(Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
L-7995, May and a reasonable relation must exist between
31, 1957
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.]
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf
of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act
No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip,
Quisumbing, Salazar & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of
Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City
Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER;
NATURE AND SCOPE. Police power is far-
reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to
limit its sweep. It derives its existence from the
very existence of the State itself, and does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is
said to be co-extensive with self - protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it
so under a modern democratic framework where
the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions;
the field and scope of police power has become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost
all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight.
2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE
III OF THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF
APPLICATION. The constitutional guarantees
in Section I, Article III, of the Constitution, which
embody the essence of individual liberty and
freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in
their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY
OR PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD. The
conflict between police power and the guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the
indispensable means for the attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would
mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty or property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons
may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection
of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
1 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
purposes and means. And if distinction or
classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CLAUSE; WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY
LEGISLATION. The equal protection of the law
clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do
not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825).
5. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE
DISTINCTION AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG
PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR
CLASSIFICATION. The Power of the legislature
to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a
law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid
ground for classification.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL
TRADE; CLASSIFICATION IN Republic Act No.
1180 ACTUAL, REAL AND REASONABLE.
The classification in the law of retail traders into
nationals and aliens is actual, real and
reasonable. All persons of one class are treated
alike, and it cannot be said that the classification
is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Hence,
it is the duty of this Court to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative
and it cannot declare that the act transcends the
limits of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF
REASONABLENESS. The law in question is
deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the
national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable
because it affects private rights and privileges (II
Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect.
Judged by this test, the disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Republic Act No.
1180 TOLERANT AND REASONABLE. A
cursory study of the provisions of the law
immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege
of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied only to persons upon
conviction of certain offenses.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND
THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. If
political independence is a legitimate aspiration
of a people, then economic independence is none
of less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not
real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may
pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can
infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration
of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
Nationalistic tendency is manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. The nationalization
of the retail trade is only a continuance of the
nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. It cannot
therefore be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid or unconstitutional.
11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. The exercise
of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial
review. The Court will not inquire into the motives
of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters
of legislative judgment. The Legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though
the Court may hold views inconsistent with the
wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not palpably in excess of the
legislative power.
12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF
DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN TITLE OR
PROVISIONS OF Republic Act No. 1180.
What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its
title completely fails to apprise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and consequences
of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297). A cursory
consideration of the title and the provisions of the
bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is
true that the term "regulate" does not and may
not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms
express the two main purposes and objectives of
the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these
have always been included within the term
"regulation".
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL
TERMS IN TITLE OF BILL. The general rule is
for the use of general terms in the title of a bill;
2 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The above rule
was followed when the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate"
instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVE REGARDING
SUBJECT OF A BILL. One purpose of the
constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators or of
the public. In case at bar it cannot be claimed
that the legislators have not been apprised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization
and prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the
prohibition in the law conducted a campaign
against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law
invalid ever existed.
15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND
OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED BY Republic
Act No. 1180; TREATIES SUBJECT TO
QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY
SUBSEQUENT LAW. The law does not violate
international treaties and obligations. The United
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation, or a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations. The Treaty of Amity between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of
China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the
same terms as the nationals of any other
country". But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:
I. The case and the issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of
passing upon the validity and constitutionality of
a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-
reaching in significance The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important
issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which
the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the
law purports to protect citizen and country from
the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field
of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to
translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the
drive and urge for national survival and welfare,
into a concrete and tangible measures designed
to free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and
the nation may be free from a supposed
economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts
and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to
engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited
in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons,
and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, economic control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating
to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening
by aliens actually engaged in the retail business
of additional stores or branches of retail business,
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged
in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the
retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based
Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of
the Act against the transmission by aliens of their
retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
3 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of
the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of
the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as
regards hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only
of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles
involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection
of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue
involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain
basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary,
considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power
and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of
the case may be brought forth with clarity and
the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said that police power is so far-
reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined
in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare
have become almost all- embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated,
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police
power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve public interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define
the scope or extent of the police power of the
State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal
protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:
"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody
the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but
are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed.
220, 226.)
c. The equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is
there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there
not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by
the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test
is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and
the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can
be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for
that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified
into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation
must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
4 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial
review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what
is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the
legislature, which is the constitutional repository
of police power and exercises the prerogative of
determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any
law promulgated in the exercise of the police
power, or of the measures adopted to implement
the public policy or to achieve public interest. On
the other hand, courts, although zealous
guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere
with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.
They have done so early where there has been a
clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative.
Moreover, courts are not supposed to override
legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into
the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will
now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a
regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no
question that it falls within the legitimate scope
of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from
engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade
or occupation, as old as society itself, which from
time immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of
the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all
that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as
group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they
consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into
existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production
begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced.
Under modern conditions and standards of living,
in which man's needs have multiplied and
diversified to unlimited extents and proportions,
the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles,
goods and commodities needed for daily life are
placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the
human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the
importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the
various little gadgets and things needed for home
and daily life. He provides his customers around
his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt,
the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily
cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle
and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes
that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the
lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store,
to the operator of a department store or a 1941:
supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924
existence. 5174
b. The alien retailer's traits. Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239
The alien retailer must have started plying his 44.21
trade in this country in the bigger centers of Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
population (Time there was when he was 1947:
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333
but gradually he invaded towns and villages; now 57.03
he predominates in the cities and big centers of Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134
population. He even pioneers in far away nooks 41.96
where the beginnings of community life appear, Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
ministering to the daily needs of the residents 1948:
and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many 60.51
communities the alien has replaced the native Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry 38.20
without limit, and the patience and forbearance Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
of a slave. Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, 1949:
but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901
ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are 53.47
made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875
forgets and forgives. The community takes no 45.36
note of him, as he appears to be harmless and Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
extremely useful. 1951:
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052
There is a general feeling on the part of the 53.07
public, which appears to be true to fact, about Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384
the controlling and dominant position that the 46.06
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 .87
and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles AVERAGE
of daily life reach the residents mostly through ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
him. In big cities and centers of population he has Item Gross Sales
acquired not only predominance, but apparent Year and Retailer's Assets (Pesos)
control over distribution of almost all kinds of Nationality (Pesos)
goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, 1941:
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of Filipino 1,878 1,633
other goods and articles. And were it not for some Chinese 7,707 9,691
national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, Others 24,415 8,281
the Facomas and the Accfa, his control over 1947:
principal foods and products would easily become Filipino 1,878 2,516
full and complete. Chinese 7,707 14,934
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance Others 24,749 13,919
and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is 1948: (Census)
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is Filipino 1,878 4,111
imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is Chinese 7,707 24,398
merely the result of racialism and pure and Others 24,916 23,686
unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not 1949:
an element of control; also so many Filipino 1,878 4,069
unmanageable factors in the retail business make Chinese 7,707 24,152
control virtually impossible. The first argument Others 24,807 20,737
which brings up an issue of fact merits serious 1951:
consideration. The others are matters of opinion Filipino 1,877 3,905
within the exclusive competence of the Chinese 7,707 33,207
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass Others 24,824 22,033
upon and decide. (Estimates Assets and Gross Sales of Retail
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail Establishments, By year and Nationality of
trade, which put down the figures in black and Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the
white. Between the constitutional convention Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of
year (1935), when the fear of alien domination Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
and control of the retail trade already filled the The above statistics do not include corporations
minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
and the year of the enactment of the establishments already include mere market
nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), vendors, whose capital is necessarily small.
official statistics unmistakably point out to the The above figures reveal that in percentage
ever-increasing dominance and control by the distribution of assets and of gross sales, alien
alien of the retail trade, as witness the following participation has steadily increased during the
tables: years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
Assets Gross Sales edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
Year and Retailer's No.-Estab- Per cent Per cent than make up for the numerical gap through their
Nationality ishments Pesos Distri- Pesos Distri- assets and gross sales which average between
bution bution six and seven times those of the very many

5 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
Filipino retailers Numbers in retailers, here, do not
imply superiority; the alien invests more capital,
buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains
much more. The same of official report, pointing
out to the known predominance of foreign
elements in the retail trade, remarks that the
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor
retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,
the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of
capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of
apprehension in Constitutional Convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe
has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the
disputed nationalization law. If they did not exist
as a fact the sweeping remedy of nationalization
would never have been adopted. The framers of
our Constitution also believed in the existence of
this alien dominance and control when they
approved a resolution categorically declaring
among other things, that "it is the sense of the
Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . ." (II Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-
663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then
have not been either pleasant or comforting.
Dean Since of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, commenting on the patrimony
clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of
our Constitution were merely translating the
general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers
from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other
economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the
concern of the members of the constitutional
convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the
Constitution, he says:
"But there has been a general feeling that alien
dominance over the economic life of the country
is not desirable and that if such a situation should
remain, political independence alone is no
guarantee to national stability and strength.
Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest
from alien hands the control of the national
economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and
hesitant. Under such conditions, the government
as the instrumentality of the national will, has to
step in and assume the initiative, if not the
leadership, in the struggle for the economic
freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way
that it did in the crusade for political freedom.
Thus . . . It (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the
nation not only against the possibilities of armed
invasion but also against its economic
subjugation by alien interests in the economic
field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p.
476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and
predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
business men, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the business coming from
alien control, and they express sentiments of
economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of
6 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
the Fifth National Convention of Filipino
Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved
on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The
man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers,
which have editorially pointed out not only to
control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore,
find alien domination and control to be a fact, a
reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all
the sections and groups that compose the Filipino
community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in
retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in
the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling
that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of
purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital
matters as the fixing of prices, the determination
of the amount of goods or articles to be made
available in the market, and even the choice of
the goods or articles they would or would not
patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of
the national economy and of the complete
subservience of national retailers and of the
consuming public are not entirely unfounded.
Nationals, producers and consumers alike, can be
placed completely at their mercy. This is easily
illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is
desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because
the producer or importer does not offer them
sufficient profits, or because a new competing
article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All
that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell
the first article, eliminating it from their stocks,
offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the
producers or importers of the prescribed article,
or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of
circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical
illustrations to show the pernicious influences of
alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by
aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which
courts of justice may not properly overlook or
ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that
there exists a general feeling on the part of the
public that alien participation in the retail trade
has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at
some time or other they have cornered the
market of essential commodities, like corn and
rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that
they have hoarded essential foods to the
inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming
public, so much so that the Government has had
to establish the National Rice and Corn
Corporation to save the public from their
continuous hoarding practices and tendencies;
that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities,
such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec.
9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their
immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret
combinations among themselves to control
prices, cheating the operation of the law of
supply and demand; that they have connived to
boycott honest merchants and traders who would
not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful
restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They
are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of
the land, violated import and export prohibitions,
control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed
that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing
the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of
the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well
founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien
retailer, especially in the big centers of
population, therefore, becomes a potential source
of danger on occasions of war or other calamity.
We do not have here in this country isolated
groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among
nationals; what we have are well organized and
powerful groups that dominate the distribution of
goods and commodities in the communities and
big centers of population. They owe no allegiance
or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely
upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of
the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic
survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all
the facts and circumstances that the disputed law
is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the
people, thru their authorized representatives, to
free the nation from the economic situation that
has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in
the interest of the public, any of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the
scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and
the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the
laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction
between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country
of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here
is for personal convenience; he is attracted by
the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit
of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where
he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration
for his Filipino customers as would prevent him
7 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
from taking advantage of their weakness and
exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the
earlier can the alien go back to his beloved
country and his beloved kin and country men.
