ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
ADMIN LAW FULL TEXT
C. EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
1. No. L-16537. June 29, 1962.
FRANCISCO C. CALO, petitioner-
appellant, vs. DELFIN C. FUERTES,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES,
respondents-appellees.
Appeal; Appeal bond filed after 30-day
period to appeal.Although the notice
of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period, the appeal has
not been perfected where the appeal
bond was filed on the 31st day after
notice of judgment.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of
administrative remedies; Withdrawal
of appeal, effect of.In an
administrative case, appeal to the
President of the Philippines is the last
step that the aggrieved party should
take. The withdrawal of the appeal
taken to the President is tantamount
to not appealing at all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal.
Same; When certiorari and prohibition
will lie.A civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court lies only when there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In the instant case,
appeal from an opinion or order by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the
petitioner.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Agusan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
Calo, Calo & Calo for petitioner-
appellant.
Ismael B. Sanchez and Jalandoni &
Jamir for respondent-appellee Delfin C.
Fuertes.
Solicitor General for respondent-
appellee Director of Lands and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
PADILLA, J.:
In Bureau of Lands Claim No. 224 (N),
Lot No. 143-A, Cadastral Case No. 84,
Butuan City, entitled Francisco C. Calo,
claimant-contestant, vs. H.A. No.
86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes,
applicant-respondent, the Director of
Lands rendered on 12 April 1956 an
opinion denying and dismissing
former's claim and contest against the
Homestead Application No. 86871 (E-
40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, ordering
him to vacate the premises within
sixty days from receipt of a copy of
the opinion, and stating that upon
finality thereof homestead patent
would be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes.
His request for reconsideration having
been denied by the Director of Lands
on 25 January 1957, Francisco C. Calo
brought to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources the case,
docketed as DANR case No. 1549. On
28 February 1958 the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
modified the opinion of the Director of
Lands
x x x in the sense that Delfin C.
Fuertes should reimburse Francisco G.
Calo of the difference between the
value of the improvements the latter
introduced on the land in controversy
and the value of the consequential
benefits derived by him therefrom
within thirty (30) days from advice by
the Director of Lands who is hereby
directed to determine the
aforementioned difference within sixty
(60) days from receipt of a copy of this
decision.
Still dissatisfied with the above
opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Page 1 of 25

Resources to reconsider it but the
latter denied a reconsideration
thereof. Hence, on 1 August 1958
Francisco C. Calo appealed to the
President of the Philippines (Annex A
to Answer, p. 54, rec. of case No. 55),
but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew it
before the President of the Philippines
could act thereon (Annex A to
memorandum of the petitioner, p. 64,
rec. of case No. 55).
On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo
filed in the Court of First Instance of
Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary
injunction praying that the
enforcement of the opinions of the
Director of Lands andthe Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Re-
sources be enjoined; that if a bond be
needed for the purpose he was willing
to file it; that after hearing the
injunction be made final and
permanent; that the respondent Delfin
C. Fuertes pay him P18,000 as
damages and attorney's fees and
costs of the suit; that he be declared
the owner entitled to possess the
parcel of land subject of the litigation;
and for any other just and equitable
relief (special civil case No. 55).
On 24 December 1958 the respondent
Delfin C. Fuertes filed an answer and,
on 27 December 1958, an amended
answer to the petition; on 29
December 1958 and 3 January 1959
the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Director of Lands, respectively,
filed their answers. After a preliminary
hearing as provided for in section 5,
Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, on 31
July 1959 the court rendered
judgment, the dispositive part of which
is-
WHEREFORE, for failure to state a
cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction
and for not exhausting all the
administrative remedies available to
the petitioner in the ordinary course of
law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it
hereby dismisses the herein petition
with costs against petitioner.
The petitioner appealed, but as only a
question of law is raised, the Court of
Appeals certified the appeal to this
Court.
This appeal has not been perfected
within the reglementary period, as
provided for in section 17, Rule 41, for
although the notice of appeal was filed
on 31 August 1959 (p. 77, record of
case No. 55) or on the 13th day from
the receipt of case No. 55 the appeal
bond was filed on 18 September 1959
(p. 78, record of case No. 55) or on the
31st day after notice of judgment. This
is enough to dispose of the case.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
At any rate, the appellant's contention
that, as the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources is the alter ego
of the President and his acts or
decisions are also those of the latter,
he need not appeal from the decision
or opinion of the former to the latter,
and that, such being the case, after he
had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
from the decision or opinion of the
Director of Lands he had exhausted all
the administrative remedies, is
untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to
the President of the Philippines is
tantamount to not appealing at all
thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal,
because the appeal to the President is
the last step he should take in an
administrative case.
Furthermore, a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court lies only when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In the case at
bar, appeal from an opinion or order
by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of
the Philippines is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the
petitioner.1
Page 2 of 25

The judgment appealed from already
had become final and cannot be
reviewed. The appeal is dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner-
appellant. Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA
397, No. L-16537 June 29, 1962
A. CERTIORARI
7. No. L-74687. November 12, 1987.*
ANTONIO DE LEON, petitioner, vs.
HEIRS OF GREGORIO REYES,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
thru MANUEL LAZARO, (now
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY), respondents.
Evidence; Administrative Agencies;
Authority of Administrative superiors
to reverse findings of subordinates
must be exercised sparingly and only
upon clear showing of error.While
there is no disputing the authority of
administrative superiors to reverse the
findings of their subordinates, this
power must be exercised sparingly
and only upon a clear showing of error.
Lacking such flaw, the decision of the
lower administrative officials should be
sustained, if only because they have
closer access to the problem sought to
be resolved and have the direct
opportunity to question the parties
and their witnesses and to assess the
evidence first-hand.
Same; Same; Same; Review of
decisions of Administrative officials by
their superiors to be valid must not be
whimsical, arbitrary or devoid of
substantial basis.While, as
previously remarked, the decisions of
administrative officials are subject to
review by their superiors, such review,
to be valid, must not be whimsical or
arbitrary or devoid of substantial
basis. There is no question that the
public respondent, acting on behalf of
the President, can reverse the
decisions of a department head
although the former is lower in rank
than the Cabinet member. But that is
not the point. The point is that,
although the power is conceded, it
must be exercised, like all powers,
within the limits of the law, if
substantive rights are to be protected
and justice is to be upheld.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Findings
and conclusions of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture upon a
question of fact are conclusive and not
subject to review.The public
respondent, in setting aside the
decision of the Bureau of Lands, as
affirmed by the Ministry of Natural
Resources, disregarded the long line of
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
decisions holding that the findings and
conclusions of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture upon a
question of fact are conclusive and not
subject to review, in the absence of
showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition, or mistake.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Remedy of
Certiorari applies to administrative
decisions up to the highest level and
includes the decision at bar even if
rendered by authority of the
President.The writ of certiorari is
available in this case. If all
administrative decisions were
conclusive upon us in any event, there
would have been no reason at all to
offer this extraordinary remedy to
litigants who otherwise would have
been deprived of this only and last
resort to the courts of justice. This
remedy applies to administrative
decisions up to the highest level and
includes the decision at bar even if
rendered by authority of the
President. The sacramental phrase
does not remove these decisions from
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court
or inhibit us from reversing them when
warranted by a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion.
Page 3 of 25

