People v.

Atienza
Gr No. 171671, June 18, 2012
Peralta, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents Aristeo E. Atienza, then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera,

Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong, then Municipal Engineer of
Puerto Galera and Crispin M. Egarque, a police officer stationed in Puerto Galera,
were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information alleged that the above-named
accused conspired with each other to destroy, demolish, and dismantle the
riprap/fence of the new Hondura Beach Resort owned by complainant Evora
located at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing undue injury to
complainant. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged against them. The prosecution presented its witnesses who gave
testimonies pointing to the alleged acts of the accused herein. Mayor Atienza and
Engr. Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit), anchored on
the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that not all the elements of the crime charged were
established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on
the part of respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did
not show that the respondents favored other persons who were similarly situated
with the private complainant. Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUE: (1) Did the Court commit an error in denying the people due process when
it resolved issues not raised by respondents in their demurrer to evidence,
without affording the prosecution an opportunity to be heard thereon.
(2) Has double jeopardy set in?

RULING: NO. Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA

3019, which has the following essential elements:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to

Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the second
element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
 The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence. In Uriarte v. People, this Court explained that Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there
is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the
second element of the crime as charged was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution. Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence
adduced did not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, the prosecution was not

denied due process. The prosecution participated in all the proceedings
before the court a quo and has filed numerous pleadings and oppositions to
the motions filed by respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested
its case and submitted its evidence when the demurrer was filed. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its interests in due
course, there is no denial of procedural due process. What is repugnant to
due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard, which is not present
here.

(2) Yes. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or
information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4)
the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent. All are attendant in the present case: (1) the Information filed
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678 against respondents were
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and
entered their respective pleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed
Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the
elements of the offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had. In criminal cases, the grant of
demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed
because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal
order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only
through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the
trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the
assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that
the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice. In the present case, no such circumstances exist to
warrant a departure from the general rule and reverse the findings of the
Sandiganbayan.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG
G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong
alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since
1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified,
however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college
in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.

As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to
1997. Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994;
P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On
November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The
Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure to
prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as
required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.

The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent
Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager
earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns
belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature
of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he
has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared
no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family
home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances,
the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not
possess a definite and existing business or trade.

The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court
denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2,
fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization

 The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are
imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of law.

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade,

profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of
his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones
becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him
and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with
the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization."

It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the
courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouses income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is
immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.

A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that

the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the
naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed,
"[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been
differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary
judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the
reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present
new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res
judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been
illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in
the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the
attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding
may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or
incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." In
the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of
the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his
possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify
for naturalization.

Republic won the case.

 EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING v. VIRGINIA
PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house
of Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique
Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her
house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they
could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told
him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land
because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of
the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a

Petition for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was
accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the
challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend
that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases
of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty
and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia
miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it
failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission
of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty
and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced
that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On
the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and
Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at
around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ
and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to
arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country.
Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity."

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes

every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that
everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by
law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds
provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also
embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this
Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the
generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law."

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not
enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of
the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents
orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees
were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as responsible
or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely
not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may
lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in
Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity.
They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA
No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case
from an ordinary case of a missing person.

DISMISSED
 RUSSEL ULYSSES I. NIEVES v. JOCELYN LB. BLANCO, in
her capacity as the Regional Director, Regional Office No. V,

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

G.R. No. 190422, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Reyes, J.)

A reassignment from one provincial office to another provincial office

within the same region is not considered as a reassignment outside
geographical location.

Russel Ulysses I. Nieves is a Trade and Industry Development Specialist

of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Nieves was formerly assigned to
the DTIs office in Sorsogon but was reassigned by to DTIs provincial office in

Albay. A year after his reassignment to DTI-Albay, Nieves requested DTI

Regional V Director Jocelyn Blanco for his reassignment back to DTI-Sorsogon
but this was denied.

