Review of General Psychology 2012 American Psychological Association

2012, Vol. 16, No. 3, 269 282 1089-2680/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0026766

On Behaviorism in the Cognitive Revolution: Myth and Reactions

Joao Paulo Watrin and Rosangela Darwich

Universidade da Amazonia

For a long time, psychology was a discipline devoted to the study of mind. Behaviorism represented a rupture
in that tradition, redefining psychology as the study of behavior. The rupture, however, would not have been
everlasting. When the cognitive revolution broke out in the 1950s, the study of mental life was renewed in the
form of cognitivism. Since then, it is usually told that the cognitive revolution displaced behaviorism, causing
the latters decline or even its death. Nonetheless, at that same time, behaviorism saw the growth of behavior
analysis, which remained until today as a living behaviorist field. This article analyzes how behaviorism is
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depicted in the story of the cognitive revolution, as well as some of the reactions that portrayal generated
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within behavior analysis. It is argued that the story of the cognitive revolution affirms the importance of
cognitivism and consolidates its historical identity but fosters the movement at the expense of behaviorisms
depiction. At the same time, behavior analysts reactions often contradict the revolutions story and, conse-
quently, offer an alternative but disarticulated version of history. As a result, each side tells a different story,
and the case would be illustrative of how such kind of stories can favor one position while distorting some
notions.

Keywords: behaviorism, behavior analysis, cognitivism, cognitive revolution, history of psychology

The past is never dead. Its not even past. (Faulkner, 1951, p. 92)
In the course of history, there is a clear difficulty to define
psychology. For a long time, it was treated as the study of mind or
human psyche. Some authors, though, saw the emergence of
behaviorism as a revolution in psychological science (e.g., Gard-
ner, 1985; Moore, 1999). Starting with J. B. Watson (1878 1958),
the behaviorist school flourished in the beginning of the 20th
century. It was a remarkable rupture in the history of psychology,
once it put the mind aside of scientific inquiry. From then on,
behaviorism began a tradition of study of behavior, comprising
severaland sometimes even conflictingtheoretical systems
(Moore, 1999). In that context, behavior analysis emerged as one
of the behavioristic approaches, having been developed from the
works of B. F. Skinner (1904 1990). With an emphasis on operant
behavior and an antimentalistic position, it became a forefront
system of behaviorism during the 1950s.
Nevertheless, during the development of behavior analysis, an-
other movement was taking shape in American psychology. If
behaviorism tried to dismiss the study of mental life, many efforts
Joao Paulo Watrin and Rosangela Darwich, Psychology Undergraduate
Program, Center for Health and Biological Sciences, Universidade da
Amazonia, Belem, Para, Brazil.
This article is a result of the first authors undergraduate research at
Universidade da Amazonia, under supervision of the second author. We
thank the very helpful comments of Claudio Watrin on early versions of
this article. The authors also thank some behavior analysts for responding
to requests for information. Joao Paulo Watrin is now at the Psychology
Undergraduate Program, Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences,
Federal University of Para.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joao
Paulo Watrin, Trav. Vileta, 688/409, Belem PA, Brazil, CEP: 66087-422.
E-mail: jpwatrin@yahoo.com.br
269
were being made to restore the mind as the so-called cognitive
processes. That is what many have been calling the cognitive
revolution (e.g., Baars, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Gardner, 1985;
Sperry, 1993). Roughly speaking, the revolution represented the
rise of cognitivism, a movement that comprises not only cognitive
psychology, but also the broader and interdisciplinary endeavor of
cognitive science.
It has been said that the cognitive revolution caused the replace-
ment, decline, or even death of behaviorism, including behavior
analysis (e.g., Baars, 1986; Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Gard-
ner, 1985; Mandler, 2002; Sperry, 1993). Leahey (2000), for his
part, talks about the strange death of radical behaviorism (p.
528), saying that its alleged end is a false belief. Roediger (2004)
asks what happened to behaviorism and, after considering possible
reasons for its decline, concludes that it is alive and well, espe-
cially in the Skinnerian tradition. Some go further and demonstrate
that there was no revolution in the philosophical sense (e.g.,
Leahey, 1992; ODonohue, Ferguson, & Naugle, 2003). Beyond
mere speculation, there were also attempts to investigate the prob-
lem through empirical means. While some showed that behavior-
ism is still growing (Friman, Allen, Kerwin, & Larzelere, 1993;
Wyatt, Hawkins, & Davis, 1986), others pointed out that it has
been declining since the rise of cognitivism (Robins, Gosling, &
Craik, 1999; Tracy, Robins, & Gosling, 2004).
As a result, the same history is told in very different ways.
History, however, is a product of the selective interpretation of an
historian. The facts never speak for themselves. As Carr (1987)
said, the facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is
he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order
or context (p. 11). In this case, the cognitive revolution is also a
story about two schools whose paths cross. Each side stresses
different facts. Both have their interests at stake, given that inter-
pretations are conflicting or disputable.
 270 WATRIN AND DARWICH
Even so, some versions of history become usual or crystallized.
That seems to be the case of the cognitive revolution, the story of
a radical paradigm shift in which behaviorism was displaced in
favor of cognitivism. Given the drama of its narrative, it probably
sounds convincing to unwary ears. In becoming usual, however,
the cognitivist story also made difficult to equally consider other
perspectives about the past. Its romance and simplicity may con-
ceal significant implications to the image of behaviorism, at the
same time that its popularity may have obscured behaviorist ver-
sions of the same facts.
This article analyzes how behaviorism is portrayed in the story
of the cognitive revolution, as well as some of the reactions it
generated within the behaviorist movement. In this context, be-
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havior analysis is taken as representative of the behaviorist point of
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view. Even though behaviorism does not reduce itself to behavior
analysis, the latter has outlived many behaviorist systems, becom-
ing an organized field and producing its own story about the facts
of the revolution. That story will be compared with the one
disseminated by the cognitivist historiography, a group of authors
who fostered the idea of cognitivism as a unified and revolutionary
movement. From this confrontation, it is expected that rhetorical
strategies in storytelling become evident. It is not a question of
who is right or wrong, neither of which approach is better or
worse, but rather of what each side tells and how they tell the same
history. The case could be illustrative of how such kind of stories
can favor one position while distorting some notions, generating
implications for how the history of psychology is told.
For those purposes, the current work is divided in two funda-
mental parts. First, it critically examines the portrayal of behav-
iorism in the cognitivist historiography. It will be argued that the
story of the cognitive revolution asserts the importance of cogni-
tivism and consolidates its historical identity but fosters the move-
ment at the expense of behaviorisms portrayal. Second, the article
presents the revolution from the perspective of a behaviorist do-
main, showing some of the reactions produced inside (or in de-
fense of) behavior analysis. Since the cognitivist story became well
known, those reactions would offer a counterpoint to that narrative
but still constitute a disarticulated story. Before that, however, it
would be useful to know how the paths from behavior analysis and
from cognitivism came across each other.
