Venue Section 4. When Rule not applicable.

This Rule shall not

apply.
A. Consti Art III sec 5 par (4)
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise; or
powers:
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
miscarriage of justice. thereof. (3a, 5a)
B. RULE 4, ROC
Venue of Actions C. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 18. Authority to
define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Section 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
be commenced and tried in the proper court which has authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions,
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
city wherein the real property involved, or a portion Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may
thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a) exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted
shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions accessible to the people of the different parts of the region
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or inexpensive as possible.
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the D. Cases
election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
Dr. Simeon Claridades v. Vicente Mercader and
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If any Perfecto Fernandez
of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the GR No. L-20341, May 14, 1966
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in Facts: Dr. Claridades brought action against Marcader and
the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in Fernandez for the dissolution of their partnership, an
the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where accounting of their operation, particularly a fishpond in Sta.
the property or any portion thereof is situated or found. Cruz, Marinduque, and damages in CFI Bulacan.
(2[c]a)
Answer: Admitted existence of partnership and it was so questioned the title to said property or the possession
far unproductive. As special defense, they alleged there thereof.
was an impending auction sale of the fishpond due to the
delinquency in paying taxes because Dr. Claridades failed The situation was not changed materially by the
to contribute. Counter-claim for damages! Intervention either of Asuncion or the Zuluetas, for, as
alleged successors to the interest Mercader in the
Guillermo Reyes allowed to intervene to recover sum of fishpond, they, at best, stepped into his shoes. Again, the
money due him for services rendered as foreman of nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
fishpond. complaint. At any rate, since the venue was properly laid
Armando Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged when the complaint was filed, said venue cannot,
assignee of the interest of Mercader. subsequently, become improper in consequence of issues
Alfredo Zulueta and wife sought to intervene alleging they later raised by any of the intervenors. The court having
were the owners of fishpond (permission granted) legally acquired authority to hear and decide the case, it
cannot be divested of that authority by said intervenors.
Zulueta and wife filed MD, complaint states no CoA, venue An intervention cannot alter the nature of the action and
improperly laid, complaint is moot and academic. the issues joined by the original parties thereto.

CFI: dismissed the case on the ground that venue had been
improperly laid. File in Marinduque!
Issue: WoN action should have been instituted in CFI
Marinduque where the fishpond is located
Order appealed from is set aside, case remanded to lower
court for further proceedings.
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS Inc. v ALEXANDER CRUZ

