Cook 1966 - The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of The Substantive Approach To Economic Anthropology

The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of the Substantive Approach to
Economic Anthropology
Author(s): Scott Cook
Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 2, Part 1 (Apr., 1966), pp. 323-
345
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/669336
Accessed: 25-05-2017 20:35 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
American Anthropological Association, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to American Anthropologist
This content downloaded from 148.223.96.146 on Thu, 25 May 2017 20:35:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of the
Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology
SCOTT COOK
University of Pittsburgh
"Analytic work begins with material provided by our vision of things, and
ideological almost by definition. It embodies the picture of things as we see th
ever there is any possible motive for wishing to see them in a given rather than
the way in which we see things can hardly be distinguished from the way
wish to see them. The more honest and naive our vision is, the more danger
eventual emergence of anything for which general validity can be claimed. The
the social sciences is obvious, and it is not even true that he who hates a soc
form an objectively more correct vision of it than he who loves it. For love dis
but hate distorts still more."
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER
1. THE PROBLEM1
ECONOMIC anthropology, a major sub-area of anthropological inquiry,

is plagued by a serious communication gap between its practitioners. Since
the impact on the field of the writings of Karl Polanyi and his followers, a
clear-cut dichotomy has emerged between scholars who maintain that "for-
mal" economic theory is applicable to the analysis of "primitive" and "peas-
ant" economies and those who believe that it is limited in application to the
market-oriented, price-governed economic systems of industrial economies.2
Prior to the publication of Trade and Market in the Early Empires (Polanyi,
et al., 1957), economic anthropology (to the extent that it dealt with behavioral
theory as opposed to being exclusively concerned with material goods and/or
subsistence technology) represented a single field of inquiry, with the majority
of its practitioners believing that formal economic theory could contribute to
anthropology. However, after the publication of this substantivist magnum
opus, the field underwent a bifurcation into two discrete spheres of discourse.
Although several attempts have been made by various scholars to provoke a
meaningful dialogue with the substantivists, their critiques have failed to
elicit any such exchange of views." Thus the field is presently characterized by
a "split-level" dialogue in which the proponents on the two dominant views
of economics-in-anthropology are talking past one another and are operating
within separate spheres of discourse.
Many anthropologists are still apparently unfamiliar with the scope and
content of the critiques of substantivist economics, while substantivist views
continue to find expression in the literature without manifesting any noticeable
concessions to the arguments of their critics (e.g., Dalton 1961; Dalton 1962;
Bohannan and Dalton 1965a, Bohannan 1963; Dalton 1964). The present
critique is intended to supplement its predecessors by elaborating on the thesis
that the substantivists' intransigency concerning the cross-cultural applicabil-
323
324 American Anthropologist [68, 1966
ity of formal economic theory is a by-product of
in an antipathy toward the "market economy" an
"primitive."
II. A "PARADOX" IN THE RECENT SUBSTANTIVIST LITERATURE
In their introduction to Markets in Africa Paul Bohannan a

Dalton (1965a), two of the most articulate and sophisticated repr
that group of economic anthropologists who take the writings o
as their major theoretical point of departure, make an effort
typology of economies first formulated by Polanyi for the analysi
of extinct societies (1957a, b: 250-256; 1959:168-174) to a body
data from eight societies of contemporary Africa. The alteration of
Polanyi typology reflects their attempt to cope with the fact
"those economic activities organized on the market principle
with a concomitant attenuation of redistribution and reciproci
or that "multicentric economies are in the process of becoming
(1965a: 25).4 Moreover, these two authors commit themselves to
prognosis: "It seems safe to predict that the process will contin
African economies are becoming like our own in the sense th
dominated by the market principle are being enlarged" (1962:
every reason to believe that the trend so succinctly described
and Dalton for Africa is a process which has world-wide ramifi
Unfortunately, neither of these substantivist writers deals with
theoretical implications of the discerned developmental trend
economies nor with its significance for future inquiry in economic
ogy. To cope theoretically with this trend would necessarily e
revision of a key tenet in the substantivist ideological system-
of the simplistic dichotomy between "market" and "primitive
economies, namely, the dogma that formal economic theory, be
of the market economy, is, ipso facto, inapplicable to the analysis o
subsistence economies (Polanyi, et al. 1957; Polanyi 1959:166; D
25; Bohannan 1963:229-231). While the recent postulation of "
primitive-subsistence or non-market economies (i.e., the "mar
the "peripheral market" types in Bohannan and Dalton 1962; Bohannan
1963; Dalton 1964) can be considered as an attempt by the substantivists to
escape from the restrictions imposed by the polar dichotomization of econo-
mies, Dalton's position vis-a-vis formal economic theory remains essentially the
same as that enunciated in 1961, although he has re-phrased it to fit the new
typological accretions.5 One slight variation on the Polanyi theme which can
be detected in the writings of Bohannan (1963:263-265) and Dalton (1964)
is a concern with "transitional" or "peasant" economies. Nevertheless, a re-
cent statement by Dalton leads one to believe that what the "market-econ-
omy" construct is in Polanyi's scheme, the "peasant economy" construct is
in Dalton's i.e.; it is postulated as a type of economy studied by those economic
anthropologists who successfully utilize concepts and principles from formal
COOK] The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality 325
economic theory (Dalton 1965b:122-123).6 In other words,
rhetorical device designed to preserve the integrity of the sub
ology.
The specific nature of the substantivist dilemma can now be pieced to-
gether in the form of a paradox. Confronted with a body of ethnographic data
from contemporary African economies, Dalton (along with Bohannan) is
forced to admit that they are "becoming more like our own in the sense that
the sectors dominated by the market principle are being enlarged," while
studies elsewhere have forced him to admit that "small-scale peasant societies
. . . can be considered analytically with the concepts and questions from large
scale American and European market economies" (1965b:122). Dalton per-
sists, however, in reiterating Polanyi's thesis by asserting that those ethnog-
raphers who successfully utilize formal economic theory are doing so in
peasant or market-dominated economies, not in primitive-subsistence (i.e.,
marketless or peripheral) economies. This argument implies that the latter
type of economy is still the dominant focus of inquiry in economic anthropol-
ogy, with substantive theory being the only legitimate analytic tool for eco-
nomic anthropologists. It is undeniable that anthropology can still profit from
the study of extinct societies as well as from the study of extant "primitive"
societies; and, in the field of economics, substantive theory offers one meaning-
ful approach to such studies. But given the fact that marketless subsistence
economies are rapidly disappearing as ethnographic entities, being displaced
by market-influenced or -dominated transitional and peasant economies, it
seems rather pointless to persist, as Dalton does, in concocting tortured argu-
ments in defense of a theory which was designed specifically for the analysis
of these moribund types of economies (i.e., substantive economic theory).
III. DEDUCTION, INDUCTION AND "ECONOMIC MAN": THE SUBSTANTIVIST

POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE KNIGHT-HERSKOVITS EXCHANGE7
The exchange between Frank Knight and Melville Herskovits is

few in the literature between an economist and an anthropologis
field of economic anthropology which revolves primarily around
issues. Knight's main thesis was essentially that "any intelligen
exposition of facts imperatively requires an understanding of princip
the need for facts in connection with the exposition of principles
tenuous" (1952a: 516). Herskovits' position reflected his indoctrin
tradition of Boasian inductionism: "My point of view concernin
method is that findings must be based on fact, and that to depart fr
is to vitiate the tenability of conclusions" (1952a:527). Although t
of views occurred a quarter of a century ago, it carries an impor
for contemporary anthropological inquiry, in general, and for
anthropology in particular.8
Not only has Knight's position in the dialogue been widely mi
and slighted by many anthropologists but, even more deplorab
their failure to discern the theoretical implications for economic ant
inherent in Herskovits' change of attitude betw
text Economic Anthropology (1952b) was publish
Knight, Herskovits demonstrated an inadequate
literature which obviously impaired his understan
ods of economic theory. This was reflected most
ness with regard to the "economic man" constru
available evidence from all over the world indicated that its existence was
purely mythical (1952a:525). At this point in his career Herskovits' posit
vis-d-vis the "economic man" was similar to that later expressed by the s
stantivists (e.g., Polanyi, et al., 1957:239; Dalton 1961:2). However, this p
sition was substantially modified in the 1952 edition of his text where it
clear that Herskovits had acquired more knowledge of the role of the "
nomic man" construct in the history of economic analysis, and had achie
greater insight into the importance of deductive reasoning in economic model
building (1952b: 8; 1952b: 19).9
How can one explain this change in attitude by Herskovits? Does it r
resent a basic intellectual conversion from "Boasian inductionism" to "Knig
ian deductionism"? This hypothesis can be rejected as incompatible with t
tone and content of his voluminous writings which, until the time of h
death, continued to manifest his inductive orientation. Fortunately, He
kovits provides us with two reasons for his change in attitude in the pref
to Economic Anthropology: (1) new ethnographic data about the economies
non-literate, non-industrial, non-pecuniary societies which convinced him
the universality of the concepts and principles of economic theory (1952b:
and (2) increased knowledge on his part of the scope and methods of econo
theory and of economists' views about economic anthropology (1952b:vi-v
Thus, far from reflecting an intellectual conversion from inductionism to
ductionism, Herskovits' attitudinal change was an affirmation of his ow
inductionist view of social science.
It seems to me that the followers of Polanyi could profit from a reexamina-
tion of the Knight-Herskovits exchange and its implications for theory and
methodology in economic anthropology. Although they continue to espouse
inductionistic canons of social scientific method, the substantivists are, in
fact, guilty of a failure to cope with ethnographic and theoretical contributions
in economics which contradict many of their own assumptions. Polanyi es-
tablished a precedent in this regard with his terse and unelaborated condem-
nation of Herskovits' text: "In the field of anthropology, Melville Herskovits'
recent work (1952b) represents a relapse after his pioneering effort of 1940"
(1959:164).
IV. THE ROMANTIC "ANTI-MARKET" SYNDROME: THE MARKET AS A

UNIVERSAL BOGEY
Underlying and to some extent cross-cutting the major split am

dents of economic anthropology between those who believe that the d
between Western-type market and primitive-subsistence economi
degree, and those who believe it is one of kind (i.e., the substan
split of another dimension-that between the "Roman

"Formalists". The Formalists may be characterized as tho
abstractions unlimited by time and place, and who are pro
or are synchronically oriented; they are scientific in outlook
in inclination, favor the deductive mode of inquiry, and a
in methodology (i.e., lean toward the belief that parts det
The Romanticists, on the other hand, may be characterized
on situations limited in time and space, and who are prone
are diachronically oriented; they are humanistic in outlo
matical in inclination, favor the inductive mode of inquir
synthetic in methodology (i.e., lean toward the belief tha
mines its parts). In this section the concern will be to li
followers to the Romanticist tradition and to suggest cer
this linkage for economic anthropology.
Eric Wolf has recently described the "Romantic Syndrom
pological context as follows: "The anthropologist has sho
to construe . . . savage worlds as worlds sui generis, to hy
representatives of pristine designs for living, untouched
civilization from which he escaped . . . " (1964: 11-12). Si
according to Wolf, this romantic element in anthropology
scope, thus he speaks of the "decline of the romantic quest
natives" (1964:23). While this trend may be discernible in
whole, it does not seem to be dominant in the field of eco
where Polanyi's influence has been essentially a post-war
shows no signs of diminution at present. Of course, it has
onstrated how Polanyi and the substantivists can be cate
ticists. To assist in this task I will turn to a recent article
(1964) who is one of the few anthropologists to view anth
standpoint of intellectual history and the sociology of kno
Diamond's thesis is that anthropology falls into the ro
historical knowledge which is part of the "retrospective
Enlightenment-a tradition which found its living labora
Discovery (1964:433). This tradition consists of " . . . the
in history for a renewed and basic sense of the possibilitie
and of culture, not only in response to the fall of feudal ideo
to the nascent modern realities that were being created by
bourgeoisie" (1964:432). The representative par excellance
was, in Diamond's opinion, Rousseau, and his characterizat
social philosopher (1964:434-5) isolates certain motive forc
tendencies implicit in Polanyi's quest for a new thought p
industrial civilization (Polanyi 1947). Implicit in Polanyi's
evitably adopted by other substantivist writers is a utopian m
society which minimizes the role of conflict, coupled with a m
emphasizes innate altruistic and cooperative propensities w
self-interest, aggressiveness, and competitiveness.
In essence, Polanyi's view of human motivation is that t
interest in the form of material gain and profit is a co
the "self-regulating" market economy in 19th centur
States. This development represented the emergence
of society since in the "pre-market" situation (w
equates with primitive society) men were motivated not
for economic gain but by simple, unadulterated sub
The upshot of this argument is that the motive of m
not "natural" to man and is operative only under s
time and place (1947:112). In other words, Polanyi vi
prior to the 19th century institutionalization of the
economy, or outside the market economy context in pr
devoid of the pursuit of self interest and as being inhe
tive Man, as inferred from Polanyi's writings, is inc
his own material advantage through the calculated
relations (1944:46).1o
Polanyi's model of primitive society is based on two p
reciprocity and redistribution, which he posits as o
production and distribution in primitive economie
168-172). These principles are in turn related to the
symmetry and centricity-the former associated w
and the latter with redistributive economies. It is in
principles that Polanyi, in effect, idealizes primitiv
the economic sector, i.e., contends that the economi
or "embedded" in social organization (1944:49).11 Re
terized by symmetry and redistributive systems ch
are considered as sub-types of the non-market econ
However, when he compares and contrasts 'primitiv
economies (i.e., non-market economies) with the 'ma
always utilizes the reciprocal economy construct (e.g
The following model of a market or exchange econom
Polanyi's writings: The dominant principle of behav
(i.e., bargaining to arrive at a mutually satisfactor
desire for personal gain or profit; this inevitably in
and ultimately provokes latent hostilities into overt
anxiety. In contrast, the inferred model of a non-mark
omy is as follows: The dominant principle of behavi
process of mutual give and take guided by a series
tivated by generosity; this inevitably involves a m
tionship which ultimately allays latent hostilities a
While conflict is built into the market model, the r
model precludes it.
At least two important relationships are glossed over
ket economy model: (1) the norm of reciprocity is n
self-interest or aggressiveness postulate (e.g., Goul
1961:61-4, 316-20; Blau 1964:88-114); (2) the prin
reciprocal economy can create conflict as well as contribut

