WABE v.

BIONSON
December 30, 2003 | Callejo, Sr. | SUMMONS > Service of summons > By whom issued

PETITIONER: Noel G. Wabe

RESPONDENTS: Luisita P. Bionson, Clerk of Court of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Malaybalay City

SUMMARY: The clerk of court issued summons to a party before the case was filed and including
awards in the writ of execution not included in the decision or judgment of the court. The SC found her
guilty of misconduct for acting beyond the scope of her duties as a clerk of court.

DOCTRINE: A clerk of court shall issue summons only upon the filing of the complaint and the payment
of the requisite legal fees.

FACTS:
1. The administrative case arose upon the filing of a complaint against Bionson, Clerk of
Court, MTC in Cities of Malaybalay City, for grave misconduct.
2. Wabe, the complainant, alleged that the Bionson acted without authority:
A. In issuing summons before a case was even filed; and
B. In adding certain in the Writ of Execution amounts to be paid by the defendant
where none were awarded in the judgment.
3. Deputy Court Administrator
A. Noted that the errors made were so glaring that they were not made through
mere inadvertence; and
B. Recommended that Bionson be suspended for 1 month, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future be dealt with more severely.
4. The case was assigned to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
5. Bionson, through counsel, manifested to the court:
A. That the sending of summons even before the actual filing of the complaint had
been a long standing practice of the court, dating back to the time of previous
judges; and
B. Admitted her mistake in adding amounts to be paid in the Writ of Execution but
said that it was done without malice and that she was very busy.
6. Executive Judge of the RTC, Malaybalay City:
A. The foregoing conduct and actuation of Bionson was in violation of her adjudicative
support functions to prepare and sign summons and writs of execution as a Clerk
of Court.

ISSUE/HELD: W/N Bionson acted beyond the scope of her duties as a clerk of court for issuing
summons to a party without a case being filed (and for including awards in the writ of execution not
included in the decision or judgment of the court).YES

RATIO:
1. A clerk of court shall issue summons only upon the filing of the complaint and the
payment of the requisite legal fees.
a. Rule 14, Sec. 1 provides that upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of
the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants.
b. This rule is clear, and it is the duty of the clerk of court to abide by it.
 c. As an important officer in the dispensation of justice, one of Bionsons primary
duties is to uphold the law and implement pertinent rules
2. Bionson usurped a judicial function when she issued an amended writ of execution.
a. She is guilty of misconduct.
3. Respondent suspended for three (3) months for misconduct, with stern warning against
repetition of similar offense.
 BELLO v. UBO
September 30, 1982 | Abad Santos, J. | Summons; By Whom Served

PETITIONERS: Patricio Bello

RESPONDENTS: EUGENIA UBO and PORFERIO REGIS

SUMMARY: Due to a land dispute, Bello filed a civil case against Ubo and Regis. A policeman, Patrolman
Yubio was the one who served the two copies of the summons (one for each defendant). He tendered the first
copy to the defendants and had them sign it, but afterwards took it back and kept it. He then gave the second
copy to the plaintiff, who instead of delivering it to defendant as instructed, eventually returned to Pat. Yobia.
Thus, defendants were not able to file responsive pleadings and were declared in default. Defendants
contended that CFI did not acquire jurisdiction because Pat. Yobia was not a proper person to serve the
summons. Court held that the list of proper persons to serve summons in Rule 14, Sec. 3 is exclusive. A
policeman, not being included in the list, is not a proper person to serve the summons. Therefore, the service
of summons is invalid and the CFI has not acquired jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE:
The list provided in the Rules of Court is exclusive. A police officer, not being one of those enumerated in Rule
14, Sec. 3, is NOT a person authorized to serve summons.