Held: No. Plaintiffs complaint merely seeks liquidation of August 9, 2007 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Cause of Action -
his partnership. It is a personal action, which may be Joinder
brought in the place of residence of plaintiff/defendants.
Since plaintiff is a resident of Bulacan, he had the right to Digester: Roa, Annamhel Monique
bring the action in CFI Bulacan. Although defendants were
residents of Marinduque, they did not object to the venue.
They waived their right to question it.
SUMMARY: UHI entered into a Franchise Agreement with
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the Cruz granting him a franchise to operate a store carrying
partnership, including the fishpond in question, did not its brand, with the stipulation that should he fail to pay the
change the nature or character of action, such sale being service fee on time, he shall be liable to pay the same with
merely a necessary incident of the liquidation of the interest. The same agreement contains a proviso that the
partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its
courts of Quezon City shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
process of dissolution. Neither plaintiff's complaint nor the
answer filed by defendants Fernandez and Mercader actions arising from the contract. Later on, UHI became the
assignee of two of its affiliate companies, to which Cruz is
also indebted. When Cruz failed to pay all three as
scheduled, UHI filed a suit in the Paranaque RTC with
multiple causes of action one in its own capacity by virtue
of the Franchise Agreement, and two in its capacity as
assignee of its affiliate companies. Cruz filed a Motion to
Dismiss, citing the proviso in the agreement stipulating
that the Quezon City courts have exclusive jurisdiction,
which was granted by the lower court. The SC held that the
stipulation, being confined to the Franchise Agreement
between UHI and Cruz alone, does not extend in
application to the other causes of action, and UHI may
choose to file suit in any other court which has jurisdiction
over them.
DOCTRINE: Where there is a joinder of causes of action
between the same parties one of which does not arise out
of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated
upon, the complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought
before other venues provided that such other cause of
action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the
venue lies therein.
ACTION: Likely an Appeal, not specified
FACTS:
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI) (principal office located in
Paranaque City) entered into a Franchise Agreement
granting respondent Cruz a 5-year franchise to adopt
and use the Uniwide Family Store System for the
establishment and operation of a Uniwide Family Store
along Marcos Highway in Marikina City.
Article 10.2 of the agreement called for Cruz as
franchisee to pay UHI a monthly service fee of P50,000
OR 3% of gross monthly purchases, whichever is higher,
payable within 5 days after the end of each month
without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. In
case of any delay in the payment of the monthly service
fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of the agreement, be
liable to pay an interest charge.
Cruz had also purchased goods from UHIs affiliated
companies First Paragon Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide
Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI)
o August 2002 - FPC and USWCI executed
Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI
assigning all their rights and interests
over Cruzs accounts payable to them.
As of August 13, 2002 - Cruz had outstanding
obligations with UHI, FPC, and USWCI in the total
amount of P1,358,531.89, drawing UHI to send him a
letter for the settlement thereof in 5 days. His receipt of
the letter notwithstanding, Cruzs accounts remained
unsettled.
UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
before the RTC of Paranaque on the ff. causes of action
(SEE Notes for more detailed recount)
o FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
10. Being entitled to the payment of
monthly service fee pursuant to the
Franchise Agreement [with UHI], which
defendant failed to pay despite demand,
plaintiff suffered actual damages xxx
o SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
11. Being the assignee of the
receivable of FPC, which receivable
 defendant failed to pay despite demand,
plaintiff suffered actual damages
o THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
12. Being the assignee of the
receivable of USWCI, which receivable
defendant failed to pay despite demand,
plaintiff suffered actual damages xxx
o FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13. By reason of defendants obstinate
refusal or failure to pay his indebtedness, plaintiff
was constrained to file this Complaint and in the
process incur expenses by way of attorneys fee
xxx
Manuel Toledo died even before the filing of the
complaint
Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue, invoking Article 27.5 of the agreement which
reads:
27.5 Venue Stipulation The Franchisee
consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the courts of Quezon City, the Franchisee
waiving any other venue.
RTC granted Motion to Dismiss
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
December 12, 2005 Order of Regional Trial Court of
Paranaque City, Branch 258 in Civil Case No. 04-0278
is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to said court which is
directed to reinstate the case to its docket and conduct
further proceedings thereon with dispatch.
WHETHER A CASE BASED ON SEVERAL CAUSES OF
ACTION IS DISMISSIBLE ON THE GROUND OF
IMPROPER VENUE WHERE ONLY ONE OF THE CAUSES
OF ACTION ARISES FROM A CONTRACT WITH
EXCLUSIVE VENUE STIPULATION. NO.
Note: Nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of
FPC and USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto
As such, they cannot be bound to the stipulation on
exclusive venue.
The general rule on venue of personal actions, as in
petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money, is
embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the RoC.
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other
actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant, where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
The provision is qualified by Sec. 4 of the same rule
which allows parties before the filing of the action, to
validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue BUT this
forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of
an action does not preclude parties from bringing a case
to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action
between the same parties one of which does not
arise out of the contract where the exclusive
venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in
the one at bar, may be brought before other
venues provided that such other cause of action
falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the
venue lies therein.
 Based on the allegations in UHIs complaint, the second NOTES:
and third causes of action are based on the deeds of
assignment executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. The
deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation with respect
to the causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general
rule on venue applies that the complaint may be filed in
the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
Furthermore, the causes of action on the assigned
accounts are not based on a breach of the agreement
between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate,
distinct and independent contracts-deeds of assignment
in which UHI is the assignee of Cruzs obligations to the
assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from
the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the
exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the
agreement.
San Miguel v. Monasterio - Exclusive venue stipulation
embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties
thereto when the suit relates to breach of said
contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not
make it necessarily encompassing, such that even
those not related to the enforcement of the
contract should be subject to the exclusive
venue, the stipulation designating exclusive
venues should be strictly confined to the specific
undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic
principles of freedom to contract might work to the
great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to
be allowed free access to courts of justice. Restrictive
stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of
making it more convenient for the parties to institute
actions arising from or in relation to their agreements.
Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as
relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive
venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of
such limitation on a contracting party will create
unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find
unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
