquire
and to use this distinction as justification for neglecting the work
done in other areas of research. In addition, science is becoming
more and more an interdisciplinary endeavor, particularly among
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE
sciences that aim is to understand behavior. Boundaries and divi-
sions are being dismantled. It is common to see psychologists,
biologists, neuroscientists, physicists, chemists, computer scien-
tists, engineers, and philosophers doing research together with one
common goal: to understand behavior. The rule is not division of
labor anymore, but collaborative and conjoint work.
It is wrong to assume that behavior analysis and neuroscience
have different goals. Both fields are interested in how behavior
works. The difference is that these fields focus on different aspects
(contingencies and neurophysiological mechanisms) that are both
necessary for the production of the phenomena. In addition, the
argument that behavior analysis provides technological and exper-
imental support for neuroscience, and that it establishes neurosci-
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ences research program, can go both ways: It is valid for behavior
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analysis, as Skinner said, but technologies and experimental pro-
cedures related to the study of physiological events as independent
variables can be used to support behavior analysis as well. Black-
man and Pellon (1993) and Branch (2006), for instance, made a
strong case for the importance of using pharmacological tech-
niques and manipulations in the study of behavior. According to
Branch, research in behavioral pharmacology has implications
not only for issues surrounding behavioral effects of drugs, but it
can have significance for the understanding of behavior in general
(p. 421). A good example of this is Lubinski and Thompsons
(1987, 1993) experimental model for studying private events in
which the discriminative function of the effects produced by
different substances played an essential part in controlling discrim-
inative behavior of rats. Perhaps closer to neuroscience than be-
havioral pharmacology, techniques used in cellular and molecular
neuroscience are another suitable example, such as in vitro rein-
forcement (Stein, 1997; Stein, Xue, & Belluzzi, 1993, 1994) and
preparations that use simplified neuronal circuits in order to un-
derstand the physiological processes related to operant and respon-
dent learning (Baxter & Byrne, 2006; Brembs, Baxter, & Byrne,
2004; Lorenzetti, Mozzachiodi, Baxter, & Byrne, 2006; Mozzach-
iodi & Byrne, 2010; Mozzachiodi, Lorenzetti, Baxter, & Byrne,
2008). As I will argue, all this results in new neuroscientific
findings that can pose new experimental and conceptual questions
for behavior analysis (Zilio, 2013). This last point leads us to
Skinners arguments for the independence of behavior analysis
that have intrinsic problems.
Skinner explicitly said that neuroscience is not relevant or
necessary in the explanation of behavior (2.6), that no fact about
the nervous system adds anything new about behavior (2.8), and
that behavioral facts are insulated from neurophysiological facts
(3.5). Elsewhere I argued that this is true only in a very restrictive
sense (Zilio, 2013). Behavioral laws (such as Matching Law or
Law of Effect) will not be changed by neurophysiological facts
because these laws are generic descriptions of observed regulari-
ties between behavioral variables (environmental and related to the
actions of organisms), not physiological ones (Skinner, 1945,
1957; see also Lee, 1985; Moore, 2008). Therefore, physiological
events do not control the verbal behavior related to the proposition
of behavioral laws. Neuroscience will not change behavioral laws
because those laws have nothing to do with neurophysiology.
Nevertheless, neuroscience can contribute to the explanation of
behavior by exposing physiological mechanisms related to it.
Neuroscience can influence the way we think about behavioral
concepts and theories by bringing into discussion data that we
165
could not possible gather by behavior analysis alone (Zilio, 2013).
