Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

Erjada Progonati

Abstract

The new elements brought by the Iranian Islamic Revolution have reshaped the
interests of Tahran in international politics.The political culture of the revolution
constitutes the motivation of Irans foreign policy. Thus, Iran has been keeping the
Shiism on the forefront trying to emerge a model country in the Islamic world. Within
this context, Iran does not limit her interest only to the Middle East. In this regard,
one of the regions that Iran plays an active role is the Balkan Peninsula. Hence, in
this paper, the impact that Iran has over the Muslim Balkan communities and
especially on Bosnian and Albanian Muslims will be explicated.

Keywords: Iran, Foreign Policy, Shiism, Albanian Muslims, Bosnian

Muslims

Introduction

The identity of the Balkans and people living within, is dominated by its geographical
position. The peninsula is positioned at the crossroads of different cultures and has
been historically a geography between the Latin and Greek bodies of Roman Empire
and an area of religious diversity where Islam and Christianity met. As Maria
Todorova mentioned for Balkans: ...two legacies can be singled out as crucial. One
is the millennium of Byzantium with its profound political, institutional, legal,
religious and cultural impact. The other is the half millennium of Ottoman rule that
established the longest period of political unity it had experienced. 1 Generally
explicating the different identities in the Balkans, its noticed a postponement in the
development of the Muslim national identity. The relationship of the Muslim
population in Balkans to the religion and politics should be seen in dependence on the
cultural and religious Ottoman heritage without sidelining their political status as
minority that they have within the Balkans population. In the Balkans, Muslims have
several different ethnic and national origins: Turks, Albanians, Bosnian Muslims,
Torbeshes, Gorans, Kosovars and Pomaks. According to the statistics, Islam is the
second most followed faith in the Balkans following Christianity.2 Excluding Turkey,
177
the total population of Balkan peninsula is 50 million and there are approximately 17
million Muslims living there. Albanians and Bosnian Muslims belong to the largest
ethnic groups that were converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. In
contrast to the Balkans Christians, the Muslim inhabitants followed the official

Submission Date: 20 May 2016 - Commission Date: 27 May 2016

Yrd. Do. Dr., Hitit niversitesi, ..B.F., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Ynetimi Blm, E-mail:
adaprog10@yahoo.it
1
Maria Todorova, The Balkans Between Clich and European Future, http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-
watch/transit-online/the-balkans-between-cliche-and-european-future/, 02.05.2016.
2
Adnan Ismaili, The Problems of Balkan Muslims: A General Evaluation,
http://www.thepenmagazine.net/the-problems-of-balkan-muslims/, 27.04.2016.
 Erjada Progonati

religion of the dominant political classes of the Ottoman Empire, a faith that
privileged religious belief over ethnicity or nationalism. These two concepts were not
understood by the Ottoman elite until the early twentieth century.3

Ipso facto, Islam was not a strong factor in the nation-building process for
Muslim populations in the Balkans. For example, in the Albanians political claims
there is no religious element. For Albanians, religious identity was abased and of a
second importance. Anallogically the Bosnian Muslims gave more importance to the
Islamic religion in their national identity but at the same time they carry out a lot of
secular elements too. The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians, developed a national
consciousness in the begining of the twentieth century.4 In these countries the
communist regimes played a significant role in the secularization process. With the
falling of communist regime in Balkan countries, the Muslim population living here,
faced with new problems. Approximately 200.000 Muslims were killed in Bosnia and
thousands of them were slaughtered in Kosovo. Particularly, the massacre of 6000
Muslims in Srebrenitsa within just a few days in 1995 became the seal of the
oppression and massacres that the Balkan Muslims experienced. Nonethless, with the
collapse of the communist regimes in these countries a return to religious identities
can be noticed. Even pressed by the totalitarian regimes, the Bosnian Muslims and
Albanian Muslims maintained the essentials of Islamic culture. Meantime, this long
period of pressure created negative effects weakening the Sunni Islamic identity in
the Balkans, creating vacuums that would be filled by different religious identities.
This included the broad penetration of Sufism into Bosnian and Albanian Muslim
consciousness.

