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MAY 2017
ISSUE 10.5

THE ASEAN AT
The QUEST FOR
50: CENTRALITY AND
REGIONAL
PEACE
 OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017

02

50:
THE ASEAN AT
The QUEST FOR
CENTRALITY AND
REGIONAL
PEACE
THE ASEAN
Various nations have sought to emulate the undisputable success of
Southeast Asian countries in creating an "island of peace". Yet, this "island of
peace", encompassing a diverse array of post-colonial nations squeezed
between the giants of China and India, is now increasingly in danger.

From the Ashes of War

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) marks its 50th founding anniversary, it can reflect,
with justifiable pride and a measured sense of achievement, decades of robust economic integration. In
particular, it managed the earlier-than-expected establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which
encompasses all regional members, including Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia
(1999), before the end of the 20th century. As of today, ASEAN states impose almost zero tariff rates on
intra-regional trade flows, paving the way for deeper economic integration across Southeast Asia.

Currently, the ASEAN is moving forward on its Economic Community, which constitutes a Customs Union
namely, uniform tariff rates on extra-regional trading partnerscombined with freer movement of labor, capital,
and technology across regional borders. The ultimate aim, with the provisional deadline of 2025, is to create an
integrated regional market, which leverages Southeast Asian nations combined market size, demographic
dividend, human capital, and investment attractiveness. Overtime, the ASEAN hopes to go head-to-head
with other major economies (e.g., India and China) and regional blocs (i.e., the European
Union) as a new pole of growth and productivity in the global economy.

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

Image Credit: visitasean50.com

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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017

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The ASEANs achievements, however, transcend economic gains.
Since its founding in 1967, at the height of the Cold War, there
have been almost zero outbreaks of armed conflict among ASEAN
member states. Without exaggeration, the regional body has
established a de facto security community, where even the threat
of use of force/coercion, not to mention actual warfare, has become
almost unthinkable, despite the plethora of territorial, maritime,
and politico-cultural disputes among ASEAN members.
This is a far cry from the tempestuous years of Konfrontasi (1962-
1966), which saw Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia teetering
on the verge of all-out military confrontation. The 1960s also saw
boiler-room tensions between Manila and Kuala Lumpur over the
energy-rich Sabah, perched at the northern tip of the Borneo Island.
Yet, the ASEANs formation allowed the founding members, namely
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, to find
a common ground and optimize institutionalized mechanisms of
dialogue to not only manage disputes among themselves, but
to also develop a coordinated response to common threats,
particularly the outbreak of war in Indochina in the
opening decades of the Cold War.
The ASEAN also has a larger and far more diverse membership
than the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which
only included the US treaty allies of Thailand and the Philippines,
as well as Britains former colony of Malaysia. The strategic
exigencies of the Cold War, particularly the threat posed by
indigenous communist movements, as well as the shockwaves of
the Vietnam War, combined with the incessant drive for national
economic development, constituted the two foundational
forces that undergirded ASEAN integration and its
impressive evolution over the past five decades.
In fact, the regional body can boast the worlds most diverse
membership of a whole different order of magnitude. The ASEAN
Table 1. Key indicators of ASEAN Nations
membership includes electoral democracies (e.g., the Philippines
and Indonesia), an absolute monarchy (Brunei), electoral
autocracies (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore), military juntas (e.g.,
Thailand and Myanmar), and communist and post-communist
regimes (e.g., Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). It hosts the
worlds largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, with a population of
250.8 million people, and among the worlds smallest nations,
Brunei, with a population of barely 400 thousand people.
Among its members are the worlds richest and most developed
nations, say Singapore with a per capita income of $55,183,
and poorest and least developed nations, say Myanmar
with a per capita of only $724. (See table 1 for key
national indicators of ASEAN countries.)

