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Marino Prez-lvarez, Jos M. Garca-Montes, Adolfo J. Cangas, Louis A. Sass
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Defending a
Phenomenological
Behavioral
Perspective:
Culture, Behavior, and
Experience Marino Prez-lvarez, Jos
M. Garca-Montes, Adolfo J.
Cangas, and Louis A. Sass
Keywords: Behavior, contextual phenomenology, not themselves represent forms of superstitious be-
culture, experience havior. She points out that it is not always a good
idea to put new wine in old barrels. For her, the
new wine and new barrels would be represented
W
e should like to express our sincere by social constructivism, of which she is reminded
thanks to all the authors for their com- by some aspects of our work. But in making her
mentaries on our articles. Given the own case, Ibez-Guerra (2008) reveals certain
restrictions of space (a limitation they too had common prejudices concerning behaviorism,
to contend with), we can only respond to a few prejudices that have apparently persisted even after
aspects of their interesting remarks. We shall reply reading our article. Thus, for example, she does
of course on the basis of our own approachan not see operant behavior as incorporating inten-
approach that sets out to integrate culture, be- tionality (what, in the target article, is presented in
havior, and experience, and that might be termed terms of final causality), because she assumes that
contextual phenomenology, phenomenological be- intentionality would necessarily imply a mentalist
haviorism, or perhaps most accurately (albeit more and dualist notion involving a supposed internal
awkwardly), the phenomenologicalbehavioral mental entity that causes behavior. Skinner (1974)
perspective. himself noted and rejected this very assumption
In her commentary, Ibez-Guerra (2008), re- in a passage that clearly distinguishes his own ap-
ferring to the target articles Phenomenology and proach from what he calls a stimulus-response
behaviorism (Prez-lvarez, Sass, and Cangas formula: Possibly no charge, he wrote,
2008) and The role of superstition in psychopa- is more often leveled against behaviorism or a science
thology (Garca-Montes et al. 2008), wonders of behavior than that it cannot deal with purpose or
whether our maintaining of the spirit of Skinner, intention. A stimulus-response formula has no answer,
as well as our recourse to phenomenology, might but operant behavior is the very field of purpose and
intention. By its nature it is directed toward the future: chology would not only not lose anything through
a person acts in order that something will happen, and a possible reconciliation with phenomenology; it
the order is temporal. (pp. 556) would in fact have a lot to gainboth in terms
The place Skinner gives to intentionality and pur- of potential scientific progress and in conceptual
pose is elaborated in our target article. openness and sophistication.
Furthermore, Ibez-Guerra (2008) assumes The problem Fletcher and Hayes see in our tem-
that, on methodological grounds, Skinner rejects poral conception of three-term contingency can be
all that is not observable, or at least that cannot be resolved, in our view, by considering the structure
operationalized. This, however, is simply incorrect, of the temporal process described by phenomenol-
at least as regards Skinners radical behaviorism. ogy. In our article, we referred to Scharff (1999);
As the reader may recall, radical (as opposed to here we turn to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008).
methodological) behaviorism is neither operation- According to the latter authors,
alist nor does it reject private or subjective events a perception cannot merely be a perception of what is
because of their unobservability. Indeed, Skinner now; rather, any perception of the present slice of an
specifically acknowledges that such events are object includes a retention of the just-past slice and a
in fact observableat least for one person: the protention of what is about to occur. . . . Perceptual
subject him- or herself. The question for Skinner presence is therefore not punctual; it is a field in which
now, not-now, and not-yet-now are given in a horizontal
is to understand how the part of the world that
gestalt. (p. 78)
is only observable and experiential for oneself is
constructed or formed. In the end, it turns out Present experience and action cannot be under-
that radical behaviorism is more radical, in the stood without taking protention into account.
