Labor 2 Compilation #22
Echo 2000 Commercial Corp v Obrero Filipino Echo
Chapter-CLO
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General Milling Corp. v Ernesto Casio, Rolando Igot,
Mario Famador, Nelson Lim, Felicisimo Booc, Procopio
Obregon, Jr., and Anonio Aninipok; and, Virgilio Pino,
Paulino Cabreros, Ma. Luna P. Jumaoas, Dominador
Booc, Fidel Valle, Bartolome Auman, Remegio
Cabantan, Loreto Gonzaga, Edilberto Mendoza, and
Antonio Panilag
G.R. No. 149552; 10 Mar 2010; Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Digest by Dudday
DOCTRINE
-In terminating an employee pursuant to the union security
clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that:
(1) union security clause is applicable
(2) union is requesting for the enforcement of such clause
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the
union to expel the employee from the union
Meeting all these requisites constitute just cause for
termination based on the union security provision of the
CBA.
FACTS
1. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa Local 31 Chapter
(IBM-Local 31) is the SEBA of the RFE of GMC in
Lapu-lapu City. Respondents Pino, Cabreros,
Jumaoas, Booc, Auman, Cabantan, Valle,
Gonzaga, Mendoza, and Panilag (Pino et al.) are
the officers and board members of IBM-Local 31,
while respondents Casio et al were regular
employees of GMC. Casio was elected IBM-Local
31 President for a three year term in June 1991
while his co-respondents were union shop
stewards.
2. 30 Nov 1991: IBM-Local 31, through its officers
and board members, entered into a CBA with GMC
the effectivity of which was retroactive to Aug 1,
1991. Such CBA contained union security
provisions which read:
Sec. 3. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP -
All employees/ workers employed by the
Company with the exception of this who are
specifically excluded by law and the terms of
this Agreement must be members in good
standing of the Union within 30 days upon the
signing of this agreement and shall maintain
such membership in good standing thereof as
a condition of their employment or continued
employment.
Sec. 6. The Company, upon written request of
the Union, shall terminate the services of any
employee/ worker who fails to fulfill the
conditions set forth in Secs 3 and 4 thereof,
subject however, to the provisions of the Labor
Laws of the Philippines and their Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The Union shall
absolve the Company from any and all
liabilities, pecuniary or otherwise, and
responsibilities to any employee or worker who
is dismissed or terminated in pursuant thereof.
3. 24 Feb 1992: IBM Regional Director Rodolfo
Gabiana, through a letter, furnished Casio et al with
copies of affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Ino
and Juan Potot, charging Casio at al with acts
inimical to the interest of the union. Gabiana gave
Casio et al three days to file their answers or
counter-affidavits, but Casio et al refused to
acknowledge receipt of the letter.
4. 29 Feb 1992: Respondents Pino et al, as union
members and officers, issued a Resolution
expelling Casio et al from the union on the ground
that the latter were found guilty of the charge upon
ex parte investigation.
5. 10 Mar 1992: Gabiana wrote a letter to GMC Vice-
President Cabahug (Vice-Pres for Engineering and
Plant Administration) to inform the complany of
Casio et al.'s expulsion from the union and to
request the termination of the latter pursuant to the
union security provision in the CBA. This demand
was reiterated on Mar 19, 1992, with a reminder
that failure of the Company to do so would amount
to a gross violation of their CBA which would
constrain the Union to file a complaint for ULP.
6. 24 Mar 1992: Threatened by the possible
complaint for ULP by the Union, the Company
issued a Memorandum terminating Casio et al
effectively on Apr 24, and placing them under
preventive suspension for the meantime.
7. 27 Mar 1992: Casio et al, in the name of IBM-Local
31, filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, alleging
as grounds the illegal dismissal of union officers
and members, discrimination, coercion, and union
busting.
8. 03 Aug 1992: Since the settlement was reached in
the conciliation proceedings, Casio et al went to
the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch VII to file a
complaint for ULP against GMC and Pino et al.
a. LA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction since the complaint did not
undergo voluntary arbitration, and instead
endorsed the case to NCMB-Regional
Office. Prior to undergoing such voluntary
arbitration, the parties agreed to submit
the case to the grievance machinery of the
Union. However, the IBM-Local 31 Board
failed to hold grievance proceedings on
the complaint of Casio et al, compelling
NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator Canonoy-
Morada to assume jurisdiction over the
same.
9. 16 Aug 1995: VA Morada dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit but granted separation pay and
attorney's fees to Casio et al.
10. CA set aside VA and held that while the dismissal
of Casio et al was made pursuant to the close shop
provision, the Company however failed to observe
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the elementary rules of due process in
implementing the said dismissal. Hence, Casio et
al were entitled to reinstatement with backwages.
Seeing as the termination was not done in bad
faith, the Company is not liable to Casio et al for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Instead, Pino et al. are the ones held liable for
damages in favor of Casio et al.
11. GMC filed the instant petition. Pino et al., however,
no longer appealed.
GMC's arguments
1. CA's reversal departed from the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment
2. Due process was already accorded to Casio et al. upon
the proceedings made by IBM-Local 31 in expelling the
members
3. GMC had not authority to inquire into or rule on the
loyalty of the members to the union since such matter is an
internal affair of the union.
4. It should be Pino et al who should be liable for the
reinstatement and payment of full backwages of Casio et al
since the Company acted in good faith and merely complied
with the closed shop provision in the CBA.
Casio et al.'s arguments
1. GMC failed to identify specific evidence to support
findings of the CA
2. GMC, as employer, should have conducted separate
inquiry before terminating them from employment. Failure of
the Company to do so deprived them of due process.
3. Defense of good faith raised by the Company is
inconsistent with the failure of the Company to accord them
due process.
ISSUE
WON Casio et al. were illegally dismissed from employment
for GMC's failure to conduct separate investigation prior to
their termination which amounted to lack of due process
[Yes]
RESOLUTION AND RATIO
Yes, Casio et al. were illegally dismissed. Despite a close
shop provision in the CBA and the expulsion of Casio et al.
from the Union, jurisprudence imposes upon GMC the
obligation to accord Casio et al. substantive and procedural
due process before complying with the Union's demand to
dismiss the expelled union members from service. Failure
of GMC to carry out this obligation makes it liable to Casio
et al.
LC 248(e) [now 254(e)] recognizes union security clauses.
254(e) "xxx Nothing in this Code or in any other law
shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition
for employment, except those employees who are
already members of another union at the time of the
signing of the collective bargaining agreement."
Labor 2 Compilation #22
The enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA is
another valid cause for termination from employment
(Alabang Country Club, Inc. v NLRC).
o "Union Security" - generic term; comprehends
"closed shop", "union shop", "maintenance of
membership", or any other form of agreement
which imposes upon employees the obligation to
acquire or retain union membership as a condition
affecting employment
o "Maintenance of membership" - when employees,
who are union members at the effective date of the
CBA, or who thereafter become members, must
maintain union membership as condition for
continued employment until they are promoted or
transferred out of the bargaining unit
o "Closed shop" - an enterprise in which, by
agreement between the employer and his
employees or their representatives, no person may
be employed in any or certain agreed departments
of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and
for the duration of the agreement, remains a
member in good standing of a union
-In terminating an employee pursuant to the union security
clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that:
(1) union security clause is applicable
(2) union is requesting for the enforcement of such clause
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the
union to expel the employee from the union
Meeting all these requisites constitute just cause for
termination based on the union security provision of the
CBA.
In the present case, the first two requisites are present:
there is a union security provision in the CBA which
requires membership in good standing in the union as
condition for employment, and this was being
requested to be enforced by the Union (as evidenced
by the letters sent by Gabiana to GMC VP Cabahug).
The third requisite, however, was not complied with.
GMC should have looked into the evidence of IBM-
Local 31 in expelling Casio et al and made a
determination of the sufficiency thereof. While the letter
sent by Gabiana contained a request by the Union to
enforce the provsion and the basis for the request of
the enforcement (Resolution of the Union expelling
Casio et al), such letter made no mention of the
evidence supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31. This
failure on the part of GMC to determine sufficiency of
evidence amounts to a non-observance of procedural
due process in the dismissal of employees.
GMC also failed to comply with the twin requirements
of notice and hearing, which are essential elements of
procedural due process. Casio et al. did not receive a
written notice apprising them of the charges against
them to afford them the opportunity to be heard. What
they received was already the written notice of
termination.
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GMC's argument that its only duty as employer was to
make sure that Casio et al. were accorded due process in
their expulsion by IBM-Local 31 is bereft of any supporting
evidence. In fact, there is no indication that the Union
actually notified Casio et al of the charges against them or
that they were given the chance to explain their side.
Casio's refusal to accept the letter should not amount to a
waiver of their right to present their answer since it was not
shown that Casio had authority to receive the letter on
behalf of the other employees. Moreover, Court is
unconvinced that the 3-day period to file an answer was
sufficient for Casio et al to prepare their defenses.
Casio et al. are entitiled to backwages and separation pay
considering that reinstatement is no longer possible
because the positions they previously occupied are no
longer existing, as declared by GMC. They are also entitled
to award of attorney's fees. Petition denied. CA decision
affirmed.
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Alabang Country Club v NLRC, Alabang Country Club
Independent Employees Union
569 Phil. 68, Feb 14, 2008, J. Velasco Jr.
Digest by Leigh
FACTS
Alabang Country Club Independent Employees
Union (UNION) is the exclusive bargaining agent of
Alabang Country Club (COMPANY.) Respondents
Pizarro, Braza and Castueras were elected its
officers.
The COMPANY and the UNION entered into a
CBA, which provided for a union shop and
maintenance of membership shop clause
A new election was held within the UNION, and a
new set of officers were elected. The new officers
conducted an audit of union funds, and found
some irregularly recorded entries, unaccounted
expenses and disbursements and uncollected
loans from the union funds.
The previous officers were notified by the UNION,
were asked to explain the discrepancies in writing
In a meeting, the previous officers (Pizarro, Braza
and Castueras) explained their side
o Braza denied any wrongdoing, and
pointed the investigation to Castueras who
was the Union Treasurer at that time. As to
his unpaid loans, he claimed he had been
paying through monthly salary deductions.
He asserted that the union expenses that
had no receipts were legitimate expenses
for which receipts were not issued (food
and transpo allowances given to union
members with pending complaints with the
DOLE and NLRC.) The unliquidated cash
advances were actually payments to a
person to had loaned from the union.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
o Pizarro blamed Castueras for the unpaid
and uncollected loan and cash advances.
His salaries were regularly deducted to
pay his loan and he did not know why it
remained unpaid in the records.
o Castueras denied any wrongdoing. The
irregular entries in the records were
unintentional and due to inadvertence due
to his voluminous workload. He suggested
that the unpaid personal loan be deducted
from his salary.
Despite their explanations, Braza, Pizarro and
Castueras were expelled from the Union, for
malversation of Union funds. The Union also
demanded that the Company dismiss the three, in
view of their expulsion from the union.
The COMPANYs general manager called Pizzaro,
Braza and Castueras for an informal conference
about the charges against them. The general
manager later announced he would conduct a
formal investigation on the matter.
After weighing the verbal and written explanations
of the three, the COMPANY concluded that validity
of the expulsion from the UNION was not refuted.
Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras were eventually
terminated from their employment.
Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras filed a case for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
o LA: ruled in favor of the COMPANY. There
was justifiable cause in terminating the
three.
o NLRC: Reversed the LA decision. Pizzaro,
Braza and Castueras illegally dismissed.
The DOLE had not yet made any
definitive ruling on their liability
regarding Union funds, as per
Sec 2, Rule 18 of the
Implementing Rules
o CA: upheld the NLRC decision
The COMPANY failed to afford
them due process, because they
were not given the opportunity to
be heard in a separate hearing
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
W/N Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras were illegally dismissed
NO
Under the Labor Code, an employee may validly
be terminated on the following grounds: (1) just
causes under Art 282 (288), (2) authorized causes
under Art 283 (289), (3) termination due to disease
under Art 284 (290), (4) termination by the
employee/resignation under Art 285 (291)
Another cause for termination is dismissal from
employment due to the enforcement of a union
security clause in the CBA. In this case, the
employer only needs to determine that
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o The union security clause is applicable
o The union is requesting for the
enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA
o There is sufficient evidence to support the
unions decision to expel the employee
from the union
The abovementioned requisites for the
enforcement of the union security clause was met
in this case
W/N Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras were afforded due
process -- YES
The employer is bound to exercise caution in
terminating the services of the employees
especially so when it is made upon the request of a
labor union pursuant to the CBA.
Due process must be observed in dismissing
employees because the dismissal affects not only
their positions but also their means of livelihood
The CA erred in relying on the case of Malayang
Samahan, as its ruling has no application in this
case. In this case, the COMPANY substantially
complied with due process.
o Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras were
notified that their dismissal was being
requested by the UNION
o The COMPANYs general manager
conferred with them
o Pizzaro, Braza and Castueras were only
dismissed after the COMPANY reviewed
and considered the documents submitted
by the UNION vis a vis their written
explanations PETITION GRANTED.
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PICOP Resources Incorporated (PRI) v Taneca
G.R. No 160828, Aug 9, 2010, J. Peralta
Digest by Leigh
FACTS
Respondents (21 total), regular rank and file employees
and members of NAMAPRI-SPFL (UNION), filed a
complaint for ULP, Illegal Dismissal and money claims
against PICOP Resources (COMPANY), its vice president
and manager of labor, the SPFL (Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor), the federations secretary general and
national president, and the local president of NAMAPRI-
SPFL (UNION)
PICOP has a CBA with the UNION for the period of
5 years, from May 22, 1995 May 22, 2000. It
included the following security provisions:
o Sec 6.1 All employees within the
appropriate bargaining unit who are
members of the UNION at the time of the
signing of this AGREEMENT, shall, as a
condition of continued employment,
maintain their membership in the UNION
Labor 2 Compilation #22
in good standing during the effectivity of
the CBA
o Sec 6.3 The COMPANY, upon the written
request of the UNION and after
compliance with the requirements of the
Labor Code, shall give notice of
termination of services of any employee
who shall fail to fulfill the condition
provided in Sec 6.1 and 6.2
On May 16, 2000, Atty. Fuentes (the national
president of the federation), sent a letter to the
COMPANY asking for the termination of the
employees who allegedly campaigned for,
supported and signed the petition for certification
election of FFW during the effectivity of the CBA
o This was considered as an act of
disloyalty, which was a valid basis for
termination of union membership in
accordance with their constitution and by
laws, and termination from employment,
citing Sec 6.1 of their CBA
A memo was issued to the concerned employees,
asking them to explain why their employment
should not be terminated
o The explanations of the employees who
submitted were endorsed to Atty. Fuentes
for evaluation
After evaluation, Atty. Fuentes demanded for the
termination of 46 employees, which included the
respondents in this case. 31 out of 46 employees
were served with termination letters due to acts of
disloyalty.
Because of this, the respondents accused PICOP
of ULP punishable under Art 248 (now 254) (a), (b),
(c), (d) and (e). They also accused Atty. Fuentes
and Trujillo of ULP under (a) and (b) of the same
article. They alleged the following:
o None of them withdrew membership from
the UNION or submitted to the COMPANY
any union dues and check off
disauthorizations. As such, they continue
to be bona fide members of the UNION
o The mere affixation of signature on an
authorization to file a petition for
certification election was not per se an act
of disloyalty. They may have signed the
authorization before the freedom period,
but the petition for certification itself was
filed within the freedom period.
o There was lack of procedural due process
they should have been summoned
individually and investigated accordingly
o When the UNION demanded their
termination, it was no longer the SEBA
because the CBA had already expired
(CBA expiration: May 22, 2000. Demand
for termination: Jul 12, 2000. Termination
letter: Oct 16, 2000)
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o Acts of the COMPANY officers in
terminating them amounted to interference
with, restraint or coercion of the
respondents right to self organization
LABOR ARBITER: Illegal Dismissal
NLRC: Reversed Labor Arbiter
CA: Reinstated Labor Arbiter decision
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
W/N there was just cause to terminate the employment of
the respondents NO
PETITIONERS:
Dismissal was valid and legal. It acted in good
faith, pursuant to the union security clause of the
CBA
Art. 253 (now 259) of the Labor Code mandates
them to keep the status quo during the 60 day
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by
the parties
SUPREME COURT:
Union Security: any form of agreement which
imposes upon the employees the obligation to
acquire or retain union membership as a condition
for employment
In terminating the employment of an employee due
to the union security clause, the employer must
first determine and prove the following:
o Applicability of the union security clause
o The union is requesting for the
enforcement of the union security
provision
o There is sufficient evidence to support the
decision of the union to expel the
employee from the union
APPLICATION IN THIS CASE
o As to the applicability of the union security
clause
No question that the CBA
included a union security clause.
The company, upon written
request from the union, can
indeed terminate an employee
who fails to maintain good
standing as a union member
o As to whether the union is requesting the
enforcement of the provision
It is undisputed that the union, in
two occasions, demanded the
termination of employment of the
respondents due to acts of
disloyalty
o As to whether there is sufficient
evidence for the expulsion of the
respondents from the union
Labor 2 Compilation #22
There is no sufficient evidence
to support the termination of
the respondents
Mere signing of the
authorization before the
freedom period is not sufficient
ground for termination. It was
only an authorization that they
signed, not a petition. The
petition itself was filed during
the freedom period.
The respondents are still
members in good standing
they did not resign nor
withdraw membership, they
continue to pay union dues,
and never joined FFW
Reliance on Art 253 (now 259)
is misplaced. Although the
employer is still bound to
recognize the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining
agent even after the expiration
of the freedom period, they can
only do so if there was no
petition for certification
election that was filed. In this
case, there were already four
petitions filed, and a
certification election was
already ordered by the DOLE.
Moreover, the automatic
renewal pertains only to the
economic provisions of the
CBA
When there is a
representational issue, the
status quo provision will not
apply. Otherwise, it will create
an absurd situation where the
union members will be forced
to maintain membership by
virtue of the union security
clause. PETITION DENIED.
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DEL PILAR ACADEMY V. DEL PILAR ACADEMY
EMPLOYEES UNION
578 Phil. 549; 30 April 2008; Nachura, J.
Digest prepared by Glenn Agbayani
I. Facts
Del Pilar Academy (Del Pilar) and Del Pilar
Academy Employees Union (Union) entered into a
CBA granting salary increases and other benefits.
Union assessed agency fees from Del Pilars non-
union member employees and requested Del Pilar
to deduct the assessment from the employees
salaries. Del Pilar refused to deduct the agency
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fees because (1) it received no individual written
authorization from any non-union member to
deduct the fee from their salaries and (2) non-
union members received no CBA benefits since the
salary increase is a benefit mandated by law
(DECS requiring the allocation of at least 70% of
tuition fee increases for salaries).
Union negotiated a renewal of the CBA. A deadlock
resulted due to disagreement on the qualifications
of teachers entitled to summer vacation leave.
Union filed a complaint for ULP with the LA against
Del Pilar.
LA held that Del Pilar should have collected the
agency fee from non-union members who are
included in the bargaining unit pursuant to Art.
248(e) [Art. 254(e)] of the Labor Code. It found that
Del Pilar is not guilty of ULP because it believed in
good faith that individual written authorizations
were required in order to deduct the fees, and that
there is no clear showing of acts aimed at stifling
the right to self-organization.
CA and NLRC affirmed the LA. The CA ordered Del
Pilar to deduct agency fees from the salaries of the
non-union members.
II. Issue
WON agency fees may be checked off from the salary of a
non-union member employee YES
WON an individual written authorization from the non-union
member is required for a valid check-off NO
III. Ratio
A check-off is a system in which an employer is
duty-bound (under a CBA or by virtue of an
individual written authorization from the employee)
to deduct a sum equivalent to the amount of union
dues, as agency fees, from the employees wages
for direct remittance to the union.
Art. 248(e) [Art. 254(e)] of the Labor Code allows
the collection of agency fees from non-union
employees. It states that non-union member
employees included in the collective bargaining
unit may be assessed reasonable fees if such
non-union members accept CBA benefits. The
proviso in the same article states that the
individual authorization requirement under Art.
241(o) [Art. 247(o)] does not apply to non-union
members.
The collection of agency fees is justified because
the non-union members receive CBA benefits.
Aside from the grant of an annual salary increase,
the Union negotiated for other benefits such as
limitations on hours of teaching assignments,
additional compensation for overload units/excess
work hours, payment of longevity pay, summer
vacation leave for certain teaching staff, and leave
with pay for non-teaching personnel.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
The rationale behind the collection of agency fees
was mentioned in Holy Cross of Davao College v.
Joaquin: The legal basis of the unions right to
agency fees is quasi-contractual, deriving from the
established principle that non-union members
may not unjustly enrich themselves from
benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
=============================================
ITOGON-SUYOC vs. BALDO
G.R. No. L-17739; Dec. 24, 1964; Zaldivar.
Digest by Ian.
Facts:
1. Nov. 18, 1958- complaint for unfair labor practice
(ULP) was filed by an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of
Industrial Relations. It charged herein petitioner Itogon
Suyoc Mines Inc. (Company) and its General
Superintendent, Claude Fertig of violating Sec. 4(a) pars.
1,4, and 5 of RA 875. The complaint alleged:
a) On June 9, 1957 and March 6, 1958, petitioner
dismissed employees A. Manaois and Jose
Baldo.
b) Dismissal was because of their membership in
Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union and for having
testified against the petitioner in a certification
election case involving the employees of co.
Prayer: An order be issued against company to cease and
desist from the labor practices complained of and that
Manaois and Baldo be reinstated to their former positions
w/o loss of benefits and with brick wages from the date of
their respective dismissal until the date of their actual
reinstatement.
2. Companys Answer: Dismissal due to just and lawful
causes (inefficiency, utter disregard and violation of safety
rules and regulations established and enforced by the
respondent for the protection of the lives of the employees
and properties of the respondent company, utter disregard
of the company property and poor attendance records)
3. Oct. 5, 1960- CIR found for Baldo there was ULP, his
dismissal being just and illegal while A. Manaois was not
proved hence dismissal was just and legal. Baldo ordered
reinstated with backpay. CIR denied MR on Oct. 27, 1960.
4. Company appealed the decision and the order denying
the MR affecting only the case of Jose Baldo, CIR
committed GAD when it ordered the reinstatement of Baldo
and backpay. No appeal has been filed regarding the case
of A. Manaois.
Issue: WON there was ULP and Baldo was illegal
dismissed.
Held: Yes. The decision of the CIR is supported by
substantial evidence. Decision appealed from is affirmed.
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Ratio:
1. The findings of the CIR were supported by substantial
evidence. CIR found that:
a) Baldo started working as miner in the sometime in
1954 until Feb. 4, 1958 when he was given a '30-
day notice of termination of employment--his
services will not he needed by the company after
March 5, 1968. Baldo refused to acknowledge
receipt of said notice when Mcwry, mine's
superintendent of the company, asked him to sign
the same. It appears that Baldo was on 15 days
vacation leave with pay immediately prior to his
being nerved his separation notice.
b) Baldos dismissal was because of his
membership to the union and for having
testified in the certification proceeding for the
union.
b.1: Narration of facts:
Feb. 4, 1958- Baldo was given 30-
day notice of separation. During this
time there was already a pending
certification election case before the
CIR brought by the union.
When he was given notice, he brought
his case to the grievance committee
to secure his reinstatement. Note that
the grievance committee was
composed of the reps of the SEBA,
Itogon Labor Union and company.
While his case is pending, he was
asked by the companys plant
engineer and former labor relations
officer Mansueto Gelladoga (who was
also a former VP of Itogon Labor
Union) not to testify to the cert.
election so that he will be reinstated.
Despite of Gelladogas request, he
testified on April. 7, 1958. Testimony
adverse to company.
After he testified, his case was
immediately 'dropped' by the
grievance committee and he was
never reinstated.
Company contends that it was the Itogon Labor Union that
dropped the case of Baldo regarding the 30-day notice of
separation because Baldo brought his case to a rival union
of the Itogon Labor Union, so that the petitioner should not
be charged of unfair labor practice. This contention of the
petitioner has no merit.
b.2: The company has much to do with the
dropping of the case of Baldo:
As can be gleamed in b.1.;
Company opposed the certification
election;
There is evidence too that Claude
Fertig, the General Superintendent of
the petitioner, was at the time acting
as adviser of the Itogon-Labor Union,
Labor 2 Compilation #22
the rival union of the Sagilo-Itogon
Workers. Baldo was given that notice
of separation from the service he had
already joined the Sagilo-Itogon
Workers Union.
c) An examination of the alleged offense imputed on
Baldo previous to his dismissal and which are
relied upon by the company shows that they were
not so serious as to warrant his immediate and
permanent dismissal.
2. On backpay:
Petitioner: CIR GAD when it ordered the reinstatement of
Baldo with back wages. The petitioner points out that it
should not be made to pay back wages during the time that
this case had been pending.
SC: No merit. The matter of granting back wages or back-
pay to an employee that is reinstated is discretionary with
the Court of Industrial Relations (Section 6 (c), Republic Act
No. 875). This question had already been settled in a line of
decisions rendered by this Court. We are satisfied that
under the circumstances as shown by the records of the
present case the Court of Industrial Relations had not
abused the exercise of its discretion when it ordered the
grant of back wages to respondent Baldo from the date he
was promised reinstatement to the day of his actual
reinstatement.
=============================================
Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v. Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corp.
=============================================
SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION v. SHELL COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, LTD.
G.R. No. L28607; May 31, 1971; Fernando, J.
Digest prepared by Jackie Canlas
FACTS:
There was move for the dissolution of the security
section of Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd (Shell)
by reassigning them to other positions and contracting
out such service to an outside security agency in 1964.
o A study conducted by Shell showed that
reassigning the guards and hiring an independent
security agency would give Shell P96K annual
savings. The move was consulted with the Shell
Oils Workers Union (Union) and there was no
objection. There was even an offer of cooperation
as long as a scheme for retirement of the security
guards affected or their redeployment would be
followed.
Tentative character of dissolution was made evident by
the fact that the CBA executed in 1966 (effective until
1969) contained the usual grievance procedure and no
strike clauses. There was inclusion of the category of
7