Unlike the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), based on

the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (better known as
the Manila Pact) signed in September 1954, the ASEAN wasnt
an overt military alliance with a pre-identified adversary (i.e., the
Communist bloc). Neither did it involve Western powersnamely,
the United States, France, Britain, Australia, and New Zealandbut
instead strictly post-colonial nations within the geographical frame of
Southeast Asia: one continental (Thailand) and four archipelagic.
This allowed the ASEAN to present itself as an inclusive and neutral
regional body, which is aligned to neither the West nor the East. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit; data for 2013

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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017
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Yet, despite this immense internal diversity, time and
again, the ASEAN members have managed to resolve their
disputes based on the two key principles of consultation
and consensus. The paradoxical result is a highly egalitarian,
democratic and peaceful supernational organizational culture
in one of the least politically stable, egalitarian democratic
regions of the world. (Despite decades of rapid economic
growth, however, Southeast Asia continues to be bedeviled
by local insurgencies [e.g., Islamic, ethno-nationalist,
communist], frequent coups, post-election mayhem,
and even a potential global flashpoint,
particularly in the South China Sea.)
Today, the ASEAN is still largely held in high regard across
the developing world, perhaps even as a model for regional
integration outside the developed West. From Sub-Saharan
Africa to the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America,
various nations have sought to emulate the undisputable
success of Southeast Asian countries in creating an island of
peace under one of the most exacting geopolitical conditions
and with very limited organizational-financial resources. Yet,
this island of peace, encompassing a diverse array of post-
colonial nations squeezed between the giants of China and
India, is now increasingly in danger, as it struggles to maintain
internal unity and craft coherent responses to 21st century
challenges, particularly the rise of China and the
attendant challenge it poses to the liberal order in Asia.
Today, the South China Sea disputes are the greatest test
of the mettle of ASEANs centrality in shaping the regional
security architecture. Chinas massive reclamation activities,
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construction of a sprawling network of military facilities, and
deployment of large-scale fishermen-cum-militia, para-
military and naval forces across the South China Sea has
transformed arguably the worlds most important sea lane
of communication (SLOC) into a de facto battlefield. Thus,
there is no room for compliancy for the ASEAN.
From Dream to Hope
Just a decade ago, there was enough reason, with justifiable
optimism, to view ASEAN as the main engine of deeper
regional integration across the Asia-Pacific region. Through
pan-regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Plus-Three (ASEAN+3), and East Asia
Summit (EAS), the Southeast Asian organization laid claim
to becoming the prime multilateral platform for
institutionalized dialogue among great powers, including
China, the United States, Japan, Russia and India.
Yet, this period of optimism coincided with what the
Council on Foreign Relations leading Southeast Asia expert,
Joshua Kurlantzick, famously described as the Chinese
charm offensive. Instead of acting as an autonomous
agent of change, however, the ASEANs ability to shape
the broader region in the image of its pacifist principles was
always mediated through the strategic calculus of great
powers, particularly China and the United States. In short,
the ASEANs diplomatic capital was largely a derivative of
the actual balance of power in the region and the strategic
preferences of larger nations, which accepted ASEAN-led
mechanisms as a neutral platform for dialogue, but
rarely involuntarily ceded strategic prerogative
to multilateral organizations.
The story of ASEANs success in the post-Cold War period
cant be separated from the distinct transformation in
Chinese strategic culture since the end of the Mao era in
late-1970s. Building on the legacy of Deng Xiaoping, the
legendary paramount leader who advocated for strategic
patience and peaceful engagement with neighboring states
and Western powers, Beijing embarked on a concerted
effort at normalizing and deepening ties with estranged
regional states, particularly in the ASEAN. By 1991, just
as the Soviet Union collapsed, China marked a diplomatic
milestone by establishing formal diplomatic relations with
all regional states. That year also saw Chinas foreign
minister, Qian Qichen, attending the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM).
Three years later, the Chinese diplomats featured among
the founders of the ARF, which soon became the primary
platform for security cooperation among Pacific powers.
From 1995 to 1997, Beijing kick-started annual meetings
with senior officials from the ASEAN. During those meetings,
both sides agreed with the idea of establishing an ASEAN+3
initiative, which brought together China, Japan and South
Korea, three uneasy neighbors struggling with cold peace
and deep historical animosities. Thus, the Southeast Asian
organization, with Chinas consent and support, facilitated
trilateral dialogue among Asias feuding industrial powers,
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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017

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which lacked, on a bilateral basis, robust and institutionalized
mechanisms for strategic cooperation.

