Professional Documents
Culture Documents
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the MTC of Manila handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision
records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan ordering Alvarado to vacate the room.[2]
for proper disposition.
Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the 11, 1993, said court rendered its decision[3] which, in effect,
Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is warned against reversed the MTC's decision on the ground that the purported
committing the same procedural error, under pain of sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a
administrative sanction. controversy pending before the National Housing Authority
(NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also
SO ORDERED. concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado
and Barredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the
dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, and ruled that
[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997] Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject
premises.
CARLITO D. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been
JUANITO ALVARADO, respondents. denied for lack of merit by the RTC[4] on July 16, 1993,
Corpuz elevated his case to the Court of Appeals. The
DECISION appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the
assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its
ROMERO, J.: assailed decision dated July 14, 1994.[5] A subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of
Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court
Appeals in its resolution dated September 1, 1994.[6] Hence,
of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
this petition.
Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review
in Civil Case No. 92-62869. The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz'
unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado
Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private
should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in
respondent Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court
the NHA impugning the sale of said property, and whether the
of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for
"Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was
recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the
authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion
latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own
challenging his ownership over the said property is not a
use.
sufficient ground to divest the MTC of its exclusive
Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain jurisdiction.[7]
Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his
The petition is impressed with merit.
property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties,
however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
"Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his ejectment cases.[8] As the law now stands, the only issue to be
house to any person who can afford to purchase the same. resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
Consequently, Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for physical or material possession over the real property, that is,
P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was possession de facto.[9]
established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals,[10]
however, we ruled that: among the parties.
"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We
Court, in making a distinction between the reception of have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall
evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to
that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts
ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It different cause of action involving possession.[13]
cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by
declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition
of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon
would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.
sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With
We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single
this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment
general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held in
introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested
Dui v. Court of Appeals[14] that failure of a party to
that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with
specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with
adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised
the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of
by the parties in an ejectment suit."
that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no
Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of reason or explanation was given to support his allegation,
possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the which is deemed a mere general averment.
controversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinal
In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a
pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith
Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had
from novel. The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for already acquired over the subject matter and the parties
the annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any therein.
ejectment action respecting the same property.[11]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, assailed decision dated July 14, 1994, of respondent Court of
et al. v. Court of Appeals,[12] Justice (now Chief Justice) Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Andres Narvasa outlined the following cases involving the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6, in
annulment of the title or document over the property which Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby
should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit, REINSTATED.
to wit:
SO ORDERED.
"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
G.R. No. L-69334 July 28, 1986
affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions
respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment SERVILLANO ALINSUGAY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare PERFECTO M. CAGAMPANG, JR., Presiding Judge
the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Designate of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon,
Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 10th Judicial Region, ESTHER G. CAJES and RICARDO M.
[1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 CAJES, respondents.
[1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174
SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment FERNAN, J.:
of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."
The issue raised in this case is whether referral to the Pangkat
Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the ng Tagapagkasundo under Presidential Decree No. 1508, the
defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is Katarungang Pambarangay Law, is mandatory even where the
summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting failure at conciliation is due to the non-appearance of one
ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the party.
NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the
authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the On October 19, 1984 petitioner Servillano Alinsugay instituted
MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for an action in the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon, Malaybalay
the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right branch, against respondents Ester G. Cajes and Ricardo M.
Cajes for the annulment of title and recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of 3,068 square between the contending parties; that the Punong Barangay on
meters located in Barangay Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon his level is bereft of legal authority to issue the questioned
[Civil Case No. 1566]. certification, and that what is contemplated by PD No. 1508 is
intervention by the Punong Barangay and members of the
Respondents Cajes filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds Pangkat, otherwise what would prevent a corrupt barangay
that: [1] the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the chairman from issuing indiscriminate certifications.
action because the dispute was not brought before the
barangay for amicable settlement in accordance with We hold for petitioner Alinsugay.
