Hamblin, W J, "The Fatimid Army During The Early Crusades"

8512418
Hamblin, William James
THE FATIMID ARMY DURING THE EARLY CRUSADES
The U niversity of M ic h ig a n Ph .D. 1985
University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
Copyright 1985
by
Hamblin, William James
All Rights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE FATIMID ARMY DURING THE EARLY CRUSADES
by
William James Hamblin
A .dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in The University of Michigan
1985
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Andrew Ehrenkreutz, Chairman

Professor James Bellamy
Associate Professor Rudi P. Lindner
Professor K. Allin Luther
RULES REGARDING THE USE OF
MICROFILMED DISSERTATIONS
Microfilmed or bound copies of doctoral dissertations submitted

to The University of Michigan and made available through University Micro
films International or The University of Michigan are open for inspection,
but they are to be used only with due regard for the rights of the author.
Extensive copying of the dissertation or publication of material in excess of
standard copyright limits, whether or not the dissertation has been copy
righted, must have been approved by the author as well as by the Dean of
the Graduate School. Proper credit must be given to the author if any
material from the dissertation is used in subsequent written or published
work.
William James Hamblin 1985
' All Rights Reserved
For Loree, Always
ii
T A B L E OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION.............. ii
LIST OF APPENDICES................................... iv
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...................... 6
III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY . . . . 13
IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY . . . 96
V. WEAPONS, TACTICS AND MILITARY THEORY . . . . 138
VI. FATIMID FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY .... 199
VII. THE FATIMID ARMY IN A C T I O N ..................235
VIII. C O N C L U S I O N S ................................ 294
APPENDICES...................... 302
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 309
iii
L IS T OF A P P E N D IC E S
Appendix
A. Chronology................................ 302
B. Nasir-i Khusrav's description

of the Fatimid A r m y ...................... 304
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study arose from an attempt to answer the
question, "Why and how did the Fatimid army lose
southern Palestine to the Crusaders?" Of course in
reality this question has been asked many times before,
and a number of different answers have been posed by
some excellent scholars. However, past studies of the
early Crusades in southern Palestine have been limited
in a number of ways. First, and perhaps most
significant, is the lack of a serious study of the wide
range of Arabic sources. This is certainly true of most
medievalists who deal with the Crusades, and although
some Islamicists have made important contributions in
this era, the later Fatimids have been woefully

1
neglected . The full use of Arabic sources can add
significant details to the study of this period.
A second related problem is the nearly universal
tendency on the part of past historians to present the
history of the early Crusades with a strong Latin bias.
1_. Although some study has been done on the early

Fatimid period, there still is no adequate history of
the entire dynasty.
This tendency, although understandable, is no longer
acceptable. Great strides have been made in recent
years in dealing with the history of the Middle F.ast
from the Muslim point of view for the period after

2
Saladin , but by comparison, the first half of the
twelfth century has been untouched. The most damaging
effect of a Latin bias is the tendency to establish a
general outline based on Latin sources, using the Muslim
sources mainly to fill in a few additional details. As
I hope to show, serious consideration of the Muslim
sources reveals a substantially different picture of the
Crusader conquests.
This study of the Fatimid loss of Palestine to the
Franks consists of two major parts. The first discusses
the nature of the Fatimid military establishment
opposing the Franks (chapters 3-5). Past descriptions of
the Fatimid army were woefully incomplete. Dr. R. C.
Smail, in his superb book C n .a*a dtn g Waa&ane., regrets
that he was only able to use translated Muslim sources,
adding that, "Scholars better equipped for research into
Byzantine and Arabic sources might well take this
2. Especially Ehrenkreutz, S a la d j. n , Lyons and Jackson,

S a la .d j.n , Humphreys, Faom S a l a d l n t o t k i M o n g o l* , and
Ayalon's works cited in the Bibliography.
subject further and it is to be hoped that one of them
3
will do so Unfortunately, Dr. Smail's hope, at least
for the study of the early period of the Crusades, has
remained unfulfilled. It may seem gratuitous at first,
but it is impossible to understand the events in
Palestine until the nature of the Fatimid army and
military response to the Crusaders has been accurately
defined. Until now the Fatimids have often served
historians as little more than straw men for the
Crusaders to knock over one by one.
The second facet of the problem is to examine the
strategic and tactical actions and goals of the Fatimids
in the region. What exactly were the Fatimids doing and
why? This question is discussed in chapters 6 and 7.
Although the story of the early Crusades has often been
told, Fatimid activities have never been studied in
detail. The Latin bias, neglect of Arabic sources, and
ignorance of Muslim technical military terminology ar^
theory by nearly all past military historians has made
it necessary to revise many battle accounts. A fresh
examination of the story from the Fatimid perspective
reveals a number of new dimensions to the course of
3. Smail p. vi.
events.
Centering only on the Fatimid field army, this study
will not deal with two additional aspects of military
history. Descriptions of Fatimid naval administration,
technology and tactics must await further study.
Likewise, it will not be possible to treat the technical
aspects of siegecraft and fortifications. However, the
Fatimid theory of siegecraft and the broader strategic
importance of the Fatimid navy will be considered in
chapters five and six.
I hope that this study will serve three major
purposes. First, it will shed some much needed
illumination on late Fatimid history and
administration. Second, it will present a more accurate
and balanced interpretation of the events of the first
two decades of the Crusades. Finally, a more complete
understanding of one portion of the military history of
the Islamic world will emerge, thereby correcting some
distortions in medieval military history.
Many of the problems discussed here leave room for
varied opinions. The inclusion of Arabic sources, often
inaccessible or ignored in past studies of the military
history of the Crusades, has added a number of
significant pieces to the story, allowing us to fit
together what had formerly seemed scattered and
unconnected blocks of evidence. However, many gaps
still remain which will probably never be completely
filled. My goal is not so much to provide a definitive
account of the Fltimid army and military activities
although I have attempted to present as complete a
description as possible but to organize a consistent
picture which can account for the known evidence and
generate useful hypotheses about those areas for which
direct evidence is lacking.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The political and military situation in the Middle
East in 1095,' when Al-Afdal

* assumed absolute rule in
Egypt in all but name, was drastically different from
that of only thirty-five years earlier. The Fatimid
response to the Crusader invasions can best be

1
understood with the preceding decades in mind . In 1060
the Middle East was .divided between three more or less
evenly matched and mutually antagonistic empires: the
Saljuqid Sultanate, centered (at least in its western
portions) on Baghdad and maintaining control over
northern Iraq; the Byzantine Empire ruling Anatolia from
its capital at Constantinople; and the Fatimids of
Cairo, who controlled most of Syria. As is well known,
1. For background from the Byzantine perspective see

Jenkins, Byza.niAM.rn; Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in
the Eleventh Century" in Setton, Ctw.6a.dz6; Hussey,
"Later Macedonians" in Hussey, Zyza.niJ.ne. Empitiz, and
especially the related bibliography for this chapter.
The Saljuqids and Fatimids have received much less
attention than the Byzantines, and a complete modern
study is available for neither dynasty. Brief
introductions can be found in: Cahen "Turkish Invasions"
and Gibb "Caliphate" in Setton Cfiu.6a.dzi; O'Leary,
H i i t o n y o& t h z Fd.iimA.d6; Zakkar, AZ z p p c .
the developments of the four decades following 1060
completely changed the political map of the Middle East
and greatly facilitate the Crusader invasions.
The crucial decades were the 1060s and 1070s, during
which both the Byzantines and Fatimids suffered major
military defeats and civil wars. Fcr the Byzantines, a
decline in strength culminated in the unprecedented
military disaster at Manzikert in 1071 followed by a
decade of civil war and Turkish invaders. From the
Fatimid military perspective, three significant changes
derived from Manzikert and the Byzantine civil wars.
First, the Byzantines, as a major military power, were
driven from Syria and the Levant. They would not return
in force until the 1130s when they were active only in
northern Syria, far.from any potential military conflict
with the Fatimids. Second, the Turkish invasions of
Anatolia undoubtedly saved Egypt from Saljuqid
conquest. In 1071 Alp Arslan was actually planning an
invasion of Egypt when the advance of the Byzantine army
under Romanus Diogenes distracted his attention from the

2
south . Although dealing with the "what ifs" of history
is a risky undertaking at best, it seems likely that if
2. Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion" p. 149.
6
Turkish access to Anatolia had been barred during the
last quarter of the eleventh century much of the Turkish
military strength that was actually expended against the
Byzantines would have been turned against Egypt, which
in its weakened condition after the great Civil War
would probably have been overwhelmed. Finally, and
perhaps most significant for this study, the Byzantine
loss of Anatolia initiated a chain of events which
culminated in the invasions of the Crusaders.
The great catastrophe for the Fatimids was a
combination of famine, plague, and economic decline
coupled with the transformation of the ever present
factionalism between the various regiments of the army
into a full-fledged civil war. Beginning in 1062, Egypt
suffered from economic depression and anarchy as the
rival Turkish, Berber and Sudani-corps vied for control
of the government and plundered palaces and villages.
This military and economic chaos lasted over ten years
until 1074, when al-Mustansir summoned the Armenian
Muslim general Badr al-Jamali from Syria. As Wazlr Badr
al-Jamall restored peace and stability to Egypt after a
series of campaigns which lasted until 1077, when he
defeated the major Saljuqid invasion of Egypt .
This period of anarchy had three major effects on
the military affairs of the Fatimids in the twelfth
century. First, the Fatimids, who in 1060 had held
control over most of Greater Syria, by 1077 held only
some of the maritime cities and the southern region of
Palestine. Second. Badr al-Jamali initiated major
military reforms, an important part of which was the
decline of the Turks as the leading military corps and

4
their replacement by Christian Armenian mercenaries .
Finally, real political power was taken from the Fatimid
Caliphs and invested in the hands of the WazTr Badr
al-Jamali and later his son al-Afdal, who took control
of both the civil and military affairs of Egypt. In the
process there occurred a major shift in Fatimid foreign
policy from an expansionist religious ideology to an

5
Egyptocentric military dictatorship .
Thus by 1080 the Saljuqids had wrested most of Syria
and much of Anatolia from the Fatimids and Byzantines.
3. Greenstone, "Turkoman Defeat at Cairo."
4. For a discussion of these military matters see ch.

3.1.1 and 3.2.5.
5. The foreign policy goals of the Jamallan dynasty are

discussed in ch. 6.
10
But if the politics of the Middle East had developed a
new pattern, it was not stable, for although the
Saljuqids had seemingly emerged victorious.- having
crushed the Byzantine army at Manzikert and driven the
disorganized Fatimids from Syria, their victories were
ephemeral. The death of the great Sultan Malikshah in
1092 once again transformed the situation in the Middle
East. The rulers of the Saljuqids, who had once seemed
destined not only to maintain control over most of the
Middle East but perhaps even to conquer Egypt, became
fragmented into feuding successor states. Both the
Byzantine and the Fatimid Empires were transformed and
revitalized, albeit on a more limited scale, by the
establishment of "successor" dynasties, whose respective
leaders, Alexius Comnenus and Badr al-Jamali, managed to
stem the course of decline, reestablish internal
security, initiate significant institutional reforms and
begin attempts to reconquer lost territory from the
successors to the Saljuqids. In the last decades of the
eleventh century both the Byzantines and Fatimids began
successful military opperations aimed at ousting the
Saljuqids from their recently conquered territories,
while the Saljuqids and other Turkic principalities
became progressively more fragmented, and Armenian lords
established a number of independent principalities in
Cilicia.
Thus in 1095, when Al-Afdal succeeded his father as
WazTr and Supreme Military Commander (Ajtua. a l - J a y U i h . ) ,
the political and military situation in the Middle East
was again in a precarious balance, with the overall
situation much more unstable than in 1060. To the east,
Barkiyaruq had succeeded to the Imperial title of his
father Malikshah, but not to his Imperial authority.
The fragmentation which had begun during his father's
reign was greatly accelerated during the three short
years of his brother Mahmud's rule (1092-5), leaving
Barkiyaruq without authority in Anatolia, and nearly so
in Syria, Northern Iraq, and parts of Iran. To the west
the Comneni had reestablished order and were even
expanding Byzantine power to some degree, but
Constantinople had lost effective control over most of
Anatolia which remained in the hands of either Turkish
or Armenian principalities, or had become a "no-man's
land." The Fatimids maintained control of Egypt but had
lost all of their holdings in Syria except the strip of
coast from Ascalon to Beirut. The area separating these
three major powers, eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and
Syria, was held by a series of independent and
12
semi-independent principalities and clients. It was
into this region at this time of maximum political and
military confusion that the Crusaders attacked, bringing
about a complete reorganization of the political and
military balance of the region, resulting in a drastic
restructuring of Fatimid foreign policy. The nature of
the Fatimid military response to this important new
element in the political balance of the Middle East is
the subject of this study.
CHAPTER I I I
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY
The activities of the Fatimid army had far reaching
effects in Egypt and Palestine in the twelfth century.
Fatimid government administration centered around the
tasks of feeding, equipping, training and recruiting
soldiers for the army, and almost all government
policies had as at least part of their purpose the
preservation of the strength of the army. During the
first half of the twelfth century the Fatimid army was
responsible both for the security that Egypt enjoyed
against outside invaders, as well as the devastating
anarchy which engulfed Egypt during the periods when the
army plunged the country into civil war.
Despite the importance of the military establishment
in the history of the Fatimid dynasty little has been
written about the details of the organization of the
Fatimid army in the twelfth century, and what has been

1
written tends to be confused and uncritical . This
chapter will examine how the army of the Fatimid dynasty
was organized during the period of the early Crusades.
1. Beshir "Fatimid Military"; Smail pp. 83-7.
13
14
3.1 Geographical and Ethnic Divisions
In its broadest sense the Fatimid army was divided
into three categories, the maiha.AJ.ca (easterners),
soldiers originating east of Egypt; the magka.AU.ba
(westerners), whose homelands were to the west of Egypt,

1
and the Sudani or Blacks , whose geographical origins
were to the south of Egypt. Each of these three
divisions could potentially contain a number of

2
different cultural, linguistic, and religious groups .
The actual numbers, sources, and relative proportions of
the soldiers in each of these three groups varied
greatly throughout the history of the Fatimid dynasty.
Attempting to understand the nature of these groups is
complicated by the fact that depending on the historical
source and period in question, the sub-groups included
under these broad designations coulu vary. For example,
1. In this study I have followed the medieval Arabic

sources by adopting the Arabic word iudanZ to refer to
Black African troops serving in the Fatimid army, either
as mamluks or mercenaries.
2. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves/ p. 481 discusses

this topic briefly.
Egyptian-born sons of soldiers originally recruited
elsewhere would often still be considered as part of the

3
groups of their respective fathers . On the other hand,
any regiment of the Fatimid army could also be called
"Egyptian" to distinguish it from regiments of other
dynasties.
Initially these terms seem to have been used to
differentiate between the large body of Fatimid soldiers
who had migrated from North Africa at the time of the
Fatimid conquest of Egypt from those defeated Ikhshidid
soldiers who were recruited by the Fatimids and enlisted

4
in their army , and should be thought of as being
general descriptions rather than technical
designations. By the twelfth century, however, the
terms were used in a fairly limited sense. The
Maghariba referred primarily to Berber tribes, whether
irregular auxiliaries or soldiers serving in the regular
regiments, although it seems that Arabs from North
Africa and Barqa could have been included as part of the
3. Nasir-i Khusrav tr. p. 217, states that in the 1060s

most of the Mashariqa were actually Egyptian born sons
of Turks or Persians.
4. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," p. 480 discusses

the fate of Ikhshidid troops after the Fatimid conquest.
16
Maghariba. The Mashariqa encompassed a broad range of
peoples, including Turks, Syrians, Arabs, and Armenians,
although at different times different groups tended to
dominate the Mashariqa coalition. Sudanis were drawn
mainly from black slaves fabZ d & l- h k J U u L ') , although it
is not impossible that non-slave Sudanis from Nubia,
Ethiopia, and the black bedouin tribes of upper Egypt
and the Sudan could have enlisted as free mercenaries as
well.
The actual organization of specific regiments did
not always reflect thase broad geographical divisions.
Although some regiments were apparently always composed

5
of soldiers drawn from a single geographical region ,
others, such as the Hujarlya and the Ustadhs, could be

6
composed of recruits from any of the regions , while the
geographical origins of some regiments seem to have

7
changed over time . These geographical terms are used
5. The Da^lami regiment was apparently composed solely

of Daylami mercenaries, while the Rayhaniya regiment
(see 3.2.5 below) seems to have been composed Sudani
mamluks.
6. See 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 respectively.
7. If my interpretation of the development of the__

JuyushTya regiment from mainly Mashariqa to Sudani is
correct, see 3.2.5 below.
17
most often in the sources during times of factionalism
and civil wars, which often took the form of pitting the
various regional groups against one another, although
alliances between any two cf the three groups against
the third also occurred on occasion.
Variations and shifts in the policies of recruiting
troops from the three regions were based primarily on
three considerations: the military needs of the dynasty
and perceived or actual military effectiveness of the
soldiers in the respective groups; the current political
situation and relative alignment or factionalism of the
different groups; and the direct accessibility and
availability of men from a given region for
recruitment. Specific details of shifts in the
recruiting pattern are difficult to determine, although
general trends are fairly clear. During the reign of
al-cAzIz and al-Mustansir the dynasty recruited large
nunioers of Turks, Daylamrs and other Mashariqa. This
was due to three major factors: the excellence of these
troops in combat, the desire to establish a
counterweight to the political power of the Maghariba,
and the recent severing of many ties with North Africa
18
8
which rendered recruitment from that region difficult .
An attempt was made to counter the subsequent rise of
Turkish influence in Egypt by recruiting increasingly
large numbers of Sudanis, culminating-in the major civil

9
wars of the 1060s between the Mashariqa and Sudanis .
The temporary victory of the Mashariqa regiments was
countered by al-Mustansir through the introduction of
Badr al-Jamali from Syria with his army composed largely

10
of Armenians . Subsequent wars with the Saljuqids of
Syria not only rendered the recruitment of Turks
difficult but also foolish, since it would establish a
large Turkish regiment which could potentially defect to
Syrian Saljuqid princes. Nonetheless, the recruitment
of troops from eastern regions continued at varving

11
levels throughout the history of the dynasty
It should be emphasized in this regard that during
the entire latter history of the Fatimids no group was
8. See Lev, "Fatimid Army," for a discussion of al-cAziz's

military reforms.
9. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," pp. 482ff

discusses this development.
10. On the importance and role of Armenians in the

Jamallan army see 3.1.1.
11. See below 3.1.3 and 3.3.2.
15
ever completely eliminated as a source of recruits.
Even during the wars with the Saljuqid Turks, the
Fatimid continued to hire Turkish mercenaries and

12
mamluks
By al-Afdal's time, however, the numbers and
influence of the Turks and Berbers in the army had been
greatly curtailed. Although they continued to appear as
individual mercenaries, there is no indication that
either group was able to play as significant a political
role as earlier. Thus, although Turkish and Maghariba
troops were never totally eliminated from the Fatimid
ranks, the reign of al-Afdal was dominated by Armenians
and Sudanis. Each of these major groups will be
discussed below.
3.1.1 Armenians
Historians have long recognized the important role
of the Armenians in the political and military history

13
of the Fatimid dynasty . However, the exact nature and
12. Such as a group of Turks serving under Suqman after

his loss of Jerusalem to al-Afdal in 1098, on which see
3.1.3 and 3.3.2.
13. See Canard, "Vizier." and "Armeniens," for the fullest

discussion.
20
full extent of their activities has never been fully
understood. Although some Armenians found their way to
Egypt in the Ninth and Tenth centuries, the major
migration to Egypt formed a part of a general dispersal

14
from Anatolia beginning in the eleventh century . The
period of significant Armenian power and influence in
Egypt began in 1073 when the Armenian Muslim Badr
al-Jamali was installed as Wazir and usurped authority
from the Caliph al-Mustansir. By 1087 there were at
least 10,000 Armenian families, numbering around 30,000
people, resident in Egypt, and many, if not most, of the

15
family heads served in the army . They first appeared
in an independent political role when they demanded that

16
Badr al-Jamali's eldest son succeed him
Perhaps the most important factor that has not been
recognized is that most of the Armenians who joined the
army remained Christian. In 1087 Gregory, Patriarch of
the Armenians, made a state visit to Egypt and was
14. See Canard, "Armeniens," 143ff.
15. L t i t cr S t . translated in Canard,

"Armeniens," p. 148 for the 10,000 families; Matthew of
Edessa quoted by Canard p. 149 for the 30,000 total.
16. Maq. 3:62.
21
__17
received with honor by Badr al-Jamali . While in Egypt
Gregory consecrated his nephew to be Patriarch over the

1 8 _
Armenians in Egypt . In 1090 Badr al-Jamali granted
the Armenian soldiers (al-cuim & n a l - ca6k(Ltu.y(L) the suburb
of al-Hasanlya to the northwest of Cairo, and gave them

19
an unused Jacobite church for worship , clearly
indicating the presence of a large Armenian Christian
element among the soldiers. Later other churches were
endowed and built for the Armenians by Badr

-20
al-Jamali . In 1110 Shams al-Khilafa attempted an
abortive coup in Ascalon in which he was supDorted by

21
300 Armenian Christian mercenaries . Bahram, an
Armenian Christian governor and general, became Wazir of
Egypt in 1134 and was supported by a strong Armenian
Christian army. This Christian dominance so infuriated
the Muslims elements of the army that they united under
Ridwan ibn Walkhashi and revolted against Bahram
17. IMuq. 4:145
18. L i . i t OjJ Si. N t t u e - i translation in Canard,

"Armenians," p. 148.
19. IMuq. 2.3:225/355-6.
20. Abu Salih, fol. 47b-48a.

0 '
21. For a discussion of this incident see ch. 6.1.1.
22
declaring their campaign to be a j i h a d , using as their
war-cry Ya m u jd h ld Z n = 0 fighters of j i h a d , and
attaching pages of the Qur'an to their lances when they
went into battle in an attempt to lure the Muslim

22
supporters of Bahram away from his Christian army
The importance of Christians among the Armenian soldiers
continued until the end of the dynasty, for the Armenian
patriarch fled Egypt after the defeat of the Armenian
troops by Saladin in 1171, implying that he somehow felt
threatened by the elimination of the Armenian soldiers
which would be less likely had they not been Christian

23
Armenians
These Armenians dominated the Fatimid military
during this period. According the Ibn al-Muqaffac, the
majority of Badr al-Jamali's soldiers fa b k a n ) were

24
Armenians , a statement confirmed by Maqrizi, who wrote
that Badr al-Jamali "established for himself a j a n d and
ca^kan. of Armenians, and from that time most of the j a y t h
22. IMuq. 3.1:30/48-9. It is interesting to note that

there is no similar instance of Fatimid troops using
J i h a d propaganda against the Frankish Christians during
the first decades of their wars.
23. Abu Salih,

# fol. 2b p.
4 5.
24. IMuq. 2.3:219/344-5
23
25
became Armenians and the Kutamas (Berbers) declined
The exact significance of these statements requires some
attention. When Badr al-JamalT was called by
al-Mustansir to Egypt he brought with him a large army
composed of a number of different elements, including a
significant number of Armenians; many others migrated to
Egypt in subsequent years. In his reconstruction of the
Egyptian army the Armenians played an increasingly
important role. Due to the disruptions in Anatolia
caused by the Turkish invasions large numbers of
Armenians, who were often considered excellent

26
soldiers , were willing to immigrate and take military
service in Egypt. More important, from Badr al-Jamali's
point of view, a body of Armenian Christian soldiers,
far from their homeland and co-roligionists, would
provide a loyal power base for his personal authority in
Egypt. Whereas the allegiance of Turks, Berbers and
Sudanis might shift to different leaders or power
groups, the Armenians would be bound to the Armenian
Jamali dynasty upon whose success their own power and
position rested.
25. MaqKh. 2:12b
26. Smail, p. 47.
24
As will be discussed below, the size of the regular
Fatimid armv stationed at Cairo amounted to between ten

27
and fifteen thousand men . What portion of this was
Armenian? We have three basically independent sources
on the size of the Armenian force in Cairo: the LLfie
St. Nerses claims there were 10,000 Armenian families in

28
Cairo ; Michael of Edessa says there were 30,000
29
Armenians in Egypt , and Maqrizi tells us that "The
largest of the suburbs (of Cairo) was the Hasaniya ...
the Armenian cavalry and infantry lived there, numbering

30
7000 or more " These three sources can be easily
reconciled: ten thousand families could number around
30,000 people total, of which 7000 would be actual
soldiers, the rest being women, children, or men engaged
in non-military occupations. Accepting the figure of of
7000 Armenian soldiers garrisoned at Cairo, it becomes
clear that they would indeed represent most of the
27. See 3.4.2.
28. Quoted by Canard, "Armeniens," p. 148.
29. Ibid. 149.
30. MaqKh. 2:21d, quoting Ibn cAbd ai-Zahir.
regular troops there as claimed bv ibn al-Muqaffac and
_ __31
Maqrizi
It seems that this numerical dominance by Armenians
in the army did not last long after the death of
al-Afdal, and was perhaps eroded even before. In 1134
when Bahram was summoned by al-Hafiz to restore order in
Cairo, he mobilized the Armenian soldiers from the
countryside in the western Delta where he was

32
governor . In all the factional fighting between the
various regiments of Cairo in the preceding years there
is no mention of direct political involvement by any

33
regiment of Armenians . At some point between the
death of Badr al-Jamali and the rise of Bahram the
31. However, beyond the fact that all of these numbers

may simply be inaccurate, another possible
interpretation is that Matthew's 30,000 people and the
Narses 10,000 families represents the total of Armenians
in all_of Egypt rather than just those Cairo, and
MaqrTzi's 7000 figure should be seen as the total number
of Armenians in living in Cairo of which perhaps only
2-3000 might have actually been soldiers.
32. Maq. 3:155
33. Despite the fact that Bahram's Armenians were

located in the Delta, it appears that there were still
some Armenians in Cairo, for Ibn WalkhashT burned their
quarter, sacked their Churches and killed the Armenian
patriarch. IMuq. 3.1:32/50. Furthermore, Armenians were
probably members of certain regiments such as the
Hujarlya, which as a whole would not have been called
Armenian, see ch. 3.2.3.
26
Armenians lost their position of dominance in the army
at Cairo. Bahram's coup thus represents the return of
Armenian influence and power to the capital.
All details of the tactical military role of the
Armenians are not clear, but some general outlines
emerge from the sources. First, it should be emphasized

->A
O*
that Armenians fought both as infantry and cavalry
They were also known as excellent archers, and

35
occasionally are simply called qa.itiA," or bow . A
significant portion, if not all of the Armenian cavalry

36
served as mounted archers
Armenians also served in garrisons for the defense
34. MaqKh. 2:21d mentions that both Armenian cavalry and

infantry lived in the Hasaniya suburb. The L L jje o S t .
NzA.Ae.4 also mentions that Armenian knights greeted the
Gregory the Patriarch when he visited Cairo, tr. Canard
"Armeniens" p. 148. Bahram was assisted by 2000 Armenian
cavalry, Maq. 3:161. Bacharach, "African Military
Slaves," p. 486, wrongly implies that the Armenians of
Badr al-Jamali were chiefly infantry, although he notes
later on the same page that Bahram had both Armenian
infantry and cavalry.
35. Hak. 43/58, 44/59 says that the Fatimids sent 400
q a w i aAman" and 700 Sudanis to ?aman. IMuq. 86
3.1:31/49 talks of 1000 Armenian- qa.WA supporting 3ahram.
36. Maq. 3:161 states that when Bahram fled to upper

Egypt in 1136 he was accompanied by about 2000 "mounted
archers (j[aLtu.A m m a t ) " . See Ch. 5.1.2 and 5.2 for a
full discussion.
37
of the maritime of Palestine against the Crusaders ,
38
and also occasionally appear as mamluks
3.1.2 Sudanis
Sudani is a generic Arabic term meaning "black" and
was used in medieval Arabic to denote Blacks of any
linguistic group or from any geographical region.
Sudanis began to be recruited for Egyptian armies as
early as the ninth century during the rule of Ahmad ibn

_ 39
Tulun , who is said to have imported at least 12,000
40
Sudani slaves . They played important military,
political, and administrative roles in Egyptian
governments until the rise of Saladin, when the Sudani
37. IKhal. 4:145 says that Tyre was defended by an

Armenian ca6kan. under cI z z al-Mulk al-Acazz. Shams
al-Khilafa also enlisted Armenians in the defense of
Ascalon, Maq. 3:47; Dhah. 2:23; IKhal. 4:145
38. Usama 21/47.
39. Bacharach "African Military Slaves" gives an

excellent survey of the role of the Sudanis in the
Egyptian army from the ninth century until the rise of
the Ayyubids.
40. Bacharach, p. 478, gives a number of estimates from

the sources, some ranging as high as 45,000.
28
41
regiments were suppressed
Despite the fact that the Sudanis appear on numerous
occasions in the sources, it is difficult to get an
exact idea of their organization and role. Still, a
number of characteristics are clear. Although their
proportion of the entire army varied under different
rulers, Sudanis are found serving in the army under each
administration until the fall of the Fatimid dynasty.
They were divided into a number of different regiments

42
rather than a single large Sudani corps Furthermore,
as Bacharach points out, "there is no real sense of
development or change during these years (from Badr
al-Jamali to Saladin) in the role of African military
slaves. Africans continued to be used as infantry by
caliphs and wazirs ... They fought on different sides

43
at different times (of civil war) ."
Although Albert of Aix once described a group of
41. Bacharach, pp. 487-9.
42. See Ch. 3.1.2 and'3.2.5 for a discussion of Sudanis

in various regiments.
43. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" p. 487.
44. AA 12.18 "mx-Lote* ex geneê A zopaAX. = knights of the

Azopart people," Azopart being Albert's name for
Sudanis, see below.
44
mounted Sudanis , it appears that they were not
extensively recruited as cavalry during the twelfth
century, although there were important Sudani cavalry

45
regiments in earlier periods . During al-Afdal's reign
the Sudanis most often appear as infantry, while cavalry
seem to be drawn from Armenians, Turks, Arabs and

46
Berbers . On the other hand there is mention of the
Qaraghulamlya, a mounted regiment mentioned under
Saladin . If their name Qaraghulamlya, probably
meaning "black slaves," is to be understood literally,
it could indicate either that in Saladin's day there was
a mounted Sudani regiment, or that during the Fatimid
period the Qaraghulamiya were mounted Sudanis whom
Saladin eventually replaced with Turks, Kurds, Arabs and
other mercenaries while retaining the earlier Fatimid
name of the regiment.
Although there are only a few descriptions of the
armament of the Sudanis, and it is dangerous to
45. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," pp. 484-6,

discusses come of the evidence for this.
46. There are numerous clear references to the Sudanis

fighting on foot. FC 2.32.1,11, 3.17.2, AA 6:41 where
they are said to kneel down to fight.
47. MaqKh. 1:86d.
30
generalize from these, there is some indication that the
Sudanis formed some of the lighter armed infantry
elements of the Fatimid army. In a description of a
military parade, al-Qalqashandi mentions that "there
were 600 javelins (h a x b a ) with polished heads ... and
three hundred da.n.a.qa. shields with bosses of silver,
borne by 300 black slaves, each carrying two javelins

48
and a shield ." This general picture of SudinT
armament is confirmed William of Tyre who described "a
countless host of infantry trained to throw the

49
javelin " who almost certainly should be equated with
the troops described by al-Qalqashandi. Fulcher
describes the "Ethiopians" as defending themselves with

50
shields , while a Sudani throwing a javelin wounded
51
king Baldwin . On the other hand, Nasir-i Khusrav,
describing the army in the 1060s, says that the z a n j (=

52
Sudanis) fought with swords
Sudanis also held important offices and positions in
48. Qal. 3:474.
49. WT 12.6.
50. FC 3.17.3.
51. FC 2.24.1.
52. Nasir-i Khusrav tr. p. 217.
31
the Fatimid military, including membership in the elite

53 54
Sibyan al-Khass and the Ustadhs
Sudani troops in the Fatimid army may not all have
been slaves. Nasir-i Khusrav draws a distinction
between -the mamluk Sudani troops, known as the CA oZd

55
til- h h ltiO L , and another group which he calls the zan/
Although z a n j often referred to Blacks from East Africa,
it is also simply Persian for black and semantically is
the equivalent of Sudani. This distinction may imply a
difference between those Sudani troops were slaves, and
those who were freemen. Egypt's close contacts with
Nubia and Ethiopia, as well as with Black nomadic tribes
of the Sudan, would offer a logical avenue for free
Blacks to enter Fatimid military service. Thus,
although there is no. concrete proof of free Sudani
troops in Fatimid service, such a possibility should not
be totally discounted.
A final interesting problem relating to the Sudanis
is Albert of Aix's use of the word Azopart apparently
53. Usama p. 9/33 mentions that the Sibyan al-Khass were

assigned by the Caliph to murder Ibn al-Sallar, and one
of the murderers was said to be a Sudani.
55. Ibid.
32
either as a term to describe Sudanis in general, or
referring to a specific regiment of Sudanis. Albert
describes them as a "black oeople from the land of

56 57
Ethiopia " and "horrible and black They are
described as "marshalled in the middle of the thousands
of pagans armed with maces like hammers composed of iron
and lead, (who) attacked the king and his men striking
not only the knights, but also their horses, on their

58
heads and other limbs with blows ."
3.1.3 Turks, Berbers and Others
The role of the Turks in the Fatimid dynasty began
during the Caliphate of al-cAzIz (r. 975-996) when a
number of Turkish mamluks were purchased and enlisted in

59
the army . Their numbers and influence progressively
increased during the Succeeding decades until in the
early reign of al-Mustansir they were reported to number
56. AA 6.41.
57. AA 6.46.
58. AA 9.4. See 5.1.3_for a further discussion of the

armament of the Sudanis.
59. Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 169 ff.
60
some 6000 men . After Badr al-Jamali overcame them,
their influence and numbers decreased drastically,
especially in view of the frequent conflicts between
Egypt and Turkish princes in Syria.
However, throughout the entire reign of al-Afdal the
Turks never ceased to play a military role. During the
early twelfth century they appear most frequently in the
sources as officers. Badr al-Jamali had recruited a
number of Turks during his governorship of Syria who
came with him to Egypt where some of them eventually
received important military and administrative commands

61
under al-Afdal
When al-Afdal conquered Jerusalem in 1098 he
enlisted part of the Turkish garrison into the Fatimid

62
army . Some were probably the Turks mentioned as being
part of the Fatimid garrison of Jerusalem during the
60. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," pp. 482-6,

discusses these developments.
61. A number of important Fatimid officers had Turkish

names such as Nasir al-Dawla*Aftikln al-Turkl, and cIzz
al-Mulk Anushtakih.
62. Ibn Sallar was the son of a Turk recruited from the
Jerusalem garrison after the siege of 1098, IKhall.
1:370-1.
34
63
Crusader siege in 1099 . Others returned to Cairo where
they continued in the military, often followed by their
sons, such as Ibn Sallar who eventually became WazTr. A
number of sources also mention Turkish participation at

64
the battle of Ascalon . Other Turkish troops were
65
engaged by the Fatimids as mercenaries . Throughout
al-Afdal's reign, however, their influence was
numerically and politically minor.
In the second quarter of the twelfth century the
military role of the Turks in the army of Egypt began to
increase, and substantial numbers of Turks again appear
in the army. By 1134 there was a regiment of unknown
size in the Fatimid army known as a l - G k u z z a l-g k u J ia b a ',

66
the "foreign Turks ." In 1153 300 Turkish cavalry are
mentioned as participating in the factional warfare in

67
Cairo . In the 1140s there was a regiment of 800 Turks
63. FC 1.30.3.
64. FC 1.31.1; Gesta 88; ME 2.125/311-2 mentions troops

from Scythia, which I take to be Turks.
65. As at Ramla in 1105, Maq. 3:35; the campaign of

1118, Maq. 3:53; the garrison at Tyre included Turkish
mercenaries from Damascus, WT 13.7.
66. Maq. 3:155.
67. IQal. 320.
35
68
who garrisoned the fortress at Bab al-Futuh in Cairo
Nonetheless, the Turks never again managed to regain the
dominant political and military position in the Fatimid

6 9
army they had held in the days of al-Mustansir
Berbers played an even less significant role than
the Turks. Most of the soldiers who conquered Egypt for
the Fatimids were Berbers, and large numbers of Berbers
continued serving in the Fatimid army in Egypt and
Syria. By the Great Civil war and the JuyushI reforms
in the third quarter of the eleventh century, their

70
importance had already begun to decline . During the
early twelfth century they only appear as irregular
bedouins, mostly of the Lawata tribe from the Libyan
desert, who were suppressed by the government on a

71
number of occasions . Although individuals probably
continued to enlist in the army, independent regular
units of Berbers are not mentioned in the chronicles for
68. Usama 25/51.
69. The question of the tactical implications of Turks

and horse archery in the Fatimid army will be dealt with
in Ch. 5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3.
70. On these developments see Lev, "Fatimid Army" and

Beshir, "Fatimid Military," pp. 38-9.
71. See IAth. 10:616; Maq. 3:97 on the major uprising of

the Lawata tribe in 1122.
36
this period. The role of Arabs in the Fatimid army will
be discussed in Chapter 3.3.
3.2 The Regular Fatimid Army
In terms of expense, military effectiveness,
political power and frequency of mobilization, the
regular regiments of the Fatimid army were certainly its

i
most important constituents . These can be divided into
two classes, the Caliphal or Royal Regiments {Khawciu
al-Khalifa) which for the most part were stationed in
Cairo in special barracks either in the Palace or near
it, and the regular army regiments ( t a . u ) a \ a . l - a . j : ~ d )
who were stationed in the suburbs of Cairo or throughout
Egypt. The Caliphal Regiments were divided into three
groups, the Ustadhs who served as the Palace guard,
military administrators, and from whom the officers of
other regiments were frequently drawn; the Sibyan
1. For this study "regular" is defined as those soldiers

who were enrolled in permanent regiments and whose names
were listed on the registers of the Dlwan al-Jaysh (see
4.2 and 4.3). Irregular troops are those whose service
was temporary and who were not individually listed on
the registers.
37
al-khass who formed the Caliph's personal bodyguard,
attendants and companions; and the Sibyin al-hujar or
the Hujariya who themselves were divided into a number
of regiments apparently garrisoned around the Palace
rather than in it.
3.2.1 The Ustadhs
The Ustadhs and the Sibyan al-Khass who will be
discussed below, were the attendants, servants,
officers, and bodyguard of the Caliph. They are most
frequently met in the sources either as participating in
royal ceremonies, or as engaged in palace coups or civil

_2
disturbances. According to al-Qalqashandi ;
"the Ustadhs are known_today (1350s) as

the khuddam and the tcuf)K6hZy<L. In the
(Fatimid) dynasty they held an important
position. Among them were found the officers
or the personal attendants of the Caliph. The
most important were the Mu.fumnafe.6 who wound
their turbans on their heads as do the Arabs
and the magkasUba today. They were the
closest and nearest to the Caliph, numbering
over 1000 men."
M. Canard, in his discussion of the ceremonial
functions of the Ustadhs, maintains that they were a
2. Qal. 3:481.
38
corps of eunuchs and consistently calls them such

3
throughout his article . He bases his interpretation on
a passage in al-Qalqashandi, where the Ustadhs are
equated with the khuddam and tau}E6hZya of Mamluk times,
and as David Ayalon has shown, both of these words, as
well as the word a hiLa.dk, were used in the Mamluk period

4
to refer to eunuchs . However, the fact that certain
terms referred to eunuchs during the Mamluk period
should not be seen as evidence that they were always so
understood. For example, most of the cavalry under
Saladin were called iatoaafiZi, a term which, according to

#
Ayalon, also eventually came to mean eunuch. Yet it
seems incredible that Saladin could have had the
resources or desire to recruit thousands of eunuchs for

5
his cavalry . The UstSdh- regiment probably contained
some eunuchs as guards or servants for the harem
quarters in the palace, but others could well have been
mamluks or free. For example, Nasr al-Dawla Aftikin was
at first a mamluk of Badr al-Jamali, and later was
3. Canard, "Ceremonial" 367 and n. 4, although he admits

that it is possible that there were non-eunuchs in the
regiment.
4. David Ayalon, "Eunuchs", passim.
5. MaqKh. 1:86c-d.
39
6
enrolled in the Ustadhs under al-Mustansir . The
Ustadhs included both blacks and whites among their

7
ranks .
The Muhannaks ("expert, experienced") where the most
powerful and important segment of the Ustadhs, holding
major offices both in the administration and the army,
including the Caliph's personal attendant and dresser
(6'na.dd a l - t K j ), the master of the royal council ( i a h i b
al-majlis), the Caliph's personal secretary USh-tb
al-risala), Master of the Palace (zZmam a l - q u M i t i ) , the
Treasurer (6&hZb b a y t a l ~ m a l ), the Master of

* * 8
Administration ( t a h i b a t - d a i t u K ), and others . Nlsir
al-Dawla Aftikin al-Turkl, a member of the Ustaah
regiment, served as governor of Alexandria and commanded

9
Nizar's armies during his revolt in 1095 . Control over
such important administrative posts could give a large
measure of political and economic power to the Ustadhs.
6. ITagh. 5:143
8. Qal. 3:484-5 gives a full list with some details of

their respective functions. See also MaqKh. 1:386d,
411b, and Canard, "Ceremonial," p. 368, for a brief
discussion.
9. MaqKh. 1:422
40
There are a number of examples of Ustadhs serving as
officers for other regiments. Each barrack of the

10
Sibyan al-hujar was under the command of an Ustadh
Others could be sent in command of armies on

11
campaigns . Although it is clear that the Ustadhs
participated in combat as officers of other regiments,
it is not possible to determine if they ever served in
battle as an independent regiment.
3.2.2 The Sibyan al-Khass
According to al-Qalqashandi, "the Sibyan al-Khass
were a group of about 500 men who were the special
companions of the Caliph. They included amirs and
others, and are the equivalent of what are known today

12
as tLl-kha.66a.kZya. ." They appear often in the sources,
usually associated with the Palace establishment. It is
difficult to detail any unique military functions beyond
that of guards and officers, or to distinguish their
10. Qal. 3:481. It is possible that the word is here

used in a general sense as "master" rather than in the
technical sense of a member of the Ustadh regiment
11. Such as Waffi al-Dawla in 1133, Maq. 3:150.
12. Qal. 3:481.
41
activities from the Ustadhs. They often participated in
palace coups, and when a new Wazir or Caliph gained
power he might massacre or replace them with supporters

13
of the new ruler
The Sibyan al-Khass were also used as secret agents
by the Caliphs when plotting against Wazirs or other

14
members of the government . On another occasion
al-Hafiz ordered a band of the Sibyan al-Khass to

15
assassinate Abu cAli ibn al-Afdal . They also fought
16
in military campaigns âlthough most often appearing
during civil wars, and as in the case of the Ustadhs, it
is unclear if they ever saw action as an independent
military unit outside Egypt.
13. IMuq. 3.1:28/44_reports that the wazir Yanis

massacred the "Sibyan al-Khass who had been the army
( j u n d ) of the Imam al-Amir" because they had
participated in the assassination of his predecessor.
14. In 1138 al-Hafiz sent one of the Sibyan al-Khas$

with money and letters to rally the support of r'Ali' ibn
al-Sallar against Ridwan, Maq. 3:159.
15. Maq._ 3:141, they were "nun a l - a . j n a d mZn Kha.4&

a .l-K h a .lZ {a .
16. Maq. 3:173, in 1139 in a battle between al-Hafiz and

Ridwan.
42
3.2.3 The Sibyan al-Hujar
The Sibyin al-Hujar ("Young Men of the Barracks or
Chambers") were also commonly called the Hujarlya. The
buildings called the h u j< v i were built in the days of