It can also be inferred that recent emigration from the Middle East to the
Balkans caused a strong impact of radical Islam originated from this geography. This
situation causes religious identities, practices and perceptions in the Balkans to be
redefined. For this reason, the role of Islam has become a political means in the recent
years and these developments has resulted in a growing interest of the international
actors towards the Muslim population of Balkans. These actors sometimes try to
control and shape the present identities of Muslims in the Balkan Peninsula. One of
the most interested actors in Muslim population of the Balkan peninsula is Iran. In
Albania, 70% of the population is Muslim. After the collapse of communism in
Albania in 1991, Arab Islamic fundamentalists wangled the mosques in this country.
178 This situation was an advantage for Arab Islamists who gained greater space for
moving towards other neighboring countries of Albania such as Macedonia where
Muslim Albanians form a large minority. Therefor, in Macedonia, the Islamic clerical
structure was quickly controlled by the Arab fundamentalists. The rivals of Arab
radicals, Iranians, also appeared in the religious landscape, and operated more
although with less impact in the Islamic public. The Wahhabi and Muslim
Brotherhood fundamentalists effected the Balkan Muslim tradition of Sufi beliefs and
practices but were doubtless richer, while the Iranians emphasized their own previous

3
Florian Bieber, Muslim Identity In the Balkans Before the Establishment of Nation States, Nationalities
Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 13.
4
Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 358.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

contributions to the Sufi legacy. Besides, the Iranians functioned through intellectual
sphere via academic seminars or publications supported by Tehrans embassies or
cultural centers. Since there were and are no Shia mosques in the Balkans, these
cultural centers could be used as staging points for their ideological agitation. 5

In this paper, particularly the case of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina

and also in Albania will be emphasized because they are the two most numerous
Muslim groups in this geography. In these countries, during the Cold War period, a
decline in religiosity was observed while in the post communist period, it can be
argued that the Re-Islamization and the rise of religion in general started to occur.

Sufism as the Mystical Dimension of Islam and its Presence within the Balkans

During the exictence of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was a popular political means that
was tremendously influential and authoritative among the Empires Muslim
population. The Ottoman rule over south-eastern Europe provided opportunity for the
spreading of Islam there. In order to justify the use of Islam as a means for political
stability, the empire took great efforts to preserve the religious administration in order
that it could serve the wellbeing and stability of the state, while other groups within
the empire developed interpretations of Islam that were often independent. These were
the spiritual fraternities, or tarikats. Unlike ulema, the tarikats were theoretically
independent of the state and they represented a variety of social and sometimes
political segments of the Ottoman population.6 However it would be a mistake to
consider the tarikats and the ulema as incessantly conflicting forces, since
membership in both regularly overlapped. Thus, supportes of the existing order were
the majority of Ottoman tarikats, including the ulema establishment and its official
dogma.

In this sense, it can not be passed without notice the role of Sufi tariqats in
the Balkans. Sufism or Tasawwuf is defined as the inner mystical dimension of Islam.
Sufi practitioners often belong to different turuq or orders, congregations formed
around a grand master referred to as a Mawla who maintains a direct chain of teachers
back to the Islamic prophet, Muhammad. Many believe that Sufism is beyond the
scope of Islam. It appeared y-that Sufism arose from within Islam in the 8th-9th
centuries as an ascetic movement. The largest and the most important tariqats during
the Ottoman period were the Khalwatis and the Bektashis.7 179

The largest Muslim ethnic group that live in the Balkan peninsula are the
Albanians, who statistically number more than 5 million. They are located mainly in
the central and southern part of the peninsula and form the pre eminent majority of
the population in Albania, Kosova and western Macedonia. Small groups of Albanians
who emigrated in Titos regime period emigrated are living now in Bosnia,

5
Stephen Schwarz, Arabs, Iranians, and Turks vs. Balkan Muslims,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/arabs-iranians-and-turks-vs.-balkan-muslims/article/644375, 02.05.2016.
6
The Ottoman Empire and Sufism, http://bektashiorder.com/the-ottomans-and-sufism, 29.04.2016.
7
Gkouma Zoi, Balkan Muslims And Modern Identities in Bosnia, Albania and Bulgaria, Master Thesis,
University of Macedonia, Department of Balkanic, Slavic and Oriental Studies, December 2012, p. 9.
 Erjada Progonati

Montenegro, and Croatia. Bektashi Sufi order is a unique aspect of Albanian religious
life. Haji Bektash Veli (1209-71) founded the Bektashi order in the 13th century. Haji
Bektash Veli came from Nishapur, Persia and spent a long time of his life in Anatolia
as a missionary. Bektashism was spread in the Balkans during the Ottoman era and
was particularly strong in the Southern Albania. Bektashis beliefs are based on the
teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and the Koran. They venerate the wider
prophetic family, especially Mohammeds cousin Ali, and his two grandsons Hassan
and Hussein. In this sense, they are close to the Shiite branch of Islam. Instead of
using mosques, Bektashis meet and pray at temples called tekkes. Bektashism is also
noted for its tolerance of other religious faiths. Herby, the Bektashis anger the
conservative Muslims by ignoring most conventional Islamic rules, such as abstention
from alcohol, the veiling of women and the need to turn towards Mecca in prayer. 8
This have made easier the cooperation of the different religious and sects in Albania.