the security guards in such collective bargaining
contract.
However, Company was bent on the dissolution, which
was communicated to the Unions in a panel to panel
meeting in 1967. Counter-offer by the Union to reduce
working days from 6 to 5 was rejected by the Company
because it was highly unusual and impracticable. When
Union consulted with the members, the majority made
clear that if the Company continued with their plan,
there would be a strike.
Eventually, Shell released a notice of reassignment,
which transferred 18 security guards stationed at its
Pandacan Installation, to its other department and the
consequent hiring of a private security agency to
undertake the work of said security guards.
The next day, the Union went on strike when the
guards from the new security agency were trying to
pass the main gate. There were acts of force,
intimidation and violence during the strike. Molotov
bombs exploded. The streets were obstructed with
wooden planks containing protruding nails, and
physical injuries were inflicted on management
personnel.
Conciliation efforts of the Dept. of Labor were
unsuccessful.
When President certified the strike, CIR released a
return to work order.
CIR declared the strike illegal there being no
compliance with the statutory requisites before an
economic strike could be staged NO ULP.
In contracting out the security service and
redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was
merely performing its legitimate prerogative to
adopt the most efficient and economical method of
operation.
Dismissal of the 18 security guards, and Union
officers (because of the violence that during the
strike) was valid.
ISSUES/HELD: WON the strike was legal - YES
WON Shell committed unfair labor
practice - YES
RATIO:
WON the strike was legal - YES
The stand of Shell as to the scope of management
prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not
bound by what was stipulated. The growth of industrial
democracy fostered by the institution of collective
bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented
by a union of their choice, has no doubt contracted the
sphere of what appertains solely to the employer.
Freedom to manage the business remains with
management. It still has plenty of elbow room for
making its wishes prevail.
In this particular case though, what was stipulated in
an existing CBA certainly precluded Shell from
carrying out what otherwise would have been within its
prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
Crucial question: WON the then existing CBA
constituted a bar to such a decision reached by
management - YES
o There was specific coverage concerning the
security guards in the CBA. It is found not only in
the body but in the 2 appendices concerning the
wage schedules as well as the premium pay and
the night compensation to which the personnel in
such section were entitled. It was thus an
assurance of security of tenure, at least, during the
lifetime of the agreement.
o It is not enough that the guards would not be
unemployed as they would be transferred to
another position with an increase in pay and with a
transfer bonus. For what is involved is the integrity
of the agreement reached, the terms of which
should be binding of both parties. One of them
may be released, but only with the consent of the
other. The right to object belongs to the latter, and
if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of
affairs should continue during the existence of the
contract.
o Furthermore, the Company had already conducted
studies and decided, as early as 1964 to dissolve
the section but they still entered into the CBA with
the Union. They did not need to agree to all the
stipulations or reserved the right to dissolve and
reassign the guards. There is no justification for
the Companys insistence on pushing through with
the dissolution without violating the CBA.
WON Shell committed unfair labor practice - YES
Shell, in failing to manifest fealty to the stipulations of
the CBA is guilty of ULP.
Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial
Relations: "It being expressly provided in the
industrial Peace Act that [an] unfair labor practice
is committed by a labor union or its agent by its
refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer'
and this Court having decided in the Republic
Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does
not end with the execution of an agreement, being
a continuous process, the duty to bargain
necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation
to live up to the terms of such a CBA if entered
into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith
constitutes ULP.
The unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did
have the impress of validity.
o The strike was triggered by Shell's failure to abide
by the terms and discrimination, resorted to with
regard to hiring and tenure of conditions of its CBA
with the Union, by the employment, and the
dismissal of employees due to union activities, as
well as the refusal of Shell to bargain collectively in
good faith.
o It is not even required that there be in fact an ULP
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a
belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the
inducing factor for staging a strike.
8

