People vs.
Mendoza Facts:
Facts:
In criminal case No. 4851 of the CFI of
Pampanga Ricardo Mendoza of the crime of
assault. September 30, 1932, in the
municipality of San Fernando. The
accused Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil of
the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
attack and lay hands upon her person. He
slapped Iluminada Tinio on one of her
cheeks, while she was engaged in the
performance of her duties as such teacher
and while she was within the premises of the
high school building.
The trial court dismissed the information
allegedly did not constitute a crime but
simply a misdemeanor or light felony. The
present appeal was taken by the fiscal for
the purpose of setting aside the order of
dismissal in question.
Issue:
Whether or not information constitutes
the crime of assault upon a person in
authority or at least an assault upon an
agent of authority, or any other grave
or light felony.
Held:
A teacher is not a person in authority in
the strict sense of the phrase as
employed in article 148, on the ground
that he does not exercise a directly
vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of
authority on the ground that, in accordance
with the doctrine laid down in the case of
United States vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472),
wherein Viada was cited in support thereof,
agents of authority are only those persons
who, by direct provision of law, or by
appointment by competent authority, are
charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life
and property, and those who come to the aid
of a person in authority.
A TEACHER IS NEITHER A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY NOR AN AGENT OF
AUTHORITY.A teacher is neither a person
in authority nor an agent of authority but
simply a public officer and, therefore, the
assault committed upon him, while he is
engaged in the performance of his duties as
such, is not and cannot constitute an assault
upon a person in authority or an agent
thereof.
People vs. Bacolod
defense of double jeopardy, In the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Ladislao Bacolod
pleaded guilty to an information
charging him with the crime of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
committed on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe.
On or about the 21st day of February, 1948,
with deliberate intent, and on the occasion'
of a dance held in the municipal tennis court
in connection with the town fiesta, did then
and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
cause a serious disturbance in a public place
by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded
one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic
among the numerous people present in the
said dance who ran and scampered in all
directions."
His counsel de oficio, invoking double
jeopardy by reason of the first information
which for convenience is quoted that on or
about the 21st day of February, 1948, the
above-named accused, then a member of
the PC patrol, by reckless imprudence and
without taking due care and precautions to
avoid damage and injury to the life and
property of other persons, did then and there
fire a shoot of a sub-machine gun thereby
hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back of the
right side of her body, which physical injury
required or will require medical attendance
for more than 30 days but less than 90, and
incapacitated or will incapacitate her from
performing her customary labor for the same
period of time."
Issue:
Whether or not can invoke double jeopardy.
Held:
The protection against double jeopardy
is only for the same offense. A single act
may be an offense against two different
provisions of law and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under one does not bar prosecution under
the other.
Therefore, the appealed resolution is
reversed and the record is remanded for
further proceedings.
United States vs. Tabiana and Canillas
Facts:
Gelasio Tabiana, tried to avoid being taken
by the policemen from the field in which he
was at the time and where these officers
served him with the warrant of arrest to the
town or to the police station of the
municipality, and also to avoid appearing in
said station, he preferring to report in the
municipal building of the town, as in fact he
did on that same night; that, therefore, on
being shown the warrant of arrest in the field
by the policeman Emiliano Callado, he told
said policeman and the latter's companion to
precede him to the pueblo, that he would go
there himself later on and meanwhile would
look for his herdsman, Vicente N., also
included in the warrant of arrest, and with
him would appear at the municipal building;
that when Tabiana reached the pueblo he
went directly to his house; that afterwards,
while accompanied by the policemen, he
passed by the market, where he tried to
elude the officers, and then went to the
municipal building, in which he inquired for
the municipal president, the chief of police,
and the justice of the peace; but that, as
none of these officials were in the building,
he returned home.
It is perfectly clear why the defendant,
Tabiana, should have performed all the acts
above related, and also why he should have
shown some irritation, as said in the
decision, at being required by the policemen
to accompany them, if we but take into
account, on the one hand, as stated in the
same decision, that he was a citizen of good
reputation in that municipality (Leon), was a
member of "the municipal council, had been
twice president of the municipality, and, at
the time of this arrest, was a candidate for
the office of municipal president; and, on the
other hand, that, as also set forth in the
majority opinion, the warrant in the hands of
the policemen for the arrest of Tabiana and
his herdsman had been procured upon the
charge of a trivial misdemeanor consisting of
an alleged trespass upon the complainant's
premises by Tabiana's cattle.
Issue:
Whether or not an offense consists of
simple resistance or of grave resistance
is to be determined with a view to the
gravity of the act proved and the
particular conditions under which
committed
Held:
RESISTANCE TO AGENTS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY. A person who at the moment
when a policeman comes to arrest him
refuses to obey the command of the latter
and strikes him with the fist may be
adjudged guilty of simple resistance and
serious disobedience under article 252, Penal
Code, instead of serious resistance under
article 249. The mere fact that some force is
used does not necessarily bring the case
under the latter article; and it is f or the court
to determine under all the circumstances
whether the act falls under the one provision
or the other. Moreover, A justice of the peace
who issues a warrant of arrest has no right to
interfere with the legitimate action of a
police officer engaged in making an arrest
there under; and a justice of the peace who
unlawfully interferes upon such occasion
may be guilty of an offense under articles
249-252, Penal Code, the same as any other
person.