One of the difficulties in defining Bektashism is because the order has taken
different shapes at different periods and places. This is especially for the post-
communist Albanian Bektashism, which is fundamentally different from Anatolian
Bektashism or Alevism or even the post-communist Albanian Bektashism. Today,
Albanian Bektashis can be characterized as a Shiite minority within a Sunni
population, as a Sufi order, or as an Albanian religious movement. Despite
controversies on the question, some scholars maintain that the Baktashi, unlike other
Sufi orders in the Balkans, though officially Sunni, is essentially Shiite 9 and anytime
can be compared with extreme sects like Ghulat.10 This predispozition is specially
spread in Albania.

The Bektashi order became one of the most important institutions in the
Ottoman Empire, with spiritual centers in cities from Cairo to the Balkans and from
Anatolia to Turkestan. Its importance for Turkish culture stands on its transcendence
nature of differences between Sunni and Shia Muslim traditions. Furthermore, the
Bektashis became chaplains for the Ottoman Janissary corps, a military body mainly
composed of young converts from Christianity to Islam. Its not a surprise that the
Bektashis are also interested in Christian spiritual traditions. The Bektashis had
become a significant force among Albanians, who have captured an original manner
of seeing Islam. During the Albanias independence period in 1912, many well-known
intellectuals including the national poet Naim Frasheri, were Bektashis.
180
In 1925, the Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, banned all Sufi orders,
closed the tekkes, and the Bektashis had to move their headquarters. Tirana was a
notable choice. In 1929, the third Bektashi Congress was held in the city of Korca. In
this congress it was decided to move the headquarters to Tirana. It is obvious that in
Albania in the Communist period, when the religion was banned by totalitarian
regime; because of their small sizes, the Bektashi tekkes survived better than the Sunni

8
For more information about the Bektashism in Albania, see: H.T.Norris, Popular Sufism in Eastern
Europe Sufi Brotherhoods and the dialogue with Christianity and Heterodoxy, Routledge, 2006.
9
H.T. Norris, Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society Between Europe and the Arab World, London:
Univ of South Carolina Press, 1993, p. 89.
10
Norris, ibid., p. 98.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

mosques. Even if the Albanians have never found a force for ethnic unity in regards
to religion, a large part of them are followers of Islam.11 It seems like the Albanians
lingustic singularity have contributed in the Bektashi Communitys nature. The
Bektashi Community in eight decades adopted Albanian patriotic symbols as well as
Albanian language for esoteric instruction. It can be said that today Bektashi
Community is fully Albanian in its character. The Bektashi Community in Albania
was suppressed under the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha, anyway with its
gatherings like those of Sufis it remained alive.12

Nowadays the Bektashi Community establish a significant presence in the

central and southern Albania and it can best be described as in contrast to Sunni Islam
which has consolidated its presence in the urban zones, Bektashianism is the religion
of the countryside or villages. They show a close proximity to Albanian Orthodox
Christians. Bektashi numbers were so great that until a recent time they were counted
as half of the Muslim 70 percent of citizens of Albania proper. Anyway, according to
the new data of the 2011 census conducted in Albania by the National Institute of
Statistics, there are enumerated Bektashi affiliation at only 2.09 percent of the
population, with self-identified Muslims granted a 56 percent share. In a national
population of 2.821.977, two percent Bektashi representation accounts for nearly
60.000 number of population. Many Albanians declare themselves Bektashi by family
heritage, even if they have never entered a Bektashi shrine or participated in the
observances of the tariqa. The 2011 census find out a total of 10.03 percent Catholics
and 6.75 percent Orthodoxs. These are interesting data because, Albanian Orthodox
Christians were traditionally credited with twice the number of Catholics that means
about 20 percent of religious believers.

There are two rival groups within Albanias Sunni Muslim Community,
founded in Tirana in 1924. The Selefi faction which promotes traditional
interpretations of Islamic doctrine and is an anti-modernist puritanical school in
contrast with the Hanefi School which promotes a more traditional liberal
interpretation of Islam. This situation has caused particular troubles for the Albanias
Bektashi community that practise the most liberal form of Islam and has put them in
direct confrontation with Selefi supporters.13 Islamic reformers want to include the
Bektashis under a single pan-Albanian Islamic umbrella group. This exigency has
met the strong opposition of the Bektashi community, which is resolutely against any
union with Albanias non-Bektashi Muslims. Anyway, for the moment Albanians of 181
all faiths seem that are nourishing by patriotism because Albanian Islam has strong
national roots and the imported religious rituals will take time to replace the traditional
ones.