o It is true that there is a requirement, in the said Act
that before the employees may do so, they must
file with the Conciliation Service of the Department
of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. Such a
requisite however, as has been repeatedly
declared by this Court, does not have to be
complied with in case of unfair labor practice strike,
which certainly is entitled to greater judicial
protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be
rendered meaningful.
Re: Violence that attended the strike
Care is to be taken, however, especially where an
unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping
it with illegality just because it is tainted by such
acts.
Under the circumstances, it would be going too far
to consider that the strike became illegal. This is
not by any means to condone the utilization of
force by labor to attain its objectives. It is only to
show awareness that is labor conflicts, the tension
that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration
and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of
violence. If there be in this case a weighing of
interests in the balance, the ban the law imposes
on unfair labor practices by management that
could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be
conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat,
unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to
stamp the strike with illegality. It is enough that
individual liability be incurred by those guilty of
such acts of violence that call for loss of employee
status.
In the light of the foregoing, there being a valid
ULP strike, the loss of employment decreed by CIR
on all the Union officers cannot stand. The premise
on which such penalty was decreed was the
illegality of the strike. Its imposition is unwarranted.
However, because of the commission of specific
serious acts of violence, the Union's President,
Gregorio Bacsa, as well as its Assistant Auditor,
Conrado Pea, did incur such a penalty.
Barredo, concurring:
When it is considered that there is nothing in the
record to show that in acting as it did in this case,
Shell was not, actuated by any anti-union, much
less anti-labor motive but by purely economic
reasons of sound management, and, in fact, Union
does not even suggest any such purpose, one
must have to hesitate and deliberate long and hard
before giving assent to a pronouncement that Shell
is guilty of unfair labor practice, such as to legalize
the strike.
However, that in a larger sense this is a policy
decision, and all things considered, the juridical
considerations and equities in this case appear to
Justice Barredos mind and conscience to be in
equipoise, on the side of labor, who acted in the
Labor 2 Compilation #22
same good faith that management did.
The record amply supports that the transfer of the
18 security guards was not a violation of the CBA.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record
indicating that there is factual basis for Union's
claim that the security guards herein involved
would surely suffer economic loss as a result of
their questioned transfer; Shell made it plain that
overtime and other benefits accruing to them as
security guards would likewise be given to them in
their new positions.
Justice Barredo cannot agree that Shell has
violated its CBA with Union, but, on the other hand,
he is not ready to conclude that for this reason, the
strike here in question was consequently illegal.
He holds that the strike votes taken by the
members of the Union were premised on the
sincere and honest belief that there was a legal
breach of the said agreement.
=============================================
De La Salle University v. De La Salle University
Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
G.R. No. 169254; August 23, 2012; Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Digest prepared by John Cruz
Facts:
1. This case involves one of the three notices of strike
filed by respondent union DLSUEANAFTEU against
petitioner DLSU due to its refusal to bargain collectively
with it in light of the intraunion dispute between 2
opposing factions, the Aliazas and Baez factions.
2. May 30, 2000 some of the union members headed by
Belen Aliazas (Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the
election of union officers in the BLR. They alleged that
there has been no election for union officers since 1992
in supposed violation of its constitution and bylaws
which provided for an election of officers every 3 years.
a. It appeared that the union members repeatedly
voted to approve the holdover of the previously
elected officers led by Baylon R. Baez
(Baez faction) and to defer the elections to
expedite the negotiations of the economic
terms covering the last 2 years of the 1995-
2000 CBA.
3. March 19, 2001 BLR Regional Director issued a
decision ordering the conduct of an election of union
officers to be presided by the Labor Relations Division
of the DOLE-NCR. It held that the members of the
Baez faction were not elected by the general
membership but were appointed by the Executive
Board since 1985. The Baez faction appealed with the
BLR Director.
4. March 20, 2001 despite the brewing conflict between
the Aliazas and Baez factions, DLSU entered into a 5-
year CBA covering the period from June 1, 2000 to May
31, 2005.
5. The Aliazas faction filed a Very Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the BLR. They alleged that the Baez
faction, in complete disregard of the March 19, 2001
9