The experience of the country is that the alien
retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this
country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He
undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth.
The alien's interest in this country being merely
transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-
advised to continue entrusting the very important
function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control
of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of
the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate
happiness of the people of the nation of which
they are mere guests, which practices,
manipulations and disregard do not attend the
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the
existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a
national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for
the State to prefer the national over the alien in
the retail trade. We would be doing violence to
fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient
basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the
exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the
wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this
we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-
making power. Since the Court finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and
all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound
to declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that
the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to
make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a
law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we
have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of
Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55
L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined
the application of equal protection clause to a law
sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
". . . '1. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide
scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids
what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely
arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.'"
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for
classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a
legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this
jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the
United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs.
Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in
issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade
to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus
denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The Legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of
Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this
was a valid exercise of the police power, and all
presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality.
In substance, we held that the limitation of
domestic ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does
not violate the equal protection of the law and
due process of law clauses of the Philippine Bill of
Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson
in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as
follows:
"'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are
universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous
liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly
of that character, and forms part of an extensive
system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal
footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost
every commercial nation reserves to its own
subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation
of the United States on this subject. It is not to
give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly
attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to
confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the
Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the
American commercial marine, as well as frauds
8 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this
whole system is projected.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional
protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be
requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens
as a class than for similar classes of American
citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in
status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149
(Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing
of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no
one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the
United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to
limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and
happiness of the community, and the court
cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In
Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among
them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race
hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose
to discriminate, but was based on the belief that
an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with
'our institutions and our life as to enable him to
appreciate the relation of this particular business
to our entire social fabric", and was not,
therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115 (1926),
the U. S. Supreme Court had under consideration
an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting
the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it
does not follow that alien race and allegiance
may not bear in some instances such a relation to
a legitimate object of legislation as to be made
the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly
wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and
for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of
State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City
of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawnbroking was considered as
having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police
power. A similar statute denying aliens the right
to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in
Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota,
1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340
(Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are
judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to
them for the business of pawnbroker, pool,
billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an
infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W.
1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but
the reason for the decision was the court's finding
that the exercise of the business by the aliens
does not in any way affect the morals, the health,
or even the convenience of the community. In
Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L.
ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
persons ineligible to citizenship was held void,
because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public
interest in the mere claim of ownership of the
waters and the fish in them, so there was no
adequate justification for the discrimination. It
further added that the law was the outgrowth of
antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory
that fishing rights have been treated traditionally
as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway &
Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a
state law which imposed a tax on every employer
of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over
21 years of age, was declared void because the
court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court
and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is
not a valid ground for classification. But in these
decisions the laws declared invalid were found to
be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or
were the result or product of racial antagonism
and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law
making unlawful the keeping of books of account
in any language other than English, Spanish or
any other local dialect, but the main reasons for
the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven
out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall
prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real
reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's
belief that no public benefit would be derived
from the operation of the law and on the other
hand it would deprive Chinese of something
indispensable for carrying on their business. In
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an
ordinance conferring power on officials to
withhold consent in the operation of laundries
both as to persons and place, was declared
invalid, but the court said that the power granted
was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration
and implementation of the law, and that the
motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State
vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law
prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the
classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the
facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for customers with
whom they come in daily contact, nor the
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their
9 | CONSTI2_Sec1_DueProcess
profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on
the qualifications of aliens have been shown on
many occasions and instances, especially in
times of crisis and emergency. We can do no
better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van
Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality
and significance of the distinction between the
alien and the national, thus:
". . . It may be judicially known, however, that
aliens coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and
usages that our own people have. So it is likewise
known that certain classes of aliens are of
different psychology from our fellow countrymen.
Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to
suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance
is first to their own country, and whose ideals of
governmental environment and control have
been engendered and formed under entirely
different regimes and political systems, have not
the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States,
as those who by citizenship, are a part of the
government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute
confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discrimination against
aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . ."
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on
the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United
States that:
". . . And the guaranty of due process, as has
often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the subject sought to be
attained. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"So far as the requirement of due process is
concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.
The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio. . . ." (Nebbia
vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
". . . Too much significance cannot be given to the
word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of the
police power in a constitutional sense, for the test
used to determine the constitutionality of the
means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restrictions it imposes on rights
secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any
restrictions on such rights. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
". . . A statute to be within this power must also
be reasonable in its operation upon the persons
whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of
a particular class, and must not be unduly
oppressive." (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302, pp. 1074-
1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385,
388, it was also held:
". . . To justify the state in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. . . ."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of
Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the
Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is
or is not constitutional, one of the first questions
to be considered by the court is whether the
power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in
reason in connection with the matter involved, or
is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of
that power, without substantial relation to the
health, safety, morals, comfort, and general
welfare of the public."
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a
common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it
is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore
beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit
and penalize. This argument overlooks fact and
reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and
premise, i.e., that in this country where the
occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has
been so engaged by him, by the alien, in an
honest creditable and unimpeachable manner,
without harm or injury to the citizens and without
ultimate danger to their economic peace,
tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has
found, as we have also found and indicated, that
the privilege has been so grossly abused by the
alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious
designs and practices, that he now enjoys a
monopolistic control of the occupation and
threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that
posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores
the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the
exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail
trade unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious,
taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens
have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to
free national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable
because it affects private rights and privileges
(11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.)
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is
not merely reasonable but actually necessary,
must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained
in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business.
Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle
hold upon our economic life. If the persons who
control this vital artery of our economic life are
the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic,
who have no profound devotion to our free
institutions, and who have no permanent stake in
our people's welfare, we are not really the
masters of our own destiny. All aspects of our life,
even our national security, will be at the mercy of
other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose,
we do not propose to deprive persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines of their means of
livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from
the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to
paralyze all aspects of our national life and
endanger our national security it respects
existing rights.
"The approval of this bill is necessary for our
national survival."
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration
of a people, then economic independence is none
the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not
real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may
pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can
infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration
of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional
Convention to be within the sphere of legislative
action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have
intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble
motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power.
The fathers of the Constitution must have given
to the legislature full authority and power to
enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and
liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared in their
Resolution:
"'That it is the sense of the Convention that the
public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstains from approving the
amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law
which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade.'" (II
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662- 663, quoted on pages 66 and
67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic
tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principal
objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary thereto the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its
natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV,
it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of
the retail trade is only a continuance of the
nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be
said that a law imbued with the same purpose
and spirit underlying many of the provisions of
the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for
the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measure is, therefore, fully
justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view
the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency
and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of
the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature
was in duty bound to face the problem and meet,
through adequate measures, the danger and
threat that alien domination of retail trade poses
to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law
immediately reveals how tolerant, how
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes the right and
privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of
their lives; and similar recognition of the right to
continue is accorded associations of aliens. The
right or privilege is denied to those only upon
conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations
of the Court on this case, attention was called to
the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes.
Besides, the exercise of legislative discretion is
not subject to judicial review It is well settled that
the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of
legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of
any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and
we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other
arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general
welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
out of employment; that prices will increase
because of the elimination of competition; that
there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be
general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed
wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import
invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged
invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals
the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize
the retail business and prohibit aliens from
engaging therein. The constitutional provision
which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1)
of Article VI, which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more then one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill".
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity,
that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p.
297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does
not and may not readily and at first glance
convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate"
is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been
included within the term regulation.
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of
intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit
the sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of
Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring
that the subject of every act of the Legislature
shall be stated in the title, the title 'To regulate
the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently
expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the
sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in
the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters
being properly included within the subject of
regulating the sale." (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind.
306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and
necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection
with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate' does not ordinarily convey meaning of
prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should
not have such meaning when used in delegating
police power in connection with a thing the best
or only efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression." (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182
La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in
the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents
of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Sec. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed
when the title of the Act in question adopted the
more general term "regulate" instead of
"nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law
also contains other rules for the regulation of the
retail trade, which may not be included in the
terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were
the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize"
or "prohibit", there would have been many
provisions not falling within the scope of the title
which would have made the Act invalid. The use
of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with
the principle governing the drafting of statutes,
under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that
the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title
is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it
cannot be claimed that the legislators have not
been apprised of the nature of the law, especially
the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected
by the prohibition in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring
the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and
obligations
Another subordinate argument against the
validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and
of the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly. We find no
merit in the above contention. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects
(Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations,
1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations
Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred from the fact that members of the
United Nations Organization, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in
retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.).
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control
of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not
only appropriate but actually necessary and
that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to
be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty
or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion
that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens.
Thus it is stated that more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing
businesses when the time comes for them to
close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend the
limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against
the harshness of the law should be addressed to
the Legislature; they are beyond our power and
jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
(Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v.
Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 98050. March 17, 1994.]
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, Secretary of Labor and Employment,
HON. RODOLFO S. MILADO, Department of Labor
and Employment Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII,
Tacloban City, and PHILPHOS MOVEMENT FOR
PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI), respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION
(PHILPHOS) assails the decision of the Secretary
of Labor of 7 August 1990 affirming the order of
the Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990 which
directed the immediate conduct of a certification
election among the supervisory, professional or
technical, and confidential employees of
petitioner corporation. prLL
On 7 July 1989, Philphos Movement for Progress,
Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, alleging that as a
supervisory union duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment it was
seeking to represent the supervisory employees
of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation.
LibLex
The petition for certification election filed by PMPI
was not opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact, on 11
August 1989, PHILPHOS submitted a position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter stating that its
management welcomed the creation of a
supervisory employees' union provided the
necessary requisites of law were properly
observed, but exempting from the union its
superintendents who were managerial and not
supervisory employees as they managed a
division, subdivision or section, and were vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies. PHILPHOS also
asserted that its professional or technical
employees were not within the definition of
supervisory employees under the Labor Code as
they were immediately under the direction and
supervision of its superintendents and
supervisors. Moreover, the professional and
technical employees did not have a staff of
workers under them. Consequently, petitioner
prayed for the exclusion of its superintendents
and professional/technical employees from the
PMPI supervisory union.
On 13 October 1989, Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and
technical employees. He also directed the parties
to attend the pre-election conference on 19 April
1990 for the determination of the mechanics of
the election process and the qualifications and
eligibility of those allowed to vote.
On 15 November 1989, PMPI filed an amended
petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it
sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential
employees. The amended petition was filed in
view of the amendment to the PMPI Construction
which included in its membership the
professional/technical and confidential
employees.
On 14 December 1989, the parties therein agreed
to submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for
decision on the basis thereof and related
documents.
On 28 March 1990, Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued
an order granting the petition and directing the
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
holding of a certification election among the
"supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.),
technical, and confidential employees" 1 to
comprise the proposed bargaining unit.
On 16 April 1990, PHILPHOS appealed the order
of 28 March 1990 to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment who on 7 August 1990 rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS
moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied; hence, the instant petition alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents in rendering the assailed rulings.
Cdpr
On 8 July 1991, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from
holding the certification election among
petitioner's supervisory, professional/technical,
and confidential employees scheduled on 12 July
1991.
There are two (2) issues raised by petitioner: (1)
whether it was denied due process in the
proceedings before respondent Mediator-Arbiter;
and, (2) whether its professional/technical and
confidential employees may validly join
respondent PMPI union which is composed of
supervisors.
PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process
when respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the
amended petition of respondent PMPI without
according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be
heard.
We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here.