can also be manipulated to secure an advantage over on
Strauss 1944:24; Homans 1961:316-20 passim; Sahlins 19
88-114 passim). In other words, "laying on obligations of
lins 1962:1068) in a reciprocal economy is functionally equivale
seeking of gain or profit in a market economy. Granted the f
at fluctuating prices in a market economy involves antago
social context of interaction is more impersonal than that in
omy, it must also be recognized that failure to reciprocate
stipulated or anticipated in a reciprocal economy usually p
At the very least, failure to reciprocate is dysfunctional f
procity contracts. In view of these relationships the "fou
postulate (Polanyi 1957a:255) in the extrapolated model
market economy is untenable.15
Polanyi contends, as a final proposition in his ideologica
market economy guided by its "ideological promoters," t
mists, transformed the natural and human substance (i.e
of 19th century Western society into commodities, thereb
ger" (fear of going without life's necessities) and "gain" (p
as economic motives into the saddle to ride man (1947:11
motives, working together, served as the propelling forces in
ization of the market economy.16 That Polanyi views this
as degrading to man, and the market system which produced
nemesis of human dignity and civilization is apparent fro
the following: "Economic motives reigned supreme in a w
and the individual was made to act on them under pain of bei
foot by the juggernaut market" (1947:110). Or, in still mo
This latter field (i.e., economy) has been "separated out" of society a
and gain. Our animal dependence upon food has been bared and the nak
permitted to run loose. Our humilitating enslavement to the 'material'
ture is designed to mitigate, was deliberately made more rigorous...
Only since the market was permitted to grind the human fabric
uniformity of selenic erosion has man's institutional creativeness
wonder that his social imagination shows signs of fatigue (1947:115).
These are undeniably the words of a Romanticist in the Ro

who feels alienated by an industrial civilization in which t
is rejected as paralyzing, in which mechanism is dominant
bureaucracy stifles individual spontaneity, and where life
as routinized tedium. Like Rousseau, Polanyi does not adv
any historically specific primitive condition, but he warns
trends are reversed, contemporary man will be unable to "
ity, the imaginative wealth and power, of his savage endo
V. A CRITIQUE OF SUBSTANTIVIST VIEWS OF FORMAL ECONOMIC THEORY
In what is generally recognized as the most erudite and authoritative

study of the development of economic science, Joseph Schumpeter (1954)
delimits three sub-areas within the discipline: (
litical economy; (3) economic thought. He defin
intellectual effort that men have made in order to understand economic
phenomena" or "the analytic or scientific aspects of economic thou
(1954:3). By a system of political economy he means "an exposition of a
prehensive set of economic policies that its author advocates on the str
of certain unifying (normative) principles such as the principles of econ
liberalism, of socialism, etc." (1954:38). Finally, economic thought in Sch
peter's terms is defined as "the sum total of all the opinions and desires conc
ing economic subjects, especially concerning public policy bearing upon
subjects that, at any given time and place, float in the public min
(1954: 38).17
The immediate relevance of these distinctions to a critique of substan
economics becomes clear only when we realize that Schumpeter, who f
accepted the idea of the pervasiveness of ideological bias in the history
economics, nevertheless suggested that "economic analysis" was less su
tible to the interests and attitudes of the market place than either "pol
economy" or "economic thought." Economic analysis alone displays a u
property of "scientific progress" which, according to Schumpeter, is analogo
to "technological progress in the extraction of teeth between the times of, s
J. S. Mill and our own" (1954:39). By failing to distinguish between th
three aspects of economics Polanyi and his followers necessarily ignore
factors which are crucial to a proper understanding of the history of th
cipline, as well as its present nature and scope: first, that when one loo
the content of the tool-kit of economic analysis, he discovers many conceptu
tools that are ideologically neutral; second, that there are concepts or the
that, though they can be shown to be actually neutral, acquire a putat
ideological importance because people erroneously believe that they are
evant to their ideologies (Schumpeter 1954:44).
Examining substantivist writings with Schumpeter's discussion as a p
of departure, the following conclusions emerge: (1) Insofar as an attemp
made to document a historical and institutional linkage between econo
theory (i.e., economic analysis) and the "market economy," the end resu
the documentation of a linkage between a particular system of political
omy (i.e., economic liberalism) and the 19th century European market e
omy; (2) Generalizations regarding the historical and institutional limitat
of formal economic theory refer to the latter as it stood in the late 19th
early 20th centuries, thus ignoring subsequent refinements, modifications an
new additions to the science.
For example, in his role as chief theoretical spokesman for the substantivist
approach to economics in anthropology, George Dalton sets out to "describe
those special organizational features of Western economy which formal eco-
nomic theory was created to analyze" (1961:1).1s The only post-Classical
economists singled out in Dalton's presentation are Jevons, Menger, Clark,
and Marshall who were the founders of the Neoclassical tradition in economic
analysis (1961:4). Dalton fails to demonstrate precisely ho