17*
M u cizz li-Din Allah , apparently to serve as barracks.
Al-Afdal either renovated these buildings or constructed
new ones on their site between Bab al-Nasr and the
Palace as barracks for his newly organized regiments.
The establishment of the Hujarlya regiments occurred
during the early reign of al-Afdal as a direct reaction
to the Frankish threat. Ibn Tuwayr gives the following

18
account of the establishment of this corps :
"Al-Afdal ibn Amir al-Juyush received a

letter from Ascalon informing him that the
Franks were gathering and the (garrison of
Ascalon) was concerned that they might march
against them. However, (al-Afdal) had
insufficient wealth, weapons, horses and men.
He therefore assigned his brother al-Muzaffar
Abu Muhammad Jacfar ibn Amir al-Juyush Badr in
the presence of the Caliph to take his place
and set out to rescue the coast (of Syria)
from the Franks. He arrived at Ascalon and
marched towards it with the army, but he was
abandoned by his army which was a terrible
catastrophe, and the fault for this lay with
17. Ibn Abi Tayy, quoted in MaqKh. 1:443.
.18. Quoted in MaqKh. 1:443c-d.
43
his army. After his defeat all of his

equipment was burned. There was a poet in the
service of the Franks who composed this poem
in honor of_the Frankish King Raymond St.
Giles (Sanjil): 'The Christian religion was
made victorious by your sword / God achieved
this by Sanjil / Mankind has. never heard tell
a tale / a s shameful as the defeat of
al-Afdal.' Al-Afdal dispatched an agent to
murder this poet.' After this catastrophe none
of the army (ajnad) were of any use to
al-Afdal... He then constructed seven
barracks (hujar) and selected 3000 men from
the sons of the army, and divided them in each
barrack, giving each 100 men a zi.ma.rn and
naqZb. Over the entire corps he assigned as
zZmam an amir called the m uuJaî.q. He
distributed to each man whatever horses, arms
and other equipment he needed, and took a
great interest in these soldiers. If there
was a sudden attack he ordered that they be
mobilized with their zimam& to meet it."
There are a number of problems with this passage
which render interpretation difficult. First, there is
no record other than this statement that al-Muzaffar
ever led an army against the Franks in the defense of
Ascalon, although there are a number of expeditions for
which the commander is not known. Second, it is not
possible from other sources to find an exact date for
the founding of the Hujariya regiment. It is certain
that they were founded before 1119/513 since in that
year twenty of the Hujariya were sent as a bodyguard
44
with the Fatimid agent Ibn Najib al-Dawla to Yaman by

19 '
al-Afdal . It is unclear how much earlier the regiment
was in existence.
According to the above statement by Ibn Tuwayr,
al-Afdal received news from Ascalon that the Franks were
mustering an army which could potentially threaten
Ascalon, and the garrison asked for assistance.
However, al-Afdal's army was in no condition to fight,
lacking money, troops, mounts and equipment. This
situation can best be explained as occurring after the
disastrous Fatimid defeats by the Crusaders in the first
few years of the wars. Thus the creation of the
Hujariya corps was probably one of the major military
and financial reforms of al-Afdal in 1106-7/501.
19. Hak. 42/57; another company of 100 were sent there

six years later, ibid. 46/62.
20. Quoted in MaqKh. 1:444a. Cf. Qal. 3:481, "The ^Zbyan

a l - h i i j c u i are a corps of young men numbering about 5000
who*live in barracks ( h a j a a ) each of which is designated
by a special name. ..." The Hujariya are described by
Qal. 3:508 as. consisting of the Greater Hujariya and the
Lesser Hujariya ( k u ja s u .y a a l - k i b a n voa a l - h a j a . f u . y a
a t - i ^ g h i f L ) . The exact significance of this phrase is
unknown, but perhaps refers either to the relative size
of the barracks the troops from the larger barracks
( h u j a A ) being known as the Greater Hujariya, while those
from the smaller barracks known as the Lesser or
alternatively one of the barracks might have been known
as a l - k l b a A and another a l-$ i.Q h a s i.
45
Ibn cAbd al-Zahir provides some additional

20
information :
"A group of young men numbering about 5000

were enlisted from a_number of sources. They
were called the Sibyan al-Hujar and were
trained in barracks, each of which had a
special name such as al-Mansura (Victorious),
al-Fath (Conquest), al-Jadlda (New) and so
forth.' The (soldiers) had their arms with
them and when they were mobilized they all set
out immediately, for there was nothing to
hinder them. In this they were like wolves
and guardians. If one of them became known
for his intelligence and courage, such as cAli
ibn Sallar and others, he would be promoted to
be an amir or officer. They would always
sleep in their barracks with their horses and
equipment and clothes. Each barrack had
Ustadhs commanding them who lived with them,
as well as servants."
The fact that the Hujariya were recruited from the
sons of soldiers of a number regiments of the army may
reflect an attempt to disrupt some of the factionalism
between the regiments. For example, Ibn Sallar, who
eventually became Wazir under al-Hafiz, was the son of a
soldier who had served in the army of the Saljuq Suqman
who defended Jerusalem against al-Afdal in 1098. Part of
Suqman's force was recruited by the Fatimids, and Ibn
Sallar, the son of one of these, was eventually enrolled
by al-Afdal in the Hujariya, from which he was promoted
by al-Hlfiz to be governor of Alexandria and eventually
_ 21
Wazir . The establishment of the Hujariya also
represents a move by al-Afdal's to limit the power of
the Ustadhs, who, as part of the Palace establishment,
would tend to be supporters of the Caliph and thus
potentially opponents of al-Afdal. With the formation
of this new regiment from which al-Afdal could draw
officers the control of the Ustadhs and through them
the Caliph over civilian and military offices could
be further limited.
Ibn tfAbd al-Zahir's statement also implies that
Hujariya were also given special military training by
the Ustadhs. Unlike most Fatimid troops, who were not

22
continually under arms , the Hujariya were permanently
stationed in Cairo and always available for immediate
service. Part of the purpose behind al-Afdal's military
reforms was to improve the training of his troops and
establish a body of men who could circumvent the long
21. IKhall. 1:370-1, Maq. 3:199 also mentions he was

once one of the Hujariya.
22. See ch. 3.2.3, 4.2 and 4.3. Maq. 3:102 mentions that
in the summer of 1123 "the army spent the entire summer
in readiness and armed," implying that this was usually
not the case.
47
delays which often faced the Fatimid army when it

23
mobilized . Finally, it seems that although al-Afdal's
original regiment numbered only 3000 men, it was

24
eventually increased to 5000
In sum, the Hujariya were an elite corps,
established by al-Afdal sometime before 1119, and quite
probably related to his reforms of 1107. They were
recruited from the sons of soldiers of other regiments,
given special training and equipment, and kept as an
elite standing army ready for immediate service.
3.2.4 The Rikabiya
The Fatimid army included an additional regiment,
part of the Palace establishment, known as the

25
Rikabiya . According to Qalqashandi they were also
known as "the Sibyan al-Rikab al-Khass. They are the
same as those known today (1350s) as the Silahdariya and
the Tabardariya. They numbered over 2000 men and had
23. See cu. 6.2 on the delays of mobilization.
24. MaqKh. 1:443 gives the original size as 3000, while

MaqKh. 1:444 and Qal. 3:481 state that they numbered
5000.
25. Literally, "Those of the stirrup." The word can

also be read Rukkablya or Rakkabiya meaning horsemen.
46
twelve officers (muq a d d a m ). They were the masters of
the stirrups (/u.ka.b) of the Caliph... The most
imDortant of these Rikabiya were commissioned with

26 ___
government offices Maqrizi states that there were
four groups of the Rikabiya, who were paid twenty,

27
fifteen, ten or five dinars per month respectively
It is impossible to determine specific military or
administrative functions for these troops other than

28
participation at Caliphal ceremonies and parades . It
is also not possible to say if they were cavalry or

29
infantry or both
3.2.5 Regular Army Regiments (ToM/a1^ a l- a .j'n a d )
Most of the regular soldiers of the army were formed
into regiments which were given names according to the
26. Qal. 3:484.
27. Maq. 3:341-2. Qal. 3:527 only mentions salaries of

15, 10 and 5.
28. Maq. 3:432 states that they carried the Caliphal

equipment or possessions (a l-m u .k h a .lla .i a . t ). They are
mentioned in processions in Qal. 3:508; MaqKh. 1:389c.
29._MaqKh. 1:389c states that they received the name

Rikabiya from walking at the su.kab or stirrup of the
Caliph, implying that at least some of them were on foot
in Caliphal processions.
49
founder or the "ethnic" composition of the troops.

_30
According to al-Qalqashandi :
"There were numerous regiments of the

army, each being named in different ways.
Some regiments were named after Caliphs_, such
as the Hafiziya from al-Hafiz, and the Amiriya
from al-Amir. Others were named after past
Wazirs such as the Juyushlya, from Amlr_
al-Juyush Badr ai-Jamall, and the Afdallya,
from al-Afdal his son. Still otherswere
named according to various categories, such as
the Waziriya and other tribes and peoples,
such as the Turks and the Kurds and the Ghuzz
and the DaylamT and the Masamida, or according
to their nationality, such*as Rum, Franks and
Slavs, or the Sudani from the CAb id CLl-ShVia .',
or the cU ta q a (emancipated slaves) and other
regiments. Each regiment had its own qa.'JLd
and muqadd&m to command it."
There are a large number of questions regarding the
exact nature of recruitment and organization of these
units. These regiments were only semi-permanent in
nature. As a new Wazir or Caliph began his reign he
would immediately set about organizing one or more
regiments troops who would subsequently be named after
him. It is possible that many if not most of the new
soldiers recruited into the army during a given regime
would be enrolled in these new regiments, leaving the
older units to slowly shrink in size and importance as
30. Qal. 3:482. Cf. Qal. 3:508 which lists nearly all
the same regiments.
50
their ranks were thinned through casualties in battle
and retirement. During the early part of his reign a
new leader consistently relied on the regiments of his
predecessors for support, while in the later part of the
reign the soldiers from the newly formed regiments
played an increasingly prominent role. On occasion new
rulers disbanded some of the old regiments and
reorganized their soldiers into new regiments under a

31
different name . A good example of this process comes
from the year 1134 when "the Amir Hasan proclaimed -
himself as Caliph and a group known as the Sibyan
al-zarad ("Mailed Youths") swore allegiance to him.
They were from a mixture of the soldiers from each
regiment ( k k l a i-a .jn a .d mJLn j'am c a l - t a M i a . ' l i ). He was
strengthened by them and they supported him; he granted
them benefits and made them commanders and granted them
JLcia.c& and made them governors of the provinces and

1 32
amirs in his government and his army (a jn cL d ) ."
Although a number of regiments are known by name,
31. Ibn Yanis "disbanded" the Sibyan al-Khass by

massacring them. Al-Afdal possibly used_soidiers from
disbanded regiments in forming his Hujariya.
32. IMuq^ 3.1:28/45, see also Maq. 3:149. In Qal. 3:508

the Sibyan al-zarad are said to have numbered 500 men.
51
for most few significant details can be found. The
following is a discussion of some of the more important
regiments most frequently mentioned during the early
twelfth century.
The Rayhaniya regiment was composed of Sudani

- 33
troops who were garrisoned in the Rayhaniya district
34
of Cairo just inside Bab al-FutUh . They came to
prominence by supporting Haydara ibn al-Hafiz against
his brother Hasan, who was supported by the Juyushiya
when he refused to accept Haydara as Caliph in June

35 36
1134 . They numbered no more than 5000 men . Usama
states that 1000 of the Rayhaniya were killed in a

37
battle with the Juyushiya in 1149 , after which their
33. IMuy. 140.
34. MaqKh. 2:2c. They were named either because the

regiment was founded by cAziz al-Dawla Rayhan, or
because their barracks were in theRayhaniya quarter of
Cairo, it being unclear if they were named after that
quarter of Cairo or if that part of the city got its
name from them.
35. IMuy. 119.
36. After their battle with the Juyushiya in 11,34 in

which 5000 men were killed from both the JuyushTya and
RayhSniya regiments, the later were said to have
numbered 2000 men, Maq. 3:149. (IMuy. 119 gives the
casualties as 10,000).
37. Usama. 31/7, Maq. 3:189.
52
power was broken and they fled Cairo for Giza. This
defeat did not result in their elimination, however, for
they are still found as an independent regiment when

- 38
Saladin became Wazir
Badr al-Jamali Amir al-Juyush established the
Juyushi regiment, giving them his name. They remained
an important regiment in the Fatimid army until their

39
suppression by Saladin in the civil war of 1171 . In
1134 they supported the usurper Hasan ibn Hafiz in his
bid for the Caliphate, decimating the Rayhaniya regiment\*

40
the subsequent war . In 1149 they again defeated the
41
Rayhaniya
This regiment contained both cavalry and infantry.

42
The mZn a l - j i i y R i h l y a . - Juyushiya Infantry ,"
were mentioned on one occasion, while on another a group
of cavalry in a royal parade were said to have been from
38. Maq. 3:312.
39. Maq. 3:312 mentions them in 1168.
40. IMuy. 119.
41. IMuy. 140; Maq. 3:189; Usama 7.
42. Maq. 3:153.
43
the Juyushiya regiment They are not explicitly called
Sudanis, but in describing the civil war of 1135 which
brought Bahram to power, Maqrizi states that "the
Sudanis were victorious over the a.jricLdn and "the Sudanis

_ 44
supported Hasan against the a jn z d " As the Juyushiya
45 _ _
were the supporters of Hasan in this battle , Maqrizi's
statement clearly implies they must have been Sudanis.
In describing the battle at Cairo in 1171, Maqrizi
states that the Fatimid forces consisted of "the
Rayhaniya, Juyushiya and Farahiya regiments, and other
Sudani regiments Cgha.yJiuhu.rn nun a Z - ta M u ' Z i

46 *
z Z -h u d d n Z y a .)" On the other hand, Maqrizi twice
mentions (in 1134) the Juyushiya and "the foreign Ghuzz
who supported them = w z-m zn yzquZ u bZqzu)ZZhZm mZn

47
z Z -g h u z z a Z -g ku A a .b a ' ." The a.Z- Ca.6kcui a Z -g k u n a b a .
43. Qal. 5:508.
44. Maq. 3:155, IDaw. 6:514-5 tells much the same story.
45. IMuy. 119; Maq. 3:149.
46. MaqKh. 2:2. The phrasing here can either imply that
all the regiments named above were Sudani, or there were
other regiments not mentioned which were Sudani.
47. Maq. 3:155.
54
48
(foreign soldiers) also supported the Juyushiya
Canard believes that since the Juyushi regiment was
founded by Badr al-Jamali it was probably initially

49
composed of Armenians , which is not impossible.
However, most, if not all, of the Armenians were clearly

_ 50
Quartered in Hasaniya suburb , while the Juyushiya were
51
quartered within the walls of Cairo , indicating that
unless the residence of the troops changed over time, or
there was more than one group of Armenian troops, the
Juyushiya should not be considered as chiefly an
Armenian corps, although there may have been Armenians
included in their number.
I would suggest as an hypothesis that Badr al-Jamali
recruited the best troops from a number of nationalities
and sources into his Juyushiya corps, centered initially
around the nucleus of his personal mamluks and Armenian
retainers who had accompanied him from Acre. After the
death of Badr al-Jamali the regiment continued its
48. Maq. 3:153.
49. Canard "Vizier" p. 96, he gives no evidence to

support this assumption.
50. See 3.1.1.
51. MaqKh. 2:21c
importance for a number of decades until those soldiers
he recruited had either died or retired. In the ensuing
years the regiment maintained its identity, but new
elite soldiers began to be enrolled in other regiments
such as the Hujariya, and the replacements for the
Juyushiya came increasingly from Sudani infantry. By
the 1130s and 1140s, although the regiment retained its
original name, it had been transformed from the elite
unit of the army in the days of Badr al-Jamali to a
regiment largely composed of Sudani infantry.
The Farajiya (also spelled Farahiya and Faranjiya)
do not appear as frequently in the sources as the
Rayhaniya and Juyushiya, and their composition, numbers
or functions cannot be accurately determined, although

52
chey seem to have been infantry . Although they never
played a prominent role in the army they appear as early

53
as the days al-Hakim , supported the Juyushiya in the
54 55
civil wars in 1134 , and fought Saladin in 1168
52. Qal. 3:507 lists them as part of the infantry

regiments in a military parade.
53. Maq. 2:56, 166.
54. Maq. 3:155.
55. Maq. 3:312.
56
Qalqashandl, in describing a royal parade, calls one
of the units the FaranjTya, or "Frankish" regiment, and
it is almost certain that he is referring to the
Farajlya. Although his statement is probably simply a
varient spelling, it may be that the regiment originated
as a small body of Frankish mercenaries or mamluks
serving the Fatimids in the late 10th and early 11th
centuries. The Fatimids clearly used European mamluks

56
in their army, usually called the ta q Z a b a or Slavs ,
and it is not impossible that a regiment was called
the Faranjiya, the pronunciation of which eventually
became corrupted to Farajlya. Some type of slave trade
contacts continued between the Fatimids and Western
Europe during the twelfth century, for there are
references to the- 6a.qa.ZZba serving in the Palace in 1134

57
and i160
56. See Beshir, "Fatimid Military" pp. 41; Bacharach,

"African Military slaves," p. 481 mentions that the
Fatimids use European slave soldiers ( ^ a J ia n jl) in North
Africa but gives no source for this statement.
57. Maq. 3:154 and 239, where they are mentioned

committing an assassination along with the Ustadhs.
3.3 Irregular units of the Fatimid Army
In addition to the regular units of the Fatimid army
discussed above, the Fatimids were often aided in their
campaigns by a variety of irregular troops who were
often quite numerous. These irregulars can be somewhat
arbitrarily divided into three classes: the bedouins, by
far the most important, mercenaries, and citizen
militias.
3.3.1 Bedouins
Arab bedouins were the dominant source of irregular
troops for the Fatimids during the early twelfth
century. They participated in many campaigns, and there
was almost always an Arab bedouin contingent with each
Fatimid army mobilized for battle in Palestine. In the
twelfth century Arab bedouins were drawn from two
distinct sources, those living in Egypt and those of
1. In Jerusalem a Jew who as an army agent known as the

"Manager of the Bedouin levy." Goitein "Jerusalem" 165,
Doc. 1, 11. 25-6.
58
1
southern Palestine and perhaps Arabia , although earlier
bedouins were also available from northern Syrian
tribes. Many bedouin tribes served in the Fatimid
armies, and a discussion of the exact relationships and
geographical locations of these tribes is beyond the

2
scope of this study .
At least some of the bedouin tribes received yearly
stipends from the government by means of iqtaccit

_3
Z ctA .ia d Z in return for military service and loyalty,
although they were paid at levels much lower than the

4
regular soldiers . Makhzumi describes a number of
services the bedouins were expected to perform in return

5
for these stipends . The first was that the bedouins
were to obey the Fatimid rulers. In a sense this could
be seen as "Danegeld", money paid the nomads to
forestall raids on Fatimid villages and cities. They
were also to guard the roads and offer assistance in
2. Usama 24/50 mentions the Darma, Zurayq, Judham,

Sinbis, Talha and Jacfar tribes. There is a useful but
incomplete study by A. H. Salih, "Le role aes bedouins."
3. On which see ch. 4.3.
4. Ibn Mammati reports that the dZnan. jaythZ for the

bedouins was 1/8th the regular dTnar, tr. by Cahen
"Administration," p. 178-9.
5. Makhzumi tr. pp. 166-7.
59
times of invasion or trouble, as well as participating
in offensive expeditions. The exact nature of this
agreement, the number of men to be called, duration of
service, regions in which the nomads were to serve,
etc., probably varied according to tribe and regime. In
addition to this standard annual payment, however, it
was occasionally necessary to pay additional amounts to
gain the active participation of bedouins in an

6
offensive campaign .
It is impossible to arrive at a precise figure for
the total number of Arabs available for military
service, as opposed to those finally called up for
actual military service. Nasir-i Khusrav gives the
number of bedouins as 50,000, which is undoubtedly

7
exaggerated . A more accurate figure of those actually
receiving stipends is available from the early reign of
Saladin, when 7000 bedouins from the Judham tribe
6. Al-Afdal managed to buy the support of a group of

bedouins around Alexandria during Nizar's rebellion,
IMuy. 68, Maq. 3:14. The Caliph al-Hafiz gave one of his
officers some money to buy the support of the bedouin
tribes of the Hawf region. Usama 24/50.
7 . Tr. p. 217. See App. B for a complete discussion of

NSsir-i Khusrav's account.
60
received one million jayikZ dinars in return for their

8
services . Although it is likely that the Fatimids paid
stipends to more bedouins than were enlisted under
Saladin, this number probably reflects the potential
bedouin manpower in Egypt. For actual campaigns,
however, only a fraction of this total force would be

9
mobilized, perhaps a few thousand .
The Arabs exercised little real political power
during the first half of the twelfth century. Although
they often appear fighting for one side or the other

10
during periods of anarchy or civil war , there is no
evidence that there was any long range plan or well
defined political goal behind their activities. They
simply took advantage of opportunities for pay and
plunder. Even in the later decades of the dynasty, with
8. MaqKh. 1:86d.If we accept Ibn Mammatl's statement

that the value of the bedouin ja y s h x . dinar was on eighth
the standard dinar then this figure should be reduced to
about 125,000 dinars total which is about eighteen
dinars a year per bedouin, or one and a half dinars per
month not an unreasonable figure for non-regular
troops with other sources of income. See 4.2 and 4.3.
9. The numerous problems involved in trying to deal with

the numbers of the Fatimid army will be dealt with in
3.4 below.
10. Salih, "Bedouins/' reviews a number of Arab

disturbances.
61
the rise of the Arabs Shawar and Dirgham as wazirs, the

11
bedouins still fought on both sides in most disputes
Berber tribesmen had played the dominant role in the

12 .
Fatimid army during the early years of the dynasty ,
but by the time of al-Afdal they seem to have been
seldom enlisted as tribal groups, although there may
have been a number of individual Berbers in various
regiments. In the twelfth century their power centered
on the Lawata confederation of the western delta and
Libyan desert, plundering and taking advantage of

13
anarchy
3.3.2 Turkish and Syrian Mercenaries
14
As has been discussed above , Turks continued to
play an active though diminished role in the regular
Fatimid army during the early twelfth century. They
11. Salih, "Bedouins" p. 62-5.
12. See Lev, "Fatimid Army," and Beshir, "Fatimid

Military."
13. They revolted after the death of al-Afqlal requiring

a major campaign to subdue them, IAth. 10:616; they are
involved in the civil wars of the 1140s, Usama 24/50,
8/32.
14. Ch. 3.1.3.
62
also appear on occasion as mercenaries hired in Syria,
generally for one campaign.
The nature of the role of Turks and Syrians in the
Fatimid army is clouded by their appearance in Fatimid
armies in Palestine as allied troops from the Princes of
Damascus. Perhaps the most famous example was when
Tughtakln sent 1300 cavalry to support the Fatimids at

15
the battle of Ramla in 1105 , but this is by no means
the only case. When the Fatimids sent an army of 7000
men to Palestine in retaliation for Baldwin's sacking of
Farama, Tughtakln met them, presumably with a strong
force, and took over command of the army for that

16
campaign . When an alliance was made between Damascus
and Egypt for the defense of Tyre, the agreement was
that the Fafimids would pay the Damascenes 1/3 of the
revenues of Tyre in return for a garrison force of 700

17
cavalry from Syria . Exact details concerning terms of
service and how often such mercenaries were hired are
lacking.
The most illuminating example of Syrian mercenary
15. See ch. 7.5 for details and sources.
16. IAth. 10:543-4.
17. WT 13.7.
63
service comes from Usama's activities in Fatimid service
in Palestine in 1150. He was given 6000 dinars and some
fine robes and ordered to recruit a force of mercenaries
from Syria. After receiving permission from Nur al-Dln
to enlist Syrian soldiers who were not currently
enrolled in the regular Syrian army, Usama managed to

18
hire 860 mounted men
3.3.3 Militia
Although in the twelfth century the city militias
(a h d l t h ) were in general decline as important military
units, they nonetheless played a significant role in

-L2
defending Fatimid Palestinian cities . The Franks
describe the efforts of the "citizens" of Muslim cities,
whom they often distinguish .from the regular troops of
the garrison. However, although such troops were
important, especially during sieges, they tended to be
unreliable in martial skill and morale, and were
18. Usama 9/33ff.
19. On the a h d a th in general see von Sievers. and Cahen,

"Ahdath."
64
20
probably poorly equipped . Thus, although the militias
could be relied on during a siege, a regular Fatimid
garrison was also invariably found in each coastal city,
both to insure loyalty and to bolster the defense in

21
case of siege . Militia soldiers also occasionally
22
fought in pitched battles outside their cities . In
terms of numbers, if not skill and equipment, the
militias still played a major role in the Fatimid
defense of Palestine.
Non-Muslims also occasionally assisted the Fatimids
by defending their homes and cities along with Muslim
militias. According to Gilo of Paris, Jews also took an
active part in defending Jerusalemagainst the Crusaders
20. WT 13.7 describes the Fatimid militia at Tyre as

"weak a lid effeminate in character and not at all
accustomed to warfare," although his opinion should not
be thought of as unprejudiced in this matter.
21. See ch. 4.4.
22. The most notable example was at the battle of

Ascalon in 1099 where there was a large force of
Palestinian militia. See ch. 7.1 for details and
sources. The Ascalon Infantry skirmishing with the
Franks described by Usama 16/40-1 may also have been
city militia.
23. Quoted by Goitein, "Jerusalem" p. 163. There is no

confirmation of this in the earlier sources and it may
be late anti-semitic propaganda, although it is accepted
as accurate by Goitein.
65
23
in 1099 , and the large Jewish population of Haifa
played a major role in the defense of the city during

24
the siege of 1100
3.4 The Size of the Fatimid Army
A significant problem that one continually faces
with the nature of the Fatimid army is the question of
size. Before any estimate of the military effectiveness
of the Fatimid army can be made we must have a
relatively accurate assessment of the potential size of
the army. A battle in which 20,000 Fatimids are
defeated by 5000 Crusaders is very different from a
battle in which only 5000 Fatimids fought and lost.
Figures given for the size of the army as a whole, or of
specific contingents in battle, vary widely in the
sources, and, when taken uncritically, have led to gross
distortions of the numbers in the Fatimid army. There
are three sorts of evidence which can be used to
determine the size of the Fatimid army. First, we must
determine the upper limit of the size of the army based
24. AA 7.22-5.
66
on the economic limitations of the military
administration. The army could have no more men than
the Fatimid government was able to recruit, equip, pay
and supply. Second, statements made by medieval
historians giving the total size of the Fatimid army
should be examined. Finally, numbers given for the size
of Fatimid armies in specific battles should be
collected and compared.
The fundamental historiographical problem of the
reliability of the sources, both Latin and Arabic,

1
deserves some initial attention . Among historians the
response to numbers in medieval chronicles has ranged
from almost naive credence to such extreme skepticism
that almost no figure is acceptable. Some medieval
writers, while occasionally recording extravagant
numbers, recognized the inherent problems of accuracy.

2
Fulcher of Chartes wrote that :
"The truth regarding the number of dead or

wounded in this or any other battle cannot be
determined since large numbers can only be
estimated. Often when different sorts of
writers speak falsely the cause of the falsity
is really adulation. They try to heap up
1. For an excellent discussion of similar problems see

Smail, pp. 165-8.
2. FC 3.43. 1.
67
praise of the victorious men of their country

and to extol the power of their land for the
benefit of the present and future
generations, Kence it is very plain that such
is the shamelessness of lying that they will
exaggerate the number of the enemy slain and
minimize or omit entirely the losses of their
friends."
Ibn Khaldun saw things in much the same way. He
believed that there were many ways in which inaccuracies

3
could enter historical works :
"This is especially the case with figures,

either sums of money or of soldiers, whenever
they occur in stories. They offer a good
opportunity for false information and
constitute a vehicle for nonsensical
statements. They must be controlled and
checked with the help of known fundamental
facts. ... Whenever contemporaries speak
about the dynastic armies cf their own or
recent times, and whenever they engage in
discussions about Muslim or Christian
soldiers, or when they get to figuring the tax
revenues and the money spent by the government
... they are quite generally found to
exaggerate, to go beyond the bound of the
ordinary, and to succumb to the temptation of
sensationalism."
Yet despite the very real dangers of exaggeration
and outright falsification of numbers by medieval
historians, if we are to attempt to estimate the -size of
the Fatimid army it becomes necessary to -assume that,
for the most part, the chroniclers recorded numbers
3. IKhal. Muqa.adj.mcL tr. pp. 11, 13.
68
which they had derived from personal estimates, were
counted or estimated by others (in government records,
for example), they heard verbally, or saw in some type
of written records. Otherwise, research becomes a
matter of simply accepting those numbers which support
ones preconceptions which "seem reasonable" while
rejecting these which would tend to counter a given
thesis.
However, accepting that an historian accurately
recorded numbers need not imply that the numbers given
in a text are correct. There are a wide variety of ways
in which numbers could be distorted, of which only a few
will be briefly mentioned here. For propaganda
purposes, Islamic governments occasionally published
exaggerated figures. As will be shown below, this is
quite probably the case with some of the figures given

4
for the Fatimid army .
It was often difficult for an observer, even with
the best of intentions, to estimate the size of a
military force. An example of this type of problem can
be seen in the following hypothetical situation. A
certain army marshals its soldiers in four ranks with
4. See ch. 3.4.2.
69
one meter per man, thus being able to mobilize 4000 men
5
on a front of 1000 meters . A second army marshals in
three ranks with 1.25 meters per man. On the same
frontage of 1000 meters the second army would marshal

6
only 2400 men . Now imagine an observer from the first
army, standing 400 meters from the enemy, trying to
estimate the size of the second. He guesses that their
army covers 2000 meters, and based on the density of the
troops in his own army he concludes that the enemy must
number 8000 men. In reality, however, the front of army
two is only 1800 meters long, meaning that there are
only 4320 men in the second army. Thus our hypothetical
observer, although sincerely trying to avoid
exaggeration, still estimated the size of his enemy at
nearly twice their actual number. The problems are
naturally compounded when an observer consciously or
unconsciously att 3Hijpu3 to glorify the victory of his
companions or excuse a defeat.
Numbers recorded by historians who heard or read
them some years or decades after they were transmitted
5. One man per meter x 1000 meters = 1000 men x 4 ranks

= 4000 men.
6. One man per 1.25 meters = 800 men per rank x three
ranks = 2400 men.
70
could easily be distorted by inaccurate memory. A
related form of this problem involves numbers which are
reported and passed by word of mouth by a number of
transmitters. What may have started out a fairly
accurate guess of five to ten thousand (a statement
still varying 100%) could be potentially enlarged in
three or four tellings to "nearly ten thousand", "ten
thousand or more," "over ten thousand," and so forth.
Finally, great care should be taken to determine
exactly what the historian is counting. A good example
of this occurs in accounts of the battle of Ramla in
1105. Ibn al-Athlr states that the Fatimid army

7
consisted of 500C men , while Maqrizi and other later
8
historians record 5000 cavalry . A Fatimid army with
5000 men might have had 2500 cavalry and 2500 infantry,
while an army with 5000 cavalry would have included
several thousand additional infantry. A similar example
is found in economic history, where Ibn Muyassar records
that the annual revenue of Egypt during al-Afdal's reign
was five million dinars. Maqrizi records that the
kha.Aa.j alone was five million, to which must be added
7. lAth. 10:394.
8. Maq. 3:35.
71
other taxes. In this case the revenue of Egypt will be
markedly different depending on whether one accepts

9
kh(UuLj as original or as an interpolation .
Of course none of this should be taken to imply that
medieval chroniclers were not above exaggerating the
size of armies. Muslim chroniclers even went so far as
to state that the Franks had one million men at the

10
siege of Jerusalem in 1099 , while Ekkehard gives the
size Fafimid army at the battle of Ascalon in 1099 as

11
500.000 . If these and other related problems are borne
in mind a careful consideration of the numbers given can
lead us, if not an exact understanding of the size of
the Fatimid army, at least a general idea.
3.4.1 The Military Budget and Maximum Army Size
The first variable which needs to be defined, and
against which all other figures must be compared, is the
potential size of the military budget of the Faîmids.
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, the total annual
9. See ch. 4.1 for sources and a discussion of this

problem.
IU sj ' - X U * I >
11. Ekk. 17.5/176.
military budget for the Fatimid dynasty probably
amounted to a sum between 2.5 and 3.75 million

12
dinars . This figure gives us the potential range of
total military spending for the dynasty, including
expenses for equipment and pay for the army, navy and
fortifications.
According to ai-Qalqashandi the monthly pay of an
officer ranged from thirty to seventy dinars a month,
while soldiers received either five, ten, fifteen or
twenty dinars a month, which included allowances for
food and fodder. In addition, however, there was a
yearly clothing distribution and special combat pay
called the n a fa q a , making the actual cost of maintaining

13
a soldier somewhat more than his monthly salary
Further, a significant sum was spent in yearly stipends
to Arab and perhaps Berber tribes in return for their
occasional military service, which would have further
decreased the resources available to the regular army.
Assuming for the moment that the monthly pay was all the
expense required to maintain a soldier, and there were
no ocher military expenses besides this (both of which
12. See 4.1 for details and sources.
13. See 4.3 for sources and discussion.
73
are incorrect assumptions), the following table
summarizes the potential number of soldiers which could
be paid at each pay level with budgets of a number of
different sizes within the ranges established in Chapter
4, sections 1 and 3.
Table 4.1. Potential Army Size
Monthly Pay/ Yearly Budget in Millions of Dinars

Yearly Pay 2.4 3.0 3.6
5/60 40,000 50,000 60,000
10/120 20,000 25,000 30,000
15/180 15,000 17,500 20,000
20/240 10,000 12,500 15,000
If we assume that the army was 50% infantry and 50%
cavalry and the average pay for infantry was 5 dinars a

14
month and cavalry 15 dinars a month , we find that at a
yearly military budget of 3.0 million dinars the total
size of the Fatimid army would be 12,500 cavalry and

15
12,500 infantry, or 25,000 men in all . Since we lack
14. See 3.4.2 and 4.3 for a discussion of these

assumptions.
15. That is, 5 dinars per month per infantryman and 15

dinars per cavalryman makes a total of 20 dinars for one
of each. According to table 4.1 a budget of 3 Million
dinars could support 12,500 men at 20 dinars a month, or
12,500 each of cavalry and infantry.
74
the necessary sources the exact figures can not be
ascertained. However, if the data presented above is
relatively accurate it establishes the probable maximum
size of the regular Fatimid army at somewhere around
25,000 men. At any rate, what can be known for certain
is that given the financial limitations of the dynasty
the army certainly could not have been much larger than
this figure.
3.4.2 The Total Size of the Fatimid Army
A number of different sources give various figures
said to represent, at different times, the total size of
the Fatimid field army. Perhaps the most significant
figures come from the descriptions of military reviews
held in Cairo during the twelfth century. According to
Maqrizi: "The regiments of the. ca6k(Ln advanced, preceded
by their officers (zZmam)... regiment by regiment,
numbering more than 5000 cavalry, then the infantry
archers with bows and crossbows numbering about 1000,
and then the infantry regiments . .. numbering about

16
7000, each with its banner and standard ." This did
16. MaqKh. 1:389c.
75
not represent the entire army at Cairo for the Rikabiya,
Ustadhs and the Sibyan al-Khass appeared elsewhere in
the procession. If all of these are included the total

17
number of men reached 16,500 ..
Qalqashandl describes another military review: "Then
came marines on foot, carrying Arab bows called foot

18
bows or stirrup bows , numbering over 500 men, then the
regiments of infantry from the Masamida, then the
Rayhaniya and the Juyushiya, then the FaranjTya, then
the Waziriya, troop after troop in great numbers,
exceeding 4000 men ... then the regiments of the eahkan.t
the Amiriya and the Hafiziya and the Greater Hujariya
and the Lesser Hujariya (kujanZya ai-ktban. wa
al-hujariya al-sighar) and the Afdaliya and the
Juyushiya, then the commissioned Turks (aZ-atn.dk
al-mustanaun), then the Daylam, the Kurds, the
commissioned Ghuzz and others exceeding 3000
17. The Ustadhs numbered about 1000, the Rikabiya 2000

and the Sibyan 500; see ch. 3.2 for details.
18. "Al-qtiZ al-caxabZya, wa tuAamnia qt&t al-tUjl u>a

a l ' f U k a b both of which were types of crossbows, see
ch. 5.1.
19. Qal. 3:508. The precise date_of this event is not-

certain, but mention of the Amiriya and Hafiziya make it
certainly sometime after the 113Cs.
76
19
cavalry ." To these troops should again be added the
Ustadhs, Riltabiya and Sibyan, also mentioned as
participating in the review, bringing the total number
of men in the review to some 11,000.
Although it is not certain, it would seem that both
of these events represented an ca.nd, one of the regular

20
military reviews carried out by Islamic governments ,
and if this is true, we can estimate that the regular
army stationed at Cairo numbered between 10,000 and
15,000, depending on the date and whether or not some
troops were absent on military expeditions.' These
figures are confirmed by a report from 1122 that 14,305
robes were distributed as the kJLiwa. (clothing
distribution) to the soldiers and civil servants at

21
Cairo
An examination of the grain and fodder distributions
of the Fatimid government are also consistent with an
army of this size. The grain distribution was said to
20. Bosworth "Recruitment" pp. 70 ff. and "Isticrad"

discusses the ca>id in Islamic armies.
21. MaqKh. 1:410. Although it is not clear from the

text, I am assuming that this distribution includes
robes given to both soldiers and civil servants at
Cairo, but excludes distributions which may have been
made to troops stationed in the provinces and
garrisons. See ch. 4.3 for further details.
77
have been one million V id a b b i of grain a year, and if
half of this can be thought of as supplying fodder for
mounts it could supply enough fodder for aoout 10,000

22
horses and mules . Subtracting the several thousand
mounts owned by the Caliph which were probably not used

23 -
for military purposes , this would leave only enough
fodder supplies for perhaps 7-8000 mounts. Further
deductions for pack animals and remounts would leave
sufficient resources to maintain a regular cavalry force
of 4-5000 at Cairo, which is consistent with the other

24
figures discussed . Although none of these
interpretations is certain, they all consistently point
to an army stationed in Cairo numbering about 10-15,000
men.
Army sizes recorded in a number of others incidents
supports a regular army at Cairo of about 10-15,000
22. The topic of fodder distribution is discussed in

detail in ch. 4.3 with full references.
23. Qal. 3:478 mentions that there were two royal

stables each containing over 1000 horses and mules
specifically for the Caliph and royal processions.
24. It should be emphasized that this discussion is

completely hypothetical, since it is not known what
portion of the grain was used for fodder for animals,
-what portion of the fodder was for military horses, or
even if the fodder distribution represented all the
grain needs for a given mount, etc.
78
men. A significant example is the rebellion of 1135,
when the army at Cairo, excluding the Juyushiya regiment
and a group of foreign mercenaries numbered 10,000 men

25
including both cavalry and infantry . On another
occasion each military and civilian officer in Cairo was
given a robe of honor, the total distribution amounting
to 144 robes. If all of these officers were military
(which they probably weren't), and each commanded 100

26
men (the usual unit size) , the size of the army under
the command of these officers would have numbered

27
14,400 . In 1130 a force of 5000 cavalry and infantry
at Cairo were sufficient to compel al-Hafiz to depose

_ 28
and execute his son Hizar . This would tend to
indicate that the size of the entire army at Cairo
probably did not number much over 10,000 men or a force
of 5000 men would not have been able to dominate the
political situation there.
To this army of about 10-15,000 stationed at Cairo
should be added the Mu q t< ic& stationed in the provinces,
25. Maq. 3:153.
26. See ch. 3.5.
27. Maq. 1:390.
28. Maq. 3:137.
79
and other troops on garrison duty in Palestine. It is
impossible to estimate their number, but a figure of an
additional 10-15,000 falls within the economic limits
discussed ir. section 3.4.1.
There are other descriptions of the Fatimid army,
however, which would to contradict my reconstruction.
According to Maqrizi the army at the time of Ruzayk

29
numbered 40,000 cavalry and 36.000 infantry . An
estimate of the total size of the army in 1163 is given

30
as 10,000 cavalry and 40,000 slaves of the Caliph . In
a letter to Roger of Sicily the Caliph al-Hafiz claimed

'31
that Bahram had 20,000 troops under his command . The
Armenians and Sudanese at Cairo were said to have

32
numbered 50,000 . These figures point to an army
33
substantially larger than the one discussed above
29. MaqKh. 1:94d. Maqrizi here states that he read this

in a document written by Ibn MammatT.
30. Maq. 3:266
31. Qal. 6:461.
32. Maq. 2.1,
33. One of the largest estimates of the size of the

Fatimid army, a total of 215,000 men, is given by
Na?ir-i Khusrav. His description will be discussed in
detail in Appendix B, where it will be shown to be
significantly exaggerated in many respects.
80
However, each of these statistics is subject to
various historiographical problems. First, it was often
a standard government practice among Islamic dynasties
to exaggerate the numbers in their armed forces for
security or propaganda purposes. By publishing inflated
numbers of troops, their enemies, who would certainly
not accept the figures as accurate, would nevertheless
be confused about the actual military power of a
dynasty. The inflating of published figures would thus
serve to deter possible invasions because a leader could
never be absolutely certain of the size of his enemy's
army. According to the Fakhr-i Mudabbir, a Perso-Indian
government official of the thirteenth century, official
army strengths should exaggerate their actual

34
numbers . Nizam al-Mulk also advises that care be
taken lest foreign ambassadors learn the size of the

35
army . The Ma.mluk Sultans also practiced this policy.
David Ayalon has analyzed al-Zahirl's description of the
Mamluk army and determined that it was a purposeful
exaggeration to convince the Mongols that their army was
34. Discussed by Bosworth, "Recruitment," p. 76, where

other techniques of confusing enemy spies are discussed.
35. Nizam al-Mulk ZJLylLkoX Kamah ch 21, tr. pp. 98-101.
81
36
much stronger than it was . Although there is no
explicit evidence that the Fatimids practiced such
official exaggeration, it would clearly be to their
advantage to do so and easily explain some of the
excessively large numbers given in some cases for the
strength of the Fatimid armies.
Furthermore, many of these large figures can be seen
as obvious misinterpretations or exaggerations. For
example, although it is usually assumed that the 40,000
slaves said to have been owned by the Caliph were all
military slaves, this may not actually have been the

37
case. Some may have been palace slaves , others were
38
undoubtedly women for the harem , or wives for other
slaves and soldiers.
Also, not all of the military slaves would have been
ready for military service. In the Mamluk military
system slaves were purchased as young teenagers, trained
for a number of years, and sent into battle only when
36. Ayalon, "Structure" III pp. 70-73.
37. Such as the ^ A A c iik Z and other Palace servants

described by Qal. 3:526.
38. The mother of al-Mustansir was a black slave woman.
82
39
they reacned their eariy twenties
With these factors in mind the following model can
be constructed. If it is assumed that the slaves were
purchased at age fourteen, entered the army at age

40
twenty and served until age fourty it follows that
every year five per cent of the current military slave
corps would retire. However, during any given year
others would have been killed, captured or crippled in
battle, deserted, or died of natural causes. If these
are arbitrarily estimated to average another five per
cent, then each year ten per cent of the total number of
military slaves would need to be replaced. However, as
the training begins at age fourteen, and lasts six years
until age twenty, each years age group of replacements
must contain ten per cent of the total number of active
military slaves in order to keep the regiments at full
strength. If there were 10,000 military slaves in the
39. See Ayalon, "Military Slavery" for an excellent

discussion. It is here assumed that the essential
pattern of recruitment and training for Fltimid military
slaves was basically similar to that of the later
Mamluks.
40. Nizam al-Mulk, ch. 27.2, tr. pp. 106 describes a

seven year training program for mamluks, although they
apparently began some type of military service in the
fourth year of training.
S3
army, an additional 6,000 young slaves, or nearly fourty
per cent of the total force, would need to be in the
training process preparing to fill the yearly gaps in
the. ranks.
Thus, even if the figure given above that the Caliph
owned 40,000 slaves is accepted (and it may be an
exaggeration), a large portion of those slaves would
have been non-military or in training. If it is assumed
that 15,000 of those were non-military, according to the
model described above the actual fighting force would be
only 15,000 men, the rest being recruits and trainees.
Although in practice the actual numbers and proportions
undoubtedly varied, it is certain only a portion of the
total slave manpower of the dynasty could have been
actively engaged in military service.
Al-Hafiz's description of the size of Bahrain's army
is also somewhat tenuous. Although al-Hafiz's letter is
a primary source preserved in archives, copied by
al-Qalqashandl, and as such should be given serious
attention, other sources mention Bahram as being
supported by an army of 2000 rather than 20,000

41
Armenians , giving the impression that al-Hafiz's
41. Maq. 3:161.
84
letter is propaganda aimed at impressing the King of
Sicily with Fatimid power.
Turning to the question of the number of Sudanis and
Armenians at.Cairo during Saladin's coup- although some
sources seem to imply that there were indeed 50,000
soldiers engaged in the revolt against Saladin, others
describe the rebels differently, stating that although
there were 50,000 people involved in the revolution,
this number included not only the Sudani and Armenian
soldiers but a large body of the citizens (cSma) of

42
Cairo as well . Thus the 50,000 figure given should
not be seen as representing the strength of the army
alone, but of the city mob and the army combined.
3.4.3 Sizes of the Fatimid Field Army
Up to this point only the maximum potential number
of troops in the Fatimid army have been discussed.
Barring civil war or a major national military crisis
42. MaqKh. 2:3a.
43. In the last 100 years of Fatimid history the Delta

was invaded five times: Atslz's invasion in 1077,
Baldwin's abortive raid in 1118 and-the three Syrian
Invasions in the 1160s under Shirkuh, when the dynasty
was disintegrating.
85
43
such as an invasion of the Delta , the Fatimids would
never have fielded all these troops at once. During
expeditions to Syria a significant portion of the army
would have remained in Egypt to defend the country and
maintain the authority of the Wazir against rival
factions. Most field armies numbered only a fraction of
the total Fatimid army.
Latin estimates of the size of Fatimid field armies
range from two to three times the average sizes given by
the Arabic sources. Leaving aside the wild .
exaggerations giving the Fatimids hundreds of thousands

44
of soldiers , the Latins claimed that there were 11,000
45
cavalry and 21,000 infantry at Ramla in 1101 , 20,000
46
cavalry and 10,000 infantry in 1102 , 15,000 total at
47
Ramla in 1105 , 15,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry in
44. Such as Ekk. 17.5/176 giving the Fatimids at Ascalon

100,000 cavalry and 400,000 infantry; the Gesta gives
them 200,000 men at the same battle.
45. FC 2,11.2.
46. FC 2.15.1.
47. FC 2.32.3.
48. FC 3.2.1; WT 12.6.
86
48 49
1118 , and 16,000 total in 1123 . Thus the Latin
estimates for the usual size of the Fatimid army in
major pitched battles ranges from about 15 to 35,000.
The Muslim sources give an entirely different
picture of the usual size of Fatimid expeditionary
forces. In the period before the rise of Badr al-Jamall
Fatimid field armies tended, with few exceptions, to
range roughly from 5000 to 10,000 men. In 970 an army

50
in Syria numbered 4000 ; in 973 another numbered
51 52
4000 or 10,000 ; in 976 one of the largest armies of
53 54
the period numbered 20,000 ; in 979 again 4000 ; in
_ 55
992 a Fatimid army in northern Syria numbered 13,000 ;
56
in 997 10,000 ; in 1025 there was a request for 1000
cavalry and 1000 infantry to reinforce the Fatimid army
49. FC 3.18.6, although his earlier redaction gives

30,000; WT 12.21.
50. Maq. 1:126.
51. Maq. 1:202.
52. IQal. 3.
53. Maq. 1:239
54. Maq. 1:253.
55. IAdim. 1:185-8, but it was joined by allies from a

bedouin confederation numbering about 20,000.
56. IQal. 51.
87
57
at Ramla ; in 1067 during the great civil war involving
the entire Fatimid army in Egypt the Turks of the

58
Mashariqa numbered 6000 while the Sudanis over 15.000
Although this is by no means an exhaustive analysis
of the recorded army sizes in pre-twelfth century
sources, it does give the general impression that the
usual field army of the Fatimids contained 5-10,000 men,

59
reaching as high as 20,000 men in exceptional cases
A major exception was the army led by the Caliph
al-cAziz to Syria in 978, said to have numbered 70,000.
If this number represents the muster of all regular
Fatimid troops along with large numbers of irregulars it
might be conceivable. However, when faced with the
general trend it seems more reasonable to conclude that
this number is an exaggeration.
During the Crusades the sizes of the Fatimid armies
57. Maq. 2:152.
58. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" pp. 484-5; Maq.

