No.

of Printed Pages : 12 MEC-001

MASTER OF ARTS
(Economics)
Term-End Examination
June, 2012

MEC-001 : MICRO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Time : 3 hours Maximum Marks : 100
Note : Attempt questions from each section as per instructions
given under each section .

SECTION - A
Answer any two questions form this section. 2x20=40
1. Consider a world with two agents, A and B. There
are two goods 1 and 2 . The utility functions of
A and B are given as U A = X.?" XA2 and
UB = XB1 XB2 Their initial endowments are
WA =(1,2) and WB =(2,1)
(a) Draw the Edgeworth Box for the agents
considering their initial endowments and
commodity consumptions.
Lr.)
p (b) Find the contract curve through your
Lc) Edgework Box.
CD
(c) Find the demand functions of A and B for
prices Pi,P2 and incomes mA of A and mB
of B.
(d) Find the competitive equilibrium price P*
and equilibrium allocation
()CAP A2,X*B1, X*B2) of this economy.

MEC-001 1 P.T.O.
2. A monopoly insurance company provides
accident insurance to two types of customers; low
risk and high risk, for whom the probability of an
accident is 0.25 and 0.5. There are customers in
the groups of low and high risks in equal number.
Without insurance, each customer's wealth is 16
if there is no accident but zero if there is an
accident. Customers utility function of wealth is
given as u(w) = . The insurance company
cannot identify the type of customer's when they
apply for insurance contract. The company plans
to offer two contracts; First, a payout of 8 in case
there is an accident and requires the customer to
pay a premimum of 7. Second, .a payout of 16 in
case an accident happens but requires customers
to pay a premiiim of 10.
(a) Determine for the low risk and high risk
customers which if any, of these contract
they will buy.
(b) Calculate the insurance company's expected
profit if it offers these contracts. comment
how does the company would like to screen
its customers with these contracts.

3. (a) What do you mean by a pure public good ?

(b) There are only two individuals A and B in
an economy. Their respective marginal
valuation curves for a public good, x, are
given by MVA = 100 2x and MVB = 25 x.
The marginal cost of providing the public
good is given by MC =100 + 2x. Find the
socially efficient quality of public goods.

MEC-001 2
4. A consumer's utility function is given as

U(x, y) = In (x +2y -Y
2)

Where x and y are two goods of consumption.

(a) Find the indirect utility function of the
consumer.
(b) Examine if Roy's law is satisfied by the
consumer's demand function for y .
(c) Find the expenditure function of the
consumer e(p,u) where price of x =1 and
price of y=p.
(d) Find the Hickrian demand function
by (p,u) for commodity y, where the price
of x is 1 and the price of y is p .

MEC-001 3 P.T.O.
 SECTION - B
5. Answer any four questions from this section. 4x10=40
(a) How would you differentiate a static game
from that of a dynamic game ?
(b) Suppose the following game is played for a
infinite number of periods. If the players
are discounting the future at the rates of 8A
and 6B respectively, find the conditions
under which they sustain the outcome (2,2)
in every period.
Player B
Low High
Player A Low (1, 1) (4, 0)
High (0, 4) (2, 2)

6. Sita expects her future earnings to be worth

Rs 100. If she falls ill, her expected future earning
will be Rs 25, There is a belief that she may fall ill
2
with probability of -
3 while the probability of

remaining in good health is 3. Let her utility

function be given as u(y)= y Suppose that an

insuranne company offers to fully insure sita

against loss of earnings caused by illness against
an actuarially fair premimum.

MEC-001 4
 (a) Will Sita accept the insurance Explain
(b) What is the maximum amount that Sita
would pay for the insurance ?

7. Suppose that two identical firms produce bal.:

bearings. Their total costs are given by
CJi and C2 = 30 Q7 where Qi =out put_ of firni
fori =1, 2. The inverse demand curve is given
by P =150 Q where Q= Q7. Find the
Courn.ot equilibrium quantities, price and profits
of the firms.

8. Why would you prefer Pareto's approach t

welfare analysis over that of Pigou ? EI.aboraie
your view points.

9. (a) Explain how and in what circumstances

markets would lead to a Pareto efficient
allocation of resources ?
(b) Why does the existence of public goods
make it impossible or unlikely that markets
would lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation
of resources ? -

10. Why would you say Boumol's model of sales

maximisation is. an alternative theory of firm ?
Which features of his model may be considered
to support your view points ? Explain your
answer.

MEC-001 5 P.T.O.
 SECTION - C

Answer all the questions from this section. 2x10=20

11. Write short notes on any two of the following :
(a) Public goods
(b) Rawl's theory of justice
(c) VNM utility function

12. Differentiate between (any two) :

(a) Moral hazard and Adverse selection
(b) Shepherd's lemma and Hotelling's lemma
(c) First and third degrees of price
discrimination.

