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Rural Sociology
Henri Lefebvre1
Contribution to the International Congress of Sociology, Amsterdam, August 19562
Introduction
In the domain of rural sociology, even slight acquaintance with the facts destroys
commonly held opinion.3
In terms of time, agriculture came before industry; in terms of space, even today,
an ocean of agricultural production surrounds some continents and some small
islands of urban life and industrial production. Hence we imagine, in general, that
rural life and agricultural structure is simpler than the modern life of cities and
factories.
But, in fact, rural sociology has to deal with extremely complicated realities; espe-
cially as it is shaken by contradictory movements. Not only does the rural sociolo-
gist nd themselves confronting structures originating from different historical
epochs (for instance, structures historically linked to the Middle Ages), but they
confront structures that are disintegrating, mixed with new forms and structures.
There is not much in common between a village in north-eastern France (with a
strong communal structure, although extensively reorganised through major
[grande] modern agriculture) and a hamlet [village individualiste], although stagnant
or declining, from the south. There is not much in common between a typical
French village and a village from the south of Italy or Spain, real agricultural towns,
from where (every day or at the beginning of every week) thousands of agricultural
workers go to work on latifundia, often very far away from their home [domicile].
Today, amongst the branches of sociology, rural sociology is probably more than
others connected to life, to practical action, to efcacy [ lefcacit].4 The agrarian
reforms being considered in much of the world cannot be implemented without so-
ciologists, because they pose serious sociological problems. For instance, during at-
tempts (as yet uncompleted, as yet unsatisfactory) to transform the agricultural
structure of southern Italy, it was necessary to ask sociologists to study how agricul-
tural workers in large villages could become small-scale farmers with their own
individual plots [exploitation individuelle]. Another example: in Hungary, on the
plain, peasants traditionally spent the winter in agrarian villages (Szeged, etc), then
in the spring they would return to their far-ung farms (tanyas). How to put an
end to this tradition of semi-nomadism xed to the soil and regroup in modernised
villages of tanyas?5 Here we refer only to structures close to us. If we considered
Asia (India, China, etc) it would be much more complicated.
Antipode Vol. 48 No. 1 2016 ISSN 0066-4812, pp. 6773 doi: 10.1111/anti.12172
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68 Antipode
Development of a Theory
The theory of ground rent was born in England. Marx and Engels considered it to be
a very important contribution by classical English economists to science because
it was only in England that there existed a mode of production under which
ground rent had in fact been separated from prot and interest.6
Marx took up [repris] and developed the theory of ground rent elaborated by
James Anderson, Adam Smith and, most importantly, Ricardo. He modied it pro-
foundly, rst of all by criticising the well-known [fameuse] law of decreasing pro-
ductivity [loi de la productivite decroissante] of land (technical progress in modern
agriculture conrmed this refutation). Marx showed that the notion of differential
rent [rentes differentielle] introduced by Ricardo must itself be differentiated, in the
sense that there are multiple differential rents (rent A comes from natural differ-
ences in soils, unequal fertility, diverse situations in relation to markets and commu-
nication routes; rent B develops from differences of productivity from successive
capital investments in the same soil).
After Marx, then, to differential rent must be added the notion of absolute rent
[rente absolute], taken by the owner of the land, even if the land remains fallow (un-
productive). This absolute rent does not relate to the price of agricultural products,
nor to the prot of the capitalist farmer who invests in the land.
Marx conrmed Ricardos important viewpoint: the landowner (historically of
feudal origin, although in many parts of the world [globe] the bourgeoisie displaced
and replaced the feudal latifundium) tends to take all the rent, leaving the
exploited with only a minimal part: the average prot for his capital, wage labour
for the work accomplished. In this way, Marx answered in a new and thoroughly
scientic manner the large problem posed by Ricardo: How do we distribute rev-
enue according to the classes of the population?
Curious fact: contemporary economists often ignore the theory of ground rent.
Nevertheless, it played a signicant role in the formation of marginalism. But
marginalists are content to emphasise the role played by marginal enterprises
(smallholdings [petites agriculture]) in establishing agricultural prices. They leave
aside the essential: the source of the revenues and their distribution.7
Furthermore, the very notion of ground rent becomes obscured. In Italy, where
agrarian research institutes are especially active and well equipped, it is ofcially
only a matter of ground revenue [revenu foncire], and they study its total revenue
per land hectare, so that we know neither its origin nor its distribution (what goes
to the landlord and what goes to the different categories of farmers [exploitants]).
Recently, in France, the study of ground rent has experienced a new revival. Why?
Precisely because the problems of the peasantry are raised with increasing acuity.