PETITION to review the decision of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
The land in dispute is located in Sta.
Quiteria, Caloocan City, and has an
area of 13,956 square meters. It is the
subject of two separate applications,
one for sale filed by the late Gregorio
Reyes on December 21, 1967, and the
other for free patent filed by petitioner
Antonio de Leon on September 23,
1968. Both are based on the claim of
actual possession. To resolve the
conflict, the Bureau of Lands
conducted an investigation and after
hearing ruled against Gregorio Reyes,1
who appealed to the Ministry of
Natural Resources. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands was there set aside
by the assistant secretary for legal
affairs,2 but he was himself, on motion
for reconsideration, reversed by the
Minister.3 The private respondents**
then elevated the case to the Office of
the President, where they were
sustained.4 The subsequent motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner
was denied.5
This petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court was originally
dismissed, and the first motion for
reconsideration was denied. We held
that the issues raised were mainly
factual and there was no showing that
the findings thereon were not
supported by substantial evidence.
Upon the filing with leave of a second
motion for reconsideration, the Court
decided to take a harder look at the
case, set aside the earlier dismissal of
the petition and gave due course
thereto, requiring the parties to file
memoranda.6
As a matter of law and policy, this
Court does not review the factual
findings of administrative bodies as
long as there is substantial evidence
to support them. Only in exceptional
cases do we deviate from this
discipline, which is based on a proper
respect for the decisions of a
coordinate department and a just
recognition of its expertise on matters
coming under its direct jurisdiction.
After the thorough study of the
pleadings filed by the parties, and of
the antecedent proceedings, we find
that this is one occasion for such
deviation. The Court feels that there is
justification to review the decision
here questioned on the challenge that
it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion by the public respondent.
The reversal was made by then
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
Manuel M. Lazaro on December 19,
1985. The petitioners motion for
reconsideration was subsequently
denied on April 29, 1986, on the
ground that there was no strong and
cogent reason to warrant the reversal
or modification of the decision.
The questioned decision was based on
the reports made by Land Investigator
Pablo Bautista on November 7, 1967,
and December 21, 1967, as
corroborated by Land Surveyor
Medardo Habal after his survey of the
disputed land on November 29, 1967.
Bautista found that the private
respondent had been in possession of
the land in question since 1950, had
planted it to fruit trees and seasonal
crops, and that no other person was
occupying it.7 Habal, for his part, said
that no one else was claiming the
land, nobody had protested his survey,
and that there was no house on the
said property.8
The public respondent also noted that
it was only on December 3, 1968, that
the petitioner had declared the said
land for taxation purposes, retroactive
to 1965. This was deemed an
indication that the petitioner was not
really in possession thereof as he
claimed and had filed the declaration
only to support his free patent
application.9
Page 4 of 25

To bolster these findings, the private
respondents submit that the land in
dispute was part of the lot from the
Piedad Estate which had been sold on
July 16,1931, to the Bartolome
spouses and that this portion had
merely been inadvertently omitted in
the technical description of the said
lot. Even so, it was occupied by the
Bartolomes (including Gregorio Reyes
and his wife, who was a daughter of
the Bartolomes) along with the rest of
the lot since its purchase in the
aforesaid year.10
Conversely, the petitioner points to
the finding of the Bureau of Lands, as
affirmed by the Ministry of Natural
Resources, that his father, Simeon de
Leon, had been in possession of the
disputed land since 1925 and until his
death in 1950. His possession was
then continued by the petitioner.
According to Land Investigator Jose B.
Isidro, who inspected the land on
October 30, 1968, it was planted by
the petitioner and his father to fruit-
bearing trees, and there were two nipa
huts thereon, one belonging to the
petitioner and the other to his
daughter, Catalina.11 Another report,
filed this time by Land Investigator
Romeo Salvado, found that the
petitioners possession was
discontinued only in 1969 when
Gregorio Reyes forced himself into the
land in dispute and with the aid of
armed men bulldozed the trees and
plants thereon. The petitioner
complained to the Bureau of Lands,
which issued a status quo order on
May 4, 1970. Nevertheless, Reyes
ignored the same and in violation of
the order and the Public Land Act,
leased the land to Hi-Protein
Corporation, which introduced its own
improvements on the property.12
While there is no disputing the
authority of administrative superiors
to reverse the findings of their
subordinates, this power must be
exercised sparingly and only upon a
clear showing of error. Lacking such
flaw, the decision of the lower
administrative officials should be
sustained, if only because they have
closer access to the problem sought to
be resolved and have the direct
opportunity to question the parties
and their witnesses and to assess the
evidence first-hand.
The hearing officer of the Bureau of
Lands, who made the initial
investigation in the case at bar, had
such an opportunity. It was Jose B.
Isidro who conducted the hearings to
resolve the conflicting claims of
possession of the petitioner and
Gregorio Reyes, examined them and
their witnesses and inspected the
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
disputed property. His report of
December 5,1968, was in favor of the
petitioners. Notably, not even the
private respondents impugn his
integrity and impartiality and in fact
even cite him to support their own
position that de Leon had abandoned
the property by selling it in 1968 and
1969.13
By contrast, the motives of both
Bautista and Habal have been
questioned by the petitioner, and for
good reason. The record shows that it
was Bautista who advised Gregorio
Reyes to file his sales application,14
and by some happenstance, it was
also Bautista who was assigned to
investigate the same. It is also not
denied that Habal was retained by
Reyes to conduct the survey of the
land in dispute, presumably for a
corresponding compensation.15 Given
such circumstances, we find it not
unreasonable to suppose, and even
expect, that the reports of these two
individuals would be, as in fact they
were, favorable to Reyes.
It is worth noting that in his decision
reversing the Ministry of Natural
Resources, the public respondent
merely rejected the report of Isidro
and opted in favor of the reports of
Bautista and Habal, but without saying
why except to note that Bautistas
Page 5 of 25