Initially, the United States, eager to build on the peace dividends of the post-Cold War
period, supportedalbeit reluctantlythe ASEANs role as a primary driver of economic
integration and dialogue-based interaction among Asia-Pacific states. Ushering in a new
world order, the George H. W. Bush administration wasnt interested in maintaining
large-scale forward-deployed military presence in the region, which culminated in the
withdrawal of American bases from Subic and Clark in the Philippinesthe former
site of Washingtons largest overseas military facilities. The succeeding Bill Clinton
administration advocated a new era of neo-liberal globalization, which saw the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), upgrading of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) platform, and full-fledged integration of China
into the global economic order. Thus, from Washingtons viewpoint, the
ASEAN was seen as a helpful ally in creating a peaceful environment for
sustained economic integration among Asia-Pacific economies.

The years 1997-1998, however, proved as a crucial turning point for Chinas
emergence as a benevolent power and Americas as a villain. While Washington and
US-led international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
hastily promoted financial liberalization and cruelly ignored the socio-political dislocation
caused by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), China instead adopted a prudent, helpful and
sympathetic policy. Instead of exploiting capital outflow in severely-hit ASEAN countries
such as Indonesia and Thailand, China refused to revalue its currency (to attract capital
fleeing regional economies and/or compete with cheaper ASEAN exports); advocated
the establishment of an independent Asian Monetary Fund (as a counterpart to
the IMF), of information-sharing mechanisms on capital movement, and of Currency-
Swap Agreements (CSAs) for monetary stabilization, specifically the Chiang Mai
Initiative (CMI), among affected nations; and, in fact, even contributed
to the IMF financial aid package to post-crisis Thailand.

Even the Clinton administration was impressed by Chinas behavior as a responsible

stakeholder during the AFC and its destructive aftermath. In response, Washington
Image Credit:si.wsj.net