Parallel Histories
On the Behaviorist Side: From Behaviorism to
Behavior Analysis
As the philosophy of a science of behavior, behaviorism calls for
probably the most drastic change ever proposed in our way of thinking
about man. It is almost literally a matter of turning the explanation of
behavior inside out. (Skinner, 1974, p. 274)
Behavior analysis constitutes a field and a psychological system
devoted to the study of behavior, here defined in terms of func-
tional relations between behavioral and environmental events (Ca-
tania, 1998). As a field, behavior analysis has today three funda-
mental domains: (a) the experimental analysis of behavior, a basic
science devoted to empirical research on behavioral processes,
especially in the laboratory; (b) applied behavior analysis, a tech-
nological domain dedicated to apply behavior-analytic knowledge
to solve practical problems; and (c) the conceptual analysis of
behavior, which performs theoretical reflections about the subject
matter and methods of investigation (Moore, 1999; see also Moore
& Cooper, 2003). Those domains are interrelated and based in
radical behaviorism, a philosophy of science that lays the founda-
tions of behavior analysis.
The history of the field as a whole has its roots in the behaviorist
school. In 1913, Watson published the article Psychology as the
Behaviorist Views It. Attacking the study of consciousness, Wat-
son (1913) redefined psychology as a purely objective experi-
mental branch of natural science (p. 158), proposing the predic-
tion and control of behavior as its goal. That drastic movement
would greatly contribute to the beginning of a new tradition, whose
name seems to have been created by Watson himself: behavior-
ism (Schneider & Morris, 1987).
In the following decades, several psychologists would be iden-
tified as behaviorists. Names such as Clark Hull (1884 1952) and
Edward Tolman (1886 1959) became associated with the behav-
iorist movement, once they developed their own explanatory mod-
els of behavior (e.g., Hull, 1943; Tolman, 1932). New forms of
behaviorism were thus being shaped and were sometimes at odds
with those that already existed (Moore, 1999). In the 1930s, the
contributions of Skinner established his place among those devel-
opments. Conceiving behavior as a lawful process, Skinners ex-
perimental works on reflexes led him to new concepts and methods
of investigation (see Iversen, 1992). Reflexand, subsequently,
all behaviorwas no longer something that happened inside the
organism; rather, it was seen as a relation in which a response is
defined in function of a stimulus and vice versa (Skinner, 1931).
Then, the differentiation of two kinds of reflex established the
basis for the distinction between operants and respondents (Skin-
ner, 1937). If respondent was the traditional reflex (eliciting stim-
ulus 3 response), operant referred to the behavior that is sensitive
to its consequences (antecedent stimulus 3 operant response 7
consequence) (Skinner, 1938, 1953/1965). In 1938, Skinner pub-
lished The Behavior of Organisms, in which he summarized many
of his positions and refined the concept of operant behavior.
Skinnerian behaviorism was acquiring its shape. Its first develop-
ments laid the fundamental concepts and methods of behavior
analysis. Because they relied on basic research, they were also the
first steps of the experimental analysis of behavior.
In the 1940s, the first introductory course based in Skinners
psychology and the first conference on experimental analysis of
behavior took place (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1949; Michael, 1980).
In 1945, Skinner wrote The Operational Analysis of Psychological
Terms, in which, for the first time in print, he defined his thought
as radical behaviorism (Skinner, 1945, p. 294; see also Sch-
neider, & Morris, 1987). The term would designate a philosophy
that, on one hand, defines private events (e.g., thinking, feelings)
as behavior and, therefore, as a legitimate subject matter of a
behavioral analysis, but on the other hand attacks explanatory
mentalism, the explanation of behavior by mental events (cf.
Skinner, 1945, 1974). Private events usually refer to a mental
concept, but they are behavior and, as such, cannot cause other
behavior. That antimentalism would become a central feature of
radical behaviorism.
Then called operant psychology, Skinnerian behaviorism was
put to the test during the 1950s. Applications and extensions of
Skinners principles were being developed, such as those with
 ON BEHAVIORISM IN THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
psychiatric patients (see Rutherford, 2003). Many of those appli-
cations were successful. As Morris (2003) noted, the applicability
of operant psychology was a result of its success as a science, and
then a reason for its success as a paradigm and approach (p. 291).
It is remarkable that, at that same time, Skinner wrote books with
applications of his principles to human daily life. In 1953, he
published Science and Human Behavior (Skinner, 1953/1965), a
book with interpretations of social institutions as varied as educa-
tion and religion. Four years later, it was the time for Verbal
Behavior (Skinner, 1957), the application of his principles to
language. The prominence of Skinner and his work began to rise
and the foundations for applied behavior analysis were laid (Mor-
ris, Smith, & Altus, 2005).
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Therefore, Skinner would become central to the development of
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behavior analysis. The field, however, was not yet structured. Indeed,
the term behavior analysis only appeared in the 1970s (Morris,
Todd, Midgley, Schneider, & Johnson, 1990).1 Moreover, a field
constitutes itself as such when it starts to become organized, that is, to
have its own associations and journals. That began in the late 1950s.
In 1957, it was established the Society for the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior (SEAB) and, one year later, the Journal of the Experi-
mental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB). In 1968, it came the time for
founding the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA). Experi-
mental analysis of behavior and applied behavior analysis then be-
came institutionalized (see also Laties, 2008; Laties & Mace, 1993).
Other behavior-analytic associations and journals were to be created,
such as the Midwest Association for Behavior Analysis (MABA) in
1974, which would become the Association for Behavior Analysis
(ABA). Its respective journal, The Behavior Analyst (TBA), was
founded in 1978 (Morris et al., 2001).
Thus, behavior analysis constituted itself by the gradual establish-
ment of its domains, being consolidated as a field in the late 1970s.
Although Skinner became synonymous with behavior analysis, the
field exceeded its pioneer.2 Behavior analysis took on a life of its own.
Other people took part in the spreading of the field, such as Fred
Keller (1899 1996), Charles Ferster (19221981), William Schoen-
feld (19151996), and Murray Sidman (1923). They disseminated its
knowledge, just as developed new concepts and methods (e.g., Sid-
man & Tailby, 1982). Skinner, however, remained as the fields main
spokesman. Schultz and Schultz (2004), for instance, asserted that,
despite. . .criticisms, Skinner remained the uncontested champion of
behavioral psychology from the 1950s to the 1980s. During this
period, American psychology was shaped more by his work than by
the ideas of any other psychologist (p. 344).
Behavior analysis was, in a manner, at the cutting edge of
behaviorism from the 1950s onward, at the same time that propo-
nents of other behaviorisms (e.g., Hull, Tolman) were dying one
by one (Morris, 2003). Nevertheless, while behavior analysis
flourished, a series of events were already shaping a new approach
to the study of the mind. Taken as a revolution, that other move-
ment represented the birth of cognitivism (see Figure 1 for the
parallel timelines of behavior analysis and cognitivism).
On the Cognitivist Side: The Road to the Revolution
I believe that. . .the current so-called cognitive, mentalist, or con-
sciousness revolution is the most radical turnaroundthe most revi-
sionary and transformative. (Sperry, 1993, p. 878)
271
The cognitivist movement was, in fact, a series of developments
that simultaneously took place in various disciplines, such as
psychology, linguistics, computer science, philosophy, anthropol-
ogy, and neuroscience (Gardner, 1985; Miller, 2003). Each disci-
pline would provide a different perspective about cognition, a
distinct level and object of analysis. Thus, since its beginnings, the
movement would reveal itself as a very heterogeneous group of
researchers and works.