2:273 states first that the Sudanis numbered 50,000,
fought a battle with the Turks, and numbered 15,000 in a
later battle. Since these supposed 50,000 Sudanis were
defeated by only 6000 Turks it is probable the 50,000
figure is an exaggeration.
59. A combination of Lev, "Fatimid Army," Lev, "Fatimid

Policy," Beshir, "Fatimid Military" and Bacharach,
"African Military Slaves" provides a spotty overview of
the Fatimid army during this period.
88
as depicted by the Muslim sources again fall within this
same range. The largest Fatimid force ever mentioned by
the Muslim chroniclers was about 20,000 men at Ascalon,

60
1099 , but this number included many thousands of
61
militiamen from Palestine . The Fatimids sent a force
62
of 4000 cavalry to Palestine in 1103 ; at Ramla in 1105
63
the Fatimid army numbered 5000 men ; 7000 cavalry were
64
sent to Syria in response to Baldwin's invasion ;
10,000 troops are mentioned in a faction dominating

65
Cairo in 1135 ; Bahrain was supported by 2000 Armenian
66
horse archers in 1136 ; in 1139 RidWan ibn Walkhashi is
said to have defeated a force of 15,000 Fatimid troops

67
at Cairo with only 300 cavalry , which would tend to
indicate that the 15,000 figure is ah exaggeration;
60. Dhah. 2:15-6; ITagh. 5:149.
61. IQal. 137/48-9.
62. Maq. 3:33; this force probably included an

additional body of infantry as well.
63. IAth. 10:394.
64. IAth. 10:543.
65. Maq. 3:153.
66. Maq. 3:161.
67. Maq. 3:173
89
Usama claims that 17,000 Fatimid soldiers were killed in
battle of the civil war in the 1140s, but this figure,
if not an exaggeration, includes large numbers of Arab

68
and Berber irregulars who had been hired ; in 1149 500
69
cavalry were sent to relieve the garrison at Ascalon ;
70
cAbbas had 5000 men in 1154 ; in 1163 a Fatimid army
71
numbered 6000 cavalry
Although the size of the army for each individual
campaign should be considered independently, this broad
range of references shows that most Fatimid expeditions
generally included 5-10,000 men, which gives a good
indication of the military potential of the dynasty.
These figures, on the average, range from about 1/2 to
1/3 of the Latin estimates.
A final question which remains to be considered is
that of the proportion of infantry to cavalry in Fatimid
armies. It is unfortunately impossible to give any
definitive answer, but some general patterns emerge.
The first point is that the proportions of Fatimid
68. Usama 32/8.
69. Maq. 3:190.
70. Maq. 3:216.
71. Maq 3:267
9G
armies could vary widely depending on the types of
irregular troops which were enlisted. When large bodies
of militia infantry were included, such as at the battle
of Ascalon, the proportion of cavalry could be much
lower than normal, while if mounted bedouin irregulars
were enlisted in large numbers the proportion of cavalry
could rise sharply. Fulcher described one Fatimid army

72
as consisting of one third cavalry , another of two
73 74
thirds , and a third of about 40%
Unfortunately the Muslim sources tend to be much
less specific in these matters and often only mention
the number of cavalry in a given field army. Nasir-i
Khusrav describes the total Fatimid army as consisting

75
of about one half cavalry . Likewise the army at the
time of Ruzayk is said to have consisted of
approximately equal proportions of cavalry and

76
infantry . The two best descriptions of Fatimid army
72. FC 2.11.2.
73. FC 2.15.1.
74. FC 3.2.1.
75. Nasir-i Khusrav, tr. pp. 217-8.
76. MaqKh. 1:94d. However, the numbers given in both of

these instances are exaggerated, and the proportions may
also be inaccurate.
reviews discussed above both list about 45-55% of the
77
soldiers as cavalry . MaqrTzT lists 5000 cavalry and
78
8000 infantry , to which should be added at least an
additional 1500 cavalry from the .Ustadhs and Sibyan
al-Khass, making the total 6500 cavalry to 8000
infantry, or about 45% cavalry. Qalqashandi has 4000

79
infantry and 3000 cavalry , to which should be added
1500 from the Ustadhs and Sibyan, which comes to

80
slightly over 50% cavalry . The tentative conclusion
can be drawn that, although the actual proportion of
cavalry and infantry undoubtedly varied from time to
time, the Fatimids were able to field armies
which could range from one third to two thirds cavalry,
depending on which regular troops were mobilized and the
types and numbers of irregular troops.
In conclusion, the economic constraints of the
dynasty, the size of the regular army garrisoned at
77. See 3.4.2. for details.
78. MaqKh. 1:389c.
79. Qal. 3:508.
80. The RikabTya have been ignored in both of these

cases since it is unclear whether they were cavalry or
infantry.
92
Cairo and the general pattern of numbers for Fatimid
field armies are consistent with a total size for the
regular army during the reign of al-Afdal of between 20
and 30,000, and field armies of from 5 to 10,000, with
about half of the regular army being cavalry.
3.5 Officers and Unit Sizes
Details of the exact structure of the officer corps
and standard size of units are lacking for the Fatimid
army, and only the general outline can be discerned.
During the twelfth century the WazTr was the supreme
commander of the army, but under his command there were
a number of different officers. Al-Qalqashandl
describes the system as follows: "There are three ranks
of Amirs: The first rank consists of the Amirs of the
Necklace ( a Z ~ ' UmanZ aZ-Mutamaqun) who wear a golden
necklace around their necks. They are the equivalent of
the Amirs (of One Hundred end) Commanders of 1000 in our
day (1350s). The second rank consists of the Lords of
Maces (An.bab aZ-Q.udab), who ride in the procession (of
the Caliph) with maces of silver, which the Caliph gives
to them from the KkZza.no. aZ-ZajammuZ. They are the
93
equivalent of the Tablakhdna in our day. The third rank
consists of the rest of the Amirs who are not allowed to
carry maces. They are the equivalent of the AmTrs of

1
Ten or Five in our day . The officers in the Fatimid
2 '
army were apparently officially known as zlmdm rather
than A mZA.6.
In addition to the ranks mentioned above there was

3
the l 6 i a h 6 a l l J i or J6ia.k6a.ldA. a l - cA6kaA. who is
described by Ibn Tuwayr as "the zImam of all zi.ma.m6 who
is in charge of the affairs of the army ." The
\ 6 ia k 6 a t d A was more a government position in the
administration than strictly military, and according to
Maqrizi the l6 ia k 6 a la A was an officer in the V7x)an

5
a l' H al .
Exact details as to how many men were commanded by
each of the three ranks are not known. It seems fairly
1. Qal. 3:480^ on the equivalent ranks under the Mamluks

of Qalqashandi's day see Ayalon, "Structure."
2. Literally "reins" but perhaps best rendered, "a _

holder of the reins of power." The terms zimam and am lA
seem to be used as equivalents in the sources.
3. See Bosworth "Ispahsalar" on the origin and use of

this term in the Islamic world.
4. Qal. 483
5. Maq. 3:335.
94
certain that the smallest tactical unit of the Fatimid
army was a company of 100 men, probably under the
command of an Amir of the third rank. The Hujariya
regiment was divided into companies of 100 men each

6
under a zim am , and it was the standard practice that
armies sent to relieve the garrison at Ascalon were in

7
units of 100 men . The "Lords of Maces" can probably be
seen as commanding several of these companies of 100
men, while the "Amirs of the Necklace" would command
entire regiments.
The impression from the sources, which cannot be
confirmed, is that the companies of .100 men were of
fixed size and composition, while the larger regiments
such as the Juyushiya and the Hujariya could fluctuate

8
in numbers . It appears that only portions of each
regiment would be sent to battle at a given time, and
were apparently organized into temporary battalions and
6. MaqKh. 1:443d
7. Maq. 3:190.
8. The Hujariya increased from 3000 (MaqKh. 1:443d) to

5000 (MaqKh. 1:444a, Qal. 3:481).
9. Thus, although the Hujariya numbered 3 to 5000 men, a

small independent band*of 100 was sent to Yaman in 1124,
Hak. 46/62.
95
assigned officers at the beginning of a campaign .
CHAPTER IV
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY
Dealing accurately with the administration of the
Fatimid army is difficult. Few administrative records
have survived from Fatimid times and the references in

the historians are-scattered, often unclear, and
sometimes contradictory. Another major difficulty is
that modern scholars have yet to give the administration
of the Fatimid dynasty the careful study it deserves.
A significant amount of research and analysis remains to
be done, and the following description must remain
general and tentative. Nonetheless, an attempt should
be made to make some sense of the scattered and
incomplete records which have survived and which can
give us some idea of the administrative and economic
constraints within which the Fatimid army operated.
4.1 Financial Resources
Although there is a lamentable dearth of surviving
documents for the Fatimid dynasty we are fortunate in
possessing a summary of the Ratvk (land and tax survey)
96
97
of Badr al-Jamali in 478/1085-6 as recorded by Abu

1
Salih . The sum for the kharaj of Egypt is given as
3,121,000 dinars. This amount is generally consistent
with the kh.an.CLj income for Egypt from a number of
different periods which for the most part ranges from

2
2.8 to 3.4 million dinars per year . However, this
figure only represents the kh.an.aj, and there were other
imDortant sources of revenue available to the Fatimid

3
government .
The taxes on the textile and other industries in the
1. Abu Salih, fol. 7b-8b, pp. 15-19. Rabie, p. 51

mistakenly states that Abu Salih's figures are from the
Afdall n a w k . Abu Salih, p.*19 states that this was the
revenue in the d a g s of al-Mustansir, and MaqKh. 1:100
gives^3,100,000 dinars as the revenue based on the
Jamal l nau ik.
2. Toussoun, pp. 23ff (summarized pp. 31-2) gives a list

of kka n a j income from Egypt from a wide variety of
sources and over a number of centuries. This data is
also partially summarized in part by Ashtor, Economic
Hlt>tony, pp. 207-8.
3. For much of the following discussion I rely mainly on

the analysis and figures given by Rabie, f i n a n c i a l
Syit&m. Although his work for the most part treats the
Ayyubid and Mamluk periods, he gives a great deal of
information about the Fatimid financial administration
as background to the Ayyubids.
4. Rabie, p. 80-1 where he gives figures for c. 1060

dealing only with the taxes on industries in- parts of
the delta and Cairo. The total industrial tax from all
of Egypt was certainly higher.
96
4
Egyptian delta produced over 370,000 dinars annually .
Another important form of revenue derived from such
state owned monopolies as alum and natron mining, which

5
could produce tens of thousands of dinars yearly .
Tariffs on trade in Ibn Mammati's time (1190s) in
Alexandria alone amounted to almost 30,000 dinars a
year, while the z a k a i on Muslim merchants produced over

6
50,000 dinars . A wide range of k Z l a lZ (non-canonical)
taxes which were abolished by Saladin produced 100,000

7
dinars from Cairo alone , while other cites in Egypt .
also had k Z l a . i l taxes under the Fatimids. Such taxes

8
produced nearly 1000 dinars from Fayyum alone . Thus
the total revenue from k Z l a iZ taxes from all Egyptian
cities could have been significant. The ja .u ia .li (or
jZ z y a ,
the poll-tax on non-Muslims) produced 130,000
9
dinars a year-under Ibn Mammati's administration , and
taxes on the minting of new coins, although varying
5. Rabie pp. 82-8.
6. Rabie p. 92 for figure from Alexandria, p. 98 for

the z j . k a t .
7. MaqKh. 1:104.
8. Rabie, p. 105-6.
9. Rabie p. 109.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
greatly from year to year, could produce as much as

1
36,000 dinars annually . Added to these may have been
11
a number of public service and other taxes , and
confiscations of private property which, although
irregular, could produce significant sums.
Although these figures are incomplete and possibly
inaccurate, and in our present state of knowledge should
not be used to attempt any detailed reconstruction of
the Fatimid government resources, they do present us
with a broad view. The approximate yearly total from
the non-kh cvicL j taxes mentioned above was between 800,000
and 900,000 dinars, and it should be emphasized that
some of the figures given above (tariffs and h l l a i l Z
taxes especially) represent only a portion of the actual
government income from those sources. Thus when these
figures are added to the k h a Z c ij income of 3,121,000
dinars, we find that the total government income for the
Fatimids %as probably well over 4,000,000 dinars
annually. This sum is partially confirmed by Ibn
10. Rabie, p. 116.
11. Rabie, pp. 113-7. Public service taxes may have

originated with Saladin's economic reforms and therefore
might not have been available as sources for Fatimid
revenue, see Rabie, p. 114.
TOO
Muyassar who states that during al-Afdal's reign the
yearly income of the Fatimid government was 5,000,000

12
dinars , with an additional 1 ,000,000 lA.da.bb6 in
grain.
There are a number of ways in which Ibn Muyassar's
figure can be interpreted. Abu SSlih wrote that the
kha.A.aj of Egypt amounted to 3, 121 ,000 dinars during the

13
reign of al-Mustansir , and this is confirmed by a
report from al-Maqrlzi that when Badr al-Jamali was
. established as WazTr of Egypt he initiated a A.cuok in
478/1085-6 which gave the revenues as 3,100,000, whereas
in 463/1070-1 the khaJtaj had only amounted to 2,800,000

14
dinars . As mentioned above, Ibn Muyassar, reports
that during al-Afdal's reign the dJLyaiA.mJL&>i =
revenue of Egypt" amounted to 5,000,000 dinars and an

15
additional one million iK da.bb6 of grain . The five
million dinSr figure can be interpreted in a number of
different ways: as an inaccurate exaggeration with
12. IMuy. 84, see next paragraph for analysis.
13. Abu Salih, p. 17.
14. MaqKh. 1:100.
15. IMuy. 84. and MaqKh. 1:100. However, Maq. 3:72b

states that it is the revenue from the k k a A a j of Egypt
rather than the entire government revenue.
101
16
little value; a figure given in jayihZ dinars ; a
figure representing a real increase in the khatCaj based
on al-Afdal's new naw k in 1107, the purpose of which was
to eliminate corruption and increase government revenue;
or the total government revenue including both k k a s ia j
and other sources of government income mentioned above.
A final resolution of this problem will require
additional research. At this point it appears that the
simplest solution is to assume that Abu SSlih's and
Maqrizi's figures of 3,100,000 represent the total
revenue from the k k a J u ij alone, while Ibn Muyassar's
5,000,000 dinars should be seen as the combination of
the 3.1 million dinars in khaJuEj along with all other
sources of government revenue.
To the figures discussed above must be added the
revenues from the territory controlled by the Fatimids
in Palestine. The scarcity of sources makes it
impossible to arrive at even a partial estimate for
these numbers, but it would not have represented a major
portion of the total. The nearest chronological figure
16. Following Ashtor, Economic Hi&ofl.y, p. 208, who

points out that this figure is substantially above the
other kkcLAZJ estimates for Egypt at this time, and
concludes ,that it actually represents jc y ^ h Z rather than
standard dinars.
102
was given by al-Muqaddasi for the year 985, who states
that the revenues from Palestine were 259,000 dinars,

17
and from all of Greater Syria as 1,189,000 dinars
Before the Crusader attacks the FStimids controlled the
equivalent of most of the old province of Palestine and
some additional cities on the coast. An initial total
for k k a x E j of somewhere around three hundred thousand
dinars from Palestinian revenues would probably be
fairly accurate, with additional revenues from tariffs,
"industrial" taxes, and the various h i l c i Z taxes
discussed above. This revenue would have been
substantially diminished during al-Afdal's reign as the
Crusaders captured cities, gardens, and farm land, while
their raids devastated crops ar.d choked off trade.
In summary, it must again be emphasized that it is
impossible to arrive at any conclusive totals for the
financial resources of the Fatimid dynasty. However,
based on the figures briefly reviewed above, it can
perhaps be estimated that the annual available resources
17. Al-Muqaddasi, quoted in Le Strange, P a le s t in e . , pp.

44-8 who gives a summary of reports on the revenues of
Palestine from a number of sources all preceding the
twelfth century whjxh generally range from two to three
hundred thousand dinars. These figures are also
summarized by Ashtor, E co n o m ic H i s t o a y , p. 174.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. F u r th e r reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the Fatimid dynasty lay somewhere between four and
five million dinars. However, by no means all of the
state revenue was devoted to the military, and some
attempt must be made to establish the proportion devoted
to the military budget. Unfortunately, there is even
less data regarding this question than the for preceding
one.
One way to deal with this question is to examine
some known non-military expenditures of the Dynasty.
The maintenance of the Fatimid court was enormously
expensive. The salaries of the Ustadhs, Rikabiya and
other palace guards and servants would have amounted to

18
several hundred thousand dinars annually . Al-Afdal
was said to have had over 6 million dinars in his
personal treasury when he died the accumulation of which

19
would have represented a major drain on the treasury ,
18. Qal. 3:525-7. The Ustadhs numbered about 1000 men

and received from ten to 100 dinars per month, the
Rikabiya, numbering 2000, from five to twenty. If we
take twenty dinars as the average pay for an Ustaclh and
ten dinars for a Rikabiya, the pay for the Ustadhs and
Rikabiya each would be 240,000 dinars a year, or 480,000
dinars total. To this should be added the costs of the
Firrash, the Rashshash and other servants.
19. Maq. 3:70; IZaf. 91.
104
20
and to have freed 10,000 slaves when he died
Building costs totaled ten million dinars during

21
al-Afdal's reign , which, if divided into the number of
years he served as WazTr, amounts to almost 400,000
dinars per year. The expense of the CId for one

22
year was 100,000 dinars , and the fCh^zan a l- k h iiv o a was
^ _ 23
said to have had a budget of 600,000 dinars annually
To these figures should be added other civil and
religious expenditures. Although no exact budget can be
reconstructed, it is clear that a substantial portion of
the state budget was spent on non-military matters.
Another way to approach this question is to draw an
analogy from the more detailed data available for
Saladin's reign. Al-Qadi al-Fadil has left us an
account of the revenues and military expenditures of

24
Egypt for 585/1189 . Al-Fidil lists the revenues from
Egypt as totalling 4,653,01S dinars, of which 3,462,096
20. Maq. 3:71.
21. Maq. 3:72-3.
22. Maq. 3:83, although this figure included the

military expenditure of supplying new uniforms to some
of the soldiers.
23. MaqKh. 1:409; Maq. 3:343.
24. Reported by MaqKh. 1:87.
105
were apparently utilized directly for military matters,

25
he equivalent of nearly 75% of the total budget
Although there is no way of determining if the Fatimid
military budget of some ninety years earlier utilized
precisely the same proportions of the state funds as in

26
the days of Saladin , this figure presents some idea of
the potential cost of maintaining an army. For
subsequent analysis in an attempt to gain a feeling for
the economic limitations placed on the Fatimid army, it
will be cautiously assumed that potential Fatimid
military expenditures could have ranged from 50-75% of
the total government revenues, or from 2.5 million to
3.75 million dinars.
25. Gibb "Armies" p. 77; Elbeheiry pp. 330ff. However,

there are a large number of unanswered questions and
difficulties concerning these figures, and Saladin's
military budget as a whole.
26. Indeed, it seems likely that the Fatimid military

budget was proportionally lower, both because of the
vast cost of maintaining the Fatimid court had been
eliminated, and because Saladin*was involved much more
extensively in Syrian conquests and in battles with the
Crusaders than were the B'atimids.
106
4.2 Military Administration
The military administration of the Fatimid
government was quite sophisticated, especially when
compared with the administration of the Crusaders at the
same period. The major administrative body for the army
was the VXwan al-ja.y6h (Ministry of the Army) which
employed a large number of ministers and secretaries.
According to al-Qalqashandi this dJbxi&n. was divided into
three offices, the VZm.n a l - j a y t h proper, the Vhaan

1
a.1-KOMioXXh (Ministry of Salaries) , and the Vhaan
2
a l~ lq td .c (Ministry of lq t a . c4) .
The major duty of the minister of the VZwan a.l-jatj4k
was maintaining a complete register of all regular
I^This office was also associated at times with the

Vim.n which controlled non-military affairs.
2. Qal. 3:525. Al-QalqashandT quotes extensively from

Ibn Tuwayr in his description of the dJua1n&, and it is
likely that much of his unattributed material is from
this source. The fullest description of the financial
aspects of Fatimid military administration is Cahen,
"Administration," which includes a French translation of
a portion of al-Makhzumi's UZnhaj . All references to
al-Makhzumi below are from this translation as the
original manuscript was unavailable to me.
107
soldiers. The names of the officers of each regiment
were listed, followed by the names of each soldier under
his command, the district from which the revenues for
his salary were drawn, the quality and type of his

3
equipment, his physiognomy and his martial skill .
These registers were kept current through regular
military reviews (ca n d ) where each soldier was required
to report for inspection with full equipment and pass
tests of military expertise. The quality of the mounts
and beasts of burden of each soldier was also inspected
at these reviews. All changes in numbers of men in a
regiment, salaries or and quality of equipment
and mounts were updated in the registries based on these

4
inspections . To insure against such fraud as padding
the ranks with non-military personnel to increase the
pay of a regiment, detailed descriptions of each regular
soldier and his mount were kept in the registers.
3. Makhzumi tr. p. 164-5, mentions all of these subjects

as being listed in the registers except the martial
skill of each soldier. However, other detailed
descriptions of Islamic military reviews ( O n d )
generally mention the practice of grading the troops
according to skill, and it seems likely that the
Fatimids followed this as well. See Bosworth,
"Recruitment" and "Isticrad."
4. Qal. 3:492.
'108
The VZuaan nl-njimJJib kept registers of the names of
all government employees, both civil and military, who

5
received stipends in cash from the treasury . These
employees were divided groups according to departments
of the government, and their rank within their
department. These groups included the wazTr, his family
and staff, the personal attendants of the Caliph such as
the UL6tadh.& and personal physicians, the administrators
of the palace, officers of the army, major religious
officials, ministers of the various administrative

6
offices, and various other palace employees .
Al-MakhzumI states that there were two types of
regular pay distributed by this d X m x i. The first, known
as the A,nâ.q, was paid to the Hujariya regiments, and
probably the other Royal regiments and officials
stationed at Cairo as well; the second, the Z jcib or
monthly stipend, was paid to "those troops employed in

7
the provincial garrisons The troops and officials
stationed at Cairo received as part of the i n i a q both a
5. Qal. 3:493.
6. Qal. 3:525f, for a discussion of the salaries of

those associated with the military see 4.3.
7. Makhzumi, tr. pp. 165-6, Cahen, "Administration," pp.

171-2
109
cash stipend and allocations of food and fodder for

8
mounts and clothing .
The troops in the provinces of Egypt or in garrisons
in Palestine were paid under a somewhat different system
than those stationed in Cairo. A representative of the
Pxutan a l jCLy-S)h was assigned to each garrison in the
provinces. This official held regular military reviews
for his regiment and maintained a registry like the main
registries of the VZuo&n. Copies of these provincial
records would be sent to Cairo where they would be
processed and the necessary monthly stipends ordered to

9
be paid to the troops of that region . It is unclear .
whether the money for provincial soldiers would be sent
from the treasury at Cairo, taken from local resources,
or some combination of both, or if all or part of the
revenue to pay these troops might have come from i q a c6
in the region where they were garrisoned.
The third office of military administration was the
Dili.ian at-lqta.c which kept registries of the lands
allocated to the army. Rabie rightly maintains that
8. Makhzumi, tr. p. 165, Cahen, "Administration," pp.

171-2.. For a discussion of these payments in kind see
4.3.
S. Makhzumi, tr. p. 116.
110
"the main features of the Fatimid iqta.*-' in Egypt are

10
still ambiguous and need serious research and no
solution to these difficulties can be offered here.
According to Cahen, government officials and officers
would receive grants of certain agricultural regions as
iqtac6. Part of the revenue would be owed to the
government, while part would be retained by the maqtac.
The maqta0 would usually owe civil or military services,
for which he might occasionally receive an additional
salary. The government's portion of an i q t a ^ , the size
of the iqtac , and its holder could all be changed at the

11
discretion of the government
The i q t a ^ of the Fatimid system were divided into
two main types, the iqtac jaythZ and the iqta.c i ctidadx
The first was allocated to regular soldiers and civil
officials and included both cash and produce from the

12
lands . The collection of revenue and produce from
some of these i q t a c jaythi was on an annual basis.
10. Rabie, p. 26.
11. Cahen, "Administration," pp. 173ff; Cahen,

"Evolution," pp. 37-8; Cahen, "Iqtac," p. 1089b; Rabie,
f i n a n c i a l S y s te m , pp. 26-8, 51.
12. Makhzumi tr. p. 166, Cahen, "Administration," pp.

17 3ff.
11
According to al-Makhzumi there was another type of
iq x ta c in which the revenue from a certain tract of land
was assigned to a soldier, but collected by the
government, and paid to the soldier as an / . j a b , or

13
monthly stipend mentioned above . In addition to the
regular troops permanently stationed at Cairo some of
the army was garrisoned throughout Egypt where they had
been given tracts of land as iqta*

*. MaqrTzi mentions
that troops were mobilized from "those regiments present

14 _
(at Cairo) and those visiting their iq Z lc* ." Bahram
is said to have mobilized "a group of the ju.nd and the
cOL*kaJL along with the army of the countryside ( ju n d

15
n l - a t iy o ii ) ." Maqrlzi, in describing the same situation
says that Bahram gained the support of "a group of

- 16
m uqta.c* of the Gharbiya province In al-Afdal's
military and financial reforms of 11078/5G1 he made a
13. Makhzumi, tr. p. 166.
14. Maq. 3:190, "m in a l - t a w a i hadin.an via man ka n a

m u*aiiA M .n &
i q t a ci k i . n *The term m a & a iia a n , which I
have translated*"visiting" may imply that the troops
were not permanently based near their iq ta .* -* but only
visited them occasionally, perhaps during harvest or
planting times.
15. IDaw. 6:514.
16. Maq. 3:155
112
distinction between the "men of the army and the

17
mu.qta.c6 ." In 1118 the m a q t a i of the governor of the
eastern delta were mobilized to oppose Baldwin's
invasion, implying that they were stationed in the
eastern delta where the land of their l q t a c& was

18
found
The exact significance of such sketchy evidence is
not certain, but as a tentative hypothesis, it seems
likely that the troops paid by the 4 .n lZ q were for the
most part stationed in Cairo, while the m u q ta H resided
as garrisons in towns near the lands of their Z q t a ^ i .
This would make both economic and military sense in that
the m u q p ic6 would be near their lands and at the same
time would also be available as a army for regional
military needs and as garrisons of the major towns.
These troops were paid from the revenue produced from
the land in the region in which they were stationed
which had been assigned to them as l q t a i . Thus the
officers and soldiers of a regiment stationed at
Alexandria, for example, would be assigned a certain
tract of land in that area as their i . q t a 0 . This land
17. Maq. 3:40, " a l - i u L i a l a l - ca6ktLnXya uia al-mmqta.cZn.
18. Maq. 3:53.
113
would be administered by government officials, and a
portion of the revenues from it would be sent to Cairo.
The rest would be kept in Alexandria and distributed on
a monthly basis to the troops stationed in Alexandria.
If this hypothesis is correct, troops stationed in the
provinces would have been muqpLCi receiving the Zjab or
monthly stipends, while those stationed in Cairo would
have been paid by In&aq direct from the state treasuries
and granaries and would not, for the most part, have
held A.qta.c&.
The JLqta.c i cida.dt was based on a set of registers
kept by the VZwan a . l- Z q t a . ^ concerning the bedouin tribas
of the region around Alexandria, the Kiriani berbers, and
bedouins of other regions, as well as the fleet. The
registers for the irregular bedouins were less complete
than those of the regular soldiers kept by the VZuocin
al-jaysh, listing only the required number of men from
each tribe, and the stipends for the tribe as a whole in

19
jayihZ dinars , rather than a detailed listing of each
individual. According to al-Qalqashanai the q a c4 of
19. Makhzumi, tr. pp. 164-5, 166-7; Qal. 3:493.
: 14
20
the bedouins were located on the fringes of Egypt and
were of less value than those of the regular soldiers.
However the system actually functioned in practice,
there were two major ramifications for the structure of
the army. The first was that the bedouins of Egypt were
provided with revenues from their yiq ta.*' JLcJLdd.dJL in
return for which they were obligated to undertake the
protection of Egyptian territory and send troops to join

21
Fatimid expeditionary forces outside Egypt , although
in practice the bedouins tended to receive additional
cash supplements, perhaps a type of na&aqa., when called

22
up for military service . The second result was that a
portion of the Fatimid army was more or less permanently
stationed in the provinces, while the elite regiments

23
were based at Cairo
20. Qal. 3:495, an.Z a l - b l l o i d ."
21. Makhzumi, tr. p. 167.
22. See ch. 3.3.1.
23. Ayalon, "Structure" I, 204ff., discusses the fact

that in much the same way the Royal Mamluks were
stationed at Cairo, were better paid and considered
superior troops, while other mamluks and the h&lqa. lived
in the provinces, apparently at or near their I q t a ^ .
115
4.3 The System of Payment
Only a brief summary of the Fatimid system of
payment can be attempted here. The subject can not be
fully examined until the economic and administrative
history of the period has been studied in detail.
Furthermore, the Fatimid period lacks the economic
detials which have allowed Dr. Ayalon to make his

1
excellent studies of the Mamluk system of payment . All
thrt can be done here is to give a general outline of
the system for paying and supplying the armed forces,
with a few details of that system in action.
As has been discussed in the previous section, for
purposes of payment Fatimid troops was divided into
three classes: those who received the Z n ^ K q , those
receiving the Z j'a b which seems to have been usually
supplied from iq a .c&, and those holding JLqfiLc& of one of
the various types discussed above. Unfortunately it is
impossible to determine for certain the monthly pay of
1. Ayalon, "Payment," pp. 38-41 discusses the plentiful

sources for his study.
116
these various groups of Fatimid soldiers, although the
general ranges and types of pay can be established.
Qalqashandl provides some figures for pay rates for
many government employees and soldiers serving in
Cairo. The most important government officials received

2
monthly salaries in the hundreds of dinars , while "the
officers of the soldiers and the Sudanis were

3
paid fifty, fo rty or thirty dinars per month ." Guards
of government buildings other than the Palace in Cairo
were paid five, ten, fifteen or twenty dTnars each,
while non-military servants in the Palace each received

4 _
five or ten dTnars The pay of the Rikabiya fits the
same pattern, with the officers receiving fifty dinars a
month and the normal soldiers five, ten, fifteen or

5
twenty dinars .
The general pattern that emerges from these few
known examples is a pay scale of five, ten, fifteen or
twenty dinars a month for the normal soldier and thirty,
2. Qal. 3:525-6.
3. Qal. 3:526.
4. Qal._3:526-. Officers of the city guard were paid

fifty dinars a month, the leaders of the Palace servants
thirty.
5. Maq. 3:341-2.
fotfrty or fifty dTriars a month for the officers. It is
difficult to make any distinctions beyond this, although
a few observations are pertinent. These differences in
pay probably are based on three major criteria, the
first whether the soldier was mounted or on foot,
second, the skill and experience of the soldier, and,
finally, the quality and cost of his arms. Cavalry
would naturally receive a higher rate of pay than
infantry to cover the cost of their horse, saddle gear,
groom for the mount, etc.; the heavily armoured man
would likewise receive higher pay than the lightly
armoured due to the increased cost of his equipment and
perhaps the need for a servant to care for it and a mule
or camel to carry it to battle. Finally, in many
Islamic dynasties there was a pay scale and grading

6
according to military prowess , and it is likely the
Fatimids followed this policy as well.
With these factors in mind the following is a
hypothetical reconstruction of the basis for the pay
structure outlined above. The major division in pay was
between cavalry and infantry. In each group there were
two classes of troops; for infantry, the standard pay
6. Bcsworth, "Recruitment," passim, esp. pp. 73-4.
118
was five dTnars, while elite or heavily armed infantry
were p a i d ten dTnars. For calvary, the standard pay was

fifteen dTnars, while the elite or extra heavy cavalry
recei v ed twenty. Infantry off i c e r s rec e i v e d thirty or

fourty dTriars, while cavalry officers received fotfrty or
fifty.
Although such a reconstruction is completely
co n j e c t u r a l it parallels some known pay rates of other

troops in the Middle East during this time. In Iraq in
the late Tenth century a cavalryman received twelve to
fourteen dinars per month, an infantryman three and a

7
half , and during the Crusades the Armenian cavalry were
pa i d twelve dTnars a month, w hile the infantry received

8
three . Another parallel presents itself from the
9
na.6a.qa. paid to troops mobilizing for combat . The
na.6a.qa. of a cavalry officer was 100 dTnars, or twice

~ 10
their m o n t h l y salary of fifty d T nars . The na6aqa of
the c a v a l r y m a n was thirty dTnars, and if this also

re p r e s e n t e d double his mont h l y salary, the salary would
7. Ashtor, Economic. Hl&tony , pp. 132-3, 154.
8. ME p. 246.
9. On the na.6a.qa see the following paragraph.
10. Maq. 3:190.
115
be fifteen dinars a month, which fits the general

11
pattern described above .
Monthly salaries were not the only type of payment
received by Fatimid soldiers. Another important, and
for the government costly, form of pay was the n a fia q a , a
special grant of money on the eve of a campaign or at

12
the ascension of a new Caliph . If the troops were
being mobilized for combat its purpose was to provide
soldiers with money to refurbish their equipment, buy
camels or mules, and cover all extra expenses involved
in a major campaign, as well as boosting morale. At the
accession of a new ruler it was meant to solidify
support of the army and thereby ease the transfer of
power.
Very few details are known about the actual
procedure and level of the n a ^ a q a in Fatimid times. The
most illuminating example is recorded by Maqrizi, who
11. This hypothesis does not conform to the situation

when UsSma managed to recruit 860 mercenary Cavalry for
6000 dinars at a rate of about seven dinars each (Usama
9/33). However, these troops were unemployed Syrian
soldiers and their actual pay rate was undoubtedly
negotiated on the spot and should not be seen as some
type of standard Fatimid practice.
12. Ayalon, "Payment," pp. 56-65, has an excellent

discussion of this practice during Mamlun times.
12C
states that whenever the garrison at Ascalon was
relieved the new troops were given a n a fia q a . "The
nafaqa of the amirs was 100 dinars, and for the

13
(cavalry) soldiers thirty dinars each ." It is
impossible to tell if this was the standard rate paid to
soldiers whenever they went to combat or was a special
n a ^ a q a for garrison duty. However, at an earlier period
a n a fia q a of fourty dinars per cavalryman was

14
mentioned . During the Mamluk period the na.ia.qa was
15
t h e o r e t i c a l l y 100 dTnars , but in pra c t i c e it usually
1c
t v*
varied from twenty to fifty dinars . It seems likely
that in practice the Fatimid n a fa q a also varied
according to the current reserves of the treasury and
the type of military activity to be undertaken, with a
higher n a fa q a being paid for a more lengthy and arduous
campaign.
This practice could represent a significant expense
for a campaign. If an army of 5000 cavalry was
13. Maq. 3:190.
14. Maq. 2:152; Lev, "Fatimid Army," p. 189 mistakenly

takes this figure as an increase in pay rather than the
n a fa q a paid on the eve of a campaign.
15. Ayalon, "Payment," p. 57.
16. Ibid., pp. 58, 64.
121
mobilized, each receiving a thirty dinar n a & a q a , the
cost of the n a ia q a alone would amount to 150,000 dTnars,
to which would be added the regular pay of the troops,
the cost of supplies, equipment, and the mobilization of
the fleet to transport troops and supplies. Although no
exact costs can be determined each expeditionary force
undoubtedly cost the Fatimid government at least several
hundred thousand dTnars.
The KZ&ida was an annual or semi-annual distribution
of either a robe or its cost to soldiers and government

17
employees . The governments supplies of clothing and
cloth were kept in the KkZza.no. al~ kZ 4 u )a in Cairo, and
according, to Ibn Abl Tayy, the early Fatimid
administration spent approximately 600,000 dinars a year
on the maintenance of this storehouse. However, this
KhZzana included the costly jewel and gold covered robes
of the Caliph and his high officials, as well as the
robes for the slaves and servants of Palace
establishment, and the figure of 600,000 dTnars, if not
an exaggeration, should not be thought of mainly as a
17. Although some could receive clothing more

frequently, for example, al-Afdal's librarian received 3
robes per year, Maq. 3:51.
122
18
military expense
In 1119 the kJ.6wa was said to have amounted to 8775

19
robes, while in 1122 it was 14,305 . The money spent on
the kZiuia. was said to have been greatly decreased during

_ ^ 2 0
the regime of al-Ma'mun al-Bataql . It thus appears
that in practice there was no set standard as to who
received the )a or how many times a year, or even the
quality or value of the robes distributed. It is clear
that the robes for the high officers and administrators
were much finer and more expensive than those of the
lower ranks, Ibn Abl Tayy stating that the gold
embroidered L>iaz (decorative band) on the robes of the

21
amirs alone cost 500 dinars each . During Ramadan in
1122 the cost of the distribution of gifts, sweets and
robes given on the cZd a.t~iXXn. amounted to 100,000
18. Quoted by MaqKh. 1:409. (Note that Maq. 3:343

abridges and distorts this same passage.) MaqKtu 3:415
mentions royal robes costing 30,000 and 80,000 dinars
made of gold fabric and covered with jewels and pearls.
19. MaqKh 1:410. Maq. 3:82 gives the second number as

4305, undoubtedly erroneously omitting the 10,000.
20. Ibid.
21. Quoted by MaqKh. 1:409. The subsequent pages of

MaqKh. give additional descriptions of costly robes.
22. Maq. 3:33.
123
22
dTnars
Although again all the details are not known, it is
clear that the Fatimids had some type of fodder
distribution for the army. According to Ibn Muyassar
the Fatimid government's yearly revenues included one
million V id a b b i of grain for the state granaries

23
. Qalgashandl states that there were a number
of store houses for grain in which taxes in kind were
stored for distribution to many different government
employees and charities, including the daily food
rations ( ja n Z y K t ) for the army and navy. Two large
storage facilities were established near Fustat for

24
straw
There was food distribution to some government
employees. Al-Makhzuml's discussion implies that part

25
of the payment to Fatimid troops was in kind .
Qalqashandi's statement above shows that at least some
of the grain in the storehouses was distributed to civil
servants and the military. There are also cases of
23. IMuy. 84 followed by Maq. 3:72.
24. Qal. 3:479.
25. Makhzumi tr. p. 166, Cahen, "Administration," p.