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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017
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invited China to attend the G8 finance ministers meeting in
1998, a remarkable gesture of respect and appreciation by
the superpower. Over the years, Sino-ASEAN goodwill was
strengthened by Chinas adoption of the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002;
signing of the ASEANChina Free Trade Area (ACFTA) framework
agreement in same year; Chinas accession to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003; and Chinas generous assistance
to tsunami-hit nations across the Indian Ocean in 2004. On the
bilateral-minilateral level, China signed up to other confidence-
building measures (CBMs) such as the trilateral Joint Maritime
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) agreement with the Philippines
and Vietnam in 2005, which served as a potential model
for more large-scale and ambitious Joint Development
Agreements (JDAs) in the South China Sea.
The ASEANs golden age coincided with the Jiang Zemin and
early Hu Jintao administrations, roughly between the mid-1990s
to the mid-2000s. Yet, it was precisely this period of
unprecedented diplomatic amicability and economic integration
that sowed the seeds of strategic complacency, institutional
atrophy, and delusions of an end of history in East Asia. It didnt
take long for the ASEAN to be jolted out of its stupor, as China
transformed into a revisionist regional power bent on shaping Asia
in its own image. Beginning in 2009, China overtly asserted its
expansive claims across the South China Sea, flexed its naval
and para-military muscle, and began to challenge Americas
naval hegemony in the Western Pacific and East Asia.
China also employed a divide-and-conquer strategy towards the
ASEAN, stepped up its diplomatic pressure on and economic
incentives to individual members. As a result, not only the
ASEANs centrality, in shaping the regional order, but also its very
existence and internal coherence has been put into question. It is
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a remarkable and dispiriting turnabout for an organization
that was once considered a gold standard for regional
integration in the post-colonial world.
Reality Check
In many ways, Chinas improved ties with the ASEAN was
abetted by the George W. Bush administrations singular and
monolithic focus on its Global War on Terror (GWOT) to the
exclusion of a more comprehensive engagement with the
region. Neither the American president nor his senior officials
committed to regular attendance at the regional fora, a blatant
snub that didnt escape the attention of anxious regional allies
and strategic partners. This was a major strategic faux pas,
since, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once
memorably put it, sometimes, particularly in Asia,
half of diplomacy is showing up at regional meetings.
Eager to correct the mistakes of its predecessor, expand
economic engagement in Asia, and check Chinas rising
influence in the region, the Obama administration shifted
gears by launching the much-vaunted Pivot to Asia (P2A) policy.
The ASEAN stood at the heart of this reorientation in Americas
strategic priorities. Under President Barack Obamas
watchthe Hawaii-born and Jakarta-raised lawyer who
has been dubbed as the first Pacific America leader
Washington sought to translate its lofty rhetoric
of engagement with concrete action.
In particular, the Obama administration signed the TAC;
became the first major power to appoint a permanent mission
to the ASEAN (Kurt M. Campbell as the first ambassador);
upgraded diplomatic relations with a liberalizing Burmese
junta, and supported the democratic opposition (namely, Aung
San Suu Kyis National League for Demoracy); established
the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) together with the Japan-
led Asian Development Bank (ADB); normalized ties and
subsequently established a strategic partnership with former
foes like Vietnam, which welcomed arms purchases and joint
naval exercises with America (to check China); advocated for
the inclusion of Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation, into the
elite club of G20 nations; and signed the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, its oldest
Asian ally. To strengthen the domain awareness and coast
guard capabilities of regional states, Washington also
launched a Maritime Security Initiative in 2015
during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
In its final year, Obama raised the stakes by making another
unprecedented move: He invited ASEAN leaders (mostly
from small-sized autocratic nations with mixed records on
democracy and human rights) to the Sunnylands ranch
in California for an informal, intimate and high-profile US-
ASEAN summit. During the meeting, he reiterated Americas
commitment to remain an anchor of stability and prosperity;
launched new economic initiatives (e.g., the US-ASEAN
Connect Initiative); and advocated for a shared
responsibility in preserving freedom of navigation
and overflight in the South China Sea.
A month earlier, in January, Obama dispatched his Foreign
Secretary, John Kerry, to Laos and Cambodia, two nations
that are considered as Beijings closest allies in the ASEAN, to
garner support for a unified and coherent regional response to
rising tensions in the South China Sea. During the trip, Kerry
offered economic incentives to both nations, which are heavily
dependent on Chinese economic assistance. With Laos as the
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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017