Aristotelian ontological sense (see Prez-Alvarez, This is not to say, of course, that the literal future
Sass, and Garca-Montes 2008), than post-modern determines what came before it; but, rather, that
constructionism. Indeed, as we remarked, radical anticipation plays a crucial role. Three-term
behaviorism can still surprise us today. Similarly, contingency without further specification is use-
phenomenology is starting to be missed in the ful in many practical situations, but without the
clinical context (Andreasen 2007). We believe consideration of the retentional and protentional
that radical behaviorism and phenomenology, structure of perceptual presence, such contingency
mutually readjusted, are in fact excellent wines cannot account for the dynamic structure of the
for the times we live inif only we knew how to experience of time that is involved, for example,
appreciate them. in music and speech. On the other hand, phenom-
In their commentary on Phenomenology and enology could contribute to scientific progress by
behaviorism: A mutual readjustment, Fletcher providing relational frameworks that are more
and Hayes (2008) argue that the philosophy and closely linked to natural social contexts than those
theory of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy usually studied by RFT, notwithstanding the great
(ACT)/Relational Frame Theory (RFT) already importance of the latter theoretical approach.
contain the salutary aspects of phenomenology Many studies derived from RFT do have a some-
that we highlight in our target article. Their in- what artificial and elementalistic quality, and
sistence on reducing the affinities we find between lack the holistic and pragmatic configurations of
phenomenology and behaviorism to ACT/RFT the lived world.
consists, in our view, in a scientifictechnical Lpez-Ibors comment (2008) on More Aristo-
argument that is more scientistic than strictly tle, less DSM: The ontology of mental disorders in
philosophical in nature. Their insistence on the constructionist perspective reflects considerable
scientifictechnical argument itself implies an agreement with fundamental aspects of the target
unclarified philosophical assumption. On what paper he addresses; it also includes some important
grounds do experimental data constitute the last clarifications. He begins by acknowledging the
word? Has science discovered the condition of its need for an ontological perspective inspired by an-
own necessity? In our view modern behavioral psy- thropology, and ends by identifying some clinical
Prez-lvarez et al. / Phenomenological-Behavioral Perspective 283
our claim about the failure to consider cultural century), but one would also need to explore the
factors or issues, Vilardaga and Hayes (2008) previous context related to exorcism in the Middle
cite only one very recent work and another still in Ages. It is precisely there that many of the present
press. This essentially vindicates our point about components of hypnosis originate, including the
the slighting of the sociocultural dimension. presumed unwittingness or lack of awareness of
Quite another question is whether, in develop- the person hypnotized, split personality, amnesia,
ing what Vilardaga and Hayes (2008) call in- and so on (Sarbin and Coe 1972). It is the same
creasingly organized statements of relationships with hallucinations. There is a nineteenth-century
among events that allow actions embedded in their scientific current whose influence cannot be over-
historical and situational context to be predicted looked, but we must also consider the previous
and influenced (a goal we share), it is preferable social context which, in this case, we have related
to start out from the world as it presents itself to to emerging qualities of individualism, subjectiv-
people, or whether we should rather give prior- ity, and personal self-consciousness. Saint Teresa
ity to a scientific understanding that reconfigures would thus be an example of this tradition. This
lived reality on the basis of practices and concepts context is very different from those of other eras,
developed in non-everyday contexts. Scientific such as that of Ancient Greece, or other cultural
experimentation has its advantages, of course, traditions in which experiences of visions or hal-
notably the ability to control variables and stan- lucinations also occurwhere the same or similar
dardize procedures. There will, however, always be experiences would have rather different meanings,
considerable ambiguity (and a concomitant call for consequences, and origins (Castillo 2003). Our
complex and fallible forms of judgment) whenever approach emphasizes the socio-cultural context
such procedures come to be applied to the com- as a determinant of subjective experience.
plex and holistic reality of actual life. In our view, Lpez-Ibors commentary (2008b) on From
and following what we have argued elsewhere the visions of Saint Teresa of Jesus to the voices
(Prez-lvarez and Sass 2008), the true context of schizophrenia contributes some reflections
of human life is fundamentally pragmatic and that complement our work, focusing on some of
personal, social, and historical. A truly scientific its essential arguments. Sor Juana Ins de la Cruz,
psychology (in the broadest sense of scientific) of seventeenth-century Mexico, is indeed a very
should therefore give considerable attention to relevant example, for she experienced difficulties
studies of real-world contexts. similar to those of St. Teresa, also due to her fe-
Luque and Villagrn.s comments (2008) on male role. It is also important to emphasize that
From the visions of Saint Teresa of Jesus to the extraordinary experiences can be analyzed from
voices of schizophrenia coincide with our idea the same perspective as normal phenomena
that the current conception of hallucinations is (without, of course, denying the literary and social
a modern one, deriving particularly from nine- value of St. Teresas works).
teenth-century conceptualizations. This does not,
however, mean there are no previous precursors References
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