Chavez vs.

Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who
had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after
media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape. Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez
filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast
media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise
of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts
already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

CASE DIGEST : Chavez Vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES,
in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to
the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6
June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacaang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President
Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear
that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release
warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met
with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel
fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press
freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories
of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restrain Expression not
subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior
restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means
what it says it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-based if
the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny
content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is
content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a
content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTCs claim
that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should
not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci
Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of
unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper
conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential
elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on
the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint.
Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of
any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception,
is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the
NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a
wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by
respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the
tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in
itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution
expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom
of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected
expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of
unprotected expression.

U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

J. Malcolm

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges
against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his
office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found
him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary
justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of
the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in
this case arose.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. It also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment.
If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the
result of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer.
Public policy is the unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof
of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct having
a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may
cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-
seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to
the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence
of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one
of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the
peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable.
But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious
accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for
them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but
which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their
seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14,

1999
Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and
Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against
Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with
anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the
conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was
filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the
subject of the published articles.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was
Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the
public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the
conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was
intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public
interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a
public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and
protected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the
exercise thereof.

Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 126466,

January 14, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Constitutional Law Right to Free Press, Newspaper Commentaries is Privileged Communication)

FACTS: Private respondent filed for damages against petitioners for the series of articles written by the latter in a
newspaper column, which dealt with alleged anomalous activities without naming or identifying private respondent.
Petitioners contends that the right to free press is a privilege communication.

ISSUE: WON commentaries on matters of public interest are privilege.

HELD: Yes. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence
to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
Facts of the case
George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the
Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity
charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news
broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but
failed to use the words allegedly or reportedly in during one
broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called
Rosenbloom and other similar distributors girlie look peddlers
and smut distributors. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on
the obscenity charges.

Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court

held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery
of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements,
did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or
figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages
where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the
truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general
and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the
punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard
applied.

Question
(1) Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for
defamatory statements apply to private individuals?

(2) If so, is the evidence presented at trial enough to support the

damages originally awarded to Rosenbloom?
Conclusion
Sort: by seniority by ideology
53 DECISION
PLURALITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.
Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the
judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The
Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false
standard applied because the story was a matter of public
concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen.
The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support
the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the

First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments
even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false.
Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting
that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of
public servants, such as the police, in full detail.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states

should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation
actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for
further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual
harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice
Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court
should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual
losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

Rodolfo Vasquez v Court of Appeals

The 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan handed down by the
United States Supreme Court has been the barometer used in
defamation cases involving public officials in both jurisdictions.
The Philippine case that comes comparably close in
circumnstances with that of the New York Times ruling is that of
Rodolfo Vasquez versus Court of Appeals.
It is similar to the New York Times v. Sullivan ruling in the sense
that the plaintiff is also a public official (a barangay official).
When the barangay official sued for criminal libel (note: New York
Times case was a civil case), the Supreme Court ruled that it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice, and
failing such, no liability attached against the accused.
In any event, the Supreme Court took ocassion to apply the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard in this case.

Here is the digest of that case:

Rodolfo R. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118971
September 15, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the
area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General
Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their
meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his
companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at
the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day,
April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article appeared
in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were
supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1) nakipagsabwatan
umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14
na lote ng lupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan,
nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project
manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si
Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging
sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel
against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast
aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times
versus Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.

Held:
The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is
to be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no
liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public
official concerned proves that the statement was made with
actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the
charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner
made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and
justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be
contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all,
infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Libel was used as a form of harassment:

Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in

making the charges against complainant, it would appear that
complainant filed this case to harass petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the
publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the
editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded.
The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser"
still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies
of the newspaper.

Freedman v. Maryland
Facts of the case
Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of
censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films
that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to
incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making
process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional
due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that
prior approval itself was unconstitutional.

Question
Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression
protected by the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Sort: by seniority by ideology
UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR FREEDMAN
MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.
The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court
decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger
of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was
allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory
provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit
a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate
safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected
expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of
proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2)
require judicial determination to impose a valid determination,
and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time
period."

Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation

Facts of the case
During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio
station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin
spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves.
His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker,
and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue
included "sensitive language which might be regarded as
offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man
who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his
young son.
Question
Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict
the public broadcast of indecent language under any
circumstances?

Conclusion
Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >>
54 DECISION FOR FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS
54 DECISION FOR FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS
No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could
constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently
offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need
not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of
day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in
determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the
Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise
of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is
obscene."

MGM Studios v. Grokster

Facts of the case
Grokster and other companies distributed free software that
allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-
peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files
directly between their computers, without the use of a central
server. Users employed the software primarily to download
copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew
about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising
revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group
of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged
that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act
by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe
copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning
that the software distribution companies were not liable for
copyright violations stemming from their software, which could
have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question
Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and
encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using
such software, liable for the infringement?

Conclusion
Sort: by seniority by ideology
UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS
INC., ET AL.
MAJORITY OPINION BY DAVID H. SOUTER
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the
Court held that companies that distributed software, and
promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the
resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the
Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's
infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The
software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights
that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each
individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go
against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the
software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting
from direct infringement.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/am_01-4-03-
sc_2001.html