The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. 2 Where, as in the instant case, petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process,
as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity
to present its side. 3 Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to
confront and examine the witnesses of the other
party. But it did not; 4 instead, it opted to submit
its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter.
Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to
ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.
As regards the second issue, we are with
petitioner that being a supervisory union,
respondent PMPI cannot represent the
professional/technical and confidential employees
of petitioner whose positions we find to be more
of the rank and file than supervisory.
With the enactment in March 1989 of R.A. 6715,
employees were thereunder reclassified into
three (3) groups, namely: (a) managerial
employees, (b) supervisory employees, and (c)
rank and file employees. The category of
supervisory employees is once again recognized
in the present law.
Article 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides that "(s)upervisory employees
are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if
the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use
of independent judgment." The definition of
managerial employees is limited to those having
authority to hire and fire, while those who only
recommend effectively the hiring or firing or
transfer of personnel are considered closer to
rank and file employees. The exclusion therefore
of mid-level executives from the category of
managers has brought about a third
classification, the supervisory employees. The
peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they
are not managers, when they recommend action
implementing management policy or ask for the
discipline or dismissal of subordinates, they
identify with the interests of the employer and
may act contrary to the interests of the rank and
file. 5
In its position paper submitted to the Mediator-
Arbiter, petitioner described the positions and
functions of its professional/technical employees,
(engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants,
nurses, and midwives). The guidelines, which
were not refuted by respondent PMPI, state:
. . . Professional and Technical positions are those
whose primary duty consists of the performance
of work directly related to management
programs; who customarily, regularly and
routinarily exercise judgment in the application of
concepts, methods, systems and procedures in
their respective fields of specialization; who
regularly and directly assist a managerial and/or
supervisory employee, execute under general
supervision, work along specialized or technical
lines requiring special training, experience or
knowledge, or execute under general supervision
special assignments and tasks . . . They are
immediately under the direction and supervision
of supervisors or superintendents. They have no
men under them but are regularly called upon by
their supervisors or superintendents on some
technical matters. 6
Moreover, Herculano A. Duhaylungsod, Personnel
Officer of petitioner, attested that there was no
community of interests between the supervisors
of petitioner and the professional/technical
employees; that as of 25 July 1990, personnel
records showed that there were 125 supervisors
and 271 professional/technical employees; that of
the 271 professional/technical employees, 150
were directly under and being supervised by
supervisors, while the rest were staff members of
superintendents. 7
The certification of Personnel Officer
Duhaylungsod that its professional/technical
employees occupy positions that are non-
supervisory is evidence that said employees
belong to the rank and file. 8 Quite obviously,
these professional/technical employees cannot
effectively recommend managerial actions with
the use of independent judgment because they
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
are under the supervision of superintendents and
supervisors. Because it is unrefuted that
theseprofessional/technical employees are
performing non-supervisory functions, hence
considered admitted, they should be classified, at
least for purposes of this case, as rank and file
employees. Consequently, these
professional/technical employees cannot be
allowed to join a union composed of supervisors.
Conversely, supervisory employees cannot join a
labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may validly form a separate
organization of their own. 9 This is provided in
Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6715, to wit:
. . . Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in
a labor organization of the rank and file
employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own. llcd
Respondent PMPI is supposed to be a union of
125 supervisors. If the professional/technical
employees are included as members, and records
show that they are 271 in all or much more than
the supervisors, then PMPI will turn out to be a
rank and file union with the supervisors as
members.
This is precisely the situation which the law
prohibits. It would create an obvious conflict of
views among the members, or at least between
two (2) groups of members espousing opposing
interests. The intent of the law is to avoid a
situation where supervisors would merge with the
rank and file, or where the supervisors' labor
organization would represent conflicting interests,
especially where, as in the case at bar, the
supervisors will be commingling with those
employees whom they directly supervise in their
own bargaining unit. Members of the supervisory
union might refuse to carry out disciplinary
measures against their co-member rank and file
employees. 10
Supervisors have the right to form their own
union or labor organization. What the law
prohibits is a union whose membership comprises
of supervisors merging with the rank and file
employees because this is where conflict of
interests may arise in the areas of discipline,
collective bargaining and strikes. 11 The
professional/technical employees of petitioner
therefore may join the existing rank and file
union, or form a union separate and distinct from
the existing union organized by the rank and file
employees of the same company.
As to the confidential employees of the petitioner,
the latter has not shown any proof or compelling
reason to exclude them from joining respondent
PMPI and from participating in the certification
election, unless these confidential employees are
the same professional/technical employees whom
we find to be occupying rank and file positions.
LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of respondent Secretary of Labor of 7
August 1990, as well as the order of the
respondent Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990, is
SET ASIDE. The professional/technical employees
of petitioner Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation (PHILPHOS) are declared disqualified
from affiliating with respondent Philphos
Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI).
The Department of Labor is directed to order
immediately the conduct of certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
particularly excluding therefrom its professional
and technical employees.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.
(Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The essence of due process is distilled in the
immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades:
"Strike but hear me first!'" It is this cry that the
petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges
the constitutionality of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
626-A. Cdpr
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders
prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
complying with the requirements of EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 626 particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite
such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against interprovincial
movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef
instead; and.
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and
objectives of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626 is
hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government, to be
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of
October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered
the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for
lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which upheld
the trial court, ** and he has now come before us
in this petition for review on certiorari. prcd
The thrust of his petition is that the executive
order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it
is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court
as guaranteed by due process. He complains that
the measure should not have been presumed,
and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also
a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order,
the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity
of the previous publication of the measure in the
Official Gazette before it could be considered
enforceable. We imposed the requirement then
on the basis of due process of law. In doing so,
however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts
should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction
under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. 7 This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted.
Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so,
then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant
warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the
exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this
Court. LLjur
The challenged measure is denominated an
executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of
taking care that the laws were faithfully executed
but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there
existed a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof or whenever the legislature
failed or was unable to act adequately on any
matter that in his judgment required immediate
action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that
were to have the force and effect of law. As there
is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the
petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the
validity of the executive order. Nevertheless,
since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in
his judgment," a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this
time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental
question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the
provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies
that might arise on their correct interpretation.
That is the ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it
more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Pill of Rights, who forcefully
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
argued against it. He was sustained by the body.
10
The due process clause was kept intentionally
vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times
and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to
adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow
room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection
open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of
the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go
no farther than to define due process - and in so
doing sums it all up as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their
sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the
life, liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the
law of the land, they thereby won for themselves
and their progeny that splendid guaranty of
fairness that is now the hallmark of the free
society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded
through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all
rulers, benevolent or base, that every person,
when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is
entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing
of his cause. prLL
The closed mind has no place in the open society.
It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a
decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered
if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on
an informed appreciation of the issues in
contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the
arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. A
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on
the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty
as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by
the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person
are to be secured beyond the reach of officials
who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are
a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive
presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditious action
will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a
mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on
sight because of the immediate danger it poses
to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may
be summarily destroyed. The passport of a
person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to
the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may
be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health and bawdy houses to protect the
public morals. 17 In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation
of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger. cdll
The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and
property for the promotion of the general welfare.
18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the
State, far outpacing taxation and eminent
domain. The individual, as a member of society,
is hemmed in by the police power, which affects
him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead from the womb to beyond the
tomb in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a
ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even
so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only
proper but necessary. And the justification is
found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the
government to justify EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
626-A, amending the basic rule in EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The
original measure was issued for the reason, as
expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy
needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such
a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms
on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United
States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The defendant had
been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required
permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The conviction was affirmed. The law was
sustained as a valid police measure to prevent
the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were
then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had
stricken many of these animals and the reduction
of their number had resulted in an acute decline
in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent
increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and branding of
these animals. The Court held that the
questioned statute was a valid exercise of the
police power and declared in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that
the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by `the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class' and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was
a `reasonably necessary' limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either
by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected."

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold
with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626. The
method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to
be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals, again following the above-cited
doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are
at least seven years old if male and eleven years
old if female upon issuance of the necessary
permit, the executive order will be conserving
those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion. llcd
But while conceding that the amendatory
measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.
We note that to strengthen the original measure,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more
than moving them to another province will make
it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef,
the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be
easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their
slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow
that there is no reason either to prohibit their
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means
and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually
the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute
was sustained because the penalty prescribed
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of
due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional
cases accepted, however, there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous
hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it. cdphil
In the case before us, there was no such pressure
of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved
were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have
been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and
only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous
and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit,
and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation
of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A
unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however,
that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable
in damages for enforcing the executive order in
accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce
it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a
mere subordinate of the President, to declare the
executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the
trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself
did not feel they had the competence, for all their
superior authority, to question the order we now
annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not
seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and
the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity. We commend him for his
spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter
would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate
and another violation of the Constitution, for all
its obviousness, would have been perpetrated,
allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights. LLpr
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it
guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or
violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if,
like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish
and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them
in the free society, if they are kept bright and
sharp with use by those who are not afraid to
assert them.
WHEREFORE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626-A is
hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as
affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
19 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered
restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
(Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. No. 131652,
131728, March 09, 1998)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO
A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN,
respondents.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner Bayani M.
Alonte.
Ramon C. Casano for petitioner in 131728.
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for
respondent Judge.
SYNOPSIS
Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian,
Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were
charged with rape based on the complaint of
Juvielyn Punongbayan. During the pendency of
the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance. The petition for change of
venue was granted and the case was raffled to
respondent judge who issued warrants of arrest
for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to
abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners
pleaded not guilty when arraigned and waived
pre-trial. Immediately following arraignment the
prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to
the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of
desistance and that she has no interest in further
prosecuting the action. The Prosecution then
manifested that the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of
the accused. She then moved for the "dismissal
of the case" against both accused-petitioners.
The two accused did not present any
countervailing evidence, did not take the witness
stand nor admitted the act charged in the
information. Thereupon, respondent judge said
that "the case was submitted for decision." On
December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered
convicting petitioners of rape. IEaCDH
Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the
case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable.
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly
spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court which should be strictly adhered to. There
can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an
accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly
occupying the first and foremost place of honor in
our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most
undeserving.
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when
construed as a pardon in the so-called "private
crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case once the action has been instituted.
Prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time
with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The
Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been
exhibited many times in the past, although
regrettably a disappointment on few occasions,
will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to
follow. TEDaAc
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS;
REQUISITES. Jurisprudence acknowledges
that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before
it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it
over the person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing. The above constitutional and
jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary
and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are
tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement
that procedural due process cannot possibly be
met without a "law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial."
2. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO SHORT-CUT TO
THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THERE CAN BE NO
EXCUSE FOR NOT AFFORDING AN ACCUSED
HIS FULL DAY IN COURT. The existence of
the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The
standard of waiver requires that it "not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences."
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not
be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. The Solicitor General
has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from
what otherwise should have been the regular
course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been
directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled
20 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been
given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information
so as to justify any modification in the order of
trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process, and there can be no excuse for not
affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN
PROBATIVE VALUE. In the case of People vs.
Junio, the Court held that: Thus, we have declared
that at most the retraction is an afterthought
which should not be given value. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the
witness who has given it later on changed his
mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually for monetary consideration,
the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits
as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211
SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs.
Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
4. ID.; COURTS; WITH INHERENT POWER TO
COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY PERSON
TO TESTIFY. Courts have the inherent power
to compel the attendance of any person to testify
in a case pending before it, and a party is not
precluded from invoking that authority.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE; THOUGH CONSTRUED AS
PARDON IN "PRIVATE CRIMES," IT IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL
ACTION. An affidavit of desistance by itself,
even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal
of the criminal case once the action has been
instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other
piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. EaSCAH
6. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; IT
IS NOT ENOUGH THAT A COURT IS
IMPARTIAL, IT MUST ALSO BE PERCEIVED TO
BE IMPARTIAL. Relative to the prayer for the
disqualification of Judge Savellano from further
hearing the case, the Court is convinced that
Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances,
be best excused from the case. Possible
animosity between the personalities here
involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of
Luque vs. Kayanan could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality
of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in
a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to
the fairness and integrity of the Judge. It is not
enough that a court is impartial, it must also be
perceived as impartial.
7. ID.; ATTORNEYS; USE OF INTEMPERATE
LANGUAGE AND UNKIND ASCRIPTIONS CAN
HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED. While the lawyer in
promoting the cause of his client or defending his
rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy
demands that it be done within the bounds of
propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be
justified nor can have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the
legal profession is a treasured tradition that must
at no time be lost to it. DHEcCT
8. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTORS; EXPECTED TO ACT WITH
UTMOST DEVOTION AND DEDICATION TO
DUTY. Finally, it may be opportune to say,
once again, that prosecutors are expected not
merely to discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism and skill
but also to act each time with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that
the zeal which has been exhibited many times in
the past, although regrettably a disappointment
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the
proceedings yet to follow.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
RECANTATION; CONSTRUED. A recantation
usually applies to a repudiation by a complainant
or a witness, either for the prosecution or the
defense, who has previously given an
extrajudicial statement or testimony in court.
Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by
sworn statement, or by testifying on the witness
stand.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY LOOKED UPON
WITH DISFAVOR. Mere retraction by a
witness or by complainant of his or her testimony
does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony
or statement, if credible. The general rule is that
courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court. This rule
applies to crimes, offenses as well as to
administrative offenses. The reason is because
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration.
Moreover, there is always the probability that
they will later be repudiated and there would
never be an end to criminal litigation. It would
also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witnesses who had
given them later on changed their minds for one
reason or another. This would make solemn trials
a mockery and place the investigation of the
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. The general
rule notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be
peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of
paper. There are instances when a recantation
may create serious doubts as to the guilt of the
21 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
accused. A retracted statement or testimony
must be subject to scrupulous examination. The
previous statement or testimony and the
subsequent one must be carefully compared and
the circumstances under which each was given
and the reasons and motives for the change
carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each
statement or testimony must be tested by the
credibility of the witness which is left for the
judge to decide. In short, only where there exists
special circumstances in the case which when
coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the
truth of the testimony or statement given, can a
retraction be considered and upheld.
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE,
GENERALLY WITH NO PERSUASIVE EFFECT.
An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a
sworn statement executed by a complainant in a
criminal or administrative case that he or she is
discontinuing the action filed upon his or her
complaint for whatever reason he or she may
cite. The court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance especially when executed as an
afterthought. However, as in retractions, an
affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of
the records of the case. cAHDES
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT IN PRIVATE CRIMES.
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance
filed by a private complainant is also frowned
upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may
deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly
an instance when this Court upheld it in private
crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis
thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon
mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where there exist special
circumstances that raise doubts as to the
reliability of the affidavit.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRIVATE
CRIMES; CANNOT BE PROSECUTED EXCEPT
UPON COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED PARTY.
Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon
complaint filed by the offended party. In adultery
and concubinage, the offended party must
implead both the guilty parties and must not
have consented or pardoned the offenders. In
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents or
guardian. The complainant must not have
expressly pardoned the offender. The filing of a
complaint in private crimes is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. It is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding without which the fiscal
and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over
the case. Once the complaint is filed, the action
proceeds just as in any other crime.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY; MODES. Article 344 also provides
for the extinction of criminal liability in private
crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and
marriage, which when validly and timely made,
result in the total extinction of criminal liability of
the offender. The pardon in private crimes must
be made before the institution of the criminal
action. In adultery and concubinage, the pardon
may be express or implied while in seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
pardon must be express. In all cases, the pardon
must come prior to the institution of the criminal
action. After the case has been filed in court, any
pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness
stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability. The
only act that extinguishes the penal action and
the penalty that may have been imposed is the
marriage between the offender and the offended
party.
8. ID.; ID.; PARDON IN PRIVATE CRIMES;
MUST COME BEFORE INSTITUTION OF
CRIMINAL ACTION. Pardon by the offended
party extinguishes criminal liability when made
while the crime is still "private" and within the
control of the offended party. But once the case is
filed in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto
operate to dismiss the case. After the institution
of the criminal action, any pardon given by the
complainant to the offender would be unavailing,
except of course when the offender validly
marries the offended party. The offended party's
pardon of the offender in a seduction case after
the criminal action had been instituted
constitutes no bar to said action. A pardon given
in a rape case after the filing of the action in
court "comes too late to hide the shameful
occurrence from public notice."
9. ID.; ID.; DESISTANCE, NOT A GROUND.
Article 344 does not include desistance of the
offended party from prosecuting the case as a
ground for extinction of criminal liability whether
total or partial. Hence, only when the desistance
is grounded on forgiveness and pardon and is
made before the institution of the criminal action,
can it extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per
se, is not equivalent to pardon.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case
at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is
not an express pardon of the accused and the
crime committed. Private complainant desisted
from prosecuting the case against the petitioners
because she wished "to start life anew and live
normally again." She reiterated this reason on the
witness stand. She complained that members of
the media were bothering and harassing her and
that she wanted to go back to her normal life.
She never said that she forgave the petitioners.
She did not absolve them from their culpability.
She did not give any exculpatory fact that would
raise doubts about her rape. She did not say that
she consented to petitioner Alonte's acts.
Moreover, the rape case is already in court and it
is no longer her right to decide whether or not the
charge should be continued.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
DUE PROCESS; ACCUSED DENIED THEREOF
WHERE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS
RENDERED WITHOUT TRIAL. Justice Puno
agrees with the majority that the November 7,
1997 proceedings could not have been a trial on
the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not
conform with the procedure for trial as provided
in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the
case at bar, petitioners were never instructed to
present evidence to prove their defenses. The
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
parties were never given the opportunity to
present their respective evidence rebutting the
testimony of private complainant. There was no
admission by petitioners of the charge in the
information as to justify a change in the order of
trial. Second, the admission of private
complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was
made solely in response to respondent judge's
own questioning. It was this affidavit which
respondent judge used to convict the petitioners.
This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was
it formally offered before the court. Third, where
there is a doubt as to the nature of the criminal
proceedings before the court, this doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused who must be
given the widest latitude of action to prove his
innocence. It is in petitioners' favor that the
proceedings of November 7, 1997 be treated as a
hearing on the motion to dismiss, not a trial on
the merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny
petitioners due process and all the other rights of
an accused under the Bill of Rights and our Rules
in Criminal Procedure. AHacIS
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
RULES STRICTLY ADHERED TO. Our criminal
rules of procedure strictly provide the step by
step procedure to be followed by courts in cases
punishable by death. This rule also applies to all
other criminal cases, particularly where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
reason for this is to assure that the State makes
no mistake in taking life and liberty except that of
the guilty.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED, NOT TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION. Evidence not formally
offered in court will not be taken into
consideration by the court in disposing of the
issues of the case. Any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by him, otherwise
it is excluded and rejected. Indeed, following
respondent judge's finding and assuming that the
November 7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on
the merits, petitioners were never afforded their
right to confront and cross-examine the witness.
The court did not, at the very least, inquire as to
whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine
private complainant with respect to her affidavit
of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-
examine was afforded petitioners and their
counsels such that they cannot be deemed to
have waived said right by inaction.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Pending before this Court are two separate
petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte,
docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by
petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed
G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila
finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions
were consolidated. llcd
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape
was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an
incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The
information contained the following averments;
thus:
"That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto.
Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable court, the above named
accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Bian,
Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking
water which made her dizzy and weak, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion
without having participated as principal or
accessory assisted in the commission of the
offense by bringing said complainant child to the
rest house of accused Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte at
Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the
amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani
Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law." 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B
and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of
Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B.
Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin,
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP")
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of
Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-
12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by
any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and
counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance,
quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
"I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of
age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street,
Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City,
duly assisted by private legal counsel and my
parents, after having duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case
filed against Mayor Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte of
Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian,
Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some
time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a)
change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court;
(b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of
Appeals, and after its denial by said court,
brought to the Office of the President, on the
veracity of the findings of the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor's
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a
hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly,
and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2)
semesters of my college residence. And when the
actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues
are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite
suspension of my schooling to attend the
hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the
case, my family has lived a most abnormal life:
my father and mother had to give up their jobs;
my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had
to stop his schooling, like myself;
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long,
judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live
elsewhere with my family, where we can start life
anew, and live normally once again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my
complaint for rape and the other charge for child
abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of
the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima
facie case although the information has not been
filed, and that I will not at any time revive this,
and related cases or file new cases, whether
criminal, civil, and or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of
this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a
witness-complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without
fear or favor, premised on a corresponding
commitment that there will be no reprisals in
whatever form, against members of the police
force or any other official of officer, my relatives
and friends who extended assistance to me in
whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of
June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25
day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer" 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on
behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition
for change of venue dismissed on the ground that
it had become moot in view of complainant's
affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP
Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to
dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware
of the desistance of private complainant and
opined that the desistance, in any case, would
not produce any legal effect since it was the
public prosecutor who had direction and control
of the prosecution of the criminal action. He
prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a
Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-
RTC), granting the petition for change of venue.
The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and
methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte
and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the
petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses
are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the
probability that in desisting from pursuing her
complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have
succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of
justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to
transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B
from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of
Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is
granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of
its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No.
9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the
petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in
Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and
determine the voluntariness and validity of
petitioner's desistance in light of the opposition of
the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of
court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is
ordered to personally deliver to the Executive
Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim.
Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution."
3 her parents not to pursue the case, the State had
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-
docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the
Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to
Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila
court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her
decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte
and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Court's separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the [private
complainant's] desistance in the light of the
24 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily
surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo
of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"),
while Concepcion,. in his case, posted the
recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were
arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge. The parties manifested that they were
waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went
on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4
According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano
allowed the prosecution to present evidence
relative only to the question of the voluntariness
and validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the
arraignment, the prosecution presented private
complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by
her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan
affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had
no intention of giving positive testimony in
support of the charges against Alonte and had no
interest in further prosecuting the action.
Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was
compelled to desist because of the harassment
she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no
pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to
sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that
neither she nor her parents received a single
centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of
desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes
then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's
parents, who affirmed their signatures on the
affidavit of desistance and their consent to their
daughter's decision to desist from the case, and
(ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto
Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of
desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her
parents in his presence and that he was satisfied
that the same was executed freely and
voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that
in light of the decision of private complainant and
no further evidence against the accused to prove
the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the
"dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and
Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case
was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an
"Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State
Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on
the same date, stated that the State interposed
"no objection to the granting of bail and in fact
Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the
accused in his prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application
for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an
Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On
even date, ASP Campomanes filed a
Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord
with justice and fair play to Join the aforestated
motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the
urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th
November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th
December 1997 and 10th December 1997,
petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and
Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in
respect of his application for bail. None of these
motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A.
Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte
received a notice from the RTC Manila Branch 53,
notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on
18 December 1997, of the decision on the case.
The counsel for accused Concepcion denied
having received any notice of the scheduled
promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called,
Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano
manifested that Alonte could not attend the
promulgation of the decision because he was
suffering from mild hypertension and was
confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel
would appear not to have been notified of the
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of
the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading
concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte
and Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of
RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article
335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, for which each one of the them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for
twenty (20) years; and one (1) day to forty (40)
years.