177
I 4m
124
26
salaries including flour and meat . There was thus
clearly some kind of food distribution to the soldiers
stationed in Cairo.
According to Ayalon the daily fodder allotment per
soldier under the Mamluk dynasty ranged from three to

27
five caZZqaA per day . As an ca tZ q a was 1/25th of a
Z n d a b b , this rate of distribution would amount to about
one Zn.da.bb of barley per week per cavalryman, or around

28
50 Zn.da.bbA per year . If we arbitrarily assume that
half of the government grain was barley for cavalry
mounts, this would include enough grain to supply 10,000

29
mounts , which corresponds to the needs of the
30
estimated size of the army stationed in Cairo . Of
course this is a much simplified and completely
hypothetical model. It is clear that not all of the
government's grain was intended to serve as fodder for
26. Maq. 3:79.
27. Ayalon, "Payment" pp. 261-2.
28._For the ca lZ q a . see Ayalon, "Payment," p.261. At 3

ca .llc ia A
perday the rate is one in.da.bb per 8 days, at 5
ca tiq a .A
it is one per 5 days. For the purposes of
general calculations I am using one Zn.da.bb per week.
29. One half of a million Zn.da.bbA divided by fifty

in.da.bb a per mount equals 10,000.
30. See 3.4.2.
125
animals, since some was given to the Navy, government

31
employees and charitable institutions . Further, not
all fodder was used for distribution to the mounts of
cavalrymen as the Fatimid government maintained the

32 33 34
mounts of the royal stables , mules , and livestock
which probably received some type of fodder distribution
from these storehouses as well. Furthermore, it may be
that the Fatimid barley distribution for military mounts
was less than that of the Mamluk period with the Fatimid
soldiers being expected to supply part of their mount's
needs from their monthly pay.
It should be noted that the costs of the food and
fodder, and perhaps the kZ&wa. as well, were apparently
not paid in addition to the monthly salary. According
to al-Makhzumi, the salaries of soldiers were recorded
on paper in j a y t h ! dTnars, but were distributed in both

35
cash and payments in kind . As an hypothetical
31. Qal. 3:479.
32. Qal. 3:478, numbering well over 2000.
33. Qal. 3:479.
34. Maq. 3:70 mentions that al-Afdal spent 40,000 dinars

a year feeding his cattle, sheep and camels.
35. Makhzuml tr. pp. 165, 167.
126
example, if cavalryman's salary was fifteen dinars per
month, he would receive daily rations of wheat or flour,
and perhaps meat, oil and vegetables or other products,
and a measure of barley and/or straw as fodder for his
mount. The value of all of these products would then be
deducted from his monthly pay, so that although he was
officially listed in the registers as having been paid
fifteen dinars a month, in practice he was paid perhaps
seven dTnars in cash, the rest having been paid in kind
throughout the month.
It is not clear how many of these types of payment
applied to those troops holding I q t a H in the
provinces. Clearly they received the na.ia.qa when they
were mustered for military expeditions. However, as
their income from an JL q ta c almost certainly included
produce, it seems possible that they were not given
special fodder or food rations as were the troops based
in Cairo receiving the I n i a q .
4.4 Garrisons
The important role played by the garrisons of the
Fatimid
;
maritime cities merits some attention.
127
Garrisons of regular Fatimid troops were found in most
Fatimid coastal cities. They were numbered for the most
part only in the hundreds, only in the most important
cities or in times of crisis reaching over 1000 men.
When the walls of Jerusalem were breached in 1099 it was
said that 500 men took refuge in the citadel, perhaps
reflecting the general size of the regular garrison

1
there . Reinforcements to the city of Arsuf in 1100
2
numbered 100 cavalry and 200 infantry , a strong enough
force to encourage the initiation of counter-raids from
the city. A Turkish mercenary force from Damascus

3
garrisoning Tyre numbered some 700 cavalry , but as at
that time the revenues of the city were divided between
Damascus and Cairo, and there were probably additional

4 _
Fatimid contingents as well Shams al-Khilafa
1. FC 1.30.3.
2. AA 7:10.
3. WT 13.7.
4. WT 13.5 says that 1/3 of the revenues of Tyre went to

Damascus, 2/3 to Egypt. If this represents the
proportion of defense obligations taken we can perhaps
assume that the total garrison was about 2100 men, 1/3,
or 70C from Damascus, and 2/3 or 1400 from Egypt.
128
garrisoned Ascalon with 300 Armenian mercenaries in

5
1110 . All of these figures indicate the relatively
small size of the regular garrison forces of the
cities.
Garrisons were paid from some combination of a

6
portion of the revenues of each city and direct
payments from the treasury of Egypt, which could include

7 8
regular monthly stipends, na.aqa. payments , supplies ,
and sometimes even stipends to the citizens to encourage

S
their support . As the Crusaders captured the
agricultural hinterland and interdicted trading through
competition and piracy, the difficulties and expense in
supplying the city and paying and feeding the garrisons
continually mounted.
More information is available concerning the
garrison at Ascalon than any other, and although there
were possibly significant differences in the
5. See 6.1.1 for details.
6. As at Tripoli: Nipir-i Khusrav, tr. in LeStrange,

V a.le.6 tx.nz, p. 349.
7. See ch. 4.3.
8. Maq. 3:96 mentions shipping 15,000 tn.da.bb6 of grain

to Tyre.
9. WT 17.22.
administration of the garrison of each city, Ascalon can
serve as a paradigm of the coastal defense. Fulcher
makes the general statement that the garrison of Ascalon

10
was "few in number and this is supported by other
sources. According to Ibn TaghrlbardT, the Fatimids
maintained a garrison of from 300 to 600 cavalry at

11 _
Ascalon , which is confirmed by MaqrTzi, who mentions
that in 1149 a force of 500 cavalry wasfeent to relieve

12
the Ascalon garrison . Fulcher mentions a raid from
the garrison of Ascalon carried out by 500 cavalry and
1000 infantry, the infantry in this case possibly
representing, at least in part, the militia of

13
Ascalon
William of Tyre gives an interesting description of
how he viewed the Fatimid policy toward the garrisoning

14
of Ascalon :
10. FC 2.49.12.
11. ITagh. 5:244
12. Maq. 3:190.
13. FC 2.37.3 claims this entire force was defeated by a

mere sixty five knights from Jaffa, indicating Fulcher's
figures are perhaps exaggerated.
14. WT 14:22, 17:22.
130
"Now because of their continued success

(in raids against the Crusaders), the people
of Ascalon were becoming increasingly bold and
insolent and were overrunning the entire
region without restraint. Ascalon itself was
subject to a very powerful Egyptian
potentate-. If this city should be taken, the
prince foresaw with alarm that the Christian
army might invade Egypt and disturb the
peaceful conditions which existed there.
Accordingly, at a great outlay of money and
effort, he was endeavoring to make the land of
Ascalon a barrier, as it were, between Egypt
and our territory. Fearing that the strength
of its people might give way under the
constant hardships and perils of warfare, he
took great care to send to their assistance
every three months new people and fresh
legions, together with provisions and supplies
of arms. The new arrivals aturally wished to
try their strength and to give proofs of their
courage. Hence, against the wishes of the
veterans, they often made experimental sallies
and expeditions... There was a large
population in that city, even the least of
whom and, indeed, according to the general
report, even the youngest babes received
pay from the treasury of the caliph of Egypt."
The garrison was relieved on a regular basis by
fresh troops from Egypt. According to Maqrizi this

15
relief occurred every six months , while William of
16
Tyre maintains it was every three months . On the
other hand, Usama only stayed there four months, but he
15. Maq 3:190, 204, and ITagh. 6:244.
16. WT 14:22.
17
was apparently called back earlier than usual . It is
possible that during times of relative quiet the
garrison was relieved every six.months as stated by
Maqrizi, while when under siege or facing the danger of
siege, the relief may have been increased to every three
months, or perhaps at one time the standard service
period was six months which eventually changed to three
months.
In addition to.their regular pay, each time a man
was sent from Egypt for his tour of duty at Ascalon he
received a special a type of active duty pay, of
100 dinars per officer and thirty dinars per

18
cavalryman . With 500 cavalry paid fifteen dinars a
month, five officers at fifty a month, plus the na.a.qa,
the cost of supplies and transportation, and stipends to
the citizens, the total yearly cost of maintaining the
garrison at Ascalon would have been well over 100,000
dTnars. If William of Tyre's statement is correct, the
citizens were also paid a special stipend, presumably
both to encourage them to stay while facing imminent
17. Usama 17/42. He received a letter summoning him back

to Cairo, while his brother, who had come with him to
Ascalon, stayed on in the city.
18. Maq. 3:190, ITagh. 5:244, see ch. 4.3 above.
danger from the Franks, assist them in meeting the
possibly increased prices due to the need to transport
all goods there by sea from Egypt, and enable the city
militia to provide themselves with better equipment.
The soldiers of the regular garrison were divided
into units of 100 men, each commanded by an amir, while
the commander of the entire force was called the amZa

- 19
aZ-muqaddamZn . The amZn. aZ-muLqa.dda.mZn was not the
governor of Ascalon, as he was to present his
credentials to the governor when his force arrived.
This commander was'sent a purse with 100 dinars (his

20
naâqa) as a sign he was to be mobilized , and was
given written orders from the Army Office and additional
money to be distributed for the naâqa to the troops.
He then dispatched officers to mobilize "the regiments
who were present (in Cairo) and those who were visiting
21
their Z q & L c6 ."
19. Maq. 190.
20. ITagh. 5:244.12
21. Maq. 3:190. Although both ITagh. 5:244 and Maq.

3:190 appear to be either quoting or paraphrasing Ibn
Tuwayr (specifically mentioned only by ITagh. 5:240.9),
both versions should be consulted since, though giving
generally the same description, each gives specific
information not found in the other.
133
Finally, after the invasion of the Crusaders had
effectively cut off the maritime cities from most of the
agricultural hinterland, the maritime garrisons had to
be supported by a constant flow of supplies from Egypt
by sea. There are numerous references to seaborne
supplies being sent from Egypt, but one case merits
special attention. During the final siege of Tyre in
1122-4 15,000 JLk d a b b i of grain were sent there from

22
Egypt
In addition to the garrisons stationed in the
maritime cities of Syria the Fatimids maintained troops
in Egyptian towns outside Cairo, although little

23
information has survived regarding these units
4.5 Al-Afdal's Administrative Reforms
By 1107 the invasions of the Crusaders and the
subsequent loss of Palestine brought to a head a number
of military, administrative and economic problems faced
by the Fatimid dynasty in the early twelfth century.
22. Maq. 3:96. An iA d a b b = c. 110 kg.
23. See 3.4.2 and 4.3 on provincial troops.
1 34
The defeats at the hands of the Crusaders had resulted
in the loss of a great deal of equipment, money and men,
leaving al-Afdal with "insufficient wealth, weapons,

1
horses and men " to mount an effective expedition into
Palestine. This military problem was compounded due to
extensive corruption in the Z q ta .c system. The soldiers
were complaining that the revenues from their had
declined and the officers and government agents were
increasing the size of their own at the expense

2
of the common soldiers . It was said that the revenues
of the j.q tc L c6 were too small to meet the military
requirements of the soldiers, the government took too
much of the revenue, the estates were in disrepair
because of lack of funds for upkeep, and the number of

3
inhabitants were too few to work the land In .response
to these difficulties al-Afdal initiated two major
series of reforms, one administrative, the other
military.
1. Ibn Tuwayr quoted in MaqKh. 1:443c. For a full

discussion of this passage see Ch. 3.2.3.
2. MaqKh. 1:83a, see also French translation by Cahen,

"Administration," p. 174. Maq. 3:38-9 also mentions the
dismissal of corrupt officials.
3. Ibid.
Although the details of his reforms have not been
preserved, the general outline is clear. With the
assistance of al-Ma'mun al-Bataql, al-Afdal synchronized
the solar and lunar calendars which had reached a

4
disparity of about four years , and apparently upset the
tax schedule. A complete cadastral survey of lands in
Egypt was ordered, and the values of each A.qpc was
fixed in registers and guaranteed for the next thirty

5 _
years . The size and values of the of the amirs
and other powerful lords were decreased to a prescribed
level, and the resultant excess in revenue was

6
reassigned to the weak soldiers (duuâ' a l - j u n d ) , who
could thereby upgrade the quality of their equipment and
mounts.
Al-Afdal's major military reform was the

_ 7
establishment of the Hujariya regiment . In response to
the Fatimid defeats in Palestine al-Afdal "constructed
seven barracks (hujar) and selected 3000 men from the
4. Maq. 3:40.
5. MaqKh. 1:83a.
6 . MaqKh. 1:83a, Maq. 3:40 gives an abridgement of the

of this text which clarifies some of the meaning.
7. For a full discussion of this regiment see Ch. 3.2.3.
136
sons of the army, and divided them in each barrack,
giving each 100 men a ZA.ma.rn and n a q Z b . Over the entire
corp he assigned as zZmam an amir called the m u .iua.H lq.
He distributed to each man whatever horses, arms and
other equipment he needed, and took a great interest in
these soldiers. If there was a sudden attack he ordered
that they be mobilized with with their zLm&mt to meet

8
it ." Al-Afdal thus hoped that his security and
military power would be increased with this specially
trained and equipped body of cavalry stationed at
Cairo. It is impossible to determine the ultimate
effectiveness of al-Afdal's reforms, but it seems that
they did not ultimately resolve the problem. The
Fatimids continued to suffer setbacks in Palestine, and
al-Ma'mun was forced to again reorganize the JLqHcir
system.
This is the only recorded attempt at a major
military or administrative reform during the early
eleventh century. Although the chronologies and
records for this period are by no means complete,
it appears that the Fatimids made no significant
8 . Ibn Tuwayr quoted by MaqKh. 1 :443c.
137
effort to adopt new organizational or tactical theories
in response to the Crusader invasions.
CHAPTER V
WEAPONS, TACTICS AND MILITARY THEORY
There are a large number of physical, psychological
and theoretical factors which influenced the
effectiveness of medieval armies in combat such as the
relative superiority in numbers, quality of armour and
weapons, the types of weapons and techniques of their
use, the appropriateness of tactics employed on the
battlefield, motivation, morale and courage. This
chapter will analyze the quality of Fatimid arms and
armour and their tactics and military theory on the
battlefield and in siegecraft, ending with a discussion
of some of the weaknesses of the Fatimid army which
contributed to their loss of southern Palestine to the
Crusaders.
5.1 Arms and Armour
The types and quality of weapons can be an important
factor in the relative effectiveness of an army. In a
general sense the Fatimid army was equipped with the
standard weapons of any pre-technical army: spears,
138
139
swords, bows, and various types of armour, shields,
helmets, etc. There were not substantial differences
between the military technology of the Fatimids and the
Crusaders, and if anything,' the Fatimid technology may
have been superior.
However, the relative proportions of heavily as
opposed to lightly armed men in the two armies could
have a significant impact on the results of campaigns.
In attempting to explain the reasons for the Fatimid
defeat at. the hands of the Crusaders, some modern
historians have made the assumption that the Fatimid
troops were in general more lightly armed than the

1
Crusaders .
Precise data on the types and quality of arms and
armour for the Fatimids is not readily available. Few
actual archaeological examples of their equipment have
survived and Fatimid art with military themes was not

2
extensive . Nonetheless, a careful examination of the
available evidence, even if it will not as yet produce a
complete picture of Fatimid armament, will at least
1. Runciman 2:74 "the huge army of the Egyptians ...

was lightly armed and untrained." See also 2:77
2. For a survey of some of the significant artistic

remains see Gorelik and Nicolle.
140
allow us to dismiss the theory that the Fatimids were
poorly and lightly equipped.
5.1.1 Arsenals
Based on a survey of artistic Gorelik has recognized

3
that the armour of the Fatimid period included :
"mail (cUac or zcuidZya), lamellar jcLuiAkan,

a type similar to scale with a rounded scale
edge directed upwards beyond the mail and
finally the scale (quilted or lined)
qa.zalza.nd. Like the contemporary short Syrian
mail coat the long mail shirt had full length
sleeves and often served as an undershirt.
Lamellar armour, being knee-length, probably
had a hemmed slit in the front. Armour
similar to scale was waist long and
poncho-shaped,...
This general description is confirmed by literary
sources describing the arms and armour contained in the
Fatimid arsenals. The Fatimid government maintained a
number of important arsenals and storehouses in which
all types of military equipment and material was

4
stored . There were three main storehouses devoted to
military equipment which also served as factories for
3. Gorelik, p. 33.
4. See MaqKh. 1:397, 1:417, 2:423-4 and Qal. 3:477-8.
141
5
making arms and armour . To maintain this highly
organized system of procurement, storage and
distribution of military equipment, the government spent
70-80,000 dinars a year on keeping the stocks of weapons

6
adequate in the khiza.n o. a l- b iX Z h alone .
The first and most significant of these is the
Kki.za.na. al-&ilah, the "Treasury of arms," or Arsenal. A
detailed descriptions of this arsenal was given by Ibn

7
Tuwayr describing a large number of different types of
8
arms and armour includina nka za g h a n d armour
9
reinforced by mail covered in finely wrought silk
brocade, and ja u iik a n armour reinforced (Madt5uVuz.) by
chain mail and gold... Helmets and most of the many
types cf mail suits and swords were decorated with
5. MaqRh. 2:423 describes 3000 craftsmen as being

employed in the Treasury of Banners.
6 . According to QadI Muhi al-Din al-Zahir quoted in Qal.

3:477. ' *
7. Preserved in MaqKh. 1:417.
8 . Kazagka.nd (khazaghand , qazakand) and ja.u)iha.n were

types of laminar, scale or splint armour which included
a large number of different specific styles. See
Tarsus! p. 116/138; Mayer pp. 36-41; Gorelik p. 32-3
and passim.; Nicolle 66 ff.
9. Madjjuna, literally "buried."
1 42
silver. These included Arab style and q a Z jiin Z y a .

10 _ 11
swords , lances, painted and gold washed q a n te u iZ y a ,
and lance heads (a6Zn.no.) from Busra. There were bows
for shooting by hand according to the respective skill
(of the archer), for- example the k h a t u t bow which is
appropriate for skilled archers. (The Caliph) had
arrows brought to him from the arsenal which he
examined, including triangular arrowheads of various

12
types There were also crossbows (q Z 6 Z a Z - J iZ jZ ) and
.
13 14
stirrup crossbows (q Z 6 Z a Z -tiZ k a b ) and ballistas
with arrowheads weighing 5 n.a tZ 6 . ... One type of
arrow was called the ja a a d with the length of a span (c.
10. A long slightly curved Persian saber, the q a Z a c h u fi.

Nicolle pp. 123-4
11. A very long cavalry lance, Tarsus! 113/135.
12. Cf. Latham pp. 25-6 "The most reliable and effective
arrowheads are those which are either triangular or
square, these are for use in battle and for piercing
iron and all kinds of armour." See also p. 28 where
they are called ya.gh.ZZq or k a A b Z arrowheads, and
illustrations 15.1 and 2 on'page 25.
13. On both of these crossbows see Latham and Huuri p.

94.
14. q Z iZ aZ -Z au )Z a b, literally "spring or pivotal bow".

Huuri pp. 120, 126.
143
7-8 inches), which is shot from a bow with an arrow

15
guide . Neither cavalry nor infantry are aware of it
16
until it has struck them ."
The treasury was also said to have included
"helmets, suits of armour (d tx x u c), horse barding
, swords embellished with gold and silver, steel
swords, boxes of arrow heads and heathwocd arrow shafts,
boxes of bows, bundles of strong long lances, and mail
and helmets numbering 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 , each type divided into

17
tens of thousands. " Although the intent is not clear,
the last phrase in this passage probably means that
there were a total of 2 0 0 ,0 On items in the arsenal,
divided according to types in groups of 10 ,0 0 0 , which is
to say, 10,000 helmets, 10,000 swords, 10,000 lances,
and so on.
Other descriptions give further evidence of the
variety, quality and quantity of weapons found in the
15. See Latham pp. 145-50, 184, 191
16. Qal. 3:477 gives an abbreviated and somewhat

different version of the same: "There were mail coats
covered with finely wrought silk brocade decorated with
silver, gold decorated ja u n h a n armour,_ helmets decorated
with gold and silver, Arab and q a lja J iZ y a swords, and
long qointGiru.ycL lances polished and engraven with gold
with huge lance (heads)."
17. MaqKh. 2:417.
144
various arsenals. In 1066 the Arsenal was plundered of
a large number of weapons including "cAzizT lances with
lance heads finely inlaid with gold and silver, jeweled
swords, arrows made of heath wood (kka.Zna.jZ), Lamtl

18
shields (dcuiaqa.) ... suits of armour (dtu.uc) washed
with silver, horse barding and jau)6kan and

19
kazaakand armour with silk brocade and stars of
20
silver ." Twenty thousand decorated swords were said
21
to have been taken during the same period . This
Arsenal also functioned as a type of military museum in
which could be found preserved large quantities of arms

22
and armour of famous Islamic rulers and warriors
Another important arsenal was known as the Kkj.za.na.
al-bunud, or the "Treasury of Banners" in which 3000
skilled craftsmen were employed in the days of
al-Zahir. During an inspection in the year 1068 it was
18. Vaxaga referred to shields made of leather (Qal.

2:136), i a m t l shields were a type of North African hide
shield. See also Tarsusi p. 114/136
19. The text reads kaaacJLdaJt, which I have amended to

kkaza.gkanda.t.
20. MaqKh. 1:397.
21. Qal. 3:478.
22. MaqKh. 1:417.
145
found to contain 1900 da.n.a.qa. shields and a similar
number of weapons, as well as banners, gold brocade

23
robes and other ceremonial items , and at various times
from 10-15,000 swords. This arsenal was apparently
mainly devoted to ceremonial equipment of the guards and
officers.
Finally, both military and ceremonial equipment for
horses and other mounts was kept in the kkZza.no. a.l-6u.suZj

24
(Saddle Treasury) . The kkZza.no. c.l-ta.ja.m m u.1 (Treasury
of Adornment) contained ceremonial weapons for the
nobles to carry in royal processions and could also
perhaps be considered an independent treasury, although
according to Ibn al-Tuwayr it was actually a part of the

25
kkZza.no. a.Z ~ iZ la.k
5.1.2 Cavalry
Although the Berber tribesmen who initially served
ae cavalry in the Fatimid army during their conquest of
23. MaqKh. 2:423-4.
24. Qal. 3:477.
25. Quoted by Qal. 3:477.
146
26
Egypt may have been for the most part lightly armed , a
significant portion of Fatimid cavalry adopted heavy
armour in later periods. About 1000 AD a Fatimid
cavalry regiment is described as "400 military slave

27
cavalry wearing KZza.gha.nd armour and helmets,
carrying swords and war maces ( I n t u i t ) , with

28
armour for their horses. " Nasir-i Khusrav's
description of the Fatimid army in 1060s confirms this
when he describes 10,000 cavalry, "with expensive
equipment. Each horse is covered with armour and a
helmet is placed on the pommel of the saddle along with

29
the other arms ." Usama noted that in a battle in 1144
the Fatimid army had "donned armour (mudaAn.ac ) for
combat." In 1163 6000 Fatimid cavalry are described as

30
having "costly armour and excellent weapons ." Some
Fatimid armour is described as being double strength,
26. According to Beshir "Fatimid Military" 38, 48.
27. I have emended the text from ka d h a g k a n d to

kazaghand.
28. IQal. 36.
29. Nasir-i Khusrav text p. 46. On Nasir's exaggeration

of numbers see App. B.
30. Maq. 3:267.
147
31
consisting of a fcaza.ghand covered by mail . With such
double strength armour and barding for horses, which was
uncommon among Frankish knights of this period, it is
not impossible that some Fatimid cavalry units were
actually more heavily armoured than their Frankish
opponents. This is not to say that all Fatimid cavalry
were as heavily armoured as those described above.
Certainly many of the irregular troops, lacking regular
pay and equipment distributions from the state would
have have been more lightly armed, some even altogether
unarmoured. Unfortunately it is not possible to
determine what proportion of the Fatimid cavalry were
lightly or heavily armed.
Smail asserts that "Mounted archers did not form

32
part of the Fatimid armies ," and that they therefore
did not make use of traditional Turkish mounted archer
tactics. Although the Fatimid use of Central Asian

33
dispersal tactics is somewhat problematic , there is
strong evidence that a significant number of Fatimid
cavalry served as mounted archers. Maqrizi states that
31. MaqKh. 2:417.
32. mail p. 8 6 .
33. See ch. 5.2.
148
when Bahram fled to upper Egypt in 1136 he was
accompanied by about 2000 " { a n t b n u m a t = mounted

34
archers ." Albert of Aix confirms the use of bows by
mounted Fatimid troops, when he states that the garrison
of Ascalon "sent forth men on horses, extraodinarily

35
skilled in the use of lance and bow ." Another
possible exampxe of Armenian horse archers comes from a
Fatimid expeditionary force which consisted of 400

_ - 36
Armenian archers and 700 SudanTs . It seems unlikely
that the Fatimid expeditionary force would have
consisted of only infantry, implying that perhaps some
of the Armenian archers were mounted. Furthermore, the
army was defeated in a battle in which all of the
Sudanis were killed and only 50 of the Armenians
escaped, which could best be explained if Sudanis were
on foot while the Armenians were mounted allowing them
34. Maq. 3:161. The reading is somewhat tenuous.

Technically it should read a l a y {a u L b .In a a rr.tn, with
tiamJLn in the genitive singular as opposed to n u m a ttn ,
the genitive plural. However, as noted by Wright, A
Gnamman o& t h e A r a b ic Language 2:239a, #103 rem., it is
not impossible for a l to be modified by a genitive
plural.
35. AA 10.10 p n a e m l6 e a u .n t v ln .06 I n equ.1 6 , la n c z a et

& a g .L tt l i ptfuUULz 6 lm o 6 . "
36. Hak 43/58.
149
37
to flee more easily to safety . Archery was also an
important part of the training of Fatimid cavalrymen.
MaqrizT mentions that in the days of al-Zahir the

_ ' 3 8
Hujariya cavalry regiments were trained in archery .
5.1.3 Infantry
Arabic sources make it clear that there were a
number of important types of infantry in the Fatimid
army. One group was armed with a type of war mace know
as the l i L t a t which had an "elongated head and an iron

39
shafts two cubits long (c. 3 feet), square in form ."
40
The l a t i i t was used by cavalry , as well as by Sudani
infantrymen. Albert describes the "Azoparts," or
Sudanis as fighting "marshalled in the middle of the
thousands of pagans armed with maces like hammers
37. Hak. 44/59.
38. MaqKh. 1:423. On the Hujariya as cavalry see ch.

3.2.3. The tactical role of these horse archers will be
discussed in section 5.2.
39. Qal. 3:473; He is here only describing the soldiers

on parade with the Caliph who would undoubtedly have
been armed, if not with better weapons, at least with
more expensive and beautiful one. However, a general
picture of the types of infantry in the Fatimid soldiers
can be obtained from his description.
40. IQal. 36, describes cavalrymen armed with the L u p L t.
150
composed of iron and lead, (they) attacked the king and
his men striking not only the knights, but also their
41
horses, on their heads and other limbs with blows ."
On another occasion these Sudani Azoparts were armed
with "a terrible iron mace penetrating both mail and
helmets, striking horses on their heads, and causing a

42
great clamor in the ranks of the faithful . These
43
"maces composed of iron and lead shaped like hammers ",
correspond perfectly with al-Qalqashandi's description
of the Z u t u t as
heavy iron war-maces with shafts a
44
yard long and square elongated heads , which would have
appeared much like the "hammers" by which Albert
describes the Azoparts' maces.
An important group of Sudani infantrymen are
described as armed with "600 javelins with polished
heads ... and 300 daaaqa shields with silver bosses.
41. AA 9.4, " iu 6 Z b u & , i n modum m a lle .0A.um ie.A.n.0 e t

pZumbo z o m p o 6 it i6 .
42. AA 6.46, Albert actually uses the word i l a g e . l l a

here, meaning whip, but as it is apparently the same
weapon and tactic described above, and since a whip
could hardly be expected to penetrate armour as here
described, I take it to be a mace.
43. AA 9.4.
44. Qal. 3:473.
151
These were carried in the procession by 300 black slaves

45
each slave with two javelins and a shield ." The
existence of javelin armed Sudani infantrymen in battle
is confirmed by the Latin sources. William of Tyre
mentions a "countless host of infantry trained to throw

46
the javelin. " and Baldwin was wounded by a Sudani
47
javelin thrower
Archers and crossbowmen also formed an important
element among the Fatimid infantry. Of 8000 infantry
present during a military review, only iCOO were

48
archers, armed with both bows and crossbows . In
49
another review of 5000 infantry 500 were crossbowmen
The role of the Sudanis as archers of the Fatimids has
occasionally been exaggerated by modern scholars.
SudSnl troops are found serving in all types of infantry
45. Qal. 3:473.
46. WT 12.6.
47. FC 2.24.1.
48. MaqKh. 1: 3 8 9 b , 1000 infantry archers with hand bows

and foot bows a .l-a.njU Ll = crossbows"; see Huuri pp.
94, 208)
49. Qal. 3:508. These crossbowmen were specifically

mentioned as being marines from the fleet, and it may
have been that some of the other 5000 infantry were also
archers.
152
regiments, most often appearing in the sources bearing
javelins or maces. In fact, it was not the Sudanis, but
the Armenians who were well known among the Fatimids as
excellent archers, and are occasionally simply called

50
" qavoi = bow ." The Armenians who supported Bahram
claimed that they were "A thousand archers (qaw&)
capable of conquering the world to the gates of

51
Constantinople Maqrizi states that all Armenian
52
soldiers were archers , and it may well be that during
the period of al-Afdal it was the Armenians rather than
the Sudanis who monopolized archery in the Fatimid
army.
The exact nature of the weaponry of another regiment
is somewhat ambiguous, in that it could be considered
either infantry or cavalry. They are only said to be
armed with pikes seven cubits (c. 11-12 feet) long, on
the top of which was lance head with a neck of iron.
50. Hak. 43/58, 44/59 says that the Fatimids sent 400
qau)6 aiLman and 700 Sudanis to Yaman.
51. IMuqq. 3.1:31/49.
52. Maq. 3:313. The incident refers to the riots of

1168-9.
153
53
These were carried by a group known as the baitZnJiya. ."
Other infantry were armed with "small dafincia. shields and

54
swords. The Fatimids also apparently had slingers
55
among there troops, as described by Albert of Aix , and
there are numerous references to stones being cast at
the Franks during sieges, some of which may also have
come from slings.
This discussion should not be thought of as a
necessarily complete description of all types of Fatimid
infantry. However, it is sufficient to show that the
infantry were not simply a mass of archers waiting to be

56
ridden down by the Franks . They included a large
range of infantry types organized for specific tactical
purposes, including archers, slingers, crossbowmen and
javelin throwers as missile troops, pikemen, and men
armed with swords and heavy maces for defensive lines
53. Qal. 3:473. There is perhaps some relationship

between these infantry and the SatiaiyJL described by
Nasir-i Khusrav tr. p. 217. However, the later are said
tobe drawn from many countries, each fighting with
their own weapons as opposed to being solely pikemen
here described.
54. Qal. 3:473. Ekkehard 17.8/178 mention "Moorish"

swords among the Frankish booty.
55. AA 6.46.
56. As described by Smail p. 86-7.
154
and close combat. Additional discussion of the tactical
functions of these troops will be presented in section
5.2.
Although there is no detailed information concerning
uniforms, al-Qalqashandi also includes some interesting
descriptions of the banners and standards of the army,
from, which some idea of the oomo and color of a Fatimid

" 57*
army on the march can be seen :
"The two most important banners are known

as the 'Two Standards of Praise (to God).'
They are on two tall lances inlaid with joints
of gold up to their lance.heads. Their flags
are of white silk striped with gold ...
(carried) by two amTrs assigned to bear them.
In addition there are two lances with a
crescent moon of gold on the top of each with
seven silk pennants of red and yellow ...
Theyjwere carried by two horsemen from the
Sibyan al-khass. Behind them was a narrow
many colored banner of stripped silk upon
which was written, 'Victory is from God' and
'Conquest in Near!'. The length of each of
these banners was two cubits and the width was
a cubit and a half."
The Latin sources also mention the trumpets and

53
drums which accompanied the Fatimid battle array
57. Qal. 3:473.
58. WT 11.13; AA 6.41. Examples could be further

multiplied.
5.2 Tactics
The study of Fatimid tactics against the Crusaders
has been virtually ignored . There are two basic
sources of information which can be utilized to help
clarify this subject. The first is an examination of
how the Latin and Arabic chronicles describe Fatimid
actions in battle. This type of analysis is complicated
by the fact that there are only a few detailed
references to Fatimid tactical military actions in
battle and these are usually ambiguous.
A second source of information comes from the Arabic
military manuals. However, the study of these crucial
documents is fraught with difficulties. Although there
have been some attempts to identify the surviving
manuscripts of the various Arabic and Persian military
manuals, these efforts are incomplete and sometimes
1. Smail pp. 86-7 devotes three paragraphs to the

subject, Beshir another three, pp. 51-3.
2. Mercier pp. 431ff; Ritter; Scanlon pp. 1-21 reviews

the work of these two scholars and adds a number of
other manuscripts as well.
156
2
contradictory . Only a handful of these manuals have
3
been published, and, excepting the field of archery ,
there has been only preliminary study of the technical

4
vocabulary and military techniques they describe . Thus
it must be emphasized that the discussion of these
manuals which follows should be considered as a
tentative attempt to shed some much needed light on

C
Muslim military tactics during the Crusades .
Although most of the military manuals which have
survived date, at least in their current form, to after
the thirteenth century, it is clear from the fJLhnJL&t of
Ibn Nadlm, that by the ninth century military science of

6
the Muslims was already highly developed , and dependent
in part on even earlier Sassanian, Greek and Indian
3. See Latham SaA.a.ce.n Au c h ttiy and Far is Atiab Afic .h ttiy .

It is somewhat remarkable that so much scholarly
attention has been paid to archery while the other
branches of Muslim military science have been totally
ignored.
> 4. Tantum, "Muslim Warfare," Wustenfeld, "Das Heerwesen

der Muhammedaner" both deal with the NZhauaX a Z - S u ' l .
See also Rabie, "Training" and Ayalon, "Furuslya."
5. The author is currently preparing a more detailed

study and translation of these documents.
6 . Ibn Nadim tr. pp. 2:737-8.
7
military theory . This military tradition was
transferred and transformed throughout the Islamic
world, until the thirteenth century when a significant
disjunction occurred in Muslim military theory in the
Middle East and Egypt, at which time the extensive use
of professional infantry was essentially curtailed in
favor of forces composed mainly of mounted Mamluk

8
archers . Due to this disjunction there are many
problems in attempting to utilize post thirteenth
century material for the study of pre-thirteenth century
tactics and theory, when armies still utilized large

9
bodies of professional infantry . Nonetheless, there
are a number of important documents related to Fatimid
military theory in the twelfth century which can provide
7. Ibn Nadim includes in his list works from Greek,

Sassanian and Indian sources. Tantum and Wustenfeld
discuss the relationship to Greek sources, specifically
Aelian's T a c t Z c a . Neither recognizes the dependence on
Sassanian military theory. For example, the passage in
U ih K y a t BM Add. 18866 fol. 208, translated by Tantum p.
199 is directly based_on an Arabic translation of the
Sassanian K<UGLb a l - A y i n found in Ibn Qutayba 1:113-4.
8 . Ayalon's many articles best trace this phenomenon.
9. Of course much of the material in the later manuals

represents quotations and paraphrases from earlier
documents. However, until the exact relationships
between the dozens of texts can be established, it is
dangerous to attempt to trace lines of thought and
development from earlier periods.
158
important new information.
An important document is the Mu.khta.6a.

k Si.ya.6dt
al-Hurub by al-Harthami, an abridgement of an earlier
text written for the Caliph al-Ma'mun in the early ninth

10
century . This manual, although very terse and
sometimes confusing, gives numerous details of military
tactics and theory which can be seen clearly reflected
in Fatimid military activities. The great Fatimid
scholar al-Qadi al-Nucma' wrote a text on the
propagation of Ismacilism, the Vaâ'im al-J6lam, which
contains a chapter on jihad detailing some of the battle
tactics of the Fatimids of the late tenth cen'-ury. Two
important military documents of the late twelfth
century, written under the patronage of Saladin, also
contain many items of interest for the study of-Fatimid
military theory. The first is a manual of military
theory written by cAli ibn Abi Bakr al-Harawi and the
second a discussion of arms and armour by al-TarsusI.
Unfortunately none of these documents is precisely
contemporary with early twelfth century Fatimid Egypt.
10. According to cAbd al-Ru'uf cAwn, the editor of

al-HarthamT, the Siya6at is an abridgement of the Kitab
&Z al~FusuL6Zya wa haml ai-6ilah listed in Ibn al-NadTm
2:737.
However, although there may have been significant
changes and differences in military organization and
practice between different decades and places, a
comparison of the outlines of the military theory
described in the manuals with the few available
descriptions of Fatimid tactics on the battlefield can
reveal at least the general pattern of the Fatimid
military theory and tactics employed against the
Crusaders.
Although the details are unknown, it is clear that
the Fatimids had a sophisticated system of training, at
least for the elite regiments of the regular troops.
The only detailed description of the training method is
recorded by Maqrizi concerning the days of al-Zahir.
'"Barracks ( k u j t i a ) were established for mamluks in which
they were taught in different branches of (military)
knowledge, and (the use) of different types of
instruments of war, and types of military theory,

11
including archery, lance play, racing, and others
Similar barracks for training and housing soldiers had
been established as early as the days of al-Mucizz and
11. MaqKh. 1:423.
160
12
later reorganized by al-Afdal . Beshir believes that
these Fatimid training centers were based on earlier

13
cAbbasid and Aghlabid models . The actual training
methods and exercises probably differed in detail, but a
general idea of the wide range of military training can
be seen from later Mamluk military manuals, including
horsemanship, dozens of different techniques of fighting
with lances both mounted and on foot, group training for
military maneuvers, various mounted and foot archery and
crossbow techniques, fencing, wrestling and the use of

14.
maces, axes and shields
Military strategy and tactics were formalized and
highly developed, and probably systematically taught to

15
Fatimid officers . The importance of proper
reconnaissance and scouting is emphasized in Muslim
12. MaqKh. 1:443.
13. Beshir "Fatimid Military" pp. 46-8.
14. The contents of many of these manuals, most of which

are still unpublished, are summarized by Rabie,
"Training," and Ayalon, "Furusiya."
15. According to MaqKh. 1:423 training included

"different branches of (military) knowledge" (anu)cic
as well as the use of weapons.
161
16
military theory . Al-Afdal's failure to follow this
principle is probably the major reason for his
disastrous defeat at Ascalon in 109S. The building of
camps fortified with trenches is advised whenever the

17
army is marching within five days of the enemy . There
is no evidence that the Fatimids practiced this policy
in their campaigns in Palestine, but this may be because
they were never much more than a day's march from
Ascalon which could have served the same strategic and

18
tactical function as a fortified camp
Complex methods of organizing the army are described
in the military manuals. The army is divided into three
major corps, known as the Right, Left and Center, each
of which in turn is divided into three divisions, again

19
called the right, center and left When describing,
for instance, the Right division, the texts refer to the
"right of the Right" or the right division of the Right
16. Nucman p. 369; Harawi ch. 12, p. 79; HarthamT ch. 9,

pp. 23-5.
17. Harthami ch. 10, p. 25; Nuriman p. 369.
18. Fatimid practice on the march probably resembled

more the description in HarawT ch. 14, p. 87, which does
not mention fortifying campsites with a ditch.
19. HarthamT ch. 11, p. 26; Nuînan p. 372.
162
corps, the "center of the Right" and so on. The same
general organizational pattern was followed by the later

20
Mamluks . To these were added the Vanguard and the
Rearguard, each of which could have additional
subdivision; the Vanguard including scouts, flying

21
columns, and skirmishers , while the Rearguard
22
including army reserves, and baggage . Thirty
different tactical functions of regiments are outlined

_23
by al -Karthami . The best troops were to be placed in
the front ranks, the Right corps, on the far flanks, and
in a reserve division to exploit weaknesses in the enemy

24
formation . The least experienced were assigned to
20. Described by Ayalon, "Harb," pp. 186-7. In my

discussion I will attempt to distinguish between the
major divisions of an army in corps from the smaller
divisions by capitalizing the words Right, Left and
Center when referring to the major divisions.
21. Harthamich. 11.2, p. 26.
22. H a r t h a m T ch. 19.3, p. 36, ch. 2 2 .2 , p. 39.
23r H a r t h a m T ch. 11 .2 , pp. 26-7, in c l u d i n g a number of

types of scouts, flying columns, rear a n d flank guards,
heavy a nd elite cavalry, ambushers, inf a n t r y in close
m a r s h a l l e d ranks, etc. Unfortunately there is no
e l a b o r ation as to the specific r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of each
group.
24. H a r t h a m T ch. 2 0 .1 , p. 36-7.
163
25
guard the baggage , while the "unreliable cavalry
should be placed in the rear of the Left Corps so that
if God grants victory over the enemy they can advance to

26
capture his army there is no other use for them
Specific duties and commands were assigned to various
officers, ranging from a highly formalized system as

_21
described by a l - H a r t h a m T to the practice of assigning
leaders and positions for regiments only on che day of

_ 28
battle as described by ai-Qidi al-Nuînan . Although it
is clear from Muslim chronicles that the Fatimids
divided their armies into three major corps as described
above, it is impossible to specifically confirm any of
the other organizational details.
It is possible to gain an accurate idea of the
method of marshalling infantry from the manuals.
Al-HarthamT only mentions that the infantry should
precede the cavalry in battle "in ranks and types
25. HarthamT ch. 2 0 .1 , p. 37, ch. 2 1 .6 , p. 38.
26. HarthamT ch. 2 2 .6 , p. 39.
27. Harthami 21.5, pp. 37-8.
28. Nucman p. 372 "cAlT, when he advanced into battle,

marshalled the regiments (k a ta .1i b ) and divided the tribes
placing a man in command of each tribe to order the
ranks and organize the cavalry regiments (kcuuLdj .&),
after which he advanced into battle."
164
29
according to their practice ," without giving any of
the additional details which the unabridged version

30
probably contained . Al-Harawi adds that "the
infantry, archers, bowmen, naphta throwers and javelin