FACTS:

1. Bello filed with the CFI of Leyte a Complaint for the Recovery of Real Property with Damages
against Ubo and her son. He (Bello) was claiming ownership over a parcel of land that Ubo and
her son had forcibly occupied for years.
2. Summons were issued by the court, requiring the defendants to file their answer within 15 days
from service.
3. Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. Initially, both of the defendants refused to
receive the summons and complaint. However, after Patrolman Yobia explained to them the
nature of the Summons, and that there was a civil case against them, they reluctantly signed the
summons. Patrolman Yobia then handed the signed summons and complaint to defendants.
However, he took back the same afterwards.
4. Patrolman Yobia returned to his office and was informed that there was another copy of the
summons to be given to the other defendant. He gave this copy to the PLAINTIFF (Patricio
Bello), and requested the latter to give the same to the respondent. A month later, Bellos son
gave this copy back to Yobia, stating that they were not able to give it to the defendant because
his father was ill.
5. Despite signing the summons, defendants were not able to file any responsive pleadings; nor
did they appear in court. CFI of Leyte declared them in default.
6. The counsel of defendants inquired from Pat. Yobia about the service of summons. Only then
were they able to receive copies of the complaint which he had kept.
7. Defendants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment charging irregularity in the service of
summons, praying that the order of default and judgment by default be set aside, and that their
answer be admitted.
8. CFI of Leyte denied the motion; The MR was also denied.
9. Defendants filed a notice of appeal, stating that there was no valid and effective service of
summons upon the defendants; therefore, CFI of Leyte did NOT acquire jurisdiction. Their
contention was that:
 a. Pat. Castulo Yobia was not a proper person to serve the summons under Sec. 5, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court since he was not a sheriff or a court officer of the province where
service was made;
b. neither was he a person who, for special reasons, was specially authorized to serve the
summons by the judge who issued the same
c. even assuming that he was a proper person to serve the summons, still there was no valid
and effective service since he brought back the summons with him together with the copy
of the complaint.
10. Plaintiff-appellee countered that Sec. 5, Rule 14 is merely directory and its specification of
persons who are to serve summons is not exclusive.

ISSUES/HELD: WON a police officer can be considered as a proper person to serve the summons. NO

RATIO:
There was no valid service of summons. Therefore CFI of Leyte did NOT acquire jurisdiction.
1. The enumeration in Sec. 5, Rule 14 re: who may serve the summons is EXCLUSIVE. Pat.
Yobia, who was a police officer, was not a sheriff or a court officer of the province where service
was made; and neither was he a person who, for special reasons, was specially authorized to
serve the summons by the judge who issued the same. Therefore, he cannot be considered as
a proper person to serve the summons.
2. Even assuming that Pat. Yobia could be considered as a proper person to serve the summons,
still there was no valid and effective service since he brought back the summons with him
together with the copy of the complaint. Since there is no valid service of summons, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis.
3. Therefore, the ex parte proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null
and void.
 TALION V. AYUPAN
JANUARY 23, 2002 | PER CURIAM | SUMMONS BY WHOM SERVED (RULE 14, SEC. 3)

COMPLAINANT: ATTY. GISELLE G. TALION, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Panabo, Davao del Norte
RESPONDENT: ESTEBAN P. AYUPAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Davao del
Norte

SUMMARY: Ayupan is a sheriff in RTC Davao. He gets absent for more than 30 days, and fails, inter alia, to
serve 45 summonses and make a return on 18 served by him. Atty. Talion investigates him. Judge Palabrica
recommends his dismissal. SC removes him from service.

DOCTRINE: The service of summons may be entrusted to the sheriff. He is required, within five days after
service, to make a return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiffs counsel, and to return the summons
to the clerk who issued it, together with the proof of service. The sheriff has the duty to serve the process
promptly and to make a return of his service within a reasonable time. This is necessary in order for the court
to determine if the period for filing an answer has not yet expired.