Nieves appealed his reassignment to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

asserting that under Section 6(a) of the CSC Omnibus Revised Rules on

Reassignment, he is a station-specific employee and is allowed only to be

reassigned for a maximum period of one year. CSC however pointed out that
Nieves appointment is not station-specific but this does not mean that Nieves
could be reassigned to DTI-Albay indefinitely. The CSC ruled that under the
Revised Rules on Reassignment, a reassignment outside the geographical
location, if without the consent of the employee concerned should not exceed the
maximum period of one year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reassignment of Nieves is station-specific and subject

to the one-year period limitation

HELD:

Under Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Reassignment, an appointment is

considered station-specific when the particular office or station where the
position is located is specifically indicated on the face of the appointment paper.
The Revised Rules on Reassignment has clearly confined the coverage of the
phrase reassignment outside geographical location to the following: (1)
reassignment from one provincial office to another; (2) reassignment from the
regional office to the central office; and (3) reassignment from the central office
to the regional office. The said provision used the word may to emphasize that
a reassignment outside geographical location is restricted only to either
reassignment from one regional office to another regional office or a
reassignment from the central office to a regional office and vice-versa. Nieves
appointment was only within the same regional office, specifically Region V
which is from DTI-Sorsogon to DTI-Albay and is therefore not station-specific.

The language of the Revised Rules on Reassignment is plain and

unambiguous. The reassignment of an employee with a station-specific place of
work indicated in their respective appointments is allowed provided that it
would not exceed a maximum period of one year. On the other hand, the
reassignment of an employee whose appointment is not station-specific has no
definite period unless otherwise revoked or recalled by the Head of the Agency,
the CSC or a competent court.

Nieves appointment is not station-specific which makes the period of his

reassignment to DTI-Albay indefinite, unless otherwise revoked or recalled by
the Head of the Agency, the CSC or a competent court. Since the reassignment
of Nieves was within the same regional office, the one-year period limitation
does not apply.
 Francisco T. Duque III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission Vs. Florentino Veloso
G.R. No. 196201. June 19, 2012

FACTS:
The records show that the respondent, then District Supervisor of Quedan
and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was
administratively charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty in connection with his
unauthorized withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino (complainant), a
client of Quedancor.
The complainant (Duque) applied for a restructuring of his loan with
Quedancor and deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Quedancors cashier for his
Manila account.
In three (3) separate occasions, the respondent (Veloso) , without notice and
authority from the complainant and with the assistance of Quedancors cashier,
managed to withdraw the P50,000.00 deposit.
Upon the discovery of the withdrawals, the complainant demanded the
return of the money and called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in
Cagayan de Oro City, who issued to the respondent a memorandum requiring him
to explain the withdrawals and to return the money.
Veloso, the respondent returned the money. The respondent admitted having
received the P50,000.00 from Quedancors cashier knowing that it was intended
for the, Duques, complainants loan repayment.
Veloso, the respondent was charged by Quedancor with dishonesty, and was
subsequently found guilty of the charges and dismissed from the service. The CSC
affirmed the findings and conclusions of Quedancor on appeal.
Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the CSC, the
respondent, Veloso elevated his case to the CA which adjudged him guilty of
dishonesty, but modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year suspension from
office without pay.
The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law and
jurisprudence which penalize the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the
service. The CSC also argues that there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant
a reduction of the penalty, for the following reasons:
(1) The respondents length of service aggravated his dishonesty since the
respondent took advantage of his authority over a subordinate and disregarded his
oath that a public office is a public trust.
(2) The admission of guilt and the restitution by the respondent were made
in 2003, while the misappropriation took place in 2001.
(3) The respondent was charged with, and admitted having committed,
dishonesty in three separate occasions.
(4) Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules imposes dismissal from
the service for dishonesty, even for the first offense.

