multilatup now

Obama solves
Brimmer 09 (Statement of Assistant Secretary-Designate Esther Brimmer Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary-Designate to Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton,
http://usunrome.usmission.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2009_03/alia/a9032403.htm)

President Obama has enunciated a new vision of U.S. leadership in international affairs , to
"strengthen our common security by investing in our common humanity." Revitalizing
multilateral cooperation will play an important part in that effort. T he President has
reaffirmed Americas commitment to the United Nations as an indispensable, if imperfect,
institution for advancing our security and well-being . This represents a return to the role we played after the Second World War,
when the United States took the lead in establishing and developing a wide range of international
institutions . This greatly enhanced our influence, while also serving to enhance collective security
and stability. Even if viewed from a unilateral perspective, it was clear American interests

required a positive, multilateralist foreign policy. A recommitment to this approach and a

sense of urgency is desperately needed . We face new and fast-moving challenges on a daunting array of issues that no one state can address effectively alone.
When thinking about the UN, our focus is often on intractable, politically-charged issues debated at the Security Council or General Assembly. But the UN system is comprised of many agencies and organizations
quietly trying to get the job done in difficult circumstances. Indeed, in some parts of the globe the UN is the only institution able to make a difference in performing vital, life-saving services. If confirmed, I would
focus my efforts on shaping U.S. engagement in the UN system to serve our national interests of strengthening peace, security and the well-being of humanity, while also strengthening the UN as an institution.
Besides its ten internal offices in Washington, the IO Bureau supports the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York and six overseas missions. All told, this comprises 617 hardworking people with a major impact on
multilateral programs. During Fiscal Year 2009, IO-managed accounts comprised $1.5 billion in assessed contributions to mostly UN-system organizations, nearly $300 million in voluntary contributions to a host of
international organizations and initiatives, and we anticipate $2.3 billion in assessed peacekeeping costs. Multilateral diplomacy is of course not the only tool available to us. I appreciate the need to dovetail these
efforts with the bilateral work of our Embassies, with our public diplomacy, with the often hazardous operations of the U.S. military and other government agencies, and with regional and non-governmental

Clinton and others have summed

organizations. Nor does being an effective part of the UN mean surrendering our sovereignty in any way. Secretary

up this multifaceted approach with the term "smart power" -- using the full range of tools at our disposal to advance
American interests and promote a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world. This places diplomacy on the leading edge of international relations. We will join

the United Nations in addressing climate change, stabilizing weak and failing states, delivering humanitarian assistance,
preventing and resolving conflict, improving health and education , and on a host of other issues. In achieving these goals, we
must convince others they have a stake in the efficient operation of the institutions. That comes only by including them as full partners. For example, the UN plays a crucial role in reducing poverty and advancing
human well-being. The United States will join the UN in helping countries reach their Millennium Development Goals, including efforts to reduce the proportion of hunger and extreme poverty by half by 2015.
Developing nations need effective health care, not only to protect their citizens, but also to sustain economic gains. Diseases know no borders, and global health represent a security issue for the United States. Thanks
to the efforts of the World Health Organization and UNICEF, we will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the eradication of smallpox next year. The food security crisis that struck last year threatened an estimated 86
million people in 80 countries. The World Food Program responded by expanding its program of work to $10.9 billion, an increase of 87%. The United States has provided over 40 percent WFP's resources.
Addressing the January 26 World Food Programs Summit in Madrid, Secretary Clinton recommitted the United States to continue this support . For six decades, the Security Council has provided a framework for
cooperative international efforts to sustain or restore international peace and security. As authorized in the Council's resolutions, some 112,000 UN peacekeepers, police personnel and civilian support staff from 119
countries -- more than ever before -- are now deployed in 16 peacekeeping missions around the world as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last year, the Council had to grapple with a problem out of the history books
piracy. Centuries ago countries realized that international cooperation was needed to deal with threats to international navigation, upon which a nascent global system of commerce depended. Today, when the
problem of piracy reemerged, countries turned to the Security Council to provide the framework for an effective naval, legal and commercial response. This exemplifies how the Security Council can be a forum for
confronting the challenges of the 21 st century. If confirmed, one of the most challenging aspects of my work will be to find a way forward on Security Council reform that enhances its credibility and enables it to
carry out its mandate. One of the greatest potential threats to international security is Iran's push to develop nuclear weapons. As Secretary Clinton stated, we will "do all that we can to deter and to prevent Iran from
obtaining [these] weapons." The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided the technical expertise that informed the Council's action in sanctioning Iran. Compliance with the Council's resolutions is the sole
path Iran can take toward restoring international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Multilateral engagement is also central to achieving core human rights objectives. Unfortunately, the Human
Rights Council has been a major disappointment, diverted from its mission by states with some of the worst human rights records. Under the Obama Administration, the United States has resumed its observer status,
reflecting a fervent commitment to defend the rights of the individual, the rule of law and the principles of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice have stated the
Administrations strong commitment to womens rights, and Ambassador Rice was actively involved in the U.S. delegation to this year's meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women. Racism remains a
serious human rights concern as well. However, the Durban process was diverted by a vocal group of delegations and NGOs into a platform for prejudice and intolerance towards one country, the state of Israel, and a
vehicle to promote restrictions on freedom of speech in the guise of protecting against alleged defamation of religions. The Administration made a good faith effort to engage, but in this case came to the conclusion
that it could not participate in negotiations on the document originally presented. Having noted these challenges and the UN's potential to addressing them, one must acknowledge our expectations have often not
been met. At times, mismanagement and corruption have tainted the UN's work. The Secretariat must continue to improve accountability, transparency, internal oversight and program effectiveness. The United

