EN BANC

G.R. No. 88211|15 September 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE

M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, Respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Courts decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect
on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via
the non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino
was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and
consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by
political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led
by Col. Canlas with the support of Marcos loyalists and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos
spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by
a Lebanese arms dealer awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification
of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of people power and also clearly reinforced the
constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquinos presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody
challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants
and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message
they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened
civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government
could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and
among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the
secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the
extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they
effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There
has been no let up on this groups determination to wrest power from the government. Not only
through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in
creating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The
efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show
concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.
 The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of
office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of
the following issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President
Marcos and family to the Philippines?

a. Is this a political question?

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President
Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest
of national security, public safety or public health

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former

President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in
making such finding?

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with,

has the Presidents decision, including the grounds upon
which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that
they may controvert the same?

c. Is the Presidents determination that the return of former

President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health
a political question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of

former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the Presidents

decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family,
acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of
 jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act
which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and
his family to the Philippines?

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor may
the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of
the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified
by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12

(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory,
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.

(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents principal argument is that the issue in this case involves
a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not

petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
 liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo
without reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or

not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to
the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will endanger national
security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a

political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law
provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with
the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and
safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable
Court cannot consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to

the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to

the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and
residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still
a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand

E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their
residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court
cannot decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of
the President of the Philippines.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over
individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning
to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of
Guatemala, Fulgencio Bautista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose
return to their homelands was prevented by their governments.

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential
power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due
weight to the parties formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in
arriving at a solution to the controversy.

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the
right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of
Kent v. Dulles and Haig v. Agee which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to
the exercise thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to ones country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave a country, and the right to enter ones country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state (Art. 13[l]) separately from the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country. (Art. 13[2]) On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence (Art. 12[l]) and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. (Art. 12[2]) which rights may be restricted by such laws
as are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter his
own country of which one cannot be arbitrarily deprived. (Art. 12[4]) It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to ones country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land (Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution). However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
arbitrarily deprived thereof (Art. 12 [4]).

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the
purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise
of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence.

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can
be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered
unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the
methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach.
We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the
express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches
of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines; the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division
(Angara v. Electoral Commission) but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers
subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis pointed out a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and
a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised
under the government. If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial
power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power
which is vested in one official the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress.

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of executive power? Petitioners
advance the view that the Presidents powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: The President has enumerated powers, and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius. This argument brings
to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the
same problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those

who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should
be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political
forces, it should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: The

executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons
who held the office from Washington to the early 1900s, and the swing from the presidency by
commission to Lincolns dictatorship, he concluded that what the presidency is at any particular
moment depends in important measure on who is President.

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it

remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands
and duties no matter who was President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in
charge. Each Presidents distinctive temperament and character, his values,
 standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the White House and pervaded the entire government. The
executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from
the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its
impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to
President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal
obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the
confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and
posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the
constitutional order.

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but,
rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the
different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations
to the Presidents powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong
President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution
attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President
as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more
powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however,
brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative,
executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that executive power is the power to enforce
the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers
inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the countrys foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect
directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the board
and committee respectively, are not charged with the performance of any
legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are
vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are
not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The
fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical
ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among
which the powers of government are divided.

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes strong dissent. But in his enduring words of
dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers
of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
 The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields
of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in
a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise
it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that [t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people and that [t]he maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus,
in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic
principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the
officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants
of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to
the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are
laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered.
The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of
even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms,
admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests
(Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan)

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the Presidents
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power
of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the Presidents duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the Presidents duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed.

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of
the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as
Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning
has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution
proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President
to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect
for human rights under the Constitution and our laws. The Resolution does not question the
Presidents power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
Presidents sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond
the Courts jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress
or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example,
question the Presidents recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may
appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the
Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the
political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by
petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not
intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is
for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining judicial power, which specifically
empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental
law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia that:

Article VII of the 1935 Constitution vests in the Executive the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.
What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,
under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by
the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted
is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of
the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or
acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts
revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the Presidents decision.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not
besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in
Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history
of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups.
But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final
straw that would break the camels back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the
escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and
exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp
out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-
emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the peoples sovereignty is an obligation in the highest
order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful
execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
 We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from
the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their
close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in
its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development
and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of
judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic
collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.