ISSUE: the determination of the proper administrative penalty to be imposed on

the respondent.
HELD:
Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed by Section
52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as
a first offense.
The aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional principle that public office
is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve
the honor of continuing in public service.
In appreciating the presence of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances to a given case, two constitutional principles come into play which
the Court is tasked to balance.
The first is public accountability which requires the Court to consider the
improvement of public service, and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government by ensuring that only individuals who possess good
moral character, integrity and competence are employed in the government service.
The second relates to social justice which gives the Court the discretionary
leeway to lessen the harsh effects of the wrongdoing committed by an offender for
equitable and humanitarian considerations.
A significant aspect which the CA failed to consider under the circumstances
is the inapplicability to the present case of the Courts ruling in Vicente A. Miel v.
Jesus A. Malindog
In the clearest of terms, the CA upheld that factual findings of the CSC.
Thus, it is on the basis of these findings that we must now make our own
independent appreciation of the circumstances cited by the respondent and
appreciated by the CA as mitigating circumstances.
After a careful review of the records and jurisprudence, we disagree with the
CAs conclusion that mitigating circumstances warrant the mitigation of the
prescribed penalty imposed against the respondent.
First, we have repeatedly held that length of service can either be a
mitigating or an aggravating circumstance depending on the facts of each case.
While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the respondent, it is
not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious or grave; or
when the length of service helped the offender commit the infraction.
The factors against mitigation are present in this case. Under the
circumstances, the administrative offense of dishonesty committed by the
respondent was serious on account of the supervisory position he held at
Quedancor and the nature of Quedancors business. Quedancor deals with the
administration, management and disposition of public funds which the respondent
was entrusted to handle. The respondents dishonest acts carried grave
consequences because Quedancor is a credit and guarantee institution, and the
publics perception of its credibility is critical.
In this case, the sanction of dismissal imposed on the respondent as a
dishonest employee assures the public that: first, public funds belonging to
Quedancor are used for their intended purpose; second, public funds are released to
their proper recipients only after strict compliance with the standard operating
procedure of Quedancor is followed; and lastly, only employees who are
competent, honest and trustworthy may manage, administer and handle public
funds in Quedancor.
The respondents dismissal from the service is a measure of self-protection
and self-preservation by Quedancor of its reputation before its clients and the
public.
We additionally note that length of service should also be taken against the
respondent; the infraction he committed and the number of times he committed the
violations demonstrate the highest degree of ingratitude and ungratefulness to an
institution that has been the source of his livelihood for 18 years. His actions
constitute no less than disloyalty and betrayal of the trust and confidence the
institution reposed in him. They constitute ingratitude for the opportunities given to
him over the years for career advancement.
Second, the circumstance that this is the respondents first administrative
offense should not benefit him.
By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the
commission of an administrative offense classified as a serious offense (like
dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first time. In
other words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-
time offender as a mitigating circumstance.
Finally, we reject as mitigating circumstances the respondents admission of
his culpability and the restitution of the amount. The Court, in Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, clearly recognized the limitations in invoking
social justice: The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for
the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is
not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Social justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge of scoundrels any more
than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who
invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not
worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character.
Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful disbursement of public
funds or loss of public property. Greater damage comes with the publics
perception of corruption and incompetence in the government. Thus, the
Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are
not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as
working standards by all in the public service.
 PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. v.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 180308, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of

Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective
discharge.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are

nominees of the government to the board of directors of Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and Andal are
also directors and corporate officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC). By virtue of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the
government has also substantial interest in PHC.

The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC
suffered losses because of its huge operating expenses. In view of the losses and
to protect the governments interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455
directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred
by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their
respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee), which
conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as
resource persons. The Senate Committee found an overwhelming
mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that
PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the governments
interest in the said corporations.

Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of

the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT
to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance

(DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and

PHILCOMSAT. Locsin and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the hasty approval of the Senate of the Committee Report No. 312.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
HELD:

The Senate Committees power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has
been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section
21 of the Constitution, as follows:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry
upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate
Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective
discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional
mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be
faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was
submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative
inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be
rendered pointless.
 MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190793, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and

unlawful means to achieve ones goals is within the determination of the
COMELEC, and such fact is sufficient to deny a party registration and
accreditation.

Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration

with the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the
National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local
Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV
(Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).

Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the

Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and
unlawful means to achieve their goals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it

denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the
latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means

HELD:

MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the

COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts
or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument
cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be
taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to
admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably
prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.

That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by
the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public
knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and
reception of evidence thereon.
 The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that

MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article
IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions
that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be
denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881,
which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through
violence shall be entitled to accreditation.

In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with
violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege,
their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of
former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and
the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the

President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to
resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by
civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant
explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the
government constituted clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not,
therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood
standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.