. Failure to pay all of our dues has reduced our influence ,

States must fulfill its financial obligations while insisting on UN accountability

diluting efforts to promote reform. President Obama has stated that we should pay down
arrears. This can have a major impact on international peace and security. Despite its limitations, most Americans continue to support the
UN, sharing the view of a majority worldwide that it can be our best hope for the resolution
of globally challenging issues. Opinion surveys conducted in scores of countries have consistently shown a strong public commitment to the UN. Yet these surveys also show
that many people realize the UN has often failed to meet its potential. Why this continued commitment to an institution with so many flaws? I believe it speaks to a sense of ownership in the United Nations that
people around the world share. Challenged by economic, cultural or political disenfranchisement, feeling disconnected from traditional societies, people turn to the UN if not for immediate solutions, at least for the
consolation of having an address where solutions ultimately may reside. By enhancing our connection to the UN, we connect with people around the globe who hope for better lives for themselves and their children.
Even if we are regularly outvoted, our principled positions in the UN are reported to -- and resonate among -- communities under stress worldwide. We sometimes forget how important this was throughout the Cold
War -- the world's leading democracy speaking honestly and openly in the world's leading international institution, refusing to be silenced on the need for universal human rights, justice and economic opportunity for
all, and an end to violence and repression. With the determination to exercise "smart power" at the UN and other international organizations, we can build communities of interest once again, bringing openness and

President Obama and Secretary-General

transparency to international affairs. No other country is more capable of exercising leadership in this way. Bot h

Ban saw it as a high priority to meet early on in the President's new administration to
consult on the wide range of challenges they face. The President noted the UN can be "an
extraordinarily constructive partner in bringing about peace and security in the world ." I was heartened
as well by the Secretary-General's unconditional statement of his commitment to work with us. In conclusion, I look forward with enthusiasm to the prospect of advancing along
all of these avenues. If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to this effort , not only to address the immediate crises that will inevitably arise in the
 to lay the groundwork for sustained U.S. leadership in multilateral
coming weeks and months, but also

engagement as we move forward into the 21st century . Thank you.

 multilatfails
Multilateralism fails its unsustainable and it cant solve
anything
Held et al, 13 Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and
Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,
ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS
***Edited for ablest language
Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war
multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha
round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds
before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global
emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest
dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation
sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of
breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of
issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but
rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not
simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because
previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended
consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that
created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled , given failures of
contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into
institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful
countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand
how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that
contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great
powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what
now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the
sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of
democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country,
many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late
1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as
China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the
institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental
organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International
Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as
well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal . At the same time, new kinds of.
Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from
forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and
engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization .
These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the
world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in
turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle
anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the
last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology,
are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took
place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great
Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990;
O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to
the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in
large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the
factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global
cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on
politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of
the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled . In areas such as nuclear
proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic
imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water
deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly
ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming
a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and
deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for
this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder
problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific
mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has
increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More
importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global
problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions . At Bretton Woods in
1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other
European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management,
not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However,
a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of
interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded,
in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods
institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were
wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important
countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West
to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At
the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold
more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar
order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems.
As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must
cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of
countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic
policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade
negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between
industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a
host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and
environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree
sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up
industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number
of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe.
Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds , along
with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made
a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the
1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense
institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational
organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of
institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce
resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to
lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide
public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide
policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when
international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in
turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs . In stressing four
pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on
each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now
faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are
second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block
and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level

