DoDIGAuditReport

09142016
EquippingandTrainingIraqandAfghanSecurityForces
TheArmyDidNotImplementEffectiveControlsToMaintainVisibilityandAccountabilityofIraqTrainand
EquipFundEquipment(ProjectNo.D2016D000JB0104.000)
Clickthefollowinglinktoviewtheredactedversionofthisreport:http://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/err/DODIG
2016134.pdf
DODIG2016134

Objective

WedeterminedwhethertheArmyhadeffectivecontrolsforprocessingandtransferringIraqTrainandEquip
Fund(ITEF)equipmenttotheGovernmentofIraq.Thisisthethirdinaseriesofauditsonproperty
accountabilityinsupportofOperationInherentResolve.

ITEF,createdbytheFY2015NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,assiststheGovernmentofIraqtocombat
theIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant.ExamplesofITEFequipmentprovidedtotheGovernmentofIraq
includebodyarmor,navigationsets,magazinepouches,ambulances,andcargotrucks.

Findings

ArmycommandsdocumentedproceduresforprocessingandtransferringITEFequipmenttotheGovernment
ofIraq.However,the1stTSCdidnothaveeffectivecontrolstomaintaincompletevisibilityandaccountability
ofITEFequipmentinKuwaitandIraqpriortotransfertotheGovernmentofIraq.Equipmentvisibility
providesuserswithequipmentlocation,movement,andstatus.ArmyRegulation7355statesthatallproperty
acquiredbytheArmywillbecontinuouslyaccountedforfromthetimeofacquisitionuntiltheultimate
consumptionordisposaloftheproperty.However,the1stTSCcouldnotprovidecompletedataforthe
quantityanddollarvalueofequipmentonhand,includingrollingstockandammunition.Rollingstockrefers
tovehicles.ExamplesincludeMineClearanceSystems,ambulances,andwreckertrucks.The1stTSCdidnot
haveeffectivecontrolsbecauseitdidnotusecentralizedsystemstomaintainvisibilityandaccountabilityof
ITEFequipment.Instead,the1stTSCreliedonmultiplespreadsheetsdevelopedbydifferentcommandsin
bothKuwaitandIraqtoprovideitwithvisibilityandaccountabilityofequipmentanddidnotconsistently
accountforequipmentinIraq.

Asaresult,the1stTSCdidnothaveaccurate,uptodaterecordsonthequantityandlocationofITEF
equipmentonhandinKuwaitandIraq.Accurate,uptodaterecordsofequipmentonhandinKuwaitandIraq
arecriticalforfillingequipmentrequests.Theprocesstocontactmultiplecommandsandreferencemultiple
spreadsheetstodetermineequipmentquantitiesandlocationcoulddelaythefulfillmentofarequestordelay
thedevelopmentoffuturerequests.Inaddition,nothavingaccuraterecordsofequipmentonhandcouldresult
induplicateequipmentrequests.Further,theuseofmanuallypopulatedspreadsheetsincreasedtheriskfor
humanerrorwheninputtingandupdatingequipmentdata.

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheCommander,1stTheaterSustainmentCommand,useautomatedsystemstoaccount
forandprovidecompletevisibilityofIraqTrainandEquipFundequipment.

ManagementActionsTaken
DuringtheauditweinformedtheDeputyCommanders,1stTSCandCombinedJointForcesLandComponent
CommandOperationInherentResolvetheCommander,336thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalionand
officialsfromtheCombinedJointTaskForceOperationInherentResolveofthelackofcentralizedvisibility
andaccountabilitysystemsforITEFequipment.

TheDeputyCommander,1stTSC,agreedwithourfindingsandimmediatelyinitiatedstepstoimplement
correctiveactions.Asashorttermsolution,1stTSCdevelopedacentralizedequipmentvisibilitytracker.The
tracker,locatedonashareddrive,allowedthe1stTSCandcommandsassociatedwiththeITEFprogramto
haveacentralizedsystemtotrackITEFequipmentonhandatmultiplelocationsandmakechangestothe
trackerwhenITEFequipmentwasprocessedthroughtheirlocations.Asalongtermsolution,1stTSCis
workingtowardsusingArmyvisibilityandaccountabilitysystemstofurtherincreaseitsvisibilityand
accountabilityofITEFequipment.TheDeputyCommander,1stTSC,anticipatesfulluseofthesystemsinlate
2016.Themanagementactionstakenaddressedtheconcernsweidentifiedtherefore,wearenotmakingany
additionalrecommendations.