The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence
or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-
2784. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and
Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain
the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether
the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals
by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily
criminal in nature.

In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill

its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not
required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited
only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary
qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party.
Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to
groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by law.

Noteworthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in

favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the
Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context
of the disqualifications from party registration.
 PEOPLE VS. MARAORAO
G.R. No. 174369 June 20, 2012

FACTS:

PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified they received reliable information at Police

Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined amount
of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early morning
of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2
Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the
Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men
talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela
Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the
pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit
picked up the maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant Zafra
Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and saw a
transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they
suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic
sachet ZM-1 in the presence of the police officers.
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
chemical analysis. When examined, the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline
substance gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug.
In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00
a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle at the Islamic Center to get a letter
from his mother. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a
house number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who
placed his bag down and asked him again. When they turned around, they saw four
men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that they were police
officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the man
dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of
what was inside the bag.
Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and asked who the
owner of the bag was. He replied that it did not belong to him but to the man who
ran away. He was brought to the police station in Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was
referred to a desk sergeant. The desk sergeant asked him whether the bag was
recovered from him, and he replied that he had no knowledge about that bag. He
was not assisted by counsel during the investigation. He was also incarcerated in a
small cell for about ten days before he was brought to Manila City Jail. At the
Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer for the first time.
The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of
1,280.081 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride without license or
prescription. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maraorao must be acquitted.

RULING:

YES.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the
accused. While a lone witness testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in
certain instances, the testimony must be clear, consistent, and crediblequalities
we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial
evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be credible
in itselftested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and
accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.
Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in possession of shabu, and that
he freely and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. In
this case, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where
there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their
innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person
innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not
proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of
right.
 CLAVITE-VIDAL VS. AGUAM
G.R. No. 174369 June 20, 2012

FACTS:

In a letter Director IV Lourdes Clavite-Vidal (petitioner) of the CSC referred

to the OCA for appropriate action the records of respondent Aguam. Director Vidal
stated that a person purporting to be Aguam took the Career Service
Subprofessional examination held on December 1, 1996 at Room No. 5, City
Central School, Cagayan de Oro City, and got a grade of 80% in the examination.
But upon verification of Aguams eligibility, the CSC found that Aguams picture
and handwriting on her January 14, 1997 Personal Data Sheet differ from those on
the Picture Seat Plan during the examination.
Mr. Justice Jose P. Perez, in his capacity as then Court Administrator,
required Aguam to file her comment to Director Vidals letter. In her comment
dated January 19, 2010, Aguam said that she personally took and passed the
aforesaid examination. Aguam claimed that her picture on the Picture Seat Plan is
an old picture taken when she was still in high school and single, while her picture
on the Personal Data Sheet was taken after giving birth to four children and
suffering another miscarriage. Aguam also claimed that the signatures on the two
documents are hers and were not made by two different persons. Her signature on
the Picture Seat Plan was signed under pressure during the examination. On the
other hand, she signed the Personal Data Sheet without pressure and having the
leisure of time.
The case was then referred to Judge Rasad G. Balindong for investigation.
After due proceedings, Judge Balindong submitted his investigation report finding
Aguam guilty of serious dishonesty and recommending Aguams dismissal from
the service. Judge Balindong said that during the May 24, 2011 hearing, he
approached Aguam to observe her physically and compare her face with the
pictures on the Picture Seat Plan and Personal Data Sheet. Judge Balindong found
that the picture on the Personal Data Sheet is that of Aguam while the one on the
Picture Seat Plan is not hers. Judge Balindong also found that Aguams specimen
signatures submitted before him were different from Aguams purported signature
on the Picture Seat Plan. Judge Balindong concluded that the signature on the
Picture Seat Plan and the one on the Personal Data Sheet were written by two
different persons. Judge Balindong opined that Aguams representation that she
herself took the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes
dishonesty.
In its own evaluation report, OCA concurred with the opinions of Judge
Balindong, and thereby recommended that Aguam be dismissed from service as
court stenographer for being guilty of the administrative offense of dishonesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aguam is guilty of dishonesty.