Multilateral cooperation fails states priorities are too diverse

Patrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, Irresponsible Stakeholders? The
Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)

Rivalry among the emerging powers may also complicate multilateral cooperation. This is most
obvious between China and India, which share a disputed border extending over 2,000 miles,
compete for regional influence and natural resources, and remain acutely sensitive to changes in
their relative military capabilities. China's cultivation of India's neighbors is making New Delhi
afraid of strategic encirclement, and maritime competition between the two powers is increasing
in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, even on those issues on which the basic interests of the established and the emerging
powers align-terrorism, climate change, nuclear proliferation, or global financial stability-these
states' priorities may differ. The issue of North Korea is an obvious example. Both the United
States and China want the North Korean nuclear program eliminated. But whereas Washington
places a high priority on this objective, Beijing seeks above all to preserve cordial relations with
Pyongyang. It fears the anarchy of a failed state on its borders and would rather maintain the
status quo than see the Korean Peninsula reunified under a democratic government that might
prove hostile to Chinese interests. Beijing had these motives in mind when it ensured that a UN
Security Council resolution in July addressing the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel earlier
this year offered only a tepid condemnation, failing to indict by name the obvious perpetrator,
North Korea.
 multilatno public support
US politics prevent adjusting to effective multilateralism
Patrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, Irresponsible Stakeholders? The
Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)
PRESERVATION THROUGH COOPERATION
In the end, the
biggest obstacle to integrating rising powers into the world order may come from
within the United States. Making room for emerging players will require psychological
adjustments on the part of U.S. officials. They will have to reevaluate the touchstones that have defined U.S. foreign policy since
1945. For more than half a century, the United States has served as the chief architect and ultimate guarantor of an open, liberal international political and
economic order. This role has become embedded in U.S. political culture and national identity. But as global power becomes diffuse, the United States'
long-standing habits of mind may be more limiting than helpful.
By the 1960s, as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson cruelly noted, the United Kingdom had lost an empire but not yet found a new role. The
erosion of U.S. hegemony, although less stark, poses its own challenges. As
the United States sheds its primacy, it will need
to adopt a more inclusive form of leadership. Compromise will be the order of the day.
The U.S. public may be prepared to make this shift: a comprehensive digest of recent polling data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations and
World Public Opinion suggests that Americans are willing to share the world's burdens. Yet at a minimum, multipolarity
will test the
assumptions of American exceptionalism. The United States has long taken an la carte approach
to its international commitments: picking and choosing among multilateral treaties, institutions, and initiatives and occasionally acting
alone or opting out to preserve its sovereignty or freedom of action. But as the U.S. National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 202$ suggests,
"Such a selective approach is . . . running into trouble because those powerful enough to afford picking and choosing are growing more numerous." As
today's rising powers avail themselves of the same privilege, such exceptionalism may fray the
fabric of the international system. To hold the postwar order together, the United States will have to become a more consistent
exemplar of multilateral cooperation.
 multilatregionalism checks
Global multilateralism is impossible, but regional solutions check the impact
Khanna, 10 senior research fellow at the New America Foundation (Parag, Hows That New
World Order Working Out?, Foreign Policy, December,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/hows_that_new_world_order_working_out
Bush Sr. chose to give the speech at the United Nations for a reason: America was the preeminent power, but he was a multilateralist. Paralyzed during
the Cold War, the United Nations now had a chance toplay the central role as arbiter of global governance for which it was envisioned. But rather than
personify multilateralism itself, the United Nations is proving to be at best just one manifestation of it. Free-standing functional agencies like the World
Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund -- which has only become more important in the wake of the financial crisis -- are our only
effective global bodies, and they are solely economic in nature. Butthe G-20 has hardly lived up to its billing as the new
"steering committee for the world." Before the most recent Seoul summit, world leaders
described U.S. proposals for harmonizing current account surpluses and deficits as "clueless."
The Security Council has long ceased to be legitimate or effective, with little prospect for reform
in sight. As we learned so painfully this year, the United Nations can't forge a global climate deal and can't make the world meet the Millennium
Development Goals. For every issue there are now several specialized agencies, like the World Food Program and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, that mostly secure their own funding contributions and are evolving at their own pace.
The closest thing we have to multilateral governance happens on a regional level, and it is far
more promising, whether the deeply entrenched and supranational European Union, the
rejuvenated Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the nascent African Union . Each is
building a regional order tailored to its members' priorities and level of development. On Sudan and
Somalia, it's Uganda leading the new diplomatic and peacekeeping push. For Palestine, the Arab League is considering a peacekeeping force. And on
Iran, Turkey is now in the lead.
The world of 1990 was expected to remain fundamentally international. Yet instead its very structure has changed as globalization has empowered legions
of transnational nonstate actors from corporations to NGOs to religious groups. As a result, today's world features overlapping and competing claims to
authority and legitimacy. The Gates Foundation gives away more money each year than any European country. Villagers in Nigeria expect Shell to deliver
the goods, not their government. And Oxfam shapes the British development agency's priorities more than the reverse.
Neither the United States nor the United Nations can put the genie back in the bottle. With each passing year, deal-making
at Davos and
the Clinton Global Initiative become more important than the glacial advance of empty
declarations at international summits . These and other venues are the places where the "new new world order" is being built. And it's
happening from the bottom up rather than the top down.
 xt multilateralism fails
Emerging powers wont cooperate with the US
Patrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, Irresponsible Stakeholders? The
Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)
COMPROMISE MAY COME SECOND
The emerging non-Western powers do not share the United States' view on global governance. The
ideal scenario for Washington
would be for the rising powers to embrace Western principles, norms, and rules, just as entrants to
the European Union adopt its acquis communautaire, the whole body of eu laws. But the
emerging nations are intent on altering existing rules, not adopting them hook, line, and sinker.
These countries do not grant the United States the sole authority to define the limits of
responsible sovereignty. They believe that they are entitled to reshape international arrangements to suit themselves. This shared aspiration
has been on display at the annual bric summits, at which Brazil, Russia, India, and China have (among other things) challenged the dollar's role as the
world's reserve currency and demanded a greater voice in international financial institutions.
Another important source of tension between the established and the rising powers concerns the limits of national sovereignty. Most of the emerging
powers are skeptical of the belief, common in Western circles, that sovereignty is contingent and that international intervention is justified against states
that commit mass atrocities, sponsor terrorism, or pursue weapons of mass destruction. This skepticism extends to democracies such as Brazil, India, and
South Africa, which have opposed vigorous un Security Council action in response to human rights violations in places such as Myanmar (also known as
Burma), Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
Principled differences between the established and the emerging powers extend to other realms. Progress on preventing nuclear proliferation, including an
agreement on the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has been stymied by disputes over the relative responsibilities of the nuclear
weapons states and the nonnuclear weapons states. Brazil, for instance, insists that all weaponsholding states must make significant progress on their
obligations to disarm before it will accept additional controls on its own nuclear facilities.
Similar disputes arise in economic relations. All of today's emerging players seek to have greater weight in global governance, but they do not necessarily
seek more global governance. Their views on the International Monetary Fund's reform agenda are a case in point. Many Western countries in the G-20
want the imf to assume a more overt surveillance role and to monitor the macroeconomic policies of member states, the status of their regulatory efforts,
and the risks these states pose in terms of spawning international financial crises. China, India, and Saudi Arabia, in contrast, oppose a larger role for the
imf; they want larger voting shares at the organization without any additional infringement on their prerogatives.
The Obama administration often insists that international rules, such as those regarding nonproliferation or trade, must be enforced. It assumes that the
world's major players will naturally prioritize global security and economic and environmental challenges just as it does. But the
emerging
powers do not accept all the current international rules, and the White House has provided little
insight into what it can or will do to persuade these powers to cooperate in cases in which their
preferences are not, in fact, aligned with those of the United States.