"In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the
accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and
rendered without any further force and effect.
"SO ORDERED." 7
On the same day of 18th December 1997,
petitioner Alonte filed a motion for
reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution,
Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam" for certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas
Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and
for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge."
Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorariand mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support
of his petition seeking to have the decision
25 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
nullified and the case remanded for new trial;
thus:
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo (Annex A) without affording the
petitioner his Constitutional right to due process
of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule
119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment
(Rule 120; Annex A).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised
Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal
jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case
a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits
(Punongbayan's and Balbin's) which were neither
marked nor offered into evidence by the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof,
again in violation of petitioner's right to due
process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts
which would establish that complainant was
raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1,
Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous
precedent where heinous offenses can result in
conviction without trial (then with more reason
that simpler offenses could end up with the same
result)." 8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the
following grounds in support of his own petition;
thus:
"1. The decision of the respondent Judge
rendered in the course of resolving the
prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a
patent nullity for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in
total violation of the petitioner's right to due
process of law.
"2. There had been no valid promulgation of
judgment at least as far as petitioner is
concerned.
"3. The decision had been rendered in gross
violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial
by an impartial and neutral judge whose
actuations and outlook of the case had been
motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest
of media hype that surrounded this case and use
this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion
to a higher court.
"4. The decision is patently contrary to law and
the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the
petitioner as a principal even though he has been
charged only as an accomplice in the
information." 9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will
disregard, in view of the case milieu, the
prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i e., even
before the trial court could resolve Alonte's
motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the
somewhat strange way the case has proceeded
below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by
the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the
case did proceed on the merits but that
"The two (2) accused did not present any
countervailing evidence during the trial. They did
not take the witness stand to refute or deny
under oath the truth of the contents of the
private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in
Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers,
they rested and submitted the case for decision
merely on the basis of the private complainant's
so called 'desistance' which, to them, was
sufficient enough for their purposes. They left
everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the
private complainant." 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no
such trial for what was conducted on 07
November 1997, aside from the arraignment of
the accused, was merely a proceeding in
conformity with the resolution of this Court in
Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to
determine the validity and voluntariness of the
affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been
undue precipitancy in the conduct of the
proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have
well been avoided had not the basic procedures
been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And
in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the
case, the trial court certainly is not alone to
blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III,
of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process
in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a)
that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that
26 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a "law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly
spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in
the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to
prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove
his defense, and damages, if any, arising from
the issuance of any provisional remedy in the
case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision unless
the court directs the parties to argue orally or to
submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act
or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the
order of trial may be modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored
the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that
". . . each step in the trial process serves a
specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of an accused requires that an accused be given
sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So,
with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of
trial should always take into consideration the
rights of all the parties to the case, whether in
the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of
their discretion, judges are sworn not only to
uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just.
The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one
who has an unsound and distorted sense of
justice and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his
Comment that
"Petitioners-accused were each represented
during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
their respective counsel of choice. None of their
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine
rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she
attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and
truth of her two affidavits one detailing the
rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy
her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not
used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that
the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
'is a personal one and may be waived."'
(emphasis supplied)
It should be pointed out, however, that the
existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires
that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be so construed as
a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver. 17
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of
the deviations from what otherwise should have
been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners
have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor
been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the
parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been
set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and
(3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged
in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there can
be no excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the
first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further
proceedings. And, since the case would have to
be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has
carefully avoided making any statement or
reference that might be misconstrued as
prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in
the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related
proceedings therein, including the petition for
bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of
the trial court. LLpr
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few
observations on the affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not
contain any statement that disavows the veracity
of her complaint against petitioners but merely
seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint
and to discontinue with the case for varied other
reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs.
Junio, 21 should be instructive. The Court has
there explained:
27 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
"The appellant's submission that the execution of
an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who
was assisted by her mother supported the
'inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is
specious. We have said in so many cases that
retractions are generally unreliable and are
looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. The unreliable character of this document
is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that
after going through the process of having
accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who
raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, and then
repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly
turn around and declare that '[a]fter a careful
deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the
same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.'
"Thus, we have declared that at most the
retraction is an afterthought which should not be
given probative value. It would be a dangerous
rule to reject the testimony taken before the
court of justice simply because the witness who
has given it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for
monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622,
citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123
SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary
criminal cases. For instance, in People vs.
Ballabare, 23 a murder case, the Court has ruled:
"The contention has no merit. To begin with, the
Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is
not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is
to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly.
[36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs.
State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie
Asenita did not really recant what she had said
during the trial. She only said she wanted to
withdraw her testimony because her father,
Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested
in prosecuting the case against accused-
appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
"3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no
longer interested to prosecute the case as
manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance
before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby
WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of
record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;
"It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has
undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the
parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing
the testimony is subsequently presented by the
defense. In the first place, any recantation must
be tested in a public trial with sufficient
opportunity given to the party adversely affected
by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. In
this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the
witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her
affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband,
Roque Asenita, who was presented and the
matters he testified to did not even bear on the
substance of Tessie's affidavit. He testified that
accused-appellant was not involved in the
perpetration of the crime.
"In the second place, to accept the new evidence
uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134,
citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For
even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a
retraction, this circumstance alone does not
require the court to disregard her original
testimony. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. [People vs.
Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts
look with disfavor upon retractions because they
can easily be obtained from witnesses usually
through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA
642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation
where a witness recants his testimony, courts
must not automatically exclude the original
testimony solely on the basis of the recantation.
They should determine which testimony should
be given credence through a comparison of the
original testimony and the new testimony,
applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs.
Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we
think the trial court correctly ruled." 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the
inherent power to compel the attendance of any
person to testify in a case pending before it, and
a party is not precluded from invoking that
authority. 25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even
when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal
of the criminal case once the action has been
instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other
piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on
to hold
"While '[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be,' [Third par. of Art.
344, The Revised Penal Code,] the pardon to
justify the dismissal of the complaint should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal
action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by
People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is
cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.]
Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit
of desistance is attached was filed after the
institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did
not appear to be serious in 'signifying (her)
intention to refrain from testifying' since she still
completed her testimony notwithstanding her
28 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
earlier affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit
is suspect considering that while it was dated
'April 1992,' it was only submitted sometime in
August 1992, four (4) months after the
Information was filed before the court a quo on 6
April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide
with the actual filing of the case." 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent
provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or
acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons,
as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-
principals, accomplices and accessories after the
fact of the above-mentioned crimes."
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted
prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction,
rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a
complaint made by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may
be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a
prosecution in the offended patty pardons the
offender after the cause has been instituted, nor
does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only
act that according to article 344 extinguishes the
penal action and the penalty that may have been
imposed is the marriage between the offender
and the offended party." 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over
a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted,
a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the
appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by
Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his
guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted
pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The
second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which is in question reads: 'The
offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.' This provision means that the pardon
afforded the offenders must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution, and
means, further, that both the offenders must be
pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate
further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: 'The husband may at any time remit
the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case
the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour
shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These
provisions of the old Penal Code became
inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773,
section 2, which had the effect of repealing the
same. The Revised Penal Code thereafter
expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so
doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its
provisions which were not in force. But with the
incorporation of the second paragraph of article
344, the pardon given by the offended party
again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for
adultery. Once more, however, it must be
emphasized that this pardon must come before
the institution of the criminal prosecution and
must be for both offenders to be effective
circumstances which do not concur in this case."
30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the
Court need not say more than what it has
heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of
Judge Savellano from further hearing the case,
the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano
should, given the circumstances, be best excused
from the case. Possible animosity between the
personalities here involved may not all be that
unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the
old case of Luque vs. Kayanan 31 could again be
said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only
to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty
of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the
Judge. 32 It is not enough that a court is
impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a
simple reminder on the use of proper language
before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting
the cause of his client or defending his rights
might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands
that it be done within the bounds of propriety and
decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can
have a place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Civility among members of the legal profession is
a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost
to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again,
that prosecutors are expected not merely to
discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism and skill but also to
act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that
the zeal which has been exhibited many times in
the past, although regrettably a disappointment
29 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the
proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing,
the Court hereby RULES that
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of
Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y.
Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed
AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-
159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of
said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed
judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting
petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and
thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge
of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case
No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall
immediately be scheduled for raffle among the
other branches of that court for proper disposition
.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and
Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., took no part: related to one of
counsel.
(Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961,
October 07, 1994)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 104961. October 7, 1994.]
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR.,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK
FORCE, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
PETITIONER assails in this petition (for
declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the
following resolutions of the Commission on
Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26
December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and
Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and
Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for
want of legal and factual bases. cdrep
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the
synchronized national and local elections
scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December
1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to
as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting
of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by
members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance
of reaction forces during the election period. 1
Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged
in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing
spot checkpoints. 2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban,"
Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan
requesting the return of the two (2) firearms 3
issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Upon being advised of the request on 13 January
1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up
the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle
Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo
Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan
Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its
entrance. About thirty minutes later, the
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the
car driven by Arellano as it approached the
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano
was then apprehended and detained. He
explained that he was ordered by petitioner to
get the firearms from the house and return them
to Sergeant-at Arms Taccad of the House of
Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The
referral did not include petitioner as among those
charged with an election offense. On 15 January
1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of
Arellano after finding the latter's sworn
explanation meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited
petitioner to shed light on the circumstances
mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.
Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but
also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano
did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning
the firearms to Congress; and, that he was
petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City
Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among
other matters, recommended that the case
against Arellano be dismissed and that the
"unofficial" charge against petitioner be also
dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon
recommendation of its Law Department,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing
the filing of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P.
Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he
should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Secs. 32, 33
and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P.
Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the
administrative proceedings as well as the filing of
30 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the
COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must
respect the limits defined by law; that the
Omnibus Election Code provides for the
disqualification of any person/candidate from
running for or holding a public office, i.e., any
person who has either been declared by
competent authority as insane or incompetent or
has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are
not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of
the Code; that the resolution did away with the
requirement of final conviction before the
commission of certain offenses; that instead, it
created a presumption of guilt as a candidate
may be disqualified from office in situations (a)
where the criminal charge is still pending, (b)
where there is no pending criminal case, and (c)
where the accused has already been acquitted,
all contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for
one to be disqualified from running or holding
public office under the Omnibus Election Code,
i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result,
petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates
the fundamental law thus rendering it fatally
defective.
But the issue on the disqualification of petitioner
from running in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid
for a seat in Congress in the elections that
ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss
the implications of the charge against him on his
qualification to run for public office. LibLex
However, there still remains an important
question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be
validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives the two firearms issued to him
on the basis of the evidence gathered from the
warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner
by which the PNP conducted the search.
According to him, without a warrant and without
informing the driver of his fundamental rights the
policemen searched his car. The firearms were
not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate
reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their
gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk
of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded
the evidence for the prosecution was clearly
violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the
Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither
impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City
Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet.
Consequently, making him a respondent in the
criminal information would violate his
constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated
Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any
candidate for public office during the election
period from employing or availing himself or
engaging the services of security personnel or
bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a
security officer or bodyguard but a civilian
employee assigned to him as driver by the House
of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner further
argues, Arellano was instructed to return to
Congress, as he did, the firearms in compliance
with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms
pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in
fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its
own comment on the petition 13 upon
manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could
not take the position of COMELEC and prayed
instead to be excused from filing the required
comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with
violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec.