The Socite francaise dconomie rurale has published two reports: Rente foncire
et revenu agricole [Ground Rent and Agricultural Revenue] and Le problme de la
rente du sol [The Problem of Land Rent].8 They are rather confused reports refer-
ring to Ricardo without considering the Marxist critique. The authors of these stud-
ies point out the importance of the problem, but they face a simple fact: strictly
speaking, ground rent in France today represents only two percent of national rev-
enue. How then can it exercise any inuence on the agrarian structure? How does it
connect to those problems that trouble the French peasantry?
Meanwhile, the theory of ground rent is investigated and developed, although in
more distant countries, especially in China (where the economist and sociologist
Chen Po-Ta has just published a remarkable work on this question).9
For us, a developed Marxist theory applies and is validated across the board. We
will be content to mention some facts related to the agrarian structure of France.
First, in certain regions, such as Brittany, the original feudal monopoly remains
powerful and sometimes predominant (although over the last few years it has been
challenged by the growth of large capitalist agriculture). In such regions, the
agrarian nobles and the bourgeois landholders buying feudal estates [domaines]
still occupy strong positions. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the clustering
of small-scale landholders and tenant farmers around large estates. The effect of
demographic pressure, when aided by ground rent in the strict sense due to
the landowner, is strong [forte]. Villages are highly populated and dominated
by the castle. An archaic character is preserved, with the strong inuence of
the Catholic clergy, the excess population emigrates, permanently or not (as
sailors and as seasonal workers). Nevertheless, new movements caused by the ten-
dencies of mechanised agriculture and by some level of industrialisation ght
traditionalism.
Second, in the northern and the eastern part of the Parisian region, the capitalist
monopoly dominates. It is here that we can study this new social type previously
mentioned: the powerful capitalist proteer [exploitant], owner of a wheat and
beetroot factory, often associated with industrial and nancial capitalism (fabrica-
tion of sugar, alcohol, etc). Sometimes he is the landlord, sometimes not; but
generally he is the leaseholder [locataire] of elds owned by several small- and me-
dium-scale landlords. Curious fact: the landlords are then only minor gures [petites
gens] compared to their tenant [locataire]. In this region, the proportion of the
exploitation becomes huge and far exceeds the proportion of the property. The
multiple farms [exploitations] incorporate [englobent] the whole villages territory
or even spread beyond it. Villages depopulate. Agricultural workers (lodging in or
outside the farm) have replaced the older population of peasants and artisans.
These workers are often foreigners, badly paid, living in deplorable conditions.
Nonetheless, a new elite is forming: mechanical technicians and tractor drivers,
specialists, technicians of scientic farming, etc.
Third, the whole of the south of France is, increasingly, an underdeveloped area,
whose agrarian structure is disintegrating. A detailed examination shows, within a
general backwardness [dans le retard gnral], great diversity. In certain sectors,
the feudal monopoly remains powerful; tenant farming (an outdated and semi-
feudal mode of cultivation) still persists, for instance in the south-west. In other sec-
tors, inclusive of part of the wine-growing sector, small- and medium-scale prop-
erty [propriet] still exists, although in a lamentable state. Lastly, in sectors of
specialised cultivation (vines, fruits, vegetables and early crops [primeurs], owers)
large capitalist farming [exploitation] becomes established, although in reduced
areas [surface]. It is clear that 10 hectares of early crops [primeurs] or owers repre-
sent a big farm requiring large capital investment (in the statistics, these landhold-
ings are lumped together with the smallholdings of familial [familiale] polyculture,
which signicantly interferes with interpreting the gures).
In any case, the sectors where smallholdings prevail, small property, the familial
polyculture is completely declining. Statistics show a decrease of global revenue in
the regions considered, as much as 7% in 20 years in the south-west.
Villages get depopulated, for many reasons (low birth rate, migration, denite
emigration). In this region, which is generally becoming impoverished, wealth gets
concentrated in the towns inhabited by landlords owning properties that are held
for sharecropping [mtayage], or in the most important modernised farms [exploita-
tions]. These towns are also markets (Toulouse, Perpignan, Montpellier, etc) and
administrative centres. What happens then is a complex and contradictory process
that only the theory of ground rent can explain.
Conclusion
The theoretical considerations and the concrete facts noted above therefore seem to
scientically conrm the position indicated at the beginning of this study.
The rural sociologist is confronted with extremely varied phenomena, which they
must try to attempt to organise. Beginning with description but soon confronted
with problems that exceed simple descriptions, what is required is another tool of
investigation distinct from empiricism. By delving deeply into the problems of rural
sociology in order to grasp its laws, the process is confronted as simultaneously his-
torical, economical, and social. In order to know the objective process, a theory is
needed. In the area of rural sociology, this theory exists: it is the theory of ground
rent, developed from classical economics by Marxists.15
Endnotes
1
Translated by Matthew Dennis (Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick,
Coventry, UK; m.dennis@warwick.ac.uk) and edited by Stuart Elden (Department of
Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK; stuart.
elden@warwick.ac.uk) and Adam David Morton (Department of Political Economy,
University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia; adam.morton@sydney.edu.au). All notes are by
the editors, unless stated otherwise.