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ASEAN chairman in 2016, the Obama administration was eager to
ensure China will not exercise undue influence over the conduct of
the regional body. In response, a grateful Laos reassured America
and the broader region that it will act as a responsible ASEAN
chairman, implicitly suggesting that it wont repeat Cambodias
chairmanship in 2012, when it blocked even the discussion
of the South China Sea disputes at the height of the
Scarborough Shoal standoff between Manila and Beijing.
Obamas proactive diplomatic engagement with ASEAN leaders
seemingly paid off. At the end of the Sunnylands summit
in February 17th 2016, both sides expressed their shared
commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes, including full
respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to
threat or use of force, in accordance with universally recognized
principles of international law and the 1982 United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea. They agreed that not only
should UNCLOS be a basis for resolution of the disputes, but also
mentioned legal processes, which could be interpreted as an
implicit statement of support for the Philippines right to resort to
arbitration, under the aegis of the UNCLOS (Article 287, Annex
VII), against Chinese assertiveness in the disputed waters.
Crucially, both sides also emphasized the necessity for non-
militarization and self-restraint, which was particularly salient in
light of Chinas deployment of high-frequency radars, surface-
to-air-missile (SAM) systems, mobile artilleries, and fighter jets to
contested land features in the Paracels and newly-built facilities
across artificial islands the Spratlys, which are also claimed by the
Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and Vietnam. Subsequently,
during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM) in Vientiane,
Southeast Asian states reaffirmed the importance of maintaining
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peace, security, stability and freedom of navigation in and
over-flight above the South China Sea. They also expressed
concerns over the maritime disputes, stating how they
remained seriously concerned [authors emphasis] over the
recent and ongoing developments [in the South China Sea] and
took note of the concern expressed by some ministers on the
land reclamations and escalation of activities in the area.
Yet, despite the best efforts of the Obama administration and
like-minded allies such as Japan and Australia, the ASEAN
quickly succumbed to Chinese pressure when the Philippines
arbitration case reached its emphatic conclusion, with an
arbitral tribunal at The Hague unanimously ruling, among other
things, Beijings nine-dashed line claims and doctrine of historic
rights as null and void. In fact, there were signs of internal
discord within the ASEAN. In June, just a month before the
release of the final arbitration award (July 12), Southeast Asian
countries failed to release a joint statement during the
ASEAN-China foreign ministers meeting in Kunming, China.
Some frustrated officials in the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, who
initiated the high-level meeting, leaked the draft joint statement,
which was quite critical of China, to the media, certain member
nations, particularly Laos and Cambodia, were accused of
preventing the release of the initial statement, led by Kuala
Lumpur, under Chinese pressure. The leaked joint statement,
in particular, expressed [Aseans] serious concerns over the
South China Sea disputes, because they have eroded trust
and confidence, increased tensions and which may have the
potential to undermine peace, security and stability in the
region. It also emphasized the importance of non-militarization
and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities, including land
reclamation, calling upon claimant states to maintain full
respect for legal and diplomatic processes, shun the
threat or use of force, and act in accordance with
universally recognized principles of international law,
including the [United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea] and the UN Charter.
In an explicit rebuff to China, which vainly pushed for a
ten-point consensus to sideline the maritime issues, the draft
statement mentioned how member states cannot ignore what
is happening in the South China Sea as it is an important issue
in the relations and cooperation between ASEAN and China.
It didnt take long, however, for some ASEAN countries to
shut down any hope of ASEAN centrality on the South China
Sea disputes, particularly after The Hague arbitration case.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen went so far as openly
criticizing the Philippines compulsory arbitration against
China, dismissing it as a provocative act that is not
about laws and instead a political conspiracy
between some countries and the court.
More disappointingly, when it became clear that the Philippines
scored a clean sweep victory against China, ASEAN countries
immediately called for patience and calm rather than
compliance to a binding decision by claimant states. The very
fact that the newly inaugurated Philippine government, under
President Rodrigo Duterte, itself adopted a measured language,
calling for restraint and sobriety, added impetus to a more
sober response to the historic legal verdict. As of this writing,
the ASEAN has not even mentioned the arbitration
award, as if it has never come into existence.
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Challenges Ahead