31
throwers should precede the cavalry
32
Al-Qadi al-NuSian gives the fullest description ,
saying that heavy infantry wearing j a v i t h a n armour or
mail, armed with shields and pikes should be placed in
the front ranks of the infantry, behind whom were placed
archers. If attacked the armoured infantry in the front
ranks were ordered to "kneel on your knees and hide
behind your shields in tight solid ranks ( acl mukfcam)
without any gaps." Then they were to "raise up their
pikes, and stand firm and patient; the archers are to
shower the enemy with arrows. They should wave their
O Q
aV
Uar*f
t i M *
0 1 1*
te
r\
^
*30
W /
30. He does later add that "the infantry archers

( a l - n a j j a i a a l - n a s h Z b a ) should jorecede (the cavalry)
loosing their arrows." Harthami 24.3 p. 41.
31. H a r a w T ch. 20 p._99, "ia y a t a q a d d a m ca l a a l - k h a y y a i a

a l - n a j i a l a via a l - m i m a t via a l - n a b b a l a via a t - z a w i a q u n via
a t- h *a tu ia b a ."
32. All of the following material in this paragraph is
paraphrased from Numan p. 373.
165
33
banners and beat their shields The ranks of the
infantry were to hold their positions until the enemy
was in full retreat, after which they were to engage the
enemy in melee.
This infantry tactic is closely paralleled by an
eleventh century account of Andalusian Muslim infantry
in battle by al-Turtushl, which coincides with all the
specifics of al-Qadi a l - N u ^ a n s description, but is
worth quoting in full for its additional details and

34
clarity :
"The infantry, armed with large shields,

long pikes and sharp tipped javelins, form the
first ranks, taking their positions with their
pikes thrust into the ground behind them and
the points aimed at the enemy, each man
kneeling on the ground on his left knee with
his shield in front of him. Behind them are
marshalled the elite archers whose arrows can
pierce armour; behind them are the cavalry.
When the Christians ( a i - t u i m ) attack the
Muslims the infantry do not move from their
place and no man advances in front of
another. When the enemy draws near the
archers loose their arrows and the infantry
throw their javelins and take up their pikes.
They then go to the right and the left and the
Muslim cavalry charges between the archers and
the infantry."
33. Nufman 373. The details of this tactic occur in two

sections separated by admonitions to hold firm in the
ranks, making the entire procedure somewhat unclear.
34. TurtushT pp. 309-10.
166
That this was a standard Fatimid infantry tactic is
confirmed by a passage from Albert of Aix where he
describes the Egyptian tactics. "The Sudanis, whose
custom in war is to kneel on the ground, advanced
forward to battle, violently attacking the Franks with a

35
hail of arrows This has usually been interpreted as
meaning that the Sudani infantry knelt down to loose

36
their bows . In view of the above description of
infantry tactics known to the Fatimids, it seems certain
that the Albert's informant saw the front ranks of the
Fatimid infantry kneeling, while the archers behind the
heavy infantry were loosing volleys of arrows,
slingstones and javelins as described in the military
manuals.
. Smail maintains that "With a mass of bowmen on foot
... the Fatimid armies provided, as the Turks never
did, a solid target for the most powerful tactical
weapon of the Franks: the charge of the mailed and
35. AA 6.46, "Nam Az opa.A t, q u i & l e x i 4 ge.ni.bu.4 4uo motit

b e l lu m 4 o l e n t e o m m it t e A e , pAM.etni.44i, i n ^ A o n te b e l l i
g A a .v ite A 4a .g iX ta .w m g A a n d in e G a l l o 4 im p u g n a v e A u n t ."
36. Oman 1:290.
167
37
mounted knights implying that the Fatimid infantry
were generally easily broken and defeated by the

38
knights . In reality, the Fatimid infantry, when
properly marshalled and supported by cavalry, formed a
formidable barrier to the Frankish knights. It is most
unfortunate that the battle of Ascalon is used by Smail,
and many other historians as the major example of the

39 40
Fatimid army in actions . As will be discussed , the
Fatimid army was completely surprised at Ascalon and
their defeat there, the most grievous of the entire war
with the Crusaders, should not be taken as the norm for
the Fatimid army in battle, any more than the Frankish
defeats at the battles of Mersivar, 1101 , Ramla 1102 ,
Harran 1104, or Ager Sanguinus 1119, should be seen as
the norm for Frankish arn.;es in battle.
At Ramla in 1101 the Fatimid army was able to
sustain four charges of the supposedly invincible
Frankish knights in a battle which ended in a tactical
draw. At Ramla in 1102 the Fatimid army repelled a
37. Smail pp. 86-7.
38. Smail pp. 87, 174-7
39. Smail pp. 87, 74-5.
40. See 7.1.
168
massive charge by the knights, culminating'in the
complete defeat of the Frankish army, while at Ramla in
1105 the Fatimid infantry were defeated only after they

41
had been deserted by their Damascene cavalry allies
Albert of Aix makes mention on two occasions of the
great skill and deadly effectiveness of the Sudani heavy
infantry armed with the l u u mace against the Frankish

42
knights . Thus although in certain circumstances the
Fatimid infantry could be defeated and overrun by
Frankish knights, (just as the Frankish knights and
infantry, or any other army could be defeated), in
different circumstances they managed to thwart the
knight's attack, and there seems little justification to
conclude with Smail that "the charge alone secured a

43
Latin victory Despite the general excellence of
Smail's work, the fact that many of the Arabic sources
were not available to him on occasion distorts his
usually illuminating analysis. For example, when the
41. See chs. 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5 for discussions of each of
these battles.
42. AA 6.46 mentions them "penetrating mail and helm and

attacking the heads of the horses." AA 9.4, and ch.
5.1.3.
43. Smail p. 175,
Fatimid infantry at Ramla in 1102 defeated the charge of
the knights he writes, "the (Egyotian) enemy mass

44
absorbed the charge of the leading squadrons " seeming
to imply that there were just too many Fatimids for the
Franks to kill the*all, while when the Frankish infantry
performed well .at Jaffa in 1102 it was "by virtue of
that defensive ability to be displayed throughout the
century by bodies of armed, dismounted Franks in close

45
formation
There were a number of different formations and
methods for attacking discussed in the military
manuals. Three general formations are mentioned: the
straight ranks (mu&c.u)a) in which all of the troops
formed up parallel to the enemy; the crescent ( h i l a l Z ) ,
with the two flanks were extended closer to the enemy
than the center; and the recurved (m a ct u O , with the
Right and Left corps withdrawn and the Center closest to
the enemy, which was considered the weakest

46
formation . Fulcher witnessed the Fatimid use of the
crescent formation at Ascalon in 1099, when the
44. Smail p. 176.
45. Smail p. 177.
46. Harthami ch. 17, pp. 34-6.
1 70
Egyptians "approached our army like a stag thrusting

47
forward the branches of his antlers
Scouts and ambushers were to advance in front of the
main army and take the high ground, groves of trees and
sources of water, prevent enemy ambushes, prepare
ambushes against the enemy and cut off the enemy from
48
water . Strong cavalry regiments were posted on the
extreme wings of the Right and Left corps to prevent the
enemy from accomplishing flanking maneuvers and
attacking the baggage. Reserve cavalry regiments were
marshalled behind the main battle line to fill gaps in
the ranks, reinforce weak areas, and to attack gaps or
weaknesses in the enemy's army. The unreliable cavalry
were held in reserve on the left flank and used to
pursue the enemy's army after it has been routed.
Offensive actions were preceded by volleys of

49
archery and naphta with flanking attacks by the light
cavalry. The main attack began with the troops of the
right flank and center. If this attack failed and the
47. FC 1.31.6.
48. This entire paragraph is a summary of Harthami ch.

22, p. 39.
49. This paragraph summarizes Harthami ch. 24, pp. 41-4.
171
army was forced to retreat each regiment was to remain
in its relative position to the other regiments and
retreat to its former position in the main battle line.
Latin sources clearly reveal that some variation of this
general procedure was generally followed by the
Fatimids. Missile volleys are mentioned as preceding

50
the general engagement and attempts by Fatimid
cavalry units to outflank the Frankish army and strike

51
them in the rear are common
Dr. Smail, in his discussion of Fatimid tactics,
makes the important point that the Egyptians "did not
use dispersal as a tactical device, and therefore

52
offered a solid target for the Latin charge ."
However, this was not, as Smail claims, because the

53
Fatimids "were not an army of mounted archers ." As
discussed above, the Fatimids indeed had regiments of

54
regular mounted archers and utilized Turkish
50. AA 6:46.
51. FC 1.31.6 at Ascalon 1099, FC 2.21.10 at Jaffa 1102,

FC 2.32.6 at Ramla in 1105.
52. Smail p. 174.
53. Ibid.
54. See 3.1.1 and 5.1.2.
172
55
mercenary mounted archers on occasion as well . Thus
although Smail's point that the Fatimids did not fully
utilize the fluid nomadic mounted archer tactics is well
taken, the decisive factor underlying difference in
tactics was not whether they did or did not include
mounted archers, but that the Fatimid army contained a
large body of professional infantry who were unable to
avoid the Frankish knights' charge by dispersal.
Fatimid mounted archers could utilize their mounted
archery techniques in a number of ways, but if they
dispersed when faced with a Frankish charge they would

56
leave their infantry to be surrounded and overrun
Another point of confusion needs to be clarified.
Smail maintains that "the fact that on other occasions
the Egyptian forces outflanked the Latins was a
consequence not of mounted archery, but of numerical

57
superiority ." As discussed previously, question of
55. See 3.1.3 and 3.3.2.
56. As occurred at Ramla in 1105 when the allied Turks

from Damascus dispersed when attacked by the Frankish
knights leaving the main body of infantry to be
defeated, FC 2.32.6-7, and at the battle of Ramla in
1123, FC 3.18.4.
57. Smail, p. 8 6 .
1 73
58
numerical superiority is somewhat problematic . But
even if the Fatimids on occasion outnumbered the Franks,
this alone would not insure that they would have
outflanked them. The area occupied by the front of an
army is dependent not only on the number of men in a
force, but the density of deployment, the number of
ranks per unit, the proportions of cavalry to infantry,
and the number of units held in reserve. Thus even if
the Fatimids outnumbered the Franks in a given battle it
is not certain they would have outflanked them.
Although the view of the Latin chroniclers may be that
Fatimid flanking maneuvers were due solely to numerical
superiority, the military theory described above clearly
indicates that cavalry flanking attacks was a standard
tactical practice of Muslim armies.
5.3 Sieqecraft
Until the development of effective gunpowder siege
artillery the general pattern of siegecraft remained
58. See ch. 3.4 for a general discussion and chapter 7

for detailed analysis, of five major battles.
174
quite similar throughout the Middle East during the
Islamic period, and this pattern generally holds true

1
for the warfare of the Crusades . However unlike the
Latin West, Muslim military theorists formally described
a number of principles of siegecraft, most of which are
clearly reflected in the recorded activities of the
Fatimid army during sieges. This general pattern of
siegecraft will be outlined here and highlighted with
examples from the military manuals and from actual
Fatimid activities during sieges.
In offensive siegecraft the easiest way to capture a
city is to avoid a siege altogether. This can be done
best by unexpectedly striking a city with a force of

2
cavalry , or by drawing out most of the garrison of the
3
city into an ambush . Opportunities should be taken to
strike at cities when they can be surprised, the
garrison is weak or they are known to be low on supplies
1. See Smail's excellent chapter on castles in warfare

pp. 204-244.
2. Harthami, ch. 34.4, p. 57. This type of surprise

attack was attempted by the Fatimids against Jaffa in
1115, FC 2.53.7.
3. HarthamT, ch. 34.5, p. 57. This was probably the "

Fatimid intent when they withdrew from their initial
blockade of Jaffa in the summer of 1102. See 7.4.
175
4
and water .
If a siege is necessary it is vital to completely
sever the city from all enemy communications and

5
supplies . The citizens should always be given a chance
for surrender, for even if this fails it will tend to
create a pro-peace faction within the city and undermine

6
morale . Attempts to bribe some of the citizens or
7
garrison into betraying the fortress are also advised .
Careful inspection and spying should be undertaken to
learn of the weaknesses and strengths of the
fortifications and the most effective places for
mangonel bombardments, archery, assaults, and the
4. Harawi, ch. 21, p. 102. The attacks on Jaffa in 1115

and 1123 both took advantage of the temporary absence of
the Latin field army.
5. Harthami, ch. 34.6, p. 57. This is specifically

mentioned at the siege of Alexandria in 1095, Maa. 3:14.
6 . Harthami, ch. 34.7-8, p. 57, as at Jerusalem in 1098

when the townspeople were given a chance to surrender
before the siege began (IQal. 135, IMuy. 6 6 ), and later
a group of them surrendered a gate of the city to
al-Afdal's troops, ITagh. 5:159.5-7.
7. Harawi, ch. 21, p. 102. Al-Afdal's activities during

the siege of Alexandria in 1095 are a good example of _
this, when he bribed members of the Banu Hadid and Banu
Haritha clans to aid him against the Nizari rebels.
IZhaf. 85; IDaw. 6:446.
176
8
placement of ladders or towers . Troops and equipment
of many different types should be gathered, inspected

g
and given speciric assignments . Trenches should be dug
surrounding the city for the defense of the

10
besiegers . A major effort of the besiegers should be
to break the morale of the city bringing about surrender
and avoiding the costly necessity of an assault by

11
storm . General assaults should be undertaken by the
finest warriors bearing heavy armour, large shields,
excellent equipment, spears or long pikes, and naphta.
Ladders, ropes, towers, rams and penthouses are to be

12
prepared for assaults .
In defending a city or fortress, the first general
principle is to try to avoid sieges in any way possible,
usually by negotiations. There were probably two main
purposes behind such negotiations. First,-it was
certainly much cheaper to pay a relatively small tribute
8 . Harthami, 34.10-14, p. 58; Harawi, ch. 21, p. 106.

Al-Afdal was said to have mustered 40 Mangonels for his
siege of Jerusalem in 1098. IAth. 10:283; Maq. 3:22.
9. Harthami, ch. 34.16-17, p. 59.
10. Harthami, ch. 34.23, p. 60.
11. Harthami, ch. 34.21, p. 60; Harawi, ch. 21, p. 103.
12. Harawi, ch. 21, pp. 105-6.
177
to an attacking army than to be forced to endure a siege
which would undoubtedly result in the death of a number
of citizens, the destruction of a great deal of
property, economic losses, and potentially the J-!js of
the entire city. Fatimid governors managed to avoid
sieges at Ascalon in 1099 and Sidon in 1106 by paying
bribes to the Franks. The Fatimids basic strategy
during the initial period of 1099-1101of seeking a
negotiated peace with the Franks could also be thought
of as being in part attempts to avoid sieges by

13
negotiation
If a siege became inevitable a number of precautions
should be taken before the enemy arrives. A conference
of war with the officers of the garrison and leading
townspeople *as necessary, both to assign duties and so
the commander can gain insights from the opinions of his

14
officers . The walls and fortifications of the city or
castle were to be carefully inspected and put in
excellent repair. Military equipment such as crossbows,
13. See ch. 6.1.
14. Harawi, ch. 23, p. 109.
178
15
naphta, mangonels and ammunition should be collected,
16
prepared and stored . The quality and equipment of the
17
troops is also to be carefully inspected . Officers
were to be assigned over each gate, tower, wali and

18
postern . The importance of the morale of the
defenders is well understood by the military theorists.
"The chief weapon of the besieged ... is the

19
encouragement of the defenders ." Buildings in the
suburbs of the city which could be used for protection
of the attackers should be destroyed and all wood,
stones and other material of potential use to the
attackers should be taken away, and water sources

20
outside the city should be blocked . Artisans and
other citizens of the city should also be actively
15. On types of mangonels and other siege equipment see

TarsusI, 118-122; French tr. Cahen, "Traite
d'armurerie," pp. 141-5 and notes and illustrations pp.
157-9; partial Enalish translation in Lewis, I6iam
1:118-23.
16. Harawi, ch. 23, p. 109; Harthami, ch. 35.1, pp.

60-1.
17. Harawi, ch. 23, p. 110.
18. Harthami, ch. 35.8, p. 162.
19. Harthami, ch. 35, p. 61.
20. Harawi, ch. 23, p. 110.
179
employed in the defense of the city so that "there'no one
capable of working at a useful task who is not employed

21
in it
The importance of ruses and strategems is
emphasized. The commander should spread false rumors
among the enemy camp telling them of traitors among
their ranks, raids and attacks against their home bases,
and the impending arrival of large relief armies for the

22
garrison . Every attempt should be made to make the
enemy believe that the strong points of the walls are
actually the weakest, thereby drawing the main enemy

23
attacks on the strongest towers and walls .
Effort should be made to destroy or neutralize the
siege equipment of the enemy. The range and effect of
each weapon should be understood, and the commander
"should not launch a missile or use a weapon unless he

24
is sure he will injure his enemy with it Missile
21. Harthami, ch. 35.9, p. 62.
22. Harawi, ch. 23, p. 110-1. The Faînuds at Tyre in

managed to spread a false rumor of the approach of a
large non-existent Fatimid fleet from Egypt, WT 13.9.
23. Harthami, ch. 35.7, pp. 61-2, ch. 35.10, p. 62.
24. Harthami, ch. 35.4, p. 61, cf. the sorties of the

Fatimids during the siege of Tyre in 1124, FC 3.32.1.
1 80
fire, naphta and mangonel bombardments should be
constant. Sorties against the enemy camp should be
employed with caution lest the army be drawn into an

25
ambush This brief survey of some of the highlights
of the military manuals unfortunately excludes many
other interesting details of defensive siegecraft, but
is sufficient to shew that the Fatimids had access to
some sophisticated manuals and thinking on the subject.
If the Fatimid siegecraft, both offensive and -
defensive, was as well developed as this discussion
would seem to indicate, why did they eventually lose all
of the Palestinian maritime cities by siege to the
Franks, and fail to permanently recapture any of those

26
which had been conquered ? There are a number of
subtle factors underlying the Frankish success in

27
siegecraft in Palestine which deserve consideration
If the actual sieges undertaken by each side are
25. Harthami, ch. 35.4, p. 61; Harawi, ch. 23, pp.

113-5.
26. The Fatimids only managed to retake Ramla in 1102,

but abandoned it after their defeat at Jaffa a few
months later.
27. The general reasons for the Crusader conquest of

Palestine will be dealt with more extensively in ch.
6.2. Here only the perspective of sieges is discussed.
numbered and compared, we find that of the seventeen
major sieges of the Crusaders against Fatimid held

28 ' 29
cities, nine succeeded and eight failed . Of the
seven major Fatimid sieges undertaken during this same

30 31
period, four succeeded while three failed . The
overall success rate at offensive siegecraft of the

32
Fatimids and Franks is essentially the same . There
are nonetheless some significant differences in the
patterns of sieges during this period which can help
account for the eventual Frankish strategic triumph.
28. Jerusalem 1099, Haifa 1100, Arsuf 1101, Caesarea

1101, Acre 1104, Tripoli 1109, Beirut 1110, Sidon 1110,
Tyre 1124.
29. Ascalon 1099, Arsuf 1100, Ascalon 1102, Acre 1103,

Sidon 1106, Sidon 1108, Tyre 1108, Tyre 1111.
30. Alexandria 1095, Tyre 1097, Jerusalem 1098, Ramla

1102. Only the last of these was against the Crusaders.
31. Sieges of Jaffa in 1102, 1115 and "123. I am not

here including the naval blockade of Jaffa in 1103 as an
actual siege since the land forces under Taj al-cAjam
did not assist leaving almost no hope for success, nor
the FStimid forays against Jerusalem and other cities
which were little more than plundering raids or attempts
to divert the Franks from other sieges rather than
serious attempts at conquest.
32. In defensive siegecraft the pattern is quite

different. The Fatimids successfully defended their
cities against the Franks seven out of fifteen times,
while the Crusaders defeated Fatimid siege attempts
three out of four times.
182
First, the Crusaders simply undertook twice as many
sieges as the Fatimids attacking a total of 11 different
major Fatimid cities. The Fatimids only attempted four
sieges against the Crusaders, three of which were
against Jaffa alone. Another very significant factor is
that most Crusader sieges succeeded before 3 m ci J 0 E*
Fatimid relief army was able to arrive from Egypt
allowing the Franks to carry out their siege attempts
essentially without interference. Fatimid relief armies
required about two months to muster and arrive in

33
Palestine . The strategic result of this fact is that
five of the eight Frankish victories in siegecraft were
concluded in less than two months, before the arrival of

34
a major Fatimid relief army from Egypt was possible
Furthermore, Tripoli in 1109 received no assistance
because of Fatimid negligence and apathy, nor did Tyre
in 1123-4 because the Fatimid fleet had been largely
destroyed by the Venetians at a naval battle at Ascalon
in 1122. On the other hand, Fatimid siege attempts
33. See 5.2.
34. The following Frankish sieges were successfully

concluded in less than two months: Jerusalem 1099 after
40 days; Haifa 1100 after about one week; Arsuf 1101 in
2 weeks; Caesarea 1101 after 2 weeks; Acre 1104 3 weeks;
Sidon 1110 after six to eight weeks.
183
aiways had to be preceded by either by the elimination
of the Crusader field army in battle, or by its
preoccupation elsewhere in another battle or siege

35
siege ,
The Fatimids could effectively only strike at Jaffa
and Ramla, which were therefore the only cities the
Crusaders needed to seriously defend in that region. A
siege of Jerusalem, without first eliminating the
Frankish field army and reducing Ramla or Jaffa, would
have be extremely difficult since it would leave the
Fatimid besieging army perilously surrounded by strong
enemy bases and with a tenuous supply and communication
line back to Ascalon. Jerusalem could not be
effectively assaulted until most of the other southern
cities of Palestine were in Fatimid hands. On the other
hand, every Fatimid city in Palestine was in equal
potential peril from Frankish assault, and it was
militarily and economically impossible for the Fatimids
to defend them all adequately at all times. Thus the
Franks were able to pick and chose the cities they would
35. The sieges of Ramla ad Jaffa 1102 followed the

defeat of the Frankish army at Ramla. The sieges of
Jaffa in 1123 was an attempt to relieve the siege of
Tyre by drawing off Franks to defend Jaffa.
184
attack, while being required to defend only a narrow

36
zone against the Fatimids
The Franks were also substantially more fortunate in
their sieges than the Fatimids. Jaffa would most likely
have fallen to the Fatimids in 1102 were it not for
Baldwin's miraculous escape from death or capture at the
battle of Ramla in 1102, and the arrival of substantial
reinforcements by sea. Likewise the Fatimid siege of
Jaffa in 1123 failed only because of the providential
arrival of the Venetian relief fleet.
The policy of terrorism, initiated by the Franks
during the early sieges in the region greatly effected
the morale of the defenders of unconquered cities. When
given the choice of safe conduct and survival upon
surrender versus complete massacre and pillage if the
city was taken by storm, the citizens and garrison would
naturally tend to consider capitulation if the Franks
began to gain the upper hand. Of the eight major
36. This is of course ignoring the threat to the

Crusaderr from Damascus, which, while real enough, in
practice seems to have been adequately met by the
Princes of Galilee and Tripoli, although with strong
support from the King.
185
victorious Crusader sieges in Palestine, four were by

37 38
storm , and four by terms . However, of the sieges
after 1101 only one, Beirut in 1110, was by storm,
indicating a clear shift on the part of the Fatimids
from a strong extended defense to surrender by terms.
Finally, it should be emphasized that for the Franks
the capture and possession of the maritime cities w^s
vital to their survival and was central to their
strategy in Palestine. A Fatimid governor of a maritime
city, on the other hand, had absolutely no stake in a
continued and vigorous defense of a city. He saw no
reason to risk his life for a city which was neither his
home, nor from which he directly derived his
livelihood. Thus when the siege became difficult and
Frankish success looked possible, the governors tended
simply to surrender to save their own lives. The
vigorous defense of Tripoli under its indigenous dynasty
compared to the half-hearted efforts under Fatimid rule
in 1109 emphasizes this weakness.
37. Jerusalem 1099, Haifa 1100, Caesarea 1101 and Beirut

1110 .
38. Acre 1104, Tripoli 1109, Sidon 1110, Tyre 1124.
186
5.4 The Weaknesses of the Fatimid Military System
It is a clear historical fact that the Fatimids lest
the war in Palestine to the Franks. However, exactly
how and why they lost Palestine has often been
incorrectly described. In Chapter Six the difficult
strategic problems faced by the Fatimids in their
attempts to retain control of Palestine will be
described, and in Chapter Seven a detailed analysis of
what actually happened in some major battles in which
they were involved will be undertaken. At this point
only some of the organizational, tactical and
psychological problems of the military will be
discussed.
A fundamental factor in past misconceptions about
the weaknesses and quality of the Fatimid army is that
it is generally assumed that the Fatimids far
outnumbered the Franks in any given battle. If the
Franks, while so vastly outnumbered, could still defeat
Fatimids, there must have been grave weaknesses in the
the structure and tactics of the Fatimid army. These
137
1
weaknesses are seldom explicitly dealt with , but can be
inferred from various statements. They can be
categorized as: individual inferiority of the Fatimid
soldier when compared to the Frank, light weapons and
armour, poor training and military incompetence, and

2
cowardness. As has been demonstrated in Chapter Three ,
in most battles the Fatimids were only fractionally more
numerous than the Franks, if at all, and although there
were certainly grave weaknesses in the Fatimid military
system, they were much more subtle than has usually been
assumed.
It is occasionally considered that the Muslim
soldier was individually inferior to the Christian
knight. Runciman mentions the "greater physical
strength" of the Crusaders as a reason for their

3
victories in battle . Dr. Hill, in a recent study of
the Frankish view of Muslim e~^mies, states that "the
crusaders had much less to fear of the Arabs (in context
1. The only major exception is Smail, pp. 83-7.
2. See 3.4.
3. Runciman 2:23. It is, of course, impossible to verify

that the averaga Frankish knight was bigger or stronger
than the Average Arab, Turk, Sudani or Armenian in the
Fatimid army.
188
meaning Fatimid Egyptians) than of the Turks, and from a

4
military point of view they were probably right
Smail seems to agree that the individual Egyptian
soldier was inferior to the Franks. "Their (the Franks)
victory at Ascalon in August 1099 taught the Franks that
the soldiers from Egypt were the equals neither of the
redoubtable Turks nor of themselves. Because this
knowledge of tactical superiority gave them confidence
... in victory ...they did not hesitate to meet

5
renewed Egyptians counter-attacks with battle ." As
evidence ofthis he cites William of Tyre's biased
description of the Fatimids at the battle of Babayn 1167
as "weak and effeminate and more of a hindrance than a

6
help ." However, Smail fails to note Maqrizi's opinion
of the performance of the Frankish troops at this same
battle after they fled the field leaving the Fatimids
and Syrians still fighting. Maqrizi states that "the
two sides (Egyptians and Syrians) continued fighting
4. Hill, "Camp Follower" p. 81.
5. Smail, p. 27. See also Smail, p. 87, although in the

later case he is stating that it was the Franks who saw
the Egyptian soldiers as inferior, it seems that he
accepts this idea as well.
6 . Smail, p. 87 quoting WT 19.25.
after the weakness of the Franks (by fleeing) had been
7
made evident Such partisan descriptions should not
be accepted as significant historical statements
concerning the military quality of troops. As will be
discussed below, there are numerous examples, even from
the antagonistic Frankish sources, where the Fatimid
troops are described as courageous and skilled.
A second general misconception is that the Fatimid

3
troops were lightly armed , although Smail feels that
the arms of Arabs probably resembled those of the

9
Franks . Although it may be true that some elements of
the Faimid army were more lightly armed than their
equivalents in the Frankish army, there were numerous
other heavily armed infantry and cavalry who formed a

10
significant part of the army
Fatimid troops are also occasionally accused of poor

11
training and military incompetence . In fact, in
7. Maq. 3:284.
8 . Runciman 2:74.
9. Smail, p. 85.
10. See above ch. 5.1.
11. Runciman 2:74 states that the Egyptian army was

"untrained".
training and general military skill they were quite
possibly superior to the Franks. As discussed above,
the Fatimids had a well developed sophisticated military
theory, including defined programs of weapons

12
training . Frankish military skill, though
considerable, tended to be individual rather than

13
formal, and was often limited in technical matters
For example, during the siege of Tyre, the mangonels of
the F a t i m i d garrison in the city were far more accurate
than the Franks, for "there was no one in (the Crusader)
camp who possessed the expert skill necessary for aiming

14
and hurling the mighty missiles
Finally, the Fatimids are also sometimes
characterized by modern scholars, based on Latin
chronicler's often biased descriptions, as cowardly.
Although there are numerous examples of cowardness on

15
the part of the Fatimids , there are certainly cases
12. See 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
13. Smail, pp. 120ff.
14. WT 13.10.
15. Perhaps the worse case being when the Fatimid

cavalry abandoned their infantry to be massacred at
Ramla 1123, FC 3.18.4, although this may be more due to
factionalism than cowardness.
191
where the Franks showed cowardness and fled from

16
battle . Both sides on occasion also showed courage in
difficult circumstances. Fulcher reported that "both

17
sides greatly feared to attack the other ," and that on
occasion "the Christians feared that it would be rash to
rouse so vast an army (as that of the Fatimids) against

18
them ." Usama related many anecdotes of courage,
skill, folly and cowardness divided equally among both
Franks and Muslims. Such descriptions should not be
thought of as a permanent state of affairs but rather as
temporarily conditions due to specific circumstances.
Nor do Latin chroniclers fail to give words of
praise for the courage and skill of the Fatimids, such

19
as the garrison at Tyre . The Fatimid assault on Jaffa
20
is described as a "vigorous effort ," and in battle the
Fatimids "valiantly ... strove to resist and return our
15. Significant deterioration of Frankish morale

occurred at Mersivan 1101, Ager Sanguinis 1119 and
Babayn 1167.
17. FC 3.2.3.
18. WT 12.6.
19. WT 13.14, although the defenders included Damascene

Turks and city militia as well.
20. FC 2.53.4.
192
21
blows wich like vigor ," and were "completely
22
fearless Albert of Aix describes the victory of the
Fatimids over four successive Frankish cavalry charges
at Ramla in 1101 as due to "the pride and strength of

23
the gentiles ," and Fulcher agrees that "both sides
24
fought mightily ." Such examples could be further
multiplied.
If most of these supposed weaknesses of the Fatimid
army do not universally apply, there was still no dearth
of military problems among the Fatimids. The most
significant weakness faced by the Fatimids was a crisis
in leadership, which included a number of different
dimensions. Other than the expedition in 1099, al-Afdal
never personally led a Fatimid army into Palestine. The
main military effect of this was a lack of central
authority capable of compelling united military action
among the officers. The classic example of this problem
is when Taj al-cAjam refused to cooperate with Ibn Qadus
21. WT 12.21, although he adds that "both in courage and

strength, however, they were wholly unequal to us (the
Franks)."
22. WT 10.22.
23. AA 7.67.
24. FC 2.11.12.
193
in his attempted siege of Jaffa in 1103 . If al-Afdal
had been in Palestine this problem would never have
arisen, but Ibn Qadus alone had no authority to compel
Taj al-cAjam to military action.
Another dimension of the Fatimid leadership crisis
is that there was no permanent military commander facing
the Franks. Even if al-Afdal would not personally lead
armies against the Franks, it would have been possible
to assign a permanent commander for the armies there.
However, in practice, almost every campaign in Palestine
was placed under the command of a new general, often one
of al-Afdal's relatives. Thus each of these new
commanders would not only potentially be unfamiliar with
the terrain and strategic and tactical situation, but
would also be unfamiliar with the Frankish methods of
warfare. Part of the reason that the Franks were
ultimately victorious over the Fatimids in Palestine was
that each Fatimid army was lea by an inexperienced
leader who would have to relearn all the tactical
lessons of his predecessors, and then by being
subsequently reassigned, would never be able to profit
from those lessons.
25. Maq. 3:33; IAth. 10:365.
194
Part of the reason for this constant shifting of the
officer corps in Palestine was perhaps that al-Afdal,
wisely or not, refused to renew the command of an
officer who had once been defeated in battle. Another
significant factor in this decision, however, was that
ultimately al-Afdal could not trust his officers. The
abortive rebellion of Shams al-Khilaia in Ascalon is the

26
most stunning example of this problem . Al-Afdal
enjoyed much more prestige and authority than any of his
successors, and after his death Egypt was plunged into
successive cycles of anarchy and civil war from which it
never fully recovered. Thus although the symptoms of
this lack of loyalty among the Fatimid officers were not
as frequently overtly expressed in military affairs as
they were after al-Afdal's death, the underlying causes
were nonetheless present, and al-Afdal was thus forced
to continually consider the potential of rebellion among
his officer corps. Indeed, perhaps part of the reason
that al-Afdal never took to the field in Palestine was
that he felt his absence from Egypt would prove an
irresistible temptation to antagonistic elements in
Cairo to attempt a coup. Ultimately al-Afdal's death
26. See Ch. 6.1.1.
195
27
was due precisely to his lack of absolute authority
A second very significant weakness in the Fatimid
military system was the lack of any well defined foreign
policy goals in Palestine. For the Franks their very
survival depended on the achievement of precisely
defined strategic goals, specifically the conquest of
the maritime cities of Palestine. Excepting the need to
maintain a strategic base in Palestine as a defensive
outpost for Egypt, the Fatimids had no overriding reason
for intervention in Palestine, and in difficult and
expensive situations it was simply easier to ignore the
deteriorating situation there than to attempt the type
of major and sustained military action which would have

28
been required to expel the Franks
Another major problem in the Fatimid army was
factionalism between the various regiments. Although in
theory having regiments drawn from a number of different
linguistic and cultural backgrounds could promote
27. Although specifically initiated by the Caliph

al-Hafiz, the assassination had the backing of the
Palace establishment who subsequently supported
al-Hafiz's attempt to gain complete control over affairs
in Egypt, Maq. 3:60-2, 108ff.
28. This question is fully discussed in Chapter 6 .
1 96
29
military efficiency , this was only the case when there
was a strong and effective leadership. After al-Afdal's
death the destructive potential of this factionalism
became clearly manifest. Although al-Afdal managed for
the most part to hold the competing regiments together
during his reign, he continually faced the potential
problems of factionalism. In 1102 after the Fatimid
victory at Ramla, the delays in further military action
due to factionalism between the regiments was partly to
blame for the lack of significant strategic results from
that victory. As Ibn al-Athir wrote, "After he (Sharaf
al-Macal!) took Ramla a dispute arose between the
Egyptians and the Arabs, each claiming that the victory
was due to their efforts. A Frankish patrol advanced
against them, and each groups refused to associate with

30
the other, so that the Franks almost defeated them ."
In 1123 when the Fatimid cavalry deserted the infantry

' 31
at the battle of Ramla , this may have in part been
based on the fact that the cavalry regiments saw the
29. See Nizam al-Mulk SJLyai&at Namak ch. 24 tr. pp.

103-4.
30. IAth. 10:394.
31. FC 3.18.4, Maq. 3:100.
197
infantry not really as part of the unified army, but as
an opposing military faction.
The Fatimid army also lacked individual motivation
among their soldiers. The Franks were motivated by both
the desire for personal gain from victory through
plunder and the distribution of conquered cities and
lands as fiefs, and by a religious conviction that they
were serving God by their military conquests in
Palestine. For the Fatimids the potential for plunder
remained, but plunder could be gained much more safely
by raiding from Ascalon than by full scale battles and
sieges against the Franks. The Fatimid officers all had
regular monthly stipends or and although a
conquered city would potentially increase tne revenues
to the state treasury, it did not offer.the immediate
potential of an individual lordship that Frankish
officers could hope to receive.
Finally, ideology of jZ h a d was never fully developed
or expressed by the Fatimids, and indeed, the fact that
many of their soldiers were Armenian Christians or
slaves from Christian or pagan backgrounds essentially
precluded the possibility of j i h a d becoming major
motivating and unifying force for the army. It was only
a number of decades after the original Frankish
198
invasions that the propaganda of jihad would begin to
play a significant role among the Muslim leaders and

_ 32
soldiers and bear the ultimate fruit of Hattin
32. Sivan, L !i6iam z La Csioliadz, pp. 53-6 discusses

the rise of anti-Frankish Jihad propaganda beginning in
the years following al-Afdal's rule.
CHAPTER VI
FATIMID FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY
Little attention has been paid to the foreign policy
goals and strategic problems facing the Fatimids in
their warfare with the Crusaders, despite the fact that
the full significance of the military events in
Palestine can never be understood until the nature of
the strategic situation from the Fatimid perspective has
been analyzed. No previous attempt has been made to
describe either the range of potential foreign policy
choices or grave strategic problems facing the Fatimids
in conducting a.war in southern Palestine. These issues
will be discussed in this chapter.
6.1 Fatimid Foreign Policy Goals
Without the availability of archives or documents by
Fatimid officials openly discussing foreign policy goals
and plans and recording directives to various governors
and generals, it is impossible to accurately describe
199
200
1
the details of Fatimid foreign policy . Nonetheless,
through a careful examination of what al-Afdal actually
attempted to do combined with a few statements briefly
describing the Fatimid goals as found preserved in
chronicles, it is possible to see a general pattern of
policy emergina. Although the strategic goals of the

2
Fatimid state have seldom been explicitly discussed ,
there seems to be an implicit assumption on the part of
most historians that the major foreign policy goal of
al-Afdal was the destruction of the Crusader state and
the recovery of southern Palestine for the Fatimids. As
will be shown below, in reality this was not at all the
case. Before examining exactly what al-Afdal tried to
accomplish in Palestine, it is important to discuss the
major Fatimid foreign policy goals. These can be
1. It is due to the existence of such an "archive" for

Saladin's reign in the form of the correspondence of
al-Qadi al-Fadil and others that Lyons and Jackson,
SaladZn, have'been able to explore and interpret Muslim
foreign policy during that period.
2. A notable exception to this general rule is Surur,

SJLya&a. al-F atZ m ZyZ k. However Fatimid policy in relation
to the Crusaders is considered only on pp. 156-59, and
amounts to only a brief recounting of the events of the
early Crusades with no significant insights.
201
3
divided into three broad categories: ideological ,
military, and economic.
6.1.1 Ideological Goals
The most important form of ideological motivation
during most of the history of the Fatimid dynasty was
religious the desire to spread the Fatimid version of
Islam both by individual conversion, covert subversion

4
of opposing dynasties, and open conquest . However
beginning with the rise to power of Badr al-Jamall,
although lip service may have continued to be paid to
the past religious goals of the state, the importance of
reliction as a functioning factor in foreign policy

5
decisions was greatly diminished , leaving more
extremist elements of ShTcism such as the Assassins to
continue efforts for the triumph of Sh7cIte Islam.
Although it is impossible to determine al-Afdal's
personal religious feelings and motivations, Ibn
3. The term "ideological" will be used here in a broad

general sense including a number of theoretical
psychological motivations, rather than in its modern
technical sense.
4. See Vatikiotis, T a t lm ld I k t o x y .
5. Gibb, "Caliphate" p. 94-5
202
al-Qalanisi claims that al-Afdal was a SunnT rather than

6
a Shicite , which, if true, would illuminate his lack of
concern for Fatimid religious expansion. The major
indication of this attitude is al-Afdal's cynical role
in the succession dispute upon the death of
al-Mustansir, when he invented a last minute change in
the nomination of the heir apparent and placed a child
on the throne in order to secure his authority over the

7
government . Only in Yaman which was closely linked to
the vital Fatimid economic interests in the trade route

8
to India , did he actively support Shicite missionary
9
activities . The general policy of the Jamali dynasty
was clearly to limit rather than expand the influence of
the Fatimid Caliphs. During Badr al-JamalT's rule this
took the form of an attempt to dominate all aspects of
the government and limit al-Mustansir's personal
authority as much as possible. Al-Afdal took the
further expedient of manipulating the succession to the
6 . IQal. 204/164, vZ ctJ iq a d i Z ma.dhh.ab a Z - 6 u n n a "
7. IMuy. 68-9, IQal. 127ff, Mao. 3:12-5, IAth. 10:237-8,

IZaf. 83-5.
8 . Lewis, "India."
9. Hak. passim.
203
Caliphate to insure that children were placed on the
throne to be dominated by the WazTr, even when such a
policy risked civil war as during.his dispute with Nizar
over the succession to al-Mustanfir. Al-Afdal1s son
Kutayfat took this policy to its logical end by his
abortive attempt in 1130-1 to eliminate the Fatimid

10
Caliphate altogether
Personal aggrandizement the desire for military
victory and conquest for the honor of the leader or
dynasty could also be seen as a possible type of
ideological motivation for conflict or expansionism.
MaqrizI records an incident when Baldwin hired an Arab
poet to compose a satire about al-Afdal's defeat in
Palestine, which according so infuriated al-Afdal that

11
he sent an assassin to kill the poet . Although it
seems unlikely that al-Afdal would have been foolish
enough to risk a major war in order to retaliate for
what he saw as a personal insult, from one perspective,
it could be said that such personal aggrandizement was
necessarily of central concern, in the sense that the
10. Maq. 3:138-44? Stern, "Al-Afdal Kutayfat."
11. MaqKh. i:443, see Ch. 3.2.3 for a further

discussion.
ultimate goal of all his activities was to secure his
personal authority and power in Egypt. If al-Afdal
perceived that warfare in Palestine was necessary to
maintain his authority over the Fatimid officer corps
and army he would feel compelled to engage in war. The
question of how southern Palestine was economically and
militarily linked to security in Egypt and the
continuance of al-Afdal's authority thus becomes the

12
central question
Whatever personal motivations may have been felt by
al-Afdal in this regard, however, there is an important
political side to this problem as well. Defeats in
battle could be interpreted as personal defeats of
al-Afdal and his policies, which would have had the
tendency of undermining his authority among his
officers. The classic example of this problem is Shams
al-Khilafa's rebellion in Ascalon in 1111, which can be
best understood in the light of a preceding decade of
failure of Fatimid military policy in Palestine, giving
Shams al-Khilafa enough confidence to attempt a regional
coup.
The year 1110 was disastrous for the Fatimids in
12. See 6.1.3 below.
205
Palestine. Beirut had fallen by storm in May, and Sidon

13
surrendered to Baldwin in December . Immediately
thereafter Baldwin made his way to Ascalon and managed

. 14
to impose tribute on the governor Shams al-Khilafa .
Al-Afdal, angered by his governor's negotiations with
Baldwin, mobilized an army under cIzz al-Mulk al-Acazz
to expel Shams al-Khilafa from Ascalon. When the army
neared Ascalon Shams al-Khilafa openly revolted against

15
al-Afdal . The exact motivation behind Shams
al-Khilafa's actions can't be determined, but a vital
factor was certairly the near collapse of Fatimid
authority and military prestige in Palestine. Beirut
and Sidon had fallen, leaving only Tyre and Ascalon in
Frankish hands. If Shams al-Khilafa could secure
control of Ascalon under the protection of Baldwin,
there would be little al-Afdal could do about it.
Fatimid failures in Palestine had served to undermine
al-Afdal's authority culminating in Shams al-Khilafa's
rebellion.
The exact nature of the coup in Ascalon is somewhat
13. See Runciman 2;S 13 for a review of these events.
14. IQal. 172/109; Maq. 3:46.
15. Maq. 3:46; IQal. 172/109; IAth. 10:480-1.
206
confused. The Muslim sources all agree that Shams
al-Khilafa ousted the Fatimid Egyptian garrison and

16
enlisted a band of Armenian mercenaries . On the other
hand, Albert of Aix claims that a band of 300 Baldwin's
"knightly and warlike men" were sent to help garrison