11
Hseyin Abiva, A Survey of Sufism in the Balkans, http://bektashiorder.com/sufism-in-the-balkans-1,
01.05.2016.
12
Stephen Schwartz, The Heritage of Ottoman Islam in the Balkans,
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1663/the-heritage-of-ottoman-islam-in-the-balkans#_edn3, 28.04.2016.
13
Miranda Vickers, Islam in Albania, Balkan Series, 8/9, Defence Academy of United Kingdom, March
2008, p. 4.
 Erjada Progonati

Another ethnic element of the Muslim population of the Balkan Peninsula,

are Slavs. They number about 3.5 million and are the descendants of the populace that
embraced Islam during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Culturally and linguistically
they form a different group. Muslim Slavs or Bonjaks, as they are known in their
native language, constitute the plurality of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
They constitute also the majority of the Serbian-controlled region of Sandzak, and an
imprtant minority in Macedonia, where they are known as Torbesi. In Bulgaria and in
the Northen part of Greece, they are self-identified as Pomaks; in Kosova they are
known as Goranis.

Competing Theologies of a Sacred History: The Sunni and Shia Dichotonomy

The Shia-Sunni conflict has become familiar for the humanity and is is an evidence
of a kind of tribal war of different ethnicities or identities. There are two elements,
faith and identity, that converge in this conflict. Despite the periods of coexistence,
the Shia-Sunni struggle is further prolonged and apprehend urgency and significance.
This old religious dispute of Islam is fossilized but it is also a contemporary clash of
identities that we witness today. Within time theological and historical disputes have
complicated it much more giving possibility to regional or international actors to
participate and intrigate with the situation. This make this situation paradox in the
sense of calling it an old and also a modern conflict.

As Akbar Ahmed mentioned, Islams two major components, are the Sunni
and Shia thoughts. Today approximately 90 percent of the Muslims, are Sunni and the
rest are pre eminently Shia. Theologicaly these two sects are too close, because both
of them believe in the same God, Prophet, Quran and the values of Islam. Their
differences stand in political and sociological level. 14 Shia belief originates in the
question of who should have been the first successor to the Prophet of God and born
the title of caliph. They also advocate that the Prophets son-in-law, Ali, was the
rightful successor and the first male to declare his belief in the message of Islam. After
Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman he became the ruler of Islam. 15 The difference referring
to the succession, developed into secterian schism under Umars rule when the Persian
Empire converted to Islam. Persians brought to the Muslim world a lot of their
customs and spirit of national pride. After having defeated by the Arabs, they
identified Ali in their new sect because this affiliation enabled them to retain a sense
182 of superiority while seeing themselves as a persecuted minority within the world body
of Muslims dominated by the Sunni. Over time, sociological differences seeped into
religious observance which affected rituals.

Thereby the Shia-Sunni conflict has attracted the world attention. It seems
like an old age damnation of the region where Arabs and Iranians are living and time
after time complicate the Muslims history, theology, law and politics. It has been far

14
Akbar Ahmed, Journey Into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, Washington D. C.: Brooking Institution
Press, 2008, p. 44.
15
Ahmed, ibid. , p. 44.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

more important in shaping the Middle East than many realize or acknowledge. 16 And
it has disposed a popular prejudice, as stereotypes of the plebeian Shias and their
restive view of Islam have defined how many Sunnis have seen their relatives.

The Islamic Revolution in 1979, was an important event for invigorating the
role of the Shia factor in Irans foreign policy. As the matter of fact, the Islamic
Revolution braced the Shias up to express their earnest identity and also to bode their
existence to the others. However, the repressive policies practiced by the Arab
regimes were the main obstacles to take advantage of the Shia factor in Irans foreign
policy. Since the Islamic Revolution served to intensify the ideological differences,
the fundamentalists of the Islamic Republic, with their own brand of Shia Islam, came
into conflict either with the regions conservative Sunni Islam.17 Shias and Sunnis will
emulate over power, firstly in Iraq and later across the whole region. Beyond Iraq,
other actors will have to cope with the situation created by the intensifying rivalries
between Shias and Sunnis. The overall Sunni-Shia conflict will play a large role in
defining the Middle East as a whole and shaping its relations with the outside world.
Recently and especially after the Cold War era, one of the Middle Easts external
geographies that Iran plays an active role is the Muslim part of Balkans.

The Shiism of Iran as Its Theo-Politic Means in the Foreign Policy

The Iran Islam Revolution of 1979, has been an inspiration for the anti-American
Islamists all over the world. If this would be seen from a wider perspective especially
after the Iraq war of 2003, the Iran Shiism has been awakwen and Tahran became a
regional power. In addition, in Bagdad came in power a Shiite majority; in Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain the Shiite communities become
stronger than before. This empowerment of Shii community in Middle East brought
in light two meaningful dimensions: The Irans regional policy based on Shiism and
the integration of Shiism in Iraq polics that time by time will be in a rivality with
Irans one.18