For five decades, the ASEAN commendably established the foundations of a nascent
security community in Southeast Asia, where the threat of war among neighboring
states has teetered on the verge of impossibility. Post-war Vietnam has been peacefully
integrated into the fabric of the ASEAN community, and today enjoys stable relations
with its Indochinese neighbors, including Cambodia. The Philippines and Indonesia have
delimited their overlapping maritime zones; the Philippines and Malaysia have carefully
and quietly managed their disputes over Sabah (despite the occasional flare-ups as
in the 2013, when the remnants of the Sultanate of Sulu sought to reclaim the island
through military expedition); Indonesia has submitted some of its maritime/territorial
disputes with Singapore and Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan case under the
International Court of Justice) to international arbitration; and Thailand
and Cambodia similarly resolved their border dispute over Preah
Vihear temple (called Phra Viharn in Thailand) under the ICJ.

There have also been encouraging cases of joint maritime cooperation to deal with
piracy and terrorism, particularly the anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Strait by
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as the emerging trilateral maritime
cooperation among Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia in the Celebes
and Sulu Seas against Abu Sayyaf and other criminal elements.

In the past two decades, the regional body has also tirelessly sought to create a broadly
peaceful, rule-based and inclusive regional security architecture. Yet, the rise of China
and its growing assertiveness isnt only disturbing the regional security architecture, but
also undermining the ASEANs internal cohesion and quest for centrality in East Asian
affairs. The ASEAN Way, where consensus and consultation undergird decision-making Image Credit:dulichbui.org
regimes, is no longer up to the task. The regional bodys unanimity-based decision-
making mechanism has unwittingly handed a de facto veto power to
weaker links that are under the influence of external powers.

Bemoaning the illusion of ASEAN unity, Singaporean diplomat Barry Desker has
rightfully pointed out the glaring lack of internal coherence within the regional body:

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OCCASIONAL PAPER MAY 2017
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The ability of external parties to shape the positions of
ASEAN members on regional issues such as the competing
maritime claims in the South China Sea could undermine
efforts to create an agreed ASEAN view. As China exerts
its influence on ASEAN members to prevent any decisions
which could affect its preference for bilateral negotiations, it
will be increasingly difficult to reach an ASEAN consensus.
This should come as no surprise, since as veteran analyst
Muthiah Alagappa argues, The foremost priority for ASEAN
national leaders in the foreseeable future will be making
strong nations and states at home to preserve their hold on
power. Regional community building will be lower priority and
likely to succeed only when it can contribute to or
does not hinder realization of the primary national
objectives of incumbent leaders.
This was painfully apparent during the Philippines
chairmanship of the ASEAN summit under the Duterte
administration, which has promised to finalize the framework
of an eventual legally-binding Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea before the end of the year, but has taken a
soft approach on the disputes. In March, Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi announced that a first draft of a COC
has been finalized, lauding what he described as clear
(diplomatic) progress, which has left China and
ASEAN countries feeling satisfied. Yet, this dubious
claim hasnt been confirmed by a single ASEAN official.
This year, two sets of meetings, one in Bali in February
and another one in the Philippines in June, have been
scheduled to iron out the framework of a COC. It would
take a herculean effort to finalize a COC in the near future,
considering Chinas established pattern of diplomatic foot-
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dragging. To put things into context, we should keep in
mind how the road to negotiating a binding COC
has been long and arduous.
As early as 1996, during the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
in Jakarta, regional members called for a legally binding
COC in the South China Sea, which will lay the foundation
for long-term stability in the area and foster understanding
among claimant countries. By 1999, ASEAN forwarded
the proposal to China, which promised to take it into full
consideration. By 2002, China and ASEAN signed the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the
South China Sea, a declaratory prelude to a
legally binding final agreement.
Among other things, the non-binding DOC discourages
signatories from aggressive actions and bars construction
of new structures in the contested region that could spark
armed conflicts. In 2011, under the chairmanship of
Indonesia, there were hopes of a swift negotiation of the
guidelines of a COC. In September 2013, during a technical
working groups meeting between ASEAN and China in
Suzhou, hopes were once again raised that by early 2014
there would be a breakthrough on the implementation of
the DOC as a prelude to full negotiation of a COC.
Over the next three years, however, China rapidly expanded
its strategic footprint across disputed land features in the
Spratlys and Paracels and stepped up its deployment of
military, coast guard and paramilitary patrols across disputed
waters. Yet, ASEAN repeatedly failed to call a spade a
spade, even though such provocative unilateral actions
directly contradict the spirit and letter of the DOC, which
expressly encourages claimant states to exercise self-
restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or
escalate disputes and refrain from action of inhabiting on
the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals,
cays, and other features and to handle their
differences in a constructive manner.
Twenty-one years since the idea of a COC came up and
15 years since the signing of the DOC, Asean is still in the
middle of what some see as never-ending negotiations.
In addition to uncertainties over the fate of a COC, the
Duterte administration has also soft-pedaled on the
South China Sea issue. Although ASEAN operates on a
consensus-based decision-making process, the chairman
has significant prerogative in setting the regional agenda and
stating what they deem as a primary area of concern for the
region. Reports suggest that during the recently-concluded
ASEAN summit in Manila (April), Duterte not only declined to
raise the Philippines arbitration case, but he also vetoed
any reference to Chinas massive reclamation activities,
which have given birth to a sprawling network
of military facilities in the high seas.
Even the term serious concern, which prominently
appeared in previous Asean pronouncements, was dropped.
By any measure, this was a slam-dunk diplomatic victory for
Beijing, which has sought to court Mr. Duterte by offering
multibillion-dollar investment deals and the prospect of joint
development agreements in contested waters. Dutertes
soft-pedaling on the South China Sea issue likely pleased
non-claimant countries such as Laos and Cambodia, which
have contentiously avoided any diplomatic friction with China
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over sensitive territorial issues. Yet, other member countries concerned about the trajectory of the maritime spats and
ASEANs centrality in shaping the regional security architecture were left unimpressed, if not disappointed.