17
Ascalon . This seeming contradiction can be resolved
if it is assumed that the "knightly men" sent by Baldwin
were Christian Armenian mercenaries in Crusader

18
service . It may also be possible that Shams
al-Khilafa himself was an Armenian Christian, and was
simply recruiting fellow Armenians mercenaries who
happened to be currently in Frankish employ to support

19
his revolt in Ascalon
Al-Afdals reaction to this outright rebellion was
passive. Instead of initiating a siege to wrest Ascalon
16. IQal.172/110; IAth. 10:480-1; Maq. 3:47; Dhah. 2:23;

IKhal. 4:415.
17. AA 11.35, m J H ltn K th z t b t l l l g z t i o &."
18. This might also explain why they were called

"knightly = m m ta fiJ L h " instead of knights = m i l / j t z * ,
since as Armenians they could not be included socially
as true iriJLtJUtzb.
19. On the importance of Armenian Christians in the

Fatimid army see 3.1.1. His name, Shams al-Khilafa =
"Sun of the Caliphate" could have been borne by a
non-Muslim.
207
from Shams al-Khilafa, al-Afdal actually gave the city
to him as an Z q ta .c and increased his i,qiac holdings in
Egypt, thereby essentially recognizing his new

20
semi-independent position . Shams al-Khilafa was
finally overthrown not by direct action by al-Afdal, but
by a rebellion among the citizens of Ascalon.
6.1.2 Economic Foreign Policy Goals
In addition to the fact that control of Palestine
might have been indirectly important for the defense of
Egypt, there were a number of more direct economic
benefits which could be gained by control of the region,
and which might have compelled al-Afdal to pursue a war
in southern Palestine. Economic gain could be acquired
from control of Palestine in three way. First, and most
significant, was the tax revenue from Palestine. There
are no accurate figures for land tax revenue for this
period, although it can be estimated as a general figure
that the revenues amounted to about three to four

21
hundred thousand dinars a year
20. Maq. 3:47; IQal. 172/109.
21. For a discussion of this estimate see Ch. 4.1.
206
Second, beyond the agricultural tax revenues the
Fatimid controlled cities in Palestine included a large
number of prosperous trading and industrial centers
which could have brought them a number of economic
advantages. Again no exact figures for revenues are
available, but it could have been as high as several

22
hundred thousand dinars . One interesting aspect of
this comes from a statement by Nasir-i Khusrav, who
claimed that the Fatimid garrison at Tripoli was paid by
a tithe on the trading goods of foreign merchants who

23
traded in the city . If this statement is accurate and
generally applicable to other cities in the region it
would mean that in times of peace the revenues from
Palestine paid for the Fatimid military presence there
and probably contributed additional revenues to the
treasury in Egypt, presenting a clear economic
motivation for control of the region.
The intervention of the Crusaders changed this
situation drastically in a number of ways. As the
Crusaders captured a number of ports a great deal of the
22. Alexandria alone produced at least 80,000 dinars in

government revenues, Rabie, Fi n a n z i a l A d tr .in i6 tfia t4 .o n ,
pp. 92, 98; see also ch. 4.6.
23. Nasir-i Khusrav, tr. LeStrange, ? a l z 6 t i n z , p. 349.
209
European traffic was diverted to those cities, causing a
proportional decline in mercantile prosperity in the
Muslim controlled cities. The occasional presence of
large hostile Frankish fleets in the coastal waters of
the area, accompanied by widespread piracy, would have
further negatively effected Muslim trade. The conquest
of most of the inland agricultural regions, although.not
completely cutting off the supply of foodstuffs from the
mainland, brought about a general increase in the cost
of food, and occasional need of importation of supplies
from Egypt. Finally, in addition to all of these
economic hardships the cities faced sharply increasing
expenses to maintain their defenses against repeated
Crusader raids and sieges. Thus, whereas before the
Crusader invasions the Fatimid presence in the region
produced an increase in state revenues, as the Crusader
presence increased and solidified, the economic benefits
proportionally declined, and in years when armies or
fleets were mobilized and sent to Palestine Fatimid
expenditures in the region certainly outweighed the
potential income.
It has elsewhere been estimated that mobilization of
a 5000 man army for a summer's campaign in southern
210
24
Palestine cost several hundred thousand dinars . When
all of southern Palestine was in Fatimid hands it is
possible that the revenues of the region could have
supported such an expenditure. However, when much of
the agricultural land and a large number of cities were
in Frankish hands, coupled with the shift in trading
patterns and the increase in piracy and raids, it is
impossible that on a year to year basis any economic
gains could be expected from Fatimid holdings in
Palestine. In purely economic terms the cost of
defending the regions far outweighed the benefits which
could be derived from a continued Fatimid military
presence there.
A final economic motivation for prosecuting war in
southern Palestine was the plunder which could be
derived from such conflicts. Fatimid plundering raids
from Ascalon, and to a lesser degree from other coastal

25
cities, were almost a yearly affair . Victory in
battle also offered the prospect of financial gain.
24. Ch. 4.3.
25. There are numerous references to Fatimid raids. A

few include Ekk. 27.6/258, 33.3/288-9; FC 2.49.12, 2.37;
WT 3.8,12, 14.22, AA 10-10-4, 10.33, 11.28, which could
be further multiplied.
211
Piracy by Fatimid government ships and privateers in
Syria was also frequent, coupled with occasional full
scale naval operations in which plunder could be
acquired. However, such economic motivations were more
important from the perspective of the troops actually
engaged in battle or garrisoning cities rather than from
the broader perspective of regional foreign policy, and
could not have served as a major factor in al-Afdal's
foreign policy decisions. If plunder could be obtained
at the expense of the Franks, that was fine, but there
is no evidence that al-Afdal tailored his activities to
maximize the potential for plunder. When Baldwin's
counter-raiding, culminating in the loss of a large

26
merchant fleet in 1111 and the capture of a large
caravan from the east in 1113-4 began to cause a serious
economic threat to Egypt, al-Afdal made a treaty
agreeing to a truce and ending the plunder raids.
Al-Afdal "made a peace treaty in 509/1115-6 with Baldwin
the Frank, Lord of Jerusalem. Baldwin had previously
taken a great caravan from the Muslims in the Salt
Marsh, known today as Baldwin's Marsh. So al-Afdal
decided to make a truce because of his inability to
26. Maq. 3:46
212
prevent (such raids), and commanded his men

27
likewise
Furthermore, from the point of view of the
individual soldier, permanent reconquest of Palestine
from the Franks would only serve to increase the number
of cities to be defended, while the elimination of
Frankish pilgrim and trading traffic would drastically
reduce the personal profit to be gained by the
individual soldier through plunder. Thus although
plundering raids continued to be carried out by the
Fatimids the net result of the success of these raids
was to further decrease the desire on the part of the
soldiers to attempt more permanent conquests.
6.1.3 Strategic Foreign Policy Goals
The final category of foreign policy goals can
described as military or strategic goals. The. central
strategic concern of al-Afdal was clearly the protection
of Egypt and the maintenance of his personal authority
there. An invasion or conquest of Egypt would bring
about widespread devastation, potentially followed by
27. ITagh. 5:209.8-11.
213
famine, disease, brigandage and at least a temporary
economic decline, or even worse, the complete conquest
of the country, the end of the Fatimid dynasty, and the
exile or death of al-Afdal himself.
Thus if Fatimid control of southern Palestine could
somehow increase the security of Egypt, there would
exist a clear need for military intervention in that
region. What strategic role did southern Palestine play
in the defense of Egypt? Dr. A. S. Ehrenkreutz has
discussed the ways in which the control and defense of
southern Palestine was of crucial importance to the
defense of Egypt as a type of "naval alarm system" which
gave Egypt advance notice of Frankish military and naval
activities, and could serve as a fortress to harass anv

28
Crusader attempts to cross the Sinai into Egypt . The
major threat from lack of Fatimid control of southern
Palestine was that the region could be used for invasion
of the Egyptian delta by either sea or land. This
situation was recognized by Badr al-Jamall, who, after
having defeated Atsiz's invasion of the Delta in 1077
refortified the gates of Cairo and initiated an attempt
to reconquer Palestine. Al-Afdal continued this same
28. Ehrenkreutz, "Naval" p. 102f.
214
policy of maintaining a strong military presence in
Palestine with his reconquest of rebellious Tyre and the

29
capture of Jerusalem from the Urtuqid brothers .
How did the intervention of the Franks in southern
Palestine change these general goals? Until the coming
of the Franks the major enemy facing the Fatimids were
the Saljuqid princes in Syria and Palestine. In one
sense the wedge the Crusaders drove between Damascus and
Egypt admirably served Fatimid strategic goals in that
Egypt no longer faced any significant threat from
Damascus, and indeed al-Afdal began to see Damascus as a
potential ally. As Ibn Zafir saw it, "al-Afdal ...
desired their (the Frankish) conquest of the coast (of
southern Palestine) so they would serve as a barrier

30
preventing the invasion of the Turks into Egypt ."
Al-Afdal saw the Syrian Turks as the major threat to
Egypt, and thus the Frankish intrusion into the region
was essentially beneficial to Fatimid interests.
The history of al-Afdal's attempts at conciliation
with the Franks confirms that he was not entirely
29= IQal. 135; IMuy. 65-6; IAth. 10:282-3; IKhal.

4:141; Maq. 3:22a; MaqKh. 1:427b; ITagh 5:159.3-7.
30, IZaf. 82.
215
opposed to a Frankish presence in the region. Al-Afdal
opened negotiations with the Franks as their army was

31
besieging Antioch in 1098 . Originally his goal was
probably to allow a Frankish presence in northern Syria
while giving them free access for pilgrimage to
Jerusalem, and negotiations on these lines were
continued by a second embassy sent to the Franks while

32
they besieged Arqa . Al-Afdal recognized that the
Franks had no plans for the conquest of Egypt, and if an
arrangement could be made with the Franks he woul d have
not only a potential ally against the Syrians, but would
forestall any possible future danger to Egypt without
the necessity of expensive military action.
Apparently the Fatimids felt that the results of
these negotiations were satisfactory, for agreements
were made to provide supplies to the Frankish army
during its advance to Jerusalem. Caffaro mentions that
an embassy was sent to Egypt by John the Camararius
guaranteeing "safe conduct and supplies from the
maritime cities and villages on the route to Jerusalem
31. See Runciman 1:229-30.
32. RA 16, pp. 106f; WT 7.19; Runciman 1:273.
216
33
for the Frankish knights ," indicating that the
provision of supplies to the Crusaders was not
undertaken solely on the initiative of the governors of
the maritime cities but on direct orders from al-Afdal.
It seems hardly credible that al-Afdal would have given
supplies to the Crusaders if he had thought they were
invading to conquer Palestine. The best explanation for
these developments is that he was under the delusion,
probably fostered by lies from the Frankish ambassadors,
that the Franks only intended to visit Jerusalem as
pilgrims.
In view of these negotiations the siege and fall of
Jerusalem undoubtedly came as a surprise to al-Afdal,
but even after Jerusalem fell he was still willing to
come to terms with the Franks and formulate some kind of
negotiated division of Palestine. Al-Afdal:s first act
upon arrival at Ascalon in 1099 after the fall of
Jerusalem was to send ambassadors to Jerusalem in
another attempt to negotiate a treaty. Ibn Muyassar
states that al-Afdal "sent (messengers) to rebuke the
Franks because of what they had done, and they (the
Franks) responded favorably. The (Egyptian) messenger
33. Caf. 1:109.
217
had barely returned when they (the Franks) came in great

34
n u n ^ r s and attacked al-Afdal (at Ascalon) Rebuking
an enemy with whom you are at war makes little sense,
and this incident can best be understood if it is
assumed that al-Afdal was rebuking the Franks for having
broken^previous treaty. The Franks sent back a
favorable response to these overtures, while marshalling

35
their army and rushing to battle . Despite the fact
that this was the only occasion al-Afdal ever personally
led an army against the Franks, and that it was the
largest Fatimid army ever mobilized against them, his
first move was not to attack the Crusaders, but to
attempt to intimidate them into a negotiated peace,
perhaps by granting the Franks control of Jerusalem and
defining respective zones of influence in southern
Palestine. Due to the favorable initial response of the
Crusaders al-Afdal was expecting to negotiate with the
Franks and their attack the next day caught his army
completely by surprise, the Fatimids suffering their
34. IMuy. 6 6 , followed by Maq. 3:24 who gives an

abbreviated version; Dhah. 2:15-6.
35. The sources mentioned above say that the Franks sent
a response "j'awab," which invariably means an
affirmative response to a petition.
218
36
worst defeat of the war
Even after this defeat, or perhaps because of it,
al-Afdal was still willing to continue in his attempts
to formulate a negotiated peace with the Crusaders. In
the spring of 1100 a treaty was concluded between the
Crusaders and the Fatimid coastal cities of southern
Palestine by which a tribute of 60,000 dinars a year
would be paid to the Franks if the Franks agreed not

37
attack any Fatimid cities . This may have been an
expedient on al-Afdal's part because he was unable to
mobilize a new army to defend the cities after his
defeat at Ascalon the previous summer. However,
al-Afdal might also have perceived it as a permanent
settlement, somewhat along the lines of the Fatimid

38
treaty dividing the revenues of Tyre with Damascus
The Franks would control Jerusalem having Jaffa as a
port, while sharing the revenues of the other Fatimid
coastal towns with al-Afdal in the form of the monthly
"tribute." It is of course impossible to know if
36. See ch. 7.1.
37. AA 7.12-3 gives the tribute as 5000 dTnars a month,

or 60,000 a year.
38. WT 13.5 discusses the nature of this dyarchy.
219
al-Afdal saw this treaty as permanent since the Franks
broke it a few months later, but it does give some
indication that al-Afdal was willing to sacrifice
Jerusalem to the Franks and even surrender a portion of
the revenues of the province in return for a treaty of
friendship with the Crusaders which would leave Egypt
secure and in possession of the rich coastal towns.
By the summer of 1100 when the Franks had broken the
treaties made that spring by attacking Arsuf and Haifa,
it became clear that al-Afdal's policy of conciliation
and a negotiated division of Palestine with the
Crusaders was hopeless and that the ultimate goal of the
Franks was the conquest of the region. As Ibn Zafir
wrote, "when the Franks may God forsake them
conquered Jerusalem, al-Afglal regretted it only after
there was no use in regretting, for he desired their
conouest of the coast so they would be a barrier

39
preventing the invasion of the Turks into Egypt . Ibn
TaghribardI echoes these same sentiments, "The affairs
of Egypt were reorganized during (al-Afdal's)
administration, which distracted him from the Syrian
coast so that the Franks were able to conquer most of
39. IZaf. 82.
220
it. He regretted this fact only after it was no longer

40
useful to regret it Al-Afdal's initial policy of
reconciliation had succeeded only in allowing the Franks
to become firmly in control of a large section of
southern Palestine.
In order to understand Fatimid strategy in the
following years it should be emphasized that the Franks
had neither the intention or the capability of invading
Egypt. They were too involved their continuing conquest
of Muslim cities on the Palestinian coast and battles
with the Turks in Syria to be able to seriously consider
a major invasion of Egypt. The only Frankish land
invasion of Egypt before the 1160s was by Baldwin in
1118. This was clearly a punitive raid in retaliation
for similar raids from Ascalon in violation of the
treaty of 1115, rather than a serious invasion,
especially when it is remembered that his "army"

41
consisted of a mere 260 cavalry and 400 infantry . The
military significance of this raid has tended to be
exaggerated. As long as Frankish goals remained limited
to Palestine and the Fatimids could maintain a strong
40. ITagh. 5:153.5.
41. AA 12.25
naval and military presence at least in Ascalon, Egypt
was relatively secure.
In the following years the guiding policy behind
Fatimid military intervention in Palestine was to defend
existing Fatimid possessions which could serve as the
outer ring of defense for Egypt rather than a serious
attempt at expelling the Franks or reconquering
Palestine. When the Frankish attacks on Fatimid cities
ceased, so did Fhtimid intervention in Palestine. When
a Fatimid city was threatened, the Fatimids usually made

42
some type of military counter-move
This lack of a clearly defined offensive strategy in
Palestine is reflected in the events of the following
years. After the victory at Ramla in 1102, rather than
moving directly to attempt to reconquer part of
Palestine, the Fatimid officers were unable to decide
what to do next and spent several weeks in indecision
with their troops scattered seeking plunder. Sharaf
al-Macali's "officers disputed about their goal. A
group said 'We should attack and conquer Jerusalem,'
42. The two exceptions to this general rule are the

campaign of 1105 and the raiding activities of Ascalon.
222
while another group said. 'We should attack and conquer

43
Jaffa ," a situation that can be best explained if the
Fatimids had no general strategic plan for the
reconquest of Palestine.
Al-Afdal's cynical response to the requests of the
citizens of Tripoli for aid in defending their city
again points to a passive Fatimid foreign policy. When
the citizens decided they could no longer defend their
city alone and asked Egypt for aid, al-Afdal sent them a
small garrison who plundered their treasury and
imprisoned the leading members of the Banu cAmmar. When
the Franks began a major siege in 1109 al-Afdal spent an
entire year deciding whether to send aid or not, leaving
the garrison to eventually surrender the city on

44
terms . Al-Afdal had taken whatever wealth he could
from the city and then essentially left it to its own
devices for defense.
In summary, none of the potential foreign policy
goals, except that of using Palestine as base for
defending Egypt, presented an overwhelming argument for
continued and extensive Fatimid military presence in
43. IAth. 10:364.
44. IAth. 10:476.
223
southern Palestine. When the Crusaders first invaded a
single military victory in Palestine would have allow
the Fatimids to maintain control of the region with a
minimum of economic and military loss and would have
certainly been beneficial in the long run. However,
after the Crusader's quick reduction of Jerusalem and
their initial surprise defeat of the Fatimid relief
force at Ascalon in 1099, the Franks were able to become
firmly established in the region with a number of
important fortresses and cities in their possession, and
with direct control of much of the agricultural land.
From this point on, the potential economic benefits
from continued military intervention in Palestine
progressively diminished. Each battle presented the
very real possibility of major losses in manpower,
equipment, supplies and treasure, while each fleet faced
the possibility of destruction by storms or by the
enemy. On the other hand the Crusaders continued to
grow stronger militarily and economically with each
passing year, and the potential benefits from victory in
battle progressively decreased. Thus the overall
motivations for Fatimid military intervention steadily
declined.
The only foreign policy goal remaining for Al-Afdal
224
was to preserve a forward base for naval and military
operations, and to warn and defend Egypt from possible
invasions. As has been discussed previously, Al-Afdal
was willing to go to great lengths and expenses to
insure that Ascalon remained securely in Fatimid

45
hands , but unless the opportunity presented itself, as
after the battle of Ramla in 1102, little attempt was
made to regain lost territory. Ibn TaghrlbardI in
summarizing al-Afdal's reign, stated that al-Mustacli
was satisfied with al-Afdal as Wazlr, "except for the
fact that he refrained from jZ h Z d (against the

46
Franks) ."
6.2 Strategic Problems Facing the Fatimids
In addition to the fact that the Fatimid foreign
policy goals in Palestine were essentially passive,
there were a number of strategic factors which made
aggressive action on their part extremely difficult and
hindered their attempts to defend those cities which
45. Ch. 4.4.
46. ITagh. 5:153.10-11.
225
remained in their hands. For the most part these
strategic difficulties have not been recognized by most
scholars. Once some of the implications of the Fatimid
strategic and military situation are understood Fatimid
policies and military actions become much more
coherent.
By far the most significant strategic problem facing
the Fatimids was thattheir army was in Egypt while the
war was in Palestine. When the Franks began to take
offensive action against a Fatimid city word had to be
sent to Egypt, mobilization orders issued, the troops
collected and reviewed, supplies organized and
transported to the fleet, the equipment and draft
animals readied, and the army and fleet had to march
from Ca iro to Ascalon, the journey alone taking up to

1
two weeks . Although in theory it might have been
possible for a better organized army under an agressive
leader to mobilize a force more quickly, in practice,
Fatimid armies tended to reach Ascalon on the average of
two months after the initiation of hostilities in
Palestine. In 1099 the siege of Jerusalem began on 7
June, while the Fatimid army arrived at Ascalon in the
1. Ayalon, "Harb," p. 185b.
226
first week in August. In 1101 the siege of Arsuf began

2
on 15 April, the main Fatimid army arrived on 30 June .
In 1102 Beirut was harassed beginning on 15 February,

3
the Fatimid army arrived in early May . In 1103 the
4
siege of Acre began on 6 April , and the Fatimid army
5
arrived on 8 June .
In strategic terms this meant that the Crusaders had
two months in which to carry out sieges without
interference from a major FStimid field army. An
examination of the sieges of the period shows that most
sieges were either successfully completed or abandoned

6
before the this two month period expired . Thus Smail's
statement that "only in 1112 did a Muslim force actively

7
interfere with the siege operations of the Franks " is
somewhat misleading. In actuality most sieges were
either concluded before a Fatimid army could arrive from
Egypt, or, if it seemed that the city would not swiftly
2. IQal. 140=53, IMuy. 6 8 , Maq. 3:26.
3. See ch. 7.3, IQal. 144=55.
4. AA 9.19, FC 2.22.1.
5. IQal. 142=58.
6 . On the duration of successful sieges see 5.4.
7. Smail p. 27, referring to the siege of Tyre.
227
surrender, the Franks abandoned their siege. On the
other hand, the Franks could mobilize most of their
troops in southern Palestine in a few days, and be ready
to face any Fatimid threat to their kingdom.
This points to a second major strategic problem
facing the Fatimids, their inability to achieve any type
of strategic surprise. The fact that it took the
Fatimids some two weeks to march from Cairo to Ascalon
essentially insured that the Franks would have previous
knowledge of the mobilization of an Egyptian army,
allowing them sufficient time to mobilize their own
forces. It was inevitable that any Fatimid army from
Egypt would always arrive at Ascalon, and thus the
Franks always knew exactly where to mobilize and where
they would have to meet the Fatimids.
In theory the Fatimids could have attempted to
achieve some type of strategic surprise by launching
attacks from Tyre or other maritime cities north of
Ascalon by transporting an army and supplies from Egypt
by sea. However, there were a number of logistical
problems hsinpS ring such an operation which rendered it
functionally impossible. The age of the great
amphibious operations which were eventually launched by.
the Crusaders did not begin until the latter decades of
228
the twelfth century. A major difficulty was in the
transportation of horses, the technology for large scale
horse transportation by sea still being in its infancy

8
in the early twelfth century . However, even if the
technology was fully available, the logistical problems
were still immense. The average Muslim horse transport,

9
the -fa/uTda, carried at most fourty horses , so an army
of 2000 cavalry would have required a fleet of at least
50 naval transports for the horses alone, with a large
number of additional vessels for the infantry, the
horsemen, supplies, servants and additional war galleys
for protection. The Fatimid navy at this period was not
capable of mounting such a major operation without a
large scale ship building project and massive logistical

10
preparations . Even if the necessary transports could
have been prepared, the fleet would still face
additional dangers of storm and possible encounter with
8 . Pryor, "Transportation," pp. 9-14 discusses

pre-twelfth century naval transport of horses, usually
numbering from twelve to twenty horses per ship, while
later transports were able to carry fourty or more
horses.
9. IMam. 339, Pryor, "Transportation" p. 18.
10. According to Qal. 3:523 the Fatimid navy consisted

of only 75 warships and 10 supply ships.
229
large European fleets. After the army had arrived
safely at Tyre, large scale naval supply operations

11
would still be required . Finally, from the Fatimid
point of view, the strategic goals to be achieved by an
assault based at Tyre were not very significant. The
recapture of Jaffa, Acre, or Haifa would have been very
useful to the Fatimids by providing them with an
additional center for the defense of Egypt, but
victories further north would simply have resulted in an
additional city to defend. A sustained effort at the
reconquest of Palestine must necessarily have originated
from Ascalon. Thus although in theory an attack through
a northern port may have been possible, the cost,
difficulty, and lack of practical strategic and economic
benefits made it impractical.
There were also a wide range of strategic defense
problems facing the Fatimids. In 1100 the Fatimids held
Ascalon, Arsuf, Caesarea, Haifa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon and
Beirut. Although the specific defensive requirements in
terms of money, supplies, equipment and troops varied
according to the size and importance of each city, each
11. See Ehrenkreutz, "Naval," on the difficulties faced

by Saladin during his naval operations against the
Franks.
230
city had tc be defended individually. For example, if
2000 men were sent to Palestine to garrison the region,
in actuality eacn city would only have 250 men for
defense. If the Crusaders marshalled an army of 2000
men, they could select whichever city seemed weakest or
most susceptible to attack at any given time. Thus a
siege the Franks could centralize their military power
against only a small fraction of the Fatimid defensive
strength in the region. Until a relief force arrived
from Egypt, which as pointed out above took at least two
months, the Franks were assured of a regional military
superiority against whichever city they decided to
attack, and city by city the coast was conquered.
Although some support could be expected from the other

12
Fatimid garrisons in the region , in practice the
Franks seldom faced the entire defensive strength of
Palestine. On the other hand, as each Fatimid city on
the coast fell, the defensive strength of the Fatimids
became more concentrated in the remaining cities, which
perhaps in part explains why it took the Franks
12. As when a fleet and reinforcements from Tyre and

Sidon saved Acre from capture in 1103 (AA 9.15), and
Arsuf was reinforced with 100 cavalry and 200 infantry
from Ascalon in 1100 (AA 7.13).
231
progressively longer to capture each succeeding city.
In the end the sieges of Tyre and Ascalon each lasted
well over a year and came decades after the initial

13
Frankish invasions . The early capture by the
Crusaders of Jaffa, Arsuf, Caesarea and Haifa presented
the Fatimids with another significant strategic problem,
in that the remaining northern cities were thereby cut
off from the possibility of any substantial
reinforcements by land, necessitating a defensive
military alliance with the Damascenes.
In addition to all of these strategic difficulties
the Fatimids also faced a major logistical problem.
Once most Palestinian agricultural land was lost the
sources for supplies, equipment and troops for a
campaign were all in Egypt, and nearly every arrow,
biscuit, man and draft animal had to be transported by
sea or land to Palestine. The Franks on the other hand,
had their sources of supply only a few days or hours
from their battles and sieges. Thus any -expedition sent
by the Fatimids became a major logistical undertaking.
13. Tyre finally fell only after the FStimid fleet had
been destroyed by the Venetians the year before so that
Egypt was unable to send naval relief. Ascalon fell
only when civil war in Egypt striped its defenses and
forestalled a land relief effort.
232
In a sense, each summer the Fatimids sent an army to
Palestine it was like building and supplying a new city
of thousands of soldiers and servants with many
additional animals. The fact that the Fatimids
repeatedly maintained large armies in Palestine shows
that the problem was not insurmountable, but it was
expensive and provided strict limitations within which
the Fatimid army was required to operate.
A final strategic problem facing the Fatimids was
that in reality they were not fighting just a few
thousand Franks living in Palestine, but a combination
of many of the nations of Europe. The Fatimid victory
at Ramla in 1102 clearly shows the significance of this

14
fact . The Frankish army was crushed and scattered,
and the Fatimids had overrun the countryside and had
begun siege operations against Jaffa when a massive
relief fleet arrived from Europe which drove off the
Fatimid army and navy and saved the kingdom. Southern
Palestine would have clearly fallen in 1102 there had
been no reinforcements available from Europe.
Strategically, economically, and militarily the Franks
of Palestine alone could never have forestalled an
14. See 7.3 for a discussion.
233
eventual Egyptian victory without the constant influx of
wealth and men from Europe. Or, from the opposite
perspective, the Fatimids alone could never have
reconquered Frankish Palestine while it was receiving
the full support of Europe. It was only when the
military and economic power of Egypt, Syria and northern
Mesopotamia was combined that the strategic balance .
ultimately shifted against the Crusaders.
During the period of the early Crusades the Franks
clearly had most of the strategic advantages. They had
advance notice of the mobilization of Fatimid armies,
they could mobilize all their forces in just a few days,
had direct and constant access to their bases for
supplies and reinforcements, and could select from a
large number of targets for sieges while always knowing
exactly where the Fatimids-would inevitably attack.
When defeated they could expect strong support from the
northern Crusader principalities and Europe. For the
Fatimids this situation was exactly reversed. The
Franks could strike with only a day or two of advance
notice, the Fatimids would often have to face additional
unforeseen enemies from Europe, they required two months
to mobilize their army, they had to ship most of their
equipment, men and supplies from Egypt, and had a large
234
number of coastal towns to defend, any one of which
could be attacked at any time, and many of which were
beyond the access of their land army.
None of these difficulties alone would have proved
insurmountable, however. A strong and resolute leader,
with clearly defined goals and a motivated army could
have overcome them. However, the Fatimid weakness in
leadership, lack of motivation and passive foreign
policy goals, combined with the basic strategic and
logistical problems described above, proved
insurmountable. Al-Afdal simply allowed affairs in
Palestine to slowly drift from Frankish victory to
victory, culminating in their conquest of nearly the
entire region.
CHAPTER VII
THE FATIMID ARMY IN ACTION
Nearly every history of the Crusades includes some
accounts of the battles fought between Franks and
Fatimids, while many of these battles have been the
focus of numerous attempts at detailed reconstruction.
Unfortunately for the most part these efforts have
resulted in a distorted perspective of the course and
significance of most battles, due mainly to the failure
to seriously consider the testimony of Arabic sources.
This universal overreliance on the Latin perspective in
the study of these battles can be seen even in the work
of the excellent military historian R. C. Smail who in
his analysis of five major battles between the Crusaders
and Fatimids, does not reference a single Arabic

1
source . The broader view made possible by the serious
consideration of Arabic testimony will not only allow a
corrected understanding of the nature of the Fatimid
army, but on occasion will necessitate major revisions
1. Smail: Ascalon 1099, pp. 174-7, esp. p. 174 n. 5;

Ramla 1101, p. 175 n. 3; Ramla 1102, p. 176 n. 1; Jaffa
1102 p. 176; and Ramla 1105 p. 177 n. 3. These same five
battles will be studied in this chapter and should be
compared with Smail1s analysis.
235
236
in our understanding of the course and nature of warfare
during the early Crusades.
The following pages include reconstructions of five
major land battles fought by the Crusaders and Fatimids:
Ascalon in 1099, the battles of Ramla in 1101, 1102 and
1105, and the battle of Jaffa in 1102. The study of each
battle includes a section discussing the number of
troops in the opposing armies, a description of the
course of the battle, and a summary of the major primary
sources for the battle. In addition the battles of
Ramla and Jaffa in 1102 contain sections discussing
questions of the dating of those battles. Much of the
discussion is quite technical and detailed, but is
necessary to provide the basis for some of the revisions
in past descriptions which I am suggesting.
7.1 Ascalon: 12 August 1099
7.1.1 Opposing Forces
Ibn al-Qalanisi makes two important statements on
the size of the Fatimid army at Ascalon. The first is
that "death came to the infantry and the volunteers and
237
the people of the city. They numbered about 10,000

2
souls The major question in the interpretation of
this phrase is whether the figure 10,000 refers to the
number of infantry, volunteers and militia who fought,
or to the number of those men who were killed in the
battle. Grammatically it can be understood either way.
However, Ibn al-QalanisT adds that "at this battle about
2700 souls were killed from among the witnesses (those
whose testimony is acceptable under Muslim law), leading
citizens, merchants and city militia ( a h d E tk ) of the
people of Ascalon, not counting the regular army

3
{ a jn a d ) ."
These two statements can best be reconciled by the
following reconstruction. In the first phrase, k a j Z l ,
"infantry" refers to the regular infantry which came
with Al-Afdal from Egypt, which is probably equivalent
with the a jn a d of phrase two. Mu.au)u)Aca in the first
phrase refers to volunteers not normally trained for
battle, who should probably be equated with the
"witnesses, leading citizens, and merchants" of phrase
2. IQal. 137 = 48-9, " a t a a i - q a t l ca la . a l-n .d jA .1 wa.

a.l-m uta.uiw Zca. wa a h l a l - b a l a d wa. kanu z u k a a. cashana. ala.&
nai a*."
3. IQal. 138 = 49.
238
two. Finally the a h d a th are the city militia of
Ascalon, young men who are trained to some degree in
fighting and better equipped than most of the
"volunteers." Thus the first number given, 10,000
refers to the total number of infantry, both regular and
irregular, involved in the battle, while the 2700 deaths
refers only to the casualties suffered by the irregular
infantry who had been recruited in southern Palestine,
mainly from Ascalon.
Al-DhahabI states that "Al-Afdal arrived at Ascalon

4
with 20,000 men ." This figure may well be an
5
exaggeration , but it could be accepted as possibly
correct if 20,000 is taken to be an approximation of the
total number of men in the battle, including the Ascalon
militia and bedouin irregulars, rather than just the
regular army which marched from Egypt. Thus as a
hypothetical reconstruction, Ibn al-QalanisPs 10,000
infantry can be divided into two roughly equal groups,
perhaps 5000 militia and volunteers from the Ascalon
4. Dhah. 2:15-6, followed by ITagh. 5:149.
5. Al-Dhahabi also claims that 100,000 men died in the

battle, 2:17, although this passage is placed under the
wrong year in Dhah.'s chronicle, it seems clearly to
refer to the battle of Ascalon.
area, and another 5000 regular infantry from Egypt. The
5000 regular infantry would be accompanied by 5000

6
regular cavalry , to which should be added several
thousand irregular bedouin cavalry which would have
joined the expedition both in Egypt and Palestine
bringing the total Fatimid force to somewhere near the
20,000 figure given by Al-Dhahabi.
The Crusader sources give a wide variety of
unreliable figures for the Fatimid army. The author of

7
the Ge-s-ta claims they numbered 200,000 ; Ekkehard gives
the Fatimids 100,000 cavalry and 400,000 infantry,
adding that 100,000 "moorish swords (Mau/tOAum gladJLo)

8
were caotured as bootv , figures which agree precisely
9
with those given bv Daimbert in his letter to the Pope ;
10
Matthew of Edessa puts them at 300,000 . In trying to
deal with such figures perhaps it is best to conclude
along with the Anonymous author of the G t& ta. that "the
6. See 3.4.3 on the regular Fatimid army generally

consisting of half cavalry and half infantry.
7. Anon. p. 96.
8. Ekk. 17.5/176.'
9. HEp. p. 172.
10. ME 2.125/311-2.
240
multitude of the pagans was innumerable and none (of the

11
Crusaders) knew their number save only God ."
On the size of the Crusader army, Raymond, followed
by William of Tyre, states that they included 1200

12
knights ( m lZ Z t & i) and 9000 foot , which is perhaps not
far from accurate. However, this is directly
contradicted by another contemporary source. In the
letter written by Daimbert to the Pope, it is claimed
that there were 5000 knights and 15000 infantry in the
Frankish army, with which Albert agrees, giving the

13
total force as 20,000 . Ekkehard gives the Franks 1000
14
knights and 15000 infantry . Although the Fatimids at
Ascalon were probably more numerous than the Crusaders,
the two armies were most likely roughly equal in numbers
of experienced regulars.
11. Anon. pp. 95-6.
12. RA 156 = 270; WT 9.12.
13. HEp. p. 172? AA 6.50.
14. Ekk. 17.5/176. It is possible to reconcile these

figures somewhat if it is assumed that the authors
giving the lower figures are counting only true knights
and regular infantry, while those giving the higher
figures include cavalry who were not knights and poorly
armed pilgrims.
241
7.1.2 The Battle
On 11 August Al-Afdal's army was encamped on north

15
of Ascalon and about seven miles from Ibelin , near a
16
village named al-Bissa . According to information
gathered from captured Fatimid soldiers, the Crusaders
believed he planned to march against Jerusalem , and
decided to forestall this by an attack on the Fatimids
the next day. Al-Afdal's army was totally unprepared
for this move. He had previously sent ambassadors to
Jerusalem who had only recently returned with word that
the Franks had apparently agreed to some kind of

18
negotiations , and therefore assumed that there was at
least a temporary truce. However, even if he had cause
to doubt the Frankish sincerity in this matter, he still
could reasonably doubt that the Franks would leave the
15. WT 9.12/295.
16. IZaf. 82.
17. RA 155 = 268-9; WT 9.12.
18. IMuy. 66, see ch. 6.1 for details of al-Afdal's

attempts at negotiations.
242
safety of the walls of Jerusalem to attack his large

19
army . Al-Afdal had every reason to assume that the
Crusaders would not come out to face his force in open
battle, and this, coupled with the apparent truce his

20
ambassadors announced, made him doubly uncautious
A large flock of animals grazing on the plains
between Ascalon and Ibelin with three hundred bedouin

21
guards was attacked by 200 Frankish knights who drove
22
off the Arabs and captured their flocks . Any of the
bedouins who might have fled back to al-Afdal apparently
only reported the presence of a small Frankish raiding

23
party rather than the full army
The next day the Crusaders marshalled their troops
into nine units formed in three ranks so that they could
19. RA 157 = 271; WT 9.10.
20. Despite his obvious lack of precaution, al-Afdal

still had sent out some scouts according to Anon. 93.
21. Anon. 94 gives their number as 300, while R A . 156=

270 says they numbered 3000, an interesting example of
the inflation of figures. RA. 156-7 = 269-70 states
that the men were "herders of animals = p a n to i z 6 Z 6 6 tn t
antm als.um n which would seem to refer to bedouins, who
were going to sell animals to the Fatimid army. WT
9.12/396.
22. RA 156 = 269-70, Anon. 94.
23. RA 158 = 271.
243
meet attacks from whichever direction enemy skirmishers

24
might come . However, the flocks which the Crusaders
had captured the previous day were either following or
being driven along with the army and from a distance the
dark mass appeared to be soldiers, making the Crusader's

25
army appear much larger than it really was . Panic
began to spread among parts of the Fatimid army, and
some of them began to flee when it appeared to them that

26
they were badly outnumbered . As the Crusaders
approached the Fatimid army they apparently shifted
formation somewhat, for the author of the G z ita . claims
that Raymond of St. Gilles was on the right flank near
the sea, Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders and
24. Anon. 212; RA 158 = 271 (RA describes this order

more fully on 156 = 269); FC 1.31.6; WT 9.12.
25. RA 158 = 271; FC 1.31.5; Ekk. 18.2/180-1; AA 6.45;

WT 9.12.
26. WT 9.12 states that the Fatimids took to flight

before the fighting began. Most other source make it is
clear that there was some fighting.
27. Anon. 95. Oman, 1:290 and plate ix, gives a

reasonable account of how a change in formation from
that described by Raymond to that found in the Gesta may
have been carried out. See also Heerman's description
pp. 49ff. AA 6:45, while generally agreeing with the
Gesta, describes the organization of the Frankish army
in greater detail, and places Godfrey in the center with
2000 cavalry (cqiuutuml and 3000 infantry.
244
Tancred were in the center with Duke Godfrey on the

27
left
As the Crusaders came into view from the distance
the Fatimid army scrambled in an attempt to organize
itself. Apparently the infantry, not being required to
prepare horses and their saddles, were the first to

28
marshal . According to Fulcher the Fatimid army
"approached (the Crusader) formation like a stag

29
thrusting forward the branches of its horns This
formation is probably a description of what is described
as the h Z la Z Z or crescent shaped formation which is
described in the S Z y a ia t a.Z-HuJLab of al-Harthami as
follows: "The crescent shaped (h Z la Z Z ) formation has an
extension of the two wings (ja.naha.ynZ) in front of the
center. This formation was considered stronger for the
center and weaker for the wings. When this formation
was used they marshaled on the far edges of each wing

30
regiments (kurdus) of strong cavalry to protect them ."
This is exactly what we find the Fatimid troops doing at
28. AA 6:46 describes the Fatimid infantry the archery

duels between the Fatimid archers and the Franks.
29. FC 1.31.6=126.
30. HarthamI ch. 17.2, p. 34. See also ch. 5.2 for
additional discussion.
245
Ascalon, marshalling in the h Z l a lZ formation and sending
cavalry regiments (see below) to attack on the flanks.
As the h jL la ilZ formation is said to have been strongest
for the center thus may have been an attempt to delay
the Frankish attack against the center regiments thereby
allowing the main body of troops more time to organize
themselves.
A unit of bedouin cavalry attempted to circle around

31
the right Frankish flank in an envelopment tactic , but
these troops were driven off by a countercharge of
Godfrey's heavy knights. Meanwhile the Fatimid heavy
cavalry was attempting to saddle their horses and arm

32
themselves . But before they could completely mobilize
and marshal their ranks the Crusaders advanced within
archery range and exchanged volleys with the Fatimid
archers. This was followed by a charge of the heavy
Christian cavalry, which swept through the Fatimid
infantry ranks. At this point Al-Afdals standard
31. FC 1.31.6.
32. IAth. 10:286; IKhal. 4:142.
33. Anon. p. 95 states that Robert himself saw the

banner of the "amnuAaiu.A.ix. = amir al-juyush" and
attacked and killed the man carrying it. Later, however
(Anon. 97), the same author states that Robert purchased
al-Afdal's banner from the men who had captured it.
246
33
bearer was killed by a knight of Robert of Normandy ,
34
who captured the army standard
The Fatimid heavy cavalry was not yet fully prepared
for battle and was cast into confusion by the fleeing
infantry who further disrupted their order. They also
saw Al-Afâl's standard fall, and perhaps assumed he was
dead. At any rate joined the flight, apparently without

. 35
having engaged in combat . Many of the Fatimid
infantry fled into the sea and drowned while trying to
swim to the Fatimid fleet which was anchored offshore

36
nearby . Others fled into the large grove of sycamore
trees near Ascalon, which were set afire by the
Crusaders who then killed anyone who tried to escape the

37
flames . Many of the Fatimid cavalry apparent arrived
unharmed to Ascalon.
34. Dhah. 2:17 confirms that the Fatimid army's banner

was lost. The banner was said to have had a golden
apple on the top (Anon. 95). Qal. 3:473 mentions that
the two main Fatimid army banners were placed on "two
long spears dressed with joints of gold up to the spear
point." Perhaps these ended in a bulb of gold which was
mistaken by the Crusaders for an apple.
35. Other than the initial cavalry assaults on the

Crusader flanks there is no mention that the Fatimid
cavalry ever engaged the Franks.
36. Anon. 96.
37. Anon. 96; Maq. 3:24.
247
In many modern descriptions of the battle the
Fatimid army is described as preforming much worse than
it actually did, considering all the circumstances.
First, the army was caught off guard, and although many
of the infantry had time to marshal the regular Fatimid
cavalry does not seem to have been extensively involved
in the battle. Al-Afdal and the Fatimids were obviously
taken completely by surprise, and blame for this must be
placed squarely on Al-Afdal. The fact that the
Egyptians were surprised is mentioned by a number of
authors. Ibn al-AthTr specifically states, "The
Egyptians had not received reports of their (Crusader's)
arrival or activities and they were not prepared (u k b a )
for battle. They summoned (the cavalry) to mount their
horses and arm themselves, but the Franks charged and

38 _
routed them ." Ibn Khaldun, probably following Ibn
al-Athir, states that the (Crusaders) "ambushed them

39
(the Fatimids) while unprepared"
38. IAth. 10:286.
39. IKhal. 4:142, "ka.ba.6u.hum ea la . ghciyJi u k b a . n This

testimony of the Arabic sources is somewhat contradicted
by Anon. 95 who states that "The Pagans stood prepared
for battle," although he is here only be describing the
infantry, and would not have had direct knowledge of the
actual state of Fatimid readiness.
248
Second, the unreliable militia, and perhaps other
troops as well, panicked at the approach of the
Crusaders, assuming them to be much more numerous than
they really were because of the captured flocks

40
accompanying them . The Crusaders then launched a
massive cavalry charge against the partially formed
infantry, who had never previously faced a European
heavy shock cavalry tactics, and their lines were

41
crushed . The capture of Al-Afdal's standard, often an
event of crucial significance in medieval battles,
served to further confuse the situation and panic the
army. Finally, the heavy cavalry of the Fatimids never
managed to marshal for battle, and, having been thrown
into confusion by the fleeing infantry and loss of the
standard, also took to flight.
Thus although the battle was strategically a crucial
Crusader victory, which gave the Crusaders the time
needed to more firmly establish themselves in the
40. WT 9.12.
41. RA 158 = 271 mentions the Fatimids fled after a

single charge "u n o I m p t t u . . " Fatimid infantry were
accustomed to facing the " a i - via a l - k a i i i = flight
and return" cavalry tactics of most Muslim armies where
the cavalry would advance, skirmish and retire a number
of times. Thus the shock tactics of the Franks would
have cgme as a complete surprise.
249
region, it was by no means the tremendous tactical
success that many modern scholars claim. Smail's claim
that "the (knight's) charge alone secured the victory"
ignores the disastrous tactical situation in which the
Fatimids found themselves before the battle even began.
William of Tyre was probably not far from wrong when he
wrote, "The flight of the enemy gave the victory to the
Christians without effort on their part."
7.1.3 Sources
Arabic: ITagh. 5:149; Mag. 3:23-4; IAth. 10:286;
IQal. 136-7/48-9; IKhal. 4:142; IMuy. 66-7.
Latin: Anon. 210-4; RA 154-9 = 268-72; HEp..170-174;
FC 1.31; AA 6.44-50; Ekk. 17-18/172ff.; WT 9.10-12.
Others: ME. 2.125/311-2; MS. 15.7/3:184-6.
Modern References: Smail 85-7, 174-5 for a list of
other earlier descriptions; Nicholson, Tanc.x&d 98-101;
Runciman 1:297-6; Hill Raymond pp. 135-7.
7.2 Ramla: 7 September 1101
Although the Arabic and Latin sources are in basic
250
agreement as to the general course of events of the
battle, they disagree as to the final outcome and
significance, both sides claiming victory. Thus the
study of the battle of Ramla not only offers an
opportunity to examine the Fatimid army in battle, but
also to analyze the differences in perspective between
the Latin and Arabic sources, and how those sources are
used by modern historians.
It is impossible to arrive at an accurate estimate
of the number of Fatimid troops involved in the battle.
Fulcher states that the army consisted of 11,000 cavalry

1
and 21,000 infantry in which he is followed by William ;
Ekkehard qives the total Fatimid force at 40,000, while

2
Albert gives them 200,000 . These Latin figures are
certainly exaggerated, leaving us with no good evidence
of the size of the Fatimid force. Various phrases in
the Latin sources imply that the Fatimids outnumbered
1. FC 2.11.2; WT 10.17, William saying that there were

only 20,000 rather than 21,000. Note also that Fulcher
calls the Fatimid cavalry m ile .6 while William calls them
tqu.JULti>.
2. AA 7.63.
251
the Franks, which seems to have been true, but it is
impossible to arrive at an accurate ratio between the
two armies.
Two different sets of figures are given by the Latin
sources for the Crusader army. The first is 260 knights

3
and 900 infantry by Fulcher , which is roughly
equivalent to Albert's 300 cavalry { z q u Z iu J tu * ) and 1000

4
infantry . It is possible, however, that when Fulcher
wrote that there were only 260 knights in the army he
was referring only to those heavily armed cavalry who
had obtained knightly status. In his preceding sentence
Fulcher wrote that Baldwin had ordered that "whoever was
able should make his squire (aA .m lge.A iii) a knight

5
(m L te .i) It can be inferred from this statement that
there was another body of men, the a K m lQ tfu . squires
who perhaps served as cavalry more lightly armed than
the knights, and who were not officially numbered among
the when the cavalry was counted, who would have
perhaps been given heavier arms and knighted on the eve
of the battle. On the other hand, it is also possible
3. FC 2.11.2 followed by WT 10.17.
4. AA 7.63.
5. FC 2.11.2.
252
that the (Ln.mlgtnJi were not originally mounted troops and
part of making them knights was giving them horses.
This would seem unlikely, however, for simply giving a
man a horse and arms on the eve of a battle would not
make him an effective cavalryman. Some previous
equestrian and military skill seems implied if the king
thinks it worth the risk of giving expensive arms and
horses to the a xm lg zn J.. In Smail's useful discussion of
this question, he maintain that the s u m lg tJ u . "did not

6
normally take part in the action ," while nonetheless
holding that there were certainly additional light
cavalry not counted among the Albert speaks
not of knights ( m ilZ te .6 ) but of cavalry ( z q a iX a t Z ) and
gives their number as 300 rather than Fulcher's 260.
Perhaps the forty man difference in the figures is
because Fulcher counted knights only, while Albert added
on fourty mounted and armed OLKmJLgtnJ. to the fiaure of

7
260 knights .
Another set of figures is given by Ekkehard and the
Muslim sources. Ekkehard states that the Frankish army
6 . Smail p. 108ff.
7. Of course, the differences between these numbers may

also just be that Albert gave rounded figures.
253
8
numbered 1000 cavalryi z q u i X t i ) and 7000 infantry , in
which he is supported by Ibn al-QalanisI and Ibn
Muyassar both of whom claimed that the Frankish army

9
numbered 1000 cavalryand 10,000 .infantry . Sibt ibn
JawzI goes so far as to claim that 300,000 Franks were

10
killed in the battle
There are three possible explanations for the
differences between these two sets of numbers. First,
it may be that Ekkehard and the Muslims are simply
giving exaggerated figures. The figures of Fulcher and
Albert would surely be accepted over those of the Arab
writers were it not for Ekkehards figures being so
close to the Muslim's that it would seem more than a
mere coincidence. Second, it may be that Fulcher and
Albert are quoting only figures for the royal army, that
is the permanent troops of the kingdom, while Ekkehard
8 . Ekk. 29.7/268-9. It would be possible to argue that

Ekkehard is giving the total for the Frankish army after
the arrival of the Frankish fleet in Jaffa on 9 Sept.,
except he specifically states elsewhere that those
reinforcements consisted of 12,000 "brother pilgrims" in
30 ships.
9. IQal, 140 = 53-4; IMuy. 68 followed by Maq. 3:26.