10. Being entitled to the payment of
monthly service fee pursuant to the FA,
which defendant failed to pay despite
demand, plaintiff suffered actual
damages in the amount of Phil. Peso: One
Million Three Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Sixty Nine & 83/100
(P1,327,669.83), computed as of 05 April 2004,
for which defendant should be held liable
together with legal interest thereon from the
date of filing of this Complaint, until fully paid.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
11. Being the assignee of the receivable
of FPC, which receivable defendant failed
to pay despite demand, plaintiff suffered
actual damages in the amount of Phil. Peso:
Sixty Four Thousand One Hundred Sixty Five &
96/100 (P64,165.96) for which defendant
should be held liable together with the legal
interest thereon computed from date of receipt
of plaintiffs demand letter, or on August 16,
2002 to be exact, until fully paid.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
12. Being the assignee of the receivable
of USWCI, which receivable defendant
failed to pay despite demand, plaintiff
suffered actual damages in the total
 amount of Phil. Peso: One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Nine Thousand Sixty One & 36/100
(P1,579,061.36), computed as of 05 April 2004,
inclusive of the two and a half percent (2.5%)
monthly interest, as and by way of penalty,
and the three (3%) annual interest on the
unpaid amount, for which defendant should be
held liable, with legal interest thereon from the
date of filing of this Complaint, until fully paid.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13. By reason of defendants obstinate refusal
or failure to pay his indebtedness, plaintiff was
constrained to file this Complaint and in the
process incur expenses by way of attorneys
fees, which could be reasonably estimated to
reach at least Phil. Peso: Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P250,000.00) and for which
defendant should be held answerable for.
GO v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB),
ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE,
PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD MARTIN
November 11, 2004 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Venue: Real v.
Personal
Digester: Arreza, Dapor
SUMMARY: Petitioner Go applied for an Omnibus Line
accommodation with respondent UCPB amounting to Php
900M, and was favorably acted upon by UCPB. The
transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over
parcels of land owned by Mr. Looyuko (co-owner of Noahs
Ark companies with petitioner Go) and Noahs Ark Sugar
Refinery. However, the Omnibus Line accommodation was
subsequently cancelled by UCPB so petitioner Go
demanded from UCPB to recover the TCTs covered by the
real estate mortgage but UCPB refused to return them. To
protect his interest, petitioner Go filed a complaint for
cancellation of the real estate mortgage and damages with
prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The
trial court granted petitioners application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale
was enjoined and denied UCPBs motion to dismiss. The CA
set aside the orders and directed the trial court to dismiss
the case on the ground of improper venue. The SC denied
the petition for lack of merit and held that the cancellation
of real estate mortgage is a real action, considering that a
real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by
itself.
DOCTRINE: The cancellation of the real estate mortgage,
subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering
that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the
property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-
owners of Noahs Ark International, Noahs Ark Sugar
 Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar
Repacker, Noahs Ark Sugar Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar
Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark
Sugar Refinery.
August 1996: Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T.
Looyuko applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation
with respondent UCPB in the amount of Php 900M, and
was favorably acted upon by the latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages
over parcels of land, one located at Mandaluyong City,
and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko (24,837
sqm); and another also located at Mandaluyong City
registered in the name of Noahs Ark Sugar Refinery
(14,271 sqm).
The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to
petitioner was subsequently cancelled by respondent
UCPB.
As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded
from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs covered by
Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed.
UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have
the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized
and caused the registration thereof before the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
Then, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage of one
of the lots for nonpayment of the obligation secured by
said mortgage.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and
damages, with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, against respondent bank and its officers
The complaint was subsequently amended and further
alleged, among other things, the following:
o That petitioner Jimmy T. Go is a co-owner of the
property covered by TCT No. 64070, although the
title is registered only in the name of Looyuko,
o That respondent bank was aware that he is a co-
owner as he was asked to sign two deeds of real
estate mortgage covering the subject property;
o That the approved omnibus credit line applied for
by him and Looyuko did not materialize and was
cancelled by respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so
that the pre-signed real estate mortgages were
likewise cancelled;
o That he demanded from respondent bank that
TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him,
but respondent bank refused to do so;
o That despite the cancellation of the omnibus
credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had
the two deeds of real estate mortgage dated and
notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted
on TCT No. 64070;
o That the auction sale scheduled on 11 April 2000
and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real
estate mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No.
64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him; and
o That respondent bank and its officers be ordered
to pay him moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
June 7, 2000: UCPB filed a motion to dismiss based on
the following grounds:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the case
due to nonpayment of the proper filing and docket
fees;
2. That the complaint was filed in the wrong venue;
3. An indispensable party/real party in interest was
not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint
states no cause of action;
4. That the complaint was improperly verified; and
 5. That petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and
submitted an insufficient and false certification of
non-forum shopping.
TC: Granted petitioners application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale
was enjoined and denied UCPBs motion to dismiss.
CA: Set aside the Orders and directed the trial court to
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
o MR filed by petitioner was denied.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision dated 31 July 2002 and
the Order dated 14 November 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
WoN petitioners complaint for cancellation of real
estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the
purpose of determining venue REAL ACTION
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real
action is an action affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property. The venue for real actions is the same for
regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property or any part thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of
personal property, for the enforcement of some contract
or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to
the person or property. The venue for personal actions
is likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial
courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of
Rule 4.
It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in
determining venue for cases of the above nature is the
primary objective for which said cases are filed. Here,
the Court briefly summarized several cases which
involved real action.
o The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is
more particularly instructive. There, we held that
an action for nullification of the mortgage
documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
property is a real action that affects the title to the
property. Thus, venue of the real action is before
the court having jurisdiction over the territory in
which the property lies, which is the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for
cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and since
he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein.
He tries to make a point by alluding to the case of
Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.
o Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S.
Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena is misplaced.
That case was primarily an action to compel the
mortgagee bank to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That
action, which is not expressly included in the
enumeration found under Section 1, Rule 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve
titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a personal action
and not a real action. The plaintiffs title is not in
question. They are in possession of the mortgaged
lots. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs personal
action is the place where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where
 the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the Sec. 1, Rule 4. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting
election of the plaintiff. title to or possession of real property, or interest
o In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
was primarily an action to compel private real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
respondent bank to return to him the properties
covered by the TCTs over which the bank had Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality
of the cancellation by the said respondent bank of or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion
the omnibus credit line. The prime objective is to thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)
recover said real properties. Sec. 2, Rule 4. Venue of personal actions. All other
o Also, Carandang distinctly articulated that the actions may be commenced and tried where the
ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
mortgaged property had already been foreclosed. where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
Here, and as correctly pointed out by the resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
appellate court, respondent bank had already where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and (2[b]a)
were it not for the timely issuance of a restraining
order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court,
the same would have already been sold at a DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. (DAPCO)
public auction. petitioner, vs. DOLE PHILIPPINES (DOLE),
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. INC., respondent.
Court of Appeals, it was succinctly stated that the G.R. No. 134431 ; December 1, 2000 ; J. Buena
prayer for the nullification of the mortgage is a prayer
affecting real property, hence, is a real action. Nature: Appeal from CA decision
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage,
subject of the instant petition, is a real action, Facts:
considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right DAPCO owner of land situated in Carmen, Davao del
and a real property by itself. An action for cancellation Norte ; Lessor to DOLE
of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action DOLE lessee of DAPCO, renting aforementioned property
affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real in Carmen (the Subject Property or SP).
action which should be commenced and tried in
Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property DAPCO and DOLE (Lessor and Lessee) entered into a
lies. contract of lease for 10 years, 1985 to 1995. DOLE had
exclusive option to renew the lease contract for 6 more
years. If DOLE chooses not to renew, it will get an
NOTES: additional 2 years lease so that DOLE may wind up its
operations.
 DOLE, in response, filed a petition before the CA via RULE
1988: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP) was 65 CERTIORARI, to review RTC jurisdiction over the case.
passed. The SP was subject to CARP. During the case at
bar, the DAR proceedings re CARP over the SP was CA: DISMISSED DAPCOs case, stating that the action is a
pending. REAL ACTION involving RECOVERY of PROPERTY therefore
venue is the court where the property is situated, i.e.
1993: During the proceedings before the DAR, DAPCO SOUTH COTABATO .
wrote letter to DOLE, asking that it appear as intervenor as
DOLE had contractual rights as lessee over the SP, DAPCO appealed before the SC vs CA decision.
therefore a party-in-interest. However, DOLE refused to Arguments:
appear, alleging that under the CARP, its rights over the SP DOLE DAPCOs action is one for RECOVERY of PROPERTY,
as lessee will be respected anyway, since DAR will defer therefore action in rem. Since the SP is situated at Davao,
dispossession of SP from owner/possessor until the the RTC Davao del Norte has jurisdiction and not RTC
contracts expiration. Manila.
DAPCO action is one in personam for specific
Jan 6, 1995: DOLE followed-up with DAPCO re lease performance, i.e. payment of rentals and recognition of the
agreement extension up to 2000. DAPCO, replied that it willlease agreement between DAPCO and DOLE
honor the contract, and reminded DOLE to pay rentals, and
make an accounting of its production so that the base
rental may be computed. Issue: WON action is real or personal
Held: Personal
DOLE suddenly reversed its decision re renewal/extension
of lease contract, cancelling the lease agreement, stating Ratio: Venue for personal actions is in the place where
that the lessor failed to maintain the lessee in peaceful the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
possession of the SP, and that the government through the found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides,
CARP was caso fortuito, therefore DOLEs obligation to pay at the election of the plaintiff. Since DAPCO has its
rentals from the time the SP was subjected to CARP principal office in Legaspi Towers, Manila, it cannot be said
CEASED. DOLE then started dealing with another that DAPCO, in exercising its option by filing the suit in
organization re. SP, SEARBAI (it was never mentioned in Manila, committed a breach of the rules. (NOTE: DOLEs
the case whats SEARBAI although most likely farmers main office is located in Lepanto Bldg, Makati City).
group ito, yung farmer-beneficiaries ng CARP)
Here, DAPCO mainly sought the recognition of its standing
DAPCO filed a complaint before the RTC MANILA for lease agreement with DOLE so that the latter may pay it
INJUNCTION and DAMAGES AGAINST DOLE, to restrain rentals. Although some confusion was caused because
DOLE from dealing with SEARBAI re SP, considering that DAPCO also prayed for the surrender and delivery to
DOLE-DAPCO had a standing lease agreement. DAPCO the land, together with all permanent and fixed
improvements thereon existing including standing crops
and the fruits thereof, the main action of DAPCO was for
the COLLECTION of RENTALS, the determination of which aforementioned order. R sought to revive the judgment
DEPENDS on the resolution of the issue as to WON the since P refused to comply to the courts order.
lease agreement subsists DESPITE the CARP coverage of
the SP. Hence, the controversy before the court is really the P filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of
determination of the subsistence of the lease agreement, a judgment on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
contractual issue, which is PERSONAL IN NATURE. jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue
was improperly laid. R opposed the motion.
Besides, DAPCO could not be praying for recovery of the
property based on ownership precisely because DOLE is a Muntinlupa RTC denied Ps MTD. Stating that the reason
mere lessee. DOLE itself does not question DAPCOs that the case to be revived was heard in the Makati RTC
ownership of the property because as lessee, it recognizes was only because there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa City.
the superior title of DAPCO over the SP as owner, and is With the creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City, matters
therefore estopped from claiming better title over the involving properties located in this City, and cases
property; DOLE only questions the subsistence of the lease involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be
agreement with DAPCO. litigated before these Courts. Since the subject lot of the
case to be revived is located in Muntinlupa City, RTC of
(NOTE: also, SC stated that CA erred in ruling that the Muntinlupa is the correct venue.
jurisdiction, if action was real, was with SOUTH COTABATO
because the PROPERTY is NOT in S.Cotabato but in DAVAO P appealed to the CA and asserts that the complaint for
DEL NORTE. LOL) specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC
is an action in personam and, therefore, the suit to revive
the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that,
Adelaida Infante vs. Aran Builders Inc. consequently, the venue of the action for revival of
August 24, 2007 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: judgment is either Makati City or Paraaque City where
private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at
Facts: the election of private respondent.