There seems to be general agreement that cognitivism began to
flourish from the middle 1950s to the 1960s (see, e.g., Baars, 1986;
Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Miller, 2003; Thagard, 2005). At
that time, computers were being developed at full steam. Because
the brain was compared to the computer, the latter became the
vehicle for the reintroduction of mind, and a vital agent of behav-
iorisms overthrow (Crowther-Heyck, 1999, p. 37). The analogy
between mind and computer came to be a central feature of
cognitivism. Computers would inspire the movements terminol-
ogy, and cognitivism was early associated to the expression infor-
mation processing (Baars, 1986; Mandler, 2002). The device be-
came a main instrument of research and, fundamentally, served as
a model for explaining human thought (see Friedenberg & Silver-
man, 2006; Gardner, 1985; Sternberg, 2009). The computer met-
aphor was born and would become an alternative to behaviorist
explanations.
Deviations from behaviorism were already visible in the 1940s,
such as in the Hixon Symposium of 1948 at the California Institute
of Technology (see Gardner, 1985; Mandler, 2002). It was, how-
ever, in the 1950s that major events began to happen. In 1956,
cognitivism had its annus mirabilis. The Symposium on Informa-
tion Theory occurred in that year at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and was attended by many of the future leading
figures of the cognitivist movement, such as George Miller
(1920 ), Noam Chomsky (1928 ), Herbert Simon (1916 2001),
and Allen Newell (19271992). In that same year, many works
based on new approaches were published, such as Millers (1956)
article The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two and
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austins (1956/1986) book A Study of
Thinking. 1956 became the birthdate of the cognitivist move-
ment (Miller, 2003). Gardner (1986) observed that seldom have
amateur historians achieved such consensus. There has been nearly
unanimous agreement among the surviving principals that cogni-
tive science was officially recognized around 1956 (p. 28).
In 1959, a major controversy involving Skinnerian behaviorism
would begin. Two years after Skinners (1957) publication of
Verbal Behavior, Chomsky (1959) published a review of that
book, rejecting Skinnerian assumptions about language. Skinner
did not publicly reply to the attack, a posture that would bring
many costs to his position. As Gardner (1985) pointed out, the
fact that Skinner never responded publicly to the review signaled
to many interested researchers the theoretical bankruptcy of the
1
It is noteworthy, for example, that Skinner did not use to speak of
behavior analysis but rather referred to a science of behavior (e.g.,
Skinner, 1975, 1987).
2
Therefore, Skinnerian behaviorism would be an inadequate term for
behavior analysis. The former would properly refer to Skinners body of
work, whereas the latter would refer to a field developed from his propos-
als. Still, both phrases will be used here interchangeably.
 272 WATRIN AND DARWICH
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Figure 1. Some of the parallel developments in behavior analysis and cognitivism from the 1930s until the
1970s.
behaviorist position (p. 191). The review became one of the
movements landmarks, and Chomsky was regarded as a pioneer
(see Palmer, 2006).
During the 1960s, the movement picked up steam and received
its current name (Bruner, 1986; Gardner, 1985). In 1960, Miller
and Jerome Bruner (1915) founded the Center for Cognitive
Studies at Harvard University. In 1967, Ulric Neisser (1928 )
published Cognitive Psychology, defining the movements subject
matter as all processes by which the sensory input is transformed,
reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. . .. Such terms as
sensation, perception, imagery, retention, recall, problem-solving,
and thinking, among many others, refer to hypothetical stages or
aspects of cognition (Neisser, 1967, p. 4). Other important pub-
lications were made (e.g., Miller, Pribram, & Galanter, 1960), and
cognitivist research began to receive strong financial support.
Up to that time, cognitivism was a somewhat quiet and
unconscious movement (see Baars, 1986). According to
Miller (2003), at the time it was happening I did not realize
that I was, in fact, a revolutionary. . .. (p. 141). Then, the
1970s saw the movements consolidation. Journals based in its
new perspectives were established in that decade, such as
Cognitive Psychology (1970) and Cognition (1971). Also at that
time, the term cognitive science was coined. It referred to an
interdisciplinary endeavor whose subject matter was the nature
of knowledge and, ultimately, the mind (see Gardner, 1985;
Miller, 2003). Given its interdisciplinary character, the mind
was approached by multiple perspectives. In spite of the move-
ments general interest by psychological phenomena, cognitive
psychology became the expression of cognitivism in the spe-
cific discipline of psychology.
 ON BEHAVIORISM IN THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
Still, from all developments in the 1970s, it was remarkable the
growing awareness about the movements impact, specifically the
changes it provoked in psychology. An alleged behavioristic dom-
inance seemed to be shaken, and discussions about a possible
scientific revolution in experimental psychology were being
made (e.g., Palermo, 1971; Segal & Lachman, 1972). Decades
after Watsons (1913) dismissal of consciousness and introspec-
tion, both seemed to make a return (Lieberman, 1979; Natsoulas,
1978). It was being said that behaviorisms dominance was eroded,
giving way to competing formulations, such as those of cognitiv-
ism (Segal & Lachman, 1972). Even in the American Psycholog-
ical Association (APA) presidential address, there was already talk
about a cognitive revolution (McKeachie, 1976, p. 829).
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Behaviorism in the Cognitivist Historiography
The quarrel between cognitivism and behaviorism became cen-
tral to understanding the revolution. Behaviorism would have been
greatly affected, and impacts would be thus extensible to behavior
analysis. Alleged changes are drastic, but assumptions are some-
times inconsistent. This analysis evaluates recurring features of
behaviorism as it is portrayed in the cognitivist historiography.
Although not present in every account, those elements are suffi-
ciently repeated to constitute a widespread version of history,
whose structure will be reviewed here (see Table 1 for a list of
references here cited that show some of these elements). Empirical
verifications on the revolutions claims will be also briefly as-
sessed, as wells as the historiographical functions of the cognitivist
story.
The Nature and Target of the Cognitivist Movement
There is no consensus about the nature of the cognitivist move-
ment. It is usually understood as a scientific revolution in the
Kuhnian sense, implying that psychology had undergone a para-
digm shift (e.g., Baars, 1986; Palermo, 1971; see also Kuhn, 1970).
Some, however, argue that it was rather a counterrevolution,
because it was a response to an earlier behaviorist revolution
(e.g., Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Miller, 2003). There is also
controversy over the adequacy of the term revolution, given that
there were no cataclysmic events, leaders, or radicalisms (Mandler,
2002, 2007). Despite the disagreement, revolution still seems to
be the most common label, having widespread use in literature
Table 1
Some Recurring Features of Behaviorism in the Cognitivist Historiography
Features of behaviorism
a
Generic label for different and conflicting theoretical systems
Former hegemonic force in psychology (includes generic label)
Displaced or defunct school (includes generic label)
All features above
a
Friman et al. (1993) and Spear (2007) also used generic labels for the behaviorist school (e.g., behavioral psychology). Nevertheless, because they are
critical of the cognitivist historiography, they were not included here. b Segal and Lachman (1972) speak rather of neobehavioristic dominance. They
recognized that neobehaviorism comprised several and conflicting systems, at the same time they also treat it as a paradigm, with common features across
its many differences.
273
(see, e.g., Baars, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Gardner, 1985; Sperry,
1993).
In any case, the cognitivist movement is usually depicted in
terms of its conflictive relationship with behaviorism, including
the Skinnerian tradition. Mandler (2002) even defines a revolution
with such a relation, stating that the well-documented cognitive
revolution was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes
and trends that were present before the advent of behaviorism and
that were alive and well outside of the United States, where
behaviorism had not developed any coherent support (p. 339).