report was earlier. No effort was made
to explain away their apparent bias as
directly challenged by the petitioner.
The reports were simply and
completely accepted to sustain the
private respondents stand. There was
also no mention of Land Investigator
Salvado, who reported on August 12,
1983, that Reyes had violated the
status quo order of the Bureau of
Lands and recommended that he be
held civilly and criminally liable. His
report was totally ignored.
Besides invoking the reports of Isidro
and Salvado, the petitioner presented
two witnesses who both testified that
he and his father had been in
continuous possession of the land in
dispute, raising fruit-bearing trees
there. Pastor Buenaventura swore he
was born in Sta. Quiteria in 1917 and
Ricardo Javier claimed he transferred
to the place in 1938, and both were
positive that the de Leon father and
son were occupying the disputed
property until it was bulldozed in
1969.16 Giving credence to this
evidence, the Bureau of Lands in its
decision declared:
Evidence for the protestant (herein
petitioner) bears heavily upon the
facts that he has been in actual and
physical control of the property since
1925 through his predecessor-in-
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
interest Simeon de Leon. The captain and wrote this office to inform
preliminary investigation report that on June 30, 1969, Gregorio Reyes,
submitted by Land Investigator Jose in company with a number of armed
Isidro relative to his free patent men and with a bulldozer forcibly
application as to the fact of possession entered the land covered by his Free
confirmed the testimonies of his Patent Application No. (III-l) 4649.
witnesses, who are long time residents Once inside the premises his (Gregorio
and native-born of the barrio where Reyes) men destroyed many of his
the land is situated. The final (Antonio de Leon) improvements.17
investigation report on the application
The private respondents allegation
stated, among others, that the
that the petitioner had sold the land in
cultivation and occupation of the land
question was never established. Their
in question by Antonio de Leon has
counsel tried hard enough to draw an
been continuous, notorious and
admission to this effect but all he got
exclusive since 1925, and the
from the petitioner was a consistent
improvements on the land as
denial.18 It was never proved that the
ascertained by the investigator during
alleged deeds of sale were authentic
his ocular inspection on October 30,
and had been signed by the petitioner,
1968 were clearly indicated on the
who said he could never manage to
sketch drawn at the back thereof
write his full name, which was the
consisting of ten guava trees, two
signature on the instruments. The
guyabano trees, fifty atis trees, two
alleged vendees were never presented
star apple trees, three tieza trees,
at the hearing. The private
several bamboo grooves, patola,
respondents also did not offer the
camote patch, a nipa house owned by
testimony of a handwriting expert to
the applicants daughter Catalina de
prove the genuineness of the
Leon. In a desperate bid to obliterate
signature on the challenged deeds of
traces of improvements by Antonio de
sale. There was also a supposed
Leon, respondent bulldozed and
affidavit of de Leons daughter
destroyed them, and in their stead
Catalina affirming that her hut had not
replaced them with his improvements,
been bulldozed by Gregorio Reyes but
to give it a semblance that it was he
had been destroyed during a typhoon,
who is in actual possession of the
but this too has no evidentiary value.
land. Forthwith, Antonio de Leon
As the alleged affiant was never
lodged a complaint before the barrio
presented and could not be examined
Page 6 of 25

on the said sworn statement, it must
be rejected as hearsay.
The Minister also found that the tax
declarations made by Gregorio Reyes
referred not to the land in dispute but
to the lot purchased from the Piedad
Estate by the Bartolome spouses, his
parents-in-law.19 The private
respondents argument that the
disputed land was part of the said lot
is weakened by the fact that Reyes
filed a sales application therefor and
so impliedly admitted it was public
land. Then there is Reyes assertion
that the Bartolomes had merely
allowed or tolerated de Leons
occupation of the land because he was
their relative. This claim, if true at all,
would only disprove the reports made
by Bautista and Habal that no one but
Reyes was at the time of their
inspection occupying the land.
We are satisfied from an examination
of the evidence of record that the
petitioner, as his father before him,
was in continuous possession of the
disputed land from 1925 and raised
fruit-bearing trees therein. In 1969,
Reyes forcibly ousted de Leon from the
said property and destroyed the trees
and structures on the said property.
Thereafter, despite the order of the
Bureau of Lands requiring the parties
to maintain the status quo pending the
resolution of their dispute, Reyes
leased the property to the Hi-Protein
Corporation, which itself introduced
improvements on the land.
While, as previously remarked, the
decisions of administrative officials are
subject to review by their superiors,
such review, to be valid, must not be
whimsical or arbitrary or devoid of
substantial basis. There is no question
that the public respondent, acting on
behalf of the President, can reverse
the decisions of a department head
although the former is lower in rank
than the Cabinet member. But that is
not the point. The point is that,
although the power is conceded, it
must be exercised, like all powers,
within the limits of the law, if
substantive rights are to be protected
and justice is to be upheld.
Our finding is that such power was not
properly exercised in this case, to the
prejudice of the petitioner. The basis of
the reversal, to wit, the reports of
Bautista and Habal, have been
discredited for partiality and refuted
by the private respondents
themselves when they argued that the
petitioners possession of the land was
only tolerated. This was an implicit
admission that the petitioner was
actually occupying the land at the
time they said they had no possession
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
of it. Moreover, the public respondent
did not consider the other official
reports submitted by Isidro and
Salvado and just dismissed them out
of hand notwithstanding that these
were the very bases used by the
Bureau of Lands in deciding for the
petitioner.
The public respondent, in setting aside
the decision of the Bureau of Lands, as
affirmed by the Ministry of Natural
Resources, disregarded the long line of
decisions holding that the findings and
conclusions of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture upon a
question of fact are conclusive and not
subject to review, in the absence of
showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition, or mistake.20
The writ of certiorari is available in this
case. If all administrative decisions
were conclusive upon us in any event,
there would have been no reason at all
to offer this extraordinary remedy to
litigants who otherwise would have
been deprived of this only and last
resort to the courts of justice. This
remedy applies to administrative
decisions up to the highest level and
includes the decision at bar even if
rendered by authority of the
President. The sacramental phrase
Page 7 of 25