Even if numerically Shiite community compose a minority in comparison

with Sunnite community, it looks that Shiism has a more advantageous position
because of its international and transnational network. The Shia Crescent thought
consists on creating a common Shiite identity in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria together with
Iran dominance.19 However, Shiite Islam and the network that it produce can easily 183
have been manipulated by Iran and it is used as a theo-political instrument for
Tahrans national interests. Shiism have been oftenly used as Irans soft power in
foreign policy. Historically the character of Shiism has been beyond the Irans

16
Haydar akmak, Trkiyenin Orta Dou Politikas, 21 Yzyl Dergisi, Number 19, July 2010, pp. 23-
24.
17
Kayhan Barzegar, The Shia Factor in Iran's Foreign Policy
http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=en&abtid=07&&depid=74&semid=1421, 01.05.2016.
18
Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, 11 Eyll Sonras Trk D Politikasnda Vizyon Araylar ve Drt Tarz-
Siyaset, Gazi Akademik Bak, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, p. 39.
19
Laurance Lour, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 2008, pp.
243-244
 Erjada Progonati

national nature comprehending a strong identity within the Arab world; but the Islam
Revolution of 1979 in Iran transformed the Shiite identity, melting Islamic and
nationalistic nuances together. This emphasizes the Shiism critics towards the pan-
Arabism or Arab nationalism. The secular Baathist regimes in have Middle East lost
their legitimacies by time, so the fall of Saddam Huseyin in Iraq and the situation
created by the Arab Spring completed this process.

The revival of Shiism strengthened the regional role of Iran but at the same
time gave birth to a new rivalry between Shiite community in Iran and the one of Iraq.
In 2012, the Maiqi government in Iraq followed to consolidate the efforts for Shiite
power. This situation brings out also a differentation between Shiite communities of
different countries.

Irans Silent Revolution in the Balkans: A History and A Forecast

Irans emergence is a considerable destabilizing factor in the Balkans security

equation. The Iran and its proxies threat in the Balkans is evident and multiplied by
the growth of Wahhabi movements in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and the
Sandzak region. The Iranian presence in Balkan peninsula goes back to the Yugoslav
war, but the effects of Khomeinis ideology to the Muslim population of Balkans had
already been present before. In 1979, Bosnian Muslims were evoked by the Iranian
revolution.20

Since the 1960 the Bosnian community had been looking for a national
identity. This year corresponds with the period when Alija Izetbegovi was
imprisoned for his Islamic Declaration. Izetbegovic was affected by the Islamic
Revolution in Iran and this made him feel part of an international movement. Several
of Izetbegovics closest collaborators at the time secretly went to Iran in January 1982
to attend anniversary celebrations marking the establishment of the Islamic Republic,
and to attend a congress aimed at the reunification of Sunni and Shia Islam.21 Second
Izetbegovic and other intellectuals of the pan-Islamic organisation called Mladi
Muslimani, the Turkish model was too secular. 22 In addition, Izetbegovic has declared
clearly in his Islamic Declaration his orientation to the radical Islamic states such
as Pakistan. As the scholar Vjekoslav Perica noted in his 2002 book Balkan Idols,
The Pakistan parallel also revealed Izetbegovics vision of Yugoslavias fate as
184 analogous to that of India after 1948. In this terms between 1930-1940, Izetbegovic
and a circle of like-minded devout Islamists formed a group called the Mladi
Muslimani (Young Muslims), inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In
Izetbegovics own words, the goal of the Mladi Muslimani was the creation of one
great Muslim state called the Islamistan that will compass the Muslim population

20
Matteo Pugliese, Iran in the Balkans,
http://www.lowlandssolutions.com/downloads/Iran%20in%20the%20Balkans%20-%20Pugliese.pdf,
07.05.2016.
21
Gordon N. Bardos, Iran in the Balkans: A History and a Forecast,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/iran-balkans-history-and-forecast, 02.05.2016.
22
Matteo Pugliese, Iran in the Balkans,
http://www.lowlandssolutions.com/downloads/Iran%20in%20the%20Balkans%20-%20Pugliese.pdf,
07.05.2016.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

of the Balkan peninsula, northern Africa and the Middle East. This was the situation
when in 1946, Titos Communist regime arrested Izetbegovic and a large number of
the The Young Muslims. They were sympathizers of the Ayatollahs regime after
the success of the Revolution.23 Until 1982 around six hundred Bosnians had already
studied theology in the Iranian madrasas. 24 In 1983 these activities, together with the
views promoted in the Islamic Declaration, forced Izetbegovic and other Islamist
activists in Bosnia to a second prison term.

When the inter-ethnic war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the

Muslims sought allies who were able to supply them with arms despite the
international embargo. Iran supported them. Iranians saw in the Bosnian war an
opportunity to expand their geopolitical influence in Europe thats why Tahran was
one of the main suppliers of arms to the Bosnian Muslims in the Yugoslav civil war.
Since 1992, Iran began to organise their presence in the former Yugoslav republic,
with several religious, diplomatic and military initiatives.