The revolution was thus the birth of a new mentalistic approach,
which developed in parallel to an antimentalistic tradition, that is,
behaviorism itself. It was, in a sense, natural that some reciprocal
opposition to behaviorism appeared. Bruner (1990), however, says
that it was not a revolution against behaviorism with the aim of
transforming behaviorism into a better way of pursuing psychol-
ogy by adding a little mentalism to it (p. 2), but he soon con-
cludes: I think it should be clear to you by now that we were not
out to reform behaviorism, but to replace it [emphasis added]
(p. 3). Certainly, someone who wants to replace behaviorism does
not support it or, at least, has a better proposal.
The Generic (and Misrepresented) Nature of
Behaviorism
In that context, oppositions are rather to a generically defined
behaviorism. It is usually understood in its broad sense, sometimes
as a metatheory or as a paradigm. Consequently, behaviorism
does not refer to any particular behaviorist system or psychologist
and, at the same time, it seems to refer to all of them. Baars (1986)
acknowledges the ambiguity of the term, saying the following:
Behaviorism is a fairly good label for the scientific metatheory that
dominated psychology between 1913 and 1960, but a closer look
shows that there are many varieties of behaviorism: . . .the reader
should be sensitive to possible ambiguities (p. 5).
Sperry (1993), for his part, asserts the following:
[W]hen I speak of behaviorism here, I mean behaviorism per se, in the
sense of an overriding paradigm, metatheory, or working framework
for psychology in general. The reference is not [emphasis added] to
any of the various subordinate theories, practices, and approaches to
behavior, learning, or brain function that may have become associated
References
Pinker, 1999
Bruner, 1986; McKeachie, 1976; Palermo, 1971; Sternberg, 2009; Thagard, 2005
Miller, 2003
Baars, 1986; Crowther-Heyck, 1999; Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Gardner,
1985; Mandler, 2002, 2007; Pinker, 2003; Robins, Gosling, & Craik, 1999;
Segal & Lachman, 1972b; Sperry, 1993; Tracy, Robins, & Gosling, 2004
 274 WATRIN AND DARWICH
incidentally by coming into vogue during the half-century reign of
behaviorism (p. 880).
As a result, accounts of the revolution usually refer to behav-
iorism or behaviorists only. It is not uncommon, for instance,
that they talk about behaviorist dogmas (Mandler, 2002, p. 339),
without much reference to any particular system. A host of differ-
ent and conflicting systems is grouped under a single label, as if
they all shared the same position. Being vaguely defined, behav-
iorism is frequently treated as a homogeneous school, as a linear
tradition. The term behaviorism, however, refers to a variety of
conflicting positions (Leigland, 2003; but see also Moore, 1999).
Indeed, after Watsons (1913) first use, many theories related to
the study of behavior were taken as behaviorists.3 Since the term
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began to be largely used, its ambiguity was soon recognized, seen
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that there was no single-enterprise called behaviorism (e.g.,
Hunter, 1922; Spence, 1948; Williams, 1931). Woodworth (1924)
summarized the problem:
[I]f I am asked whether I am a behaviorist, I have to reply that I do not
know, and do not much care. If I am, it is because I believe in the
several projects put forward by behaviorists. If I am not, it is partly
because I also believe in other projects which behaviorists seem to
avoid, and partly because I cannot see any one big thing, to be called
behaviorism . . . (p. 264).
Spence (1948) also noted that the term was mostly used when
someone defines his or her oppositions to an effective (or alleged)
behaviorism. Even so, later developments were identified with
behaviorism, such as behavior analysis itself. Therefore, the
term would still designate a very heterogeneous set of positions. Its
indiscriminate use, on the other hand, overlooks the historical
complexity and diversity of the behaviorist school.
Moreover, references to a generic behaviorism set biases in the
analysis of behavioristic systems. When behaviorism is vaguely
defined, it is easier to misrepresent any system by attributing
features of other positions to it. Properties of particular systems are
ascribed to all. Pinker (1999), for example, says the following:
Skinner and other behaviorists insisted that all talk about mental
events was sterile speculation; only stimulusresponse connection
could be studied in the lab and the field. Exactly the opposite turned
out to be true. Before computational ideas were imported in the 1950s
and 1960s by Newell and Simon and the psychologists George Miller
and Donald Broadbent, psychology was dull, dull, dull (p. 84).
Generalizations like that are likely to produce misattributions.
Indeed, the stimulusresponse connections were the subject-matter
of Watsons behaviorism, but Pinker (1999) seems to neglect that
some behavioral systems had other theoretical emphases, as was
the case of Hullian, Tolmanian, and Skinnerian behaviorisms. On
the other hand, general features of behaviorism are also postulated
as if they were a strict rule. It is the case of saying, for example,
that behaviorism focuses only on the relation between observable
behavior [emphasis added] and environmental events or stimuli
(Sternberg, 2009, p. 8). That argument ignores that Skinner (1945,
1974), for instance, made private events (e.g., thinking, feeling) a
legitimate subject-matter too.4
In this manner, misattributions usually take the form of hasty or
sweeping generalizations, as if all behaviorists shared a certain
position. Those kinds of arguments are fallacious, once their
exceptions put their validity at stake. Furthermore, the notion of
generic behaviorism itself is a fallacy, having the form of a straw
man argument. Given its vague definition, the behaviorism at-
tacked by cognitivists is often a simplification, a superficial ver-
sion of a complex set of theoretical systems. In the conventional
historiography, it is that representation that is often refuted by the
cognitivists instead of any behavioristic system in particular.
In spite of the prior disputable use of the word behaviorism,
the conventional historiography seems to have taken advantage of
the terms ambiguity to legitimate the idea of a revolution. A
generic behaviorism was, then, presented, underlying fallacious
arguments. This ambiguous treatment is dangerous for behavior
analysis and modern behaviorism, because it creates and strength-
ens academic folklore (see also Todd & Morris, 1992). Its decep-
tive character gives rise to misrepresentations.
Alleged Behavioristic Dominance
Grounded in the idea of a generic behaviorism is the assumption
of a behavioristic hegemony. Behaviorism is said to have domi-
nated American psychology, reigning before the advent of
cognitivism. Baars (1986) began his book saying that for at least
50 years, until very recently, scientific psychology was dominated
by a philosophy of science known as behaviorism (p. 1), even
when, later in that same book, Skinner asserts in an interview that
behaviorism was never really dominant (as cited in Baars, 1986,
p. 88).
When behaviorism is vaguely defined, it is also easier to assume
its previous hegemony, as well as its later decline or even its
death. Conversely, it also becomes more difficult to assess the
dominance. It would be necessary to define in which terms behav-
iorism was dominant, to what extent it was hegemonic. That
presupposes the need for evaluating such factors as the period of
dominance, its reach (e.g., experimental psychology, psychology
as a whole), the means by which it was expressed (e.g., journal
citations, presence in graduate programs), and, fundamentally,
which behavioristic position(s) was (were) dominantif any.