Multilateralism fails interests are too diverse and domestic politics prevent cooperation
Patrick, 10 - Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, Irresponsible Stakeholders? The
Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, November/December, proquest)
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY
Rising powers are often inclined to enjoy the privileges of power without assuming its obligations. They prefer to free ride on the contributions of
established nations. This instinct is reinforced by the anxiety that accepting international commitments could jeopardize their domestic development.
Emerging countries wrestle with conflicting identities. They seek a louder voice in global affairs, but as self-identified developing countries, they remain
committed to alleviating poverty within their own borders. Thus, they resist global initiatives that would hamper their domestic growth.
This dual identity can sometimes allow rising powers to bridge North-South divides. But it can also leave them whipsawed between global ambitions and
solidarity with other developing nations. Obama administration officials speak wryly of emerging powers cross-dressing as developed countries within
the G-20 only to invoke long-standing developingcountry grievances in other forums.
Some of the most prominent rising powers are ringleaders of developing country blocs. Brazil,
India, Indonesia, and South Africa, for example, are all leaders of the Group of 77 (G-77), and the last
three are members of the Non- Aligned Movement-both groups that impede multilateral cooperation by reinforcing obsolete ideological divisions
between the North and the South. Despite
strong bilateral ties to the United States, these rising players have a
penchant for playing to the gallery and voting against U.S. preferences in the un General
Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and other multilateral forums. Obama has spoken vristfully of the need to
abandon "outdated" bloc mentalities, but the emerging powers show little inclination to do so.
Internal political dynamics make integration efforts difficult. Leaders of both the established and
the emerging powers must reconcile an increasingly complicated and intrusive multilateral
agenda with political realities at home. These pressures are likely to constrain partnership
between them.
Regime type, for example, is limiting U.S.-Chinese cooperation on cybersecurity. The United States has
promoted a vision of cyberspace that is open, global, and relatively anonymous, whereas China's vision is predicated on state control. Both countries are
interested in keeping the Internet safe from criminal activities, but it is hard to see how they can agree on any multilateral system as long as Beijing insists
on censorship and persecutes online dissidents.