263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the
principals, accomplices and accessories, as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be
criminally liable for election offenses." It points
out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that
Arellano brought the firearms in question outside
petitioner's residence, submitting that his right to
be heard was not violated as he was invited by
the City Prosecutor to explain the circumstances
regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms.
Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation
about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that
violation of the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita,
hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial.
15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into
the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution
No. 2327 since this petition may be resolved
without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of
moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in
plain view, 17 as well as the search conducted at
police or military checkpoints which we declared
are not illegal per se, and stressed that the
warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked
in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach,
and that they were neatly packed in gun cases
and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim.
The records do not show that the manner by
which the package was bundled led the PNP to
suspect that it contained firearms. There was not
mention either of any report regarding any
nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from
Arellano when the car was stopped and searched.
Given these circumstances and relying on its
visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package
without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only
be resorted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist
was a law offender or that they would find the
31 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. 19 The existence of probable cause
justifying the warrantless search is determined by
the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the
validity of the warrantless search in situations
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted
to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without
warrant conducted by police officers on the basis
of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant
matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was
conducted and appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the time of
their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence
information, there were reports by an undercover
"deep penetration" agent that appellants were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23
where the information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was
strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in
accused's waistline and his suspicious failure to
produce his passport and other identification
papers; 24 where the physical appearance of the
accused fitted the description given in the
confidential information about a woman
transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused
carrying a bulging black leather bag were
suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried
about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the
drug courier was already established by police
authorities who received confidential information
about the probable arrival of accused on board
one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint
was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance
to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No.
2327. There was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably
believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or
in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as
adverted to earlier, was there any indication from
the package or behavior of Arellano that could
have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically
pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action
then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into
petitioner's privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained
in violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence
of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner's right to question the
reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and
the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting
up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no
infringement of civil and political rights results
from the implementation of this authority," and
that "the places and manner of setting up of
checkpoints shall be determined in consultation
with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security
Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No.
2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon
of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon
thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not
shown that news of impending checkpoints
without necessarily giving their locations, and the
reason for the same have been announced in the
media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the
informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs
informing the public of the purpose of its
operation. As a result, motorists passing that
place did not have any inkling whatsoever about
the reason behind the instant exercise. With the
authorities in control to stop and search passing
vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice
but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise,
any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would
raise suspicion and provide probable cause for
the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct
an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at
the car at that time it was stopped for inspection.
As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not
know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face
of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the
operation, 29 driver Arellano being alone and a
mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshalled the strength and the courage to
protest against the extensive search conducted in
the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied
acquiescence," if there was any, could not be
more than a mere passive conformity on
Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC
proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The facts
show that petitioner was not among those
charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City
Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor
to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation is violative of due
process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the
chance to be heard because he was invited to
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver,
and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn
letter of explanation regarding the incident. This
does not satisfy the requirement of due process
the essence of which is the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense.
31 Due process guarantees the observance of
both substantive and procedural rights, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
itself or only a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go
v. Court of Appeals, 33 we held that
While the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundamental, since it has in fact been established
by statute, it is a component part of due process
in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
32 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
investigation conducted before being bound over
to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is
not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone
save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a
valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
of the full measure of his right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during
the preliminary investigation of Arellano to
corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner
then was made to believe that he was not a party
respondent in the case, so that his written
explanation on the incident was only intended to
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence,
it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner
was fully given the opportunity to meet the
accusation against him as he was not apprised
that he was himself a respondent when he
appeared before the City Prosecutor. cdll
Finally, it must be pointed out too that
petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration
with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver
of his claim to a separate preliminary
investigation for himself. The motion itself
expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his
right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as
he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did
not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his
motion for reconsideration. This is
understandably so since the prohibition against
carrying firearms bears the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor
more than six (6) years without probation and
with disqualification from holding public office,
and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against
such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not
waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The warrantless search conducted by the
Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during
the warrantless search cannot be used as
evidence in an proceeding against petitioner.
Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829
dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the
Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5
May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corp.
v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 18,
1989)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84818. December 18, 1989.]
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A.
ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for
petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
 SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REQUISITES OF A
VALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional.
2. ID.; RATE-FIXING POWER; STANDARDS
REQUIRED; MAY BE IMPLIED. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard
which the legislature is required to prescribe for
the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it
has been held that even in the absence of an
express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. The inherent power and
authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to
regulate the rates charged by public utilities
should be subject always to the requirement that
the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A
commission has no power to fix rates which are
unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This
basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so
low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. What is a just and reasonable rate is
not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence; it is a
question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened
and independent judgment. In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also
to consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility. A method often
employed in determining reasonableness is the
fair return upon the value of the property to the
public utility. Competition is also a very important
factor in determining the reasonableness of rates
since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as
are necessary to meet competition. (Mla. Railroad
Co. vs. A.L. Ammon Trans. Co. Inc. 218 Phil. 900
(1920)
3. ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN THE SAME WAS
CLASSIFIED AS QUASI-JUDICIAL WHEN SAME
WAS CLASSIFIED. In Vigan Electric Light Co.,
Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a
categorical classification as to when the rate-
fixing power of administrative bodies is quasi-
judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
"Moreover, although the rule-making power end
even the power to fix rates when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein.
What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact based upon a report submitted by the
General Auditing Office that petitioner is
making a profit of more than 12% of its invested
capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously,
33 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker
of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In
other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing."
This rule was further explained in the subsequent
case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. to wit: "It is also clear from the
authorities that where the function of the
administrative body is legislative, notice of
hearing is not required by due process of law (See
Oppenheiner, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185,
204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative,
the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a
specific individual) . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130,
pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the
character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing.
4. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND
HEARING NECESSARY EVEN IF THE ORDER IS
TEMPORARY IN NATURE. While respondents
may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may
be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that
such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise
the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory
manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary
in nature does not perforce entail the applicability
of a different rule of statutory procedure than
would otherwise be applied to any other order on
the same matter unless otherwise provided by
the applicable law. In the case at bar, the
applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of
the Public Service Act which provides: "Section
16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice
and hearing. The Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint
rates, . . . which shall be imposed, observed and
followed thereafter by any public service; . . . ."
5. ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY RATE-FIXING ORDER;
A FINAL LEGISLATIVE ACT AS TO THE
PERIOD DURING WHICH IT HAS TO REMAIN
IN FORCE. The order requires the new
reduced rates to be made effective on a specified
date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the
period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case. An
order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced
rates, even for a temporary period, could be
unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory,
especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since
the utility permanently loses its just revenue
during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is
in effect final insofar as the revenue during the
period covered by the order is concerned.
6. ID.; POWER TO REGULATE THE CONDUCT
AND BUSINESS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES;
LIMITATION. The rule is that the power of the
State to regulate the conduct and business of
public utilities is limited by the consideration that
it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or
clothed with the general power of management
incident to ownership, since the private right of
ownership to such property remains and is not to
be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power
to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and
harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any
regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it
is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection of the laws.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
This case is posed as one of first impression in
the sense that it involves the public utility
services of the petitioner Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one
rendering such services in the Philippines. cdrep
The petition before us seeks to annul and set
aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the
provisional reduction of the rates which may be
charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of
its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the
reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power and
a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law. llcd
The antecedental facts as summarized by
petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of
Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted
"a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and
operate in the Philippines, at such places as the
grantee may select, station or stations and
associated equipment and facilities for
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
international satellite communications." Under
this franchise, it was likewise granted the
authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on
record that it undertook the following activities
and established the following installations:
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its
provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna
(Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided
direct satellite communication links with the
Pacific Ocean Region (the United States,
Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand,
China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the
Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A"
antenna (Pinugay II) was established. Pinugay II
provided links with the Indian Ocean Region
(major cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and
other Asia Pacific countries operating within the
region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B"
antenna (Pinugay III) was established to
temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I
and then Pinugay II while they were being
refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or
reserved antenna for possible contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed
a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field,
Pampanga as a television receive-only earth
station which provides the U.S. Military bases
with a 24-hour television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation
of a third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay
IV)to take over the links in Pinugay I due to
obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines,
the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the
Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating
Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in
the Convention and the Operating Agreement of
the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two
global commercial telecommunications satellite
corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth
in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly
of the United Nations. llcd
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its
satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite
services thus provided by petitioner enable said
international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams,
high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to
American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514,
petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now respondent
NTC. However, pursuant to EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was
placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC, including all its
facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to
charge rates therefor. prcd
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987,
petitioner filed with respondent NTC an
application 4 for authority to continue operating
and maintaining the same facilities it has been
continuously operating and maintaining since
1967, to continue providing the international
satellite communications services it has likewise
been providing since 1967, and to charge the
current rates applied for in rendering such
services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a
provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above mentioned
facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it was
then offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging. This authority was valid for six (6)
months from the date of said order. 5 When said
provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988,
it was extended for another six (6) months, or up
to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further
extended the provisional authority of the
petitioner for another six (6) months, counted
from September 16, 1988, but it directed the
petitioner to charge modified reduced rates
through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on
the present authorized rates. Respondent
Commissioner ordered said reduction on the
following ground:
"The Commission in its on-going review of
present service rates takes note that after an
initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division
of the Common Carriers Authorization
Department of the financial statements of
applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some
of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions,
should the Commission finds (sic) in its further
35 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
evaluation that more reduction should be effected
either on the basis of a provisional authorization
or in the final consideration of the case." 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for
the following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for
public service communications does not provide
the necessary standards constitutionally required,
hence there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of
NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power
was properly and constitutionally conferred, the
same was exercised in an unconstitutional
manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the
questioned order violates procedural due process
for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus
constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the
provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing
for the creation of respondent NTC and granting
its rate-fixing powers, nor of EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction
of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that
respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory
powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief
raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative
power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not
of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to
respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly
requires an express conferment by the legislative
body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in
effect questioning the constitutionality of
Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground
that the same do not fix a standard for the
exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied. 7

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature
of the power delegated to respondent NTC and
the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules
and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications
and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section
6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of
the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision
over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided
that the national economic viability of the entire
network or components of the communications
systems contemplated therein should be
maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go
into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent
provisions of the law in order to conclude that
respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the
questioned order violates procedural due process
because it was issued motu proprio, without
notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was
based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a
unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been
given an opportunity to present its side before
the order in question was issued, the confiscatory
nature of the rate reduction and the consequent
deterioration of the public service could have
been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the
rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and
hence quasi-judicial, not quasi-legislative; thus,
notice and hearing are necessary and the
absence thereof results in a violation of due
process.
Respondents admit that the application of a
policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative: that where the function of the
administrative agency is legislative, notice and
hearing are not required, but where an order
applies to a named person, as in the instant case,
the function involved is adjudicatory. 8
Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts
obtaining the order in question need not be
preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued
pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function
but because the assailed order is merely
interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner's application for a
certificate of public convenience; and that
36 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
petitioner is not the only primary source of data
or information since respondent is currently
engaged in a continuing review of the rates
charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-fixing power of
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it
is legislative, thus:
"Moreover, although the rule-making power end
even the power to fix rates when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein.
What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact based upon a report submitted by the
General Auditing Office that petitioner is
making a profit of more than 12% of its invested
capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously,
the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker
of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In
other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing."