Presidential Decree No. 1508, [2] the complaint was
premature, and [3] the action was barred by prescription and This is a case wherein only one party appears before the
laches. Specifically, respondents argued that petitioner did not Punong Barangay and the other party fails to do so despite due
follow the process of going through a Pangkat in the notice or summons. What should the Punong Barangay do in
settlement of his dispute, after mediation before the barangay such a case?
chairman had failed.
Rule VI, Section 7 of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules
In reply, petitioner asserted that the trial court had jurisdiction provides:
over the case because of the "certification to file action" issued
SECTION 7. Failure to appear.- The complaint may be
on July 31, 1983 by the Punong Barangay and attested by the
dismissed when complainant, after due notice, wilfully fails or
Barangay Secretary to the effect that respondent Esther Cajes
refuses to appear on the date set for mediation, conciliation or
"wilfully failed or refused to obey summons or to appear for
arbitration. Such dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or
hearing, and therefore the corresponding complaint for the
Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, shall bar the
dispute may now be filed in court/government office. 1
complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause
In an order dated November 13, 1984, respondent Judge of action as that dismissed.
Perfecto M. Cagampang, Jr. dismissed the complaint "without
Upon a similar failure of the respondent to appear, any
prejudice to the filing of the same after the provisions of PD
counterclaim he has made that arises from or is necessarily
1508 shall have been complied properly as prayed for in the
connected with complainant's action, may be dismissed. Such
'Motion to Dismiss' filed by defendants despite the Opposition
dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary, as
filed by plaintiff; and without passing on the merits on the
the case may be, shall bar the respondent from filing such
other grounds alleged in the same 'Motion to Dismiss.' " 2
counterclaim in court; and it shall likewise be a sufficient basis
Assailing the order of dismissal as a patent nullity and having for the issuance of a certification for filing complainant's cause
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed the of action in court or with the proper government agency or
instant special civil action for certiorari. office.
There is no question that the controversy was referred to the In addition, such willful failure or refusal to appear may
Punong Barangay of Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon. It was subject the recalcitrant party or witness to punishment as for
docketed as Barangay Case No. 26. Summons were served contempt of court, i.e., by a fine not exceeding one hundred
upon the parties. For one reason or another, respondent Esther pesos (P100.00) or imprisonment of not more than one (1)
Cajes failed to appear before the barangay chairman, month or both.
prompting the latter to issue on July 31, 1983 the certification
Thus it is very clear from the Rules that the willful refusal or
to file action for the complainant, herein petitioner Alinsugay.
failure to appear on the part of respondent is sufficient basis
There is no mention in the records of the reason for Cajes'
for the complainant present to be given a certification to file
non-appearance.
action. The issuance of a certification to file action means that
In his memorandum, petitioner Alinsugay contends that the the complainant may already bring his case to the court or
issuance of the certification to file action by the Punong other government office for adjudication.
Barangay, attested by the Barangay Secretary, substantially
Section 4[b] of PD No. 1508 likewise provides that if the
complies with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
Punong Barangay fails in his mediation efforts within fifteen
and its implementing rules.
[15] days from the first meeting of the parties, he shall
On the other hand, respondents Esther Cajes and Ricardo M. forthwith set the date for the constitution of the Pangkat.
Cajes argue that the certification is premature and therefore However, such referral to the Pangkat is mandatory only in
null and void. They theorize that under the law, the Punong those cases where both parties have submitted themselves to
Barangay should have constituted the Pangkat ng the Lupon for conciliation and conciliation has failed.
Tagapagkasundo after he had failed to bring about a settlement
In instances where one party fails to appear for no justifiable
reason, convening the Pangkat as a necessary second step will
serve no useful purpose. It will accomplish nothing in view of
a party's unwillingness, as reflected in his unjustified absence,
to settle the dispute outside the regular courts. In that case, the
only feasible alternative for the Lupon is to issue the
certification allowing complainant to bring the controversy to
court.
SO ORDERED.