HAMBURGER HILL

Mission Command Analysis Paper

Hamburger Hill

CPT Dale, Tameca

AMEDD Captains Career Course 16-162

24 April 2016

HAMBURGER HILL

Introduction
 In May 1969, the War in Vietnam was in full swing and the battle to overtake the

Dong Ap Bia Mountain in Operation Apache Snow would soon be underway. Colonel

Joseph B. Conmy Jr. prepared to strategically place his 3 rd Brigade American Soldiers in

the A Shau Valley to overwhelm the 29th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) enemy forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Weldon F. Honeycutt (LTC), commander of the 3 rd Battalion, 187th

Airborne (3-187) had the difficult objective of securing Hill 937 or Dong Ap Bia. May 10,

1969, was the start date of an intense 10-day battle that would claim the lives of many

American and enemy Soldiers.1 This paper will examine how LTC Honeycutt failed to

create a shared understanding with his troops, failed to provide clear intentions, and

negatively accepted risk. This analysis will scrutinize the factors that led to LTC

Honeycutts refusal to accept defeat, even though the victory came at the cost of his

Soldiers lives.

Description of the Battle

On May 10, the forces were dispositioned. The 1 st Battalion, 506th Airborne (1-

506) and the 3-187, air assaulted into their landing zones at the northern end of the A

Shau Valley. The terrain was thickly covered and jungle-matted together with vines and

thick groves of bamboo. The 3-187 discovered enemy huts and bunkers only a few

hundred meters along their lines of advancement. 2 Alpha Company secured the landing

zone (LZ) near Hill 810 (each hill was known for their height in meters).

Bravo Company progressed along the northwest slope of Hill 937. Charlie Company,

moving eastward, encountered rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) ambushes and Delta

Company, positioned on Bravo Companys left flank, fought enemy fire and rough

terrain.3

1
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By May 13, the goal of each day was to strive to reach the top of Dong Ap Bia.

LTC Honeycutts Battalion was still fighting an uphill battle. In an effort to subdue the

enemy, a friendly fire incident killed two American Soldiers and wounded 35 including

LTC Honeycutt. COL Conmy ordered the 1-506 to march across the backcountry and

perform a rear attack on the NVA. Unfortunately, with the rugged terrain and enemy

snipers, it took five days for the 1-506 to get into position. On May 14 and 15, American

Soldiers encountered explosive booby traps, got shot, and slid back down the mountain

in the mud, which hindered the Soldiers from reaching the top. 4

On May 16 and 17, COL Conmy ordered LTC Honeycutt to halt the attacks

against the NVA and wait for the 1-506 to catch up. 5 On May 18, impatient and ready to

proceed, COL Conmy ordered the 3-187 to attack from the north and 1-506 to attack

from the south. By 0800, COL Conmy hit the area with every available fighter-bomber,

followed by a 60-minute artillery preparation. This phase was to allow the 1-506 to

initiate a breakout against the enemy and alleviate some of the pressure on the 3-187.

LTC Honeycutts men moved up for another attack. Unfortunately, another incident of

friendly fire shot up a platoon from Bravo Company, killing one soldier and wounding

four others.6

One noted key event during the battle was, By the 8th day of the mission, every

officer in the company had been either killed or wounded and the unit as a whole had

suffered greater than 50 percent of casualties. 7 Major General Melvin Zais, of the 101st

Division, considered calling off the attack due to the heavy amount of casualties and

negative media attention but decided to continue with the fight. He committed three

additional battalions (2-501, 2-506 and 2-3 Army of the Republic of Vietnam) to the
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battle to relieve the badly battered 3-187 Soldiers. LTC Honeycutt protested the relief

and demanded that his men stay in the fight and complete the mission. At 1000 on May

20, after ten artillery batteries fired 20,000 rounds and 272 tactical airstrikes dumped

more than one million pounds of bombs, and 152,000 pounds of napalm, the 3-187

started back up the mountain. At 1145, they finally took the summit, only to find that

most of the enemy had already fled. By 1700, the 3-187 secured the hill. 8

The overall outcome was, LTC Honeycutts men secured Objective Hill 937 after

a 10 day heated battle. The operation claimed 60 American lives and 480 suffered from

wounds. Enemy forces, the 29th NVA Regiment lost an estimated 600 lives.9 Due to the

nature of the tortuous battle that chewed up the bodies of American Soldiers, one

trooper cut out the cardboard bottom of a C-ration box and printed Hamburger Hill on

it. It was pinned to a blackened tree trunk with a bayonet. Later another Soldier

scribbled on the bottom of the note, Was it worth it? On June 5, orders were given to

abandon Dong Ap Bia. Just two weeks following Americas departure, more than 1000

North Vietnamese Army troops had moved into the area and reoccupied the mountain. 10

