Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A contractor is responsible for the damages It was petitioner itself which made a study of
caused by the defects in the work or by the its electrical system and on the basis of such
use of materials of inferior quality or due to study decided on the specifications of the
any violation of the terms of the contract (cf. capacitor. Likewise, it was petitioner itself
Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1723; that designed the equipment it ordered from
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 291 private respondent. The blame cannot be
[1992]). laid at the door of private respondent, if
petitioner's study did not take into
Petitioner failed to present evidence that consideration the deficiency of its electrical
there was a defect in the capacitor it ordered system. Whatever defects or imperfections
from private respondent; that the latter used were extant in the design were the
materials of inferior quality; or that it had responsibility of petitioner's resident
violated the terms of the contract for the engineers. It was petitioner which formally
supply of said equipment. communicated to private respondent in a
letter dated July 25, 1982, requesting for a
The Court of Appeals was categorical that quotation for a power-capacitor bank and
private respondent "did not at all break its attaching thereat a lay-out of said capacitor
contractual obligation with plaintiff-appellant bank.
(petitioner)" (Rollo,
p. 40). According to the Technical Committee, "had
a technical audit been made before the
Another point to consider is that after the capacitors were considered, the system
fire, the capacitor was still in good condition, would have revealed its weakness" (Rollo, p.
which could only mean that private 89).
respondent had complied with the design
made by the engineers of petitioner. It was petitioner's duty to conduct a periodic
technical audit of the cement plant. In this
Based on the findings of the Technical particular case, petitioner was remiss in its
Committee, the trial court concluded that the duty (TSN, March 4, 1988, pp. 52-54).
overvoltage, caused by the weak and
inadequate electrical system of the cement The "technical audit" is not included in the
plant, generated the sparks which ICC's contract for commissioning, installing and
circuit breakers failed to isolate or neutralize. testing of the power capacitor. It was
Hence, the sparks spread to other bigger- supposed to be the subject of another
sized circuit breakers of the cement plant's contract between the parties but which did
electrical system, heated the poorly not push through because of the fire.
insulated electrical wiring and ignited the oil
in the circuit breakers and transformer Petitioner contends that there was no more
equipment. need to switch-on the capacitor prior to the
accident because its power factor had
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial already been raised to 93.3%, which was
court that the overvoltage was caused by the more than the desired 85% level. It was
weak and deficient electrical system, petitioner which ordered the capacitor. It was
including the lack of protective relays, of the in a better position to ascertain whether or
cement plant itself (Rollo, p. 40). not it still needed the equipment. It was its
duty to inform private respondent that it had
The installation of the equipment prior to its already achieved the desired power factor
switching on into the electric system of the rating.
cement plant was made under the
supervision of the engineers of petitioner. Finally, petitioner claims that the Court of
The wiring lay-out plans were also approved Appeals and the trial court substituted their
by petitioner (Rollo, own judgment for the findings of fact of the
p. 41). Technical Committee. The fact is that the
Technical Committee only made these
conclusions as to what, not who, caused the There are two principal questions posed for
fire. The two courts were the ones which resolution: (1) who was responsible for the
determined who was to be blamed for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael
Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu
fire on the basis of the findings of fact of the
Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the
Technical Committee. In brief, the two courts first question the trial court found Rafael
did not alter the findings of fact of the Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held
Technical Committee, much less make their his employer solidarily liable with him.
own findings.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity
of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving
his Mercury car on his way from his home in
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968 Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs.
CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
CAEDO, suing through their father, Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque
litem, plaintiffs-appellants, home to Wack Wack for his regular round of
vs. golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL moderate speeds, considering the condition
BERNARDO, defendants-appellants. of the road and the absence of traffic the
Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs- the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles
appellants. (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead
Divino for defendants-appellants of the Cadillac, going in the same direction,
was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro
MAKALINTAL, J.: Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around
As a result of a vehicular accident in which the rig's vertical post on the right side and
plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian
of his family were injured they filed this suit Bautista.
for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost
Court of First Instance of Rizal on February upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following only eight meters away. This is the first clear
disposition: indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court one on each side, and they should have
renders a judgment, one in favor of given him sufficient warning to take the
the plaintiffs and against the necessary precautions. And even if he did
defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael not notice the lights, as he claimed later on
Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay at the trial, the carretela should anyway
to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the have been visible to him from afar if he had
sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; been careful, as it must have been in the
P48,000.00 for moral damages; beam of his headlights for a considerable
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; while.