FACTS:
1. This is a complaint filed by Atty. Giselle G. Talion, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Panabo,
Davao Province, against Esteban Ayupan, Sheriff IV of the same court, alleging failure of the
latter to serve summons assigned to him, to act on petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure, and to
enforce writs of execution and absenteeism.
2. Ayupan was absent from work for 44 working days from July to October 1999. For his first days
of absence, Ayupan submitted a letter explaining that he suffered stomach pain and had to
search for his missing daughter. The remaining absences were without explanation.
3. He filed an application for indefinite leave on November 18, 1999, which was not
approved. Thus, he again became absent without official leave.
4. During his absence, Ayupan failed to serve 45 summonses and make a return on 18
served by him; to act upon 196 petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure; and to act upon 68
writs of execution.
5. Atty. Talion submitted a report to Executive Judge Palabrica, who endorsed the same to
the Office of the Court Administrator. The OCA directed Judge Palabrica to investigate
the matter. In compliance with the directive of the OCA, Judge Palabrica scheduled a
hearing, notifying Ayupan of the same. However, Ayupan ignored the notice. Only Atty.
Talion appeared to testify on Ayupans alleged inefficiency.
6. Judge Pabricas findings stated Ayupans absence without official leave for more than 30
days, including the duties upon which he failed to act. Judge Pabrica recommended
Ayupans removal from service.
7. The OCA submitted Judge Palabricas report to SC, recommending that Ayupan be
dismissed from the service for abandonment of office, with prejudice to reinstatement in
any government instrumentality or government owned or controlled corporation. (At this
time, Ayupan has been absent for approximately 2 years.)

ISSUE/HELD: WON Ayupan should be dismissed from service, considering, among others, his failure to act
upon summonses assigned to him YES
RATIO:
1. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the service of summons may be entrusted to
the sheriff. He is required, within five days after service, to make a return, personally or by
registered mail, to the plaintiffs counsel, and to return the summons to the clerk who issued it,
together with the proof of service. The sheriff has the duty to serve the process promptly and to
make a return of his service within a reasonable time. This is necessary in order for the court to
determine if the period for filing an answer has not yet expired.
2. In the present case, respondent failed to serve approximately 45 summonses and failed to
make a return on 18 summonses served as of October 22, 1999 (date of report of Atty. Talion).
These summonses were dated as early as October 27, 1997, with the latest ones bearing the
date April 15, 1999. Although respondents absences started in July, 1999, it appears that he had
been neglecting his duties for nearly two years before that date. The Clerk of Court became
aware of respondents neglect when complaints started coming from litigants and two judges
who threatened to cite her (the Clerk of Court) for contempt of court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Esteban P. Ayupan is hereby found guilty of gross neglect
of duty, aggravated by unauthorized absences and absence without leave, and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with the forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits and with prejudice to his reemployment
in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned and
controlled corporations.
 LAUS V. CA
1993 | DAVIDE, JR. | MODES OF SERVICE

PETITIONERS/INTERVENORS: SPOUSES PEPITO AND LORETO LAUS

RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, SHERIFF CABANG AND CONSUELO TORRES

SUMMARY: action for collection of sum of money where Sheriff opts for substituted service of
summons instead of personal service. He does not attempt earnestly to look for the defendant (only
one attempt in fact) and does not abide by ROC in substituted service; thus the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the defendant and any decision of said court is void.

DOCTRINE: "within a reasonable time" contemplates a period of time longer than that demarcated by
the word "prompt," and presupposes that a prior attempt at personal service, within a justifiable time
frame as would be necessary to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court, had failed.
Since substituted service is in derogation of the common law and is extraordinary in character, it must
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Statutes prescribing modes
other than personal service of summons must be strictly complied with to give the court jurisdiction, and
such compliance must appear affirmatively in the return.

FACTS
1. Respondent Consuelo P. Torres filed against "Loreto Alfaro-Laus and John Doe" for
collection of a sum of money. The defendants in the said case are the petitioners in the
instant petition. The complaint alleges that petitioner Loreto Alfaro-Laus executed a
promissory note in favor of respondent for the amount of P66,000.00 payable in 3
months. Upon maturity of the said promissory note, only 11k was paid. No further
payments made despite demands.
2. Deputy Sheriff Romero S. Cruz proceeded to the petitioners' address at 122 Molave
Park Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila to serve the summons and a copy of the
complaint. Failing to serve the summons personally upon the petitioners after waiting for
10 minutes, he resorted to a substituted service through one Josephine Areola, who
purportedly represented herself to be the maid of the said petitioners. On the same
date, Deputy Sheriff Cruz executed and filed a return.
3. The petitioners did not file any answer. Consequently, TC issued on 29 December 1989
an order declaring the former in default and setting the ex parte presentation of the
private respondent's evidence (which the petitioners received) then afterwards ruled
against petitioners.
a. Before promulgation of the ruling, petitioners, by way of a special appearance, filed
a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. They allege
that the service of summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in the
return that the sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same personally before
resorting to substituted service.
b. TC denied as decision on the case had already been made. TC denied MR and
held that there was a proper service of summons because contrary to Alfaro-Laus'
statement that Areola was a guest of their maid for a week, it was proven that
Areola was in fact the very person who received the demand letter earlier sent by
the respondent.
c. CA also denied.