Mission Command Analysis

Consequently, LTC Honeycutts actions greatly affected the outcome on

Hamburger Hill. As a commander, LTC Honeycutt shouldve strived to create a shared

understanding among his troops by ensuring his Soldiers fully comprehended the

operations purpose, operational environment, foreseen and unforeseen problems, and

possible solutions.11 However, LTC Honeycutts unrelenting efforts to take Hill 937 was

not understood by his subordinates. To prove LTC Honeycutts actions were ineffective

in creating a shared understanding, one paratrooper stated, That Blackjack (Honeycutt)

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wont stop until he kills every one of us.12 This failure not only affected LTC Honeycutts

Soldiers, but the American People also held him accountable. In the Senate, Edward

Kennedy stated, It is senseless and irresponsible to continue to send our young men to

their deaths to capture hills and positions that have no relation to this conflict. 13

Ultimately, LTC Honeycutts failure to create a shared understanding was the

downfall of his success as a commander. When he stated that he was concerned that

the NVA had his unit surrounded he requested that COL Conmy release Bravo

Company from the brigade reserve to his control.14 COL Conmy granted his request but

this verifies that LTC Honeycutt knew what his men were up against. LTC Honeycutt

was unsuccessful in strategizing with his subordinate leaders, a plan that couldve

saved the lives of many Soldiers. Since he failed to take the steps to create a shared

understanding in his battalion, this negatively affected the trust relationships he also

needed to establish amongst his Soldiers.15

Comparatively, LTC Honeycutt was unsuccessful with defining his intent. Every

Soldier in his chain knew that LTC Honeycutt wanted to secure Hill 937, but he failed to

explain his reasoning. As a commander, he needed to articulate the overall reason for

the operation so his forces would understand its purpose. 16 His negative intentions were

made evident when he demanded that his badly wounded men be allowed to continue

up the hill and finish the mission.17 LTC Honeycutt was determined not to fail, no matter

how many Soldiers were lost in the battle.18 LTC Honeycutts intent was not clear and

concise and he displayed tunnel vision, seeking to only secure the hill with disregard to

the lives of Soldiers. The Soldiers stayed on their course by seeing the mission through

to fruition, even though the operation didnt unfold as planned. 19

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Lastly, LTC Honeycutt failed to properly accept prudent risk when he sought to

secure Dong Ap Bia Mountain. By definition, in preparation for the battle, he shouldve

made plans with reasonable estimates that created opportunities. Instead, LTC

Honeycutt did exactly the opposite. He gambled with the lives of his Soldiers, and

staked his success on the single thought process that if he kept adding men to the fight,

eventually they would successfully take the hill. 20 On May 14, LTC Honeycutt stated,

Theyve got communications. Theyre dug in. Theyve got a defense-in-depth, and

theyre movin fresh troops up those draws from Laos every night, and I dont have the

manpower to stop them.21 He recognized early in the mission, the terrain and enemy

obstacles that he was up against, but that didnt deter his desire to continue forth with

the mission. Even though he lost Soldiers to friendly fire and suffered from wounds

himself, he gambled the risks associated with the task.

In summary, LTC Honeycutt took deliberate exposure to potential injury and loss,

even after judging the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment. He knew the

opportunity to secure Hill 937 came with risks, but he failed to analyze them. 22 In the

end, he successfully secured the objective, but with the loss of 60 lives and 480

wounded, the price for success came at too high of a cost.

1. James H. Willbanks, Hamburger Hill, Vietnam 22, no. 1 (2009): 24-25.

2. Ibid, 25.
3. You Command, A Shau Valley: Hamburger Hill, 1969, Armchair General 2,
no. 4 (2005): 50-52.

4. W. Thomas Smith JR, Alpha Bravo Delta Guide to Decisive 20th-Century

American Battles (New York: Penguin Group Inc, 2003), 228-229.

5. Ibid, 229.
6. Willbanks, 27-28.
7. Ibid, 28.
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8. Ibid, 29.
9. Arthur Wiknik, I Was There, Soldier of Fortune 24, no. 3 (1999) 17.
10. Willbanks, 29.
11. Department of the Army, ADP 6-0 Mission Command (Washington, DC:
Army Publishing, 2012), 3.

12. Willbanks, 27.

13. Ibid, 29.

14. You Command, 50.

15. Department of the Army, 3.

16. Ibid, 4.

17. Willbanks, 29.

18. Smith, 229.

19. Department of the Army, 3-4.

20. Ibid, 5.

21. Smith, 229.

22. Department of the Army, 5.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Darman, Peter. Surprise Attack Lightning Strikes of the Worlds Elite Forces. New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1993.

Department of the Army. ADP 6-0 Mission Command. Washington, DC: Army
Publishing, 2012.

Smith, W. Thomas Jr. Alpha Bravo Delta Guide to Decisive 20th-Century

American Battles. New York: Penguin Group Inc, 2003.

Wiknik, Arthur. I Was There. Soldier of Fortune 24, no. 3 (1999): 16-17.

Willbanks, James H. Hamburger Hill. Vietnam 22, no. 1 (2009): 23-31.

You Command. A Shau Valley: Hamburger Hill, 1969. Armchair General 2, no. 4
(2005): 50-53.