Before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, presided over by JudgeCA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was
Perello was an action for revival of judgment filed on June rendered in an action involving title to or possession of
6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. against Adelaida Infante. real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of
judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered bywith the RTC of the place where the real property is
the RTC of Makati City in an action for specific performance located.
and damages, where it ruled in favor of R and ordered P to
execute a deed of sale of a lot in Ayala Alabang, to register Issues/Held:
the said deed and deliver title to R, and to pay the taxes of
the said lot. The same judgment ordered R to pay P theWoN the revival of judgment is a real action- YES
sum of P321,918.25 upon P's compliance with the
WoN Muntinlupa RTC is the correct venue for the revival of
judgment rendered by Makati RTC- YES
Ratio:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of
judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be
enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in whichThus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
[3]
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must
be brought either in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where
the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes
which treat of the venue of actions in
general.
It must be noted that other provisions in the rules of of a sum money which is a personal action. Clearly, the
procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the
be considered.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. -
Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
xxxx
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. -
All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real
action or a personal action.
P cites the case of Aldeguer to support her claim but
misunderstood the doctrine to mean that any action for
revival of judgment should be considered as a personal
one. The Court specified that the judgment sought to be
revived in said case was a judgment for damages. The
judgment subject of the action for revival did not involve or
affect any title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein. P also cited the case of Donnelly, but the
judgment to be revived in the said case was for a collection
actions for revival of judgment as being personal in
character does not apply to the present case.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment
determine whether it is a real action or a personal action.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed
property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that R
has an established interest over the lot in
question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous
judgment. The sole reason for the present action to
revive is the enforcement of private respondent's
adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the
action falls under the category of a real action, for it Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S.
affects private respondent's interest over real Benedicto, now deceased, and his business
property. associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East
Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal
The present case for revival of judgment being a real Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively.
action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both
Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is corporations were organized pursuant to a contract
located. whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name
and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the
According to Sec.18 of BP129, the Supreme Court shall shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the shares. Several years after, Irene demanded the
branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings, but the
all suits. Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
In March 2000, Irene filed before the RTC two similar
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial complaints for conveyance of shares of stock,
jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of RA accounting and receivership against the Benedicto
No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of BP Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act restraining order (TRO).
of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law In a consolidated opposition, Benedicto, moved to
provided for the creation of a branch of the RTC
dismiss on grounds, among which were: (2) venue
in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the RTC
was improperly laid
in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or
During the preliminary proceedings on their motions
authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning
real property within Muntinlupa City. to dismiss, Benedicto presented the Joint Affidavit of
Gilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Rasco who all attested being employed as household
Decision dated August 12, 2002 and staff at the Marcos Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac,
Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain
are AFFIRMED. residence in said place as she in fact only visited the
mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac
in the 1998 national elections; and that she was
staying at her husbands house in Makati City.
Marcos-Araneta v CA Irene presented her community tax certificate issued
on 11/07/99 in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support
FACTS: her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
 RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the
partly constituted real action, and that Irene did earliest time possible, meaning within the time for but
not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, before filing the answer to the complaint, the matter of
venue was improperly laid. improper venue. They would thereafter reiterate and
The RTC eventually entertained an amended pursue their objection on venue, first, in their answer to the
complaint filed by Irene, dispositively stating: (1) amended complaints and then in their petition for certiorari
Irene may opt to file, as a matter of right, an before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca
amended complaint.(2) The inclusion of additional and Benedicto or his substitutes abandoned along the way
plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte improper venue as ground to defeat Irenes claim before
resident, in the amended complaint setting out the the RTC has to be rejected.
same cause of action cured the defect of improper
venue.(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 The RTC Has No Jurisdiction on the Ground of
of Rule 4 allow the filing of the amended complaint in Improper Venue | Subject Civil Cases are Personal
question in the place of residence of any of Irenes Actions
co-plaintiffs. According to the Benedictos, venue was in this case
The Benedictos filed on April 10, 2001 their Answer improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real
to the amended complaint but also went the CA via a action involving real properties located outside the
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the following territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.
RTC orders. The CA rendered a Decision, setting This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the
aside the assailed RTC orders and dismissing the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages.
3342-17. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein. In
ISSUE: accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the
venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has
W/N venue was properly laid NO territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The
RATIO: venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
personal actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience found, at the election of the plaintiff.
possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of
improperly laid venue must be raised seasonably, else it is Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust
deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to either file a arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a
include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now
to have waived his right to object to improper venue. In the represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their
alleged personal liability to Irene upon an alleged trust trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere
constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in representatives of Irene.
rem where the actions are against the real properties
instead of against persons. Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is
more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the
Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 residences of the principal parties should be the basis for
of Rule 4 determining proper venue. Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil
Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly
SC: Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found by the as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-
RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases
as she claimed. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place
action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her where Irene resides.
reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is
not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action
the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared
plaintiffs resides at the time she filed her amended Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, that
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued court was an improper venue for her conveyance
sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which action. The Court can concede that Irenes three co-
she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it
really of no moment since it can easily be procured from ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the three
the BIR with the necessary desired information. can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs . In the final
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in analysis, the residences of Irenes co-plaintiffs cannot be
Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate made the basis in determining the venue of the subject
that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties suit.Irene was a resident during the period material
reside. Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy.
determination of the status of Irenes co-plaintiffs in the Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it
context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of that one can have several residences, if such were the
Rule 4. established fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason
why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and
Venue is Improperly Laid expenses she and her adversaries would have to endure by
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in- a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and decided
interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the dismissal of the
disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three
avails of the present suit. It is undisputed too that new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless
petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the case stays
Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs with the RTC in Batac.
in the amended complaint as Irenes new designated
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDOThus, PRs sued P for damages (P10K) and for breach of
TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental contract of carriage before the CFI of Misamis Oriental.
Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO
TIRO, respondents (1978; J. Santos; G.R. No. L-37750)
P moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
* Sweet Lines Inc. = shipping company transporting inter-
improper venue. This motion was premised on the
island passengers and cargoes
condition printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition
No. 14, which reads: 14. It is hereby agreed and
understood that any and all actions arising out of
FACTS: PRs Atty. Tandog and Tiro, a contractor by
the conditions and provisions of this ticket,
profession, bought tickets for Voyage 90 on Dec. 31, 1971
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in
at the branch office of P at Cagayan de Oro City. PRs were
the competent courts in the City of Cebu.
to board P's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran
City via the port of Cebu.