does not remove these decisions from
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court
or inhibit us from reversing them when
warranted by a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion.
The petition is granted. The writ must
issue.
It bears emphasis that whereas the
petitioner is a humble farmer applying
for a free patent over the only land he
and his father before him have tilled
all these many years, the private
respondents are subdivision owners
who really do not need the disputed
property as much as the petitioner. We
are elated that the facts and the law of
this case have tilted in favor of the
party with less privileges in life and
thus given meaning to the
constitutional ideal of a more
equitable distribution among our
people of the bounties of the earth.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs
dated December 19, 1985, and the
Order of the Deputy Executive
Secretary dated April 29,1986, are SET
ASIDE and the Order of the Minister of
Natural Resources dated March
8,1985, is REINSTATED, with costs
against the private respondents. It is
so ordered. De Leon vs. Heirs of
Gregorio Reyes, 155 SCRA 584, No. L-
74687 November 12, 1987
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
E. Habeas Corpus been an honest effort to arrive at the
truth by methods sufficiently fair and
3. CASIMIRO BAYANI, petitioner
reasonable to amount to due process
and appellant, vs. THE INSULAR
of law.
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
respondent and appellee. 2.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO HAVE ATTORNEYS;
RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO PRESENT
1.ALIENS; ADMINISTRATIVE
QUESTIONS DIRECTLY TO THE
PROCEEDINGS; RIGHT TO A FULL,
WITNESS.Aliens seeking admission
FREE AND FAIR HEARING.While the
into the territory of the United States
hearings before the board of special
have the right to be represented by an
inquiry, of the department of customs,
attorney if they so desire. They have a
are summary, in that no special
right to present witnesses in support
pleadings, etc., are, required, they are
of their request to enter. Their
nevertheless judicial in character, and
attorney has the right to present
the persons whose rights are inquired
whatsoever pertinent and material
into by it are entitled to a full, free,
questions which he may desire to such
and fair hearing just as in any other
witnesses, as will demonstrate or will
cases where the rights of individuals
tend to demonstrate the right to such
are being determined. While the
alien to enter the country. The burden
decisions of the customs
of proving his right to enter the
administrative officers are final upon
territory of the United States is upon
the question of the right of an alien to
the immigrant who seeks that
enter the territory of the United
privilege. To sustain that burden he
States, unless there has been an
has a right to call and present
abuse of the power and discretion in
witnesses. To that end either he or his
them vested, the courts will not
attorney should be permitted to ask
hesitate to review the decision of such
such pertinent and material questions
officers whenever it is alleged and
as will tend to support his contention.
proved that they have abused the
A. denial of any of these rights is not
power and discretion conferred upon
authorized in law, and amounts to an
them, or where they have acted in
unfair and unjust hearing. It is the
open violation of the law. The essential
duty of the board of special inquiry to
thing in such investigations, as well as
make an effort to arrive at the truth by
in all other judicial or quasi-judicial
hearing all of the witnesses and to
proceedings, is that there shall have
permit them, without intimidation, to
Page 8 of 25

state all of the facts, and to answer all
of the pertinent questions put to them,
either by the attorney or by the board.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. Del Rosario,
J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the court.
Chas. E. Tenney for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for
appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that the
appellant arrived at Manila, on the
21st day of August, 1917, on the
steamship Loongsang and requested
permission to enter the Philippine
Islands upon the ground that he was a
citizen thereof, having been born in
said Islands. His right to enter was
inquired into by a board of special
inquiry. At the conclusion of said
inquiry his request to enter was
denied. An appeal was taken to the
Collector of Customs and the decision
of the board of special inquiry was by
him confirmed. Thereupon a writ of
habeas corpus was petitioned for in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. At
the conclusion of the hearing on said
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
petition the writ was denied and the capricious and was not sustained by
present appeal was perfected. the evidence.
The appellant now alleges that he has In reply to said alleged errors the
not been given a full, free, and fair Attorney-General, Quintin Paredes,
hearing before the board of special admits that appellant has not been
inquiry, and that the order denying accorded a free, full, and fair hearing
him the right to enter the Philippine and recommended that he be given a
Islands should be set aside and that new trial. The Attorney-General in his
he should be granted a new trial on brief said:
the merits. The appellant now alleges
"The issue raised by this appeal is
that the record of the proceedings
whether the record shows abuse of
before the board of special inquiry
discretion and authority on the part of
shows that said board had abused its
the board of special inquiry which
authority in not giving him a full, free,
heard this case. Counsel for appellant
and fair hearing; that it appears from
directs attention to some very
the record that the said hearing was in
illadvised action on the part of
great part made up of leading and
members of the board in their
misleading questions and untrue
examination of the witnesses in this
statements, calculated to confuse the
case. The misstatement of material
witnesses and not adapted to discover
facts to witnesses (rec., pp. 10 and 12)
the real merits of the petitioner's
and the barring of a witness before
rights; that the board failed to present
she had concluded her testimony
questions and refused to permit the
(rec., p. 12) unquestionably are
attorney for the appellant to present
serious irregularities. And in the
questions which would bring to light
opinion of the undersigned, this
the real, material, and important facts
petitioner was not accorded such a
justifying his right to enter the
hearing as the law contemplates and
Philippine Islands; that the Court of
assures immigrants. It is
First Instance failed to find from the
recommended that the record be
record that the board of special inquiry
remanded to the immigration officials
had abused its authority, power and
with instructions to grant this
discretion in refusing the appellant
applicant a new hearing.
permission to land in the Philippine
Islands, and that the decision of said "Respectfully submitted."
board was arbitrary, frivolous and
Page 9 of 25