This rule was further explained in the subsequent
case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:
"It is also clear from the authorities that where
the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by
due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra,
where it is said: 'If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative,
the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a
specific individual') . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130,
pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the
character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great
variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing." 11
The order in question which was issued by
respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further,
it is premised on a finding of fact, although
patently superficial, that there is merit in a
reduction of some of the rates charged based
on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial
statements without affording petitioner the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular
aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No
rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched
to assume that petitioner could be in a better
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed
study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such
nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined
to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and
the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still
has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which
respondent NTC based its questioned order.
LibLex
At any rate, there remains the categorical
admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature.
This postulate is bereft of merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Assuming that such power is
vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an
arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing
such an order as temporary in nature does not
perforce entail the applicability of a different rule
of statutory procedure than would otherwise be
applied to any other order on the same matter
unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
In the case at bar, the applicable statutory
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act
which provides:
"Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission,
upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall
have power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
37 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint
rates, . . . which shall be imposed, observed and
followed thereafter by any public service; . . . ."
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid
provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there
being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions
to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and
196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,
respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether
the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.
That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC
Case No. 8794 which granted PHILCOMSAT a
provisional authority "to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it
presently offers, and to charge the rates as
reduced by them" under the condition that
"(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration
of the merit of this application, the Commission
may modify, revise or amend the rates . . .." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-
fixing respondents may have other sources of
information or data, still, since a hearing is
essential, respondent NTC should act solely on
the basis of the evidence before it and not on
knowledge or information otherwise acquired by
it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if
so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity
to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates
to be made effective on a specified date. It
becomes a final legislative act as to the period
during which it has to remain in force pending the
final determination of the case. 13 An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even
for a temporary period, could be unjust,
unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if
the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility
permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect
final insofar as the revenue during the period
covered by the order is concerned. Upon a
showing, therefore, that the order requiring a
reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly
deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
property, a declaration of its nullity becomes
inductible, which brings us to the issue on
substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is
confiscatory in that its implementation would
virtually result in a cessation of its operations and
eventual closure of business. On the other hand,
respondents assert that since petitioner is
operating its communications satellite facilities
through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it
has no vested right therein. What it has is merely
a privilege or license which may be revoked at
will by the State at any time without necessarily
violating any vested property right of herein
petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of
respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of
such privilege should nevertheless be neither
whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and
reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere
grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress
when the common good so requires. 14
Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the
termination of the operation of said utility is
required by the common good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate
the conduct and business of public utilities is
limited by the consideration that it is not the
owner of the property of the utility, or clothed
with the general power of management incident
to ownership, since the private right of ownership
to such property remains and is not to be
destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to
regulate is not the power to destroy useful and
harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any
regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it
is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection of the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the
State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the
rates charged by public utilities should be subject
always to the requirement that the rates so fixed
shall be reasonable and just. A commission has
no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or
to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic
requirement of reasonableness comprehends
such rates which must not be so low as to be
confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a
question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence; 17 it is a
question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened
and independent judgment 18 In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also
to consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility. A method often
employed in determining reasonableness is the
fair return upon the value of the property to the
public utility. Competition is also a very important
factor in determining the reasonableness of rates
since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as
are necessary to meet competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals
that the rate reduction is solely and primarily
based on the initial evaluation made on the
financial statements of petitioner, contrary to
respondent NTC's allegation that it has several
other sources of information without, however,
divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as
much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it
arrived at the prescribed rates. It just
perfunctorily declared that based on the financial
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
statements, there is merit for a rate reduction
without any elucidation on what implications and
conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from
said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how
the data reflected in the financial statements
influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a
severe drawback, with the consequent detriment
to the public service, should the order of
respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and
improvident. The business in which petitioner is
engaged is unique in that its machinery and
equipment have always to be taken in relation to
the equipment on the other end of the
transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging,
acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of
machinery and equipment necessarily entails a
major adjustment or innovation on the business
of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any
change in the sending end abroad has to be
matched with the corresponding change in the
receiving end in the Philippines. conversely, any
change in the receiving end abroad has to be
matched with the corresponding change in the
sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the
part of petitioner to meet the variegations
demanded by technology could result in a
deterioration or total failure of the service of
satellite communications. cdll
At present, petitioner is engaged in several
projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and
renewing its machinery and equipment in order
to keep up with the continuing changes of the
times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances
abroad. These projected undertakings were
formulated on the premise that rates are
maintained at their present or at reasonable
levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may
practically lead to a cessation of its business.
While we concede the primacy of the public
interest in an adequate and efficient service, the
same is not necessarily to be equated with
reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public
utility and the consumer. cdll
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order,
particularly on the issue of rates provided therein,
being violative of the due process clause is void
and should be nullified. Respondents should now
proceed, as they should heretofore have done,
with the hearing and determination of petitioner's
pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which
proceeding the subject of rates involved in the
present controversy, as well as other matters
involved in said application, may be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with
due observance or our pronouncements herein.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and
the order of respondents, dated September 2,
1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued under our
resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically
directed against the aforesaid order of
respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Corts, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
(Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO,
manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;
POWER. The nature of the Court of Industrial
Relations and of its power is extensively
discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF
PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations
et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that
the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these rights is the right
to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
Not only must there be some evidence to support
a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations
or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
39 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controvercial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW
TRIAL GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe
here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis
upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a
conclusion of law. This result, however, does not
now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to
in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for
a new trial should be, and the same is hereby,
granted, and the entire record of this' case shall
be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it re-open the case, receive
all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth in the decision.
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and
moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion,
we reconsider the following legal conclusions of
the majority opinion of this Court:
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual
como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que
no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por
voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez
que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o
cuando se termine la obra;
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que
han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se
han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por
haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica en la
cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros
de la misma;
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado
un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus obreros
sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una
obra determinada y que se niega a readmitir a
dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia
de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica
injusta ni incurre en la sancion penal del articulo
5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque
su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos
obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo
obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en
virtud del paro."
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the
other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgment rendered by the majority of this Court
and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on
September 26,1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary
for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the
members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine
Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT
with the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of
ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their
rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. ( Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code
which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions
of a modern labor legislation of American origin
where industrial peace has always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty
of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are
of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to
the motion for new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be
herein- after stated with reference to the motion
for a new trial of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of
the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make
several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
40 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire record
of the proceedings had before the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence to indicate that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript
taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory
and conflicting statements of opposing counsel,
with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulate the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section
1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement,
of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wageshares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants or
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be death with by the Court for the sake
of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and
induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts
related to the industry concerned or to the
industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determining the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry
or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers
or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be
paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement
of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and
compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality
here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the
award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary
or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in
the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due Process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.
S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is
41 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle
that the genius of constitutional government is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation
upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November
29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81
Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6
Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F.
2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct.
563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265
U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed.
lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280
U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed.
624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go so far as
to justify orders without a basis in evidence
having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated
Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59
S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter
under its consideration or advisement to a local
board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of
the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions
as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may
be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide
all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the
portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the
supposed lack of leather material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the
National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and this
averment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers'
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the
exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein." We have considered the reply
of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the
petition. By and large, after considerable
discussion, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp
the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz,
Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
(Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong,
G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993.]
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER
JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL
CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR.,
JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL
ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND
CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA
and RAMON ERENETA, petitioners, vs. HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Makati, Br. 134 ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR.
ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO
AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM, JR., MANUEL
ESCALONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson,
Benson & Jimenez for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los
Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; DUE PROCESS;
REQUIREMENTS; MINIMUM STANDARD TO BE
SATISFIED IN IMPOSING DISCIPLINARY
SANCTION BY AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION.
Corollary to respondent students' contention of
denial of due process is their argument that it is
the Ang Tibay case [69 Phil. 635 (1940)] and not
the Guzman case [142 SCRA 699], which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically
with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus: "(1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) that they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINIMUM STANDARD
SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. In view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del
Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students on
February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, the
records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. While some of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the
others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991
to file their statements. Indubitably, the nature
and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February
14 and 20, 1991. It is to be noted that the
February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3
of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed
individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14
and 20 clearly show that respondent students
were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the
charges leveled against them. The requisite
assistance of counsel was met when, from the
very start of the investigations before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Committee, the
law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed
pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
3. ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINARY CASES INVOLVING
STUDENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE;
RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE, NOT INVOLVED.
Respondent students may not use the
argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were
denied procedural due process. Granting that
they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the observance
of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. An administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate students' participation
in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of
our previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C.
Branch, 161 SCRA 20.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, NOT REQUIRED. With regard to the
charge of hazing, respondent students fault
petitioners for not explicitly defining the word
"hazing" and allege that there is no proof that
they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo
Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing.
Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students
who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It
cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed
before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary
Board is not a criminal case requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt but is merely
administrative in character. As such, it is not
subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal
due process, particularly with respect to the
specification of the charge involved. As we have
43 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
had occasion to declare in previous cases of a
similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings identical to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34
Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a
student need not be drawn with the precision of a
criminal information or complaint. Having given
prior notice to the students involved that "hazing"
which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall
be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No.
3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose
Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said.
We deem this sufficient for purposes of the
investigation under scrutiny.
5. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, EXCEPTION;
CASE AT BAR. It is accepted legal doctrine
that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from petitioner university.
6. ID.; ACADEMIC FREEDOM CONSTRUED;
CASE AT BAR. At this juncture, it would be
meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed
by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic
freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what
may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4)
who may be admitted to study. "Academic
freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the
emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has
traditionally been associated with freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press; in
other words, with the right of individuals in
university communities, such as professors,
researchers and administrators, to investigate,
pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it
may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure. But obviously, its
optimum impact is best realized where the
freedom is exercised judiciously and does not
degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on
this individual aspect of academic freedom have
stressed the need for assuring to such individuals
a measure of independence through the
guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure.
The components of this aspect of academic
freedom have been categorized under the areas
of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach. It is
to be realized that this individual aspect of
academic freedom could have developed only
pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As
corporate entities, educational institutions of
higher learning are inherently endowed with the
right to establish their policies, academic and
otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is
articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be
taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be
admitted to study. In an attempt to give an
explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by
teachers, and by researchers." After protracted
debate and ringing speeches, the final version
which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of
the question as to whether and what aspects of
academic freedom are included herein, ConCom
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since
academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want
to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom." While under the Education
Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely
choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up
to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights
are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.
[Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
effective September 11, 1982]. "For private
schools have the right to establish reasonable
rules and regulations for the admission, discipline
and promotion of students. This right . . . extends
as well to parents . . . as parents are under a
social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools." (Yap Chin Fah v.
Court of Appeals [Resolution], G.R. No. 90063,
December 12, 1989) Such rules are "incident to
the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of
the college. The rules may include those
governing student discipline." Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES;
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; PROPER
ISSUANCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR.
respondent students argue that we erred in
issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since
petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable
damage in the event that private respondents are
allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as
to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated
and found by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules
and standards will certainly undermine the
authority of the administration of the school. This
we would be most loathe to do.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
In 1975, the Court was confronted with a
mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, a religious seminary which has a
working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila
University regarding accreditation of common
students, to allow petitioner who had taken some
courses therein for credit during summer, to
continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the
issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground
that students in the position of petitioner
possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be
admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied
44 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding since there is no duty,
much less a clear duty, on the part of the
respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition
did not prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked
academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the
concept encompassing the right of a school to
choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University
to refuse admittance to its students, this time in
Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again
challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the
opening paragraph, the individual concerned was
not a regular student, the respondents in the
case at bar, having been previously enrolled in
the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in
the earlier case, the petitioner was refused
admittance, not on such considerations as
personality traits and character orientation, or
even inability to meet the institution's academic
or intellectual standards, but because of her
behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly
informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your
best interest to work with a Faculty that is more
compatible with your orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being
refused admission into petitioner University have
been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. The
case attracted much publicity due to the death of
one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries
inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add
another dimension to the concept of academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning, this
time a case fraught with social and emotional
overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far
from novel, are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a
fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School,
held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10,
1991, for students interested in joining its ranks.