United States vs. Gumban
Facts:
Accused Nicomedes Gumban of the crime of
assault upon agents of authority committed
as follows:
That on or about August 13, 1917, in the
municipality of Jaro, Province of Iloilo, P. I.,
the said accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally, attack, employ
force, and lay hands upon the person of
Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of the
said municipality of Jaro, and therefore upon
the person of an agent of authority of the
said municipality, at a time when said
Petronilo Gumban was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, giving said
Petronilo Gumban a slap on the face.
Committed in violation of article 250 of
the Penal Code."
On the morning of August 13, 1917, Petronilo
Gumban, municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo,
was in the barrio of Pavia of the said
municipality, inspecting the quarantine of
animals. He was getting some information
from a councilor, Magdaleno Suliano,
regarding the condition of the animals in his
barrio, when Gregorio Ismaa, a tenant of
Magdaleno Suliano, arrived to report the fact
that he had surprised a carabao belonging to
Policarpio Gumban, destroying a planted
area belonging to the said Magdaleno
Suliano, and that, having seized the carabao,
he brought the same to the police station at
Pavia, which is within the zone affected by
the quarantine. Then Epifanio Gumban and
the accused Nicomedes Gumban, brothers of
Policarpio Gumban, the owner of the
carabao, arrived there and protested to the
president that their brother's carabao was
taken to Pavia which is within the zone
affected by the quarantine. The president,
upon hearing said protest, said that it was
his opinion that Gregorio Ismaa was right in
taking the carabao to the police station at
Pavia. However he promised to intervene in
the matter and to telephone to the man in
charge of the quarantine to find out whether,
on the following day, the said carabao could
not be withdrawn from the zone affected by
the quarantine. Upon hearing this statement
of the president, the accused insulted the
said president and gave him a slap on the
face which struck his left ear.
Issue:
Whether or not the force used is
sufficient to constitute assault upon an
agent of authority
Held:
The mere fact of having slapped the face of
an official, engaged in the performance of his
official duties, constitutes the crime of
assault with the hands, committed upon a
person in authority.
In the information, the fiscal qualified the
crime charged as assault upon an agent of
authority.
Held: That the qualification given by the
fiscal is not what constitutes the crime, but
the facts stated in the body of the
information.
The fiscal alleges in the body of the
information that the offended party, as
municipal president, was an agent of
authority. Held:
(1) That such an allegation is but a
conclusion of law, which ought to be
considered discarded from the information;
(2) that a municipal president is a person
in authority (U. S. vs. Dirain, 4 Phil. Rep.,
541);
(3) that, it being alleged in the information
that the offended party was a municipal
president, the information is sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime of assault
upon a person in authority.
People vs. Bustamante
Facts:
Bustamante was united in wedlock to one
Maria Perez on August 9, 1954. A little over a
year later, or on September 16, 1955, he
contracted a second marriage with Demetria
Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor
Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan,
acting as Mayor of said Municipality, while
the first marriage was still subsisting.
Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her
parents for about a month, after which time
he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live
with the first wife, Maria Perez. In the course
of her search for him, Demetria discovered
from the Binalonan municipal authorities the
previous marriage of defendant Bustamante.
Hence, this accusation.
Defendant did not testify in his behalf during
the trial. The main problem poised in this
appeal concerns the authority 01 Francisco
Nato to solemnize the second marriage.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco
Nato were the duly elected mayor and vice-
mayor, respectively, of the municipality of
Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of
1951. On September 16, 1955, Aquino went
on leave of absence for one month. In view
of this, the vice-mayor was designated by
the mayor to take over the rein of municipal
government during his absence; and, Nato
was acting in this capacity when he
performed the second marriage of
Bustamante with Demetria Tibayan.
Issue:
Whether assumption of powers and duties of
the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor is
proper.
Held:
The vice mayor of a municipality acting as
Acting Mayor has the authority to solemnize
marriages, because if the vice mayor
assumes the powers and duties of the office
of the mayor, when proper, it is immaterial
whether it is because the latter is the Acting
Mayor or merely Acting as mayor, for in both
instances, he discharges all the duties and
wields the powers appurtenant to said office.
(Laxamana vs. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32; 48 Off.
Gaz. No. 9, 3869; see 2195 Revised
Administrative Code.)
The wrong averment made in the information
charging bigamy as to the person that
solemnized the second marriage is
considered unsubstantial and immaterial, for
it matters not who solemnized the marriage,
it being sufficient that the information
charging bigamy alleges that a second
marriage was contracted while the first still
remained undissolved. The information filed
in the case at bar having properly stated the
time and place of the second wedding, was
sufficient to apprise the defendant of the
crime imputed.