RULING:
YES.
 The fact of impersonation was proven with certainty. Judge Balindong
observed upon approaching Aguam during a hearing that she is not the person
whose picture was attached to the Picture Seat Plan. This finding debunks Aguams
claim that she attached her high school picture on the Picture Seat Plan. The
records also validate Judge Balindongs finding that Aguams specimen signatures
written on a piece of paper10 are starkly different from Aguams supposed
signature on the Picture Seat Plan.11 Then there is the discernible difference in
Aguams handwriting and signature on the Personal Data Sheet12 and the
impersonators handwriting and signature on the Picture Seat Plan. Taken together,
the evidence leads to no other conclusion than that somebody else took the
examination using Aguams identity.
For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the examination when
in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the
Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any
public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only
in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Aguam failed to meet these
stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not therefore deserve to
remain with the Judiciary.

In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,

and Concerned Citizen v. Dominga Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the
employees found guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim masqueraded
as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service examination in behalf of Cruz. The Court
said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of dismissal. In Sta. Ana,
somebody else took the Civil Service examination for Sta. Ana. The Court
dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad, the evidence disproved Abads claim
that she personally took the examination. The Court held that for Abad to assert
that she herself took the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her
constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for her offense. The Court found no reason
to deviate from these consistent rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58(a) of the same
rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. The OCA properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave
credits, pursuant to the Courts ruling in Sta. Ana and Abad. The Court also
consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on employees found guilty
of an offense of this nature is dismissal from the service.
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
DAN ERASMO, SR.
G.R. No. 192474 June 26, 2012
ABAD,J.:

FACTS:

In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for
Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan
Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he
began occupying the house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his
voters registration record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan
Erasmo, Sr., respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due
proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos
opposition.

Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of

registered voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos
from the list of registered voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not
abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its
Mayor.Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian
City which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.

Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition
for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his
application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the
result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village voters list
pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for
the May 10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to
deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos
made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he
resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC
issued a joint resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form
and substance.

While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the

COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos
winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay.He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before

it,holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of
Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and
Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the
CA decision before this Court in G.R. 193566.

Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos

motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.It held that Jalosjos
did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position
of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have
transferred his residence from that place toBarangayVeteransVillagein Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to
pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay
considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed
the discharge of that office.

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all
questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not
extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution
of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010,
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election.Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon
the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the

proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule. Since the
COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his
proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For
Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based
on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646.Section 6 provides:

Section 6.Effects of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.

Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En
Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of
the disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought.The last standing official action in his case before election day was the
ruling of the COMELEC's Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list.Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his
proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the
same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to
consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily,
Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC's failure to annul his
proclamation also fail.The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution
solely on the HRET.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R.

192474,REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections
En Bancs order dated June 3, 2010, and REINSTATESthe Commissions Second
Division resolution dated February 23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan
Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr.Further, the Court DISMISSED the petitions in
G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of jurisdiction over the issues they raise.
 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL
G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012

SERENO,J.:

FACTS:

Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic

Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in
its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption
and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service. Under the leadership
of the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party
participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two
different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the
COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.

The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and
Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.

On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due
course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination
which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the
official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.

On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel

Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and
Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of
Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-
list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-
general of CIBAC.

Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was
unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From
The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed
by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting
secretary-general, when she was not even

a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was
Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records,
and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the Divisions findings.

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by
special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction;
and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside
the requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders
of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
which states:

REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the

COMELEC and the COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission

on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the

immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the
allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of
both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to
the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be
equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a
period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the
COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010.
This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September 2010.16
Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to
file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or
until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this
Court.

However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly
outside the required period.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes

In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that
the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a
necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws
and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case
that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

ELECTION LAW: party-list system law

Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well

as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law.
Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:

Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party,

organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five
(45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.

Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC
with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing
the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:

The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent,
which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of
the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list
group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only
an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of
said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this
resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of
nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the

COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc.

The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-
general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of
CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its
Certificate of Nomination.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is
DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC
expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March
2010 by Pia B. Derla.
 ARNOLD VICENCIO v. HON. HEYNALOO A. VILLAR, et al.

G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

The mandate of the Commission on Audit is to observe the policy that

government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and
that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
such funds and property should be prevented.