CFI denied the motion. P moved to reconsider the order of

denial to no avail. Hence, this instant petition for
Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol,
prohibition for preliminary injunction. (In a resolution, the
since many passengers were bound for Surigao, PRs, per
SC restrained respondent Judge from proceeding further
advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to
with the case and required PRs to comment.)
M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said vessel was already
filled to capacity, they were forced to agree to hide at the
cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of
ISSUE: Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of P's
the Philippine Coastguard.
passage tickets purchased by PRs, which limits the venue
of actions arising from the contract of carriage to the CFI of
Cebu, valid and enforceable? Otherwise stated, may a
PRs alleged that they were, during the trip, exposed to
common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate
the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming
thru condition printed at the back of passage tickets to its
from the ship's cargo of corn grits, and that the
vessels that any and all actions arising out of the ocntract
tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for
of carriage should be filed only in a particular province or
Tagbilaran were not honored and they were
city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all
constrained to pay for other tickets.
others?
RULING: NO. Petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. The had no choice but to pay for the tickets and to avail of P's
restraining order is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. shipping facilities out of necessity.

> The carrier has been exacting too much from the public
by inserting impositions in the passage tickets too
Ps claims:
burdensome to bear. The condition which was printed in
> Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable since PRs fine letters is an imposition on the riding public and does
acceded to it when they purchased the said passage not bind respondents, citing cases.
tickets and took its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to
> While venue of actions may be transferred from one
Tagbilaran, Bohol.
province to another, such arrangement requires the
> The condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu "written agreement of the parties", not to be imposed
is proper since venue may be validly waived, citing cases. unilaterally.

> It is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as > Assuming that the condition is valid, it is not exclusive
such, since it is printed in bold and capital letters and not and does not, therefore, exclude the filing of the action in
in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action Misamis Oriental.
arising from the contract may be instituted, citing cases.

> Condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory. The

Discussion on contract of carriage and contract of
words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective of where it is
adhesion
issued," and "shall" leave no doubt that the intention of
Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to
the exclusion of other places.
1. There was a valid contract of carriage entered into by P
and PRs and that the passage tickets, upon which the latter
based their complaint, are the best evidence thereof. All
PRs claims:
the essential elements of a valid contract, i.e., consent,
> Condition No. 14 is not valid. It is not an essential cause or consideration and object, are present
element of the contract of carriage, being in itself a
o Peralta de Guerrero, et al. v. Madrigal Shipping Co.,
different agreement which requires the mutual consent of Inc.: Whenever a passenger boards a ship for
the parties to it. transportation from one place to another he is issued
a ticket by the shipper which has all the elements of
> They had no say in its (Condition No. 14) preparation, a written contract, Namely: (1) the consent of the
the existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they contracting parties manifested by the fact that the
 passenger boards the ship and the shipper consents
or accepts him in the ship for transportation; (2)
cause or consideration which is the fare paid by the Condition No. 14 should be held as VOID &
passenger as stated in the ticket; (3) object, which is UNENFORCEABLE for the ff. reasons:
the transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination which are a. Under circumstances obtaining in the inter-island
stated in the ticket. shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind
passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at
the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition
2. With respect to the 14 conditions one of which is
No. 14 is printed in fine letters.
"Condition No. 14" printed at the back of the passage
tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of
adhesion." By the peculiar circumstances under which
these contracts are entered into namely, that it is There is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter-island
drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is vessels plying between the countrys several islands, and
sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party, in the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus,
this instance, the passengers, who cannot change the even under ordinary circumstances, the piers are
same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on the congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be
"take it or leave it" basis certain guidelines in the transported, The conditions are even worse at peak and/or
determination of their validity and/or enforceability havethe rainy seasons. The schedules are as often as not if
been formulated so that justice and fan play characterize not more so delayed or altered. This was precisely the
the relationship of the contracting parties. experience of PRs

o Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co. Thus, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers
& Fieldman Insurance v. Vargas: Such contracts to examine their tickets received from crowded/congested
obviously cap for greater strictness and vigilance on counters, more often than not during rush hours, for
the part of the courts of justice with a view to
protecting the weaker party from abuses and conditions that may be printed thereon, much less charge
imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the them with having consented to the conditioner so printed,
unwary. esp. if there are a number of such conditions in fine print,
o NCC: In all contractual property or other relations, as in this case.
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was
indigence, mental weakness, tender age and other prepared solely at the instance of P; PRs had no say in its
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to
his protection.
take the same into account prior to the purchase of their transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the
tickets. plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends
of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to
Also, shipping companies are franchise holders of
prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most
certificates of public convenience and, therefore, possess a
probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition
virtual monopoly over the business of transporting
will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice.
passengers between the ports covered by their franchise.
Upon the other hand, P has branches or offices in the
This being so, shipping companies, like P, engaged in inter-
respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to
island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of
litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit
transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms
in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant
of passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy
case, will not cause inconvience to, much less prejudice, P.
their tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally,
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of
those who board these inter-island vessels come from the
J. Barredos Concurring Opinion: In Hoechst Phils.,
low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little
Inc. vs. Francisco Torres, et al. (May 18, 1978), the Court
or no choice but to avail of petitioners vessels.
said that although generally, agreements regarding change
of venue are enforceable, there may be instances where
for equitable considerations and in the better interest of
b. Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on
justice, a court may justify the laying of, the venue in the
transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature,
place fixed by the rules instead of following written
since the same will prejudice rights and interests of
stipulation of the parties.
innumerable passengers in different parts of the
country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to
file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
In this case, there is actually no written agreement as to
venue between the parties in the sense contemplated in
Sec. 3 of Rule 4, ROC, which governs the matter. The
For, although venue may be changed or transferred from
importance that a stipulation regarding change of
one province to another by agreement of the parties in
the venue fixed by law entails is such that nothing
writing pursuant to Rule 4, Sec. 3, of the ROC, such an
less than mutually conscious agreement as to it
agreement will not be held valid where it practically
must be what the rule means. In this case, the ticket
negates the action of the claimants, such as the PRs
issued to PRs by P constitutes at best a "contract of
herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on
adhesion". It is not that kind of a contract where the
parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agreeAugust 19, 1970 supplementary lease agreement: Bonifacio
specifically on all its terms, but rather, one which PRs took leased to P his house at Lakandula Street Extension, Tondo,
no part at all in preparing, since it was just imposed upon Manila. If the lessor violates the contract, he can be sued in
them when they paid for the fare for the freight theyManila and if the lessee violates the contract, he can be sued in
wanted to ship. It is common knowledge that individuals Masantol, Pampanga, where Bonifacio resided.
who avail of common carriers hardly read the fine prints on June, 1980, the heirs of Bonifacio filed an ejectment suit against
such tickets to note anything more than the price thereofP in the municipal court of Masantol. P filed a motion to dismiss
and the destination designated therein. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction: venue of the action is
Manila where the property is located. Stipulation in contract is
void for being contrary to section 2(a), Rule 4 of ROC.t
Under these circumstances, it would seem that, since this @lF The municipal court denied P's motion.
case is already in respondent court (CFI of Misamis
P filed a certiorari petition in CFI Pampanga assailing the order.
Oriental) and there is no showing that P would be greatly
CFI dismissed the petition, ruling that the venue was properly
inconvenienced by submitting to the jurisdiction of said laid in Masantol by agreement of the parties who waived the
respondent court, it is best to allow the proceedings legal venue.
therein to continue.