and conceptual contributions of these economists are prod
applicable to the market institution, nor does he bother to
tions to the economic literature subsequent to those of th
classical theory. Few would deny that this theory has bee
the Western market-economy model as a reference point
pointed out, many of the conceptual tools so formulated
neutral and their conditioning by the interests and attitu
will be tenuous at best. Moreover, the assertion that this theo
to the analysis of non-market economies is verifiable only
a procedure which the substantivists have never taken ser
Even if the substantivists provided an airtight case for
institutional limitations of Classical and early Neoclassical
be stretching their arguments beyond reasonable bounds
"all economic theory" is so limited, Dalton's use of the
economists as typical representatives of economic theory
using Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim (for example) as typ
theory. To carry this analogy one step further, it is tant
that because sociological theory was formulated to analy
tions and behaviors of Western industrial civilization (w
correct) it is, ipso facto, inapplicable to the analysis of sim
societies. Such an attitude implicitly condemns to the ant
basket a whole host of penetrating studies of simple socie
conceptual scaffolding derived from sociological theory. I
the burden of proof rests with the substantivists to dem
has been done with recognized success by anthropologist
(and one might add, psychological) theory cannot also be d
theory.
Economists and economic analysis have, by and large, adapted to changing
intellectual and institutional conditions so that what was true of them a hun-
dred, fifty, or even ten years ago is not true of them today. This is why one
has difficulty in viewing current expositions of economic theory in terms of
the substantivist interpretation of it. Schumpeter has noted the following
crucial fact about the history of economics: " . . . the subject matter of eco-
nomics is itself a unique historical process so that, to a large extent, the
economics of different epochs deal with different sets of facts and problems"
(1954:5). Economic analysis copes with change in its subject matter through
the "filiation of scientific ideas" which Schumpeter defines as the "process by
which men's efforts to understand economic phenomena produce, improve,
and pull down analytic statements in an unending sequence" (1954:6). To
overlook this central process in the history of economics, as the substantivists
from Polanyi to Dalton do, is to distort contemporary economic analysis and
to arbitrarily deny its status as a science.
The substantivists are unanimous in agreeing that the distinction between
the "formal" and "substantive" meanings of economic is the greatest single
conceptual contribution of Polanyi. Dalton, for
indebtedness to Polanyi for "his illuminating di
meanings of economic" (1961:22). Even Robbi
criticize certain implications of the semantic di
needed distinction between economics in the substan
of material goods, and in the formal sense of r
'economizing' " (1962:802)."1
The only dissenting view of the Polanyi distin
in the anthropological literature is by LeClair in his
substantivist position when he asks "why there is a
definition of economics" (1962:1181). His curiosi
by me, especially in view of the fact that econom
effort in writing about the definition and scope
any other single issue, and that an enormous bo
this topic has been totally by-passed in substan
however, assumes in his critique that Polanyi an
distinction between the "two meanings of econom
comparable distinctions made by economists. But
tivists to consciously tie-in their discussion with
debate in economic discourse raises serious doubts
"meaning" of their "two meanings."21
Polanyi did not separate out the two meaning
exercise; his aim was "to determine the meaning
consistency to the term 'economic' in the social
this goal, Polanyi's lack of reference to the economi
problem is even more baffling. It is not surprising,
tions arise in the course of his discussion, ranging
of the universality of rational choice in man's ec
underlying the "two meanings" distinction itself
issue enables us to separate a series of traits, and
a dichotomous typology in which the polar opp
"formal',.22
Substantive Formal
1. derives from fact 1. derives from logic
2. implies neither choice nor in- 2. set of rules referring to
sufficiency of means choice between alternative
uses of insufficient means
3. power of gravity 3. power of syllogism
4. laws of nature 4. laws of mind
These two meanings obfuscate the nature of the relationship between economic
theory as the science of economics and "economy" or "economic facts," which
is no different than that between any science and its subject matter. It ex-
presses in semantic terms what is essentially a relationship between phenomena
of separate epistemological statuses. To obscure the relationship between eco-
nomic theory and empirical reality is to place yet another artificial barrier
cooK] The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality 333
between economists and anthropologists which, by exacerbat
communication gap between these two sets of scholars, can
impede meaningful research in the field of economic anthropolo
Given Polanyi's sentiments regarding the price-regulated m
coupled with his attempt to set the historical and institution
formal economic theory, it follows that only the "substant
economic" can yield the concepts required by the social scien
tigation of all the empirical economies of the past and pres
Simon Rottenberg has pointed out that Polanyi and other su
examined the conventional assumptions of economic theory
tain whether these have empirical counterparts in primitive
warns that the "significant question is not whether real wor
be found for the assumptions, but whether real-world obs
duplicates theoretically derived predictions" (1958:677). Any
of the substantivist literature must agree with Rottenberg
this area of inquiry was forcelosed by prejudgement" (1958:6
The substantivist attempt to delimit the boundaries within w
theory proves ineffective as an analytical tool depends for its su
upon their handling of the "economizing" and "scarcity" post
ing to Polanyi, economic theory is analytically useful only in
in which economizing acts (i.e., sequences of rational choice
or use of resources) induced by scarcity situations are institu
247; Polanyi, et al., 1957:xvii). He argues that the presen
scarcity is invariably a question of fact (1959:165). Altho
denying the universal relevance of scarcity as a conditionin
nomic action, the substantivists have never, to my knowle
ethnographic example of an empirical economy in which scar
implications for economic decision-making (i.e., economi
Smelser has observed, have they formulated a counter-postul
serves economic analysis than that based on the notion of sca
As is so often the case in substantivist theorizing, the sole e
offered in support of the series of propositions relating econom
and the applicability of economic theory is verbal acrobatic
in the following statement by Polanyi: "While the rules gov
(of economizing) are universal, the extent to which the rul
to a definite economy depends upon whether or not that econom
fact, a sequence of such acts" (1957a: 247).
Economists reject the thesis, developed by Polanyi and pr
ton, that scarcity is solely a function of social organization
The basic assumption which economic analysis makes abo
world is that the resources which it provides for human util
(i.e., limited in relation to the demand for them). It is becaus
that goods have to be shared out among the individual mem
group, and it is the role of an economic system to perform t
task. From the economist's point of view, if there were no s
sequently no need for goods to be shared out am
be no economic system (Stonier and Hague 1597
scarcity as an inherent condition in any human s
have relevance in economic theory only when ass
"economic good" (i.e., in order to get more of a g
of some other commodity must be relinquished).
scarce only in relation to the demand for it, it f
means scarce in relation to demand" (Stonier
nomic theory, then, scarcity is a relative concept
of biosocial (i.e., wants and the resources of time an
them) and ecological (i.e., physical and natural en
In recent years George Dalton has emerged as t
late spokesman for substantivist economics in an
1965a). His influence on current thinking in econ
American anthropologists is substantial, if not do
followed the trend of controversy in this field
persuasiveness of Dalton's arguments is a direct c
treat adequately the criticisms which have period
the substantivist approach. For example, in his 1961
an attempt to clarify certain ambiguities in ear
Dalton devotes only one short paragraph in rep
critique (1958). Furthermore, he selectively limit
of several issues raised by this critic which he dism
"The use of formal price theory concepts such a
ence to primitive economies indicates an implic
prejudgement of economic organization by way o
market structure-or its functional equivalent-e
In other words, Dalton is simply echoing Pola
against the universal applicability of formal econ
of Smelser's major critique is even less adequate
since he alludes to it only once and that is to ci
Smelser happens to agree with the substantivist
tence from Smelser's critique places Dalton's eva
tive: "It is as illegitimate to try to force a phys
economic activity as it is to impose a fully-devel
types of economy; both operations involve an il
(1959:177).
In his discussion of economic theory Dalton refers
that man's material wants are insatiable, a dictu
immutability of genetic impulse" (1961:5) provid
the substantivist penchant for overstatement. I
that human wants were insatiable they would fu
continuing one of their own major intellectual a
of consumer behavior-that branch of micro-econ
study of want-satisfaction. Indeed, many econom
CooK] The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality 335
as dealing with that aspect of the human activity of want-satisf
the problem of scarcity of means is paramount (e.g., Roll 19
economist expresses it: "The satisfaction of wants constitu
ment of human activity and economics is occupied with a st
ment" (Bober 1955:7). Economists, then, do not hold to the s
which Dalton attributes to them but believe, more realistica
given situation man's wants will be more numerous than th
for satisfying them; but that once choice as to the utilization
is exercised those wants which are deemed most satifying
highest marginal utility will be satisfied. Among other th
chosen not to consider the important role which the time fa
nomic analysis. The unqualified proposition that wants are
be true in economic theory only in a hypothetical situation i
factor was held constant or assumed to be unlimited. Howev
model-building the limitation of the time factor is crucial t
most economic problems, as well as to the predictability of t
Wilbert E. Moore, a sociologist who is skeptical of the appl
nomic analysis to non-market situations, has argued that "th
culty in the concepts (of economic theory) as applied to prim
societies is that their 'operational definition' is not the same
system" (1955:5). He further suggests that discussions of
"peasant" economics commonly employ concepts that are e
phorical, being borrowed from economic theory but withou
tion where the assumptions of economic theory are inoper
neglects to mention, can only be determined by empirically test
tive principles and models). Moore's argument, like those of the
seems to minimize the inherent plasticity and logical integrity o
tions and concepts of economic theory (Walker 1943:136) w
are ultimately derived from one simple, yet heuristically power
"The problem of maximizing satisfactions through the utiliz
means'-the need to economize in the broadest sense of the term-derives
from the basic fact of the existence of wants in excess of the capacity to pro-
duce" (Herskovits 1952b: 266). Or, to state the proposition differently: Mos
members of every discrete human group have economically relevant wan
that exceed the procurement means available to them. In band societies, sim
ple tribal and peasant societies, these economically relevant wants lie pre-
dominantly, though not exclusively, in the subsistence realm; while in mo
complex societies such wants exist both within and beyond the bounds of t
subsistence sphere.
In the development of economic principles through the use of models, an
assumption is considered valid if it conveniently simplifies analysis, if it is not
incompatible with other necessary assumptions and if it either conforms t
reality, or can subsequently be discarded without making it impossible to r
vise accordingly the generalizations reached (Higgins 1959). This is the ra
tionale underlying the economist's "method of successive approximations"
to reality which is the core tool of economic theor
qua non of model-building. Economists, on the wh
reality in making these assumptions in order to bene
simplicity. Given a set of simple assumptions abo
economist is better equipped to maneuver within
analysis. In effect, simple postulates relating to choic
"scarcity," "economizing," "maximization") enable
economic action in accordance with the canons
strength, not the weakness, of economic theory li
simple assumptions (Firth 1961:127).
Scientific knowledge of the external world is n
trinaire or a priori rejections of basic assumptions
conform to certain preconceived notions of "real
titioner of any science tests the validity of his opera
by applying the models and principles derived fro
concrete situations. He only begins to question th
tions when and if the derivative models and principle
phenomena. Dalton and the substantivists are dev
canons of scientific inquiry when they argue for t
basic assumptions and derivative models of econo
is made even more untenable when they persist in
views in open defiance of a growing body of ethn
provides ample evidence that concepts and models
have relevance in the analysis of various types of
VI. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Karl Polanyi and his followers, the Substantivist school of e