While the hearings before the board of
special inquiry are summary in that no
special pleadings, etc., are required,
they are, nevertheless, judicial in
character, and the persons tried by
such a board are entitled to a full, free,
and fair hearing just as in any other
cases where the rights of individuals
are being inquired into. Such
individuals have the right to be
represented by an attorney, if they so
desire. They have a right to present
witnesses to support their request to
enter. Their attorney has a right to
present whatever pertinent questions
he may desire to such witnesses, as
will demonstrate or will tend to show
the right of the immigrant to enter the
country. (Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil.
Rep., 598; Ang Eng Chong vs.
Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. Rep.,
614; Go Kiam vs. Collector of Customs,
R. G. No. 7099;1 Loo Bun Hian vs.
Collector of Customs, R. G. No. 7074;1
Lim Yiong vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. Rep., 424; Ex parte Lam Pui, 217
Fed. Rep., 456; Jouras vs. Allen, 222
Fed. Rep., 756; U. S. vs. Ruiz, 23 Fed.
Rep., 431 [?]; Ex parte Petkos, 212
Fed. Rep., 275; Ex parte Ung King
leng, 213 Fed. Rep., 119; Lim Ching vs.
Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. Rep.,
186; Ex parte Gregory, 210 Fed. Rep.,
680; Louie Dai vs. U. S., 238 Fed. Rep.,
68, 74; Ex parte Lee Dung Moo, 230
Fed. Rep., 746; Ex parte Tom Toy Tin,
230 Fed. Rep., 747; Ex parte Chin Loy
You, 223 Fed. Rep., 883; Ex parte
Wong Foo, 230 Fed, Rep., 534.)
The decisions of the customs
administrative officers are final in
cases like the present, unless there
has been an abuse of the power and
discretion vested in them. The courts,
however, do not hesitate to review the
decision of such administrative officers
whenever it is alleged and shown that
they have grossly abused the power
and discretion conferred upon them,
or where they acted in open violation
of the law. (Ko Poco vs. McCoy, 10 Phil.
Rep., 442; Chin Yow vs. U. S., 208 U. S.
8, 11; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S., 253;
Ex parte Lung Foot, 174 Fed. Rep., 70;
Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15 Phil. Rep., 559;
Lim Yiong vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. Rep., 424.)
An alien seeking to enter territory of
the United States, even though the
hearing is summary, is entitled to a
free, full, and fair hearing before he is
denied the right to enter. The right to
a hearing includes the right to have
the evidence considered by the board.
He is not only entitled to have the
evidence which he presents
considered, but he is entitled to
present all of the evidence which he
has and which is germane to the
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
question of his right to enter. While the
board of special inquiry is not
technically a judicial body and the
procedure is not technically judicial,
nor are the proceedings defined by
any particular rules or statutes,
nevertheless, the board is required,
under the procedure which it adopts,
to give the immigrant or the alien an
opportunity to show by proof that his
request should be granted. (Edwards
vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. Rep., 598.)
It appears from the record that all of
the witnesses presented by the
appellant were people of humble
origin and very ignorant. They were
not accustomed, perhaps, to scenes of
judicial proceedings. They were
therefore, naturally, under the strain
born of timidity and known ignorance.
For that reason they were easily
excited and intimidated. The board
should have allayed their fears and
put them, as far as possible, at their
ease, at least to the point of indicating
to them that they were under the
protection, so long as they obey the
law, of judicial authority. This the
board did not do. Upon the contrary
the board, with the evident intent to
confuse and to unduly excite the
witnesses, made statements to them
which were positively untrue and
unsupported by any part of the record.
And not only that, but the board
Page 10 of 25

actually intimidated one important
witness, apparently without reason, by
informing her that she could give no
further testimony in that case and that
she was therefore forever barred from
testifying before it. The entire
examination by the board from the
beginning to the end, of all of the
witnesses, was made in a spirit of
hostility. For that reason the board was
rendered incapacitated to properly
and judicially weigh and consider the
evidence impartially. Where the record
itself discloses the fact that the
evidence is weighed in the spirit of
hostility there cannot be that
impartial, f free, f full and f fair hearing
contemplated by the law. (Ex parte
Tom Toy Tin, 230 Fed. Rep., 747; Jouras
vs. Allen, 222 Fed. Rep., 756.)
It is the duty of the board to make an
effort to arrive at the truth by hearing
all of the witnesses and to permit
them, without intimidation, to state all
of the facts and to answer all of the
pertinent questions put to them either
by their attorney or by the board. (Ex
parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. Rep.,
833.)
The essential thing in investigations
like the present as well as all other
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is
that there shall have been an honest
effort to arrive at the truth by methods
sufficiently fair and reasonable to
amount to due process of law.
The burden of proving his right to
enter the territory of the United States
is upon the immigrant who seeks that
privilege. To sustain that burden he
has a right to call and present
witnesses. To that end either he or his
attorney should be permitted to ask
such pertinent and material questions
as will tend to support his contention.
A denial of any of these rights is not
authorized in law and amounts to an
unfair and unjust hearing. If witnesses
are presented by the board to dispute
or to overcome the proof adduced by
the immigrant then, of course, the
latter, either by himself or by his
attorney, has a perfect right to test
the credibility of such witnesses by a
proper crossexamination. (Ex parte
Ung King leng, 213 Fed. Rep., 119.)
After a careful examination of the
record we are persuaded that the
recommendation of the Attorney-
General should be adopted. It is,
therefore, hereby ordered and decreed
that the record be returned to the
court whence it came with directions
that the judgment appealed from be
reversed and that an order be issued
directing and commanding the board
of special inquiry to give to the
appellant a rehearing as speedily as
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
the f facts and circumstances will
permit, and without any findings as to
costs, So ordered Bayani vs. Collector
of Customs., 37 Phil. 468, No. 13283
January 23, 1918
B. Question of Fact
5. G.R. No. 60054. July 2, 1991.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER ANDRES
LOMABAO, and JOSE M.
MASAYA, respondents.
Administrative Proceedings; Labor;
Evidence.In administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required as
basis for a judgment of the legality of
an employers dismissal of an
employee, nor even preponderance of
evidence, substantial evidence being
sufficient. Particularly as regards
proceedings of the precise nature in
question, the Labor Code provides
thatx x the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Code that
Page 11 of 25

the Commission and its members and
the Labor Arbiters shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the
technicalities of law or procedure, all
in the interest of due process. x x And
this Court has ruled that the ground
for an employers dismissal of an
employee need
be established only by
substantial evidence, it not
being required that the formers
evidence be of such degree as
is required in criminal cases,
i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
PETITION for review from the
judgment of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
The facts are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
Benjamin R. Reonal for
petitioner.
Eugenio C. Lindo for private
respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that
quanta of proof and adjective rules
vary depending on whether the cases
to which they are meant to apply are
criminal, civil or administrative in
character. In criminal actions, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required
for conviction;1 in civil actions and
proceedings, preponderance of
evidence, as support for a judgment;2
and in administrative cases,
substantial evidence, as basis for
adjudication.3 In criminal and civil
actions, application of the Rules of
Court is called for, with more or less
strictness. In administrative
proceedings, however, the technical
rules of pleading and procedure, and
of evidence, are not strictly adhered
to; they generally apply only
suppletorily;4 indeed, in agrarian
disputes application of the Rules of
Court is actually prohibited.5
5 The Revised Rules of
Procedure of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board provides that: Unless
adopted herein or by resolution
of the board, the provisions of
the Rules of Court do not Quite
incredibly, these familiar and
elementary propositions were
disregarded in the judgment a
quo. The error is serious and
must be, as it is here, corrected.
The facts are fairly simple and
quickly recounted.
The case originated from the
discovery by Meralco
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
employees that a person by the
name of Antonio Sanchez was
consuming electricity at the
house occupied by him at No.
2048 Amparo Street, Sta. Ana,
Manila, although he had himself
neither applied with Meralco for
electric service nor made the
requisite deposit in connection
therewith.6 It was learned that
electricity was being supplied to
Sanchezs house through a
clandestine and illicit
connection to a Meralco service
line (shunting the meter base
and tapping its service drop
direct to the service wire); and
household helpers of Sanchez
and the owner of the house, a
Mr. Castaeda, informed the
Meralco investigator that it was
a Meralco employee, Jose
Masaya, who had made the
unauthorized electric service
connection.
The Meralco Legal Department
thereupon sent Jose Masaya a
letter charging him with a
violation of the Company Code
on Employee Discipline, and
thereafter conducted a formal
investigation of the matter.7
Those who gave testimony at
that investigation were Jose
Masaya himself, and Renato
Page 12 of 25