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with
costs against the defendants. The In the meantime the Mercury was coming on
counterclaim of the defendants its own lane from the opposite direction.
against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered Bernardo, instead of slowing down or
dismissed, for lack of merits. stopping altogether behind
the carretela until that lane was clear,
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was veered to the left in order to pass. As he did
amended so as to include an additional so the curved end of his car's right rear
award of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's
for the damage sustained by their car in the left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it
accident. along as the car skidded obliquely to the
other lane, where it collided with the
Both parties appealed to the Court of oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had
Appeals, which certified the case to us in seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' slackened his speed, judged the distances in
claim. relation to the carretela and concluded that
the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo,
however, decided to take a gamble beat to observe them and to direct that the
the Mercury to the point where it would be in driver cease therefrom, becomes
line with the carretela, or else squeeze in himself responsible for such acts. The
between them in any case. It was a risky owner of an automobile who permits
maneuver either way, and the risk should his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta,
have been quite obvious. Or, since the car for example, at a speed of 60 miles an
was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour hour, without any effort to stop him,
(or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was although he has had a reasonable
already too late to apply the brakes when opportunity to do so, becomes himself
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters responsible, both criminally and civilly,
in front of him, and so he had to swerve to for the results produced by the acts of
the left in spite of the presence of the the chauffeur. On the other hand, if
oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the driver, by a sudden act of
the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's negligence, and without the owner
right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, having a reasonable opportunity to
as already stated, caught the wheel of prevent the act or its continuance,
the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, injures a person or violates the
confronted with the unexpected situation, criminal law, the owner of the
tried to avoid the collision at the last automobile, although present therein
moment by going farther to the right, but at the time the act was committed, is
was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at not responsible, either civilly or
the scene show that the right wheels of his criminally, therefor. The act
car were on the unpaved shoulder of the complained of must be continued in
road at the moment of impact. the presence of the owner for such a
length of time that the owner, by his
There is no doubt at all that the collision was acquiescence, makes his driver act his
directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's own.
negligence and that he must be held liable
for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The basis of the master's liability in civil law
The next question is whether or not Yu Khe is not respondent superior but rather the
Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is
liable with the driver. The applicable law is that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads: if known to the master and susceptible of
timely correction by him, reflects his own
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
the owner is solidarily liable with his prevent injury or damage.
driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due In the present case the defendants' evidence
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
is disputably presumed that a driver Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had
was negligent, if he had been found been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co.
guilty of reckless driving or violating in the same capacity for over ten years.
traffic regulations at least twice within During that time he had no record of
the next preceding two months. violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all
Under the foregoing provision, if the may be imputed to his master. Negligence on
causative factor was the driver's negligence, the part of the latter, if any, must be sought
the owner of the vehicle who was present is in the immediate setting and circumstances
likewise held liable if he could have of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due the driver from pursuing a course which not
diligence. The rule is not new, although only gave him clear notice of the danger but
formulated as law for the first time in the also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not
new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman see that such negligence may be imputed.
vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where The car, as has been stated, was not running
this Court held: at an unreasonable speed. The road was
wide and open, and devoid of traffic that
... The same rule applies where the early morning. There was no reason for the
owner is present, unless the negligent car owner to be in any special state of alert.
acts of the driver are continued for He had reason to rely on the skill and
such a length of time as to give the experience of his driver. He became aware of
owner a reasonable opportunity to the presence of the carretela when his car
observe them and to direct his driver was only twelve meters behind it, but then
to desist therefrom. An owner who sits his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
in his automobile, or other vehicle, negligence, for he was not himself at the
and permits his driver to continue in a wheel. And even when he did see it at that
violation of the law by the distance, he could not have anticipated his
performance of negligent acts, after driver's sudden decision to pass
he has had a reasonable opportunity the carretela on its left side in spite of the
fact that another car was approaching from
the opposite direction. The time element was
3. Ephraim Caedo
such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his
4. Eileen Caedo
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other
man nervous and make the situation worse.
It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes
5. Rose Elaine Caedo
no absence of that due diligence required by
law to prevent the misfortune.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an
Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on order dismissing an action without prejudice
the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a is not appealable. The remedy of the
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan aggrieved party is to file a special civil action
and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a under Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
criminal case has a counterclaim against the states that where the judgment or final order
private complainant, he may file the is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the file an appropriate special civil action under
proper time. They contend that an action on Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
quasi-delict is different from an action dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the
resulting from the crime of reckless ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal appeal, is erroneous.