ISSUES
VILLANUEVA v JUDGE MOSQUEDA (CFI Pampanga)

19 August 1982 || Aquino, J.

WON parties can validly waive venue YES

O, wag kayo kabahan. Maikli yung digest kasi maikli yung

kaso. Halos verbatim na to. Sana ako matawag dito,RULING
though. VAF

Municipal court of Masantol, like other inferior courts, has

FACTS exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits. The
rule in section 1(a), Rule 4 of ROC that "forcible entry and
detainer actions regarding real property shall be brought in the
municipality or city in which the subject matter thereof is
situated" does not refer to the jurisdiction over the subject
matter but only to the place where the ejectment suit may be filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue,
brought. and the same was granted by Makati RTC Judge Tensuan.
Hence, the banks instant petition assailing the said order.
Section 3 of Rule 4 provides that "by written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred The Court ruled in favor of the bank, finding that the said
from one province to another". In this case, such an agreement venue stipulation only authorized the parties to bring a suit
was formalized between the lessor and the lessee. The in Valenzuela should they wish to choose it as the venue of
agreement is valid, binding and enforceable. the action, but not necessarily restricted them to file the
case only in the said place in exclusion of the other
This case should be distinguished from a case where the parties competent courts.
stipulated that actions on a construction contract may be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Naga City and the DOCTRINE: Stipulations in a contract, which specify a
Contractor, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, instead of suing definite place for the institution of an action arising in
the other party in that court, sued him in the Court of First connection therewith, do not, as a rule, supersede the
Instance of Pampanga. It was held that the suit was properly general rules on the matter set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of
filed in Pampanga because the agreement of the parties on the Court, but should be construed merely as an agreement on
venue of the actions between them was "simply permissive". an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
They did not waive their right to choose the venue provided for place (Polytrade doctrine)
in section 2(b), Rule 4 of the ROC