ISSUES/HELD
 1. W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners by virtue of
the substituted service of summons effected by Deputy Sheriff Cruz NO.
a. Since the petitioners did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
proper service of summons became imperative. Without proper service, court does
not acquire jurisdiction and thus any judgment of the Court is void
b. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be personally served;
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, such personal service
is to be accomplished by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." However, if this mode of service cannot
be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under
Section 8 of the same Rule.[1]
c. Sec. 8 is reproduced from 1940 ROC except that "promptly" was changed to "within
a reasonable time", which contemplates a period of time longer than that demarcated
by the word "prompt," and presupposes that a prior attempt at personal service,
within a justifiable time frame as would be necessary to bring the defendant within
the jurisdiction of the court, had failed.
d. Since substituted service is in derogation of the common law and is extraordinary in
character, it must be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. Statutes prescribing modes other than personal service of summons must be
strictly complied with to give the court jurisdiction, and such compliance must appear
affirmatively in the return.
e. sheriff's return in the case at bar readily reveals that it does not:
i. indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time,
ii. specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and
iii. state that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein.
f. It appears Sheriff only attempted personal service of summons once and then opted
for substituted service. Areola was only 11 to 12 years old at the time substituted
service was attempted. He should have exerted earnest effort. He could have
returned in the evening or on any of the succeeding days including the following
Saturday and Sunday. Service of summons may be made at night as well as during
the day, or even on a Sunday or holiday because of its ministerial character.
g. The order of default, the judgment by default, the writ of execution issued by it, as
well as the auction sale of the petitioners' properties levied on execution are,
therefore, all null and void.
2. What about the John Doe, referring to Laus husband? IMPLEADED AS
INDISPENSABLE PARTY. REQUIRES PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS ALSO.
a. He was impleaded as a co-defendant presumably on the theory that the liability
sought to be enforced is a conjugal partnership liability. In short, Loreto's husband
was sued as an indispensable party; it is clear that the trial court treated him as
such when in its decision, ordered the defendants, not just Loreto, to pay the
adjudged amounts.
b. No summons was even attempted to be served on petitioner Pepito Laus.

[1] SECTION 8. Substituted Service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
 KEISTER V. NAVARRO
May 31, 1977 | J. Antonio | Modes of Service

SUMMARY: General Manager of Auto Company sold car without consent of company. Initially,
company was able to retrieve the car but the car disappeared. The car was found but Constabulary
refuses to return the car in light of the sale. Company filed a complaint for annulment of sale. Service of
summons was made to the law office because Keister left the country. Court held that service was
improper because it must be made at residence or office of the defendant at time service is made.
DOCTRINE:
1. The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally heId to refer to the time of service. They
refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
2. The circumstance that defendant left the Philippines and up to the present time he has not returned"
does not warrant much less justify the service of summons upon petitioner at a place which is neither
his residence nor regular place of business.

