Chapter 4 Investigatory Powers Cases

15) CARINO V. CHR, 204 SCRA 483

Facts:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook as
"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention, as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. The
teachers who participated were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days
that followed.
Due to their failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance withP.D. 807."
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano
Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named
respondents, 6 filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . . (the Supreme) Court of
their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order; motion was denied,
hence, the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the
entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and
documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo. 8
"MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner
(Cario), which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers'
right to due process and peaceable assembly. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the
Supreme Court.
Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded. "
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them. 10 Their complaints and those of other teachers also
"ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as
"Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a
"dialogue", and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. Commission,
with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro,
proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had
been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave
of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."
Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a
motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction
over the case." 14
Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December 17, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 andb) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6,
1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the
b) petitions without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take
to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it
was prima facielawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative
charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of
law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost
respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the
case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's
joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
In this case, the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this
Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra.It has also made plain its intention "to
hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in
other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
Issue: where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on
Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication (pls rephrase, bes)

Held:

No. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its
constitution,it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at
the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following: 25
"(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants
to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation
or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in
the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am
J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. These
are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under
the Civil Service Law,and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial functionof a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have
16) Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
Facts:

RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, was nominated and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission of
Appointments as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. That in a letter dated January 28, 1960
addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the
Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of
the findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and
inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up
in the letter as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the
government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to
remedy unsatisfactory accounting; due to the findings, Congressman Roces recommended the
replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete revamp
of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed
thereafter; that having been officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him to explain within
72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against him relative to the charges
contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as required wherein he explained and
refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces;

February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as
Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, thereupon created an investigating committee with the
only purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and
to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio
A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President of the
Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of
petitioner; that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as
acting administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant
petition before this Court.

*** Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained in the
letter of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office in general for the
truth is that he was specifically charged with mismanagement gross inefficiency and negligence in
the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a result he was required
to answer the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him. Respondents also denied that petitioner was investigated without being accorded due process
as required by law for in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to
secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his behalf in a manner consistent
with administrative due process. Respondents also averred that the President of the Philippines,
contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a
presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5
of Republic Act No. 2260. Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R.
Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which
constitute just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be sworn to for
the Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered to commence
administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941,
without need of any previous verified complaint.
Issue: WON there is
Held:
No. There is no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the investigation and
disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is under the control and
supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the reason we have already stated that he
is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President. There is
merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be
investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the
Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
"That meaning is also the meaning given to the word 'control' as used in administrative law. Thus,
the Department Head pursuant to Section 79(c) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices
under his department by virtue of which he may 'repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said
bureaus or offices', and under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over the
executive department only refers to matters of general policy. The term 'policy' means a settled or
definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body or individual, and it cannot
be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a specific
policy of government.
17) RUIZ V. DRILON, 209 SCRA 695
Facts:
President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo
Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon State University ("CLSU"). 1
In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for reconsideration
therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma. Consequently, AO No.
218 became final and executory.2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-21656. 3 Petitioner
there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of discretion, President Aquino's order dated 13
September 1991 appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS
Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991 directing petitioner to turn-over
the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
Eight days later, on 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present petition
(G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of annulling,
for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the
Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. 5 The Court did not issue
the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6 This petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition
with prayer for TRO filed 8 days earlier with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-21656).
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having gone into effect
on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992, where for
the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which he had commenced in
connection with the issuance of AO No. 218. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in CA-
G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding the same to be a case of
forum shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision by way of a petition for review under
Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. 103570 and assigned to
the Second Division. 9 This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by this time pending with
the Court En Banc, by a resolution dated 2 April 1992. Cdpr
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to show cause
why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an apparent case of forum
shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised and the reliefs sought therein are
substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165. 10
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously in anticipation
of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated compliance filed on 2 March
1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies having engaged in forum shopping and
contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156 consists of the illegality of the actions
taken by the Office of the President and by the DECS in implementing AO No. 218, which may
render moot the Court's review of the intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of
action in itself; and (2) he never attempted to hide the fact, either before this Court or the Court of
Appeals, that he had instituted both actions "for separate reasons, apart though related from each
other," such candor being "an elementary consideration in the determination of the issue whether
he committed forum shopping or not." 11
Deliberating on the present consolidated petitions, the Court finds the explanations proffered by
petitioner and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers undertaken in this case to
be completely unsatisfactory and considers the petitions to be clear cases of deliberate forum
shopping.
Issue/s:
WON the Petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in rendering the assailed administrative orders
** see also, forum shoppinh
Held:
No. Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an
administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during
the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There is no doubt that he has been accorded his
rights. LLpr
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office.
Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President,
offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university
property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase
at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned
by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a company
where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty
and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty
and grave misconduct. and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service. 19
18) Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, 332 SCRA 160
Facts:
(background of the law)President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country." The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the
mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state
where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the
need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of
said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty), and this was then ratified by the senate.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of
the United States Code (USC): A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count); B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count); C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); D) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); E) 2
USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than one year).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner however denied the request because
(1) it is premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and
treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for
ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United
States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United
States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government
requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information. xxx
Hence, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish
private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford
him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter
to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and
to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction; raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in
his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was
denied. Respondent judge issued an order: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States
Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition
with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of
the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Hence, petitioner argued that the RTC acted 1) WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES; 2) PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY
PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE
PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW; 4) PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
Issue/s:

Held:
No. Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure
their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of
the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto.
The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations
of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether
the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be
the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no
power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court.
The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be
filed in court.
In contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may
result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at
two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the
request. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6,Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending
threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible consequences,
we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law
enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. Petitioner's fears that the
Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its
commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment
to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and
the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law
or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case
at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights,
although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
19) Pefianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439
Facts:
DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then
Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service due to the pilferage of some historical
documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which
were under her control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without
legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were
missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz,
Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the
administrative case while respondent was represented by her own private counsel. Secretary Gloria
then issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of
pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in
particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service
with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other
remunerations.
The received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, she received another resolution correcting the
typographical errors found on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
Hence, respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the
circumstances." 2 Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated which
Secretary Gloria similarly denied it. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was
merely "noted". As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September
1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of
the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing
the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. 4
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but
the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court but the CA sustained the trial
court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January
1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review. Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was
replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary
Gloria.
Issue: Whether or not the DECS secretary may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the DECS
Investigation Committee Report
Held:
No. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is
his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
In this case, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to
the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS
Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing
her from the service. 7 By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from
becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner to
furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent
with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v.
Drilon 8 that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings
and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against
him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of
record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these
rights.
Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action
would be appropriate to take under the circumstances," 9hardly merits consideration. It must be
stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication between the DECS
Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the perusal of
respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. More importantly, the
DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is,
it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from
office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any
further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced
by denying her access to the investigation report
20) Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 US 523
Facts: Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after three
efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the
ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential use of which allegedly violated the apartment
building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to
require a warrant for inspections, appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a
writ of prohibition, which the court denied.
Issue: WON there is a warrantless code enforcement
Held:
NO. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless
code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. Frank v. Maryland, supra, pro
tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.

(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through
the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S.
528.

(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of private
property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.

(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment interests are not
merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are involved
whose purpose is to determine the existence of physical conditions not complying with local
ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to allow
an inspection. Pp. 387 U. S. 529-531.

(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal
demands on occupants;

Page 387 U. S. 524

that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function
under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-533.

2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code enforcement
inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the code,
but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a
whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will
necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-539.

3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should normally be sought only
after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540.

21) SALAZAR V. ACHACOSO, 183 SCRA 145

Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia
Salazar a complaint due to non-return of the PECC card of the petitioner.
On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was
assigned, sent a telegram DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No.
1920 and Executive Order No. 1022 CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No.
615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of
a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of
News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs.
Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the
team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
Petitioner filed with POEA the following letter we respectfully request that the personal properties
seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said
seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof beacuase 1) there is no prior
notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates
"due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. 2. Your acts
also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." 3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdie
Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar
family,and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client
were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with
grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts.
293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code but before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial
Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.
Issue: WON the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:

No. Under the new Constitution, it states that. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue
warrants of search and arrest.

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory
powers: prLL

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of
giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of
Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will
lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor
Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have
the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority
if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national
security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall
order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia,
properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterates that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.

22) CATURA V. CIR, 37 SCRA 303

Facts:
Petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, are respondents to the complaint
against them under Section 17 filed by the prosecution division of respondent Court, the principal
complainants being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting
more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. In the complaint, it
was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such President
and Treasurer, they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds"
with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from
them "a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union and to make
the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to
inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply . The
executive board issued resolutions for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the
union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the members to refer the matter to the
Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts to
petitioners without any success. After setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies
provided in the union's constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought,
after due hearing and judgment, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair
labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease
and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to
render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to
make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to
inspection by the members|||. Then, Celestino Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners
in the above complaint before respondent Court, sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners
Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected as President in an election on November 15,
1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in
the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all
financial transactions of the union. 3
Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead
of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing "personally the
respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all
the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds,
receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union.
A motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioner Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on
the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion
was beyond the power of respondent Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CIR, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance
with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, 1 can
require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the
hearing to conduct such investigation / aka whether or not the order is invalid

Held:
Yes. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation concerning the power of investigation
of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the
corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations, may be found in
paragraphs (b), (h), and (1) of the aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The
members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and
representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws
of the organization." 5 . . . "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any
purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or
those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member." 6 . . . "The
books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor
organization shall be open to inspection by any official or member thereof." 7 The
authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted
contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and
rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents
required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there
was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the
authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in
this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was
properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be
deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private
rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be
made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged.
In this case, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and Treasurer
of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as well as the failure
to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book of
accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the members. Clearly,
the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call
for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged
violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization as specifically set forth in Section be respected.
23) Evangelista v. Jarencio, 69 SCRA 99
Facts: President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. The President vested in the
Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code ( (1) immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical
or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines. (2) To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth . . . (3) To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-
finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any
public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.") including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.
Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent
Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL
AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS . . . then and there to declare and testify in
a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed
its legality.
Respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: "IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond
in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner
[private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents,
representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing
subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Stress supplied)
Hence, petitioners elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed
on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.
Issue: whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Held:
Yes. petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." More than that, the enabling
authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function
should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon
witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in
respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending
before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the
exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be
issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however,
that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what
the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court,
and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and
qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean
the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things
does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even
before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to
one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the
subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that
the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.
24) OFFICE COURT ADMIN. V. CANQUE, 588 SCRA 226

Facts: Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay Polo, Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI
alleging that Sylvia Canque, a Clerk of Court of Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-
Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, that Canque asked from her the amount of Forty Thousand
(P40,000.00) Pesos in exchange for the release of the former's common-law husband, Jovencio
Patoc, and the dismissal of his criminal cases in court. Patoc was charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves of the said court. The NBI operatives
conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about 9:30 A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves
and arrested Canque after she received the amount of P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible
ink and dusted with fluorescent powder, from Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator Jedidah S.
Hife. Canque was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI for laboratory examination.
Forensic Chemist Rommel D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report, 1 found that the right and left hands
of Canque were positive for the presence of fluorescent powder. The NBI report further stated that
prior to the entrapment, Patoc's mother had already given the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos to Canque in the presence of Ypanto for the dismissal of Patoc's first case for
possession of "shabu" on November 30, 2003. The case remains pending to date.

Informations for direct bribery and violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu and were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. CEB-BRL-1058 and CEB-BRL-1057, respectively. Moreover, the Auditors found that she
had a cash shortage of P304,985.00 and recommended her immediate relief from her position and
any other position involving money or property accountability. The Court treated the NBI
entrapment on Canque as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and directed her to
comment thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further orders by the Court.
The case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Resolution dated November 9, 2004, the Court, upon the recommendation of the OCA,
reassigned the case to the Executive Judge, RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report and
recommendation, considering that all the persons concerned were residents of Cebu City. Executive
Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. conducted a hearing on October 18, 2005, attended by Canque, NBI
agents Gregorio Algoso, Jr., Reynaldo Villordon and Jedidah Hife. The notice sent to Ypanto was
returned with the information that she had died. The Investigating Judge found respondent
Canque guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal, with
forfeiture of all her benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government
service.