Decision, scheduled a regular election of union
officers without notice to or participation of the DOLE-
NCR.
6. July 6, 2001 BLR Director granted the motion for
intervention. It held that the unilateral act of setting the
date of election and the disqualification of the Aliazas
faction by the DLSUEACOMELEC supported the
intervening factions fear of biased elections.
7. August 7, 2001, the Aliazas faction wrote a letter to
DLSU requesting it to place in escrow the union dues
and other fees deducted from the salaries of
employees pending the resolution of the intraunion
conflict.
8. August 16, 2001 DLSU acceded the request to
establish a savings account for the union where all the
collected union dues and agency fees will be deposited
and held in trust.
a. However, DLSU said that it shall discontinue
normal relations with any group within the
union including the incumbent set of officers
since the latters holdover authority has been
extinguished and an election of new union
officers was ordered to be conducted and
supervised by the DOLE. Thus until such
elections, a void in the union leadership exists.
9. August 21, 2001. the union filed a complaint for ULP
in the NLRC against DLSU for violation of Art. 248(a)
and (g) of the Labor Code for interfering with its right to
self-organization and the administration of the labor
organization.
10. March 7, 2002 the union filed its 1st notice of strike
in the NCMB.
11. May 23, 2002 BLR Director Cacdac dismissed the
appeal of the Baez Faction since the latter admitted
that no elections were conducted in 1992 and 1998
when the terms of office of the officers expired. Hence,
the call for the conduct of elections by the BLR
Regional Director was valid.
12. July 12, 2002 LA dismissed the August 21, 2001
complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner for
lack of merit in view of the May 23, 2002 decision of the
BLR. The LA, in effect, upheld the validity of DLSUs
view that there was a void in the leadership of
respondent. Eventually, NLRC affirmed the LA decision
and the Unions MR was denied.
13. March 15, 2003 the union sent a letter to DLSU
requesting for the renegotiation of the economic terms
of the CBA.
14. March 20, 2003 DLSU denied the request due to the
void in the leadership of the union.
15. [1st SOLE CASE] April 4, 2003 the union filed its 2nd
notice of strike with the NCMB.
16. April 11, 2003 SOLE assumed jurisdiction pursuant to
Art. 263 since DLSU, as an education institution,
belonged to an industry indispensable to national
interest.
17. May 16, 2003 Meanwhile, BLR Director Cacdac
issued a memorandum stating that there was no void in
the union leadership as the March 19, 2001 decision of
the Regional Director did not automatically terminate
the Baez factions tenure in office. He explained
Labor 2 Compilation #22
therein that [a]s dulyelected officers of the union, their
leadership is not deemed terminated by the expiration
of their terms of office, for they shall continue their
functions and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining
to their respective positions in a holdover capacity, until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
18. July 28, 2003 SOLE held that DLSU was guilty of
violating Article 248(g) in relation to Article 252 of
the Labor Code for violation of its duty to bargain.
DLSU filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
a. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari in the
1st SOLE case and also denied the MR. DLSU
appealed the SC which rendered a minute
resolution dismissing the petition for failure to
show reversible error. The decision became
final and executory on September 21, 2005.
19. [2nd SOLE CASE] August 27, 2003 the union filed its
3rd notice of strike due to DLSUs continuing refusal to
bargain in good faith. Again, SOLE assumed
jurisdiction.
20. August 28, 2003 an election of union officers under
the supervision of the DOLE was conducted. The
Baez faction emerged as the winner and was formally
proclaimed as such on October 29, 2003.
21. November 17, 2003 SOLE cited the July 28, 2003
decision, and consequently declared that DLSU
committed ULP. And since the Baez faction have
reportedly taken their oath of office and have qualified,
DLSU is now under estoppel from recognizing them,
considering that it committed in writing to recognize and
commence bargaining once a set of duly elected
officers is proclaimed after an election duly conducted
under the supervision of the DOLE.
a. In accordance decision, DLSU turned over to
respondent the collected union dues and
agency fees from employees which were
previously placed in escrow amounting to
P441,924.99
22. Upon denial of DLSUs MR of the 2 nd SOLE decision, it
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed
the same on March 4, 2005, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N DLSU is guilty of ULP for violating its duty to
bargain in good faith. YES.
Held: Petition DENIED.
Ratio:
We note that both SC minute resolution arising from the 2 nd
SOLE case and this petition are offshoots of DLSUs
purported temporary measures to preserve its neutrality
with regard to the perceived void in the union leadership.
While these two cases arose out of different
notices to strike filed on April 4, 2003 (2 nd notice of
strike) and August 27, 2003 (3rd notice of strike), it
is undeniable that the facts cited and the
arguments raised by DLSU are almost identical
with regard to the charge of ULP for violating its
duty to bargain in good faith under Art. 248(g) in
relation to Art. 252.
10

Applying the law of the case doctrine, our previous
affirmance of the CA finding that DLSU erred in
suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the
union and in placing the union funds in escrow considering
that the intraunion dispute between the Aliazas and Baez
factions was not a justification therefor is binding in this
case.
The law of the case has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
DLSUs reliance on the July 12, 2002 Decision of the LA
dismissing the ULP complaint, and the NLRCs affirmance
thereof, is misplaced.
The ULP complaint questioned DLSUs actions
immediately after the March 19, 2001 Decision of
BLR finding that the reason for the holdover [of
the previously elected union officers] is already
extinguished.
The present controversy involves DLSUs actions
subsequent to (1) the clarification of said March 19,
2001 Maraan Decision by BLR Director Cacdac
who opined in a May 16, 2003 memorandum that
the then incumbent union officers (the Baez
faction) continued to hold office until their
successors have been elected and qualified, and
(2) the July 28, 2003 Decision of the SOLE ruling
that the very same intraunion dispute (subject of
several notices of strike) is insufficient ground for
the DLSU to suspend CBA negotiations with the
union.
We take notice, too, that the said Decision LA has
already been set aside by CA and upheld by the
SC, wherein petitioner was found liable for ULP.
Neither can DLSU seek refuge in its defense that as early
as November 2003 it had already released the escrowed
union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the
latter.
The fact remains that DLSU refuse to collectively
bargain with the union without valid reason. At
most, the decision of the SOLE merely rendered
moot and academic the SOLEs directives for
DLSU to commence CBA negotiations with the
period provided
=============================================
Union of Filipro Employees - Drug, Food And Allied
Industries Unions - Kilusang Mayo Uno (UFE-DFA-KMU)
v. Nestl Philippines, Incorporated
GR No. 158930-31; 22 August 2006; Chico-Nazario, J.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
Digest by Rose Ann Gonzales (Sorry, ang haba ng case eh
) [Edited by Maggy Gan focus on Issue no. 3]
FACTS
On 4 April 2001, in consideration of the impending
expiration on 5 June 2001 of the existing CBA between
Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU (Union), the Presidents of
the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of the Union,
Ernesto Pasco and Diosdado Fortuna, respectively,
informed Nestl, thru a Letter of Intent, of their intent
to open new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for
the year 2001-2004 as early as June 2001.
Nestl acknowledged receipt of the letter and informed
the Union that it was preparing its own counter-
proposal and proposed ground rules that shall govern
the conduct of the collective bargaining negotiations.
On 29 May 2001, in another letter addressed to the
UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division), Nestl
underscored its position that unilateral grants, one-
time company grants, company-initiated policies
and programs, which include, but are not limited to
the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay
and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature
not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and
therefore shall be excluded therefrom.
On 14 Aug 2001, Nestl, claiming to have reached an
impasse, requested the NCMB to conduct preventive
mediation proceedings between it and the Union.
Despite 15 meetings between them, the parties failed
to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA.
On 31 Oct 2001, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with
the NCMB complaining, in essence, of bargaining
deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e.,
retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and
attendance, and CBA.
On 7 Nov 2001, another Notice of Strike was filed, this
time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor
practices i.e., bargaining in bad faith in that it was
setting pre-conditions in the ground rules by refusing to
include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA
negotiations.
On 26 Nov 2001, in view of the looming strike, Nestl
filed with the DOLE a Petition for Assumption of
Jurisdiction praying that the SOLE assume jurisdiction
over the current labor dispute as mandated by Art. 263
[269] (g).
o On 29 Nov 2001, SOLE. Sto. Tomas issued
an Order assuming jurisdiction over the subject
labor dispute between the parties, consequently
enjoining any strike or lockout and directed the
parties to meet and convene for the discussion
11

of the union proposals and company counter-
proposals before the NCMB.
o Union sought reconsideration of the Assumption
of Jurisdiction Order on the main assertion that
Art. 263 (g) is unconstitutional, but this was
denied.
Basis: In re: labor dispute at Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation which held that
the foregoing article clearly does not
interfere with the workers right to strike
but merely regulates it, when in the
exercise of such right, national interests
will be affected.
Despite the injunction contained in the SOLEs
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and conciliation
efforts by the NCMB, the employee members of the
Union at the Nestl Cabuyao Plant went on strike.
On 16 Jan 2002, SOLE issued return-to-work Order
and for Nestl to accept back all returning workers
under the same terms and conditions existing
preceding to the strike and for both parties to cease
and desist from committing acts inimical to the on-going
conciliation proceedings.
o Notwithstanding the Return-To-Work Order, the
members of the Union continued with their strike
and refused to go back to work as instructed.
o Thus, Sec. Sto. Tomas sought the assistance of
the PNP for the enforcement of said order.
On 7 Feb 2002, hearing was conducted and the parties
submitted their respective position papers.
o Nestl addressed several issues allegedly
pertaining to the current labor dispute, i.e.,
economic provisions of the CBA as well as the
non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement Plan
in the collective bargaining negotiations.
o UFE-DFA-KMU, in contrast, limited itself to
tackling the solitary issue of whether or w/n the
retirement plan was a mandatory subject in its
CBA negotiations with the company on the
contention that the Order of Assumption of
Jurisdiction covers only the issue of Retirement
Plan.
o On 8 Feb 2002, Nestl moved that the Union be
declared to have waived its right to present
arguments respecting the other issues raised by
the company on the ground that the latter chose
to limit itself to discussing only one issue.
o On 11 Feb 2002, SOLE denied said motion.
On 8 March 2002, SOLE denied the MR of the
Union.
o The Union filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA on the question of w/n
the SOLE committed GAD in issuing the Orders
of 11 Feb 2002 and 8 March 2002.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
Meanwhile, then Acting SOLE Brion, came out with
an Order dated 2 April 2002, in the main, ruling that:
(a) the present Retirement Plan at the
Nestl Cabuyao Plant is a unilateral grant that the
parties have expressly so recognized subsequent to
the SCs ruling in Nestl, Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC, Feb 4,
1991, and is therefore not a mandatory subject for
bargaining; and that (b) the Unions charge of unfair
labor practice against the Company is dismissed for
lack of merit. On 6 May 2002, the SOLE denied MR.
o For the second time, the Union went to the CA
likewise via a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul the Orders of 2 April 2002 and 6 May 2002
of the SOLE.
o CA decided in favor of the Union (GAD in all
orders)
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
1. W/N the Retirement Plan was not a proper subject
to be included in the CBA negotiations between the
parties; hence, non-negotiableNo, the Retirement
Plan is negotiable.
In Nestl Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, the SC has had the
occasion to affirm that a retirement plan is consensual
in nature. It declared that:
o The inclusion of the retirement plan in the
CBA as part of the package of economic
benefits extended by the company to its
employees to provide them a measure of
financial security after they shall have ceased to
be employed in the company, reward their
loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and
promote industrial peace, gives a consensual
character to the plan so that it may not be
terminated or modified at will by either party.
o The fact that the retirement plan is non-
contributory, i.e., that the employees contribute
nothing to the operation of the plan, does not
make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations.
o Since the retirement plan has been an integral
part of the CBA since 1972, the Unions demand
to increase the benefits due the employees
under said plan, is a valid CBA issue.
o Employees do have a vested and demandable
right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to
them by their employer. The latter may not
unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or diminish such
benefits (Art. 100, Labor Code)
Here, it cannot be denied that the CBA that was about
to expire at that time contained provisions respecting
the Retirement Plan. As the latter benefit was already
subject of the existing CBA, the members of UFE-DFA-
KMU were only exercising their prerogative to bargain
or renegotiate for the improvement of the terms of the
Retirement Plan.
12