Repuyan, Meralco field
investigator.
Prior to being interrogated
about the illegal connection and
in response to preliminary
questions by the investigator,
Masaya stated for the record
that he had received the letter
accusing him of misconduct,
that he had a copy of the code
of discipline and understood the
nature of the precise charge
against him, and that he did not
need to be assisted by a lawyer
or a representative of his Union
because, in his own words, ang
sasabihin ko naman dito ay
pawang katotohanan lamang.
Thereafter, Masaya deposed
that he had indeed installed the
connection in question in the
following manner, again
expressed in his own words:
Nilagyan ko ng shunt o kaputol
ng alambre ang kanilang meter
base at ang koneksiyon nito ay
kinabit ko sa
malapit na service wire; and
that for that job, he had
received P200 from Antonio
Sanchez. At the close of his
testimony, he also sought
forgiveness for the offense, viz.:
Nais ko po sanang ihingi ng
kapatawaran sa kumpanya ang
mga nagawa kong pagkakamali.
Anim po ang aking mga anak at
kung sakaling ako ay matanggal
sa kompanya dahil sa
pagkakamaling iyon, sila po ay
walang aasahan kung hindi ako
lamang. Kayat ipinakikiusap ko
sa inyo na ipaabot ninyo sa
kompanya ang aking
pagmamakaawa.
Repuyan testified on the fact of
the undenied and indisputable
installation of the illegal
electrical connection at the
residence of Antonio Sanchez
(his description of the manner
of its accomplishment being
substantially the same as
Masayas own), and also, the
disclosures made to him by
Sanchezs househelpers and the
owner of the house, supra.
After the investigation, and on
the basis of the results thereof,
Meralco filed with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment an
application for clearance to
terminate Masayas services,8
serving copy on the latter.
Meralco also placed Masaya
under preventive suspension.9
A week later, Masaya filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal
against Meralco.
After issues were joined on the
complaint for illegal dismissal as
well as the application for
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
clearance, and trial had
thereon, Labor Arbiter Andres
M. Lomabao rendered a decision
in Masayas favor,10 disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent
Manila Electric Company is
hereby ordered to pay
complainant JOSE M. MASAYA
his backwages corresponding to
the period December 8, 1978
up to April 30, 1980 and
separation pay of five (5) and a
half months salary in lieu of
reinstatement.
The Arbiter was of the view that
the record of the investigation
conducted by Meralco should
not be accorded credence; that
Meralcos contention that
Masaya had surreptitiously
effected the direct connection of
x x electric service was not
credible, because Masaya was
employed as a bill collector, not
as a lineman collector, hence,
he does not know how to install
electrical connection; and that
the money received by Masaya
from Sanchez (P200 or P250)
was not in consideration of any
clandestine connection but was
accepted as representation
expenses in following up Mr.
Sanchez application for
Page 13 of 25

installation of electric facilities x
x with the Engineers Office at
the City Hall of Manila.11
On appeal by Meralco, the
National Labor Relations
Commission affirmed the
Arbiters decision.12 In the
Commissions considered
view13
x x while it is true that in
administrative proceedings,
substantial evidence only is
required, the instant case is an
exception for the reason that
respondent-appellant in this
case is charging complainant-
appellee of a criminal offense,
and, therefore, it is incumbent
upon the former to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the crime, failing
which, complainant-appellee
must be absolved from
responsibility. The alleged
admission of complainant-
appellee during the
investigation conducted by the
legal department of
respondentappellant does not, if
at all, prove beyond reasonable
doubt the criminal act allegedly
committed by complainant-
appellee in the absence of any
showing that he was given the
opportunity to be heard by
counsel or at least, a
representative to confront his
accuser.
There is implicit concession that
under the substantial evidence
rule, the evidence would be
adequate to make out a case of
gross misconduct on the part of
Masaya; however, the
Commission theorizes that an
adjudgment to this effect was
precluded by the doctrine of
proof beyond reasonable doubt,
applicable exceptionally to
Masayas case. Echoing the
Commissions views, the public
respondents comment points
out that since there is no
causal connection between
private respondents duties to
the crime imputed to him, mere
substantial evidence is
insufficient to hold private
respondent guilty of installing
electrical connection let alone
deprive him of his right to
labor.
There are two evident errors
invalidating the Commissions
conclusions.
The first is that contrary to the
Commissions view, Masaya was
in truth asked if he wished to be
assisted by a lawyer or a
representative of his Union, and
his response was in the
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
negative because, in his own
words, ang sasabihin ko naman
dito ay pawang katotohanan
lamang
The second is that in
administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required
as basis for a judgment of the
legality of an employers
dismissal of an employee, nor
even preponderance of
evidence, substantial evidence
being sufficient.14 Particularly
as regards proceedings of the
precise nature in question, the
Labor Code provides that15
x x the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling
and it is the spirit and intention
of this Code that the
Commission and its members
and the Labor Arbiters shall use
every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively
and without regard to the
technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of
due process. x x
And this Court has ruled that
the ground for an employers
dismissal of an employee need
be established only by
Page 14 of 25