2
Originally published as Lefebvre H (1956) Thorie de la rente foncire et sociologie rurale.
Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology II:244250; reprinted as Lefebvre H
(2001 [1970]) Thorie de la rente foncire et sociologie rurale. In id. Du rural lurbain
(3rd edn) (pp 7987). Paris: Anthropos. The text has been translated into Spanish twice:
Lefebvre H (1965) La teora de la Renta de la Tierra y la Sociologia Rural (trans Uribe
Villegas). Revista Mexicana de Sociologa 27(1):714; reprinted as Lefebvre H (1983) La
teora de la Renta de la Tierra y la Sociologia Rural. In H Lefebvre, J M Caballero,
O Gonzlez and W Kamppeter (eds) La renta de la tierra: Cinco ensayos (pp 1118). Mexico
City: Editorial Tlaiualli; and Lefebvre H (1971) Teora de la renta de la tierra y sociologa
rural. In id. De lo rural a lo urbano (trans J Gonzalez-Pueyo; ed M Gaviria) (pp 7784).
Barcelona: Ediciones Pennsula. Both these translations have been consulted in producing
this version, with the subheadings deriving from the 1983 reprint.
3
The 1970 French reprint merely says sociology, not rural sociology, in this sentence,
which appears in the original 1956 text and the Spanish translations.
4
It could be argued that the connection made by Lefebvre between rural sociology and
practical action, or efcacy, is one that evokes the second of Karl Marxs Theses on
Feuerbach, that The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth,
i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in practice. See Marx K
(1976 [1845]) Theses on Feuerbach. In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Collected Works,
Vol. 5 (pp 68). London: Lawrence and Wishart.
5
The 1970 French reprint has this word as tagas.
6
Engels F (1987 [1877]) Anti-Dhring. In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Collected Works,
Vol. 25 (pp 1309). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Lefebvre references Part II, Chapter
10; the passage is actually in Part II, Chapter 9 (p 208).
7
[Lefebvres note:] We should, however, note some interesting works published in the
United States of America, in particular Boulding K E (1945) The concept of economic sur-
plus. The American Economic Review 35(5):851869, Bloom G F (1942) Technical prog-
ress, costs and rents. Econmica 9(33):4052 and Singer H W (1941) An index of urban
land rents and house rents in England and Wales, 19451913. Econometrica 9:221230,
etc. [The editors have completed and corrected Lefebvres references.]
8
We have been unable to trace the rst publication, but the second is Rolland L (1955) Le
problme de la rente diffrentielle du sol. conomie rurale 23:2733. This journal is pub-
lished by Socite francaise dconomie rurale (SFERFrench Society of Rural Economy).
We suspect that the rst reference is also an article in this journal, but it is not clear which;
there is no piece in it with the cited title.
9
Tchen Po-Ta (1954) Etude sur la rente foncire en Chine. Etudes conomiques: cahiers
mensuels dconomie socialiste 84/85:167; Chen Po-Ta (1958) A Study of Land Rent in
Pre-Liberation China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press (2nd edn 1966).
10
[Lefebvres note:] I have studied this social type in numerous villages of Seine-et-Marne,
Aisne, Oise (regions north and north-east of Paris). [The 1965 Spanish translation has
new social type and the description emphasised in italics.]
11
[Lefebvres note:] Lenin V I (1960a [1899]) Capitalism in agriculture. In V I Lenin Collected
Works, Vol. 4. Moscow: Progress Publishers; Lenin V I (1960b [1901]) The agrarian ques-
tion and the critics of Marx. In V I Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 5. Moscow: Progress
Publishers; and Lenin V I (1964 [1915]) New data on the laws governing the development
of capitalism in agriculture. In V I Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22. Moscow: Progress
Publishers. [The reader should also be referred to Lenin V I (1960c [18961899]) The
development of capitalism in Russia. In V I Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 3. Moscow: Progress
Publishers. We have completed and corrected Lefebvres references here.]
12
Here, and elsewhere, the numbering differs between the 1956 and 1970 French versions
of the text. We have followed the 1956 version.
13
This section and those below are emphasised in italics in the Spanish translations.
14
In the 1965 Spanish translation this is in quotation marks.
15
Two notes on translated terms. Proprittranslated as both estate and property de-
pending on the sense; the related term, propritaire, is translated as owner. Exploitation
translated as exploitation, as in one person exploiting another; it is also the French
term for farm, however, so it has been translated as this where appropriate and marked
in the text. Related to this, Lefebvre also uses two terms for farmerexploitant (most
frequently) and agriculteur (more rarely). These have both been translated as farmer,
although occasionally exploitant has been translated as proteer when Lefebvre uses
both terms in the same sentence or when he seems to be emphasising the exploitative
nature of the farmer to those who work for him.