Vasubandhus Twenty Verses 26, Nov. 07 p.

This is an extended argument against Realists who assert that what we experience corresponds accurately to
real entities that cannot be limited to the constructive activity of individual. (Lusthaus, 5)

Verses 1, 2. Such objective entities have four characteristics: 1, 2) they are restricted to specific times and
places, 3) there is collective consensus regarding these; 4) they function in terms of certain causal regularities.
Vasubandhu argues that the presence of these characteristics does not necessarily entails external objects:

1, 2). There can be restrictions in time and space in dreams, which only occur in bed while sleeping.
3) Such restrictions occur with hell denizens, who collectively experience torture from hell guardians.
4) Causal regularities occur without external objects, such as in wet dreams.

Verses 2, 3. Hell Denizens. Similar Experiences from Similar Karma (sdhraa-karma). (ad. verses 3, 2)

Even though in hell there are no real infernal guardians, still, because of the dominant power of
the maturation of identical acts of those sentient beings, many [individual] mental continuities (satna) in
the same place, at the same time, all alike see infernal guardians. Even though there are no real objects of
perception apart from consciousness, still the nonrestriction of many mental continuities is demonstrated.

Verses 5, 6. Tortures of Hell are not Physical Realities, but Result from Beings Previous Karma.
Perfuming (vsan) of action is in one place, and you assert that the result exists elsewhere The
perfuming of their action must logically be admitted as being in their [individual] continuities of
consciousness & nowhere else

Verses 7, 8 The World-Honored One, with a hidden motive, spoke of the existence of the sense bases.
there being no separate real existence [of sense bases] for those being [fit] to be instructed.

Consciousness is born from its own seeds & transforms to resemble characteristics of objects of perception.
Consciousness appearing resembling [visible] form [rpa] is born from its own seeds as a special
transformation [of the mental continuity] and the confluence of conditions. On the basis of this seed and the
appearing form, the Buddha spoke of [them as] sense bases consisting of eyes and.. of form, respectively.

Comments. Our karmic history provides the karmic conditions for us to experience things in certain
ways. These provide the conditions for the arising of certain appearances. That is, we have the kinds
of bodies we have due to our previous karma. And, by definition, that which comes about through
karma comes about mediated by seeds in the mental stream, i.e. the mental stream maintains the
karmic potential (hetu bja phala) for us to experience such and such a form, etc.
Moreover, things appear not only in the forms that we have the (karmically) acquired the
faculties to perceive, but also in ways that we are predisposed (vsan) to experience them.

Verse 9. Awareness of the Interdependence of Conditions Provides Entry to Selflessness of Self and Dharmas.

if one thoroughly understands that the six consciousnesses develop from the six pairs of dharmas
[i.e., the twelve sense bases] and that there is no perceiver or knower at all, then that person [one] will be
able to awaken to and enter the [teaching of the] absence of self in the sentient.
if one thoroughly understands the arising of dharmas that resemble form, etc., as the appearance of
consciousness only.. [one] will be able to awaken to and enter the absence of self in all dharmas.

To see selflessness of dharmas is to see them as dependently arisen phenomena, necessarily in relation
to many other factors necessary for the arising of cognitive awareness. They have no self-existence.

It is Entering the absence of self of dharmas because it refers to the absence of self of the dharmas of self-
nature (svabhva) and difference (viea) imagined by the ignorant, not because the Dharma nature that
is the object of perception of Buddhas does not exist all, I.e. consciousness only critiques the delusion of
ordinary beings who believe that dharmas are self-existent. It is an antidote only directed toward them.
Verses 10-14. The Hindu Vaieikas maintain that the universe is comprised of partless entities called atoms. Although
we do not perceive these atoms directly, we do perceive entities as a whole (avayavin) comprised of such atoms.
These entities have their own qualities and occupy exactly the same space as the atoms. Without this whole we could
only infer, but not directly perceive, objects, since we only see one part of an object at a time (i.e., we cant see its front
and back, simultaneously). This whole exists as a real entity independently of our own cognitive constructive processes.