In a Resolution, the Court referred the Investigation Report to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA recommended that the Investigation Report of Investigating
Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint be investigated anew upon finding that
Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel during the
investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process; and for
the Audit Report of Shortage in the amount of P304,985.00 and other actuations and deficiencies of
respondent Canque to be set in the next En Banc Agenda. Then, the Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to file a Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice, on
the Audit Report of the COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00.
Respondent failed to comment. Thus, in an En Banc Resolution dated December 4, 2007, the Court
considered respondent to have waived her right to file Comment and referred, for the second time,
the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator found Canque liable for gross neglect of
duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
re-employment in any government office or instrumentality, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. It further recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount of
P304,985.00 representing the shortage in the collection of court funds.

Issue: WON right to hearing is required in the investigation

Held:

No. The Court does not agree that Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and
counsel during the investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due
process. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. 13 A formal or trial-type hearing is not required.

In the case at bar, despite respondent's protestations, the records readily show that she was
afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was directed to file her comment on the
complaint. She was notified of the hearing and was in fact present during the entire proceedings. As
to the issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent has failed to submit evidence in support of her
bare claims.
25) CARMELO V. RAMOS, 116 PHIL. 1152
Facts:
On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to
investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the
License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and
Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of
said committee.
It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a
bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and
August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an administrative case against Crisanto but that Ramos,
on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative
proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare
Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima
facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law
empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that
witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his
right against self-incrimination.
Ramos admitted having misappropriated, on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the
owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not
been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at
Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to
compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain employees in
the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used
against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party.
From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not Jesus Carmelo, chair of the committee on probe, has the power to subpoena
witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal

Held:

No, Rule 64 (Contempt) 1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does
not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this
case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as in
done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:

"Powers incidental to taking of testimony. "Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two
of this Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the
authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the
power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents or inspection,
when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and
upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by
the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law."
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take the
testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses

In this case, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about
such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies
involving certain city employees. . But We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such
power to investigate implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in
denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in
Francia vs. Pecson, et al., supra: "We do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the
powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are
applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance
of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to
a body like the committee of the petitioner.

26) Masangcay v. Comelec, 6 SCRA 27

Facts: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before
the Commission on Elections with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and
sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of
said Commissio inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division
superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions,
which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court.

Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commissionin its
resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody
of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among
the different municipalities of the province.

In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge,
they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense, and on December
16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo
guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine
of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the
provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well
as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. It is contended
that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is
null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such
disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers.
Issue: WON the Comelec may punish petitioner for contempt in the present case
Held:
No. Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner
in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of
Guevara vs. The Commission on Elections 1 that under the law and the constitution,
the Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article
VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar
as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in
drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and
a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the same
case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it
cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature.

27) Bedol v. Comelec, 606 SCRA 554

Facts:
Issue: WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it
was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of senators.
Held:
No. The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,
Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: (6) ...;investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into
administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of
the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.
Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
In this case, Task Force Maguindanao's fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether
the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly
been committed could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative
function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in
pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To
achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective
positions.

The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government institution

hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or
proceedings. In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend,
would render nugatory the COMELEC's investigative power, which is an essential incident to its
constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the
purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear
during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he
claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly,
the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.