As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo
"Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner
university, died of serious physical injuries at the
Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991.
He was not the lone victim, though, for another
freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical
Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the
same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and
submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of
the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels,
they requested copies of the charges and
pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule
3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file
their written answers to the formal charge on or
before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would
be deemed to have waived their right to present
their defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge
Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty.
Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty.
Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against
respondent students. Cdpr
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent
students were informed that they had violated
Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in
the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states:
"The complaint/charge against you arose from
participation in acts of hazing committed during
the Aquila Legis initiations held on February 8-10,
1991. The evidence against you consist of
testimonies of students, showing your
participation in acts prohibited by the School
regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent
students to file their written answers to the above
charge on or before February 22, 1991, otherwise
they would be deemed to have waive their
defense. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent
students, through counsel, requested that the
investigation against them be held in abeyance,
pending action on their request for copies of the
evidence against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the
Board to appear before it at a hearing on
February 28, 1991 to clarify their answers with
regard to the charges filed by the investigating
committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in
a letter to petitioners dated February 27, 1991,
counsel for respondent students moved to
postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to
March 1, 1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed
to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory
questions. 8 They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in
accordance with the rules laid down in the case of
Guzman vs. National University; 9
45 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the
affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School
catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the
proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No.
3815;
d) The Board will take into consideration the
degree of participation of the petitioners in the
alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable
to the President of the University, i.e. Respondent
Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean
del Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary
Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of
dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the
decision on the penalty to the Administration so
that this case be decided not just on the Law
School level but also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule
No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing
activities. The Board found that respondent
students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies"
during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and
exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows
them to participate in the physical hazing.
Although respondent students claim that they
were there to assist and attend to the needs of
the neophytes, actually they were assigned a
definite supportive role to play in the organized
activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact
that they made no effort to prevent the infliction
of further physical punishment on the neophytes
under their care. The Board considered
respondent students part and parcel of the
integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the
Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing,
either by active participation or through
acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of
unanimity among the members of the Board on
the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo
waived her prerogative to review the decision of
the Board and left to the President of the
University the decision of whether to expel
respondent students or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10,
1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as
President of the Ateneo de Manila University,
accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus:
"that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the
'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming that they
did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondent
students are still guilty in accordance with the
principle that "where two or more persons act
together in the commission of a crime, whether
they act through the physical volition of one or of
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose will contributes to the
wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr.
Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the
death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the
"offense of the respondents can be characterized
as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of
Christian education and contrary to civilized
behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and
concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the
Board excluded respondent students Abas and
Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of
March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the
latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as
yet submitted their case to the Board. Said
resolution also set the investigation of the two
students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were
currently enrolled as students for the second
semester of schoolyear 1990-91. Unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, they would
be prevented from taking their examinations. The
petition principally centered on the alleged lack
of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners
from dismissing respondent students and
stopping the former from conducting hearings
relative to the hazing incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the
temporary restraining order were then held. On
April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order
issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently,
a day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro
Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to
investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by
filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, to include the aforesaid members of
the Special Board, as additional respondents to
the original petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental
Petition arguing that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process in the
conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary
Board against respondent students; that a
supplemental petition cannot be admitted
without the same being set for hearing and that
the supplemental petition for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend
the previous restraining order beyond its
mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on the
urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order,
Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer
on April 10, 1991. 18
46 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered
petitioners to reinstate respondent students.
Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations in lieu of the final
examinations which allegedly the students were
not allowed to take, and enjoined them to
maintain the status quo with regard to the cases
of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issues of the instant case.
Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special
Board investigating petitioners Abas and
Mendoza concluded its investigation. On May 20,
1991, it imposed the penalty of dismissal on
respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo
Mendoza and directed the dropping of their
names from its roll of students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent
judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction
upon posting by respondent students of a bond
dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order questioning the order
of respondent judge reinstating respondent
students dated May 17, 1991. On May 30, 1991,
this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991
order of respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two
relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1)
whether a school is within its rights in expelling
students from its academic community pursuant
to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and
(2) whether or not the penalty imposed by the
school administration is proper under the
circumstances. Cdpr
We grant the petition and reverse the order of
respondent judge ordering readmission of
respondent students. Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ruled that respondent students had been denied
due process in the investigation of the charges
against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent
students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to expel them was arrived at
without affording them their right to procedural
due process. We are constrained to disagree as
we find no indication that such right has been
violated. On the contrary, respondent students'
rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as
enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University, 22 Alcuaz v PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and
Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously
respected by petitioners in the various
investigative proceedings held before they were
expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denial of due
process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay
case 25 and not the Guzman case which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically
with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:
"(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case." 26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above
requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del
Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students on
February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, 27
the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While some of
the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the
others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991
to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the
accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20,
1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of
Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School
Catalogue was addressed individually to
respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly
show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met
when, from the very start of the investigations
before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and
Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and
filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument
that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were
denied procedural due process. 31 Granting that
they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the observance
of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination. An administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate students' participation
in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent
47 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of
our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32
Respondent students' contention that the
investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 order clearly states that it was
reached only after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary
Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein
respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions. prcd
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent
students fault petitioners for not explicitly
defining the word "hazing" and allege that there
is no proof that they were furnished copies of the
1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which
prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not
worthy of students who aspire to be future
members of the Bar. It cannot be over-
emphasized that the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a
criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt but is merely administrative in character.
As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly
with respect to the specification of the charge
involved. As we have had occasion to declare in
previous cases of a similar nature, due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings identical to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges
against a student need not be drawn with the
precision of a criminal information or complaint.
Having given prior notice to the students involved
that "hazing" which is not defined in the School
Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with
Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said
what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for
purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to
the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its
raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of
injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes
by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes
the test of reasonableness and absence of malice
on the part of the school authorities. Far from
fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has
merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of
those who aspire to eventual leadership in our
country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are
not in a position to file the instant petition under
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby bypassing the latter and the Court
of Appeals. 3 5
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when
the case involves a question of law, 36 as in this
case, where the issue is whether or not
respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred
in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since
petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable
damage in the event that private respondents are
allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as
to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated
and found by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules
and standards will certainly undermine the
authority of the administration of the school. This
we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair
petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the
present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the
essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited
in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus:
(1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3)
how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be
admitted to study. LibLex
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of
Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the
State," has deservedly earned for himself a
respected place in the annals of history as a
martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To
Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the
most sensible, and the most just man of his age."
In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of
hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption"
of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own
words how this charge of "corruption," the
forerunner of the concept of academic freedom,
came about:
"Young men of the richer classes, who have not
much to do, come about me of their own accord:
they like to hear the pretenders examined, and
they often imitate me, and examine others
themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they
soon discover, who think that they know
something, but really know little or nothing; and
then those who are examined by them, instead of
being angry with themselves are angry with me.
This confounded Socrates, they say; this
villainous misleader of youth. And then if
somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he
practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot
tell; but in order that they may not appear to be
at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges
which are used against all philosophers about
teaching things up in the clouds and under the
earth, and having no gods, and making the worse
appear the better cause; for they do not like to
confess that their pretense of knowledge has
been detected which is the truth; and as they
are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and
are all in battle array and have persuasive
tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud
and inveterate calumnies." 38
48 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the
same heroic mold have similarly defied the
stifling strictures of authority, whether State,
Church, or various interest groups, to be able to
give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious
were the insidious and blatant attempts at
thought control during the time of the Inquisition
until even the Medieval universities, renowned as
intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their
autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian
encrustations along the way, were gradually
crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which
awaited the champions and martyrs of the
dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the
professors of the new German universities in the
16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities
of Leiden (1575), Helmstadt (1574) and
Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to
freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the
exponents of fundamental human rights of the
19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom",
the term as it evolved to describe the emerging
rights related to intellectual liberty, has
traditionally been associated with freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press; in
other words, with the right of individuals in
university communities, such as professors,
researchers and administrators, to investigate,
pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it
may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized
where the freedom is exercised judiciously and
does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early
cases on this individual aspect of academic
freedom have stressed the need for assuring to
such individuals a measure of independence
through the guarantees of autonomy and security
of tenure. The components of this aspect of
academic freedom have been categorized under
the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to
teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspect of
academic freedom could have developed only
pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As
corporate entities, educational institutions of
higher learning are inherently endowed with the
right to establish their policies, academic and
otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is
articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be
taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be
admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed
with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish
to the American government, namely, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the
rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of
"academic freedom." This is most especially true
with respect to the institutional aspect of the
term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine
Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of
legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found
in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which
stated: "Universities established by the State
shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State
university at that time, being the University of the
Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some
as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said
institution at the expense of the rest. prcd
In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the
provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its
Section 8 (2): "All institutions of higher learning
shall enjoy academic freedom." In his
interpretation of the provision, former U.P.
President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
declared that it "definitely grants the right of
academic freedom to the University as an
institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." 39
Has the right been carried over to the present
Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit
definition with an expanded coverage, the
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by
teachers, and by researchers." After protracted
debate and ringing speeches, the final version
which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of
the question as to whether and what aspects of
academic freedom are included herein, ConCom
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since
academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want
to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin
C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the
sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean
that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the
institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that,
it also includes . . ." Gascon finished off the
broken thought, "the faculty and the students."
Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we
have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning
is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field
of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish
reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as
parents are under a social and moral (if not legal)
49 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
obligation, individually and collectively, to assist
and cooperate with the schools." 43
Such rules are "incident to the very object of
incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may
include those governing student discipline." 44
Going a step further, the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the
eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked
for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty,
and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud
to claim as their own a Christian school that
includes Theology as part of its curriculum and
assiduously strives to turn out individuals of
unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold
of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus,
St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing
forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the
more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to
develop the intellect and skills of the studentry,
but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of
the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be
religious not in the sense that the founders or
charter members of the institution are sectarian
or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious
education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred
North Whitehead said, is "an education which
inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears
that the particular brand of religious education
offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has
been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a
venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila
University as their own a minute longer, for they
may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on
the students currently enrolled, as well as those
who come after them. cdphil
Quite applicable to this case is our
pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally
conducive and orderly educational environment
will be seriously imperilled if, under the
circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is
forced to admit petitioner's children and to
reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus,
the decision of petitioner university to expel them
is but congruent with the gravity of their
misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence
between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.
47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the
procedure followed by petitioner university, we
see no reason to reverse its decision founded on
the following undisputed facts: that on February
8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity
conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as
auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing,
Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries,
while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In
light of the vicious acts of respondent students
upon those whom ironically they would claim as
"brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we
countenance the imposition of such nominal
penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We,
therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the
penalty of dismissal upon respondent students.
This finds authority and justification in Section
146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. 48
50 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c 1 _ D u e P r o c e s s
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED;
the order of respondent Judge dated May 17,
1991 reinstating respondent students into
petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The
resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then
President of Ateneo de Manila University dated
March 10, 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision
of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent
students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA
dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ ., concur.
Grio Aquino, J ., is on leave.
Cruz, J ., concur in the result. I do not join in the
statements in the ponencia which seem to me to
be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against
the private respondents for the death of Lenny
Villa.