Although the accounts of IQal. and IMuy. are similar,
there does not seem to be any direct quoting, which
seems to indicate an independent source for each.
10. Quoted by ITagh. 5:152.12ff.
254
and the Muslims are giving figures which include
temporary pilgrim auxiliaries. Although the main
Italian fleet had left earlier in the summer there were
other Frankish pilgrim groups which had coma that year,
for according to Ekkehard, Baldwin summoned troops from
all the cities of his kingdom "and Joppa, where not a

11
few of the mass of pilgrims remained ." Finally, it is
possible that Ekkehard and the Muslims are giving
figures for the Frankish army when it included the
Italian troops who had fought earlier in the summer but
left before the battle of Ramla was fought, mistakenly
assuming that those forces were still available at the
battle of Ramla when in reality most of the Italians had

12
gone home . Although none of these explanations can be
confirmed, I tend to favor the later.
7.2.2 The Battle
Following the Latin sources, Kagenmeyer accepts the
11. Ekk.28.6/262.
12. Caf. 5:65 gives the Italian force as 8000 men,

which, if added to Baldwin's permanent army would give a
figure near that of the Muslim chroniclers.
255
13
seventh of September 1101 as the date of the battle
Ibn al-Qalanisx and Ibn Muyassar claim that the battle
occurred sometime in Dhu'l-Hijja, or after 27 Sept.

14
1101 . As Fulcher was an eyewitness, the Frankish
chroniclers put some importance to the celebration of
the Nativity of St. Mary (8 Sept.) after the battle, and
the Muslim sources only give a month rather than an
actual date, the Frankish dating is probably correct.
The battle took place somewhere near Ramla, probably on

15
the Jaffa-Ramla road
16 17
The Franks were marshalled in five or six
iit it b (divisions). Fulcher implies that at least some
of the Crusader acl&4 were in front of the others when
he states that the two "anlz/u.0 A &6 (front)" aclzi were
overwhelmed and that Baldwin brought up his unit "a
13. HCh. 604-5.
14. IQal. 140 = 53; IMuy. 68 followed by Maq. 3:26.
15. "Around Lydda and Ramlah" about eight miles from

A baalon [WT 10.17), on thz noad bztuizzn Jaia and Ramla
(AA 7.63), "bztuizzn Ramla and J a{â" [IKkal. 4:143).
16. AA 7.64.
17. FC 2.11.10; WT 10.17.
256
18
p a t it z p o i& iz m a . = from the rear ." Nothing can be
learned of the Fatimid order of battle except that Sacd
al-Dawla commanded the center with his bodyguard as was
customary in Muslim armies.
The battle opened with a cavalry assault by the
Fatimids against both the right and left wings of the

19
Crusaders . Smail attributes such attempts .at double
envelopment by the Fatimids not as part of any
preconceived plan on their part, but simply due to the
fact that the Fatimids outnumbered the Franks so greatly .

20
that they naturally overlapped the Crusader flanks
Although the Fatimids were probably more numerous than

the Franks on this occasion, the Muslim military
theoretician al-Harthami clearly shows us that initial
cavalry attacks on both enemy flanks was an accepted

21
tactical maneuver for Muslim armies . The Franks then
attacked with two or three of their d z i.z b in succession,
18. FC 2.11.11. Smail discusses other scholars'

interpretations of this evidence and concludes that
nothing certain can be said about the ordering of the
a.zlLzi>, p. 175 n. 4 & 5.
19. FC 2.11.10.
20. Smail p. 86.
21. Harthami ch. 24.5, p. 41, see Ch. 5.2.
257
22
each being badly defeated by the Fatimids . A charge
of the Fatimid cavalry crushed the of the Franks
on the right flank, and continued into the Crusader
infantry in the rear who were also badly defeated, many

23
of them fleeing . On the other hand, nearly all the
Muslim sources agree that it was the two wings of the
Fatimid army which were defeated while the center held

_24
firm. Ibn al-Qalanisi also adds that the victorious
Fatimid charge occurred after Sa^d al-Dawla had been
killed, which would place it after Baldwin's final
attack.
These differing accounts can be somewhat reconciled
by assuming that the Fatimid cavalry on the left flank
attacked and defeated the Frankish right wing, pushing
on to crush the Frankish infantry in the rear and
22. Two attacks according to FC 2.11.11; three from AA

7.64 who also says that only one knight of the first
iIC.A.Z6, two of the second and none of the third survived
the charges. Ibn Muyassar agrees that there were a
number of charges and encounters between the two
armies. IMuy. 68 = Maq. 3:26.
23. FC 2.13.2, stating that the right ac-cea was defeated

by the Fatimids who pushed on into the infantry in the
rear "= pidJLU,bu.i> Yio6tnJ.i> Zn po&tKtm a. p a .fu tz . William
of Tyre 10.17 speaks of "pnj.m az ho6tyiu.m a.c.Ltb = the
first enemy c L c Z ti defeating one of the Frankish a.cZe.6
and then pursuing them off the field.
24. IQal. 140 = 54.
258
pursuing the fugitives to Jaffa. At roughly the same
time, Baldwin and the fourth Frankish CLC/.&&, fortified
by the Holy Cross and prayer, made the next attack which
was also nearly defeated, when a final charge by the
fifth acxeA, and the death of the Fatimid commander Sacd
al-Dawla, broke the resistance of at least part of the

25
Fatimid line .
Thus at roughly the same time sections
26
of both armies fled while other units were victorious ,
and both sides were able to claim a victory in the

27
battle
According tc Fulcher the Crusaders lost eighty
knights and a greater number of infantry, while claiming

28
to have killed 5000 Fatimids . The Muslims give no
25. AA 7.66-7, following Albert's description of the

order of attack of the a cJL ti,, which is given in more
detail than Fulcher's, FC 2.11.13.
26. Which is what Fulcher apparently perceived, writing

that "in the tail the Christians fell, while at the head
they defeated the Saracens" FC 2.12.2.
27. The fact that the Fatimid camp was plundered by the
Crusaders should not be taken as evidence of a major
Fatimid defeat, for the only spoils taken by the
Crusaders were "bread, grain,- and flour as well as their
tents" (FC 2.13.1) which indicates that the camp was a
only temporary field camp and their main base with
weapons, armour, treasure, etc. was not captured.
28. FC 2.11.14, but Fulcher admits rhat no one took the

time to count the Fatimid bodies, so no credence should
be placed in his figure of Fatimid casualties.
259
exact figures, but imply that the Franks suffered

29
heavier casualties than the Fatimids
Following the battle Baldwin gathered what men he
could and spent the night in the tents of the

30
Fatimids . The next day Baldwin was able to muster
only fourty knights and 200 infantry, which set out for
31
Jaffa . If Fulcher's figures of 260 knights and 900
infantry are accepted for the size of the original
Crusader force, then Baldwin was left with only about
fifteen per cent of his knights and 22 per cent of his
infantry. This leaves a large portion of the army
unaccounted for.. Although some troops may have still
been scattered in pursuit of the Fatimids, many others
had undoubtedly been killed or fled to Jaffa. The fact
that nearly all modern writers claim that Ramla was a
Crusader victory when less than one fourth of their army
remained intact when the battle had ended again
indicates an overreliance on the medieval Latin
perspective.
29. IQal. 140 =54 "only a small number of them

(Fatimids) were slain"; IMuy. 68 = Maq. 3:26 "they (the
Fatimids) killed a number and captured many."
30. FC 2.12.3.
31. AA 7.68.
260
Baldwins remaining troops encountered a body of

32
about 500 Fatimid cavalry , armed with captured
Frankish weapons, returning from pillaging the region
around Jaffa. The Fatimids were surprised by the
approach of the Frankish army, which they thought had
been completely defeated, and scattered without a fight

33
when the knights attacked .
Modern historians have tended to follow the Latin
sources in ascribing victory to Baldwin and the

34
Crusaders, , despite the fact that Fulcher himself
stated that "on that day none knew the result of the
35
battle They also seem to be either completely
ignoring or at least essentially disregarding the

36
testimony of the Arab chronicles . If serious
consideration is given to the Arab sources, it appears
32. Whom FC 2.13 calls Arabs, while AA 7.68 calls them

Saracens, claiming they numbered 20,000.
33. FC 2.13.4-5; AA 7.69.
34. Smail p. 176, speaks of "the victorious Baldwin"

who won the battle; Runciman pp. 74-5.
35. FC 2.12.
36. The Muslim sources are unanimous in claiming victory

for the Fatimids, with the exception of Ibn al-AthTr who
claimed that the Muslims were defeated. However, Ibn
al-Athir's account of this battle is quite confused and
he integrates it with several other battles.
261
37
that the battle was long and hard fought , both sides
being able to claim victory because they were each
victorious in certain sections and episodes of the
battle.
It might be possible to conclude that from a
strategic point of view the purposes of the Franks were
better served. They managed to maintain the integrity
of their position and secure their newly conquered
cities. However, the fact that the Fatimid army failed
to continue the siege of Jaffa which had been initiated
by their fleet is probably due more to the arrival of
12,000 additional pilgrims from Europe a few days after

38
the battle than their supposed defeat at Ramla . On
the other hand, eighty Frankish knights one third
their total force and a large number of infantry had

39
been killed . Without t.e constant influx of both
seasonal and permanent military manpower from Europe it
would only have taken two or three such "victories" to
37. Agreeing with AA 7.67 who says the fighting lasted

until vespers. Fulcher's statement (2.11.15) that "the
battle was riot long in doubt," in context clearly refers
to events only after the king's charge at the end of the
battle, not the entire conflict.
38. Ekk. 31.
39. FC 2.11.14.
262
have completely destroyed the military capability of the
Franks in southern Palestine^
7.2.3 Sources .
Arabic: IQal. 140 = 53-4; IAth. 10:364; IMuy. 68 ;
IKhal. 4:143; Maq. 3:26; ITagh. 5:153.
Latin: FC 2.11; AA 7.57ff; WT 10.17; Ekk. 27-31.
References: Runciman 2:74-5; Smail, pp. 175-6, and
the other earlier sources he mentions.
It is unclear why Smail has concluded that Fulcher's
"account is the only trustworthy source of

40
information ," seeming to completely ignore both
Albert's and Ibn al-Qalanisi's descriptions in his
reconstruction. It is true that Fulcher was an
eyewitness which makes his version extremely important,
but Albert and the Muslim authors could also easily have
had recourse to firsthand accounts of the battle, either
oral or written, and their testimonies should be
completely discounted.
Although Albert gives extravagant figures for the
size of the Fatimid army (see above) and glorifies
40. Smail p. 175.
263
Baldwin's role by having him personally slay Sacd
al-Dawla,- he also gives significant details which would
seem to have been able to come only from eyewitnesses.
For instance, he gives names of the commanders of the
various Latin (7.64), tells us that Gerhard was
carrying the Holy Cross (7.69) whom Fulcher calls only
"a certain abbot" (FC 2.11.7), names the horse of the
king (7.66), and gives the number of men who faced the
Fatimid troops returning from Jaffa on the following day
(7.68).
7.3 Ramla: 17 May 1102
7.3.1 Dating
There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the date
of this battle and the events of the campaign in
general. Hagenmeyer, based on the Latin sources, dates

1
the battle on 17 May . On the other hand, Muslim
sources, excepting Ibn al-Qalanis!, are confused as to
the year of the battle, and Ibn al-Athir wrongly orders
1. HCh. 10:160ff gives a summary of most of the relevant

information, basically following Fulcher's chronology.
264
2
the events . Ibn al-Qalanisi says that the Egyptian
army reached Ascalon in Eajab (22 April to 21 May), and
the city of Ramla fell to the Egyptians before that
month had ended.
The chronological discrepancies of the various
authors can be reconciled for the most part by the
following theory. The Fatimid army arrived at Ramla
near the beginning of Mav and began preparations to

3
besiege the city . Baldwin began gathering his forces
during the following week and advanced against the
Fatimids shortly before May 17, when the battle was
fought. Ramla fell before the 21st of May, some three

4
days after the actual battle of Ramla , but some 15 days
5
after the siege preparations actually began . Thus
according to this interpretation the siege began about 5
2. IAth. 10:364. His chronology for the events in

southern Palestine for 1101-3 is confused, and he has
described many events of ail those years anno 496
(1102/3).
2. FC 2.15.2, and consistent with Ibn al-Qalanisi's

Rajab (22 April to 21 May) for the arrival of the
Fatimid army in Palestine.
4. Fulcher implies that the city fell within a few days

of Baldwin's defeat FC 2.18-20 passim.
5. IAth. 10:364 says the siege lasted 15 days, although

he implies that it began after Baldwin's defeat.
265
May. the battle occurred about 17 May and Ramla fell on

6
20 May, a few days after the battle , but 15 days after
the siege began.
7
Fulcher mentions 20,000 Egyptians in the actual
battle, although he claims that the original army which
came from Egypt consisted of 20,000 cavalry and 10,000

8
infantry . The Arab sources give no numbers and the
9
Latin figures are certainly an exaggeration , leaving no
accurate numbers for the size of the Fatimid
army.
Fulcher claimed that Baldwin's Franks numbered no

10 11
more than 200 knights , while Albert gives them 700 ,
in which he is supported by Muslim chroniclersr Ibn
al-Qalanisi claimed that the Frankish army consisted of
6 . AA 9.6 dates the fall of Ramla three days after the

battle.
7. FC 2.18.7; WT 10.20.
8 . FC 2.15.1.
9. See ch. 3.4.3.
10. FC 2.18.7 followed by WT 10.20.
11. AA 9.3-4.
266
12
700 infantry and cavalry , while Sibt ibn Jawzi, who
for the most quotes Ibn al-Qalanisi, gives the figure of

13
900 infantry and cavalry . The two figures can be
reconciled if the 200 knights are seen as those
permanent troops under Baldwin, while an additional 500
were mustered from the knights waiting passage to Europe

14
at Jaffa .
Albert also mentions that there were 10,000 men
marching on the road fros? Jaffa to Ramla coming to
support the King but who did not participate in the

15
actual battle . Albert's figure, although perhaps an
exaggeration, is not impossibly large. From his forces
permanently stationed in Palestine Baldwin could raise

16
1-2000 infantry , to which should be added several
thousand men who were left in Palestine after the
12. IQal. 141 = 55. IQal.'s figure of 700 coincides with

IAth. 10:364 where he states that the Franks had 700 men
not during the battle, but in Ramla during the siege
which began the next day.
13. Sibt. 8.1:1; thi-s is perhaps a scribal error for

IQal.'s 700.
14. FC 2.15.6.
15. AA 9.4.
16. For example 700 in 1101, FC 2.1.1; 900 in 1101 FC

2.11.2; 2000 in 1105, FC 2.32.3.
17
Crusade of 1101 , and several thousand others who had
18
arrived as pilgrims in the Spring of 1102
7.3.3 The Battle
The battle occurred somewhere near Ramla, ten miles

19
from Jaffa according to Albert . Ibn al-AthTr places
20
it at Yazur . The Fatimid army was under the general
command of Sharaf al-MacalT, the son of Al-Afdal, and
included contingents from the garrison of Ascalon, which

21
was at this time commanded by Nasir al-Dawla , as well
22
as regular Fatimid reinforcements from Egypt
Al-Afdal had originally mobilized the army to relieve
v'.iat he perceived to be the beginnings of a siege of
17. FC 2.18.3.
18. FC 2.15.6.
19. AA 9.4.
20. IAth. 10:364.
21. Sibt. 8.1:1.
22. WT 10.20 said that the army which advanced on Ramla

consisted of "the people of Ascalon and those Egyptians
who had escaped the battle (of Ramla in 1101)."
23. IAth. 10:345; IQal. 141=55. The governor of Beirut

apparently perceived Baldwin's presence there while
awaiting the Crusaders from the Crusade of 1101 as the
precursor to a siege.
26 8
23
Beirut which never developed .' When the army arrived
in Palestine they established a base camp and began
siege operations against Ramla. In the meantime a
Fatimid fleet advanced and blockaded Jaffa in
preparations for a siege.
The general outline of the following events is well
known and need not be recounted in any great detail

24
here . Baldwin gathered some of his local army,
supplemented by a large body of survivors from the

25
Crusade of 1101 in Jaffa , and advanced against the
Fatimid army at Ramla. As the army was advancing up the
Jaffa-Ramla road Baldwin's scouts reported there was a
small body of Fatimid cavalry ahead. Leaving behind his

26
infantry, Baldwin with 700 cavalry , advanced to drive
off what he thought was only a small Fatimid vanguard or
scouting party. The Fatimid force was either much
larger than expected, or had been reinforced in the
meantime, and the Frankish charge failed. In the
ensuing melee nearly all of the Frankish knights were
24. See Runciman 2:76ff for a general description.
25. FC 2.18.3
26. As mentioned above the exact number is disputed,

either 200 or 700.
265
either killed or captured.
In has generally been assumed by modern writers that
Baldwin's knights faced the entire Fatimid army at this
engagement, although this may not have been the case.
Aside from exaggerated accounts giving the Fatimids
thousands of men, we have a statement by Fulcher that
the scouts reported that there were no more than 700 to

27
1000 enemy cavalry , probably an accurate estimate.
The Fatimid forces which finally met Baldwin probably
outnumbered the Franks, but exact numbers can not be
determined.
At any rate, Smail's judgment that Baldwin attacked
without "any intelligent plan of action," seems harsh.
There are actually a number of ways to interpret
Baldwin's action. It can be assumed that the Fatimids
were many times more numerous than the Franks, who had
little sense of military reality and thought that a few
hundred knights could actually defeat thousands. A
second theory is that the Fatimids prepared an ambush,
with a few hundred men as bait who lured Baldwin to
attack. After he had committed his troops the Fatimids
sprang their trap with a counter attack by hidden forces
27. FC 2.18.5.
270
and defeated Baldwin. However, there is no indication
of this in the sources. Finally we can assume that the
Fatimid army, although perhaps outnumbering the Franks,
was not so numerous as to preclude a victory by
Baldwin's charge and won the victory by hard

28
fighting
The number of Frankish casualties according to
different Muslim sources were 400 Franks were killed and

29
300 taken prisoner . On the other hand Ibn Muyassar
30
claims that 900 Franks were taken captive to Egypt
If accurate the first figure probably represents those
killed and taken prisoner during the entire campaign
around Ramla in May, while Ibn Muyassar's number perhaps
represents the total number of prisoners taken during
the entire summer.
7.3.4 Sources
Arabic: IQal. 141=55-6; IMuy. 74; IAth, 10:345-6,
28. The bravery and skill of the Fatimid troops in this

battle is described by AA 9.4.
29. IAth. 10:364; followed by Maq. 3:32; Dhah. 2:19,

again supporting the 700 figure for the size of
Baldwin's cavalry force-
30. IMuy. 74.
271
10:364; Maq. 3:32; Dhah. 2:18,19; Sibt. 8.1:1; ITagh.
5:128.
Latin: FC 2.15, 2.18; AA 9.3*4; WT 10.20.
Other: ME 3.7/344*5.
References: Runciman 2:75*9 provides narrative
account. Smail 176-7, and other sources mentioned
there.
7.4 The Battles of Jaffa, 1102
7.4.1 Dating
There are two different seemingly irreconcilable
dates given for the this battle. The first is based on

1 2
Fulcher , and followed by Hagenmeyer , giving the date
of the battle as 27 May. According to this chronology.
the Frankish naval reinforcements mentioned by Albert as
arriving on "a Tuesday in July," could not yet have

3
arrived when the Fatimid siege was broker. . The Arab
1. FC 2.21.1-9.
2. HCh. #656.
3. AA 9.12.
272
sources are not directly helpful in resolving the
question of chronology, as they give no specific dates,
although they all agree that the fleet had arrived
before the battle occurred, thereby supporting Albert.
In order to attempt to resolve this problem it is
necessary to make a detailed examination of Alberts
chronology. According to Albert the battle of Ramla

4
took place sometime before 25 May , Hagenmeyer argues
that the actual date for the battle was 17 May, which
o
can be accepted as generally accurate . After fleeing
from the battle Baldwin spent two "days and nights"
evading the Fatimid scouts and raiding parties, which

6
would have him arriving in Arsuf on 19 May , where he
7
spent seven days, May 20 to 26 . On 27 May Baldwin
sailed to Jaffa, and the next day, the 28th, made a
4. AA 9.2, that is "near Pentecost."
5. HCh. #645, see ch. 7.3.1. This date agrees with

Albert in being before Pentecost, and can be reconciled
with IAth. who says that the Ramla fell before the end
of Rajab, or May 21, and Fulcher who says the city fell
three days after the battle.
6. AA 9.5, I take this to be the night of the 17th and

all of the 18th, arriving in Arsuf in the evening of the
19th.
7. AA 9.9.
8
sortie against the Fatimid army , after which the
Fatimids broke camp and marched to the plains of Ascalon
where they established a new base, remaining for three
weeks, 29 May to 18 June. They then returned to Jaffa
and set up a new siege which continued for 15 days, from
19 June to 3 July. During this second siege a European
fleet arrived at Jaffa on " t z /u t ia . izfuLa. J u lL L tnzniZ A or

9
"a Tuesday in July ," the first Tuesday in July falling
on 1 July. Albert then says that on "Friday," which
would be 4 July, Baldwin led his permanent army and the
new reinforcements from the fleet in an attack against

10
the Fatimids in which the Egyptians were defeated .
According to Albert, then, the battle of Jaffa occurred
on 4 July, the day after the 15th day of the second

11
siege of Jaffa Thus Albert's chronology is remarkably
12
self-consistent . But is it correct?
8 . AA 9.10.
9. AA 9.11.
10. AA 9.12.
11. In other words, the second siege lasted 15 days,

until Thursday the 3rd, and was broken by Baldwin.s
attack on the 16th day, which was Friday the 4th.
12. Hch. #656 has a detailed discussion of Albert's

dating in which he arrives at slightly different
conclusion than mine.
274
One would naturally be inclined, along with
Hagenmeyer, to accept Fulcher's chronology since he was
in Jerusalem during these events. In order to do so,
however, one must essentially ignore the testimony of
the Arab and Syrian chroniclers who unanimously state
that the siege of Jaffa was not broken until after the
13
arrival of the fleet from Europe , thereby lending
strong support to Albert's version.
There is a way, however, to reconcile Fulcher's and
Albert's chronologies. Albert maintains that after his
arrival at Jaffa Baldwin made a sortie against the
Fatimids on 28 May, after which they decided to abandon

14
their initial siege and retreat toward Ascalon . It is
possible that this sortie by Baldwin is in reality the
battle described by Fulcher, and the later battle on
July 4 was not included in Fulcher's account, who either
confused the two battles or condensed them into one
account, describing the details of the battle which
occurred on July 4 while dating it on the date of the
first skirmish, 28 May.
13. IQal. 141=56; IMuy. 74; Maq. 3:32; IAth. 10:365; ME

3.12/342.
14. AA 9.10.
275
According to this interpretation there were actually
two battles at Jaffa in the summer of 1102, which modern
historians, following Fulcher, have combined into one.
After the defeat at Ramla the Fatimid army scattered
throughout southern Palestine pillaging the entire
region and disrupting communications. William of Tyre
says that the Fatimids were in full possession of the

15
countryside . Fatimid troops were found at Ramla,
16 ' 1 7
Arsuf , and Jerusalem as well as Jaffa. Thus the
Fatimid force which arrived outside Jaffa in late May
was not their entire force, but rather only one division
sent to blockade the city. In the meantime the Fatimid
officers could not decide whether to attemot to besiege

18
Jaffa or Jerusalem . On 28 May Baldwin made a sortie
in force against the Fatimids troops outside Jaffa, who,
surprised by zh e presence of the King, abandoned their
camp and withdrew down the coast where they established
a new camp which would be secure from such surprise
sorties, and spent the next three weeks' regrouping their
15. WT 10.22.
16. FC 2.20.2.
17. AA 9.7.
18. IMuy. 74; Maq. 3:32; IAth. 10:364.
276
scattered forces, gathering supplies and preparing siege
equipment. The decision was finally made to strike
against Jaffa and the strengthened army returned there
on the on 19 June and began a second siege in force. It
was this major second siege which was defeated on 4 July
after the arrival of the Crusader reinforcements by
sea.
The sources do not allow us to accurately determine
the exact or relative sizes of the two armies. Most of
what follows if therefore necessarily conjecture. No
reliable information is given concerning the number of
the Fatimids, although Fulcher insists they far

19
outnumbered the Franks . Certainly the entire Fatimid
expeditionary force was not present besieging Jaffa.

20
Five hundred Fatimid cavalry were investing Arsuf ,
while other groups were raiding the region around
Jerusalem, keeping the city garrison constantly on the
19. FC 2.21.10.
20. FC 2.20.2.
21. AA 9.7.
277
21
alert . It is likely that the Fatimid army on 28 May
was only a small portion of the Fatimid forces sent to
blockade Jaffa, while by 4 July much more of the Fatimid
army had been gathered to pursue a full scale siege of
the city.
According to Albert, the Crusaders had a force of
10,COC infantry which were advancing towards Ramla on 17
May but who never participated in the battle there
because they fled to Jaffa when news of the King's

22
defeat reached them . Many of these men, even if they
actually numbered less than the 10,000 Albert claimed,
would have still been in Jaffa and could have
participated in the first battle there on 28 May. In
addition Baldwin could probably muster about 200

23
knights, 80 who arrived with Hugh of Tiberius , 90 from
24
Jerusalem , and probably several dozen others from
various sources.
For the second battle on 4 July Albert claims that
22. AA 9.4; see ch. 7.3 for a discussion of this figure.
23. FC 2.20.2
24. FC 2.21.7
278
25
200 ships full of pilgrims and soldiers arrived ,
although Ibn al-Qalanisi says they numbered only 40

26
ships . Which ever figure is correct, it is clear that
there would have been several thousand additional
soldiers from the ships, giving Baldwin a very strong
and large force.
7.4.3 Battle
The first battle on 28 May occurred about three

27
miles from Jaffa according to Fulcher . Little detail
is known but it seems that the King made a sortie with
only a small force, and the Fatimids withdrew almost

28
immediately . It is quite possible that this flight
was actually a feigned retreat in an attempt to draw the

29
Crusaders out of their fortifications to be more
easily attacked. Baldwin refused to follow the Fatimid
army which established another camp between Ascalon and
25. AA 9.11.
26. IQal. 141 = 56.
27. FC 2.21.10.
28. AA 9.10.
29. Harthaml, ch. 34.5, p. 57 describes this tactic, see

ch. 5.3.
279
Jaffa and began preparations for a renewal of the
siege.
In the battle on 4 July, the Franks, with a strong
army reinforced from the newly arrived fleet, managed to
surprise the Fatimids who were preparing siege equipment

30'
in their camp . The Fatimid troops left off their work
on siege equipment and rushed to arms. They suffered
badly from Frankish archery, but managed to sustain

31
numerous attacks from the Frankish knights , while
striking heavy blows against the Crusader infantry.
Eventually the Fatimid force retired, but apparently in
good order, for Fulcher mentions that they carried much
of their valuables away with them, saying that the
Crusader's booty included only some provisions, camels,

32
donkeys and tents . This battle demonstrates not only
the Fatimid's capacity to absorb repeated attacks by
Frankish knights, but also to maintain cohesion and
discipline on the battlefield in the face of defeat.
30. FC 2.21.9-13.
31. FC 2.21.11 mentions that the knights were compelled

to attack and withdraw a number of times.
32. FC 2.21.13.
7.4.4 Sources
Arabic: IQal. 141 = 56; IMuy. 74; Maa. 3:32;
IAth. 10:365.
Latin: FC 2.21; AA 9.7-12; WT 10.22.
Other: ME 3.12/342.
7.5 Ramla: 27 August 1105
The battle of Ramla in 1105 represents one of the
two occasions on which the Fatimid army seems to
have initiated offensive action in Palestine
without previous aggression by the Crusaders. It
has also been studied by several historians who
have seen it as a major defeat of the Fatimid
military system and the last major attempt of the
Fatimids to reconquer Palestine. As will be shown,
these views require some modification.
Ibn al-Qalanisi tells us that the Fatimid army
numbered over 10,000 cavalry and infantry^. This
figure is seemingly contradicted by Ibn al-Athir and
other Arabic sources who mention that the Fatimid
army contained 5000 men, with the assistance of 1300
2
cavalry supplied by Tughtakin of Damascus .
Al-Dhahabi, however, gives 2300 cavairy from
Damascus which, in view of the other sources,

3
should probably be considered a scribal error .
Fulcher calls the men from Damascus "excellent
archers" which, in connection with the Arab
sources saying they were cavalry, implies that

4__________ ___
they were mounted archers . In Maqrizi's version
it states that there were 5000 cavalry, rather
than 5000 men; but since he is following
1. IQal. 148/70.
2. IAth. 10:394; Maq. 3:35; IKhal. 4:144.
3. Dhah, 2:20.
4. FC 2.31.1, Smail pp. 85-6.
282
Ibn al-Athirs account^, it would seem that this is
an interpolation on his part.
These seemingly contradictory accounts can be
resolved in two ways, it can be assumed that Ibn
al-Qalanisi is describing the entire army as
numbering 10,000 men, of which Ibn al-Athir only
mentioned the 5000 cavalry, implying there were also

g
5000 infantry in the army . On the other hand, Ibn
Muyassar relates that al-Afdal expended a great deal
of money recruiting a large body of Arabs which were
then mobilized along with regular Fatimid regiments

7
and sent to Ascalon . It is- thus likely that the
5000 figure given by Ibn al-Athir represents the
5. Although Maq. based most of his work on IMuy., he

did add material from other sources. As the 5000
figure is not given in IMuy., Maq. probably got it
from IAth., whom he seems to paraphrase. It is not
impossible, however, that both IAth. and Maq. both
took their accounts from a source which is now lost,
the SZfiat a l - A ^ d a l for example, in which case Maq.'s
version may actually be more accurate.
6. This proportion of cavalry to infantry is

consistent with the general organization of the
Fatimid army. See Ch. 3.4.
7. IMuy. 75 followed by Maq. 3:35.
283
regular Fatimid troops which should be added the 1300
horse archers from Damascus and an additional several
thousand irregular bedouin mercenaries who had been
hired by al-Afdal for this campaign, bringing the
total to around 10,000.
Latin sources consistently give the Fatimids a
much large' army. Fulcher claims they numbered
15.000 including cavalry and infantry8, Albert

9 10
40.000 , and Ekkehard 50,000 . The latter two
figures are impossible, but Fulcher's does not far
exceed Ibn al-Qalanisi's "more than 10,000 men."
The numbers given by the various authors for the
si2 e of the Crusader army also vary considerably,
even among the Latin sources alone. The lowest
figure is given by Fulcher as 500 knights, an
unspecified additional number of cavalry, and
2000 i n f a n t r y E k k e h a r d gives 4000 total,
8. FC 2.32.3 = WT 11.3. .
9. AA 9.49.
10. Ekk. 33.2/285.
11. FC 2.32.3, followed by WT 11.3.
284
Albert 6000^. Finally/ Ibn al-Athir, followed by
most later Muslim sources, gives the size of the
Crusader army as 1300 cavalry and 8000 infantry"^.
Although it is basically impossible to attempt
to reconcile these disparate numbers, the following
observations should he made. Ibn al-Athir's figure
for cavalry is not necessarily a gross exaggeration.
To Fulcher's 500 knights must be added an additional
number of "those who were not called knights,

14
although they were mounted ," who could well have
numbered several hundred, and a force of 100 Turkish

15
mounted archers sent by Irtash ibn Tutush . Ibn
al-Athxr claims that Irtash \wxiom he calls Baktash)
was himself at the battle. This is contradicted by
Ibn al-Qalanisi who says that Irtash was at the Busra
before the battle, and afterwards fled to Rahba,
12. Ekk. 286; AA 9.49.
13. lath. 10:395; Maq. 3:35; Dhah. 2:20.
14. FC 2.32.3 " i l l i 4 q u i m i l i t a x i nomine, non

czn4zba.ntu.SL, t a n z m zqu.ita.ntZ6".
15. lath. 10:395, followed by IKhal. 4:144.
285
16
seeming to imply that Irtash never left Busra
Albert says that a young Turk named Muhammad joined
Baldwin with 100 Turkish archers, who were

17
undoubtedly mounted" . It seems likely that despite
Ibn al-Athir1s. statement, Irtash remained at Busra,
as is implied by Ibn al-Qalanisi, but sent 100
mounted archers to support the Franks under the ami*.
named Muhammad. The 500 knights, 100 horse archers
from the Busra, and the additional non-knightly
cavalry could conceivably increase the tocal for
the Frankish cavalry force to 1000 men and possibly

18
as high as Ibn al-Athir's 1300 . A figure of about
1000 cavalry is given some additional substantiation
by Albert's statement that the Frankish army was
divided into five ac.iz& and Baldwin's contained 160
cavalry. If each division had an equal number of
cavalry, the total would be 800, 500 of whom would
16. IQal. 148-9/71.
17. AA 9.49.
18. However, all of this is simply guess work. It

is equally possible that the non-knightly cavalry
numbered only several dozen rather than several
hundred.
286
have been knights and to which should be added the

19
100 Muslim horse archers
The figures for the infantry are much more
difficult to deal with. Both Fulcher and Ekkehard
were in Palestine at the time of the battle and their
accounts should be given greater credence than the
others, but even so Ekkehard's number is double that
of Fulcher. On the other hand, Fulcher's figure of
2000 infantry stands alone in opposition to the
figures of all the other sources who cluster between

20
4000 and 8000 . Furthermore, Fulcher admits that
21
his figure of 2000 infantry is an "estimate ."
Fulcher's figure could be seen as his estimate of
the general size of Baldwin's permanent infantry force
19. AA 9:49. Of course, the divisions may not have

been of equal size.
20. Ekk. 286, 4000; AA 9:49, 6000; IAth. 10:395

followed by other later Muslims, 8000.
21. FC 2.32.3, "cLZitimabcLntuA .." Of course, most

numbers for army sizes given inthe sources for this
period should be thought of as estimates. Nonetheless,
Fulcher's use of this term perhaps implies that he
was not certain of the accuracy of his figure.
287
to which could be added a rew thousand pilgrims who
visited Palestine each summer. Although there is no
evidence that a major Latin pilgrim fleet or naval
expedition operated in southern Palestinian waters
during the summer of 1105, it is clear that the
yearxy summer influx of pilgrims was numerically
significant and they were more than willing to assist
in military operations. Fulcher, describing events
in 1113, wrote that "in that season (July-August) the
pilgrims from overseas were arriving as was customary,

22
and our army grew from day to day ." As the battle
occurred at the end of August, it is not impossible
that a large number of pilgrims could have been
present. However, this theory is directly
contradicted by Fulcher who states that "we were few

23
and without the usual assistance of pilgrims ." If
there was significant pilgrim participation,
Ekkehard's or Albert's figures of from four to six
thousand are probably accurate. If only permanent
22. FC 2.51.2.
23. FC 2.31.1.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. F u r th e r reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
troops from Palestine participated, Fulcher's
estimate seems more appropriate.
7.5.2 The Battle
All Muslim sources date the battle on 27 August

24
1105 , which is accepted by Hagenmeyer as consistent
25
with the Latin sources . According to Albert, who
gives the most specific geographic information, the

26
battle occurred on a plain near Ibelin , which is
consistent withthe general sense of all the other

27
sources: between Jaffa and Ascalon ; four miles
28
from Ramla
The Fatimid army marched from Ascalon in the
latter part of August and encamped on the plain of
24. = 1 4 Dhu al Hujja: IQal. 149/71; IMuy. 75; Maq.