The molecular and cellular studies mentioned earlier on neuro-
physiological mechanisms of operant and respondent learning is,
again, a perfect example. Based on those studies, Donahoe and
colleagues (Donahoe, Burgos, & Palmer, 1993; Donahoe &
Palmer, 1994; Donahoe, Palmer, & Burgos, 1997a, 1997b) pro-
posed a unified principle of reinforcement, according to which
operant and respondent relations are viewed as products of the
same selection mechanism associated with changes in synaptic
efficacy. According to Donahoe et al. (1993),
cellular research has shown that the introduction of dopamine into
synapses immediately after a postsynaptic neuron has been activated
by a presynaptic neuron produces long-lasting changes in synaptic
efficacies. That is, the ability of the presynaptic neuron to initiate
activity in the postsynaptic neuron is increased. (p. 24)
However, the same kind of molecular and cellular neurophysi-
ological experiments that supported the unified principle of rein-
forcement can also be used to discuss its validity. For instance,
experiments done with Aplysia have shown that respondent and
operant learning have different neurophysiological mechanisms
related not only to changes in synaptic efficacy but also to changes
in excitability of neurons (Lorenzetti et al., 2006; Mozzachiodi &
Byrne, 2010; for a detailed analysis on this topic, see Zilio, 2013).
The main point I make here is that neuroscience can influence
theories and concepts about behaviorit can influence the behav-
ioral principles but not the behavioral laws as defined here.
Behavior analysis is not insulated or autonomous from neurosci-
ence in any strong sense of these words, and this is a good thing
because it shows that we are within the domain of natural sciences,
in which there is no real separation between objects of study
besides artificial ones proposed solely for convenience. Bunges
(1990) thoughts on the autonomy of psychology in general can
easily be applied to the particular case of behavior analysis:
A fully autonomous discipline cannot be part of the system of the
sciences, since these constitute a system by virtue of their partial
overlapping and their interactions. Of course some division of labor is
necessary, but such division should not be carried to the extreme of
isolating the various sciences, if only because every division of
scientific work is largely conventional. . . . The isolation of a disci-
pline from the total system of the sciences is a reliable indicator of its
nonscientific character. (p. 126)
Skinner would probably agree with Bunge, as he defended,
more than once, that behavior analysis is part of biological sci-
ences (e.g., Skinner, 1956/1961g, p. 206; 1963a, p. 951; 1975, p.
42): The experimental analysis of behavior is a rigorous, exten-
sive, and rapidly expanding branch of biology (Skinner, 1974, p.
231). This may be viewed as contradicting Skinners discourse for
the autonomy of behavior analysis. After all, if behavior analysis
is a branch of biological sciences, then it is not an autonomous
endeavor in the sense of strong autonomy defined in the begin-
ning of this article.
Another potentially problematic justification used by Skinner is
the one about behavior analysis being the science of variation and
selection, both processes not allegedly studied by neuroscience
(1.2). The problem lies in the implication that behavior analysis
(along with ethology and part of anthropology) is the only science
concerned with variation and selection of behavior. After all, it is
 166 ZILIO
not possible to understand selection and variation processes with-
out knowing the underlying physiological mechanisms. Behavioral
contingencies are only part of what constitutes the process of
selection of behavior. No enduring selection can occur without
retention, that is, physiological modification (Donahoe & Palmer,
1994). What modifications those would be is a question addressed
to neuroscience. The aforementioned example of molecular and
cellular researches on neurophysiological mechanisms of operant
and respondent learning applies here as well, because hypotheses
about how selection of behavior occurs (as the unified principle
of reinforcement) are largely informed by neuroscientific data. In
addition, variation in patterns of behavior can occur as a function
of behavioral contingencies (Neuringer, 2004), but it also can
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occur as a function of brain processes alone. There is a branch of
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neuroscience, for example, dedicated to the study of stochastic
processes in brain and its function in controlling behavioral vari-
ability on contingencies that involves decision making (Glimcher,
2005; Maye, Hsieh, Sugihara, & Brembs, 2007). In other words,
both behavior analysis and neuroscience are fields interested in the
study of variation and selection of behavior. However, these fields
have their focus on different aspects of the phenomena.