anthropology, are unanimous in their judgment that economic th
skills practiced by the social scientists known as economists-is ina
to the study of "non-market" or "primitive" economies. They furth
that a new approach to the study of economics, substantive and ind
orientation, must be developed to provide a cross-culturally valid me
from which a "general economic theory" may eventually derive. In the p
ing sections of this paper it has been demonstrated that these subs
views emanate from an "anti-market" ideology which considers for
nomic theory as a creature of the 19th century market economy and
tive intellectual apologists, the Classical economists. It was further
that substantivist beliefs rest upon a gross oversimplification of the his
Western economic thought as well as of the nature and content of
porary economic analysis. Finally, on the basis of a critical analysi
substantivist distinction between the "two meanings of economic" a
views vis-a-vis certain basic postulates of formal economic theory, it
gested that their extreme conclusions derive from fallacious logic
inductionism, and are ultimately reducible to the status of metaphy
untestable) propositions.
There are many aspects of the substantivist approach to ec
positive and negative, which were not treated in this paper. T
has been to focus on the relationship between economic theory
ogy and, in keeping with this aim, the discussion has been sel
to those aspects of the substantive approach which bear dire
focal concern. It should now be apparent that urging the to
economic theory in anthropological inquiry is a position whic
only in ideological terms and by dependence upon arbitrary ch
naire assertions. The selective use of models and concepts tak
formidable tool-kit of economic theory in the analysis of non-ma
does not necessarily involve an "a priori assumption that mar
or its functional equivalent-exists universally" as Dalton
believe. This is an unwarranted assertion generated by the "
ideology and, in making it, Dalton conveniently ignores key
nomic anthropology which demonstrate conclusively that man
ples and concepts of economic theory, given certain necessary
modifications, do hold up in the analysis of non-market eco
(e.g., Salisbury 1962; Pospisil 1963).27
One proponent of the substantivist approach, visualizing
anthropology of the future, advocates that "the leading ideas
developed further are those of Malinowski, Thurnwald, Bened
Mead, and not those of the economic theorists" (Fusfield
economic anthropologists to follow this advice would be bui
weakest links with the two great founders of economic anth
consequently, would stunt the growth of the discipline. From my
a science of economic anthropology will emerge only as a "hy
-representing the fusion of two trends: the study of econom
anthropologists (admirably begun by Firth more than 25 year
tinuing today in the work of anthropologists like Salisbury an
the development of an anthropological perspective by econom
scholars like Goodfellow and evident today in the work of dev
omists like E. E. Hagen, W. A. Lewis, B. Hoselitz, and B. S
large extent, the economic anthropology of the future will be
velopment-the peasantization of the primitive and the prolet
the peasant. Regardless of his ideological or philosophical com
contemporary anthropologist must adapt to one ineluctable
human populations among which he must work are not st
revolutionary proportions is ubiquitous; norms, attitudes, and beh
Western market economy are rapidly being disseminated th
world's culture areas by the many institutions of neo-colonial
Given this situation, the eventual emergence of a general th
parative economic systems depends largely upon how well ec
anthropologized. The infusion of cultural relativism into th
world-view is long overdue; his discipline is the last strongh
parochialism and ivory-tower disdain of socio-cultural realitie
sciences. Nevertheless, any general theory of co
ultimately come from the sophisticated model-build
applied to data collected by systematic ethnogra
relevant categories and conceptual tools of econ
as the substantivists do, of economics as subsist
want satisfaction, and as being comprehensible ex
is to preclude the formulation of a viable scien
systems.28
It has been suggested that the primitive world which for so long has dom-
inated the anthropological imagination is inevitably on the wane, being dis-
placed by the world of the peasant and the proletarian. The substantivist po-
sition, rooted as it is in a profound resentment of this transition, unavoidably
leads its adherents to a narrow and restricted role conception of the anthro-
pologist in economic inquiry. In the words of Dalton: "Economists are con-
cerned with inducing real output increases, anthropologists with reducing the
social decimation inherent in rapid institutional departure from indigenous
forms ... One must start with ethnoeconomic analysis-with Malinowski, not
Ricardo-in order to choose those transformation paths to industrialization
which entail only the unavoidable social costs" (1961:21). Apparently, Dalton
conceives of the anthropologist's role vis-d-vis the economist as analogous to
that of the social worker vis-d-vis the sociologist. While one may sympathize
with Dalton's sentiments on philosophical grounds, it is time for anthropolo-
gists to realize that the either/or ultimatum which he poses (i.e., Malinowski
or Ricardo) is not the choice upon which the development of a science of
economic anthropology depends. Surely, a more promising point of departure
is from the writings of those economists who have made contributions to an-
thropological theory (e.g., J. S. Berliner 1962) and others (e.g., W. A. Lewis
1954; B. Higgins 1959; B. Hoselitz 1960; E. E. Hagen 1962) who have begun
to cope in theoretical terms with the insights of Thurnwald, Malinowski and
their present anthropological counterparts; and, finally, from the work of
anthropologists like Melville Herskovits, Raymond Firth, Richard Salisbury,
Manning Nash, Robbins Burling and others who have moved well beyond the
contributions of Ricardo in their study of the literature of economic analysis.
In conclusion, I can only repeat the words which Herskovits chose to express
his vision of the future of economic anthropology: "It is my hope that the
future will see further analysis of the points taken up here, so that the science
of comparative economics may eventually emerge as a structure based on a
foundation that is equally solid in its anthropological and economic postu-
lates" (1952b:531).
NOTES
1 The writer is currently a Public Health Service Fellow (Fellowship #-F