Multilateral cooperation does nothing too many divergent interests

McGillycuddy, 8 (Sebastian, JULY 16TH, 2008 12:13 UN-Realpolitik: The Dangers of
Multilateralism,
http://my.telegraph.co.uk/sebastian_mcgillycuddy/sebastian/4632978/UNRealpolitik_The_Dange
rs_of_Multilateralism/)

To be sure, the UN is hindered by the international system, which seasoned realists know is
inimical to any genuine multilateralism due to the absence of a common power which makes
international relations scarcely more elevated than the law of the jungle. Certainly realpolitik
does no more than scratch the surface of the complex relations between states, but it is
nonetheless indispensable to any basic understanding of them. But the UN does itself no favours.
It naively assumes itself to be capable of transcending the realist analysis through soft power and
influence the quid pro quo of giving up state sovereignty, the stage on which our leaders can
flounce around flaunting their precious consciences which tends to amount to no more than
hectoring and parading moral authority, the kind beloved of liberals but which is unequal to the
task of feeding one starving child or preventing one brutal attack by a dictators henchman on a
helpless subject. It congratulates itself on its humanitarian work, which mainly involves
spending other peoples money and winning the support of narcissistic Hollywood actors. It even
has the nerve to tell us that we should have a referendum on abolishing our monarchy, an episode
so astonishingly audacious in its shocking indifference to national sovereignty that it is
impossible to even begin a discussion of it. Its reputation for corruption, whether oil-for-food in
Iraq or sexual abuse by its soldiers in Congo, is legendary. Yet there is a sense in which all of this
misses the point. If the UN was just another vacuous talking shop like the G8 or Sarkozys
current Mediterranean jaunt, or even just another pernicious, remote and interfering bureaucracy,
like a larger but weaker EU, we would at least know our enemy. Instead it is the organisation
which all too often appears to be charged with the responsibility of preventing World War III. It is
a dangerous indulgence to believe that it can do this, and its failure would surely make the demise
of the ill-fated EU 3 in Iran look like a relative diplomatic triumph.