Precisely, the purpose of collective bargaining is the
acquisition or attainment of the best possible covenants
or terms relating to economic and non-economic
benefits granted by employers and due the employees.
The Labor Code has actually imposed as a mutual
obligation of both parties, this duty to bargain
collectively. The duty is categorically prescribed by Art.
252 [258] and further expounded by Art. 253 [259].
The categorical mention of the terms unilateral
agreement in the letter and the MOA signed by the
representatives of UFE-DFA-KMU, did not estop UFE-
DFA-KMU from raising it as an issue in the CBA
negotiations.
o The characterization unilaterally imposed by
Nestl on the Retirement Plan cannot operate to
divest the employees of their vested and
demandable right over existing benefits
voluntarily granted by their employer.
Also significant is that paragraph 6 and its
subparagraphs, particularly subparagraph 6.2,
highlights an undeniable fact that Nestl recognizes
that the Retirement Plan is part of the existing CBA.
2. W/N the assumption powers of the SOLE should
have been limited merely to the grounds alleged in
the second Notice of Strike No, the SOLEs
jurisdiction necessarily includes matters incidental to
the labor dispute, that is, issues that are necessarily
involved in the dispute itself, not just to those ascribed
in the Notice of Strike
In declaring the SOLE to have acted with GAD for
ruling on substantial matters or issues and not
restricting itself merely on the ground rules, the CA
essentially treated the subject labor dispute in a
piecemeal fashion.
The power granted to the SOLE by Art. [269] (g),
authorizes her to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, and
correlatively, to decide the same.
In the case at bar, the SOLE simply relied on the
Notices of Strike that were filed by the Union.
o Based on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-
KMU, the SOLE rightly decided on matters of
substance.
o Further, it is a fact that during the conciliation
meetings before the NCMB, but prior to the filing
of the notices of strike, the parties had already
delved into matters affecting the meat of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the meetings
undertaken by the parties had not gone beyond the
discussion of the ground rules, the issue of w/n the
SOLE could decide issues incidental to the subject
Labor 2 Compilation #22
labor dispute had already been answered in the
affirmative.
o In International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. SOLE, it
was held that the Secretarys assumption of
jurisdiction power necessarily includes matters
incidental to the labor dispute, that is, issues that
are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, not
just to those ascribed in the Notice of Strike; or,
otherwise submitted to him for resolution.
Accordingly, even if not exactly on the ground upon
which the Notice of Strike is based, the fact that the
issue is incidental to the resolution of the subject labor
dispute or that a specific issue had been submitted to
the Secretary of the DOLE for her resolution, validly
empowers the latter to take cognizance of and resolve
the same.
3. W/N Nestl was guilty of unfair labor practice
because of allegedly setting a pre-condition to
bargaining the non-inclusion of the Retirement
Plan as an issue in the collective bargaining
negotiationsNo, ULP was not proven.
The concept of unfair labor practice is defined under
Art. 247 [253] and enumerated such acts in Art. 248
[254]. Art. [254] includes (g) To violate the duty to
bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code.
Here, Nestl is accused of violating its duty to bargain
collectively when it purportedly imposed a pre-condition
to its agreement to discuss and engage in collective
bargaining negotiations with UFE-DFA-KMU.
However, a meticulous review of the record and
pleadings of the cases at bar shows that, of the two
notices of strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU before the
NCMB, it was only on the second that the ground of
unfair labor practice was alleged. Worse, the 7 Nov
2001 Notice of Strike merely contained a general
allegation that Nestl committed ULP by bargaining in
bad faith for supposedly setting pre-condition in the
ground rules (Retirement issue).
o On the contrary, Nestle, in its Position Paper, did
not confine itself to the issue of the non-inclusion
of the Retirement Plan but extensively discussed
its stance on other economic matters pertaining
to the CBA.
There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from
the facts, to be precise, the crucial question of whether
or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in
good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual
case.
Except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU,
neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of
these cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor
practice.
13

In its letter to UFE-DFA-KMU on 29 May 2001, though
Nestle underscored its position that unilateral grants,
one-time company grants, company-initiated policies
and programs xxx are by their very nature not proper
subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be
excluded therefrom, such attitude is not tantamount to
refusal to bargain.
o This should be viewed in light of the fact that
eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly
agreed to treat the Retirement Plan as a
unilateral grant.
o Nestle, therefore, cannot be faulted for
considering the same benefit as unilaterally
granted.
o To be sure, it must be shown that Nestl was
motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, and, of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted in
disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects
in their collective bargaining negotiations.
o Construing arguendo that the content of
the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down
a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with
UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position
Paper of its proposals affecting other matters
covered by the CBA contradicts the claim of
refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith
Held: Retirement plan is negotiable. No GAD in the act of
SOLE assuming jurisdiction and Nestle is not guilty of ULP.
=============================================
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
LTD.
G.R. No. L-25291; Jan. 30, 2971; Castro, J.
Digest by Reinerr Nuestro
Note: Sorry for the length, 26 pages ang case wala pang
footnotes. The discussions on speech, totality of conduct
(and economic coercion??) are in Issue #1 while espionage
is discussed in issue #3.
Petitioners: The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd.,
Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers and Employees Association-NATU, and Insular
Life Building Employees Association-NATU (The Unions)
Respondents: The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., FGU
Insurance Group (The Companies), Jose M. Oble, and
Court of Industrial Relations
Facts:
The three petitioner Unions, while still members of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered
into separate CBAs with the respondent
companies.
Two of the lawyers of the Unions were Felipe Enaje
and Ramon Garcia. Garcia used to be the
Labor 2 Compilation #22
secretary-treasurer of FFW and acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life
Bldg. Employees Assoc. He tried to dissuade the
members from disaffiliating with FFW and joining
the NATU, to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
DOJ. Thereafter, they were hired by the
respondent companies, Garcia in 1956 as
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their
Legal Dept., and Enaje in 1957 as personnel
manager and chairman of the negotiating panel.
Sept. 16, 1957: the Unions jointly submitted
proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal
of their respective CBAs due to expire on Sept. 30,
1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon
retroactively effective Oct. 1, 1957.
Sept, and Oct. 1957: Negotiations were conducted
but were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of
union shop. As a result, on Jan. 27, 1958: Unions
filed a notice of strike for deadlock on CBA.
Conciliation conferences were held under the Dept.
of Labor where conciliators urged the Companies
to make reply to the Unions proposals en toto so
that the Unions might consider the feasibility of
dropping their demand for union security in
exchange for benefits.
o However, the Companies did not make
any counter-proposals and insisted that
the Unions drop their demand for union
security in exchange for other benefits.
o Petitioner Insular Life Bldg. Employees
Assoc. dropped this particular demand but
respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still
refused to make any counter-proposals.
The two other unions likewise dropped
their demands and Apr. 25, 1958 was set
by the parties to meet and discuss the
remaining demands.
Apr. 25 to May 6 1958: the parties negotiated but
with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on
the matter of salary increases. The Unions
demanded from the Companies final counter-
proposals on their economic demands but the
Companies requested the Unions to submit a
workable formula to justify their proposals.
o The Unions then voted to declare a strike
in protest against the Companies alleged
ULPs. Meanwhile, 87 unionists were
reclassified as supervisors without
increase in salary nor in responsibility
while negotiations were going on. These
employees resigned from the unions.
May 20, 1958: The Unions went on strike and
picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building in
Plaza Moraga.
14

May 21, 1958: Companies, through their acting
manager and president, respondent Jose M.
Olbes, sent a letter to each of the strikers.
o The letters said that they recognize the
strikers privilege both to strike and to
conduct picketing and that if the strikers
wanted to come back to work voluntarily,
they could tell the nearest police officer or
security guard, take meals in the office, go
home or sleep at the office where there
are comfortable cots, enjoy free coffee and
occasional movies, and be given overtime
pay for work beyond 8 hours.
The Unions, however, continued to strike with the
exception of a few who were convinced to desist.
Some management men tried to break the picket
lines, including Garcia, the former lawyer of the
Unions. He allegedly tossed aside the placard of a
picketer (Paulino Bugay), and a fight ensued
between them in which both suffered injuries.
o The Companies organized three bus loads
of employees, including a photographer,
who succeeded in penetrating the picket
lines causing injuries to the picketers and
the strike-breakers due to the strikers
resistance.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and
with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies filed criminal charges against the
strikers. They likewise filed a petition for injuction
with damages before the CFI of Manila which was
granted on May 31, 1958.
o On the same date, the Companies sent
another letter to the individual strikers,
reiterating their position and saying that
they could not hold the strikers positions
open for long and that those who were
interested in retaining their employment
who had no criminal charges against them
had until June 2, 1958 to report.
Incidentally, more than 120 criminal charges filed
against the members of the Unions were
dismissed, except for three which involved slight
physical injuries against one striker and light
coercion against two others.
Because of the writ of injuction issued, as well as
the ultimatum, the striking employees decided to
call off their strike and report back to work on June
2, 1958.
Before readmitting the strikers, the Companies
required them not only to secure clearances from
the Fiscals office but also to be screened by a
management committee, which included Enage
and Garcia as members.
o 83 strikers were initially rejected, though
eventually some were reaccepted.
o However, 34 officials and members of the
Unions who were most active in the strike
were refused admission.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
o Some 24 of the above number were
ultimately notified months later that they
were being retroactively dismissed and
were given separation pay while ten
others had not yet been readmitted at the
time of the SC decision.
July 29, 1958: CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice against the Companies under
RA 875 charging the Companies with:
o Interfering with the members of the Unions
in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to
them urging them to abandon their strike
and return to work, with a promise of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies,
and paid OT, and subsequently, warning
them that if they did not return to work on
or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced;
o Discriminating against the members of the
Unions as regards readmission to work
after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in
the strike.
The Companies denied all material allegations and
after the trial on the merits, the CIR dismissed the
Unions complaint for lack of merit. The Unions MR
was denied by the CIR, hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether the company was guilty of ULP in sending
the said individual letters.
Held: YES
Ratio:
Respondents: The sending of the letters
constituted a legitimate exercise of freedom of
speech.
SC: NO. The said letters were directed to the
striking employees individually by registered
special delivery mail without being coursed
through the Unions which represented the
employees in collective bargaining. Melo Photo
Supply Corp. v. National Relations Board (US
case) provided:
o It is an unfair labor practice for an
employer operating under a CBA to
negotiate or attempt to negotiate with his
employees individually in relation to
changes in the agreement.
o And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining is that although the
union is on strike, the employer is still
under obligation to bargain with the union
as the employees bargaining
representative.
Some illegal acts of the employer as constituting
unwarranted acts of interference:
o The act of a company president writing letters
to the strikers, urging them to return to work on
15