Vasubandhu argues that our perception of whole objects is not explicable in terms of either atoms or their aggregated
wholes and hence this realist position is untenable. Vasubandhu deconstructs perception based upon either the
whole as a direct object of perception, or of atoms collected into aggregates in which we either perceive each atom
separately or as united together into such a whole.

Vasubandhus critique of Vaieika concept of whole (Anacker, Seven Works, 128, n.11)
1. If the whole cloth exists in each thread, then it should be visible even in a single one of them.
2. If the whole doesnt exist in each part, then why isnt it simply a designation for their aggregation?
3. If seeing some of its parts were enough to see the whole object, wed see it when we see only its edge.
4. If we must see all parts to see the whole, then we never would, b/c we cant see the front, back at one time.
5. If you see the parts successively, then this is like the circle of fire, i.e. just an optical illusion.
6. If qualities must pervade their substances wholly, what whole is a multi-colored cloth?

Atoms Cannot Explain Relation Between Parts and Whole. Atomswhich are held to be partlesscant join together
to make up perceivable aggregates because either 1) certain parts of the atom would have to conjoin at certain places
which they cant because they are partlessor 2) they would have to conjoin as whole entities, in which case they
would still only take up only the space of a single atom and would therefore remain imperceivable.
But if aggregates are not combinations of atoms joined together, how are they aggregates? Vasubandhu argues
that the problem of the nonunion of atoms is not a result of their being devoid of parts, but rather thatif the atoms
themselves arent conjoinedwhat are they aggregates of? (v. 12) The whole would be disconnected from its parts.
Moreover, without parts, how could they have their perceptual qualities? To cast a shadow, they must take up
space and thus must have parts, front and back. Since partless atoms cant extend, they also cant obstruct light. (v. 13)
The same kind of analysis holds for other aspects of perceptual objects, such as a blue object or the earth. If a
[blue object] has parts, it logically would not form a unity (v. 13). But if there were blue, etc. that was without
divisions, [then all blue] objects of perception reached by the eyes, etc., would be grasped as single things, without
divisions between them. But a single thing or single time [without divisions] would logically neither be grasped nor
not grasped. (ad. verse 14)
An otherness [distinction] of entities is constructed if there is a division of characteristics, and not otherwise,
so when speaking from the atomic point of view, one must by necessity construct divisions, and it cannot be
demonstrated that they (the atoms) are in any way of one kind. (Anackers translation, p. 170).

SUMMARY: Absolute, partless and extensionless singularity, such as an atom or an instant are said to have,
are meaningless abstractions. 1) They cannot be directly perceived; 2) they cannot be aggregated into entities
possessing either duration or extension; 3) they require equally vacuousand illogicalabstractions, such as
wholes, to explain perception. There are similar problems with extension, movement, partial knowledge, shadow and
concealment, quantity, difference, and relation. (Koch. P. 181).
Thus, neither an atomist nor a holistic account of substantively existent external objects can explain perceptual
experience. Only a cognitive constructivist account can, that is, an account that affirms the dependently arisen nature of
all perceptual objects, and the role that previous experienceand its consequencesplay in constructing experience.

Verse 15-16 if there are no external objects of perception, how can one have the awareness, I am now experiencing
such an object of perception? 3 responses: 1) direct awareness is as in dreams, etc., requiring no external object.
2) When one is experiencing this direct awareness the object is already nonexistent, because it is necessarily
in the mental consciousness that one can distinguish [visible forms], and because by that time, visual and other kinds of
consciousness have necessarily already ceased. I.e. all apparent perception is actually conception.
3) Memory does not require a previous moment of an actual external object. It arises from previous appearance.

Verse 16. None of the entities one sees really exists, and one who has not acquired true awakening cannot know this.
If one acquires that supramundane antidote [to delusion] that is nondiscriminative knowledge (nirvikalpa-jna) called
true awakening, then one knows thoroughly according to reality that that object of perception is not real.

Verses 17-18. Intersubjectivity without Self-existent Objects. The difference in consciousness in the mental continuity
of one causes differences in the mental continuity of another consciousness to occur not [from] external objects.
As a result of the transformation of anothers consciousness, there are acts of injury and killing. The transformation
of consciousness of one individual brings about events that cause injury to the life force of another person far away.