In 1991the collapse of Yugoslavia and the eruption of the war in Bosnia

intensified the relationship with the mullahs. The president of the Republika Srpska,
Milorad Dodik in 2014 declared that Bosnia is subject to the interest of several
intelligence agencies, including Irans, adding that in the past, the Iranian Embassy
in Sarajevo had 480 employees.25

Croatia as the main source for arms transfers to the Bosnian Muslims, was
frigid to see them growing or becoming strong. In this case Iran was one of the first
Islamic countries that tried to support the Izetbegovic regime, although its efforts were
at the start prevented by a UN Security Council arms embargo imposed on the
combatants in Bosnia. Despite the arms embargo, Clinton adminiztration approved
tacitly the Iranians efforts to provide for Bosnian Muslims considerable military,
intelligence, and logistical support. Throughout this period, the Iranians developed a
broad intelligence network throughout the territory and in different institutions
controlled by Izetbegovics forces.26

In 1990, those same activists would form the Party of Democratic Action
(SDA), the core of Izetbegovics political party. In 1992 one of them, Omer Behmen,
was entrusted with the duty of becoming the Izetbegovic regimes first ambassador to
Tehran. Another one of the 1983 trial accused, Hasan Cengic, would in the 1990s be 185
widely seen as the leading Iranian agent in Bosnia. The educational exchanges
between two countries multiplied and spread out the Iranian influence in the former
Yugoslavia. Several hundred Yugoslav Muslim students were sent to study in Iranian
institutions.

23
N. Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History, New York: New York University Press, 1994, p. 207.
24
Matteo Pugliese, Iran in the Balkans,
http://www.lowlandssolutions.com/downloads/Iran%20in%20the%20Balkans%20-%20Pugliese.pdf,
07.05.2016.
25
Bosnia: ministro Esteri Crnadak, dimostrare determinazione nella lotta contro il terrorismo, Agenzia
Nova, 06.0 5. 2016.
26
Bardos, ibid., 02.05.2016.
 Erjada Progonati

The Izetbegovic regime had no doubts about the superiority of Iran as a

model over other possible alternatives. Iran government continued to support the
territories (Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Bihac, Visoko) controlled by Izetbegovics
forces, during the war and after the Dayton Agreement ended in 1995. This situation
attracted the attention of some actors and especially of U.S. According to the scholar
Cees Wiebes, during the war Turkey and Saudi Arabia were very willing to deliver
weapons and to lure Izetbegovic away from Iran, but the orientation of the Bosnian
government was far more towards Iran. American intelligence operatives in Bosnia
came to the same conclusion. U.S. began to see the Bosnian Muslim government as
a client of the Iranians. If its a choice between the CIA and the Iranians, theyll
take the Iranians any day.27 By wars end, public opinion polls showed some eighty-
six percent of the Bosnian Muslim population expressed a positive attitude toward
Iran.28 Thus, after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, one of the main goals
of US policy in Bosnia became reducing the influence of Iran and the various
mujahedin forces there. This proved a difficult task because pro-Iranian factions had
by this time become deeply embedded in numerous institutions.

The Iranian factor remains an important variable in the current Bosnian

security calculus. It is an interesting fact that the largest Iranian embassy in Europe is
located in Sarajevo and it shouldnt escape notice that hundreds Iranians are active in
Bosnia as diplomats, journalists, joining the Iranian Cultural Center in Sarajevo or
undertaking other roles. Despite the fact that Bosnian Islam is Sunni, there is also a
pro-Iranian and pro-Shiite faction within the Bosnia and Herzegovina. 29 Since the end
of the war, Iran has invested large sums of money and energy into promoting academic
and cultural ties with different segments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.30

After the collapse of Yugoslavya, when the Balkans entered in a more

peaceful climate, Iran decided to practice wider its soft power. Its main instruments
in this direction were the Ibn Sina Research Institute, the Mullah Sadra Foundation,
the Twelver Zivot, the Persian-Bosnian College and the Cultural Centre of the
Embassy of the Islamic Republic in Sarajevo. One of the main aims of Iran, was to
strengthen the influence of Shia Islam in Bosnian Muslims. How successful it was?
Its not easy to evaluate the effects of this campaign because there is no official data
on the number of Bosnian Shia Muslims. According to the non-governmental
organisation Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly, in 2008 the 23.400 Shia Muslims
186 constituted around 0,5% of the population. According to the Pew Forum on Religion