3:35; IAth. 10:395 dates it only in Dhu al-Kujja.
25. KCh. #756.
26. AA 9.48.
27. IQal. 149/71; IAth. 10:395; IMuy. 75; Maq. 3:35.
28. FC 2.32.3.
233
Ibelin about four miles south of Ramla while the fleet
began a blockade of Jaffa. According to Albert and
Fulcher, the Fatimid plar was for the presence of the
fleet to pin down the Crusader army in Jaffa, leaving

29
the Fatimid army free to atack both Ramla and Jaffa
If their reports of the Fatimid strategy are correct,
this is a good indication of an attempt by the Fatimids
to achieve some type of strategic surprise^. Baldwin,
with his usual vigor, attempted to retain the
initiative and rushed to attack the Fatimid land
forces before any siege attempt on Jaffa would allow

31
them to link with their fleet
The Fatimid army was composed of a number of
distinct corps, under the overall command of Sanay
al-Mulk Husayn, one of Al-Afdal's sons. As described
above, the main body consisted of the regular
29. AA 9.48; FC 2.32.4.
30. See Ch. 6.2 for a discussion of Fitimid strategic

difficulties.
31. AA 9.49 states specifically that Baldwin's goal

in attacking was "to prevent the infidels from safely
advancing."
290
regiments from Egypt, to which were added the regular
garrison from Ascalon and perhaps additional city
militia under the governor of Ascalon, Jamal al-Mulk,
a large body of Arab bedouin irregulars, and the 1300
Syrian horse archers sent by TughtakTn under the

32
command of a Turkish cumZi, Sabawa . The Crusaders
marshalled .in five a.tliA of both cavalry and infantry

33
with Baldwin commanding the reserve
The cwo armies met on the plain of Ibelin and the

34
forces engaged on the morning of the 27th . The
Fatimid force was taken somewhat by surprise by
Baldwin's swift advance and vigorous attack, which
seems to have disrupted their original marching plan
and thrown their troops into some disorder, compelling
them to reorganize. Nonetheless, the Fatimids managed
37. IKh.il. 4:144.
33. AA 9.49.
34. AA 9.49, FC 2.32.4.
35. FC2.32.4 " A t m u t n.zgZoba.ti A u n t m z t t m t n z Auo

confiuAo ."
291
to take the initiative. Their cavalry wings

36
outflanked the Crusaders and on one flank the
Damascene contingent initiated an archery assault

37
followed by a melee with swords
Baldwin, although hard pressed by this charge,
launched a counter attack with his reserve regiment
to which the Damascene Turks responded with their
standard evasion tactics. This initial defection
and flight of the Damascene Turks was followed by
a strong Frankish charge against the Fatimid infantry
whose right flank was not at least partially unguarded
due to the flight of the Turks, and the retreat
became general"^. The ^mounted soldiers were able to
36. FC 2.32.6.
37. FC 2.32.6. It is interesting to note here the

Smail Cp. 861 attributes this flanking attack as the
"traditional manner" of attack by the Turks, while
similar Fatimid flanking attacks in other battles
with Syrian allies were due only to a supposed
"numerical superiority" rather than design.
38. FC 2.32.7-8.
2 92
escape leaving many of the infantry to be cut

39
aown
The Fatimid flight at this battle in part
reflects the factionalism of the Fatimid army. The
Damascene Turks and Arab mercenaries had no great
stake in the victory of the Fatimid army. When the
Damascene assault on the Crusader's rear met with
stiff resistance from Baldwin's counterattack,
instead of holding firm the Turks simply fled, having
little to lose if the rest of the Fatimid army was
defeated. Likewise, the bedouin contingents, seeing
this initial reverse, would have felt little
compulsion not to flee as well. In this situation
the initial flight of the Turks followed by the
Crusader charge and the death of a number of
important officers culminated in a general rout.
7.5.3 Sources
Arabic: IQal. 148-9/70-1; IMuy. 75; lAth. 10:395;
Maq. 3:35; Dhah. 2720; IKhal. 4:144. The latter
three sources generally paraphrase or copy the earlier
three.
39. FC 2.32.11.
293
Latin: Ekk. 33.2/285; FC 2.31-32; AA 9:48-50;
WT 11.3.
References: Smail 85-6, 177 ar.d other sources
mentioned there; Runciman 89-90.
CHAPTER V I I T
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence and analysis presented in this study
necessitates the modification of a number of previous
misconceptions concerning the nature of the Fatimid army
and its role in Palestine in the early twelfth century.
The way in which the Fatimid army was organized
proved to be both a source of strength to the army, and
a major weakness. The Fatimids recruited troops from
all over the Islamic world, dividing these soldiers into
three major categories, the Mashariqa, recruited from
lands east of Egypt, the Maghariba from North Africa,
and the Sudanis, cr blacks, from sub-Saharan Africa.
The ability to draw on these different sources of troops
provided the Fatimids not only with large numbers of
skilled warriors, but allowed them to maintain a strong
army even when recruitment from one or more of the
regions was interdicted by economic or political
changes. Furthermore, the existence of regiments
recruited from different regions provided a check
against the usurpation of authority by any one group.
However, it also proved to be a major source in
inter-regimental rivalry and factionalism, and, under
294
295
weak rulers, a grave source of instability and potential
civil war. Finally, the existence of regiments drawn
from different cultural, linguistic and religious
backgrounds created a lack of dynastic, tribal or
religious solidarity, and tended to subvert loyalty to
the dynasty.
Structurally, the Fatimid army included both regular
professional troops, and irregular mercenaries, bedouins
and militias. The regular army consisted of two classes
of troops. Royal regiments, including the Dstadhs,
Sibyan al-Khass, Rikabiya and the Hujarlya, provided a
source of officers and administrators, served as a
permanent standing army in Cairo, personal guards for
che Caliphs and WazTrs, and elite troops in battle. The
royal regiments received higher pay, and better
equipment and training than other regular regiments.
Most regular soldiers were enlisted in regiments named
after the ruler who rounded them, their ethnic or
geographical origins, or the quarter where their
barracks were found. Some of these regiments were
stationed in Cairo, while others were located in the
provinces of Egypt or as garrisons in Palestinian
cities. These regiments were provided with regular
training, pay and equipment, had professional officers,
296
and were organized in regular tactical units.
The Fatimids also enlisted irregular troops from a
number of different sources. During the early twelfth
century the most important group was the Arab bedouins
in Egypt and southern Palestine. Many bedouin tribes
were enrolled in government registers and received
stipends in return for occasional military service.
Bedouins can be found fighting the Crusaders in most
Fatimid armies. Local militias were drawn from the
citizens of cities and provinces, usually only serving
when their homes were directly threatened by Crusader
invasions and sieges. The Fatimids also hired
mercenaries, often Turks from Syria.
A major misconception of many modern scholars
concerns the size of the Fatimid army. It has often
been simplistically assumed that the Muslims fielded
huge armies of low quality which could be defeated by
smaller bands of Franks, while winning battles due
mainly to force of numbers. Section 3.4 deals with this
problem, providing a wide range of evidence indicating
that the entire regular Fatimid army in the twelfth
century numbered 10-15,000 men, while the field armies
ranged from 5-J0,000 men, averaging one half to one
297
third the size of Fatimid armies as recorded by the
Latin chroniclers. Recognition of this fact
necessitates a reevaluation of the strength and
performance of the Fatimid army in battle against the
Crusaders.
The Fatimid army was served by a large, well
organized .and sophisticated bureaucracy, with most of
the Fatimid state budget and administrative activity
directed at recruiting, supplying and training
soldiers. Troops were.paid and supplied by a
combination of payment in cash, food, fodder, robes and
equipment, and the revenues from The government
kept detailed records on each regular soldier describing
his equipment, martial skill, and pay, and held regular
military reviews, both to update these records and
inspect the quality of troops and equipment.
The Fatimid army was equipped with a variety of
weapons and included a number of different tactical
types of troops. The government maintained large
arsenals with factories for the storage and manufacture
of arms, armour, warships, and other military
equipment. Although the Frankish knight is often
thought to have been more heavily armed than his Muslim
opponents, the Fatimid army included units of cavalry
2S8
wearing double strength armour and horse barding, who
were thus actually more heavily armed than their
Frankish counterparts. Likewise Fatimid infantry was
not a mass of lightly armed bowmen as it is occasionally
described, but included heavy infantry, and troops armed
with pikes, heavy war maces, javelins and crossbows.
The Fatimids had access to a long tradition of
sophisticated Muslim military theory which is clearly
reflected in descriptions of their army in combat.
Armies were marshalled in complex arrays with each unit
having specific tactical duties. The infantry was
organized in dense marshalled ranks with heavy pike
armed infantry in the front, supported by missile troops
in the rear ranks. Cavalry included heavy elite units
for assaults, mounted archers, and units for scouting,
flanking maneuvers, skirmishing, raiding, and pursuit.
Fatimid siegecraft was both technically and
theoretically highly developed.
A correct understand of the organization, equipment,
tactics and theory of the Fatimid army allows us to come
to a better understanding of the weaknesses of their
military system which contributed to their loss of
Palestine. The weaknesses which are usually cited by-
scholars individual inferiority, light equipment, and
295
poor training and morale are usually exaggerated, the
actual problems being much more subtle. The Fatimids
suffered from an acute crisis in leadership with a
number of significant ramifications. Al-Afdal, as the
supreme commander, followed a passive military
strategy. The loyalty of the Fatimid officer corps was
often in question and occasionally openly insubordinate,
and the commanders of field armies were regularly
replaced so that none was able act upon the tactical
lessons learned in battle against the Franks.
Factionalism between the regiments often hindered
campaigns and could deteriorate into open civil war.
The Fatimids also faced important strategic
difficulties in pursuing a war in Palestine. Al-Afdal
and most of the officers and troops lacked'any real
motivation or loyalty to the dynasty beyond the desire
for personal gain, and the Fatimids never managed
utilize jZ h a d to unify and motivate their army.
Economically the costs of continued intervention in
Palestine far outweighed the potential advantages, so
that long as al-Afdal could maintain a forward military
base for the defense of Egypt, such as Ascalon, there
were few ideological, economic or military motives for
extensive military involvement in Palestine. Al-Afdal
300
thus pursued a passive foreign policy in Palestine,
attempting to negotiate a division of the region. Most
of his military actions can be best understood as
reactions to Crusader aggression rather than a concerted
effort at driving the Franks out of Palestine.
Logistical problems also hindered the Fatimid war effort
in Palestine. All troops, supplies and equipment had to
be transported from Egypt, which rendered quick
mobilization and extending campaigning difficult. The
Fatimids were forced to defend a.narrow strip of coast
containing nine major cities. Each of these cities was
constantly threatened by a potential Crusader siege,
necessitating the division of Fatimid resources among
all the cities, while the Franks could concentrate their
strength against a single target. The constant influx
of money and troops from Europe allowed the Crusaders to
swiftly recover from any military setback they faced.
An understanding of the structure and size of the
Fatimid army, the nature of Muslim military theory, and
a serious consideration of the perspective of events
offered by the Arabic sources allows us to gain a more
complete view of the nature of warfare between the
Fatimids and Crusaders. The reanalysis of several major
battles shows that the Fatimid army performed much
301
better in battle against the Franks than has previously
been thought. The broader perspective offered by a
better understanding of the nature of the Fatimid army
and the course of their conflict with the Franks thus
provides both the means to correct a number of
misconceptions concerning warfare and international
politics in twelfth century Palestine, and a more
complete view of the nature of the Crusader invasion and
conquest of Palestine.
APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY
Except for discussions of special questions of
chronology, all dates appear in the Common Era. For
those interested in conversion of such dates to the
Islamic calendar, the following list is provided showing
the beginning date in the Common Era for each Muslim

1
lunar year during the rei^n of al-Afdal .
AH CE
487 21 Jan 1094

488 11 Jan 1095
439 31 Dec 1095
450 19 Dec 1056
491 9 Dec 1097
492 28 Nov 1098
493 17 Nov 1099
494 6 Nov 1100
495 26 Oct 1101
496 15 Oct 1102
497 5 Oct 1103
498 23 Sep 1104
1. This table is based on Jere L. Bacharach, A Nzax. B a i t

S i u d Z z i H a n d b o o k,
rev. ed. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1976.
302
303
499 13 Sep 1105

500 2 Sep 1106
501 22 Aug 1107
502 11 Aug 1108
503 31 Jul 1109
504 20 Jul 1110
505 10 Jul 1111
506 28 Jun 1112
507 18 Jun 1113
508 7 Jun 1114
509 27 May 1115
510 16 May 1116
511 5 May 1117
512 24 Apr 1118
513 14 Apr 1119
514 2 Apr 1120
515 22 Mar 1121
516 12 Mar 1122
517 1 Mar 1123
518 19 Feb 1124
519 7 Feb 1125
520 27 Jan 1126
3 04
APPENDIX B
NASIR-1 KHUSRAV'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FATIMID ARMY
An important document in attempting to analyze the
Fatimid army is contained Nasir-i Khusravs famous
S aâA-NK m a, describing his travels in the Islamic world

2
in the 1160s . The following is Nasir-i Khusrav's
3
account :
"Each corps has its own name and

designation. One group are called Kitamis.
These came from Qayrawan in the service of
al-Mucizz li-Din Allah. They are said to
number 20,.000. horsemen. Another group are
called' Batilis, said to be men from North
Africa who came to Egypt before the arrival of
al-Mu!izz. They are said to number 15,000
horsemen. Another group is called Masmudis.
They are blacks from the land of the Masmudis
and are said to number 20,000 men. Another
2. So.fja*-Mama. p. 66-7, tr. pp. 217-8. Bacharach pp.

482-85 believes that these numbers are impossibly large
but accepts the general pattern of proportional
distribution of ethnic units. Beshir "Military", also
believes that Nasir-i Khusravs figures are inflated
(pp. 44-5) but consistently quotes them as if accurate
when discussing the various groups in the Fatimid army.
3. Tr. Bernard Lewis, l i l a m , vol. 1, pp. 217-8
305
group are called the Easterners, consisting of

Turks and Persians. They are so-called
because they are not of Arab origin. Though
most of them were born in Egypt, their name
derives from their origin. They are said to
number 10,000 powerfully built men. Another
group are called the slaves by purchase (ckbZd
a t-h h i.K a !), They are slaves bought for money
and are said to number 30,000 men. Another
group are called Bedouins. They are from the
Kijaz and are all armed with spears. They are
said to number 50,000 horsemen. Another group
are called Ustads (Ustadhs). These are
servants (?eunuchs), black and white, bought
for service. They number 30,000 horsemen.
Another group are called palace men (Sarayl).
They are foot soldiers coming from all
countries. They have their own separate
commander who looks after them. Each race
fights with the weapons of its own country.
They number 10,000 men. Another groups are
called Zanj. They all fight with the saber
and are said to number 30,000 men.
All of these troops are maintained by the
Sultan, and each man is assigned fixed monthly
pay, according to his rank."
There are a large number of problems with Nasir-i
Khusrav's text. The first is obviously that the numbers
are far to large for <-he economy of Egypt to have
sustained. The figures total 215,000 men. If we take
the military budqet for Egypt to be between 2.5 and 3.5

_ 4
million dinars , and assume that all of it was spent
solely on the wages of these troops (which, as discussed
in Chapter Four, was clearly not the case) this would
4. See ch. 4.1.
306
allow only between twelve and sixteen dinars per soldier
per year, which works out to be from one to one and a
third dinars per month. A wage at this level would
placing the soldiers at the absolute bottom of Egyptian
economic life. It is known, however, that the pay of
Fatimid soldiers varied from between five and twenty

5
dinars a month Economically it would have been
impossible for Egypt to have maintained such a large
army. As a sign of the degree of exaggeration on the
part .of Nasir, he tells us that the Ustadhs numbered
30,000 cavalry, when it is clear from other complete
descriptions of the Fatimid government that the Ustadhs

6
in fact numbered only about 1000 men . Furthermore, the
SarayT, whom I would equate with the Sibyan al-Khass,
are said by Nasir to number 10,000 men when in actuality

7
they numbered only 500 .
What, then, is the historical value, if any, of
Nasir-i Khusrav's text? First, it should be emphasized
that Nasir-i Khusrav may well be accurately reporting
numbers which he had been given by officials of the
5. See ch. 4.3.
6 . See ch. 3.2 above.
7
/ v
: u:j
X v X u
3G7
8
Fatimid government. As mentioned above , Islamic
governments often followed the policy of exaggerating
the size of their military forces for security or
propaganda purposes. As Nasir-i Khusrav was a Shiite
missionary, Fatimid officials may have given him
exaggerated figures to publish in order to increase the
glory of the Fatimid dynasty. Thus although his
specific numbers were clearly exaggerated, the structure
he describes can be accepted as potentially accurate,
and at least worthy of some consideration.
As it turns out, the forces mentioned by Nasir
actually correlate nicely with the known military
corps. Kitamls, Masmudis and probably the Bat ills were
Berber tribesmen, although in the 1060s when Nasir
visited Cairo they may have included both regular
regiments and irregular tribesmen. By the time of
al-Afdal the military power of the Berbers had declined
drastically. Nasir divides the Easterners or Mashariqa,
into two groups, the Turks and the Persians, (with whom
the the Daylamis should be included). Again by
al-Afdal's time the Daylamis were no longer to be seen,
and the Turks had declined greatly in number and
8 . ch. 3.4.
308
importance. Sudanis are represented by two different
groups by Nasir, the CA b i d a l - b k l n R ' , by which the
Sudanis are frequently known in the sources, and the
Zanj, a word derived from Persian and also used in
Arabic for black. The bedouins are clearly the
irregular bedouins auxiliaries used extensively by the
Fatimids throughout their history. Ustads are, of
course the Ustadh guard of the Caliph, The Sarayi
"palace men" are somewhat problematic. They are
described as foot soldiers drawn from all races, and
unless the Fatimids had a special regiment which was
disbanded before al-Afdal's day, they best seem to match
the description of the Sibyan al-Knass. Thus, although
distorted and exaggerated, Nasir-i Khusrav's description
can be accepted as being broadly accurate of the
pre-Jamall Fatimid army.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For the most part, Arabic sources are reference by
volume, page, and occasionally line. Thus "ITagh.
5:153.10-11" refers to Ibn TaghrxbardI, vol. 5, page
153, lines 10-11. Some references are followed by lower
case Roman letters, dividing the page into fourths.
Thus "MaqKh. 1:83a" means, Maqrizi's K h i t c i t , volume 1,
page 83, the upper quarter of the text. Al-HarthamT's
work is referenced by chapter, paragraph, and page, so
that "Harthami, ch. 34.16-7, p. 59" refers to chapter
34, paragraphs sixteen and seventeen which are found on
page 59. Latin sources are referenced by book, chapter
and paragraph if the text is so divided, otherwise by
page: i.e. "FC 2.21.10" refers to Fulcher of Chartes,
Bk. 2, ch. 21, para. 10. References following a slash
(7) or an equal sign (=) refer to the page where the
text is found in translation. Thus IQal. 141=56 refers
to Ibn al-Qalanisi, Arabic text, p. 141, Gibb's English
translation p. 56. In all such cases the translation
refered to is listed directly following the original
text in this bibliography.
309
310
Abbreviations
AA Albert of Aix
Anon. Anonymous, G z i t a FAancoJium
Caf. Caffaro
Ohah. DhahabT
El 1 EnzyclopzdZa. ojj liZam Old ed.
El 2 EncycZopzdZa o& liZa m New ed.
Ekk. Ekkehard
FC Fulcher of Chartes
Hak. al-Hakimi
HCh. Hagenmeyer CkAonoZogZz da Royaume.
HEp. Hagenmeyer EpZ&tuZae.
IAdim. Ibn al-cAdIm
IAth. Ibn al-Athir
IDaw. Ibn al-Dawadarl
IKhal. Ibn Khaldun
IKhal. Mu q Ibn Khaldun, MaqaddZra.
IKhall. Ibn Khallikan
IMam. Ibn MammatT
IMuq. Ibn al-Muqaffac
IMuy. Ibn Muyassar
IQal. Ibn QalanisF
311
ITagh. = Ibn Taghrlbardi
IZaf. = Ibn Zafir
Mag. = Magrlzi, It t i cI z a.l~Huna&a
MaqKh. = Maqrlzi, K h i t u t
MS = Michael the Syrian
Nu'man = al-Qadl al-NuSian
Qal. = Qalqashandi
RA = Raymond d'Aguilers
RHCOcc. = Re.cue.il d.e* H i 6 t o n J . e m ...
WT = William of Tyre
312
1. Original Sources
1.1. Arabic Sources
Abu Salih. The C u re h z c and M ona6t,e.aiz6 o i E g y p t , ed.

and tr. B. T. A. Evetts. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1895.
al-Hakami,'Umara ibn cAli. TanZkh a l- V a m a n , ed. and tr.

'Henry Cassels Kay. London: E. Arnold, 1892.
al-Harthaml, Abu Sacid al-Shacrani. Mu k h t a i a r S l y a & a t

a l - H u r u b , ed. cAbd al-Ra'uf cAwn. Cairo, (n.d.).
al-Harawi, cAl1 ibn Abi_Bakr. A l- T a d h k lr a a l-H a ra w Z y a

it A l- H ly a t a l-H a rb ly a . Damascus: Manshurat Wizara
al-Tniqafa, 1S7-2.
Ibn al-cAdim, cUmar b. Ahmad (d. 1261). l u b d a t a l - H a l a b

m ln T a r Z k h H a la b , 2 vols. ed. S. al-Dahhan.
Damascus, 1951-4.
Ibn al-Athlr. Al - K a m l l {Z" a - T a r Z k h 12 vols., ed. K.

Tornberg. Beirut: Dar Sader, Dar Beyrouth, 1966.
Ibn al-Dawadarl. Kanz a i - D u r a r uia 3 a m lc a Z - G h u r a r vols.

6-9, ed. Salah ad-DTn al-Munaggid. Cairo: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1961.
Ibn Khaldun. T a r Z k h a Z - cAZZama ( K l t a b a Z - cl b a r ) , 1

vols. Beirut: Maktaba al-Madrasa, 1959-61.
Ibn Khaldun The M u q a d d ln a : An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o H i s t o r y ,

tr. F. Rosenthal, abridged by N. J. Dawood.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ibn Khallikan, Ibn K h a Z Z l k a n ' i B l o g r a p h l c a Z D i c t i o n a r y ,

tr. MacGuckin de Slane, 4 vols. Beirut: Librairie
du Liban, 1970 (reprint of 1843 ed.).
Ibn Mammati, al-Ascad b. al-Khatir. 2.awanZn aZ-DauiauiZn,

ed. cAzTz S. cAtIya. Cairo, 1943.
3 13
Ibn al-Muqaffac, Sawlrus. H l i t o A y o { t h e P a t A l a A c h i o

t h e E g y p t i a n ChtiAch vol. 3, pt. 1, ed. and tr. by
Antoine Khater and 0. H. E. Khs-Burmester. Cairo:
La societe d'archeologie Copte, 1968.
Ibn Muyassar, Taj al-DTn Muhammad. Akhbaa Ml i A , ed.

Ayman Fucad Sayyid. Cairo: Institut Francais
d'Archeologie Orientale, (n.d.).
Ibn al-Nadlm. The F l h J u . i t o { al-NadZm: a 1 0 t h c e n t u A y

iU Jivey o Mu i l l m Cu.ltu.Ae, tr. Bayard Dodge. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
Ibn al-QalanisI. VhayZ TaJiZkk Vlmaihq, ed. H. F.

Amedroz. Leyden: Brill, 1908.
, extracts tr. by H. A. R. Gibb. The Vama&cuu

ChJLonlcZt oj t h e
C J c u ia d e i. London: Luzac & Company,
1967.
Ibn Qutayba, cUyun a Z - A k h b a A . Cairo, 1964.
Ibn Taghribardl, Abu al-Muhasin. A Z -N u ju m a Z - l a h l A a l l

UaZUk U l i A m a Z -Q .a h lA a , 16 vols. ed. A. Z*.
al-Adawi*. Cairo: Dar ai-Kutub al-Misriya, 1929-56.
Ibn Zafir, Jamal al-Din tfAli. A khbaA aZ-VauoaZ

aZ-Mu.nqatlca, ed. Andre Ferre. Cairo: Institut
Francaisd'archeologie orientale, 1972.
MakhzumT MI n h a j , extracts, tr. by C. Cahen in

"L'administration financiere de 1'armee Fatimide
d'apr&s al-MakhzumT" J o u A n a l o t h e Economic and
Social Hlitoay o& the Qjilent. 15 (1972) pp. 164-9.
Maqrlzl, Taai al-Din Ahmad. lttlcaz al-Huna&a bl-AkhbaA

al-Almma aZ-FapimXyln cl-K.hu.lala, 3*vols. ed.
Muhammad Ahmad.' Cairo, '1973.
Al-MuLu}dcl z via a Z - 1 ct l b a A b l - V 'n l k A a Z - K h l t a t uia

a Z - A t h a A , 2*vols. Beirut: Car Sader (n.d.)'. 'Reprint
of Bulaq edition.
al-Qadr al-Nucman. V a ca'Im aZ-liZam, 2 vols., ed. A. A.

a'. Fyzee. Cairo, 1969 (Reprint).-
314
Qalgashandi, Ahmad b. cAli.^ Subh aZ-Acika, 14 vols.

Cairo: al-Matbaca al-Amlrtya*, 1903-19.
Sibt ibn al-JawzT. H O l SX aZ-laman, vol. 8 pt. 1.

Hyderabad: Osmania Oriental Publications Bureau,
1951.
Tarsusi, Murda b. chl\. Tab^Zaa Atibab aZ-aZbab,

extractsed. and tr. by Claude Cahen "Un traite
d armurerie compose pour Saladin" B a Z Z z tZ n d 'z t u . d z 6
0A Z z n t a Z z 6 12 (1948) pp. 103-163.
Turtusbl, SZJiaj aZ-MuZuk. Eulaq, 1289 AH.
Usama ibn Munqidh. KZtab aZ- 1 ctZbati, ed. Philip K.

Hitti. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931.
, tr. P. Hitti. An Anab-SynJLan gzntZzman and

WaA.sUoA Zn thz VznJLod o thz Zxu.&adz6. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1929.
315
1.2. Latin Sources
Albert of Aix. HZ6tOJiZa Hle.JL06olymZta.rLCL. RHCOcc. 4
trans. HZstoZAZ dz6 CAoZ6adz6, tr. M. Guizot,

C o Z l z c t Z o n de.6 MmoZAZ6 A z l a t Z h * a. I hZ6toZAZ dz
France vol. 20. Paris: J. L. J. Briere, Libraire,
1824.
Anonymous. Gz6ta fJiancoAum zt aZZoJuim

HZzA06oZZmZta.noJium, ed. and tr. Rosalind Hill.
Z-.ondon: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1962.
Caffaro. A nnaZZ Gznovz6Z dZ C a iia A O z d z ' 6ouZ

contZnuatcJiZ, 5 vols., ed. L. T. Belgrano. Rome:
Fonti per la storia d'Icalia, 1890-1929.
Ekkehard of Aura. EkkzhaAdZ UAa.ugZe.n6Z6 a b b a tZ 6

HZzA 0 6 clymZta, ed. H. Hagenmeyer. Tubingen, 1877.
Fulcher of Chartes, HZ6t 0Ju.a HZzA06olymZta.no. RHCOcc.

vol. 3.
tr. Frances Rita Ryan. "A H Z 6 to A y oh t h z

ExpzdZtZon to JzJiu6a.lzm , 1095-T727 . New York: W. W.
Norton& Company, Inc., 1973.
Raymond d'Anguilers. HZ6toJiZa. ?Aanc.QAu.m quZ z z p z J iu n t

lh Z A U 6 a lz m ed. John Hugh Hill and Laurita L. Hill
as Lz !!LZ b zA " dz Raymond d ! A u guZ Z zA 6. Paris:
Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1969.
tr., August C. Krey. Thz f Z A 6 t CAU6adz: t h z

A c c o u n t6 oh E yz-u)Ztnz66Z6 and P a J it Z c Z p a n t6 .
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921.
William cf Tyre. HZ6tOJiZa AZAum Zn p a JitZ b u 6

tAan6maJiZnZ6 gz6taAum RHCOcc. vol. 1.
, trs. Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey. A

HZ6toAy oh Vzzd6 Vonz Bzyond thz Sza, 2 vols. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1943.
L.t|$e otS St. Nexêi, extracts, tr. by M. Canard "Les
Armeniens in fgypte ..." pp. 146-8.
Matthew of Edessa, The ChA.orJ.cZz o i Matthew o i Bde6&a

tr. Ara Edmond Dostourian. Rutgers Univeristy PhD.
Thesis, 1975.
Michael the Syrian, ChxonZque de MZcheZ Ze S y A J e n ,

patxtaxche jacobZte d'kntZoche , 1 166-1 199, tr. J. B.
Chabot. Brussels: Culture et Civilization, 1963
(reprint of 1899-1910 ed.).
Nasir-i Khusrav. Seiex Nameh ed. C, Schefer. Paris,

1881.
, extracts trs. by Bernard Lewis, ItZam: ixom the

Paophet Muhammad to the Captuxe Con&tantZnopZe
vol. 1, PoZZtZa, and Wax. New York: Harper and Row,
1974, pp. 217-8.
Niza-T al-Mulk The Book o{ Govexnment ox KuZei ion. KZngt

{SZyatat Nama) . tr. Hubert Darke. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1960.
317
2. Secondary Sources
Ashtor, E. A Social and Economic Hlitory the Mean.

Bait In the Middle Age*. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976.
Ayalon, David. "The Eunuchs in the Mamluk Sultanate" in

Ayalon, The Mamluk Military Society no. III.
, "Harb: iii. The Mamluk Sultanate" El2 3:184ff.
. The Mamluk Military Society: Collected Studies.

London: Variorum Reprints, 1979.
, "Notes on the FurusTya Exercises and Games in the

Mamluk Sultanate." in Ayalon, The Mamluk Military
Society no. II.
, Studies on the Mamluki o Egypt [1250-1517).

London: Variorum Reprints, 1977.
, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army," in

Ayalon. Studies an the Mamluki oi Egypt; no. I.
Bacharach, Jere L., "African Military Slaves in the

Medieval Middle East: the Cases of Iraq (869-955)
and Egypt (868-1171)," International Journal oi
Middle Bait Studlei; 13 (1981) pp. 471-495.
Beshir, B. J. "Fatimid Military Organization," Ver Iilam

vol. 55.1 (1978) pp. 37-56.
Bosworth, C. E. "Recruitment, Muster, and Review in

Medieval Islamic Armies," in V. J. Parry and M. E.
Yapp, eds., War, Society and Technology In the
Middle Eait. London: Oxford University Press, 1975,
pp. 60-77.
, "Ispahsalar" EI2, 4:208-10.
, "Isticrad" 512, 4:265-9.
Cahen C. "L'administration finanei^re de l'armê

Fatimide d'apres al-Makhzumi" Journal oi the
3 1
Economic and Social Hl&toAy oi thi OAlint 15 (1972)

pp. 163-182.
r "Evolution de l'Iqtac du IXe au X H I e siecle,"

An n a l i h d h l h t o l A i tc.bnomA.quLe. i t hoc.JLa.li, 8 (1953)
pp. 25-62.
, "Ikta" EI2, 3:1088-1091.
, "Quclques chroniques anciennes relatives aux

derniers fStimides," 2n h t l t u t FAancaJLh d a A c k i o l o g h
O A l i n t a l : B u l l i t l n , vol. 37 (1937) pp. 1-27.
, La. Sy>U.i da noad a V t p o q u i d i h C A o lh a d i h , i t H

pAA.ncx.pa.uti i A a n q a i d A n t l o c h i , Paris: Librairie
Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1940.
, "The Turkish Invasions: the Selchukids" in

Setton, CAuhadih, pp. 135-176.
, "Un traite d armurerie compose pour Saladin,"

B u lh tln
d ' l t u d i h O A A . in ta . lih , 12 (1948) pp. 103-163.
Canard, M. "Le ceremonial fatimite et le ceremonial

byzantin: essai de ccmparaison," Byza.ntA.on 21 (1951)
pp. 355-420.
, "Notes sur les Armeniens en Egypte a l'^poque

fatimite,-" An n a l i h d t I ' I m t l t a t d i h t t u d i h
O n X i n t a l i h , vol. 13 (1955) pp. 142-57.
, "Un vizier chretien a l'poque fatimite:

lArmenien Bahram," Annalih di VJLnhtJLtut dih ttudih
OAlintalih, vol. 12 (1954) pp. 84-113.
Charanis, Peter. "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh

Century," in Setton [Crusades] pp. 177-219.
Ehrenkreutz, A. S. "Contribution to the monetary history

or Egypt in the Middle Ages," B u l h t l n the School
oi OAlintal and AiAJLcan StudJLih 16 (1954), pp.
502-514.
, "The place of Saladin in the Naval History of the

Mediterranean Sea in the Middle Aqes" J o u A n a l o i t h i
319
kmztiJLcan Ofu.tn.tail SocJtty, 75 (1955) pp. 100-116.
, SaZadln. Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1972.

Elbeheiry, Salah. Lti Institution* dt Z'Egyptt au JLtmp
dt* kyyubldts, Vol. 1, L organisation dt I anmtt tt
dt* Institutions mlZltalrts. University of Paris
PhD. dissertation, 1971.
E n c y & Z o p t d la o i
Is la m Old ed., M. Th. Houtsma, et. al.
eds. Leyden: Brill, 1913-1934.
E n ty tZ o p td la o iI s l a m New ed., H. A. R. Gibb, et. al.

eds. Leyden: Brill, 1960 in progress.
Paris, Nabih, and Robert P. Elmer Arab ktizhttiy: An

Arabic MS oi about kV 1500. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1945.
Gibb, H. A. R., "The Caliphate ana the Arab States," in

Setton, Crusades, pp. 81-98.
, "The Armies of Saladin," Cahltrs d hlstolrt

tgyptZtnnt, serie iii, fasc. 4 (May 1951) pp.
304-20.
Goitein, S. D. "Contemporary Letters on the Capture of

Jerusalem by the Crusaders," Journal oi Jtuilsh
Studies vol. 3.4 (1952) pp. 162-177.
Gorelik, Michael. "Oriental armour of-the Near and

Middle East from the eighth to the fifteenth
centuries as shown in works of art" in Robert
Elgood, ed. Islamic Aa.iji.4- and kfimoufi, London: Scholar
Press, 1979, pp. 30-63.
. Greenstone, Julius H., ed. & tr., "The Turkoman Defeat

at Cairo" kmtfUcan Journal oi Stmetlc Languages and
Literature * 22 (Oct. 1905 - July 1906) pp. 144-175.
Hagenmeyer, H., "Chronciogie de l'histoire du royaume de

Jerusalem: Regne de Baudouin I (1101-1118)." Revue
dt V orltnte Latin vols. 9-12 (1902-1911).
320
, Chxonologlz dz la pxzmlzxz axolhadz, 1094-1 100.

New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973 (reprint from
Revue dz I'oxlzntz Latin 1898-1901).
, Epl&tulaz zt ahaxtaz ad hlitoxlam pxlml bzlll

4>azxl 6pzctantz6. New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973
(reprint of 1901 ed.).
Hill, John Hugh and Laurita L. Hill. Raymond IV, Count

oi ToulouiZ. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1962.
Hill, Rosalind "Crusading Warfare: a Camp-follower's

view 1097-1120," Pxozzzdlng& oi thz Battlz
Convenience on Anglo-Hoxman Studlzi 1978 pp. 75-93,
209-11.
Humphreys, R. Stephen Fmom Saladin to thz Mongol&: thz

Ayyubld6 oi Vamaizu6 1193-1260 (Albany: State
University of New York Press) 1977.
Hussey, J. M. ed., Thz Byzantlnz Emplxz in Thz Cambxldgz

Mzdlzval Hlatoxy vol. 4, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) 1966.
, "Later Macedonians, the Comneni and the Angeli:

1025-1204" in Hussey, ed. Thz Byzantlnz Emplxz, pp.
193-249.
Huuri, Kalervo. lux Gztchlchtz dz6 MJ.ttzlaltzn.llc.hzn

Gz6chutzuizizm au& Oxlzntallichzn Q.uzllzn.
Helsinki, 1941.
Kubiak, W. B., "The Byzantine Attack on Damietta in 853

and the Egyptian Navy in the 9th century" Byzantlon
40 (1970) no. 1 pp. 45-66.
Jenkins, R. Byzantium: Thz Jmpzxlal Czntuxlzi. New

York: Vintage Books, 1969-.
Latham, John D. and W. F. Paterson. Saxazzn Axchzxy.

London: Holland Press, 1970.
Le Strange, Guy. FaIz&tlnz undzx thz Moilzmi: a

Vz6cxlptlon oi Syxla and thz Holy Land ixom A.P. 650
321
to 1500. Beirut: Khayats, 1965 (reprint of 1890

ed, 1
Lev, Yaacov. "The Fatimid Army, A.H. 358-427/968-1036

C. E.: Military and Social Aspects." A *lan and
Ajixlcan Studlz* vol. 14 (1980) pp. 165-192.
, "Fatimid Policy towards Damascus (358/968 -
386/996): Military, Political and Social Aspects.
J tJiu.ia.le.rn Studlz* In Axablc end l*lam 3 (1981-2) pp.
165-183.
Lewis, Bernard, "The Fatimids and the route to India,"

Revue dz la Paculttdz* *clzncz* zconomlquz ,
Unlvzx*ltz d'Istanbul, 11 (1949-50) pp. 50-4.
, l*lam: i^xom thz Pxophzt Muhammad to thz Captuxz

oh Con*tantlnoplz vol. 1, Politic* and Wua. New
York: Harper and Row, 1974.
Lyons, M. C. and Jackson, D. E. P. Saladin: thz Politic*

oh thz Holy WaA. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Mercier, L. La Paxuxz dz* Cavallzx* zt I 1ln*lgnz dz*

Pxzux, Texte Arabe. Paris, 1922, translation 1924.
't*
Meyer, Leo. Mamluk Coitumz: a *uxvzy. Geneve: A.

Kundig, 1952.
Nicholson, Robert Lawrence. Tancxzd: A Study oh hi*

Caxzzx and Uoxk. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Libraries, 1940.
Nicolle, David. Laxly Medieval l*lamlc Axm* and Axmoux,

in Gladlu * Tomo Especial (1976). Madrid: Instituto
de Estudios Sobre Armas Antiguas, 1976.
O'Leary, BeLacy. A ShoAt Hl*toAy oh thz Fatlmld

Caliphate. London, 1923.
Oman, Charles. A Hl*toxy oh thz AAt oh Wax In thz

Middle Age*, vol. 1: A.V. 37&-127&. New York: Burt
Franklin, (n.d.), (Reprint of 1924 ed.).
322
Pryor, John H. "Transportations of horses by sea during

the era of the Crusades." tttuu.ne.fi.' & ILUuion. vol.
68.1 (1982) pp. 9-27,. and vol. 68.2 (1982) pp.
103-25.
Rabie, H. The FInanclal Sy&tem o{ Egypt: A.H.

5 6 4 - 7 4 7/A.V. 1169- 7341. London: Oxford University
Press, 1972.
, "The Training of the Mamluk Paris'

in V. J. Parry
ed., Wa*, Society and Technology In the ttlddle
Ea6t. London: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp.
153-163.
Recaell de* Hl&tonlen& de 4 Cx.ol6adei: Hlitosilen*

Occldentaux, 5 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Royale,
1844-1895.
H. Ritter "La Parure des Cavaliers und die Literatur

uber die Ritterlichen Kunste" Vex. Isldim vol. 18
(1929) pp. 116-154.
Runciman, Steven. A Hlitony oi the Cxji&ade*, 3 vols.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951-4.
Salih, A. H., "Le role des bedouins d'egypt a l'epoque

fatimide" Rlvl&ta degll Studl OxJ.entall 54 (1980)
fasc. 1-2 pp. 51-65.
Scanlon, George. A ttu&llm ttanual oi Wax.. Cairo:

American University at Cairo, 1961.
Setton, Kenneth M. et. al. A Hl6tox.y oi the Cx.a6ade&:

Ilot. 7, The Flx.it Hu.ndx.ed )/eax.6t ed. M. W. Baldwin.
Madison, Wisconson: University of Wisconson Press,
1969.
Sivan, Emmanuel. L lilam et la Cnoliade: Idiologle et

Vnopagande darn, lei Reactions ttuiulmnei aax
Cx.oliadei. Paris: Librairie d'amerique et d'orient,
1968.
von Sievers, Peter. "Military, Merchants and Nomads:

The Social Evolution of the Syrian Cities and
Countryside During the Classical Period,
323
780-969/164-358," V zti l U a m vol. 56.2 (1979) pp.

212-244.
Smail, R. C. C t iu t a d in g \l)an.iatiz: 1097-1093. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1956.
Stern, S. M., "Al-Afdal Kutayfat" EI2 1:216.
Surur, Muhammad, S i y a t a a Z - F a t i m Z y i n a Z - K h a t i i j i y a .
Cairo, 1967.
Tantum, Geoffrey "Muslim Warfare: a study of a medieval

Muslim treatise on the art of war" in Robert Elgood,
ed. l ^ Z a m i z Atim6 a n d AtimoutL, London: Scholar Press,
1979, pp. 187-201.
r S
Toussoun, Omar. Me.moj.tLZ m t i Zz6 i i n a n c z s dz Z ' E g y p t z .
Cairo: Imprimerie de l'institut Francais
d archeologie orientale, 1924.
Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J., Thz F a.ti.m id T h z o tiy o i S t a t z .

Lahore: Orientalia Publishers*, 1957.
Wright, W. A Gtiammati o i t h z A t ia b ic L a n g a a g z , 3rd ed.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Wustenfeld, F. "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner nach dero

Arabischen" A b handZungzn d z x H i t t o t i i t c h -
P h i Z o Z o g i i c h z n CZa6&z dzti K o n i g Z i c h z n G z s z Z Z t c h a i t
dzK W i * 6 z n 6 c h a i t z n z a G o t t i n g z n , Vol. 26 pt. 2
(1880).
Zakkar, Suhayd, Thz E m in a tz o i A Z z p p o , 1004- 1094.

Beirut: Bar al-Amanah, 1971.

Hamblin, W J, "The Fatimid Army During The Early Crusades"

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hamblin, W J, "The Fatimid Army During The Early Crusades"

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

8512418

Hamblin, William James

THE FATIMID ARMY DURING THE EARLY CRUSADES

The U niversity of M ic h ig a n Ph .D. 1985

A .dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

Professor Andrew Ehrenkreutz, Chairman

Microfilmed or bound copies of doctoral dissertations submitted

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...................... 6

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY . . . . 13

IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY . . . 96

V. WEAPONS, TACTICS AND MILITARY THEORY . . . . 138

VI. FATIMID FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY .... 199

VII. THE FATIMID ARMY IN A C T I O N ..................235

VIII. C O N C L U S I O N S ................................ 294

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 309

B. Nasir-i Khusrav's description

This study arose from an attempt to answer the

question, "Why and how did the Fatimid army lose

southern Palestine to the Crusaders?" Of course in

reality this question has been asked many times before,

and a number of different answers have been posed by

some excellent scholars. However, past studies of the

early Crusades in southern Palestine have been limited

in a number of ways. First, and perhaps most

significant, is the lack of a serious study of the wide

range of Arabic sources. This is certainly true of most

medievalists who deal with the Crusades, and although

some Islamicists have made important contributions in

this era, the later Fatimids have been woefully

significant details to the study of this period.

A second related problem is the nearly universal

tendency on the part of past historians to present the

history of the early Crusades with a strong Latin bias.

1_. Although some study has been done on the early

acceptable. Great strides have been made in recent

years in dealing with the history of the Middle F.ast

from the Muslim point of view for the period after

twelfth century has been untouched. The most damaging

effect of a Latin bias is the tendency to establish a

general outline based on Latin sources, using the Muslim

sources mainly to fill in a few additional details. As

I hope to show, serious consideration of the Muslim

sources reveals a substantially different picture of the

This study of the Fatimid loss of Palestine to the

Franks consists of two major parts. The first discusses

the nature of the Fatimid military establishment

opposing the Franks (chapters 3-5). Past descriptions of

the Fatimid army were woefully incomplete. Dr. R. C.

Smail, in his superb book C n .a*a dtn g Waa&ane., regrets

that he was only able to use translated Muslim sources,

adding that, "Scholars better equipped for research into

Byzantine and Arabic sources might well take this

2. Especially Ehrenkreutz, S a la d j. n , Lyons and Jackson,

for the study of the early period of the Crusades, has

remained unfulfilled. It may seem gratuitous at first,

but it is impossible to understand the events in

Palestine until the nature of the Fatimid army and

military response to the Crusaders has been accurately

defined. Until now the Fatimids have often served

historians as little more than straw men for the

Crusaders to knock over one by one.

The second facet of the problem is to examine the

strategic and tactical actions and goals of the Fatimids