The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM),

presided by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and
approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled An Ordinance Granting
Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter
into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian
Secretariat Tasked to

Function in their Respective Areas of Concern.

Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of

this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same
time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City
Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services.
After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered
consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor.
However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing
the amount for being an improper disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance,
Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the
Commission on Audit (COA) which subsequently denied it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Audit committed serious errors and

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it
affirmed ASBs decision relative to the disallowance of disbursements
concerning the services rendered by hired consultants for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod ng Malabon

HELD:

Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is
no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city
was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the
Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a
continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor
to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.

The COAs assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its
mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it
by the Constitution. The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the
policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and
conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no
grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.
 JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in
his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al.

G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive

to the President.

An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra

vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly
inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were
seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf

Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Committee
(Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The
Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan,
the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state

of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In
the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a

President
HELD:

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive

powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section
1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who
is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,
Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out
powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the

Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The
net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that
a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed
forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would
be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the

President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,

is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local

Government Code.
 NAPOCOR VS. ILETO
G.R. No. 169957/G.R. No. 171558. July 11, 2012

FACTS:

On October 7, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a

complaint, which was subsequently amended, seeking to expropriate certain
parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its Northwestern Luzon
Transmission Line project. As a consequence, the Court hereby allows the National
Power Corporation to remain in possession of the aforementioned areas which it
had entered on December 16, 1997 and further orders it to pay the respective
owners thereof the following just compensation, with legal interest from the taking
of possession (Sec. 10, Rule 67 of [the] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), and after
deducting the sums due the Government for unpaid real estate taxes and other
charges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation purportedly for the acquisition of the property despite the fact that
the NPC acquired only an aerial easement of right of way over the agricultural
lands of respondents

RULING:
 The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function
addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government. We already established in Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987), that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount. We said: The determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations[,] but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.
Francisco I. Chavez Vs. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupaz, Jr.
G.R. No. 202242. July 17, 2012

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was

added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000
and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a
representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in
the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in
questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents
also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
 (2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter
to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice.
While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus
standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can
come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional.
The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the
JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to
a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made
on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to
its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in
the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed
of seven (7) members only.
 Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition
of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.
 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, Jr., et al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Paquito N. Ochoa, et al.
GR 195770 July 27, 2012

Doctrine:

The LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government powers
on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national government is
not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of
national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Facts:

Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition:

o Questioning the constitutionality of RA 10147 (2011 Gen.

Appropriations Act) provision allocating P21 Billion for the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP).

o Enjoining Respondents from implementing CCTP on the

ground that it amounts to a "recentralization" of government
functions that have already been devolved from the national
government to the LGUs.

In 2007, DSWD implemented a poverty reduction strategy

dubbed Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino.

In 2008, DSWD issued A.O.16 (s. 2008) setting the implementing

guidelines for the project, renamed as Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program (4Ps) also referred to as CCTP.

CCTP provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the

members of the families to meet certain human development goals.
Eligible households selected from priority target areas are granted
health and education benefits for a total annual subsidy of P15k.

AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network

among DepEd, DOH, DILG, the National Anti-Poverty Commission
(NAPC) and LGUs. DSWD as lead implementing agency oversees
and coordinates the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of
the program while the LGU is responsible for the availability of
health and education supply, and providing technical assistance for
the Program implementation, among others.
 DSWD executed MOAs with each participating LGUs to outline the
obligation of both parties during the 5-year implementation period.

Congress then provided funding for the project as follows: P298K

in 2008, P5 Billion in 2009, P10 Billion in 2010, and P21 Billion
in 2011.

Issue:

WON THE CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD

VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE
LGUS

Held:

No. Petition is dismissed.

Petitioners:

The manner by which CCTP is implemented is questionable

(i.e., primarily through a national agency - DSWD, instead of
LGU).

It is the LGUs responsibility to deliver social welfare, agriculture,

and health care services.

Giving DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries

and the manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with would have enhanced its
delivery of basic services. This results in the "recentralization" of
basic government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of
local autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.

Respondents:

(The Court did not outline the arguments from the respondents side)

Court:

Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the

invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011.
 The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure
the autonomy of local governments ( Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10
1987 Constitution):

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code

which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization xxx

Section 14. The President shall provide for regional

development councils or other similar bodies composed of local
government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.

To fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy

that would develop them into self-reliant communities, Section 17
LGC vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall xxx discharge the functions

and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government
units shall likewise xxx discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary to xxx provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited
to, x x x.

However, par (c) of Sec 17 provides a categorical exception of

cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof,

public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
 Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services.

This express reservation of power by the national government means

that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of

decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive and
accountable local government structure, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units
into "mini - states." With local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing
more than "to break up the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever
"the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units."

Pimentel v. Aguirre - Defined the extent of the local government's

autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national government in
the pursuit of common national goals. Thus:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national

government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in

the President and Congress.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power.

o Decentralization of administration - when the central

 government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and make local governments more responsive and
accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.

o Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political

power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. This amounts to self-immolation, since the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.

It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete

relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services. The national government is
not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES- OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, 18 July 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)

The constitutional right to travel is not absolute since the OCA may
regulate the travels of Judges and personnel to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued the Circular No. 49-

2003 requiring all foreign travels of judges and court personnel to be with prior
permission from the Court. Moreover, a travel authority must first be secured
from the OCA. Accordingly, Judges must submit the complete requirements to
the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel.

Judge Ignacio Macarine requested for authority to travel to Hongkong

with his family. Said travel was to be charged to Judge Macarines annual forced
leave. However, Judge Macarine did not submit the complete requirements so
his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. Judge Macarine
proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority. Judge
Macarine was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence had been
disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. Accordingly,
the absences of Judge Macarine shall not be deducted from his leave credits but
from his salary. The OCA found Judge Macarine guilty of violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 for traveling out of the country without filing the
necessary application for leave and without first securing a travel authority from
the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No.

49-2003

HELD:

The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the

exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as
may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as
limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower
courts.

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they
 can go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule. To
ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who
wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification
from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said
certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of
Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that
he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from
date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

Thus, for traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the

Court, Justice Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

 Abraham Rimando Vs. Naguilan Emission Testing Center, Inc., etc., et al.
G.R. No. 198860 July 23, 2012

Facts:
Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for mandamus and
damages against Abraham Rimando (petitioner), the municipal mayor of
Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint, the company alleged that from 2005 to
2007 its business is located on a land formerly belonging to the national
government which was later certified as an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain by the DENR. On January 18, 2008, it applied for a renewal of its
business permit and paid the corresponding fees, but the petitioner refused to issue
a business permit, until such time that the company executes a contract of lease
with the municipality; the respondent is amenable to signing the contract but with
some revisions, which the petitioner did not accept; no common ground was
reached among the parties, hence the company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in
favour of the petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a) the Municipality of Naguiian is the
declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-
01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of
Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract
of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real property owned
by the municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business permits is
discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.

On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case even though
the petition itself is dismissible on the ground of mootness. It held that the factual
milieu of the case justifies issuance of the writ; the tax declaration in the name of
the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of
lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA
further observed that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the
municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to
comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. It held the mayor not liable for damages since he acted in
the performance of his duties which are legally protected by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty; the case against the mayor also was
moot and academic since his term as mayor expired. Nevertheless, the CA reversed
and set aside the RTC decision.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;

Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe compelled thru a

petition for mandamus.

Ruling:
 We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become
moot and academic owing to the expiration of the period intended to be covered by
the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a

justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical
use and value1 or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.2 In such cases,
there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.3 As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.4

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant
a business permit in favor of respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009
has already been superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the
petitioners term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner,
in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the
respondents business permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that
any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be issued, the
petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business
permit no longer subsists.

While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise

moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its decision was
erroneously couched.

The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and
the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being
unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in
favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final
disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the
same along with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a

business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence,
discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in Roble
Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor5 where a determination was made on the nature of
the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government
Code6, viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)

(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and

Compensation.
 (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which
is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply
the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and
priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-
wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.

As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to

issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated
police power to local governments. Local government units exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code
of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses
and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
xxx

xxxx

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the

power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a
manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation.
Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question
of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a
writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.7 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the
respondent is incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayors discretionary duty
to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is
REINSTATED.