FACTS:
1. James Keister, as President-General/General Manager of Batjak sold an Ebay 440 car
to Juan T. Chuidian for P5,000.00. Two (2) days later, or on December 29, 1966, JD
Chuidian also sold and reconveyed the same automobile for P5,000.00 to James A.
Keister. who registered the same in his name with the Land Transportation Commission.
Batjak claims that these transactions were without its authority, knowledge and consent.
2. Batjak, Inc. took possession of the automobile, but sometime in May, 1967, the said
automobile disappeared from the Narra Compound. The automobile was recovered by
the Land Transportation Commission, which, in turn, delivered it to the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary for investigation.
2. When the Philippine Constabulary (CIS) refused to deliver said automobile to Batjak
despite its repeated demands for its return, the latter filed a complaint for annulment of
Sale with Attachment against the Philippine Constabulary (CIS) and Keister.
3. It was alleged in the complaint that defendant may "be served with summons at c/o
Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, J M T Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal". It also alleged
that on or about March 27, 1967, said defendant secretly and surreptitiously left the
Philippines for the United States and up to the present time, he has not returned ... ."
4. The summons, with the complaint attached thereto, was supon petitioner at "c/o
Chuidian Law Office. The receipt of service was signed by one Vicente Bataquil, Clerk
of Chuidian Law Office.
5. Petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of petitioner and moved to dismiss the complaint. It was asserted
that the Court had acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the
summons was improperly served at the Chuidian Law Office and not at the residence or
place of business of the petitioner, contrary to the requirements of Section 8 of Rule 14
of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge issued an Order denying the aforementioned
Motion to Dismiss stating that as far as the service of summons and complaint was
concerned, the allegation in the complaint must prevail. Judge denied MR.
6. Hence, the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that
respondent Judge be prohibited from enforcing the Order requiring petitioner to answer
the complaint. Court issued, as prayed for, the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES: Whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the person of the
petitioner. NO
RATIO
1. Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by the court may acquire
jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without
such service are null and void. This process is solely for the benefit of the defendant. Its
purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also
to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.
2. The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be
made. Intelligence of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is
"in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence
may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." Thus,
under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized
by the statute is considered ineffective.
2. Under the Rules, substituted service may be effect (a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The terms
"dwelling house" or "residence" are generally heId to refer to the time of service,
hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house,
residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal therefrom." They
refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country
at the time. Similarly, the terms "office" or "regular place of business" refer to the office
or place of business of defendant at the time of service.
3. Note that the rule designates the persons to whom copies of the process may be left.
The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with
whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will
deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
4. It is not disputed that the dwelling house or residence of the defendant. herein petitioner
James A. Keister, is at 11 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, and that his office or
regular place of business, prior to his temporary departure to the United States on March
27, 1967, is at the Batjak, Corporation office in Sarmiento Building, Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal. It is, however, conceded that in neither of these places was service of
summons effected in the manner prescribed by the procedural law.
5. The circumstance that "defendant James A, Keister left for the United States and up to
the present time he has not returned" does not warrant much less justify the service of
summons upon petitioner at a place which is neither his residence nor regular place of
business.

HELD: Petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
on June 22, 1968 is made permanent.
 SUMMIT TRADING AND DEVT CORP. v. AVENDAO
March 18, 1985 | Aquino | SUMMONS > Service of summons >> Modes of service

PETITIONER: Summit Trading and Development Corporation

RESPONDENTS: Judge Herminio A. Avendao, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Bian Branch I,
Segundo Pilipinia and Edgardo Mindo, represented by Ernesto Pilipinia

SUMMARY: Pilipinia and Mindo filed a complaint to redeem the lots it sold which was now owned of
Summit Trading. Summons was served on the secretary of the president of Summit Trading. Summit
Trading failed to answer and was declared in default. It filed an MR arguing that ithe RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over it because summons was not served upon it in accordance with Rules, as the
secretary of the president of a corporation is not among the persons mentioned therein. SC ruled that
under the facts of the case, the presidents secretary may be regarded as the agent within the
meaning of the Rules since when the judgment itself was served upon her, such judgment came to the
notice of Summit Trading.

DOCTRINE:
1. Old rule: Rule 14, Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership.If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of
its directors.
a. Generally, service on the personal secretary of the president is improper. However, the
court may regard such secretary as an agent within the meaning of the rule when the
facts of the case so warrant.