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v TENSUAN

FACTS:
December 10, 1993 | Feliciano, J. | Venue Stipulations
Digester: Angat, Christine Joy F.
SUMMARY: Circle Financial Company obtained several
loans from Philippine Banking Corporation, after which it
executed promissory notes with a stipulation that it (Circle)
is submitting to the jurisdiction of the Valenzuela courts for
any legal action arising from the said notes. Circle,
together with its 8 individual sureties, failed to pay the
obligation, prompting the bank to file a case for the
collection of sum of money with Makati RTC. Circle et.al
Sometime in 1983 and 1984, Circle Financial Company
obtained several loans amounting to P1M from
Philippine Banking Corporation, a commercial banking
corporation with principal office at Makati, Metro Manila.
o For the value received, Circle executed 4 promissory
notes, each of which contained the stipulation that
We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may
arise out of this promissory notes.
o
As additional security, eight individuals (see Notes for
names) also executed a Continuing Surety Agreement,
undertaking to pay jointly and severally the bank in
case Circle fails to meet its obligations.
 Circle failed to pay. The bank went after the 8 sureties Whether the venue stipulation in the promissory
but they likewise failed to pay.
The bank then instituted a complaint at the Makati RTC venue NO
for collection of a sum of money against the bank and
the 8 individual obligors.
o The bank eventually moved for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, alleging that Circle had
become insolvent and had been placed under
receivership by the Central Bank.
The trial court issued the writ of preliminary
attachment, but the same was not executed as the
sheriff was unable to find properties belonging to Circle
and the 8 individuals.
Thereafter, summons was served, however, only 5 duly
received them; the sheriff failed to serve summons to
the 3 others (as one has died and the two were nowhere
to be found).
Circle and the 5 individual sureties served with
summons then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the venue of the action was improperly laid since the
promissory note specifically stipulated that the action
be instituted in Valenzuela, Metro Manila only.
Makati RTC Judge Salvador Tensuan granted the said
motion to dismiss. The bank filed an MR but the same
was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, where the bank
argues that the stipulation in the promissory note is
merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to The venue stipulation in the case at bar is a permissive
the tribunals to which the parties may resort; it was not
intended to restrict the venue of the action to courts of
Valenzuela alone.
RULING: Petition granted.
note precludes the filing of the action in other
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by
written agreement, may change or transfer the venue of
an action from one province to another. The court, in
sustaining the validity and enforceability of contractual
stipulations concerning venue, is tasked with
determining the intent of the parties as manifested by
the words employed by them, and by other recognized
indicators.
A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation shows
that it does not require the laying of venue in
Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The venue
stipulation simply authorized or allowed the
parties to bring suit in Valenzuela should they
wish to do so; there was no intention to bar suit
in other competent courts.
POLYTRADE DOCTRINE: Stipulations in a contract,
which specify a definite place for the institution
of an action arising in connection therewith, do
not, as a rule, supersede the general rules on the
matter set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, but
should be construed merely as an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. (Polytrade Corporation v Blanco)
stipulation, which does not purport to deprive either
party of the right to elect, or option to have resort to,
another competent court as expressly permitted by
Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should a party
choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation merely operated
to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect
recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to
go before any of the tribunals provided for by the rules
on venue.
 For a stipulation to be restrictive as the respondents defaulted on the payments so respondent bank foreclosed
herein suggest, it must clearly indicate, through the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed properties, in partial
qualifying and restrictive words, that the parties satisfaction of petitioners debt, were sold at a public
deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from auction where the respondent bank was the winning
the operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue,
bidder.
and that they intended contractually to designate a
specific venue to the exclusion of any other court also Petitioners filed against Planters Development Bank a
competent and accessible to the parties under the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of
ordinary rules on the venue of actions.
o In the case at bar, there was neither qualifying nor Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of
restrictive words that would suggest the intention to Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages
compel the parties to file their cases only in with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that
Valenzuela courts. only their peso loans were covered by the mortgages and
It should be noted that venue in personal actions is that these had already been fully paid, hence, the
fixed for the convenience of the plaintiff and his mortgages should have been discharged. They challenged
witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. In this the validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-payment
case, none of the respondents has claimed to have been
of their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover those
put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result of
the institution of the action in Makati. It is hard to see loans
how justice will be served by confining the situs of an
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the
action in a particular place when it is not the venue
convenient for the parties. ground of improper venue since the loan agreements
restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila (may
stipulation sa kontrata). respondent judge dismissed the
NOTES: case for improper venue.
Avelino Deato, Benjamin Santiago, Domingo Santiago, Issue: W/N venue is restricted in Metro Manila, as
Hilario Lopez, Soccoro Gomez, Miguel Violago (the one stipulated, which makes the dismissal of the case valid.
who died), Nerissa Gloria (unknown whereabouts), and
Filemon Marquez (unknown whereabouts). Held: At the outset, we must make clear that under Section
4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
LANTIN V JUDGE LANTION, PLANTERS BANK general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the
parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed
Facts: Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin took several in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on
peso and dollar loans from respondent Planters the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude
Development Bank and executed several real estate parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties
mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. They must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.6 In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the documents, the stipulation on venue is also applicable
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on thereto.
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
place.
discretion. petition is DISMISSED.
The pertinent provisions of the several real estate
mortgages and promissory notes read as follows:
18. In the event of suit arising out of or in connection with EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION vs.
this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this HON. EMETERIO C. CUI (in his official capacity as
mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXV)
auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of Makati, and LORETA B. PAN
Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by the G.R. No. L-54452 | July 20, l981 | ABAD SANTOS, J.
Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any
other venue.8 (Emphasis supplied.) Facts: Pan Phil. Trading (owned by Rey Pan) entered into a
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action dealership agreement for the sale of merchandise with
arising out of this note shall exclusively be at the proper Transunion Corporation. Pursuant thereto Pan Phil. Trading
court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines or any other had to file a P 20,000 surety bond and it complied by
venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for this purpose any presenting a surety bond of Eastern Assurance & Surety
9
other venue provided by the Rules of Court. (Emphasis Corporation.
supplied.)
Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this Transunion filed a complaint against Rey M. Pan, Pan Phil.
purpose any other venue" are restrictive and used Trading and Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation for
advisedly to meet the requirements. the full payment of merchandise delivered in the amount of
Extra: Since the validity of the loan documents were P 10,841.54.
squarely put in issue, petitioners claim that effecting the
After Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation had filed its
exclusive venue stipulation would be tantamount to a Answer with cross-claim, it filed a motion to file a third-
prejudgment on the validity of the loan documents. party complaint against Loreta B. Pan, wife of Rey M. Pan.
However in this case, petitioners never assailed the validity The reason given in the motion is that movant has a legal
of the mortgage contracts securing their peso loans. What right against Loreta B. Pan. It appears that in consideration
petitioners claimed is that their peso loans had already of the surety bond, the Pan spouses executed an Indemnity
been paid thus the mortgages should be discharged, and Agreement in favor of Eastern Assurance & Surety
Corporation.
that the mortgage contracts did not include their dollar
loans. In our view, since the issues of whether the Respondent judge granted the motion and admitted the
mortgages should be properly discharged and whether third- party complaint. Subsequently, Loreta B. Pan filed a
these also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground
that venue was improperly laid. She invoked the Indemnity jurisdiction and venue of the main action. This must be so
Agreement which reads: because jurisdiction (and venue) over the main case
Sec. 7 WAIVER OF VENUE OF ACTION:We embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and
[Spouses Pan] hereby agree that any question connected therewith. A contrary rule would result in 'split
which may arise between the Company and jurisdiction which is not favored, and in multiplicity of suits,
the undersigned by reason of this document a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of
and which has to be submitted to the court of justice. The court acquired jurisdiction over the third-party
justice, shall be brought before the court of complaint, provided it had jurisdiction over the main case,
competent jurisdiction of Quezon City, waiving for the reason that the third-party complaint is but a
for this purpose any other proper venue. continuation thereof, its purpose being to seek
Respondent judge then peremptorily dismissed the third- 'contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss respect to his opponent's claim.
was "well-taken to uphold the policy of upholding the
sanctity of contracts in preference to the policy against Re: Sanctity of contracts (minor point): Sec. 7 of the
multiplicity of suits. Indemnity Agreement was imposed on the Pan spouses by
Issue: W/N a third party may be dismissed on the ground the petitioner surety company for its benefit and
of improper venue convenience and therefore the latter could waive the
provision by filing its complaint, not in Quezon City, but in
Ruling: No. A third-party complaint is but ancillary to the Manila. There is, therefore, no sanctity of contract to hold.
main action and is a procedural device to avoid multiplicity
of suits. Because of its nature the prescriptions on
jurisdiction and venue applicable to ordinary suits may not
apply. Thus a third-party complaint has to yield to the