terms inconsistent with their union
membership.
o Sending a letter to all employees notifying
them to return to work at a time specified
therein, otherwise new employees would be
engaged to perform their jobs.
o The above acts are all unfair labor practices
because they tend to undermine the concerted
activity of the employees, an activity to which
they are entitled freedom from the employers
molestation.
Moreover, the free speech protection under the
Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of
opinion by the employer or his agent contains a
promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal.
When the respondents offered reinstatement and
attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable
cots, free coffee and occasional movies and
overtime pay, they were guilty of strike-breaking
and/or union-busting and consequently, of unfair
labor practice.
Likewise violative of the right to organize form and
join labor organizations are the following acts: the
offer of a Christmas bonus to all loyal employees of
the company shortly after the making of a request
by the union to bargain; wage increases for the
purpose of mollifying employees after the employer
refused to bargain with the union or for the purpose
of inducing striking employees to return to work;
the employer's promises of benefits in return for
the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support
of their union; and the employer's statement, made
about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of
strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the
strikers returned to work, they would receive new
benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident
insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to
work in.
The respondents contend that the main cause why
the strikers returned to work was the injunction
issued by the CFI Manila and not the letter but the
Court said that the injunctive writ could not alter the
intrinsic quality of the letters, which were
calculated, or which tended to interfere with the
right to engage in lawful concerted activity.
Besides the letters should not be considered by
themselves alone but should be read in light of the
preceding and subsequent circumstances
surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted
according to the totality of conduct doctrine:
o whereby the culpability of an employers
remarks were to be evaluated not only on the
basis of their implicit implications, but were to
be appraised against the background of an in
conjunction with collateral circumstances.
o Under this doctrine, expressions of opinion
by an employer which, though innocent in
themselves, frequently were held to be
culpable because of the circumstances under
which they were uttered, the history of the
Labor 2 Compilation #22
particular employers labor relations or anti-
union bias, or because of their connection with
an established collateral plan of coercion or
interference.
Prior to the petitioners submission of proposals for
an amended renewal of their CBA, the Companies
hired Enage and Garcia, the former legal counsels
of petitioners. Enaga even became the chairman of
the negotiating panel for the Companies in the
CBA.
o 87 employees were reclassified as supervisors
without increase in salary or responsibility,
compelling them, in effect, to resign from their
unions.
o The Companies also performed other acts
such as attempting to crash through the picket
line and filing criminal actions against the
strikers.
The above actuations before and after the
issuance of their two letters yield the clear
interference that the said letters formed of the
respondents scheme to preclude, if not destroy,
unionism within them.
To justify the respondents threat to dismiss the
strikers, the CIR held the petitioners strike to be an
economic strike on the basis of the Notice of Strike
(filed on Jan. 27, 1958) which states that there was
a deadlock in collective bargaining.
o But the strike was not staged after the 30 day
period as stated in the notice proving that the
reason for the strike was not the deadlock on
collective bargaining nor any lack of economic
concessions.
o The strike took place nearly four months from
the date the notice was filed. The main reason
for the strike was that the management double
crossed or would not negotiate in good faith,
which was tantamount to refusal collectively
considering the ULP then being committed by
the management resignation of some
unionists who became supervisors without
salary increase or change in responsibility,
coercion of employees.
Issue #2: The Companies were guilty of discrimination
There were three conditions for readmission of
strikers: 1) the employee must be interested in
continuing his work with the group companies; (2)
there must be no criminal charges against him; and
(3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958,
otherwise he would be replaced.
Since the evidence shows that all the employees
reported back to work on June 2, 1953, they must
be considered as having complied with the first and
third conditions.
When the strikers reported for work on June 2,
1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused
readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact that they were
16

able to secure their respective clearances 34
officials and union members were still refused
readmission on the alleged ground that they
committed acts inimical to the Companies.
It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who
also had criminal charges pending against them
were readily readmitted and were not required to
secure clearances.
This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the
Companies in the process of rehiring and is
therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act.
Issue #3: The Companies were guilty of ULP for
dismissing the officials and union members without the
benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present
their side.
Not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed
charges against him. When the striking employees
reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they
first secured the necessary clearances; but when
all, except three, were able to secure and
subsequently present the required clearances, the
respondents still refused to take them back.
One Emiliano Tabasondra, VP of FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Assoc.-NATU was
refused reinstatement due to allegations of
abandonment but his corroborated testimony
showed that the management refused them an
audience. Mere failure to report for work after
notice to return does not constitute abandonment.
Florencio Ibarra was constructively dismissed
because he allegedly committed acts inimical to
the interest of the respondents when, as president
of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-
NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use
force and violence to have a successful picket.
o Even if this were true, the record discloses
that the picket line had been generally
peaceful, and that incidents happened
only when management men made
incursions into and tried to break the
picket line.
o Besides, the only evidence presented by
the Companies regarding Ibarra's
participation was the testimony of one
Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of
the board of who became a "turncoat" and
who likewise testified as to the union
activities another matter emphasizing
the respondents' unfair labor practice.
o Under the circumstances, there is good
ground to believe that Encarnacion was
made to spy on the actvities of the union
members. This act of the respondents is
considered unjustifiable interference in the
union activities of the petitioners and is
unfair labor practice.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
o It has been held in a great number of
decisions at espionage by an employer of
union activities, or surveillance thereof,
are such instances of interference,
restraint or coercion of employees in
connection with their right to organize,
form and join unions as to constitute unfair
labor practice.
o The information obtained by means of
espionage is in valuable to the employer
and can be used in a variety of cases to
break a union. The unfair labor practice is
committed whether the espionage is
carried on by a professional labor spy or
detective, by officials or supervisory
employees of the employer, or by fellow
employees acting at the request or
direction of the employer, or an ex-
employee.
Issue #4: The members and officials of the union were
entitled to reinstatement with backpay.
Issue #5: A misquotation of Judge Arsenio Martinez of a
portion of the case of Lopez, Sr. v. Chronicle Publication
Employees Assn. does not seem to warrant an indictment
for contempt against the said Judge. It seems to be more a
result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt to
mislead.
The Judges decision:
For it is settled that not even the acquittal
of an employee of the criminal charge against him
is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline
on its employees, should the act upon which the
criminal charged was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest... The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct
which is a just cause for dismissal.
The original text:
For it must be remembered that not even
the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal
charges against him, is a bar to the employer's
right to impose discipline on its employees, should
the act upon which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer's interest.
xxx And the fact that the same was made
in the union newspaper does not alter its
deleterious character nor shield or protect a
reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union
activity, because such end can be achieved without
resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of
the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause
for dismissal.
The 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph
quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in
the pertinent paragraph of the Court's decision.
Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the
17

quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..."
whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...,"
in the Court's decision. Finally, the second and last
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the
Judge's decision, appears not in the same
paragraph of the Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding
paragraph.
=============================================
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-
NFL [CABEU-NFL], represented by its President, PABLITO
SAGURAN v. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC.
[CAB], represented by its President, ANTONIO STEVEN L.
CHAN
G.R. No. 186605; November 17, 2010; Mendoza
Digest by Rose Ann Gonzales
Facts
CABEU-NFL is a duly registered labor union and a
certified bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file
employees, represented by its President, Pablito
Saguran (Saguran).
On January 19, 2004, CABEU-NFL sent CAB a
proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
seeking:
o increase in the daily wage and vacation
and sick leave benefits of the monthly
employees; and
o grant of leave benefits and 13th month
pay to seasonal workers.
CAB responded with a counter-proposal. It
countered that:
o the production bonus incentive and
special production bonus and incentives
be maintained.
o There will be pro-rated increase of wages
every time the government would mandate
an increase in the minimum wage.
o CAB, however, did not agree to grant
additional and separate Christmas
bonuses.
CAB received an Amended Union Proposal sent by
CABEU-NFL reducing its previous demand
regarding wages and bonuses. CAB, however,
maintained its position on the matter.
Thus, the collective bargaining negotiations
resulted in a deadlock.
Due to the deadlock, CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). The NCMB then assumed
conciliatory-mediation jurisdiction and summoned
the parties to conciliation conferences.
CABEU-NFL requested (thru letter) copies of
CABs annual financial statements from 2001 to
2004 and asked for the resumption of conciliation
meetings.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
CAB replied through its June 14, 2005 Letter
(letter-response) to NCMB Regional Director of
Dumaguete City Isidro Cepeda which stated CABs
position/view that the unions request for further
conciliation conference will serve no lawful and
practical purpose because:
o The letter-signatory, Mr. Pablito Saguran,
is no longer an employee of the Central
(lawfully terminated due to an authorized
cause)
o More importantly, the declared purpose of
the requested conciliation meeting has
already been rendered moot and
academic because:
(1) the Union has already lost its
majority status by reason of the
disauthorization and withdrawal of
support by more than 90% of the
R&F employees in the bargaining
unit, and
(2) the workers themselves,
acting as principal, after
disauthorizing the previous agent
CABEU-NFL have organized
themselves into a new Union
known as Central Azucarera de
Bais Employees Labor
Association (CABELA) and after
obtaining their registration
certificate and making due
representation that it is a duly
organized union representing
almost all the R&F workers in the
Central, had concluded a new
collective bargaining agreement
with the Central. The CBA had
been duly ratified by the rank and
file workers constituting 91% of
the collective bargaining unit.
NCMB failed to act on the letter-response of CAB.
Neither did it convene CAB and CABEU-NFL to
continue the negotiations between them.
Reacting from the letter-response of CAB, CABEU-
NFL filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice for
the formers refusal to bargain with it.
LA dismissed the complaint. No ULP. LA Ratio:
o It cannot be said that CAB refused to
negotiate or that it violated its duty to
bargain collectively in light of its active
participation in the past CBA negotiations
at the plant level as well as in the NCMB.
o No ULP in questioning the capacity of Mr.
Pablito Saguran to represent complainant
union in the CBA negotiations because Mr.
Pablito Saguran was no longer an
employee of respondent CAB at that time
having been separated from employment
on the ground of redundancy and having
received the corresponding separation
benefits.
18