Notwithstanding, historical accounts show little agreement on
those parameters. Although there are variations, the period of
dominance is usually situated between the 1920s and the 1950s
(see, e.g., Gardner, 1985; Mandler, 2002). The range of that
hegemony is not so consensual. Some have pointed that it was, in
a sense, restricted to experimental psychology (e.g., Palermo,
1971; Mandler, 2007). Others, however, simply talk of behavior-
ism having dominated psychology in general (e.g., Pinker, 2003).
Apparently, there are not many references to which form of
behaviorism reigned before the revolution. Gardner (1985), for
instance, talks about the dominance of Watsons agenda, asserting
that, later,
3
It is of small wonder, for instance, that Leahey (2000) talks about
behavioralism instead of characterizing as behaviorism all study or practice
related to behavior. Behavioralism would be the broader trend of interest in
the explanation of behavior.
4
Observable behavior is an ambiguous phrase, being usually used as
a synonym for overt, public behavior. Although not public, private events
are also observable if one considers that the behaving organism has access
to them.
 ON BEHAVIORISM IN THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
A whole generation of scientiststhe leading psychologists of the
next generationwere trained in the orbit of Watson; and investiga-
tors like Clark Hull, B. F. Skinner, Kenneth Spence, and E. L.
Thorndike helped to ensure that the psychology of America between
1920 and 1950 was irremedially behaviorist. Child care, treatment of
prisoners, teaching of children, and many other societal activities
came to be dominated by behavioristic rhetoric and behaviorist prac-
tices (p. 110).
As can be seen, when talking about dominance, Gardner put
together very different behavioristic positions in the same passage.
It is not clear which of those systems dominated, neither how,
where nor when they had their hegemony. Were they all reigning
at one time? Mandler (2002) asserts that the Hull-Spence position
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dominated during the 1930s and 1940s, and that would be the
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supposed target of the cognitivist movement. Later, only Skinner
would have maintained some influence. Sternberg (2009), for his
part, seems to suggest that Skinnerian behaviorism was dominant,
stating that, largely because of Skinners towering presence,
behaviorism dominated the discipline of psychology for several
decades (p. 9). Thagard (2005) does not even indicate a repre-
sentative system, saying only that behaviorism dominated the
psychological scene through the 1950s (p. 6). Therefore, the
question of behaviorisms hegemony still remains to be solved. As
Greenwood (1999) once noted, one might wonder to what extent
the behavioristic hegemony adequately reflects the variety of be-
havioristic positions or the rhetoric of those who attain powerful
positions within psychology.
Despite all divergences, the behavioristic dominance seems to
be a common ground in the cognitivist historiography. It is a
widespread assumption, being present not only in historical ac-
counts (e.g., Mandler, 2007), but also in introductory books to
cognitive science (e.g., Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006) and texts
for popular audiences (e.g., Pinker, 2003). Presentation of evi-
dence, however, is quite rare and, even so, inconsistent.5 Its most
knownand perhaps onlyproof is the oral and textbooks tra-
dition of assuming that hegemony. So much so that only recently
empirical studies put the claim of behavioristic fall to the test (e.g.,
Friman et al., 1993; Robins, Gosling, & Craik, 1999). The lack of
evidence puts the question of dominance at stake. It is an assump-
tion par excellence, because it is a claim taken for granted.
Nevertheless, even if all those issues were solved, dominance
itself is a troublesome notion. To assume that one school or theory
is dominant presupposes that psychology is a unified discipline, a
long-time disputed assumption (Spear, 2007). Furthermore, much
of the behaviorist movement appeared to be restricted to experi-
mental psychology, contradicting the idea that it dominated the
whole discipline. As Miller (2003) himself considered, it is im-
portant to remember that the mind had never disappeared from
social or clinical psychology. It was only experimentalists in the
U.S. who really believed that behaviorism would work (p. 142).
Even so, behaviorism did not become dominant. Studies about
mentalistic themes, such as consciousness or even animal cogni-
tion, never disappeared from the experimental field (see, e.g.,
Dewsbury, 2000; Leahey, 1992; Lovie, 1983).
Still, the idea of a behavioristic dominance also allows the
idea of a cognitivistic dominance, given that hegemonic behav-
iorism would not have been everlasting. For some, the seeds of
failure were inherent in the own behaviorist program and might
have grown because of Watsons attitude (cf. Gardner, 1985;
275
Mandler, 2002). In any case, the revolution is taken as the
cause or, at least, as the aggravating circumstancefor the
overthrow of behaviorism (e.g., Baars, 1986; Sperry, 1993). As
Gardner (1985) put it,
[C]ognitive psychologists have won the battle on their chosen field
within psychology. While behaviorism still has appeal as a method for
dealing with various clinical populations, its theoretical superstructure
and its experimental strictures no longer exert much influence within
the research community. Nearly all researchers accept the needand
the advisability of positing a level of mental representation (p. 130).
So, in the cognitivist historiography, victory would be cognitiv-
ist and behaviorism would fall. With all its remaining systems, it
was declared dead or displaced and, therefore, just another part of
history. Its fall became, then, one of the most remarkable impacts
of the cognitive revolution, while cognitivistic dominance would
become just a natural consequence. In that context, there is prac-
tically no doubt about the place that behaviorism had in the history
(see, e.g., Hergenhahn, 2009; Schultz & Schultz, 2004). It was
influential to the extent of constituting itself as a historical land-
mark. Influence, however, does not necessarily mean hegemony.
Behaviorism had and has unquestionable influence, but its domi-
nance is disputable. The same is true for cognitivism.
Empirical Verifications of the Revolution
As there seems to be a good deal of speculation in the cognitivist
historiography, the cognitive revolution has been addressed in
empirical investigations on the history of psychology. In 1987,
Boneau (1992) conducted a survey with senior psychologists about
developments in the past 25 years. The emergence of cognitivism
and the waning of behaviorism appeared as some of the most
surprising events in the then recent history, being consequently
recognized as facts by psychologys community.
Quantitative analyses on trends in psychology have been also
carried out. Friman et al. (1993), for instance, performed a citation
analysis to test the hypothesis of a Kuhnian revolution. The results
showed the growth of cognitive psychology. On the other hand,
there was no evidence for the death or decline of behavioral
psychology, refuting the revolutions hypothesis. Robins, Gos-
ling, and Craik (1999) developed another method for a quantitative
analysis of history, using citation analysis and keyword searches.
The results also pointed to the steady growth of cognitivism but
showed the decline of behaviorism. In the 1970s, that decline
would give way to the ascendant trajectory of cognitivism, thus
confirming the revolutions hypothesis. Those latter results also
appeared in a later replication (Tracy, Robins, & Gosling, 2004).
Although praiseworthy, those studies did not escape criticisms
about their implications. As Spear (2007) pointed out, the primary
concern, of course, is the question of what, if any, approach
5
Mandler (2002), for instance, tries to substantiate the claim of behav-
ioristic rise and fall by presenting the percentage of nonhuman subjects in
Journal of Experimental Psychologys articles. Behaviorism, however, is
not restricted to animal research and vice versa (e.g., Lattal & Perone,
1998; Wasserman & Zentall, 2006). Furthermore, the author tries to com-
pare the influence (here as synonymous for dominance) of Skinner, Hull,
and Spence by the number of literature citations, but references to an author
do not necessarily imply a favorable reading.