with the Department of Anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh. This pa
drafted for presentation in a graduate seminar on "Models and Model-building
conducted during the Winter Trimester of 1964-65 by Dr. Leonard Kasdan. I wi
appreciation to Dr. Kasdan, Dr. Hugo Nutini, and David Gregory of the Univers
and to Roger Peranio of the Carnegie Institute of Technology for their help
criticisms during the preparation of this manuscript.
2 The former group includes D. M. Goodfellow (1939), Raymond Firth, K.
Herskovits, Richard Salisbury, Edward LeClair, Robbins Burling, C. S. Belsha
latter group includes Karl Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, Daniel Fusfield, Wa
Dalton, Paul Bohannan, Marshall Sahlins, and others. Another split among ec
ogists is between those who believe that economics deals with a certain type of
who believe that it deals with an aspect of all behavior. This split is also found
and relates to the manner in which they interpret the roles of the "rationality
and "maximization" postulates in model-building.
3 Simon Rottenberg (1958), Edward LeClair (1962), Neil Smelser (19
Burling (1962) have written the major critiques.
* For a concise discussion of the terms "unicentric" and "multicentric" r
(1963:246-265).
5 For example, he recently criticizes writers who generalize "from what
integrated economies, to all economies" and rejects two recent studies which
"economic man" in Africa (i.e., that "Africans respond to material incentive
economic alternatives just as we do") on the grounds that ".. . all their exam
type III economies, where Africans-like us-have come to depend for livelih
(of labor or cash crops) (1965a:63). It is interesting to speculate as to how Dal
recent studies by Salisbury (1962) and Pospisil (1963) neither of which anal
nomies, but which do point up similarities between actors in market and non-m
6 A somewhat ironical illustration of the "communication gap" between
scholars is provided by the fact that immediately following the expression
"peasant economics" by Dalton is a review by Raymond Firth of Pospisil
Economy-a thorough study of the economic life of a highland New Guinea trib
qualifies as having a "primitive" or "subsistence" economy. Yet Pospisil framed
of formal economic theory and, as Firth notes in the review, he found tha
use sale as the most important form of exchange, and their economic transacti
in a highly individualistic manner, with the profit motive plainly manifest" (1
7 While the "economic man" model has been the cause of considerable c
economists and between economists and their critics, it continues to serve a
device in economic analysis. For a discussion of the role of "economic man"
economic analysis see Gide 1930:924-925; Grampp 1948; Chalk 1964:223-225.
economic theorists on the role of "economic man" in contemporary economic a
1935:94-99; Roll 1937:1-37; Higgins 1947; Bober 1955:22-24; Boulding 196
8 No one has more clearly discerned the implications of the Knight-Hersko
economic anthropology than W. E. H. Stanner (1962 :x), although K. F. Walke
many of Stanner's insights.
9 Chalk (1964:223) has succinctly delimited two roles which "economic m
the history of economic analysis: (1) as an abstract description of "hum
heuristic model of human action.
iO A substantial portion of the support which Polanyi provides for this argument is drawn
from the writings of Thurnwald, Malinowski, and Aristotle (1944:269; 1947:112). With regard to
the two eminent founders of economic anthropology, their writings-while still stimulating and
useful--can no longer be considered authoritative as general texts in the field. Studies in non-
market economies such as those by Firth 1939, Salisbury 1962, and Pospisil 1963 have documented
the proposition that economic relations among "primitive" peoples do involve motivational pat-
terns and rational calculations not unlike those characterizing actors in market economies. With
regard to Aristotle, Polanyi tends to minimize this ancient thinker's role as a cynical and astute
observer of human activity as reflected in statements like the following: " . . . all men, or the
generality at least, wish what is honorable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable" (Book
VIII Ethics-Smith and Chase 1950:219). Polanyi bases his
latter's role as a utopian political and social philosopher (
reflect these two roles is shown by Heimann 1945:23.
11 Polanyi inverts the approach of the classical economists s
ordinating "society" to "economy" (1944:45-46; 1947).
12 The statement in reference (i.e., 1957a:255) serves to il
to equate "simplicity" with "temporal priority" in his discuss
tions. Juxtaposed are "primitive"-a term which has no nec
"archaic"-a term which does possess such a connotation (
poses "early" and "primitive"). The final sentence in this s
" ... from the realm of early institutions" implies that Po
porary" primitive societies at all but, rather, about "extinct"
one can never be certain what the societal referent is in man
and economic institutions.
13 That "primitive communism" is still very much a live issue for the substantivists and is
reconcilable with their belief system can be inferred from Dalton's recent note which begins
euphemistically with the statement: "There is a kernel of truth in the notion of 'primitive com-
munism' " (1964:380). Polanyi also flirts with this notion throughout his writings (e.g., 1944:44;
1947:112).
14 Levi-Strauss (1944) has documented several cases among the Nambikuara in which "chiefs"
were forced to relinquish their statuses because of their failure to be generous in the provisioning
of their "companions." This crisis is always accompanied by a great deal of hostility and aggres-
siveness in the form of verbal abuse, threatening gestures, etc.; and the process itself threatens
the existence of the Nambikuara band as an ongoing system.
15 The value of Sahlins' contributions in the field of economic and political anthropology
(1960; 1962; 1963) lies in his attempt to formulate models which are more consistent with social
reality. Concerning his position on the "gainful motive" or the "self-interest" postulate in the
study of primitive economics see 1962:1068.
16 For Polanyi's description of the transformation of the western economy necessitated by the
rise of the market system see 1944 (esp. chapter 6).
17 In Schumpeter's terms the "public mind" is never an undifferentiated or homogeneous en-
tity but is the result of the class and group structure of a given community.
1s The bulk of Dalton's discussion under the heading "Economic Theory and Market Econ-
omy" (1961:1-5) is essentially a summary of sections of Polanyi's earlier writings and is devoted
to "documenting" a posited relationship between "the method and content of economic theory"
and "two central features of 19th century Britain: factory industrialism and market organization"
(Dalton 1961:1).
19 Burling's attitude is puzzling since he is one of a handful of anthropologists who demon-
strates an intimate acquaintance with Lionel Robbins' seminal essay on The Nature and Signif-
icance of Economic Science (1935) in which the opening chapter on "The Subject Matter of Eco-
nomics" incorporates separate sections devoted respectively to "The 'Materialist's' Definition of
Economics" and "The 'Scarcity' Definition of Economics." Although Polanyi accuses Robbins
and others of committing the "economistic fallacy" (i.e., artificially identifying the economy with
its market form) and further asserts that Robbins' essay " . . . fatefully distorted the problem"
(of the study of the place occupied by the economy in human society) (1959:164), I fail to under-
stand how Polanyi's distinction between the "formal" and "substantive" meanings of economic
adds anything but confusion to Robbins' concise discussion.
20 Writings by economists on the "scope and method" of economics can be traced back at
least to James Mill and through the writings of his son, John Stuart Mill, to John Neville Keynes,
