The services for which the fees are being sought were rendered to the executor or administrator to assist

him in the
execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees. The liability for the payment rests
on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the
reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon
the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents.

Facts:

Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. Thereafter, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an
amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration naming 4 other heirs.

The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special
administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary inventory of all the properties which
came into her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her late father. The trial court
issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of said estate and a Letter
of Administration was issued to the petitioner after the latter took her oath of office.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting of her
administration of said estate which was granted. Respondent judge issued another order requiring
petitioner to render an accounting of her administration with the express instruction that said
order be personally served upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was
returned to the Court unserved. However, said order was also not received by the petitioner.

Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a
motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their fathers estate and to appoint instead
private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to
render an accounting of her administration since her appointment as administratrix more than six
years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting within 30 days
from receipt thereof which she did on March 22, 1984. She likewise filed on the same date, her
Opposition to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in
rendering said accounting was due to the fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge
where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted to the Court of Appeals
causing said sala to be vacated for a considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel
Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did
not know to whom to render an accounting report.

Issue:
Whether the failure to perform the duty to render an accounting justifies the removal of the
administator.

Held:
Yes. The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one
year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The
only exception is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting
claims against the estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do
not exist in the case at bar.

Subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her
negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioners
removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled
rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of
the Court appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v. Ceniza
and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by
said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of
the administrator not comfortable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate
court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross
abuse of discretion is shown. In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on
the ground of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as
administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of
the Rules of Court."

Heirsof Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, et al.
G.R. 114217, October 13, 2009

Iluminada Tan, et al. vs. Bartolome Sy, et al.

G.R. No.150797

Facts:
Deceased Sy Bang died intestate leaving behind real and personal properties including
several businesses.
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy,
Lourdes Sy and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriage to respondent
Rosita Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang to Ba
Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner jose Sy Bang and
Iluminada Tan.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Partition against Petitioners.

During an out of court conference between petitioner and respondents, it was agreed that
the management, supervision or administration of the common properties and the entire estateof
the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands of Jose Sy Bang. Also as
agreed upon that the income from the three cinemas shall be given to the respondents for their
support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil case for Judicial Partition while the
income from the vast part of the entire estate will be given to the petitioners.

While the case was still pending Rosita Sy filed a motion for Payment of Widows Allowance
and the court granted the motion and ordred the petitioners to pay Rosita the amount of
P25,000.00 as monthly widows allowance until the estate was finally settled or until the court
order.

Respondent filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Sy before
RTC Branch 58, Lucena City. Rosauro Sy file a motion to be named as Guardian. The Guardianship
court issued an order directing to deposit before such court an amount representing the widows
allowance of the incompetent Rosita Sy. Petitioners questioned the order.

Issue:
Whether the trial court, acting as the Guardianship court had the authority to enforce
payment of widow allowance.

Held:
No. as stated in Rule 83, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

the widow and minor and incapacitated children of the deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance
as are provided by law
In relation to that provision was Article 188 of the Civil Code states that:

from the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is
delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them.

The court refered in Section 3 of Rule 83 is the court hearing the settlement of the estate.
The said court shall effect the payment of allowance considering that the estate are within its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. The guardianship court having a limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed
or conveyed.
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, petitioners, vs. THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS OF ARTURO ARGUNA, respondents.

DECISION

G.R. No. 156403, March 21, 2005

FACTS:

Melitona Pahamotang died and was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and
their eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein
petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang. Agustin filed a petition for issuance
of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. In his petition, Agustin identified
petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that
Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case where the intestate court
issued an order granting Agustins petition.

The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the
PNB and Arguna respectively. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial
to them. The trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were valid
with respect to the other parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals; to the
appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the
foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.

Issue:
Whether Rule 89 is mandatory.

Held:
Yes. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or
encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without previous notice
to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which
is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.

Thus, in Maneclang vs. Baun,the previous administrator of the estate filed a petition with
the intestate court seeking authority to sell portion of the estate, which the court granted despite
lack of notice of hearing to the heirs of the decedent. The new administrator of the estate filed
with the Regional Trial Court an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous
administrator. After trial, the trial court held that the order of the intestate court granting authority
to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal directly to this Court, We held that
without compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the authority to sell,
the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.

InLiu vs. Loy, Jr.,while the decedent was still living, his son and attorney-in-fact sold in behalf
of the alleged decedent certain parcels of land to Frank Liu. After the decedent died, the son sold
the same properties to two persons. Upon an ex parte motion filed by the 2nd set of buyers of
estate properties, the probate court approved the sale to them of said properties. Consequently,
certificates of title covering the estate properties were cancelled and new titles issued to the 2 nd
set of buyers. Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance/ annulment of title with the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal. When the case was appealed to us, we set aside the decision of the appellate court and
declared the probate court's approval of the sale as completely void due to the failure of the
2ndset of buyers to notify the heir-administratrix of the motion and hearing for the sale of estate
property.

Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and failure to give
notice to the heirs would invalidate the authority granted by the intestate/probate court to
mortgage or sell estate assets.

Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by Agustin
with the intestate court to mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife.
Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORIANO G. DE GUZMAN,
administrator-appellee, v. CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and
HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA, Oppositors-Appellants.

G.R. No. L-29276. May 18, 1978

Facts:
The deceased testator was survived by eight children and his will was duly probated.
Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman.

One of the properties left by the decedent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In
conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight
children, each one being given a one-eighth proin-diviso share in the project of partition which was
signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower courts order but without prejudice
to the final outcome of the instant accounting incident.

The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to
September, 1967. Three heirs named Crispina de Guzman-Carillo, Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola
and Arsenio de Guzman, interposed objections to the administrators disbursements in the total
sum of P13,610.48.

It should be noted that the probate court in its order of August 29, 1966 directed the administrator
"to refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and remodelling the house of
the deceased and to stop spending (sic) any asset of the estate without first securing authority of
the court to do so.

Issue:
Whether the probate court erred in approving the utilization of the income of the estate to
defray those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable under the Rules of Court.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that disbursements made by a duly appointed administrator
out of the funds of the estate of a decedent which are necessary for the care, management, and
settlement of the estate and which redounded to the benefit of all the heirs such as expenses to
cover (1) the improvement and necessary repairs of the family residence which was partitioned
among the eight heirs, five of whom consented to the disbursement; (2) the lawyers subsistence;
(3) the cost of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during his last illness; and (4)
irrigation fees, are allowable.
Moreover, disbursements made by an administrator out of the funds of the estate of a
decedent which are not in connection with the care, management, and settlement of the estate
and which did not inure to the benefit of all the heirs such as expenses for (1) the living allowance
of an heir as occupant of the family residence without paying rent; (2) stenographic notes; (3) the
celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased; and (4) unexplained representation are
not allowable

.TEODORICO UY TIOCO,petitioner,
vs.
CARLOS IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and ALEJANDRO M. PANIS,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-29414 July 17, 1928

Facts:
 It appears from the record that the respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of
said estate and that he, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate
proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees. The respondent judge granted the motion and
allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator, the herein petitioner, did not appeal from
the order of the court, but on Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors
Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees
and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing
of there motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to
the interest of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work performed, the services
rendered with him did not warrant the payment of the sum claimed. This motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether the attorney's fees should be paid from the funds of the estate.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the
character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to
the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore
not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or
administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or
administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the
reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the
reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner,

vs.
HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE
ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.
G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

Facts: