RULE 130 SECTION 20 WITNESSES 3.

possesses none of the disqualifications provided for by the

rules
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, 4. must take either an oath or an affirmation as provided by
can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses. the Rules
o necessary for the witness to recognize the obligation to tell the
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or truth
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground o must understand the nature of the oath and realizes the moral
for disqualification. (18a) duty to tell the truth, and understands the prospects of being
punished for falsehood
Testimonial Evidence o oath if with religion; affirmation if no belief
Evidence elicited from the mouth a witness distinguished from real
and documentary evidence
Also called the viva voce evidence take note of the difference between competence and credibility
Competence Credibility
Theory and Basis Matter of law or rule refers to the weight and
Rests upon our faith in human testimony as sanctioned by trustworthiness; reliability of the
experience; that the general truth that men are of integrity, having testimony
capacity and having opportunity to pervert the truth o hence, a witness with
varying and conflicting
Elements of Testimonial Evidence testimonies is still a
1. Observation competent witness.
2. Recollection However, his testimonies
3. Narration may not be given that much
weight
Hence, the witness must have observed the events to which he is Has reference to the basic Believability of the witness and has
testifying, he must recollect the events at the time he was testifying, and qualifications of a witness as his nothing to do with the rules
he must be able to communicate or narrate the said events in the court. capacity to perceive and
communicate what he perceived; as
Hence, the basic qualifications of a witness as provided for in this rule: well as the absence of any of the
1. can perceive disqualifications imposed upon a
o a witness must be able to perceive an event witness
o the witness must have personal knowledge of the the facts Provided by the rules Discretion of the court: the
surrounding the subject matter of the testimony; those manner of assigning values to the
which were derived from his own perception declarations of witnesses is best
and competently performed by the
2. and in perceiving, can make known his perception to trial judge who has the unique and
others. unmatched opportunity to observe
o This process involved two factors: First, ability to the demeanor of the witnesses and
remember what he perceived; and (2) ability to assess their credibility (hence,
communicate the remembered perception observations of trial court judges
i. Deafmutes are not necessarily incompetent are given weight when the cases
as witnesses if they can understand and are put on appeal)
appreciate the sanctity of the oath;
comprehend the facts; they are going to Other factors not affecting the competency of witnesses
testify to; and communicate their ideas
through a qualified interpreter 1. being a party to the case
2. religious belief
3. interest in the outcome of the case

1
 4. conviction of a crime, unless provided for by law (i.e.,
perjury) 1. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity
Elements:
A. being a party to the case a. The person must be incapable of intelligently making
o parties to the case may testify without restriction known his perception to others
o the relationship of a witness with a party does not ipso b. His incapability must exist at the time of his production for
facto render him a biased witness in criminal and civil examination
cases
o bias is not even a basis for declaring a witness Rulings:
incompetent to testify
Insanity Imbecility Deaf mute Under the
B. Religious belief influence of
o a witness is not disqualified because he does not believe in alcohol/ drugs/
God or in a future retribution or punishment hypnotism
(a) complete Marked by Not by mere Affects
C. persons pecuniarily Interested deprivation of deficiency in reason of being competence if it
o a person interested in the outcome of the suit is allowed to intelligence; and mental capacity deaf-mute that affects the
testify the same as a disinterested person, but the adverse (b) complete one is already mental capacity
party may show by cross-examination the extent of that deprivation of incompetent as of the witness at
interest as affecting the credibility of witnesses volition a witness the time of the
taking testimony
D. Conviction for a crime Note however
o Formerly, a person convicted of perjury was disqualified that the courts
from testifying in court as a part of his penalty. However, had not yet
when the RPC was amended, the said penalty was take judicial
removed. Hence, a person convicted of perjury may testify notice of the
o The fact that the witness has been convicted of a effects of
felony is a circumstance to be taken into hypnotism
consideration as affecting his character and
credibility

2. Disqualification by reason of immaturity

Disqualifications of Witnesses
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.
o Note that in both cases, the incapacity that is referred must be at
the time he is produced in court to testify and not at the time the
subject of the testimony happened. However, the incapacity during
the occurrence of the event may affect his credibility
Elements:
a. the mental maturity of the witness must render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is
examined
b. he is incapable of relating his perception truthfully
A child witness
o is any person who, at the time of giving testimony, is below the
age of eighteen (18)
AM NO. 004-07 (Rule on Examination of Child Witness:
o presumes that ever child a is presumed qualified to be a witness
o to rebut this, the burden of proof lies with the party challenging the
childs competence

2
 2. People vs. Balanon 233 S 679- MEDRANO

1. People vs. Taneo 218 S 494- BALDEO

3
3. People vs. Baid 336 S 656- PASCUAL 4. People vs Lolito Honor 584 S 547- SALTERAS

4
5. People vs Solomon Dioneda 587 S 312- ARANETA
Facts:
1. Appellant Dioneda was charged with the crime of rape of a minor, 6
years of age, named in the case as AAA.
2. During the trial of the case, it was established that:
a. AAA, on August 27, 2000, went to the 3- storey house of
their neighbor Ruth Dajao to play with latters child named
Iking in Novaliches, Quezon City.
b. Upon reaching the first floor of the house, AAA met
Dioneda, 17 y/o who was the helper of the Dajao family.
c. AAA then proceeded to the third floor of the house and
discovered that Iking was already asleep. Hence, she
decided to just go home.
Take note of this difference, because this is the
issue:
During the direct examination, AAA stated that when
she went down the house and reached the first floor,
Dioneda prevented her and forced her to return to the
second floor.
Ruling: Yes. The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to
leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor is a
trivial matter. AAA, a child of tender age, could not be expected to give a
perfect recollection of the exact floor of the house where she met
appellant.
Ratio: the inconsistencies were immaterial and inconsequential
and do not affect the credibility of the witness. Forthright witnesses
are not immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of
events. Trivial inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor
details in the testimonies of witness do not impair their credibility.
They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest
spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements
of the crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or
innocence of the accused as in the present case, these are not valid
grounds to reverse a conviction.

However, during the cross examination, AAA stated In the present case, The place where AAA met appellant when she was
that she met Dioneda in the 2nd floor and that is where she about to leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor
was prevented from going home. is a trivial matter.

d. nonetheless, AAA was brought by Dioneda to the 2nd floor

bed room into his double-deck bed and there he had carnal
knowledge of her.
e. She went home crying and told her mother that her vagina
was aching and that kuya jong referring to Dioneda, did
something to her.
3. The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant Dioneda
guilty of rape as charged but his minority during the time
of the rape mitigated the penalty.
a. The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of AAA and
the Expert witnesses.
4. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused Dioneda.
5. Hence, the present action by Dioneda arguing that the both
lower courts erred in giving full credence to the testimony
of AAA considering that there were inconsistencies in her
statements as to her account of the events prior to the
rape, specifically, as to the floor where she was prevented
to go down (kung sa 1st floor or sa second floor).

Issue: Should the testimony of AAA still be considered in view of

the inconsistency between the statements as alleged by the
accused Dioneda?
5
RULE 130 SECTION 22 DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF information subject of the testimony
MARRIAGE was acquired and may refer to
information acquired prior to or
Marital Disqualification Rule during the marriage

Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their

marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the Requisites in order for the Marital Privilege under Section 22 be
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by applied:
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one 1. that the spouse for or against whom the testimony of the other is
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. offered, is a party to the case
2. that the spouses are legally married
There are two types of incompetency by reason of marital a. hence, it does not cover illicit cohabitation
relations under this rule but must be differentiated as different b. but it does cover spouses who were estranged as
rules apply: separation de facto does not sever marital relations
3. that the case is not one against the other
Incompetency to testify as to Incompetency to testify as to
anti-marital facts (Anti marital matters concerning marital
privilege or Spousal Immunity) confidential communications Requisites in order for the Privilege under Section 24 (a) be
between husband and wife applied:
(confidential communication) 1. there must be a valid marriage between the husband and the wife
Section 22. Disqualification by Section 24. Disqualification by 2. there is a communication received in confidence by one form the
reason of marriage. During their reason of privileged communication. other (clearly, not of and with third persons);
marriage, neither the husband nor The following persons cannot 3. the confidential communication was received during the marriage
the wife may testify for or against testify as to matters learned in
the other without the consent of the confidence in the following cases:
affected spouse, except in a civil (a)The husband or the wife, during Rationale
case by one against the other, or in or after the marriage, cannot be o there is identity of interests between the spouses
a criminal case for a crime examined without the consent of o hence, in the case of Alvarez vs Ramirez where the
committed by one against the other the other as to any communication wife filed a case for arson against her estranged
or the latter's direct descendants or received in confidence by one from husband for 6 months, the SC allowed the testimony of
ascendants. the other during the marriage the wife ruling that the fact that the marital and domestic
except in a civil case by one against relations between her and the husband has become so
the other, or in a criminal case for a strained that there is no more harmony, peace, and
crime committed by one against the tranquility to be preserved. Hence, identity of the interests
other or the latter's direct of the spouses are no longer existing (Note however that
descendants or ascendants; this is an exception and still a case when filed by one
Applicable only when one of the applicable even if any of the against the other)
spouses is a party to the case spouses are not a party to the case o that there is consequent danger of perjury
Refers to adverse or favourable refers to marital communications o policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security
marital testimony in general (e.g. only; what is prohibited is the and confidence of private life even at the risk of an occasional
testify as to what the spouse saw testifying as to the privileged failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its
etc.) and may also cover communications made between the admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness
testimonies involving marital spouses o because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
communication; what is prohibited danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of
is the mere act of testifying for or the other
against the spouse
Exists only during marriage Continues even after the dissolution
of the marriage EXCEPTION TO THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE:
Tenor of Section 22 does not that the communication was done o in the following circumstances, the spouse may testify for or
distinguish as to when the during the marriage against the other spouse:
6
 a. in a civil case against each other
b. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other, or the latters direct descendants or ascendants
o note, the injury need not amount to a physical
wrong upon the person. When the offense
directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the
conjugal relations, it comes within the exception
to the statute (Ordoo vs Daquigan)
o the disqualification also applies where the
spouse is a co-accused
1. Ordoo vs. Daquigan 62 S 270
Facts:
1. Avelino Ordono was charged in the MTC of San Gabriel La Union for
having raped his daughter Leonora.
2. In support of the complaint of Leonora, Catalina, the wife of
Avelino, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on
that same date, Leonora apprised her of the rape, but she made no
denunciation because they were threatened
a. She also stated that during the investigation, she also
mentioned the rape Avelino did to their other daughter,
Rosa
3. The defense counsel then objected to the competency of
Catalina as a witness. He invoked marital disqualification found
in the ROC wherein the spouses cannot testify for or against each
other without each others consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other.
a. He stated that Avelino did not consent to the testifying of
Catalina against him
Issue: whether the rape committed by the husband against his
daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the
meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification
rule.
Controlling issue: Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes
committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical
injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or should it be given a
latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing
marital discord?
Ruling: the present case comes within the exception provided for by the
rules. hence, the testimonial disqualification by reason of Marital relations
will not apply in the present case.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person
is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better
rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in
a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the
other.
Thus, in this case, the rape of the daughter by the father is an
undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications
andpositively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too
obvious to require much elucidation.
As an exception, that the civil case or criminal case is one not
against the other, therefore, although the marital relations exists,
one of the spouses may still testify for or against the other
without the other spouses consent if:
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based
on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life which the law aims at
protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home"
2. People vs. Castaeda Jr. 88 S 562
Facts:
1. Victoria Manaloto filed a criminal complaint against her husband,
Benjamin Manaloto, before the CFI of Pampnga, with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document. She alleged that:
a. Benjamin forged her signature in the Deed of Sale of house
and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership and making it
appear as though she consented to the sale.
2. At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to
the witness stand.
3. However, the defense moved to disqualify her a witness
invoking the rules of court which provides the
disqualification of a spouse to be examined without the
other spouses consent, except when the case is a civil
7
 case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other.
4. Decision of the trial court judge: the trial court judge granted
the motion disqualifying the wife Victoria from testifying against
her husband without the latters consent.
5. The motion for reconsideration by the People, having been
denied, they filed the present action questioning the
decision of the judge.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be
directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only
in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband.

Issue: was the trial court correct in disqualifying Victoria, wife of

the accused, to testify against her husband in the Falsification
case filed by her?

Ruling: NO, the trial court erred in disqualifying her as a witness because
the crime of Falsification of Public Document that she filed against her
husband may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a
husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.

Ratio and explanation as to what may fall under the exceptions of

Marital Disqualification:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN
AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE
CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

In the present case, The act complained of as constituting the crime of

Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's
signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had
the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by
her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife,
no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the
offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the
wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is
not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to
advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents
of the instant case.

8
RULE 130 SECTION 23 DEAD MAN STATUTE RULE
Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party. Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.
Elements:
1. the defendant in the case is the executor or administrator
or representative of the deceased or the person unsound
mind;
plaintiff of the case is the person who has a claim
against the estate of decedent or of the insane person
defendant is the representativeadministrator or
executor (may even extend to the heirs themselves
(Go Chi Gum vs Go Cho)of the decedent or the
insane person; the party entitled to invoke protection
of the Dead Mans Statute
it also does not matter if the person died or became
insane subsequently to the institution of the case as
fact of death or insanity remains
o hence,
o if it is the administrator or the executor who filed a suit
against another, the defendant may be a witness against
the decedent
o the protection of the dead mans statute is also
removed when the administrator sets up a
counterclaim and the plaintiff is allowed to testify as to
occurrences to defeat the counterclaim (in the
counterclaim, the representative becomes the plaintiff)
2. the suit is a civil action or special proceedings upon a claim
by the plaintiff against the estate of the deceased person
or person of unsound mind
what is contemplated is a suit against the estate, its
administrator or executor, but not when the
administrator or executor files an action against
anothers estate
necessarily therefore, the action is civil and not
criminal because it is a claim against the estate
3. the witness is the plaintiff in whose behalf the case is
prosecuted; and
hence, if the witness being called for the prosecution is
a third person, present rule will not apply
intended exclusively for the plaintiff, the assignors of
the case, or persons whose behalf the case is
prosecuted
4. the subject of the testimony is as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind (and adverse)
prohibited matters: are those occurring in the
presence or within the hearing of the decedent/ insane
person
temporal element: hence, if the subject of the
testimony is something that which transpired after the
death or the time when the person became insane,
may be allowed by the court
topical element: testimony in favour of the estate of
the deceased or insane person is not precluded
altogether; subject on the basis of his knowledge of
other subjects and not about the transaction or dealing
with the dead or insane person
Reason for the rule:
if death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to
close the lips of the other, and that the temptation to falsehood
and concealment in such cases is considered too great to allow the
surviving party to testify in his own behalf
intends to protect the representatives of the deceased person
when sued in such capacity or a person of unsound mind on a
claim against the estate of the decedent or a claim against the
insane person
comment: there is a question on the justness of the rule because it
ignores the rights of those who may have legitimate claims against
the decedents or insane persons estate
nevertheless, the plaintiff is not completely bereft of any
remedy: he may present other witnesses and other forms
of evidence
The Dead Mans Statute may be waived
By:
(a) failing to object to the testimony
(b) cross examining the witness on the prohibited testimony
(c) offering evidence to rebut the testimony
1. Razon vs. IAC 207 S 234
9

Facts:
1. Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of decedent Juan
T. Chuidian, filed an action against the defendants Razon for them
to be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
shareholding of the Juan T. Chuidian.
2. It was the defense of Razon that during Juans lifetime, they have
agreed that Juan will be one of the nominal shareholders of the
corporation considering that the original incorporators started to
withdraw from the corporation.
a. Furthermore, they argue that it was Razon who actually
paid for the shares, hence, he has the possession of the
certificates of stock to show signify his ownership.
However, this was not registered in the books of the
corporation.
3. The RTC of Manila rendered a decision declaring Razon as the
owner of the stocks subject of the case and dismissed the
complaint of administrator Chuidian.
4. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled in
favour of Chuidian. It applied the Deadmans Statute against
Razon.
5. Hence, the present action by the petitioner Razon assailing the
appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead
man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent,
as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony
regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan
T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually
vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the
same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross
examination regarding such testimony.
Issue: Is petitioner Razon barred by the Dead mans statute?
Ruling: No.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested
directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator
or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind."
Limitation on the application of the Rule:
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
deceased person.
in the present case, the case is filed by the administrator of the
estate of the decedent, not against the decedents estate.
The testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the
defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant
agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless
the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of
the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not
within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the
estate.
Secondly, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived his objections to
the testimonies made by Razon.
The records show that the private respondent never objected to
the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony
was subject to cross examination by the private respondent's
counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within
the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Nevertheless, the SC upheld the decision of the CA because Razon
failed to register the transaction between Juan and him in the
records of the corporation. Hence, the alleged transfer of shares is
not binding.
10
RULE 130 SECTION 24 DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(1) husband and wife
(2) attorney-client
(3) physician-patient
(4) priest/ minister-penitent
Object of the Rule:
communications originate in confidence, the confidence is
essential to the relation; the relation is a proper object of
encouragement by the law and the injury that would injure it by
disclosure is probably greater than the benefit that would result in
the judicial investigation of the truth
the purpose is to insure subjectively the free and unrestrained
privacy of communication, divested of any apprehension of
compulsory nature
and if the communication is not intended to be a private one, the
privilege has not application to it
A. Husband-Wife
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants;
Object:
secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the
law upon all communication between husband and wife; and
whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of
hollowed confidence which the relation inspires
protection of freedom of private communication; prevent
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other
and this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other
Elements
1. there must be a valid marriage between the husband and the wife
2. there is a communication received in confidence by one from the
other
it is proper that all marital communications be presumed as
confidential unless the contrary appears
3. the confidential communication was received during marriage
4. that the action where the privilege is claimed is not by one against
the other
Effect of third persons:
the protection of the privilege does not apply when the
communications is made in the presence of third persons
overhearing accidentally, unintended, unknown by the
spouses, through a voice carrying device- the third
person may be examined
to commit conversation to a third person to be transmitted to
his wife destroys the protection already
communication intended for third persons although transmitted
through the wife is not privileged so far as it was to be told to
others
Waiver of the privilege
Who has the right to invoke this privilege? The spouse who
communicated the privileged communication to the other
spouse, the addressee of the communication
The addressee of the communication is not entitled to object,
unless his silence is considered or treated as an assent and an
adoption of the statement, which this makes it doubly a
communication and doubly privilege
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity;
B. attorney-client relationship
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity;
11
Wigmores statement of the rule: (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
1. where legal adcise of any kind is sought afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when
2. from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
3. the communication relating to that purpose
4. made in confidence
5. by the client
6. are at his instance permanently protected
7. from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser
8. except that the protection may be waived

Requisites:
1. there must be a communication made by the client or the attorney,
or an advice given by the attorney to the client
2. the communication or advice must be given in the course of the
professional employment or with the view to professional
employment

Objective:
in order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal
adviser must be removed
if the communications made to legal advisers were not protected,
no one would date to consult a legal adviser nor could any one
safely come into court if he should have sought his advise

with the view of professional employment

it is not necessary that there be a perfected relationship to exist,
but the advise was nevertheless sought in such view
extended to communications even if later on, the lawyer declines
to handle the case or no actual professional employment followed
payment of fee is not even essential
it may also extend to cases where the client reasonable believes
that the person consulted is a lawyer, although in fact he is not as
he is merely pretending to be one

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot

in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient;

(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making
the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice
given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;

12

1. US vs. Antipolo 37 P 726
FACTS:
1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Batangas, charged with the murder of one Fortunato
Dinal.
2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he
was appealed.
3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial
judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the
appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on
behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying
declarations.
4. The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is
the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did
your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected upon the
following ground:
I object to the testimony of this witness. She has
just testified that she is the widow of the deceased,
Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not
competent to testify under the rules and procedure in
either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent
of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that
permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from
testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured
party.
5. Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent,
arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in
mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the
parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the
prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the
accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness
having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no
longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification
arising from the status of marriage.
ISSUE/S: WON the wife of the deceased (Susana) is allowed to be a
witness.
HELD: YES. The wife is allowed to be a witness. Disqualification by reason
of privileged communication
RATIO: The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by
placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications
between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of
either by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires,
cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even though the other party be
no longer living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which
it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against
statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation,
and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing
them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the
point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement
regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such
a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be
communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
On grounds of public policy the wife cannot testify against her husband as
to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage
relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by
the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The
declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to
be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who
heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this
character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It cannot be contended
that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential
communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the
furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to
in the prosecution of the defendant.
2. Nelly Lim vs. CA, Judge Victorio of RTC of
Pangasinan, and Juan Lim 214 S 273
Facts:
1. petitioner Nelly Lim and Juan Lim were lawfully married to
each other.
2. petition for annulment: the Juan Lim then filed a petition
for annulment of their marriage on the ground that his
wife, the petitioner, was suffering from schizophrenia
before, during, and after the celevration of the marriage,
and until the present
3. the expert witness: during the trial, the private
respondent presented 3 witnesses, among them was Dra.
Acampado who is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge of
the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health
a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was
summoned as an expert witness. However, she also
happened to be the attending psychiatrist of the
petitioner Nelly Lim.
4. Motion to quash subpoena and suspend
proceedings: the counsel of the petitioner then filed a
motion to quash subpoena to be issued for Dra. Acampado
13
 so that she may not be allowed to appear as a witness in
court.
5. During the hearing for the motion:
a. Argument of the petitioner: Dra. Acampado is
barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship
b. Argument of respondent: Dra. Acampado is
appearing as an expert witness and would not be
testifying on any information acquired while
attending to her patient Nelly Lim in her
professional capacity.
6. Denial of the motion by the RTC Judge: the trial court
judge denied the motion and stated in his order that: the
respondents motion [is denied] and forthwith allowed Dr.
Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel
for respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes
apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is
covered by the privileged communication rule.
7. Dra. Acampado then took the witness stand and it was
established by the RTC and the CA that Dra. Acampado was
qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert
witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to
her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she
examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the
results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
8. The CA upheld the decision of the RTC Judge in allowing the
testimony of the Dra. Acampado when the petitioner filed
before the said court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
nullify the order denying the motion to exclude Dra. Acampado. It
stated that:
a. First, the petitioner failed to establish the confidential
nature of the testimony of Dra. Acampado
b. Secondly, the statements that Dra. Acampado gave do
not fall within the realm of privileged communication
because the information she disclosed were not obtained
from the patient while attending her in her professional
capacity and neither where the information necessary to
enable the physicial to prescribe or give treatment of the
patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information
obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character
of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach.
9. Hence, the present action by the petitioner Nelly Lim.
Issue: Is Dra. Acampado, the attending psychiatrist of the petitioner, be a
witness in the present case of annulment?
Controlling Issue: is she barred by the privileged communication rule?
Ruling: Dra. Acampado is not disqualified from testifying because she
testified as an expert witness and the information she disclosed did not fall
within the privileged communication rule.
Ratio:
The Law, Rules of Court, Rule 130:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient
in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the
patient."
The object of the law: intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand,
to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient
Therefore, in order that this privilege be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; andthe information was confidential, and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."
In relation to requisite no. 1, what are the requisites in order to be
considered as a privileged communication?
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered
14
 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation
In the present case, the said requisites were not complied with.
Firstly, Dra. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the
petitioner was never interviewed alone. Nelly would go together with his
father, Dr. Lim. There is authority to the effect that information elicited
during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties
removes such information from the mantle of the privilege.
Thirdly, nothing specific or concrete was offered by the petitioner to show
that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken
the formers "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed
any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment
and the treatment recommended therefor.
Lastly, it would appear that the counsel made no objections to the
questions asked to Dra. Acampado on that ground that it elicited an answer
what would violate the privilege, despite the trial courts advise that the
said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes
apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule. Since the object of the privilege is to
protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the
physicians testimony.
3. Krohn vs. CA 233 S 146
KROHN v. CA (1994)
FACTS:
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at
the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union
produced three children. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship
between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz
underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally
separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric
report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and
Baltazar Reyes.
On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a
decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of
"incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." The decree was
confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then RTC issued an order granting the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in
her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
-This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing
objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," and thereafter submitted
a Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no
factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being
completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving
for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also
authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her
counterclaim even during her absence.
Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, and afterwards moved to strike
out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record.
The RTC issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report in evidence. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Petitioners claim: Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and
disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the
admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of
the case. She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may
have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH
MORE REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in this
particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has
acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a
patient."
Respondents defense: The rules are very explicit: the prohibition
applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not
applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from
testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the
physician of the petitioner."
15
ISSUE/S: WON the husband can be enjoined to disclose the contents of the
psychiatric report on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim
v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the
privilege may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;
and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall
within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of
private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his
Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule
on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as
hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on
the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such
objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
4. Fortich vs. CA 268 S 152
FORTICH vs. CA (1997)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Stanley Fortich was employed as an area salesman of
soft drinks division of San Miguel Corp., a job which required him to
collect various sums of money from the retailers and buyers of the
company along his designated route.
2. One day, petitioner received a Memo ordering him to stop plying
his route and collecting sums owed by customers to the company
because of Non-issuance of either change refund nor official
receipt for empties retrieved from outlets with temporary credit
sales. It likewise directed petitioner to instead report directly to
the sales office every working day at the prescribed company
time.
3. Following up on his first memo and alleging that petitioner
misappropriated P1,605 from his collections (through non-issuance
of invoices to several customers) private respondent Felix Galleron
submitted a second Inter-office Memo addressed to the Regional
Sales Manager:
In addition, I would like to further inform management
that S/M Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and a
cockfighting enthusiast. Inspite of several advices, there
seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent
had a similar case last September 11, 1978.
4. After further investigation, petitioner was found guilty of
misappropriating company funds. He was preventively suspended
from his job and the said order also decreed his dismissal.
5. Claiming that the second memo was willful, malicious and done in
gross bad faith, petitioner filed a complaint for damages arising
from libel.
6. RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner.
7. Private respondent appealed to the CA: that no actual malice
existed or had been shown in respect to the second memo and that
in any case, the assailed letter was protected by the privileged
communication rule.
8. CA: reversed the TC. The memo was not libelous being within the
ambit of privileged communications
ISSUES: WON Gallerons second memo is libelous. WON Gallerons
second memo falls within the ambit of privileged communications.
RULING:
The second memo was not libelous in the absence of the key
element of publicity.
The right hand caption of the memorandum clearly shows the
phrase Interoffice Memorandum, implying confidentiality.
Petitioner was unable to prove that the letter was circulated or
publicized, much less read by officers of the corporation other than
those involved in the investigation or those directly supervising the
petitioners work.
16
 Moreover, it was not proven that the issuance of the letter and its
offending paragraph was motivated by malice.
While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious,
there are exceptions.
The case at bar falls under the settled exceptions to the rule: the private
respondents inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of
privileged communication rule.
A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty. In Mercado vs. CFI of Rizal, the court explained that:
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable
cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith,
the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But
the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty;
In the instant case, the private respondent was, as the District Sales
Supervisor in Dipolog City, immediate supervisor of petitioner. In this
capacity, respondent was charged with the duty to carry out and enforce
company rules and policies, including the duty to undertake initial
investigation of possible irregularities in customer accounts in order to
suggest further action which could be taken by the company. In fact, the
communications initially submitted by the private respondent to his
superiors prompted the investigation which eventually led to petitioners
preventive suspension and to the decision by the companys proper
officers to terminate the latters employment.
Even granting that the questioned memorandum contains statements
which could be slanderous and therefore actionable were they not
protected by the rule on privileged communications, still as no malice was
shown, the Court agreed with the respondent courts conclusion that the
assailed memorandum report was an official act done in good faith, an
honest innocent statement arising from a moral and legal obligation which
the private respondent certainly owed to the company in the performance
of his duties.
2. Testimonial Privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants. (20a)
RULE 130 SECTION 26 ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY
3. Admissions and Confessions
Section 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. (22)
1. People vs. Agustin 240 S 541- PASCUAL
PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN (1995)
FACTS:
1. In 5 separate informations, the accused were charged with murder in
two cases, frustrated murder in another, and attempted murder in two
more cases.
2. The crimes were allegedly committed in Baguio City and resulted in the
deaths of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Francisco, and the wounding of three
others.
3. The informations in the murder cases charged the accused, Jaime
Agustin, as having acted in conspiracy with the alleged shooter,
Wilfredo Quiano.
4. Quiano allegedly confessed during the investigation conducted by the
Baguio City fiscal in his office, that he was the triggerman in the fatal
shooting, but claims he was engaged to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee by a
bagman and also named Freddie Cartel who provided him with the
armalite. He also implicated a certain Jimmy, who turned out to be
Jaime Agustin, herein accused.
5. Quiano was assisted by Atty. Cajucom and a stenographic reporter who
took down stenographic notes of the proceedings. Her transcription
became the sworn statement of Quiano, which he signed.
6. On the basis of Quianos confession, Jaime Agustin was picked up by
military personnel in Pangasinan and brought to Baguio City where he
was taken to the City Fiscal and investigated in connection with the
said crime.
7. Atty. Cajucom assisted Agustin during the said investigation and the
stenographic reporter took down stenographic notes.
8. Agustin allegedly narrated his knowledge of the shooting and revealed
identities of his cohorts in the crime.
9. The stenographic notes consisting of 22 pages was signed by Agustin.
The same was subsequently transcribed and later offered into
evidence.
10. Before Quiano could be arraigned, he was able to escape. The
consolidated cases proceeded only against Agustin.
11. Agustin impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement for
allegedly having been given in violation of his Constitutional rights,
alleging:
a) That he was a farmer whose highest educational attainment was
grade 4;
17
 b) That in the morning of his arrest, two armed men picked him up
and taken to a car where two more armed men were waiting;
c) That along Kennon Road, he was made to kneel at gunpoint in
order to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he did out of
fear;
d) That he was brought to the City Fiscal of Baguio, where the armed
men stayed with him, which deterred him from telling the
investigating fiscal that he was being threatened;
e) That Atty. Cajucom who supposedly assisted him and who was not
his own choice, only stayed with him for 2 minutes and interviewed
him in English and Tagalog, but not Ilocano, the dialect he
understands;
f) That he was told and promised by his captors that he would be
discharged as state witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not
push through since Quiano escaped.
12. Agustins wife corroborated his story.
13. The Trial Court nevertheless admitted Agustins extrajudicial
statement, and gave scant consideration to his claim of force,
intimidation and other irregularities. The TC concluded that there was
conspiracy and the accused was a direct participant in the crime, that
his extrajudicial confession shows that he was in on the plan and
even expected to be paid and that he decided to give a statement
only when he was not given money.
14. TC convicted Agustin of murder.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible. (N) If so, should
he be acquitted? (Y)
HELD: The extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in evidence because it
was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution.
Since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was
convicted, he must then be acquitted.
RATIO: The extrajudicial ADMISSION NOT extrajudicial confession
of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him
to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because
it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also
see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under
Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
The SC pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court
and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an
extrajudicial admission.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which
he is charged. Wharton defines a confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in
a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment
of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
Nothing in Agustins extrajudicial statement indicates that he expressly
acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or
circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact
of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence
under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant
because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and
admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
CONSIDERATIONS:
Agustine was not fully and properly informed of his rights.
o He was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice.
o He was not categorically informed that he could waive his
rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel.
o He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by
agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such
right appears in the transcript and no other independent
evidence was offered to prove its existence.
That there is doubt that Atty, Cajucom is independent counsel
and his willingness to assist the accused is questionable:
18
 o he being an associate of the private prosecutor in that the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children
case; during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
o doubtful that Agustin even understood him when he was serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the
informed of his Constitutional Rights in English and respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a
Tagalog, when the dialect he understood was Ilocano, nor persona non grata.
were the same properly explained. 4. The wife presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel
o it also appears that the lawyer made it seem to Agustin Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private
that he was a witness rather than an accused. respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the
o for not bringing up the warrantless arrest and pushing for spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondents counsel.
Agustins immediate release; it was very apparent that Private respondent likewise submitted documentary evidence
such was the case (the shooting having been 5 months consisting of newspaper articles of her husbands relationship with
prior to the arrest). other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal
Agustin was arrested 5 months after the shooting, there should possession of drugs; and copies of a prior church annulment
have been a warrant of arrest. decree. The parties marriage was clerically annulled by the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.
5. RULING OF THE RTC: the trial court, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, rendered judgment declaring the nullity
2. Tuason vs. CA 241 S 695- SALTERAS of private respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent.
FACTS: 6. RULING OF THE CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
1. Private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the 7. Hence, the present petition. He argues that he was deprived of due
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or process because he was not given the opportunity to present his
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. evidence. It is worth noting that the reason why he was not able to
2. CONTENTION OF WFE: She alleged that petitioner was already present evidence is due to the fact that he was absent in the
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital supposed hearings of the said annulment case.
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in
ISSUE/S: WON respondent court erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights,
HELD: NO. The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the RTC.
petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which
RATIO: In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to
impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him;
private respondent had already become final and executory when
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the
petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner
authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and
however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in
violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due
1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women
process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife;
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private
support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of
respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground
their children compelling private respondent to accept donations
that he was then confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons.
and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse
became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal
judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not
partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large
excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and
obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment
institutions, without private respondents consent; that attempts at
resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners
judgment valid and regular on its face.
refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses,
marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration
particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible
to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation
and hearsay.Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence,
3. CONTENTION OF HUSBAND: Petitioner answered denying the
he could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the
imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that
time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten
he and private respondent were a normal married couple during
19
years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one
normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his family even
after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator
of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and
makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various
women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground
for annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage is final and binding on us. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown
that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
private respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous.
3. People vs. Chua Uy 327 S 335- ARANETA
Facts:
1. Chua was arrested in a buy bust operation by the elements of the
Anti- Narcotics Units of the Philippine National Police. He was
charged with drug pushing and illegal possession of shabu.
2. During the pre-trial, as indicated in the pre-trial order,
prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on the and make the
markings of the following prosecution's exhibits: The five (5)
plastic bags with markings containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a total weight of 401 grams.
a. The parties also agreed that they dispense with the
testimony of Forensic chemist Bravo and that the same
need not testify in court. they admitted, instead, as
evidence the final report of the said chemist.
b. However, said pretrial order was not signed
3. During the trial, the prosecution provided as witnesses the
policemen who did the buy-bust operation, as well the marked 5
transparent bags of shabu. On the other hand, the defense was
trying to establish that the buy bust operation set him up and
those confiscated plastic bags were all planted in his attach case.
4. Decision of the trial court: found as credible the witnesses of
the prosecution and convicted the accused. It also cited the Final
Report of the Forensic Chemist Bravo that the packets of Shabu
bought and tested from Chua was tested positive for
metamphetamine hydrochloride.
5. By reason of the penalty of the crime, the case was
automatically elevated up to the Supreme Court.
Among the arguments of Chua, he now contends that since the NBI
Forensic Chemist did not testify, his findings that the specimens submitted
to him were indeed shabu and weighed so much, did not longer have
probative value.
He also insists that he never waived the presentation of the
chemist during the pre-trial and that they only stipulated that the
said confiscated bags be marked as part of the prosecutions
evidence.
On the other hand, it is the argument of the OSG for the People
that when the parties stipulated during the trial that the said
plastic bags be marked as evidence for the prosecution, and that
the chemist Bravo no longer be presented in court, such is
considered as an admission of the findings of Bravo that those
were indeed shabu and that the said plastic bags containing the
shabu were the drugs that were confiscated from him.
Issue: did the act of stipulating during the pre-trial by the parties that the
plastic bags be marked as well the non-presentation of the chemist amount
to admission of the findings of the said Chemist as well as the same being
the actual evidence confiscated from him?
Ruling: No.
It may at once be noted that neither Chua nor his counsel made
express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be
marked" as contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
That Chua agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings
of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag.
Even granting for the sake of argument that Chua admitted during the pre-
trial that the exhibits contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the
admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order
was not signed by Chua and his counsel.
Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides: Sec. 4. Pre-
trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his counsel.
The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the
accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions
which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may
20
have waived his presence at the pretrial conference; and eliminate any
doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the petition of the accused must be denied in light
of the belated objection made on the admission of Bravos final
report and of the plastic bags containing the shabu. During the
trial, the petitioner made no objections as to the admissibility of
such pieces of evidence and that the same was only raised during
this appeal.
Petition denied.
4. People vs. Cepeda 324 S 290- BALDEO
FACTS:
1. Conchita Mahomoc claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at Buhang, Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to massage (hilot) his
wife who was suffering from stomach ache.
2. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to go
with her.
3. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house. He told
Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if there were
many people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina
had to leave.
4. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita
peeped inside and saw a figure covered by a blanket whom she presumed
was Cepeda's wife.
5. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her
shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep
quiet, do not make any noise, otherwise I will kill you." She elbowed him,
stooped and shouted "Help!" three times but Cepeda covered her mouth
then carried her to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself free from his
grasp, she hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom.
6. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to
remove her panty and lie on the bed. Afraid, she did as ordered and the
accused also removed his pants and brief. He placed himself on top of her,
spread her legs with his legs, inserted his penis inside her vagina and had
sexual intercourse with her at the same time embracing and kissing her.
After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing
her.
7. Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the complainant on the aspect
that at [a]bout 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, she was at
Conchita's house to discuss the gift they would give their neighbor who
was getting married. Cepeda arrived and asked Conchita to give his wife a
massage as she was having stomach pains. Conchita had been a masseuse
since 1979. On complainant's request, she accompanied her to Cepeda's
house. Upon arrival, the accused told her to leave as his Muslim wife gets
angry when there are plenty of people in their house. Both she and
Conchita protested but Cepeda insisted on it several times forcing her to
leave the house of the accused.
8. CEPEDAS DEFENSE: This charge is refuted by the accused
claiming that he and Conchita are lovers. The complainant has gone
to their house four times in February 1994. The fifth time the
complainant went to their house on March 6, he courted her by
saying: "Sing, I knew that you like me and I like you." Then they
had sexual intercourse. The next time Conchita came to see him
and had sexual intercourse with him was on March 13, then March
17, March 29 and March 27 when on this date, she asked him to
leave his wife to elope with her as she would also leave her
husband. He rejected this proposal because he loved his wife and
Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according to him, was displeased
because he would not elope with her. On April 2, 1994, Conchita again
came to his house and while they were petting, somebody outside
his house said: "You there, what are you doing? At this Conchita left his
house and went home. At about 10:00 o'clock that evening, he was
arrested.
9. RTC rendered judgment against accused Dante Cepeda.
ISSUE/S: WON Dante Cepeda is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is
too shopworn to deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of
credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the 'illicit love
affair' angle appears as a fabrication by accused- appellant. As an
affirmative defense, the alleged 'love affair' needs convincing proof.
Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the
complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of
proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows
that other than his self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to
support the claim that accused-appellant and private complainant
were in love.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both
married and are living together with their respective spouses. In this case,
other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence
21
like love letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged
amorous relationship with private complainant. Neither was there any
corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused-
appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not
have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably
exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her
womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is
allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby
lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to
mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her
children were it not the truth.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused- appellant and
private complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this
fact alone will not extricate him from his predicament. The mere
assertion of a 'love relationship' would not necessarily rule out the
use of force to consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in
rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with
a woman against her will or without her consent. Thus, granting
arguendo that the accused and the victim were really lovers this
Court has reiterated time and again that "[A] sweetheart cannot
be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot
demand sexual gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for
lust."
Succinctly stated, in rape the prosecution must rule out the victim's
consent to the sexual act. In the case at bar, the testimony of private
complainant was clear: she did not consent to penile invasion. Assuming
for argument's sake that accused-appellant and private
complainant were sweethearts, rape was nevertheless committed
because accused-appellant had sex with the victim by force and
against her will.
As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a married woman with a
husband and three (3) daughters would not , publicly admit that she had
been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason
in this case why a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she
has been sexually abused if her motive were other than to fight for her
honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her. Thus not surprisingly
when she was queried as to how much would she claim for her defilement
in terms of moral damages, she emphatically declared as follows:
Q.......If you were to ask for moral damages from the court, how much
would you claim for moral damages?
A.......I do not need payment it is Justice that I ask.
She, likewise, flatly denied the existence of an illicit affair with the accused-
appellant in face of the not too subtle insinuations of defense counsel to
this effect on cross-examination, viz:
Q.......I will ask you a candid question, Mrs. Marohomoc. Is it not a fact that
at one time you gifted Dante Cepeda with a Herway lotion?
A.......No, sir.
Q.......So you will also deny that you gifted him with Mark cigarettes.
A.......Oh no!
In a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of the evidence presented during
trial ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness.
When a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is
sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to
convict the accused.
22