 276 WATRIN AND DARWICH

currently dominates psychology (p. 364). Also the portrayal of
behaviorism was called into question, because it is, once again,
generically depicted (e.g., behavioral psychology, behavior-
ism). Leigland (2000), for example, discussed the assumption that
behaviorism was a monolithic school that once dominated psy-
chology, being later overthrown by cognitivism. Given those con-
flicting and disputable results, Spear (2007) critically reevaluated
Robins, Gosling, and Craiks (1999) analyses, replicating and
modifying some of their measures. It was demonstrated that cog-
nitivism did not come to dominate psychology, although it has
been steadily growing in popularity. There were also no evidences
for an eclipse of behaviorism.
In this manner, the rise of cognitivism is a widely recognized
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enlightened rebirth of classical values. Dark Ages, for its part,
implies a period of ignorance, a cultural stagnation during the
Middle Ages. Still, the Middle Ages were not a cultural hiatus,
seen, for instance, in its literary productivity (cf. Hay, 1977;
Treadgold, 1984). Indeed, the term Dark Ages was coined by
humanists trying to assign their place in history, given that the
contrast with Renaissances lights would serve as a sharp chrono-
logical demarcation (Mommsen, 1942; but see also Ferguson,
1939). More than showing facts, a dark era makes the lights of
Renaissance even brighter.6
The story of the cognitive revolution is not so different. Indeed,
some had already recognized the similarity between the two sto-
ries, talking about a supposed behaviorist dark age and a cog-

fact. Nevertheless, there is little agreement on the death, fall, or

nitive renaissance (see, e.g., Marx & Cronan-Hillix, 1987; Roe-
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replacement of behaviorism, as well as on whether there is a

dominant school in psychology. Those studies are naturally of
historical relevance but are too inconsistent to make the claims of
a cognitive revolution historically accurate. Such inconsistency
could be largely a result of the complexity of their subject-matter
and the simplification of their assumptions. This is clear when
most of them seem to assume that psychology is a unified science
with uniform traditions, in which schools can compete for influ-
ence or hegemony. Psychology is much broader than the simple
struggle between its traditions. It is more likely that most psychol-
ogists work in areas other than cognitive or behavioral psychology,
even if they were influenced by those traditions. Moreover, in spite
of their intended objectivity, those studies are also not immune to
the interests of any tradition, which could profit from one or other
kind of data.
Historiographical Functions
As every version of history, the revolutions story has its func-
tions, its purposes in disseminating a certain interpretation. Its
narrative was structured in a given way to fulfill those functions.
To evaluate them, one should take into account the storys impli-
cations, who tells it, and how its authors or characters could profit
from it. A comparison may shed light upon those aspects.
In the revolutions drama, behaviorism takes a central role as
antagonist. Because it dominated psychology for decades, it pre-
vented or retarded scientific progress, turning research away from
the mind. Psychologys classical subject-matter was set aside, and
an era of behavioristic orthodoxy began. In the history of the
discipline, that gap would be necessary to provoke a renewed
interest in mental life. Now called cognition, mind was brought
back. Cognitivism would perform its rebirth, its rescue from the
darkness. After a revolution, psychology could finally retake its
course of progress. In the revolutions narrative, history is told by
contrast.
That picture is not new. It resembles much of the traditional
Renaissance historiography, the depiction of the cultural, human-
istic movement that spanned from the 14th to the 17th centuries.
The French term for rebirth, Renaissance alludes to the move-
ments revival of classical values (Brotton, 2006). It is often
contrasted to the Dark Ages, the previous period of waning of many historians prefer to talk about Middle Ages instead of Dark
classical culture in the Middle Ages. Metaphors of darkness, lights,
and rebirth were already found in early Renaissances texts (see,
e.g., Burke, 1964). The contrast, however, conceals important
implications. Renaissance conveys the idea of renovation, of an
diger, 2004). The cognitivist historiography tells a story at the
expense of behaviorisms portrayal, that is, regardless of its his-
torical complexity and diversity. Behaviorism became an empty
abstraction which, taken as reality, served as repository for cog-
nitivist myths. Just as the Dark Ages, it became a synonym for
hiatus, a period of mostly sterile contributions. Cognitivism meant
the rebirth of mind and valuable research, putting an end to the
behaviorist stagnation. Although disputable, a cognitive revolution
also casts cognitivism in better lights, assigning the place of the
movement in the history of psychology. Thus, the narratives first
function is that of chronological demarcation, namely to establish
the revolution as a historical watershed.
Consequently, the narrative also supports the progressive view
of history, promoting the cognitivist research program. It estab-
lishes cognitivism as an undeniable advance, an indelible part of
psychologys progress. That would be a natural interest of cogni-
tivist researchers. It is no wonder, for instance, that the authors of
many historical accounts are linked to cognitivist research or the
revolution itself (e.g., Baars, 1986; Gardner, 1985; Mandler, 2002;
Miller, 2003). The story is also repeated in introductory books of
cognitive science (e.g., Friedenberg & Silverman, 2006; Sternberg,
2009; Thagard, 2005). The revolutions story asserts the impor-
tance of the cognitivist agenda, even if that implies the misrepre-
sentation of previous historyin this case, behaviorism. In this
manner, a second function is to boost the cognitivist movement.
As some have argued (e.g., Leahey, 1992; Spear, 2007), that
story is an origin myth. As such, it developed from erroneous or
imperfect beliefs, which are based on idealizations, oversimplifi-
cations, and misrepresentations, as well as on oral and textbooks
traditions (see Evans, 2004). Its claims are mostly disputable.
Nevertheless, that story still tells and disseminates the origins of
the movement, because some events became widely recognized
landmarks. Therefore, a third function is to constitute and consol-
idate a historical identity for the emerging tradition of cognitivism.
In short, it is suggested that the revolutions narrative serves to
three primary functions:
6
It is noteworthy that the use of both terms became so controversial that
Ages, and Early Modern Age instead of Renaissance (Brotton, 2006).
Indeed, if one admits a Dark Age and a Renaissance, it would be
necessary to talk about several dark ages and renaissances during the lively
Middle Ages (Treadgold, 1984).
 ON BEHAVIORISM IN THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
To assign a place in history for cognitivism, given that it
establishes the revolution as a watershed;
To boost the cognitivist agenda, because it glorifies the move-
ment at the expense of behaviorisms portrayal;
To constitute and consolidate a historical identity for the
movement, given that the story is a collection of landmark events.
Reactions From the Behaviorist Side
We need to change our behavior, and we can do so only by changing
our physical and social environments. We choose the wrong path at
the very start when we suppose that our goal is to change the minds
and hearts of men and women rather than the world in which they
live (Skinner, 1977, p. 10).
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This section shows another story. On the behaviorist side, be-
havior analysis was still flourishing when the events of the so-
called cognitive revolution took place. Because the cognitivist
historiography is critical of behaviorism, it was unlikely that
behavior analysts would not react. And they did. The reactions
here presented were written not only by behavior analysts but also
by other scholars interested in the quarrel. In some sense, they
would favor this alternative story.
Reception of Cognitivism
For behavior analysts, cognition is behavior and, as such, a
legitimate subject matter to their science (see, e.g., Palmer, 2003).
Cognitivism, for its part, was soon qualified as a new form of
mentalism, being thus opposed to the behavioranalytic stand-
point. Reactions to cognitivism seem to have increased from the
1970s onward, simultaneously to the growing awareness of a
cognitive revolution and to charges of behaviorisms decline. It
would begin a tense and ambiguous relationship between behavior
analysis and the study of cognition.