Multilateralism fails
Campell and O'Hanlon, 6 (Kurt, director at the CSIS Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, and Michael, senior policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, Hard Power:
The New Politics of National Security, October, p. 214)
In the convincing phrase Madeleine Albright coined in the 1990s, the United States truly is the "indispensable nation." Another useful metaphor from that
era, Richard Haass's description of America as "reluctant sheriff," is also apropos. The United States may show greater skepticism about using its military
muscle in the future than it did during much of the George W. Bush presidency, but it needs to play the role of international sheriff at times nonetheless
(with the help of "'posses" of like minded states), because no other entity can do so.5 Those moderates and progressives angry
about Bush
administration unilateralism and arrogance must
avoid overcompensating in such a way that they weaken
Americas critical role as a global leader. America's centrality in the international order is another aspect of the reason why
moderates and progressives must be careful when they suggest that multilateralism will be a core element of their foreign policy, as many do. While
multilateralism is desirable, it should not be taken so far as to devolve simplistically into a
"democratic" approach to world affairs in which each nation essentially gets equal say. As Harvard
professor and former Pentagon official Joseph Nye argues, the United States should not act multilaterally when doing so
would contradict core American values, delay responses to immediate threats to its security, or promote
poor policies that might have been improved through a tougher (and more unilateral) bargaining process.6 The United States will sometimes
have to do things that are unpopular internationally; it will
usually have to help forge consensus among nations rather
than wait for it to develop; and it will generally have to act rather than hope that crises will go away on their own. On the subject at hand,
this means that America needs to be ready to defend its allies without waiting for global approval or the
formation of large coalitions to do so.
 xt unreliable partners
Multilateralism fails partners are unreliable and their actions taint the entire effort
Farah, 4 (Joseph, The danger of multilateralism, WorldnetDaily, 3/18,
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.printable&pageId=23783)

Since the first Persian Gulf War, American leaders have sworn by multilateralism in foreign
policy.
It has become an article of faith that military actions should only be undertaken with the help and
cooperation of allies even when those allies don't have all that much to contribute and even
when those allies are brought in kicking and screaming.
Let me be the first to point out that one of the dangers of multilateralism was just illustrated in
Spain.
Spain didn't necessarily contribute much significant in terms of actual military capability in Iraq.
As with most of the nations contributing combat or peacekeeping forces to the coalition, Spain's
participation was more symbolic than substantive.
But symbolism is a two-way street. And when a symbolic partner decides to leave the coalition
under pressure, that symbolism is more destructive than its original commitment was
constructive.
A coalition of the kind we have built in Iraq symbolically, anyway is only as strong as its
weakest link. We just learned who the weakest link was. But we may find others going the way of
Spain before long, if they, too, learn there's a real cost to standing up against the Islamist "holy
warriors."
 xt no public support
Multilateralism causes free riding, crushing public support, making it unsustainable
Posen and Ross, 97 (Barry R. Posen and Andrew L Ross, Pofessor of political science at MIT;
military theorist, "Competing visions for U.S. grand strategy", International Security, Winter, p.
5)

Cooperative security is vulnerable to a range of criticisms. First, individual states are still expected to be able to rise above narrow
conceptions of national interest in response to appeals for action on behalf of the collective good, and to engage in what will seem to them as armed
altruism. In theory, some collective action problems associated with collective security[40] may be ameliorated by cooperative security. In particular, the
combination of intensive arms control, military technological superiority, and U.S. leadership ismeant to reduce substantially the costs of cooperation for
any given member of the cooperative security regime. Nevertheless, there will still be defectors and free riders . Major power
aggression would still be a problem for cooperative security, as it was for collective security, if some powers perceive the intrinsic stakes as small and the
aggressor as far away and difficult to fight. It seems unlikely, for example, that the NATO allies would ever fight the People's Republic of China over
Taiwan, even if the United States wanted to doso. States concerned about the possible competitions of the future will still ask if any given opportunity for
current cooperation toachieve a common good, or oppose a common bad, changes their power position relative to all other potential challengers,
including one another. Second, the
task of building sufficient general multilateral credibility to deter a series
of new and different potential aggressors seems very difficult . Regular U.S. action to oppose theSoviet Union during
the Cold War did not entirely dissuade that regime from new challenges. Since this was an iterative bipolar game,credibility should have accumulated, but
that does not seem to have happened. Although U.S. credibility appears to have been quite high in Europe, where direct interests were great and deployed
military power was strong, elsewhere Soviet behavior was often mischievous. It is quite likely, therefore, that a
true cooperative security
strategy would involve the UN, designated regional organizations, and effectively the United States, in a number of
wars over many years if it is to have any hope of establishing the ability to deter the ambitious and reassure
the fearful. This would, however, serve to further strain public support for a demanding strateg y. Third,
democracies are problematical partners in a cooperative security project in a crucial respect: their publics must be persuaded to go to war. Since the
publics in modern liberal democracies seem to be quite casualty-sensitive, the case for risking the lives of their troops in distant wars is inherently
difficult to make. This is one reason why the decisive military superiority of a technologically dominant coalition of peace-loving states is a necessary
condition for cooperative security to work. This in turn depends on the military power of the United States.