27
Bardos, ibid., 02.05.2016.
28
Gordon N. Bardos, Iran in the Balkans: A History and a Forecast,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/iran-balkans-history-and-forecast, 02.05.2016.
29
Vlado Azinovi - Muhamed Jusi, The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters Bosnian
Contingent, Atlantic Initiative, pp. 19-20,
http://atlanticinitiative.org/images/THE_LURE_OF_THE_SYRIAN_WAR_THE_FOREIGN_FIGHTER
S_BOSNIAN_CONTINGENT/The_Lure_of_the_Syrian_War_-
_The_Foreign_Fighters_Bosnian_Contingent.pdf, 02.05.2016.
30
Bardos, ibid. , 02.05.2016.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

and Public Life, in 2009 Shias were about 15.200 in the context of a million and a half
of Bosnian Muslims that were almost Sunni.31

Except Bosnia, Albania has been another Balkan country that Iran is focused
in its attempt to create what Reza Shafa has called a foothold in the European
continent.32 As the matter of fact and as we mentioned above Albania have a multi-
faith society and Albanian strong tradition of reliogion tolerance is almost known.
Historically Albanians have practised a traditional, tolerant form of Sunni and
Bektashi Islam. Although today Islam is interpretated a little more radically
interpretation especially by the young Albanians who have studied abroad in Islamic
countries.33 After the collapse of communism in Albania, people expected quick
investments iniciatives by American or European countries. But this didnt happen
and in countrys media began to appear a new slogan, Towards Europe or Islam. 34
This was a chance for Islam countries to move towards this country. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has expanded its operations to continental
Europe. Albania has a geopolitical importance for mullahs ruling Iran. The majority
of the countrys Muslim population makes a prime tidbit for the IRGC. As in Bosnia,
the attempted Iranian infiltration are similar in Albania, too. There are a lot of cultural
organizations and groups that serve as means organizations for the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence. It is an offshoot of the
conglomerate Islamic Culture and Communication Organization (ICCO) which is
operating worldwide apparently to promote Islamic beliefs but practically it is a sister
organization to the IRGC and more accurately the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS). ICCO has a unique task of spreading fundamentalism and terrorism
abroad. Since the Albanian authorities will not allow the mullahs' agents to operate
freely in the area, IRGC utilizes the home made charity organizations to pursue its
real intentions. Struggling not to blow the cover, Bonyad Saadi Shiraz prints some
books propagate Khomeini's thoughts.

Since the 1979 Iran Revolution, an organization called Kommitte Imdad

Imam Khomeini (Khomeini Assistance Committee) under Khomeini's direct
supervision was setup in Iran to recruit among the poorest and most needy youths
worldwide for IRGC and other security apparatus. Asgar Owladi is known for his
irreplaceable services to Khomeini Assistance Committee. He was to meet the
country's religious leaders hopping to pave the way for the IRGC's later activities.
Khamenei briefed him in person since the visit was very important for Tehran's 187
mullahs.35 A document obtained from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cabinet indicates that

31
Pugliese, ibid., 07.05.2016.
32
Reza Shafa, Albania a Foothold For Irans IRCG in Europe, http://www.ncr-
iran.org/en/news/terrorism-fundamentalism/4920-albania-a-foothold-for-irans-irgc-in-europe-,
04.05.2016.
33
Miranda Vickers, Islam in Albania, Balkan Series, 8/9, Defence Academy of United Kingdom, March
2008, p. 1.
34
Adrian Brisku, Bittersweet Europe: Albanian and Georgian Discourses on Europe, 1878-2008, 2013, p.
157.
35
Shafa, ibid., 04.05.2016.
 Erjada Progonati

in the last fiscal year $19.5 million were allocated to cover expenses in some targeted
countries; out of that $1.5m were spent in Albania.

Despite such efforts, Iran draws little sympathy in either elite circles or
amongst the general population. For instance Albanian Former President, Sali
Berisha, has been an outspoken critic of the Ahmadinejad regime; in August, for
instance, Berisha claimed that Ahmadinjad proves that he and his ideology are a
growing threat to peace and stability in the Middle East...Ahmadinejads Nazi
declarations should be a wake-up call that Irans nuclear program should be stopped
by any means, as the greatest threat to peace and stability in the world. 36 After the
fall of Communism, the Vatican gave substantial funding to the Albanian Catholics
as the Greek Church did giving to the Albanian Orthodox community. Bektashi
Community in Albania explain that: we (Bektashi) were and are still offered money
from Iran, but we have never accepted Iranian money. The Iranian government tries
to offer investment for schools, but even though we dont have much money we do
not accept anything from Iran or extremists. 37