Skinner addressed the cognitivist issue in many of his texts (e.g.,
Skinner, 1977, 1985, 1987, 1990). His criticism revolved around
central features of the cognitivist program, such as the explanatory
role of cognitive processes, the importance of rules in explaining
behavior, the computer metaphor, and contributions from brain
and computer sciences. At some times, the author also charged
cognitivism of being an ineffective approach, saying, for instance,
that the appeal to cognitive states and processes is a diversion
which could well be responsible for much of our failure to solve
our problems (Skinner, 1977, p. 10). Given the limited number of
references in Skinners work, it is sometimes difficult to determine
which version(s) of cognitivism he criticized. Indeed, the same
case made against the cognitivist historiography could be made
against Skinner. Cognitivism comprised very different develop-
ments and theoretical positions that eventually became interrelated
(Greenwood, 1999). Still, Skinners work seems to suggest the
illusion of a generic and unified cognitivism.
Nevertheless, reactions from other behavior analysts would be
more specific. Many of them were responses to particular ques-
tions or charges against behaviorism, assuming a critical tone in
general. Some took the shape of book reviews. In reviewing
Mackenzies (1977) account on the decline of behaviorism, Zuriff
(1979), for example, asserted that it was a paradox to review such
a book in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, a
healthy behaviorist journal. Morgan and Buskist (1990), for their
277
part, charged Baars (1986) account on the cognitive revolution of
misrepresenting behaviorism but noted that there is much in the
cognitive literature that, upon close inspection, cannot easily be
differentiated from the experimental concerns of behavior analy-
sis (p. 199). In his review of Gardners (1985) book, Shimp
(1989) also pointed out the misrepresentation of behavior analysis
and of behaviorism in general, asserting that behavior analysts
may occasionally need to control an urge to fling the book down
and dismiss it (p. 163). Salzinger (1973) started a review of
Neissers (1967) book with a more conciliatory tone, saying that
the research in cognitive psychology is certainly interesting, on
the whole well executed, and very challenging. It is well within the
scope of a behavioristic approach. It merely awaits more attention
from behaviorists (p. 369). Still, he also criticized the cognitivist
approach, ending in the best Skinnerian fashion: Are theories of
cognition necessary? (p. 377).
Among the reactions, there were also works that analyzed the
cognitive revolution itself, dismissing it in the philosophical sense
(e.g., Leahey, 1992; ODonohue, Ferguson, & Naugle, 2003). In
those cases, the cognitivist movement was found to be incompat-
ible with key models of scientific revolution (e.g., Kuhn, 1970;
Laudan, 1977). Other works dealt with related misconceptions
about behaviorism. Amsel (1992), for example, noted that the
behaviorism attacked by cognitivists is a caricature from Watso-
nian and Skinnerian behaviorisms. Some have tried to dismiss the
alleged death or decline of behaviorism by empirical means. They
showed that, in the period of the cognitive revolution, references to
Skinner increased (Thyer, 1991) and that professional associations
and publications devoted to behaviorism were both multiplying
(Wyatt, Hawkins, & Davis, 1986). It is noteworthy that cognitiv-
ists were not alone in misrepresenting behaviorism (see, e.g., Todd
& Morris, 1983), but it is not rare to find behaviorist rebuttals to
cognitivist allegations.
In their effort to react, behavior analysts have shown that cog-
nitivism and its portrayal of behaviorism did not go unnoticed. The
cognitivist issue became so significant that, during the late 1970s,
there was an increase in the use of cognitive keywords in the
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, one of the main
behavior-analytic outlets (Morris, Higgins, & Bickel, 1982). The
importance of the theme also became evident with a special issue
of that journal about cognition and behavior analysis in 1989.
Their editors did not hesitate to say Cognition and behavior
analysis have a continuing, close, and perhaps difficult, relation-
ship (White, McCarthy, & Fantino, 1989, p. 197).
The ChomskySkinner Controversy
Among the reactions, the ChomskySkinner issue has received
special attention in behavior-analytic literature. Indeed, since
Chomsky (1959) reviewed Skinners (1957) Verbal Behavior, it
became the major controversy involving behavior analysis in the
cognitive revolution. The impact it provoked can be assessed by
the body of works discussing the question. Those works usually
offer alternative views, pointing to the misconceptions, to biases,
and to the rhetoric involved in the controversy.
In this context, a major issue is Skinners apparent silence in
front of the review. Nevertheless, he commented on the episode far
from mainstream outlets, stating, for example, that Chomskys
review was not really a review of my book but of what Chomsky
 278 WATRIN AND DARWICH
took, erroneously, to be my position (Skinner, 1972, p. 32; but see
also Czubaroff, 1988). But, if Skinner has not answered publicly,
others would do it. MacCorquodale (1970) produced a detailed
rebuttal of Chomskys text, concluding that the theory criticized
in the review was an amalgam of some rather outdated behavior-
istic lore. . . (p. 98). Approved by Skinner (1972) himself, Mac-
Corquodales reply was submitted to Language, the same journal
where Chomskys review was published. Notwithstanding, for
reasons unknown, the editors rejected MacCorquodales manu-
script, which was eventually published in the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior (Palmer, 2006). Given the
prominence attained by Chomsky, that editorial decision may have
favored even more the Chomskian position.
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In any case, Chomskys understanding and scholarship on ver-
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bal behavior have been still widely disputed in behavior-analytic
outlets (e.g., Adelman, 2007; Palmer, 2006). There have also been
reactions pointing to other aspects of the issue. Knapp (1992), for
instance, showed that the influence of Chomskys critique resulted
in a neglect of other reviews of Skinners (1957) book, which were
more positive, even though critical. Others have tried to show the
vitality of Skinners views by the increasing number of sales and
references to Verbal Behavior, dismissing the idea that it was
refuted (Schlinger, 2008). To elucidate the episode, Chomsky was
even interviewed. At the occasion, he revealed that, in face of the
prestige and orthodoxy radical behaviorism enjoyed, he de-
cided to write the attack. Chomsky actually wrote the review
before the book was published (as cited in Virues-Ortega, 2006,
p. 246), once many of Skinners ideas were already present in the
early 1950s due to the latters William James lectures at Harvard.
Moreover, some reactions have also focused on the rhetoric
component of the ChomskySkinner controversy (e.g., Andresen,
1991; Czubaroff, 1988). In many cases, Chomsky and Skinner (as
well as other behavior analysts and cognitivists) rely upon non-
formal, persuasive strategies of argumentation. In spite of aca-
demic tradition, the controversy became a clear instance in which
debate is rather rhetorical than logical.
Concerns About the Future
The cognitivist historiography contends that behaviorism and be-
havior analysis were displaced by a paradigm shift. Indeed, in
behavior-analytic literature, there is also talk about an eclipse of
behavior analysis (Catania, 1987, p. 255). The field is far from the
mainstream. The causes, however, may be other than just the rise of
cognitivism. Behavior analysis was found to be isolating itself from
1958 to 1989, with high self-citation rates in the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, one of its main outlets (Krantz,
1971; Coleman & Mehlman, 1992). As a matter of fact, most reac-
tions here shown were published in behavior-analytic journals. In
defending against cognitivism, they seem to be talking to themselves
most of the time. On the other hand, a few aspects of their history may
explain the fields isolation. Some have already noted the general
resistance found by behavior analysts, because their conceptions chal-
lenged many Western and psychologys traditions, (see, e.g.,
ODonohue, Callaghan, & Ruckstuhl, 1998; Rutherford, 2000). Skin-
ner (1990) summarized this way:
Because of its similarity to the vernacular, cognitive psychology was
easy to understand and the so-called cognitive revolution was for a
time successful. That may have accelerated the speed with which
behavior analysts drew away from the psychological establishment,
founding their own associations, holding their own meetings, publish-
ing their own journals. They were accused of building their own
ghetto, but they were simply accepting the fact that they had little to
gain from the study of a creative mind (p. 1210).