substantial evidence, it not
being required that the formers
evidence be of such degree as
is required in criminal cases,
i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt.16 It is absolutely of no
consequence that the
misconduct with which an
employee may be charged also
constitutes a criminal offense:
theft, embezzlement, assault on
another employee or company
officer, arson, malicious
mischief, etc. The proceedings
being administrative, the
quantum of proof is governed
by the substantial evidence rule
and not, as the respondent
Commission seems to imagine,
by the rule governing
judgments in criminal actions.
It was thus serious error, and
grave abuse of discretion for the
Labor Arbiter and the
respondent Commission, for the
reasons given, to reject and
exclude from consideration the
express admissions made by
Masaya during the
administrative investigation
conducted by Meralco.
The Court cannot close its eyes
to the following facts of record,
to wit:
1) the reality of the illegal
electrical connection;
2) the written communication to
Masaya that he was accused of
that illegal connection and he
would be subjected to a formal
investigation thereon;
3) Masayas acknowledgment
that, having a copy of the
companys code of discipline,
he understood the nature of the
accusation against him, and his
declining to be assisted by a
lawyer or a representative of his
Union because, according to
him, ang sasabihin ko naman
dito ay pawang katotohanan
lamang;
4) his voluntary admission that
it was he who had made the
illegal electrical connection,
describing the manner by which
he had made it, and that he had
received P250.00 from the
occupant of the house, Antonio
Sanchez; and
5) his plea to the company for
forgiveness for having made the
illegal connection.
There is on record, too,
testimony regarding
identification of Masaya by
Antonio Sanchez servants and
by Castaeda, the owner of the
house occupied by Sanchez.
There is, finally, nothing in the
record to demonstrate that
Masayas admissions were
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
made otherwise than
voluntarily; his subsequent
assertion before the Arbiter that
he had been starved into
signing the typewritten record
of the administrative
investigation containing said
admissions is not persuasive,
and was not in fact accepted by
the Arbiter or the Commission.
The Court is satisfied that the
evidence sufficiently proves the
commission by Masaya of an act
of dishonesty against his
employer, specifically described
in the Meralco Code on
Employee Discipline as follows:
SECTION 7. Dishonesty.
xxxxx
3) Directly or indirectly
tampering with electric meters
or metering installation of the
Company or the installation of
any device, with the purpose of
defrauding the Company.
Such an offense is obviously of
so serious a character as to
merit the penalty of dismissal
from employment. The Labor
Code pronounces fraud or
willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized
representative, or serious
misconduct on the part of the
employee to be lawful ground to
Page 15 of 25

terminate employment. And this
Court has held that the
dismissal of a dishonest
employee is as much in the
interests of labor as it is of
management. The labor force in
any company is protected and
the workers security of tenure
strengthened when pilferage of
equipment, goods and products
which endangers the viability of
an employer and, therefore, the
workers continued employment
is minimized or eliminated and
consequently labor-
management relations based on
mutual trust and confidence are
promoted.17
WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari is GRANTED
Jurisdiction
6. G.R. No. 96681. December
2,1991.*
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Education,
Culture 6, Sports, DR.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her
capacity as Superintendent
of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY,
JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO,
AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ
DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES
and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction;
Commission on Human Rights;
Court declares the Commission
on Human Rights to have no
jurisdiction on adjudicatory
powers over certain specific
type of cases like alleged
human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
The threshold question is
whether or not the Commission
on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear
and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations in
volving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights
to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another
court or quasijudicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
less take over the functions of
the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
most that may be conceded to
the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil
and political rights.The most
that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of
adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But fact-
finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of
receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in a
controversy must be
accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end
Page 16 of 25

that the controversy may be
decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human
rights violations invoking civil
and political rights.As should
at once be observed, only the
first of the enumerated powers
and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants
to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of
procedure as it may adopt and,
in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in
the conduct of its investigation
or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; It cannot try and decide
cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice or
even quasi-judicial bodies do.
But it cannot try and decide
cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well
understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; The Commission
on Human Rights having merely
the power to investigate cannot
and should not try and resolve
on the merits the matters
involved in Striking Teachers
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
HRC Case No. 90775.Hence it
is that the Commission on
Human Rights, having merely
the power to investigate,
cannot and should not try and
resolve on the merits
(adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90775, as it has
announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been
transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; Same; The
matters are undoubtedly and
clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education and also within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.These
are matters undoubtedly and
clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within
Page 17 of 25

the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of
certiorari and prohibition to
review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The facts are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special
civil action of certiorari and
prohibition at bar, instituted by
the Solicitor General, may be
formulated as follows: where
the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights
by a party in a case consists of
the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or
order issued by a court of
justice or government agency or
official exercising quasi-judicial
functions, may the Commission
take cognizance
486
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cario vs. Commission on
Human Rights
of the case and grant that
relief? Stated otherwise, where
a particular subject-matter is
placed by law within the
jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official
for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights
take cognizance of the same
subject-matter for the same
purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the
petition are not denied by the
respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct
for purposes of ruling on the
legal questions posed in the
present action. These facts,1
together with others involved in
related cases recently resolved
by this Court,2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a
Monday and a class day, some
800 public school teachers,
among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook what they
described as mass concerted
actions to dramatize and
highlight their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
grievances that had time and
again been brought to the
latters attention. According to
them they had decided to
undertake said mass concerted
actions after the protest rally
staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate
the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education. The
mass actions consisted in
staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives,
the teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with
an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal, and
a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not
comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in
the days that followed.3
Page 18 of 25

Among those who took part in
the concerted mass actions
were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at
the Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, who had agreed
to support the non-political
demands of the MPSTA.4
2. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private
respondents) were
administratively charged on the
basis of the principals report
and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were
also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807' and
temporarily replaced (unmarked
CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H).
An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear
the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807."5
3. In the administrative case
docketed as Case No. DECS 90
082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta
Babaran, Luz del Castillo,
Apolinario Esber were, among
others, named respondents,6
the latter filed separate
answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved
for suspension of the
administrative proceedings
pending resolution by xx (the
Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order. But when
their motion for suspension was
denied by Order dated
November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which
later also denied their motion
for reconsideration orally made
at the hearing of November
14,1990, the respondents led
by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire
proceedings."7 The case
eventually resulted in a
Decision of Secretary Cario
dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and
documents submitted by the
respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo.8
4. In the meantime, the MPSTA
filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
of Manila against petitioner
(Cario), which was dismissed
(unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex
I). Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court (on certiorari, in
an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the)
alleged violation of the striking
teachers right to due process
and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445,
supra. The ACT also filed a
similar petition before the
Supreme Court xx docketed as
G.R. No. 95590."9 Both petitions
in this Court were filed in behalf
of the teacher associations, a
few named individuals, and
other teacher-members so
numerous similarly situated or
other similarly situated public
school teachers too numerous
to be impleaded.
5. In the meantime, too, the
respondent teachers submitted
sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights
to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for
Page 19 of 25