Lionel Robbins (1935), T. W. Hutchinson (1938), Frank Knight (1935), Joseph Schumpeter
(1954), and down to such current writers as Kenneth Boulding (1958) and Benjamin Higgins
(1951).
21 Walter Neale, in a recent attempt by a substantivist to clarify some of the ambiguity asso-
ciated with the concept of "economic," does relate Polanyi's substantive definition to others in
the economic literature (1964:1300-1302). After citing Alfred Marshall's de
on the "material requisites of well-being," he admits that portions of it ar
tical with, the substantive definition . . . " (1964:1301). However, Neale
silent about the criticisms of Rottenberg, Smelser, LeClair and Burling and
not deviate from the Polanyi line (e.g., 1964:1302). Thus, the "split-level
as the Polanyites continue to exchange notes within their own closed sphe
directly acknowledging or attempting to answer the views of their critics.
22 Statements of this distinction are available in Polanyi (1957a:243
more recently in Dalton (1961:5-7) and Neale (1964:1302). Max Weber
stantive" distinction in his discussion of "The Formal and Substantive R
Action" (1947:184-86). However, the extent to which Polanyi used Webe
of departure for his own is unclear. What is clear is that Weber, unlike Pol
"economic interest" or the "pursuit of gain" was absent in non-market
traditional) societies. (For confirmation of this point see Weber 1961:26
2a For a recent cogent statement by an economist on the relationship be
and economic facts in model-building see G. G. Firth (1964).
24 Neil J. Smelser in a major critical review article of Trade and Marke
describes the "two meanings of economic" and then proceeds to suggest th
the inferences drawn from it come " . . . perilously close to throwing
economic analysis with the culture-bound market orientation of tradition
To compound the confusion created by the "two meanings" discussion,
construct in the form of a "compound concept of the two meanings." Acc
cept is both current and past, popular and scientific in usage (1959:1
Polanyi switches his frame of reference from political economy and econo
instead, to be talking about something comparable to Schumpeter's "econ
"sociological analysis" (he cites Pareto, Durkheim, Weber and Parson
stantivist literature is this ambiguity concerning the intended referen
used loosely and interchangeably, e.g., "formal economics," "formal econom
analysis," "formal meaning of economic," and "economic theory." Even
to indicate that the referent is "economic analysis," it is obviously not
skills which contemporary economists practice, but to a set of assumption
to the Classical economists or to the founders of Neoclassical economics.
2 In the economic literature to "economize" means to arrange, consti
to best account. The act of "economizing" implies two things: (1) a standar
so that the greater or more highly valued may be distinguished from t
valued; together with (2) an acceptable method for apportioning time, e
accordance with the results of this measurement. The mutual interdepe
"standard of comparison" and the universality of these two minimal comp
has been expressed with great insight by Heimann (1945:4-5).
26 LeClair makes the same point (1962:1184).
27 Salisbury in his analysis of a New Guinea highland tribe, the Sia
identify any discrete empirical entity which he could label "economy" and
quantify economic data in terms of the usual measuring rod of money,
conduct an elaborate and penetrating study of what he calls "the econom
havior" (i.e., those aspects in which there is allocation of scarce means, b
lation in terms of quantities of goods and services, and in which goods are
consumed). Not only did Salisbury find several traditional western econ
his analysis, but his formulation of categories of goods among the Siane in
ticities is a convincing demonstration that economic concepts taken from
in the substantivist scheme is the most market-economy biased aspect
serve as valuable analytic tools in the study of non-market economies.
28 The vision of a "science of comparative economic systems" does no
commitment to the formulation of a cross-culturally valid "general" or
nomic behavior. Such a theory may never be developed and, if and when
matical skills which are part of the economist's tool-kit wil
its formulation. Given this situation, anthropologists should
and readily achievable tasks. Currently, one of the most co
potentially fruitful problem-areas in economic anthropology
or "intermediate" societies. It is in the study of such societies
of middle range theory" (Nash 1961:186) will be developed i
here that the anthropologist can perform his most significa
havior.
29 Since this article was written, three publications have
relevance to my critique of Polanyi and the substantivist ap
mented on briefly here. First, Dalton has presented us with a
of Polanyi's contribution to economic anthropology (1965c)
revealing observations about his mentor: "The qualities that
made him a difficult writer. His passionate commitment and e
bers of students to his lectures, several of whom made his rese
the contagion is spreading .... But what was forceful, lucid,
sometimes became hyperbole and polemic in print. A symp
writing style as a stiletto set in the far-end of a battering ram
us who were not able to experience personal contact with Polan
his thought by examining the "hyperbole and polemic in
prophetic of the future course of economic anthropology, the
to be institutionalized under the aegis of a coalition of intrans
my critique will prove to be an effective antidote to the sprea
gion" in anthropology by encouraging the replacement of "sym
matic figure with an objective and logical analysis of his ideas
Second, Bohannan and Dalton have recently published an
died on April 23, 1964, which includes a brief review of his sc
vides some interesting biographical data which, it seems to me
ment of Polanyi as a romanticist and ideologist. At the close o
these authors that "anthropology and economic history are fo
flash through their skies" (1965b:1311). The position I have a
is that the time has now come for anthropologists to sift thro
"flashing meteor" to determine the extent of their "pyritic" co
out" process anthropologists would do well to keep in mind
"metaphysical statements are not without content" and ". ..
late feelings which are a guide to conduct" (1964:3). More
"metaphysical propositions also provide a quarry from which
not belong to the realm of science and yet they are necessary
know what it is that we want to know ... " (1964:3). Given,
demonstration of the metaphysical and ideological nature of su
justify abandoning their views completely in future anthropo
intended to do is (1) to clarify the ideological underpinnings o
nomics, and (2) to establish limits on its applicability to th
rapidly changing world. The critique is not intended to promo
substantive theory or an uncritical acceptance of formal theor
anthropologists to recognize the possibilities, as well as the lim
so that they may be more critical in the application of both
thropology.
Third and, in my opinion, more significant for the future course of inquiry in economic
anthropology, is the appearance of Belshaw's eloquent and comprehensive introduction to the
field (1965). This book should convince even the most intransigent opponents of formal economic
theory of the untenability of their position vis-d-vis its non-applicability to the study of primitive
and peasant economies.
REFERENCES CITED
BELSHAW, C. S.
1965 Traditional exchange and modern markets. Englewood Cliff
Inc.
BERLINER, JOSEPH S.
1962 The feet of the natives are large: an essay on anthropology by an economist. Current
Anthropology 3:47-61.
BLAU, PETER M.
1964 Exchange and power in social life. New York, Wiley.
BOBER, M. M.
1955 Intermediate price and income theory. New York, W. W. Norton.
BOHANNAN, PAUL
1963 Social anthropology. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
BOHANNAN, PAUL AND DALTON, GEORGE
1965a Markets in Africa. New York, Doubleday Anchor.