As a consequence, there have been concerns about the future of
the field, giving room for criticism of behavior analysis itself (e.g.,
Fraley & Vargas, 1986; Hayes, 2001; Michael, 1980). In fact, there
were behavior analysts who did not find the isolation a problem in
itself (e.g., Lee, 1989). The conservative attitude is alive and
kicking in behavior analysissometimes, against every chance of
change. At the slightest sign of distance from the Skinnerian spirit,
resistances appear, as if there was a threat to its professional and
scientific identity. Complaints have been made, for example,
against the growing mentalism in behavior analysis, including
cognitive wording (e.g., Branch & Malagodi, 1980; Michael,
1980). Charges of intellectual intolerance against the field are not
rare (e.g., Krantz, 1971; see also Todd & Morris, 1992).
On the other hand, there are also attempts to make the field more
flexible, visible, and open to new contributions. In this context,
there have been those who still believe in a dialogue with cogni-
tivism (e.g., Slocum & Butterfield, 1994; Smith, 1994). Indeed,
behavior analysis scientific and professional identity depends on
its difference from other approaches, such as the cognitivist. While
such a distinction is still important, Catania (1998), for example,
contends that the respective correlations of cognitive and behav-
ioral languages with structural and functional problems made it
difficult to recognize that the problems were different and there-
fore that these research areas might be complementary rather than
mutually exclusive (p. 369). Palmer and Donahoe (1992), for
their part, argue that some trends in cognitive science are amenable
to interpretations from behavior analysis, making possible fruitful
interactions between them. In this manner, some have made a way
for cooperation or, at least, for a peaceful coexistence between
behavior analysis and cognitivism.
The future is unknown, but there are those who still believe that
behaviorism or behavior analysis may strengthen once again (e.g.,
Ardila, 2006; Overskeid, 2008; Uttal, 2001). In any case, behav-
iorism is still alive in the form of behavior analysisand willing
to write history in its own way. Behavior analysts reactions to
cognitivism thus offer an alternative story that often contradicts the
narrative of a cognitive revolution. Even so, it is a disarticulated
story, with convergences and divergences in many points. For the
most part, it is devoted to address specific questions and charges of
the cognitivist story instead of offering a coherent narrative that
could oppose to that of the cognitivists.
Final Remarks
The story of the cognitive revolution seems successful in fos-
tering the cognitivist movement and developing its historical iden-
tity. It left, however, several questions unsolved when it speaks of
behaviorism. That term is ambiguous and its use disputable. It
was a behaviorism that only the cognitivists knew. In the same
vein, one might argue against the meaning of cognitivism,
because it was not a unified tradition. Indeed, this review criticized
a cognitivist historiography, but the notion of such historiogra-
phy only became possible when those authors assumed a generic
 ON BEHAVIORISM IN THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION
cognitivism as a common ground to construct their story. The very
historiography that once celebrated a cognitive revolution also
favors a distorted notion of the cognitivist tradition. It is based on
the idea that cognitivism was, in some sense, a unified and revo-
lutionary movement, capable of resisting and displacing behavior-
ism. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine an alternative story,
in which someone resorts to that same generic cognitivism to
describe its rise and fall. As seen in Skinners work, that sort of
story could well be told by a behavioristand, perhaps, it already
exists (see, e.g., Overskeid, 2008).
Both behaviorism and cognitivism designate very heteroge-
neous sets of positions. In the quarrel between cognitivists and
behavior analysts, it is clear that not all of them took part in the
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issue or subscribed to the perspectives here presented. Some have
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
even argued in defense of the opposite side (e.g., Roediger, 2004).
Behaviorism and cognitivism can be deceptive terms. In the his-
tory of psychology, they can help to understand large trends over
periods of time. Nonetheless, they are abstractions. They are not
real entities, capable of dominating a discipline that is not even
unified. They may not reflect a single, conscious, or concerted
effort of a scientific and professional group. They are intended to
reflect general features, sometimes overlooking the diversity of
interests, positions, and practices. The issue of the cognitive rev-
olution illustrates the dangers of reifying such concepts, of taking
an abstract construct as a concrete entity.
As seen here, the reification gave room to an origin myth that
fosters one tradition at the expense of others. The revolution is
a story of progress, but history does not flow toward progress.
Nothing in history assures that a development will ever be a
positive fact. The story also uses a wide range of rhetorical
devices. Like many revolutions, the cognitive is a story told by
contrastsin this case, with behaviorism. History, however, is
not black and white, a simple collection of dichotomies. It is not a
matter of lights and darkness, winners and losers.
History is neither a matter of offenders and victims. Indeed,
behavior analysisa remaining behavioral fieldmay have been
greatly affected by the revolutions story. It is evident by the
misrepresentations and by the tone of behavior analysts reactions.
After hearing their version(s) of history, it may be tempting to
consider them as victims, but they are not. Some of them have also
spoken about a behaviorist revolution (e.g., Moore, 1999; Skin-
ner, 1945; but see also Leahey, 1992). They also gave a revolu-
tionary status to themselves. They also created a contrast between
their explanation and a generic mentalism (e.g., Branch & Mala-
godi, 1980; Skinner, 1974). They also thought that behavior anal-
ysis could rescue and become psychology, and cognitivism would
be just an obstacle to a science of behavior (see, e.g., Skinner,
1987, 1983). If they had found no resistances and not isolated
themselves, would their story have been so different from that of
a cognitive revolution? Apparently not.
The cognitive revolution is at the crossroad of a science of mind
and a science of behavior. Both outline a course of action for
psychology, relying, however, on very different foundational as-
sumptions. So, when their paths come across, it is no wonder that
disputes and controversies appear. It is expected that they tell
stories of success or try to dismiss opposing approaches in differ-
ent ways. The history of science advances not just by the intrinsic
force of the ideas but also by rhetoric (see also Bevan, 1991).
279
Narratives of revolutions convince by their romance, but that
kind of story is not about particular events. It is about an alleged
drastic change in scientific psychology, reflecting issues of pro-
fessional and scientific identity. If that sort of story becomes usual
and crystallized, the consequences are far-reaching. It may under-
lie decisions regarding personal and resources allocation. There-
fore, a perspective about the past can change the building of the
future. Gains and losses become concrete when those stories come
to be part of the historical process.
In the case of the revolution, each side tells a different story, but
rhetorical strategies become evident when both stories are con-
fronted. Although there are not truer interpretations, there are
certainly better ways of dealing with the past rather than by
disregarding other traditions. In the case of the cognitive revolu-
tion, the movement certainly had its originality. More than the end
of behaviorism, cognitivism represented an alternative to it. That
view begins to tell history in a different way.
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Received August 28, 2011
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Accepted December 1, 2011