o No ULP in its act of writing the NCMB
Director.
o Also, since the conciliation/mediation by
the NCMB has not been officially
concluded, the complaint for unfair labor
practice is not only without merit but also
premature.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the LAs decision and
found CAB guilty of unfair labor practice. NLRCs
Ratio:
o On whether respondents act of
concluding a CBA with CABELA is
warranted under the circumstances:
CABEU-NFL is the certified collective
bargaining agent of the regular workers
and seasonal employees of respondent.
Its status as such was determined in a
certification election conducted by the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). As such, there was no reason for
respondent to deal and negotiate with
CABELA since the latter does not have
such status of majority representation.
Thus, CAB violated its duty to bargain with
complainant when during the pendency of
the conciliation proceedings before the
NCMB it concluded a CBA with another
union.
o On the status of Saguran: at the time the
request was made, Saguran has
questioned the validity of his dismissal
with then NLRC.
CA, by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, reversed the NLRC decision and resolution.
Ratio: lack of substantial proof to support ULP
allegation.
Issue/s
WoN CAB committed acts of ULP by its act of
concluding a new CBA with CABELA (new Union) and
consequently refusing to bargain with CABEU-NFL
HeldCAB did not commit acts of ULP.
Ratio
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it
must be shown that CAB was motivated by ill will,
bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy, and, of course, that
social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxiety resulted x x x in suspending negotiations
with CABEU-NFL.
o In this case, according to SC, CAB
believed that CABEU-NFL was no longer
the representative of the workers. It just
wanted to foster industrial peace by
bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming
majority of its rank and file workers and by
Labor 2 Compilation #22
negotiating and concluding in good faith a
CBA with CABELA.
o Such actions of CAB are nowhere
tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil
sought to be punished in cases of unfair
labor practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same.
o By imputing bad faith to the actuations of
CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof
to present substantial evidence to support
the allegation of unfair labor practice.
o CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the
letter-response, failed to substantiate its
claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the
presumption of good faith.
Moreover, the filing of the complaint for unfair labor
practice was premature inasmuch as the issue of
collective bargaining is still pending before the
NCMB.
In the resolution of labor cases, this Court has always
been guided by the State policy enshrined in the
Constitution that the rights of workers and the promotion of
their welfare shall be protected. The Court is, likewise,
guided by the goal of attaining industrial peace by the
proper application of the law. Thus, it cannot favor one
party, be it labor or management, in arriving at a just
solution to a controversy if the party has no valid support to
its claims. It is not within this Courts power to rule beyond
the ambit of the law.
=============================================
BPI Employees Union o Davao City FUBU v. BPI
G.R. No. 174912; 24 July 2013; Mendoza, J.
Digest prepared by Ruth B. Guinto
I. Facts
BPI Operations Management Corporation (BOMC) was
created and primarily engaged in providing and/or handling
support services for banks and other financial institutions. It
is a subsidiary of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
operating and functioning as a separate and distinct entity.
BPI and BOMC entered into a service agreement wherein
BOMC undertook to provide services such as check
clearing, delivery of bank statements, fund transfers, card
production, operations accounting and control, and cash
servicing. Not a single BPI employee was displaced and
those performing the functions transferred to BOMC were
given other assignments.
The Manila Chapter of BPI Employees Union (BPIEU-Metro
Manila-FUBU) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice.
The LA decided in favour of the Union. The NLRC reversed
the decision of the LA. This was elevated to the CA on a
petition for certiorari which was denied. The employees
19
 Labor 2 Compilation #22

were neither demoted nor were their salaries, benefits and agent of the merged employees as the Unions right to
other privileges diminished. represent said employees did not arise until it was chosen
by them.
On January 1, 1996, the service agreement was likewise
implemented in Davao. Later , a merger between BPI II. Issues
and Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) took 1. WON the act of BPI to outsource the cashiering,
effect on April 10, 2000. Thereafter, BPIs cashiering distribution and bookkeeping functions to BOMC is
function and FEBTCs cashiering, distribution and in conformity with the law and the existing CBA.
bookkeeping functions were handled by BOMC. Twelve [YES]
former FEBTC employees were transferred to BOMC to 2. WON DO No. 10 applies to the BPI-BOMC
complete the service agreement. agreement. [both DO No. 10 and the CBP circular
no. 1388 applies]
BPI Davaos rank and file collective bargaining agent
(Union) objected to the transfer of the functions of the 12 III. Held
personnel to BOMC. The Union contends that the functions The court affirmed the decision of the lower court,
rightfully belonged to the BPI Employees and that the union sustaining the demurrer to the information filed against the
was deprived of membership pursuant to its union shop accused.
provision in the CBA.
IV. Ratio
The union filed a former protest on June 12, 2000. It 1. The rule is covered by Article 261 of the Labor
requested that the BPI submit the issue to the grievance code.
procedure under the CBA, but BPI did not consider it as
grievable. Instead BPI proposed a Labor Management ART. 261. Jurisdiction of
Conference (LMC). Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators. x x x
During the LMC, BPI invoked management prerogative. Accordingly, violations of a
The union, on the other hand, charged that BOMC Collective Bargaining
undermined the existence of the union since it reduced or Agreement, except those which
divided the bargaining unit. BPI effectively deprived the are gross in character, shall no
union of the membership of employees handling said longer be treated as unfair
functions as well as curtailed the right of those employees labor practice and shall be
to join the union. resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The union demanded that the issue be submitted to the For purposes of this article, gross
grievance machinery due to the unsuccessful LMC. BPI violations of Collective
ignored the demand. The Union filed a notice of strike on Bargaining Agreement shall mean
the following grounds: flagrant and/or malicious
a) Contracting out services/functions performed by refusal to comply with the
union members that interfered with, restrained economic provisions of such
and/or coerced the employees in the exercise of agreement.
their right to self-organization;
b) Violation of duty to bargain; and In the present case, the alleged violation of the
c) Union busting. union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming
it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of
BPI filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction with the an economic provision in the agreement. It failed to
Secretary of DOLE, who subsequently issued an order take into consideration its recognition of the banks
certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided
arbitration. in the CBA.

December 21, 2001, the NLRC came out with a resolution
upholding the validity of the service agreement and
dismissing the charge of ULP. It ruled that the agreement
was a valid exercise of management prerogative.
The grievance was elevated to the CA (Rule 65). The CA
affirmed the NLRC decision with modification. The CA
ratiocinated that it was well within BPIs prerogatives to
determine what additional tasks should be performed, who
should best perform it and what should be done to meet the
exigencies of business. It pointed out that the Union did
not, by the mere fact of the merger, become the bargaining
The reduction of positions in the collective
bargaining unit does not interfere with the
employees right to self-organization because the
employees themselves were neither transferred
nor dismissed from service. In fact, what appears is
that the Bank has exerted utmost diligence, care
and effort to see to it that no union member was
terminated. Neither had the agreement resulted in
any diminution of salaries and benefits nor led to
any reduction of union membership.
20

As far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees
are concerned, the Union failed to substantially
prove that their transfer, made to complete
BOMCs service complement, was motivated by ill
will, anti-unionism or bad faith so as to affect or
interfere with the employees right to self-
organization.
Contracting out of services is not illegal per se.
it is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative. Absent proof that the
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer. A finding
of ULP necessarily requires the alleging party
to prove it with substantial evidence.
2. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est
optimus interpretandi modus: a statute should be
construed not only to be consistent with itself but
also to harmonize with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent
and intelligible system of jurisprudence. The
seemingly conflicting provisions of a law or of two
laws must be harmonized to render each effective.
It is only when harmonization is impossible that
resort must be made to choosing which law to
apply.
While the Central Bank regulates banking, the
Labor Code and its implementing rules regulate the
employment relationship.
D.O. No. 10 is but a guide to determine what
functions may be contracted out, subject to the
rules and established jurisprudence on legitimate
job contracting and prohibited labor-only
contracting. Even if the Court considers D.O. No.
10 only, BPI would still be within the bounds of
D.O. No. 10 when it contracted out the subject
functions. This is because the subject
functions were not related or not integral to the
main business or operation of the principal
which is the lending of funds obtained in the
form of deposits.
=============================================
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. (SMFI) v. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTWGO
G.R. 168569; Oct. 5, 2007; Carpio-Morales, J.
Digest by Reinerr Nuestro
Facts:
1.) The Respondent Union was the SEBA of all the
monthly paid employees of petitioner SMFI.
2.) Nov. 9 92 Some employees of SMFIs Finance
Department, through the Union represented by
Edgar Moraleda, brought a grievance against
Finance Manager Gideon Montesa, for
discrimination, favoritism, ULP, not flexible [sic],
harassment, promoting divisiveness and
sectarianism, etc., before SMFI Plant Operations
Labor 2 Compilation #22
Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1
of the grievance machinery adopted in the CBA.
3.) At the grievance meeting on Jan. 14, 93, SMFI
informed the Union that it planned to address the
grievance through a work management review to
be completed by March 93, hence it asked the
finance personnel to give it their attention and
cooperation.
a. But the work management review was
not completed by March 93, prompting
the Union to elevate the grievance to Step
2.
4.) Almost nine months after the grievance meeting,
SMFI rendered a Decision on Step 1 Grievance
stating that it was still in the process of completing
the work management review, hence, the Unions
requests could not be granted.
5.) The Union then filed on Oct. 20, 93 before the
NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint against
SMFI, its President Amadeo Veloso, and its
Finance Manager Montesa for ULP, [and] unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion.
a. It prayed that SMFI be ordered to promote
the said employees with corresponding
pay increases and to cease and desist
from committing unjust discrimination in
matters of promotion.
6.) SMFI filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that
the issues raised in the complaint were grievance
issues which should be resolved in the grievance
machinery provided in the CBAs of the parties or in
the mandated provision of voluntary arbitration also
provided in the CBA.
7.) In its Position Paper, the Union specified acts of
ULP of SMFI under Art. 248 pars. (e) and (i) of
the Labor Code.
8.) The LA initially granted SMFIs motion to dismiss
and remanded the case to the grievance
machinery. But upon the Unions MR, the 2nd
Division of the NLRC ordered the LA to continue
with the proceedings. SMFI filed an MR but it was
denied.
9.) The CA upheld such order holding that the LA has
jurisdiction over the complaint the Union having
violated the seniority rule under the CBA by
appointing and promoting certain employees which
amounted to ULP.
Issue: Whether the Unions complaint is one of ULP over
which a Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Held: YES. Petition DENIED.
Petitioner:
The allegations in the Unions complaint filed
before the LA do not establish a cause of action for
ULP, as the Union only made allegations thereof
without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it
is based.
21

The Union failed to comply with Rule 8.1 of the
ROC which provides that Every pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party relies for his claim, hence the
LA has no jurisdiction.
Supreme Court:
A perusal of the complaint shows that the
particular acts of ULP were indeed not specified;
neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof.
However, in its Position Paper, the Union detailed
the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and
the ultimate facts in support thereof.
Sec. 7, Rule V of the NLRC New Rules of
Procedure provides that The proceedings before
the LA shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to
the requirements of due process, the technicalities
of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the
courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto.
Thus, Rule 8.1 should not be strictly to the case
filed before the LA. In determining jurisdiction,
allegations made in the complaint, as well as those
in the position paper, may be considered.
The complaint was for ULPs under Art. 248 of the
Labor Code which provides that It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any if the ff.
unfair labor practices:
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages,
hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
(i) To violate a collective bargaining
agreement.
which, as alleged in the Position Paper, was
committed by SMFI as follows:
1. large scale and wanton unjust
discrimination in matters of employment.
2. gross and blatant violations by
respondent SMFI of Section 5, Art. VIII
(Job Security) and Sec. 4, Art. VIII
(Grievance Machinery) of the current
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
On the questioned promotions, the Union did not
allege that they were done to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. In
fact, those promoted were members of the
complaining Union. Thus, the promotions do not
amount to ULP under Art. 248(e).
As for the alleged ULP committed under Art. 248
(i), for violation of a CBA, this is qualified by Art.
261 which provides in part:
violations of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except
those which are gross in
character, shall no longer be
treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective
Labor 2 Compilation #22
Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with
the economicprovisions of
such agreement.
Silva v. NLRC: For a ULP case to be cognizable
by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the
complaint should show prima
facie the concurrence of two things: (1) gross
violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation
pertains to the economic provisions of the
CBA.
The Union charged SMFI to have violated the
grievance machinery provision of the CBA but this
provision is not an economic provision, hence, the
second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise
jurisdiction of a ULP is not present.
SMFI was likewise charged to have violated the
Job Security provision, specifically the seniority
rule, in that SMFI appointed less senior employees
to positions at its Finance Dept., intentionally
bypassing more senior employees who are
deserving of the appointment.
Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that All doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor.
o Since the seniority rule in the promotion of
employees has a bearing on the salary
and benefits, it may be considered an
economic provision following a liberal
construction of Art. 261.
It is thus not disputed that the charge against SMFI
of having promoted less senior employees,
bypassing others who were more senior and
equally or more qualified, is a gross or flagrant
violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP
over which the LA has jurisdiction.
SMFI also questioned why the CA came out with a
finding that SMFI disregarded the seniority rule
when its position before the said court merely
raised a question of jurisdiction.
o SC: The CA having affirmed the NLRC
decision finding that the LA has jurisdiction
over the Unions complaint, such finding of
the CA may be taken to have been made
only for purposes of determining
jurisdiction.
=============================================
Arellano University Employees & Workers Union v CA
G.R. No. L31195; September 19, 2006; Carpio-Morales,
J.: Digest prepared by Efren II Resurreccion
22