In addition in Albania, the Bektashi Sufis have been recognized as a distinct

Islamic community under the ambiguous... supervision of the official Sunni
apparatus, with which they enjoy cordial relations. 38 The Sunni ulema in Albania
proper and the Bektashis appear in public life as equals, without the Bektashis
seemingly subordinated to the ulema. A representative of the Bektashi Sufi order,
Arben Sulejmani, highlighted that the Bektashi community has been exclusively
Albanian since the suppression of Sufism in secularist Turkey in 1925. Then the
Bektashis moved their headquarters from Turkey to the Albanias capital, Tirana.
Sulejmani openly rejected the continuous attempts of the Western academics that
support the transformation of the Bektashis in Albania. Sulejmani, we are Muslims
and Sufis but we are not Arabs or Iranians and the missionaries of foreign Islamic
cultures had better get used to it...39 said. Sufis in Albania feel spiritually closer with
the Sufis of Iraq and Afghanistan. 40 Albanian government in general have supported
the U.S. foreign policy towards Middle East. Albanian troops served partecipating in
the Iraq, Afghanistan wars.

Conclusions

188 Iran is a complex country to understand because her power structures are completely
in contrast with what it might expect to find. Even if it have a Shiite majority, Iran
never hesitated to support countries with Sunni majority or countries positioned out
of the Middle East region. This might be Tahrans strategy in the sense of intending
to be a regional power. It is obvious that Iran didnt hesitate to act at any geography

36
Albania Backs Israel, Compares Iranian Chief to Hitler, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/israel-
finds-new-cheerleader-in-albania-s-pm#sthash.qGrN3F4L.dpuf, 04.05.2016.
37
Vickers, ibid., p. 8.
38
Albert Doja, Bektashism in Albania: Political History of a Religious Movement, Tirana, Albanian
Institute for International Studies, 2008, p. 15.
39
Stephen Schwartz, Arabs, Iranians, and Turks vs. Balkan Muslims,
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/2033/arabs-iranians-and-turks-vs-balkan-muslims, 02.05.2016.
40
Schwarz, ibid., 02.05.2016.
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

that thinks it would have success. Iran tried to have a strong impact towards the Balkan
Muslim communities such as Muslim Bosnians and Muslim Albanians.

From all these developments, how can the presence of Iran in Muslim Balkan
communities be argumented? How strong is the Iran's influence in the Balkans and
what is the Tehrans impact in this geography in the long term? The limits of Iranian
influence over Bosnian Muslims have been clear in June 2010 when the Bosnia voted
in favor of tightening sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. Bosnian
community realizes that Iran has little to offer the country in comparison to the
economic and security benefits they might gain from Euro-Atlantic integration. Irans
space to maneuver in Bosnia is also narrow because of the substantial autonomy of
Bosnias Croatian-populated cantons, or the Serbian entity in Bosnia, the Republika
Srpska, that does not nourish any sympathy for the Iranians. Thus, despite the
considerable energy invested in Muslim Balkan countries the efforts of Iran to
establish a safeheaven in the Balkans has had partial success. This is because Balkan
countries in general own the aspiration to adhere in Euro-Atlantic structures like the
EU and the NATO. This make these countries to be a little destitute from efforts
similar to Irans.

In addition, today there is a triple struggle within the Bosnian Muslim

comunity: The group that have closer ties with Saudi Arabia, another group that is
sympathizant of Turkey and consider Ankara as the best model for Bosnian Muslim,
and a third group that see themselves closer to Iran. This situation makes Iran feel
anxious in the political and religious sense.

In this papers retrospecive, it can be concluded that at least in the medium

term, the Iranian impact on the Balkan Muslim comunities wouldnt be strong.
However, what is very clear and present in terms of Iran's impact on Balkan
communities, are the Iranian cells, or pro-Iranian factions in Bosnia and Albania. In
future in any case of an active crises in the Middle East, these cells could become
activated, especially as a logistical infrastructure for an Iranian counterstrike in the
Balkans.

While militant Islamism holds little appeal for the vast majority of Muslims
in Bosnia and Albania, the existence of small extremist groups provides ample reason
for concern and vigilance. Recent diplomatic activities confirm the extent of Western 189
government concern over the possibility that pro-Iranian Islamist factions in
southeastern Europe could cause serious problems for Western interests. A Western
conflict with Iran would in all likelihood motivate Islamists in the Balkans to be a
potential threat using violence against them. Because especially in isolated villages of
the Western Balkans, there are Wahhabi groups that have developed a network of
extra-territorial, sharia-run enclaves. Within two or three decades these cells have
become safe havens and recruiting grounds for jihadis from around the world. In
recent years, Islamist extremists have time by time transported young people young
camps positioned in different places like forests and hills giving them military
training. This situation seems to make future international security more complicated
to controll. At the same time, its confirmed that the Balkans are a potential front for
 Erjada Progonati

terrorism in any future conflict. This risk multiply the stand aloof of Balkan countries
from Tehran.

190
 Irans Silent Revolution in Balkans

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