Skinner also defended that neuroscience does not provide a
simpler explanation of behavior (2.3), and that neuroscience does
not explain the origins of behavior (2.5). The problem in both
arguments is in the definition of simplicity and origin. What is exactly what Kogan et al. found. Compared with the control group
a simple explanation? Neither behavior analysis nor neuroscience
is simple. An explanation based on the history of contingencies of
reinforcement is simpler than one based on how the mechanisms
in a specific part of the brain works? How is this so? It is the same
thing with the origin of behavior. Where is the origin of behav-
ior? Can we point to a place or a moment in the behavioral flux and
say there is it: the origin of behavior X? This is nonsense. As
Skinner (1953/1965) himself defended, we are dealing with a
process in constant fluxa succession of interrelated environmen-
tal, behavioral, and physiological events. All of them have some
place in the explanation of behavior X. Skinner (1953/1965) sug-
gested that we could follow the causal sequence backward until
we reach the environment events related to behavior, and so doing,
we could put aside the intermediary physiological events in our
explanations. This is true, but this does not mean that the origin is
there. We can continue to follow the causal sequence until we get
inside the organism again, and then get outside one more time, and
then inside again, ad infinitum. Contingencies related to the history
of organisms (normally, recent history) is just the point at which
Skinner and, for that matter, behavior analysts chose to stop in
their analysis of behavior.
Skinner also presented justifications for the autonomy of behav-
ior analysis that are dependent on technological and empirical
matters: knowledge of nervous system is deficient (2.2), prediction
and control of behavior through neuroscience (2.4), and the un-
certainty principle and the manipulation of brain events (2.7). Of
course, our knowledge about the nervous system is not complete,
but it is not deficient either. We do not know everything about the
brain (as we do not know everything about behavior), but the
possibility of prediction and control of behavior through the anal-
ysis and manipulation of neurophysiological events are a reality
today. One interesting example, among many others easily found
in the specialized literature, is Kogan, Frankland, and Silvas
(2000) research on neural mechanisms related to social recognition
on mice (also used by Bickle, 2007, 2008, in his defense of
reductionism of psychology to neuroscience). It is said that one
mouse recognizes or remembers another when, as a result of
a previous contact with it, it expends less time engaged in inves-
tigative behaviors (mostly olfactory responses) directed toward its
conspecifics. The procedure to measure the recognition usually
involves a first session of exposure to conspecifics and a second
session of exposure after a preestablished time interval. As a result,
subjects expend less time during the second exposure session
investigating conspecifics that they contacted before during the
first session, which indicates (indirectly, at least) that they rec-
ognized them. Knowing that social recognition learning depends
on changes in synaptic efficacy in hippocampal neurons, Kogan et
al. (2000) used the mutant mice CREB as subjects in this
particular experiment. Those mice lack and isoforms of the
cAMP response element-binding (CREB) in hippocampus. CREB
is a protein that modulates the transcription of genes responsible
for regulating the growth of neurons, a necessary step for the
increase in synaptic efficacy associated with long-term memory to
occur. The reasoning behind the experiment is quite simple: It is
known that hippocampus plays an important role in the retention
(memory) of social recognition behavior, so any kind of manip-
ulation that disrupts the functioning of hippocampus would prob-
ably have some effect on social recognition learning. That is
(nonmutant mice), the mutant mice group did not show any sign of
social recognition learning, which means that the time they expend
investigating it conspecifics during the second session of exposure
was not diminished due to the previous exposure. This happened
with large time intervals between first and second exposure ses-
sions (in this case, 24 hr), but not with smaller time intervals (in
this case, 30 min), which indicates that the disruption of CREB
affected only long-term memory (or retention), corroborating the
hypothesis that the hippocampus plays an important role in some
kinds of long-term memory. This conclusion was supported by
data on mutant mice groups as well as by data on groups of
subjects with hippocampal lesions and groups with subjects to
which protein synthesis inhibitors were administered (Kogan et al.,
2000).
However, the authors found that two groups of subjects pre-
sented similar behavior to the mutant mice group (or any of the
groups that passed through brain manipulation) in the social rec-
ognition task, except they did not suffer any kind of neurophysi-
ological manipulation. The difference was in their history. Sub-
jects from the mutant mice and control groups were group-housed
before the experiments occur, whereas the subjects of these two
other groups were individually housed: Subjects from one group
were isolated in individual cages for 3 weeks before the social
recognition task (chronic isolation), and subjects from the other
group were isolated in individual cages for 24 hr (acute isola-
tion). In both cases, the isolation had the same effect found in
mutant mice: Both mutant and isolated mice did not recognize
their conspecifics after long-term intervals between first- and
second-exposure sessions.