28) Gaoiran v. Alcala, 444 SCRA 428

Facts:
Respondent Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of the same school, charged the
petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his duties therein. The incident allegedly took
place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside the school premises. Appended to the letter-complaint
were the verified criminal complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner and the
sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority was
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 97-42.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Thereafter, Atty. Felina S.
Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-
finding investigation on the mauling incident to determine the existence of a prima facie case
against the petitioner.
For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August 15, 1997, he was about to
leave the school premises. Suddenly, respondent Castillejo shouted to the security guard to "punch
out" the petitioner's attendance card. This irked the petitioner because there were students and
other teachers in the vicinity. The petitioner confronted respondent Castillejo and asked the latter
why he had to embarrass him (petitioner) in front of the students. Respondent Castillejo just turned
his back and proceeded to his office. The petitioner followed him and later saw that respondent
Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside respondent Castillejo's office, the petitioner made a
side step and just then, respondent Castillejo slipped and fell flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed
that respondent Castillejo's left eyebrow was bleeding and he was putting up a struggle
(nagpupumiglas), so the petitioner held his feet. While going down the stairs, the petitioner met
Bautista and Henry Rupac, Watchman I of the school.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against
the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty.
Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension.
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against him.
Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. However,
considering that the petitioner had already served the suspension, the case was dismissed for being
moot and academic. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive
suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was
not informed nor apprised of the complaint against him before, during and after the
preliminary fact-finding investigation.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED, issued the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not
under oath. However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently
unaware of the existence of Director Mayo's resolution, issued another Resolution dated June 3,
1999, finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom.
The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction. He alleged that respondent Alcala committed grave abuse of discretion
when, in the Resolution, he dismissed the petitioner from the service despite the fact that the
administrative complaint against him had already been dismissed per the Resolution of February
20, 1999 of Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of respondent Alcalanull and void;
found that after the formal charge was filed against the petitioner and he chose not to
file an answer thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be conducted under
the Civil Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service dismissed the
administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint
was not under oath, the formal investigation had not, as yet, been terminated. Such
dismissal, according to the RTC, put an end to the litigation.
The Court of Appeals (CA) , reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and declared valid
dismissing the petitioner from the service. On the other hand, it declared as "without legal effect"
Director Mayo's Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner. It also
opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary. In this case, the petitioner was not denied procedural due process as he was afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side.
The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo should be
deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath. Consequently, the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the said letter-complaint, was,
likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section 2, 9 Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires that an administrative complaint against a
civil service official or employee be in writing and under oath.
Issue: Whether technical rules of procedure and evidence applies in administrative proceedings
Held:

No. Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A thereof read:

Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.

(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service official or
employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by
the complainant.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. (1)
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other persons.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit
sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his
documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to
exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he
shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be
attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted,
and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the
complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath together with supporting sworn
statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found
satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,
cited by the petitioner, reads:
Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the Commission or any of its proper
office. Said complaint shall be in writing and under oath, otherwise, the same shall not be given due
course.
Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked by the petitioner, states:
Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil servant shall be given
due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise language and in a
systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following: (d) a statement that no other administrative
action or complaint against the same party involving the same acts or omissions and issues
has been filed before another agency or administrative tribunal.
While the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not concededly verified, appended thereto
were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be considered as constituting the
complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates
and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against
court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct. 12 Indeed, it is not totally
uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers. 13 After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. 14
In any case, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo is
not a "complaint" within the purview of the provisions mentioned above. In the fairly recent case
of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that the "complaint" under E.O.
No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases "both refer to the actual charge to which the person
complained of is required to answer and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation
should his answer be deemed not satisfactory." DTSaIc
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioner's contention that respondent Castillejo's letter-
complaint was "inexistent" and could not be acted upon by the CHED for to do so, would result in an
absurd and restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292 and effectively deprive the Government of its
disciplining power over people who hold a public trust. 17
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig against
the petitioner charging him with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and directing him to submit his answer in writing and under oath that constituted the
complaint. 18Notably, Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge and order of preventive suspension "for
the Commission" in her capacity as then OIC of the CHED's Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint
against the petitioner was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, under Sections
46(c) 19 and 48(1), 20 Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292, the same need not be
subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of non-forum
shopping.
29) Ang Tibay v. CIR, 60 Phil. 635

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union
(National Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union
and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually,
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time
of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents
and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.

SYLLABUS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its power
is extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable
cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court
of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and
the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now
preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of
justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp
the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of
this' case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth in the decision.