1965b Karl Polanyi 1886-1964: an obituary. American Anthropologist 67:1508-1511.
BOULDING, KENNETH
1958 The skills of the economist. Toronto, Clarke Irwin.
1961 The image. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
1962 An economist's view: critique of Homan's Social behavior: its elementary forms.
American Journal of Sociology 67:458-461.
BURLING, ROBBINS
1962 Maximization theories and the study of economic anthropology. American Anthro-
pologist 64:802- 821.
CHALK, ALFRED F.
1964 Economic man. In Dictionary of the Social Sciences, J. Gould and W. Kolb (eds.),
New York, Free Press.
DALTON, GEORGE
1961 Economic theory and primitive society. American Anthropologist 65:1-25.
1962 Traditional production in primitive African economies. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 76:360-378.
1964 The development of subsistence and peasant economies in Africa. International
Social Science Journal 16:378-389.
1965a Primitive money. American Anthropologist 67:44-65.
1965b Review of Capital, saving and credit in peasant societies, R. Firth and B. S. Yamey
(eds.). Chicago, Aldine Press. American Anthropologist 67:121-122.
1965c Primitive, archaic, and modern economies: Karl Polanyi's contribution to economic
anthropology and comparative economy. In Essays in economic anthropology, June
Helm (ed.), Proceedings of the 1965 AES meeting, Seattle, University of Washington
Press.
DIAMOND, STANLEY
1964 A revolutionary discipline. Current Anthropology 5:432-437.
FIRTH, G. G.
1964 The frontiers of economics. The Economic Record 40:33-45.
FIRTH, RAYMOND
1939 Primitive Polynesian economy, London, Routledge.
1961 Elements of social organization. Boston, Beacon Press.
1965 Review of Kapauku Papuan Economy, by L. Pospisil. New Haven, Yale University
Press. American Anthropologist 67:122-125.
FUSFIELD, D. B.
1957 Economic theory misplaced: livelihood in primitive society. In Trade and market in
the early empires, K. Polanyi et al., (eds.). Glencoe, The Free Press.
GIDE, CHARLES
1930 Economic man. In Encyclopedia of the social scien
GOODFELLOW, D. M.
1939 Principles of economic sociology. Philadelphia, Blaki
GOULDNER, ALVIN W.
1960 The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement.
25:161-178.
GRAMPP, WILLIAM D.
1948 Adam Smith and the economic man. Journal of Political Economy LVI:315-336.
HAGEN, E. E.
1962 On the theory of social change. New York, Dorsey Press.
HEIMANN, EDUARD
1945 History of economic doctrines. New York, Oxford Press.
HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J.
1952a Economics and anthropology: a rejoinder. In Economic Anthropology, New York,
Knopf. Reprinted from Journal of Political Economy, April 1941 (vol. xlix, no. 2).
1952b Economic anthropology. New York, Knopf.
HIGGINS, BENJAMIN
1947 The economic man and economic science. Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science 13:587-598.
1951 The scope and method of economics. In What do economists know? Victoria,
Australia, Melbourne University Press, pp. 2-11.
1959 Economic development. New York, Norton.
HOMANS, GEORGE C.
1961 Social behavior: its elementary forms. New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World.
HOSELITZ, BERT F.
1960 Sociological aspects of economic growth. Glencoe, The Free Press.
HUTCHINSON, T. W.
1938 The significance and basic postulates of economic theory. London, Macmillan.
KNIGHT, FRANK H.
1935 The limitations of scientific method in economics. In The ethics of competition an
other essays. London.
1952 Anthropology and economics. In Economic anthropology, Melville Herskovits,
New York, Knopf. Reprinted from Journal of Political Economy, April, 1941 (vol.
xlix, no 2).
LECLAIR, EDWARD E.
1962 Economic theory and economic anthropology. American Anthropologist 64:1179-
1203.
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
1944 The social and psychological aspects of chieftainship in a primitive tribe: the
Nambikuara. Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Ser. 2, VII, No. 1.
LEWIS, W. A.
1954 The theory of economic growth. London, George, Allen & Unwin.
MOORE, WILBERT E.
1955 Economy and society. New York, Random House.
NASH, MANNING
1961 The social context of economic choice in a small society. Man 219:186-191.
NEALE, WALTER C.
1964 On defining "labor" and "services" for comparative studies. American Anthropol-
ogist 64:1300-1307.
POLANYI, KARL
1944 The great transformation. New York, Rinehart. (Citations are from the Beacon
Press edition, 1957)
1947 Our obsolete market mentality. Commentary 3:109-117.
1957a The economy as instituted process. In Trade and market in th
Polanyi et al. (eds.). Glencoe, The Free Press.
1957b Aristotle discovers the economy. In Trade and market in th
Glencoe, the Free Press.
1959 Anthropology and economic theory. In Readings in anthropology
New York, Crowell.
POLANYI, K., ARENSBERG, C. M., PEARSON, H. W., (EDS.)
1957 Trade and market in the early empires. Glencoe, The Free Press.
POSPISIL, LEOPOLD
1963 Kapauku Papuan economy. New Haven, Yale University Press.
ROBBINS, LIONEL
1935 The nature and significance of economic science. London, St. Mart
ROBINSON, JOAN
1964 Economic philosophy. New York, Anchor Books.
ROLL, ERIC
1937 Elements of economic theory. London, Oxford University Press.
ROTTENBERG, SIMON
1958 Review of Trade and market in the Early Empires. American Economic Review
48:675-678.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D.
1960 Political power and the economy in primitive society. In Essays in the science of
culture, R. Carneiro and G. Dole (eds.) New York, Crowell.
1962 Review of Sociological aspects of economic growth, Bert Hoselitz. Glencoe, The Free
Press. American Anthropologist 64:1063-1073.
1963 On the sociology of primitive exchange. Working draft for the ASA Conference,
London, June 25-30.
SALISBURY, R. F.
1962 From stone to steel. Melbourne, University of Melbourne Press.
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A.
1954 History of economic analysis. New York, Oxford University Press.
SMELSER, NEIL J.
1959 A comparative view of exchange systems. Economic Development and Cultural
Change 7:175-182.
SMrIT, J. A. (ed.) and CHASE, D. P. (trans.)
1950 The ethics of Aristotle. New York, E. P. Dutton.
STANNER, W. E. H.
1962 Foreword. In From stone to steel, R. F. Salisbury. Melbourne, Melbourne Univer-
sity Press.
STONIER, ALFRED W. & HAGUE, DOUGLAS C.
1957 A textbook of economic theory. 2nd edition. London, Longmans.
WALKER, K. F.
1943 The study of primitive economics. Oceania 13:131-142.
WEBER, MAX
1947 The theory of social and economic organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson
and Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, The Free Press.
1961 General economic history. Translated by F. H. Knight. New York, Collier Books.
WOLF, ERIC
1964 Anthropology. New York, Prentice-Hall.

Cook 1966 - The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of The Substantive Approach To Economic Anthropology

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cook 1966 - The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of The Substantive Approach To Economic Anthropology

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of the Substantive Approach to

ECONOMIC anthropology, a major sub-area of anthropological inquiry,

In their introduction to Markets in Africa Paul Bohannan a

III. DEDUCTION, INDUCTION AND "ECONOMIC MAN": THE SUBSTANTIVIST

The exchange between Frank Knight and Melville Herskovits is

IV. THE ROMANTIC "ANTI-MARKET" SYNDROME: THE MARKET AS A

Underlying and to some extent cross-cutting the major split am

split of another dimension-that between the "Roman

reciprocal economy can create conflict as well as contribut

These are undeniably the words of a Romanticist in the Ro

In what is generally recognized as the most erudite and authoritative

analysis (1961:4). Dalton fails to demonstrate precisely ho

Karl Polanyi and his followers, the Substantivist school of e

1 The writer is currently a Public Health Service Fellow (Fellowship #-F

You might also like