I chose to use this particular research as an example because it
clearly shows how it is possible to control and predict behavior
through manipulation and knowledge of neurophysiological pro-
cesses. Knowing that we are dealing with subjects with hippocam-
pal impairment is an important factor in predicting their behavior
 SKINNER, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCIENCE
during social recognition tasks. In other words, we can use infor-
mation about the brain to predict behavior. The possibility of
manipulation of brain in order to produce some kind of behavioral
pattern is also exemplified in Kogan et al.s (2000) research by the
administration of substances (protein synthesis inhibitor, anisomy-
cin, and saline), hippocampal lesions, and genetic manipulation.
Finally, this example is particularly interesting because here we
have a case in which neurophysiological manipulation and envi-
ronmental manipulation (history of isolation) produced the same
behavioral effect. Of course, this example involves very specific
and controlled situations, meaning we are very far away from
generalizations such as Every social behavior depends on hip-
pocampus activities or Its possible to control social behavior by
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controlling hippocampal process. Still, the same could be said of
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Skinners first experiments on operant condition summarized in
The Behavior of Organismsthe point being, Skinners criticisms
of the possibility of control and prediction of behavior through
neuroscience seem not to be sustainable anymore. Perhaps we are
reaching a moment that Skinner (1969b) himself anticipated:
In a more advanced account of a behaving organism historical
variables will be replaced by causal ones. When we can observe the
momentary state of an organism, we shall be able to use it, instead of
the history responsible for it, in predicting behavior. When we can
generate or change a state directly, we shall be able to use it to control
behavior. Neither the science nor the technology of behavior will then
vanish, however. Physiological manipulations will simply be added to
the armamentarium of the behavioral scientist. (p. 60)
Weak Autonomy Without Reduction
Nevertheless, Skinner also presented arguments that still remain
relevant for the defense of the autonomy between behavior anal-
ysis and neuroscience, although only in the weak sense of the
word. The following arguments fall into this category: a science of
behavior is possible (2.1); distinct object of study (1.1); the anal-
ysis of the reflex and, as consequence, the concept of behavior
(3.1); different level of analysis (3.2); behavior should be studied
by its own terms (3.3); and the advantages of using only behavioral
concepts, and theories (3.4). The core argument for the indepen-
dence of behavior analysis is the very definition of its subject
matter. By defining the subject matter of his behavioral science as
the relations between environmental events and the actions of
organisms, Skinner has extracted from it any reference to physi-
ology. Neurophysiological events do not define behavioral events.
Therefore, as was discussed earlier, we can say that both sciences
have different objects of study and are in different level of anal-
ysis, each one with its own terms, concepts, and theories. This does
not mean, however, that behavioral variables (i.e., the ones studied
in behavior analysis) are the only ones responsible for behavior.
Neurophysiological events are as necessary as contingencies in the
production of behavior. Here we find the core argument that
justifies the weak autonomy between behavior analysis and neu-
roscience.
Although the autonomy is not as robust as Skinner himself
seems sometimes to suggest (see previous section), we should not
be afraid of losing ground once the doors to neuroscience are open.