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil
case arising from the same incident. They Forum-Shopping
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed The essence of forum-shopping is the
independently of the criminal action. Finally, filing of multiple suits involving the same
they point out that Casupanan was not the parties for the same cause of action, either
only one who filed the independent civil simultaneously or successively, to secure a
action based on quasi-delict but also favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, present when in the two or more cases
who was not a party in the criminal case. pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there is
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the no forum-shopping in the instant case
petition is fatally defective as it does not because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
which can proceed independently of the complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal action. criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
imprudence resulting in damage to property supplied)
based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action Since the present Rules require the accused
for damages based on Article 2176 of the in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in
Civil Code. Although these two actions arose a separate civil action, there can be no
from the same act or omission, they have forum-shopping if the accused files such
different causes of action. The criminal case separate civil action.
is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is Filing of a separate civil action
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read: Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity),
as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission separate civil action independently of the
causes damage to another, there being fault criminal action provided the offended party
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the reserved the right to file such civil
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if action. Unless the offended party reserved
there is no pre-existing contractual relation the civil action before the presentation of the
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions
and is governed by the provisions of this arising from the same act or omission were
Chapter. deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the
negligence under the preceding article is recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
entirely separate and distinct from the civil recovery of damages for violation of Articles
liability arising from negligence under the 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover Relations.
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. Thus, to file a separate and independent
civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985
Any aggrieved person can invoke these Rules, the offended party had to reserve in
articles provided he proves, by the criminal action the right to bring such
preponderance of evidence, that he has action.Otherwise, such civil action was
suffered damage because of the fault or deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
negligence of another. Either the private action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
complainant or the accused can file a provided as follows:
separate civil action under these
articles. There is nothing in the law or rules Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
that state only the private complainant in a actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
criminal case may invoke these articles. the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule criminal action, unless the offended party
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure waives the action, reserves his right to
(2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires institute it separately, or institutes the civil
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a action prior to the criminal action.
separate civil action, to wit:
Such civil action includes recovery of
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil indemnity under the Revised Penal
actions. (a) x x x. Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, The amended provision of Section 2, Rule
what is deemed instituted with the criminal 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
action is only the action to recover civil procedure, to wit:
liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under SEC. 2. When separate civil action is
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code suspended. After the criminal action has
are no longer deemed instituted, and may be been commenced, the separate civil action
filed separately and prosecuted arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the independently of the criminal action and
criminal action. shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
If the criminal action is filed after the offended party recover damages twice for
said civil action has already been the same act or omission charged in the
instituted, the latter shall be criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its
The suspension shall last until final counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
judgment is rendered in the criminal expressly allows the offended party to bring
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on an independent civil action under Articles 32,
the merits is rendered in the civil action, the 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated
same may, upon motion of the offended in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
party, be consolidated with the criminal action shall proceed independently of the
action in the court trying the criminal action. criminal action and shall require only a
In case of consolidation, the evidence preponderance of evidence.In no case,
already adduced in the civil action shall be however, may the offended party recover
deemed automatically reproduced in the damages twice for the same act or omission
criminal action without prejudice to the right charged in the criminal action.
of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in There is no question that the offended
the criminal case and of the parties to party in the criminal action can file an
present additional evidence. The independent civil action for quasi-delict
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall against the accused. Section 3 of the present
be tried and decided jointly. Rule 111 expressly states that the offended
party may bring such an action but the
During the pendency of the criminal action, offended party may not recover damages
the running of the period of prescription of twice for the same act or omission charged
the civil action which cannot be instituted in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
separately or whose proceeding has been Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
suspended shall be tolled. criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two We make this ruling aware of the
separate suits for the same act or possibility that the decision of the trial court
omission. The first a criminal case where the in the criminal case may vary with the
civil action to recover civil liability ex- decision of the trial court in the independent
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil action. This possibility has always been
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating recognized ever since the Civil Code
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two introduced in 1950 the concept of an
cases can proceed simultaneously and independent civil action under Articles 32,
independently of each other. The 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law
commencement or prosecution of the itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
criminal action will not suspend the civil provides that the independent civil action
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is may proceed independently of the criminal
that the offended party cannot recover proceedings and regardless of the result of
damages twice for the same act or omission the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
[13]
of the defendant. In most cases, the the Court declared:
offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover x x x. There can indeed be no other logical
damages twice for the same act or omission conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
of the accused. In some instances, the civil action contemplated in the said articles
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the to the result of the criminal prosecution
filing of another case against his employer or whether it be conviction or acquittal would
guardians. render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear
Similarly, the accused can file a civil injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
action for quasi-delict for the same act or proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the amendment of the rules. The Revised
the latter. Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled
More than half a century has passed rule that -
since the Civil Code introduced the concept
of a civil action separate and independent x x x statutes regulating the procedure of
from the criminal action although arising the court will be construed as applicable to
from the same act or omission. The Court, actions pending and undetermined at the
however, has yet to encounter a case of time of their passage. Procedural laws are
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
[14]
trial courts, one hearing the criminal case
and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
irreconcilable decisions may be more certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
apparent than real. In any event, there are Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
to deal with such remote possibilities. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No.
2089 is REINSTATED.
One final point. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure took effect on December SO ORDERED.
1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before