MEC-001 6
 7.4.t-ooi

71T7. ( ankrrw)
Trita TAT
Tr, 2012
71.1.111-001 : Tgzi 311*TM clq qui
wig : 3 oo alfErw-d-4 3fW : 100

5)2" : sim d-(

viva( Tri4 u- .1

.11P4 3rkr- 11 2x20=40

1. faqir 4 t aTrfik aifirw-df t, A *B I 3 t

qgq. 1 3l 2 ill I d-14, sn4ikr:
uA = xAi xA2 3 uB = xBi x82 tI 34 9-rtfw
Ofd .wITEf WA = (1,2) 47 WB =(2,1) t I

(a) 3-14) ti4fd ct))4.13117 ZrfilliT ei),siitaff 317NTKITT

1:71c1?-f WF err Fc171 I

(b) 31:r .:31efef SIT fqi 3-1c111 3 1fR I

(c) 31.14-*714 A AT B*1:fiTT a 6111R, /it Pi*
P2 al:pi 4,144 -ffen MA 3th MB
afir*--diaff 3Trzr -Rrtt
(d) i aTefardRTT*TErtillt09. ch sicf P* 311T 374E9.
(X*Ai, X*A2,X*Bp X*B2) WI I

MEC-001 7 P.T.O.
2. -cr*--15-1Thlt ticit 13T-6-4 V1-6-1T
t ; 17ff-*- f9-Pi 7)-t111 ak,)
tI 9-f 1441TW-0 so-RI: 0.25 and 0.5 t I
-71Ett 14 17-F4 chei titSq I 4-11-1 t I rci -I I ci14
74-cr-q-r t 'TT
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et A741dr T -- t97:17 ;17T- t. 17,:r91- 41
71* ! 14
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I

A. 7 U 4-T 3 7,7 ;4) % e. f all

-4 8 -71--4 d1 ti 11#
10 -7:1-4 317r-q9. ;dl t f--*-q 16 3-T5-117

(a) 711d rch -7gT 711T- R:ft

F-14-1 -ti7T4 17-6T -F-*-74 trio17#
--t4
(b) ITT ttIt "WE 314N-d -oTtIT ch-k I ff %ft
3T-1
-4.eff -grEwq 74 *cit
Act)ik cpiTcnkur t

3. (a) t> fa-714 wciAilch trq-r21 Err 310 t?

(b) -4711 3-12-i-W4T-2,1T 14q1:4 A *13 t I

x viicni co,

91-)4-11: MVA =100 2x 72TT MVB = 25 x e I

k-1147ftT oi+id ash t;
MC =100 + 2x I Vq
07 chkI
3-1-f-*-

MEC-001 8
4. 31:TINT 341 4101 910-f t:

-:-)
U (x, y) = In (x + 2y -Y

x3thytT:rziw[qW t1
(a) 3714WIT 4101 1st) 7 c4

(b) Fen ITT y f' -41-Trr 410-1 tfT1

F.-Ng 7-
07 t- I

(c) tirqx .WIWITI-fflff211yriffptt-31111)-Wff

cig ash e (p,u) c I

(d) y tWi ciiq1 1:111'T by (p,u)

grq x .11 --1-1=m =13 y
fi =P I

MEC-001 9 P.T.O.
 WT+T- Zd
dTi( .F14 I 4x10=40
5. (a) 31Tt1 Ict)1:9-1tWV -A ICt410-Ict) 7 A.
- 46114;1?
-114)(1
(b) .441 31-e---- d 3T-A-z4 7w -to -11 ITT
ifdicEr .W1 6A ' 21T SEI TtI ciehltf
W.{ t I 3ff Tr f-4-4
17-1W 3T-lfz1 14 (2, 2) TrITRIN %TIM cilt
t (0 4;1) I

-B
14-i 3"
-1.-f (1,1) (4,0)
ft~ M!s1 -A
314 (0,4) (2,2)

6. t if-atzr zu-A. z ,1
71-1 z 25 40-0 311 TT Wcd111

R-W 41111IT 3t14 ti:fri 6-A t ViTwr 3117

TER2T TilTraraT 3 t d4t.1 ildr 4.)oi

U (y) = i X11 i ci:o4-11 4di 3TRE

t 414 t aT i rz)
. r -wT
al-11TR -411,-qui .113tvg-riTri-T t
(a) r 401 zig. 4 HI r R? t,+-WW I
(b) -Tt aftrwa14 414-11 ai Ti (qC1 4101 "r
1Tfali:ftt ITT-4 t4R @ID

MEC-001 10
7. i 41(,) t t 31 01 Id 01911
t I C1 =30 Q1 and C2 =30 Q2

,316 Qi =I Q' 1:514 3041q1 3-fr{ i =1, 2

fd-ATF 1:67 ash P=150-Q

Q = Q/ + Q2 I ItTru, 141-1T
414-1 t

8. 3174 Lags T1- 3-1-4-1T r rcik;tIuf rcirq

qT17:1-dT T ? 3-714 371( I

9. (a) e411tM et) rebq ita# 4 at cht-f 51ch1t

111ft 4th%Ta. 31-r-4a7 i 3f TfLCT -cfrcrt I

(b) TR1211 TTF-T-9Ofd, GUAR Itt Wf

37-4TffVFI T Rm.{ Wahlt 31-#91-11- Wif 1

10. 3Ti-Er c 31fkwaTr fa-wa ixf-d-rrri

3-1
--d-rrN Tff t? 3TrEr fa-9-R
-aftz -5faTrri ichl fa 34 t? 3T 3rIt
ceIRNI 41.11

MEC-001 11 P.T.O.
 14PT - TT
%WI 5Ik11 f 37R t/ZI 2x10=20
11. frs re.uaNqi t-4
(a) sal 1* 1:1-q2i
(b) tf-(7- 4 -611q feria
(c) (VNM) dt-QPRif

12. fWt t 1)- 73:1,3 ch

(a) rc g-g 47 fa-R1
- -ff q1
(b) "WF 1;11:14 TR .wr Tr-gr
(c) 1;12.114 311T Tdtzl chlre. -NATi

MEC-001 12