In particular, Vietnam strongly advocated the inclusion of the reclamation activities as well as the troubling militarization of the disputes (by China)
in the final statement. Smaller claimant states are deeply worried about Beijings growing ability to deploy advanced weaponry to artificially created
islands - a potential prelude to the imposition of a de facto exclusion zone in the South China Sea. Other claimant states, particularly Malaysia and
Brunei, reportedly shared Vietnams position. A Filipino official lamented how the host country, which used to be among the most vociferous
critics of China, is now being lumped together with Cambodia and Laos in protecting Chinese interests (in Asean) at all costs.

Dutertes decision to block any robust ASEAN statement on the disputes, however, was likely due to an upcoming visit to Beijing, where the
Filipino President met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the One Belt, One Road summit. During his summit with the Chinese
leader, Duterte likely sought concessions from China in exchange for shielding the Asian powerhouse in multilateral forums. The Philippines likely
sought not only major trade and investment deals, but also explored a modus vivendi that will allow the Philippines to have easier
access to contested waters and resources in the South China Sea. Although this transactional approach may serve the
Philippines national interest mirroring Cambodias chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012 - it risks undermining
ASEAN internal cohesion and centrality as an engine of peaceful integration in the region.

Nothing is, of course, set in stone. The Philippines can still adopt a tougher language in the coming months, particularly during the November
gathering of ASEAN and global leaders from the United States, China, Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea for the East Asia Summit (EAS).
Key ASEAN countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia though can, on a bilateral basis and on individual
basis, release statements that communicate their disappointment with Chinas activities in the area and communicate their
willingness to step up their minilateral cooperation if China doesnt relent and respect the spirit, if not the letter, of the verdict.
ASEAN claimant states can also finalize a binding COC among themselves, then pressure China into joining later on.

Instead of vacuously calling for continuation of talks on DOC and negotiation of COC, which have been going nowhere, it is important to
call for immediate freeze on reclamation activities, construction of military facilities, deployment of military assets, and expansive illegal
fishing in the area. Yet, the ASEANs predicament runs deeper than the behavior and calculations of the rotational chairmen.

Moving forward, the ASEAN will either have to modify its institutional configuration, adopting an ASEAN Minus X or a Qualified Majority (QM)
voting modality, on politico-security affairs or fall into utter irrelevance. This has been poignantly evident when it comes to the South China Sea
disputes. Failing to embrace wholesale institutional innovation, the only way forward is ASEAN minilateralism, where likeminded and
influential countries in the region coordinate their diplomatic and strategic calculations vis--vis the South China Sea disputes.

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10.5
VOLUME

ABOUT
Richard Javad Heydarian
is an academic, columnist and author of Asias New Battlefield: US,
China and the Struggle for Western Pacific (Zed, London). He is a
regular contributor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in Washington D.C. and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
in New York. He has written for or/and been interviewed by Aljazeera,
BBC, Bloomberg, CNN, The New York Times, The Guardian, The
Washington Post, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The
Financial Times, among other leading global publications. This paper
is partly based on his columns for the Straits Times in Singapore.

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