Neuroscience will not substitute behavior analysis, nor will it
reduce behavioral explanations to physiological explanations
(Marr & Zilio, 2013). It is not possible to reduce a behavioral
167
concept or explanation to a neurophysiological concept or expla-
nation. This endeavor does not make sense when we are dealing
with two scientific domains that have different subject matters. On
one side, we have behavior analysis, interested in the study of
contingencies of selection (the relations between environmental
events and the actions of organisms). On the other side, we have
neuroscience, interested in the study of physiological mechanisms
that mediates behavioral relations. Because behavior analysis and
neuroscience focus on different variables of study, the events that
set the occasion for scientists verbal behavior related to behav-
ioral and neurophyisiological explanations are distinct. In behavior
analysis, we find concepts like contingencies of selection, sched-
ules of reinforcement, discriminative stimuli, operant and respon-
dent responses, reinforcement and punishment, and so on. In
neuroscience, we find concepts like neural networks and circuits,
neurons, membranes, molecules, proteins, action potential, syn-
apse, neural plasticity, and so on. Purely behavioral explanations
refer only to the events studied in behavior analysis. Purely neu-
rophysiological explanations refer only the events studied in neu-
roscience. Reduction does not make any sense because those
explanations have different referents and it is not possible to derive
one for another (cf. Gold & Stoljar, 1999). How to reduce a
particular operant response to a particular neurophysiological ac-
tivity of motor cortex? How to reduce a specific consequence of
reinforcement (an environmental event) to a specific activity of
ventral tegmental area, a brain region assumed to be (at least in
part) responsible for the process of reinforcement at the neural
level through the modulation of the synaptic efficacy by the
liberation of dopamine (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994; Phillmore,
2008; Zilio, 2013)? In sum, how to reduce contingencies of selec-
tion to neurophysiological events?
The pursuit of reductionist explanations is only pertinent if some
kind of identity between subject matters at different levels of
analysis is assumed to exist. That is exactly the case of cognition
and brain, which is probably why the reductionist literature men-
tioned in the beginning of this article (Bickle, 2003; P. M. Church-
land, 1981, 1989; P. S. Churchland, 1986; Gazzaniga, 1998;
Hawkins & Kandel, 1984a, 1984b) focuses exclusively on the
relation between cognitive processes and brain processes and not
on behavioral processes (as defined in behavior analysis) and brain
processes. In Bechtels (2008) words, Underlying attempts to
localize cognitive operations in brain structures is the assumption
that there is an identity relation between particular mental mech-
anisms and neural mechanisms (p. 69). Defined as heuristic
identity theory, for Bechtel, this thesis can guide not only the
elaboration of the two perspectives [cognitive and neurophysio-
logical] which are linked by the identity claim, but it can use each
to revise the other (p. 71). One of the consequences of assuming
the identity between cognition and brain is the possibility of
reduction of cognitive processes or explanations to neurophysio-
logical processes or explanations. There is an ontological thesis
supporting the identity theory: Cognition is physical and it is
somehow related to brain function. Reductionism is a valid en-
deavor in this case because there is a synchronic relation between
cognition and brain. The main assumption is that something inside
the organism mediates behavior (usually defined in cognitive
literature only as observed effects of what happens inside the
organism, cf. Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Hineline, 1990)
something called cognition, which, in turn, is related to brain
 168
processes. Synchronic relation can be defined as the coexistence in
time of phenomena belonging to different levels of analysis.
Briefly, at the same time, we have a brain process and a cognitive
process occurring inside the organism, and both are supposed to
cause behavior. In contrast, the relation between contingencies of
selection and neurophysiological processes is diachronic. Dia-
chronic relations occur across time. Therefore, brain events and
behavioral events are not the same thing. Any attempt of reduction
between behavior analysis and neuroscience is nonsensical. Think-
ing more generally, as described here, the relation between behav-
ior analysis and neuroscience can shed some light on the more
general debate about the relation between psychology and neuro-
science by presenting an interesting nonreductionist alternative
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free of the problems faced by cognitive-brain identity theories (cf.
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Uttal, 2011, 2013).
In sum, the relation or autonomy between behavior analysis and
neuroscience is no different from the relation or autonomy be-
tween, for instance, physics and chemistry or any domain of
natural sciences. To use Donahoes (2013) words, As a branch of
biology, behavior-analysis is no less independent ofand no less
interdependent uponsuch sister sciences as neuroscience and
biochemistry (p. 366). As I said more than once in this article,
behavior analysis and neuroscience deal with different variables
equally necessary for the production of behavior. Behavior is not
solely a product of contingencies of selection, nor is it a merely
effect of what happens inside. It is both and probably more.
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Received August 14, 2015
Revision received December 20, 2015
Accepted January 5, 2016