reasons completely unknown to
them.10
6. Their complaintsand those
of other teachers also ordered
suspended by the xx (DECS),"
all numbering forty-two (42)
were docketed as Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90
775." In connection therewith
the Commission scheduled a
dialogue on October 11,1990,
and sent a subpoena to
Secretary Cario requiring his
attendance therein.11
On the day of the dialogue,
although it said that it was not
certain whether he (Sec. Cario)
received the subpoena which
was served at his office, xx (the)
Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners
Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso
C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear
the case; it heard the
complainants counsel (a)
explain that his clients had been
denied due process and
suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they
did not join the mass leave,
and (b) expatiate on the
grievances which were the
cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize."12
The Commission thereafter
issued an Order13 reciting
these facts and making the
following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the
real facts of the case and be
accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of
the matter, considering that
these forty two teachers are
now suspended and deprived of
their wages, which they need
very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cario, of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports,
Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and
the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila,
are hereby enjoined to appear
and enlighten the Commission
en banc on October 19,1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with
them any and all documents
relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the
basis of complainants
evidence.
x x x.
7. Through the Office of the
Solicitor General, Secretary
Cario sought and was granted
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
leave to file a motion to dismiss
the case. His motion to dismiss
was submitted on November 14,
1990 alleging as grounds
therefor, that the complaint
states no cause of action and
that the CHR has no jurisdiction
over the case."14
8. Pending determination by the
Commission of the motion to
dismiss, judgments affecting
the striking teachers were
promulgated in two (2) cases,
as aforestated, viz.:
________________
a) The Decision dated
December 17, 1990 of
Education Secretary Cario in
Case No. DECS 90082,
decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo;15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this
Court dated August 6, 1991 in
G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions
without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the
individual petitioners may take
to the Civil Service Commission
on the matters complained
of,"16 and inter alia ruling that
it was prima facie lawful for
petitioner Cario to issue
Page 20 of 25

return-to-work orders, file
administrative charges against
recalcitrants, preventively
suspend them, and issue
decision on those charges."17
9. In an Order dated December
28,1990, respondent
Commission denied Sec.
Carios motion to dismiss and
required him and
Superintendent Lolarga to
submit their counter-affidavits
within ten (10) days x x (after
which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the
case on the merits with or
without respondents counter
affidavit."18 It held that the
striking teachers were
denied due process of law; x x
they should not have been
replaced without a chance to
reply to the administrative
charges; there had been a
violation of their civil and
political rights which the
Commission was empowered to
investigate; and while
expressing its utmost respect
to the Supreme Court xx the
facts before xx (it) are different
from those in the case decided
by the Supreme Court (the
reference being ummistakably
to this Courts joint Resolution
of August 6,1991 in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside
this Order of December 28,
1990 that the Solicitor General,
in behalf of petitioner Cario,
has commenced the present
action of certiorari and
prohibition.
The Commission on Human
Rights has made clear its
position that it does not feel
bound by this Courts joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra. It has also
made plain its intention to hear
and resolve the case (i.e.,
Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90775) on the merits. It
intends, in other words, to try
and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following
general issues:
1) whether or not the striking
teachers were denied due
process, and just cause exists
for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary
sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the
grievances which were the
cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
complainants) sympathize,
justify their mass action or
strike.
The Commission evidently
intends to itself adjudicate, that
is to say, determine with
character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues
which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of
Education, Culture 6, Sports,
subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court
having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take
appeals to the Civil Service
Commission on said matters, if
still timely.
The threshold question is
whether or not the Commission
on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of
justice,19 or even a quasi-
judicial agency,20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try
and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights
to have no such power; and that
Page 21 of 25

it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded
to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But fact-
finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of
receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be
accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be
decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
may be provided by law.21 This
function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear
by the constitutional provisions
specifying the powers of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by
the 1987 Constitution as an
independent office.23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and
superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution,24
Its powers and functions are the
following:25
"(1) Investigate, on its own or
on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political
rights;
(2) Adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or
need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers
over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing
program of research, education,
and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress
effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or
their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine
Governments compliance with
international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from
prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of
any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of
its functions;
Page 22 of 25

(10) Appoint its officers and
employees in accordance with
law; and
(11) Perform such other duties
and functions as may be
provided by law.
As should at once be observed,
only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants
to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of
procedure as it may adopt and,
in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in
the conduct of its investigation
or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its
findings.26
But it cannot try and decide
cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well
understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Investigate commonly
understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of
investigate is to observe or
study closely: inquire into
systematically: to search or
inquire into: xx to subject to an
official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry."27 The purpose
of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information. Nowhere
included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved
in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the
facts established by the inquiry.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
The legal meaning of
investigate is essentially the
same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or
observation, To trace or track;
to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;"28 to inquire; to make
an investigation,
investigation being in turn
described as "(a)n
administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."29
Adjudicate, commonly or
popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as to settle
finally (the rights and duties of
the parties to a court case) on
the merits of issues raised: xx
to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: xx act as judge."30
And adjudge means to
decide or rule upon as a judge
Page 23 of 25

or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of
controversy xx."31
In the legal sense, adjudicate
means: To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest
sense; and adjudge means:
To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. xx Implies a
judicial determination of a fact,
and the entry of a judgment."32
Hence it is that the Commission
on Human Rights, having
merely the power to
investigate, cannot and should
not try and resolve on the
merits (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90775, as it has
announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS,
their
human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the
Commission has no power to
resolve on the merits the
question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers
constitute a strike and are
prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or
not the act of carrying on and
taking part in those actions, and
the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and
return to their classes despite
the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant
rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by
them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or
omissions,
These are matters undoubtedly
and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within
the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of
Education has, as above
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and
resolved them,33 and it appears
that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil
Service Commission; and even
this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said
issues.34
Now, it is quite obvious that
whether or not the conclusions
reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases
are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings
themselves are void or
defective in not having
accorded the respondents due
process; and whether or not the
Secretary of Education had in
truth committed human rights
violations involving civil and
political rights, are matters
which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion
for reconsideration addressed to
the Secretary of Education
himself, and in the event of an
adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually by
the Supreme Court.
Page 24 of 25

The Commission on Human
Rights simply has no place in
this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the
jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no
business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter
and making its own judgment
on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what
may well have been the
complaining teachers strategy
to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education
Secretary in the administrative
cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to
them.
This cannot be done. It will not
be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation
by the Commission on Human
Rights would serve no useful
purpose. If its investigation
should result in conclusions
contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cario, it would have
no power anyway to reverse the
Secretarys conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by
done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this
Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario
was in error, is to refer the
matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
for assistance; that would be
the Civil Service Commission.35
It cannot arrogate unto itself the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
granted; the Order of December
29,1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent
Commission on Human Rights
and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited to hear
and resolve the case (i.e.,
Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90775) on the merits.
SO ORDERED. Cario vs.
Commission on Human Rights,
204 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 96681
December 2, 1991
Page 25 of 25