Facts:
1. December 12, 1997, Arellano University Employees
and Workers Union (Union), the SEBA for about 380
R&F employees of Arellano University filed with the
NCMB a notice of strike for the ULP claiming: a)
Interfering in union activities, b) union busting, c)
disregarding the unions request to deduct penalties
from its members who were absent and without
justifiable reasons, d) contracting Work of functions
performed by union members
2. December 17, 1997, Majority members of the union
filed a petition for audit of union funds with the dole.
The Dole ordered the rendering of an accounting on
union funds remitted as per the check-off statement.
3. The notice of strike filed was certified for compulsory
arbitration. After hearings, no settlement was reached
by the parties.
4. July 16, 1998 A second notice of strike was filed by the
Union charging the University of violating the CBA by:
a) withholding union ad death benefits, b) to granting
10% salary increase; c) illegal and unauthorized
deductions in the payroll, d) union interference, e) non-
implementation of the retirement plan as approved by
the BIR.
a. Dole Sec ordered this certified for compulsory
arbitration on August 5, 1998
5. Aug 5, 1998 Strike was staged by the union.
6. A return to work order was issued by the DOLE served
on the Union on Aug 6. The strike ended on August.
7. NLRC held: the two notices of strike were without
merit. The University is absolved from charges of ULP.
And that the individual respondents in the case are
dismissed.
a. NLRC found that what triggered the strike was the
Unions suspicion that the petition for audit was
initiated by the University.
b. Further, it was the members of the Union who
failed to attend meetings as required by the CBA to
implement a valid check-off.
c. Neither was the contracting out of work raised at
the NCMB level. Nor was the issue on the
retirement plan raised.
d. On withholding of death benefits, the explanation
of the University that it was upon request of some
individual members was given credit. Thus no ULP
was committed.
e. The petition of the university to declare the strike
illegal is gated leading to the loss of employment
status of all strikers who defied the return to work
order issued August 5, served August 6, complied
with on August 7.
8. MR by union: Denied. CA:certiorari dismissed
Issues/Ratio:
W/N the University was engaged in an unfair labor
practice by withholding benefits NO.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
To constitute ULP, violations to the CBA must be
gross. It must be flagrant and/or malicious refusal not
to comply with the economic provisions.
The University cannot be faulted for ULP for acting in
good faith in heeding the request of the Union
members.
On the declaration of loss of employment of the
strikers, under Art 264 LC: An ordinary striking worker
may not be declared to have lost his employment status
by mere participation in illegal strike. He must have
knowingly participated in the illegal acts, which can be
proven using photographs. It was not proven here.
For officers, participation warrants dismissal.
Held: Resolution set-aside. Members reinstated
without backwages.
=============================================
Phil. Metal Foundries, Inc. v. CIR
GR. No. L-34948-49; May 15, 1979; Antonio, J.
Digest by Donna S. Talledo
Petitioners: Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. (PMFI)
Respondents: CIR, Regal Manufacturing Employees
Association (REGEMAS), and Celestino Baylon
FACTS
Nov. 21, 1963 PMFI (Company) charged REGEMAS
and its members with unfair labor practice (ULP) for
declaring a strike on October 5, 1963 ans picketing
the companys premises without filing a notice of strike
in spite of a no strike, no lockout clause and grievance
procedure in their CBA.
The Union denied the charge and alleged that
on October 3, 1963 the Union requested the
management for grievance conference but the
latter, through its Gen. Manager, refused and
handed a memorandum to the Union President
dismissing him from work and told the members
not to report for work
July 21, 1964 The respondents, on the other hand,
charged the Company and its General Manager with
ULP for the dismissal of Baylon, Union President, on
October 3, 1963, allegedly due to his union activities
in representing and protecting the union members.
The Company and its manager denied such
allegations and alleged that Baylons services
were terminated by reason of his frequent and
repeated absences and, because of such
dismissal, he encouraged the staging of the
October 5 strike.
After the joint trial, the CIR found that Baylon was
discharged for his union activities and that the
employees declared a strike because they believed in
23

good faith that his dismissal was a ULP. The company
and its manager were thus declared guilty of ULP and
Baylons reinstatement was ordered.
Its MR was denied, hence the present petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether Baylon was dismissed due to his absences
or to his union activities as Union President. Union
activities
2. Whether or not the strike declared on Oct. 5, 1963 is
legal. YES
HELD
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
RATIO
1. Baylon was dismissed by reason of his union
activies.
COMPANY
According to their CBA, one absent for a period of one
week who fails to give notice thereof shall be dropped
automatically and under its Disciplinary Policies and
Procedures, absence of an employee without permission
for a period seven consecutive calendar days is a ground
for immediate dismissal.
Since the CIR found that Baylon incurred 25 unexcused
absences from Jan. to Sep. 1963, the court erred in
holding that he was dismissed not because of his
absences but because of his union activities.
SUPREME COURT
While union activity is no bar to a discharge, the
existence of a lawful cause for discharge is no defense if
the employee was actually discharged for union activity.
Although there is no question that Baylon incurred
numerous absences, the Company could have
terminated his services as early as March 1963 when he
incurred 12 consecutive absences without permission. Its
failure to do so shows that such infractions were
disregarded.
The CIR found that the letter invitation for the grievance
conference was received by the company at 12:45 noon
and at 2:45 of the same day, Baylon was handed his
termination letter. Thus, his dismissal under the
circumstance, being ultimately triggered by his union
activities is not without some taint of ULP.
The question of whether an employee was discharged
because of his union activities is essentially a question
of fact and the findings of the CIR upon which are
Labor 2 Compilation #22
conclusive and binding if supported by substantial
evidence. And in this case, it was found to be
substantially supported.
Although a mans motive, like his intent, is, in the
words of Lord Justice Bowen, as much a fact as the
state of his digestion, evidence of such fact may
consist both direct testimony by one whose motive is
in question and of inferences of probability drawn
from the totality of other facts.
2. The strike was not illegal.
The Company admitted that it accepted the grievance
invitation on October 5, 1963, yet two hours later, it
dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or
investigation. Such dismissal is undoubtedly a ULP.
When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the
dismissal was due to union activities, said strike was not
illegal. It suffices, if such belief in good faith is
entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a
strike. The no strike clause of the CBA was not violated
since it was due to the ULP of the employer.
In strikes arising out of and against a companys ULP, a
strike notice is not necessary in view of the strike being
founded on urgent necessity and directed against
practices condemned by public policy, such notice being
legally required only in cases of economic strikes.
The request for grievance conference was not for the
purpose discussing Baylons dismissal since he only
received his termination letter after he requested for such
conference. He could not have requested for a grievance
conference if he did not have demands to present on that
date.
Several exhibits, evidencing how he used to make
representations and protestations in behalf of the Union
member against unfair acts committed by the company,
show how Baylon fought for the rights and protection of
his members.
=============================================
Royal Undergarment Corp. of the Phil. v. CIR, Royal
Undergarment Workers Union-PTWGO & Cruz
G.R. No. 39040; Jun. 6, 1990; Medialdea, J.
Digest prepared by Paolo Tamase
A. Facts
1. Dec. 1961: CRUZ, a ROYAL electrician since 1957,
was elected president of the Royal
Undergarment Workers Union (RUWU), a legit.
labor organization affiliated with PTGWO. On Dec.
14, RUWU (through CRUZ) sent collective
bargaining proposals to ROYAL.
24

a. The ff. day (Dec. 15), ROYAL terminated
CRUZ allegedly on the basis of his record
and after careful [] deliberation.
CRUZs wife, also from ROYAL, was also
terminated.
b. Jan. 1962: As a consequence, RUWU
called a strike.
2. Jan. 10, 1962: RUWU and ROYAL entered into a
Return-to-Work Agreement. A condition was the
sps. CRUZ would be reinstated if RUWU would be
chosen as the SEBA in a consent election.
a. RUWU evidently won, indicated by the fact
that the sps. CRUZ were reinstated.
3. Nov. 1962: CRUZ campaigned among RUWU to
support PTGWOs nationwide strike.
a. Nov. 28, 1962: At 11:00 pm within the
company premises, there was a
confrontation between CRUZ and three
company SUPERVISORS (Camiguin,
Dayadante, & Gaspar)
i. Accdg. to the SUPERVISORS,
CRUZ (1) was drunk, (2)
threatened them1, and (3)
challenged another co-
employee. Cruz denied the
SUPERVISORs version.2
4. Nov. 29, 1962: The SUPERVISORS reported the
incident to ROYAL and executed an affidavit.
a. ROYAL placed CRUZ on preventive
suspension for violating company rules,
i.e. (1) threatening the lives of 4
employees and (2) being under the
influence of liquor.
b. A conference-investigation was
conducted, but in Dec. 13, 1962 CRUZ
was dismissed.
5. CRUZ filed a ULP case with the CIR. The CIR
found for CRUZ, ordered reinstatement, and
awarded backwages of 7 years (i.e. from dismissal
to Nov. 17, 1969). ROYAL filed pet. for review.
B. Issues
1. WON there was unfair labor practice. YES.
2. WON it was correct for the CIR to award full backwages.
NO.
1 Ikaw, Ikaw, Ikawmga hayop kayo. Bibigyan ko
kayo ng isang linggong taning sa buhay ninyo
ipapapatay ko kayo.
2 According to CRUZ, what he said was: Ikaw, Ikaw,
Ikaw pare, alam kong matitigas kayo rito sa compania,
kayat akoy nakikiusap, kung maaari pag natuloy ang
nationwide strike, makiisa kayo at gamitin and tigas
ninyo.
Labor 2 Compilation #22
C. Held. Petition denied. CIR decision modified to limit
backwages to only three (3) years.
D. Ratio
1. There was unfair labor practice as supported by the
totality of evidence
a. ROYALs version is flimsy. It is undisputed that
as RUWU president, CRUZ (1) supported
aggressive, militant union activities, (2) had been
previously dismissed for active participation in
union affairs, and (3) was dismissed again in the
course of his campaign for support in the nation-
wide strike.
b. Generally, an employer is not obliged to support
his actions with a reason or purpose.
c. HOWEVER, when the (1) attendant
circumstances, (2) history of employers past
conduct and like considerations, coupled with
an (3) intimate connection between the
employers action and the union activities
taken as a whole, raise a suspicion as to the
motivation of an employers actionthe (4)
failure to give a valid reason may justify an
inference that the employers unexplained conduct
was inspired by the employees union membership
or activities.
d. Also, factual findings of CIR are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence. The VIR found
that the cause of CRUZs dismissal was ROYALs
antipathy to CRUZs union activities and not his
misconduct.
2. [SUPERSEDED] CRUZ should be reinstated but
backwages limited to 3 years, following judicial trend to
avoid delay [otherwise, there would be a need to determine
CRUZs income during the period that he was not
reinstated.]
25