Justo vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Nemesio B. de la Cuesta is a duly appointed
district supervisor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, with station at Sarrat, Ilocos Norte.
Between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. on October 16,
1950, he went to the division office in Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, in answer to. a call f rom said
office, in order to revise the plantilla of his
district comprising the towns of Sarrat and
Piddig. At about 11:25 a.m., De la Cuesta
was leaving the office in order to take his
meal when he saw the appellant conversing
with. Severino Caridad, academic supervisor.
Appellant requested De la Cuesta to go with
him and Caridad to the office of the latter.
They did and in tlie office of Caridad, the
appellant asked about the possibility of
accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in
the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that
there was no vacancy, except that of the
position of shop teacher. Upon hearing
Caridad' answer, the appellant sharply
addressed the complainant thus: "Shet, you
are a double crosser. One who cannot keep
his prqmise." The appellant then grabbed a
lead paper weight from the table of Caridad
and challenged the offended party to go out.
The appellant left Caridad's office, followed
by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of
the table of one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the
division office, De la Cuesta asked the
appellant to put down the paper weight but
instead the appellant grabbed the neck and
collar of the polo shirt of the complainant
which was torn. Carlos Bueno separated the
protagonists, but not before the complainant
had boxed the, appellant several times."
Issue:
Whether AGGRESSION AHEAD ATTACHES
EVEN IF AT THE TIME OP ASSAULT NO
OFFICIAL DUTY
Held:
The character of person in authority is not
assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant was not
actually performing the duties of his office
when assaulted, this f act does not bar the
existence of the crime of assault Tipon a
person in authority, so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of
official duty.
This is apparent from the phraseology of
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, in
penalizing attacks upon person in authority
"while engaged in, the performance of
official duties or on occasion of such
performance", tlie words "on occasion"
signifying "because" or "by reason" of the
past performance of official duty, even if at
the very time of tie assault no official duty
was being discharged
Where there was a mutual agreement to
fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated
time and place would be unlawful; to hold
otherwise would be to sanction unexpected
assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and
fair play. The acceptance of the challenge did
not place on the offended party the burden
of preparing to meet an assault at any time
even before reaching the appointed place for
the agreed encounter, and any such
aggression was patently illegal.
United States vs. Saiel
Facts:
Between 8 and 9 o'clock of the morning of
January 26, 1914, Manuel Alburo, the justice
of the peace of the municipality of Argao,
Province of Cebu, and Gaudencio Saiel, the
defendant, were in the railway station of said
municipality on private business, alone and
engaged in a conversation at a place about 6
or 8 yards away from the station scales,
when Saiel gave the justice of the peace a
shove in the belly with his fist. When said
official received the shove and hurriedly
started to leave the place to call the police to
his aid, his hat fell off his head, and
defendant stooped down, picked it up and
handed it to him. Afterwards they both went,
though not together, to the Constabulary
bar- racks of the pueblo, where, although no
order of arrest had as yet been issued
against defendant, he expressed a desire to
remain, f or he f eared that if he were taken
to the municipal building he might be
mobbed. At the time of the occurrence just
referred to, a charge of estafa was pending
against defendant before this same justice of
the peace and he had to furnish new bail for
his provisional release while awaiting trial
under that charge.
The justice of the peace, Manuel Alburo,
testified that their conversation was
commenced by defendant who, on seeing
him in the station, approached him,
embraced him and said: "Two words with
you, friend Maneng," then, taking him to the
place where they conversed, lamented his
situation for having been first charged with
theft and then with estafa, and also the fact
that the bondsmen he had presented had
been rejected, which rejection defendant
attributed to personal revenge on the part of
the justice of the peace; this accusation the
latter denied, saying he had done no more
than to comply with his duty in accordance
with the fiscal's instructions. The justice of
the peace testified that immediately after he
had said this and while he was wiping his
eyes with his handkerchief, defendant struck
him saying: "Ah, evil justice of the peace,
servant of the fiscal and of the judge."
Issue:
Whether or not the ASSAULT is UPON A
PERSON IN AUTHORITY.The defendant,
against whom an action for estafa was
pending in the justice of the peace court of
the municipality, accidentally met the justice
of the peace in the railway station, and while
talking to him there, gave the latter a blow
and shove with the fist. It was not proven
that the justice of the peace was then. and
there exercising his functions nor that the
defendant, in so striking and shoving the
justice of the peace acted under the impulse
of any resentment caused by the acts
performed by the justice of the peace or by
his rulings in the proceedings for estafa then
pending against defendant before the same
justice of the peace, or by any other act
performed by the latter in the performance
of his office, with respect to defendant. Held:
That the said offense does not constitute the
crime of assault upon a person in authority,
as defined and punished by article 249 of the
Penal Code, but that it was a simple assault
and battery constituting a misdemeanor
against the person, provided for and
punished in paragraph 1 of article 589 of the
Penal Code.