2. Cf. New rule: Rule 14, Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

FACTS:
1. Pilipinia and Mindo in acquired under Land Authority Administrative Order No. 4 two registered
lots.
a. The titles of the lots contain the annotation that should Pilipinia and Mindo sell the same,
they have the right to redeem the lots within five years from the date of the sale.
2. In 1977, Pilipinia and Mindo sold the lots to Gavino Ortega.
a. However, they retained possession of the lots and became tenants thereof.
3. Judge Avendao: cancelled said annotation on the instance of Ortega, ostensibly because the
lots would be converted into commercial, industrial or residential sites.
a. That conversion has not taken place. At present the two lots are still ricelands.
4. In 1979, Ortega resold the two lots to Summit Trading through its president, Balaguer.
5. In 1981, within the five-year period, Pilipinia and Mindo filed a complaint against Ortega and
Summit Trading for the redemption or repurchase of the two lots.
6. Ortega was duly summoned. He failed to answer the complaint.
7. Summons was served on Saquilayan, whom Judge Avendao assumed was the secretary of
Summit Trading.
a. In reality, Saquilayan received the summons as secretary of Balaguer, as the president
of Summit Trading which purchased the lots from Ortega.
8. Judge Avendao: declared Ortega and Summit Trading in default.
 a. Gave Pilipinia and Mindo 15 days from notice within which to redeem the lots.
b. Ordered Summit Trading to execute the corresponding deeds of sale and surrender the
Torrens titles.
9. Saquilayan received a copy of the decision.
10. Summit Trading filed an MR on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it
because summons was not served upon it in accordance with Rule 14, Sec. 13 (now Sec. 11) of
the Rules of Court (see doctrine), as Saquilayan is not among the persons mentioned therein.
11. Judge Avendao: denied MR.
12. Summit Trading filed a petition to review the judgment of Judge Avendao.

ISSUE/HELD:
W/N summons was validly served upon Summit TradingYES

RATIO:
1. Summit Trading is technically correct in contending that there was no strict compliance with Sec.
13.
a. However, Saquilayan, being the secretary of the president (whose contact with the
outside world is normally through his secretary), may be regarded as an agent within
the meaning of Sec. 13.
b. Saquilayan who could have easily notified the president that an action was filed against
the corporation just as she had apprised him of the judgment in this case.
2. Hence, summons was validly served upon Summit Trading.
a. Its negligence in not answering the complaint was inexcusable.
3. We are not saying that service on such a secretary is always proper. Generally, it is improper.
a. The president himself must be served personally with the summons if it is desired to
effect the service on that particular officer.
b. But, under the facts of this case, the presidents secretary may be regarded as the
agent within the meaning of section 13 since service upon her of the judgment itself
came to the notice of Summit Trading.

Petition dismissed. Judgment affirmed

 CARIAGA v. MALAYA
August 13, 1986 | Paras, J. | Summons; Modes of Service

PETITIONERS: JOSE C. CARIAGA, JR. AND MARIETA CARIAGA

RESPONDENTS: THE HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, CAROLINA ALMONTE CARIAGA-SOON AND ANA
ALMONTE CARIAGA

SUMMARY: Two of the defendants in a civil action were residing abroad and were not served with summons.
Through motion of the plaintiffs, the lower court granted an extra-territorial service of summons upon these two
defendants through registered mail. Defendants contested the validity of this service of summons for not being
in accordance with the rules on extra-territorial service it was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation. The court held that registered mail coupled with publication was only one of three ways to validly
serve summons outside the Philippines. There may be extra-territorial service of summons in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.

DOCTRINE:

Service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
1. personal service;
2. registered mail coupled with publication in a newspaper of general circulation;
3. any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

FACTS:

1. Ana Almonte Cariaga-Soon filed an action for (1) Annulment of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of Real
Property with damages in the CFI of Laguna, Branch IV (now known as the RTC of Laguna).
2. Summons were served upon all the defendants, except for Jose Cariaga, Jr. and Marieta
Cariaga, who were residing abroad (USA and Guam, respectively). Thus, the two were not able
to file their answer with counterclaim.
3. Upon motion of Carolina, et. al., the lower court granted them leave to effect extra-territorial
service of summons upon Jose and Marieta, in accordance with Secs. 7, 17, and 18 of Rule 14
ROC.
4. Summonses with copies of the complaint were served upon Jose and Marieta by registered mail
abroad.
5. The other defendants (who were residents of the Philippines) filed a motion to set aside the said
summons and to declare the service of summons abroad by registered mail as null and void for
being irregular and unauthorized under Rule 14.
6. Lower court denied the motion stating that there was substantial compliance with the rules.
7. Jose and Marieta (who were still abroad), by special appearance and through counsel, filed a
motion to consider the summons served upon them through registered mail as null and void.
8. Motion was again denied by the lower court.
9. Jose and Marieta filed a petition for certiorari before SC to review and set aside orders of the
lower court
a. Argument: the service of summons upon them through registered mail was invalid for not
being coupled with publication in a newspaper of general circulation

ISSUES/HELD: WON the service of summons by registered mail abroad upon Jose and Marieta is valid and in
accordance with the provisions of the ROC Rule 14 on extraterritorial service (Sec. 17), personal service of
summons (Sec. 7), and proof of service through registered mail (Sec. 22) YES
RULE:
Extraterritorial service of summons is proper:
1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
3. when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
4. when defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec.
17, Rule 14, Rules of Court)
RATIO:
1. Service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways
(De Midgely v. Fernandos):
a. by personal service;
b. by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; and
c. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
2. The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this
case.
3. Jose and Marieta have no reason to assail that they were uninformed of the action filed against
them or that they were denied due process
a. They were able to receive their copies of the summons, as evidenced by their Registry
Return Cards.
b. Whatever defect there may have been in the summons was corrected by the court through
its order giving them 90 days to file their responsive pleadings.
 REBOLLIDO V. CA
FEBRUARY 28, 1989 | GUTIERREZ, JR., J. | MODES OF SERVICE

PETITIONERS: Crisostomo Rebollido, Fernando Valencia And Edwin Rebollido

RESPONDENTS: Honorable Court of Appeals and PEPSICO, Inc.

SUMMARY: Petitioners minibus collides with Pepsi Colas truck. One day later, Pepsi Cola is dissolved and
PEPSICO assumes its obligations. Petitioners file complaint for damages with RTC. Sheriff serves summons to
Sison, who represents herself as secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. Pepsi Cola does not appear
in court proceedings. RTC then rules in favor of Petitioners. CA reverses, believing there is no valid service of
summons. SC resolves case in favor of petitioners with the following reasons: (1) Pepsi Cola, not PEPSICO, is
the real party-in-interest for service of summons; (2) A dissolved corp. can still be served with summons and
can be made a party in a case, and; (3) Service of summons was substantially complied with.
DOCTRINE: Although the service of summons is made on a person not authorized to receive the same, when
it appears that the summons and complaint are in fact received by defendant, there is substantial compliance
with the rule on service of summons.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Pepsi Cola and Alberto Alva before RTC
Makati. Case arose on March 1, 1984, when Petitioners Mazda Minibus crashed with Pepsi
Colas truck trailer (driven by Alva).
2. Sep. 21, 1984: RTC sheriff served the summons addressed to Pepsi Cola and Alva. Nanette
Sison received summons. She represented herself to be the authorized person receiving court
processes as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
3. Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. RTC heard the case ex-
parte and ruled in favor of Petitioners on June 24, 1985.
4. Petitioners filed a motion for execution. A copy of which was received no longer by Pepsi Cola
but by private respondent PEPSICO, Inc. At that time, the PEPSICO was already occupying the
place of business of Pepsi Cola at Ricogen Building, Aguirre Street, Legaspi Village, Makati.
PEPSICO held offices here for the purpose, among others, of settling Pepsi Cola's debts,
liabilities and obligations which it assumed in a written undertaking executed on June 11, 1983,
preparatory to the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola. All this time, Pepsi Cola was already
dissolved since March 2, 1984, one day after the accident occurred.
5. Realizing that the judgment of the lower court would eventually be executed against it,
PEPSICO opposed the motion for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of summons
to a mere clerk.
6. RTC denied PEPSICOs motion: Despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the
private respondent, there was proper service of summons upon defendant Pepsi Cola.
7. PEPSICO filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with CA. CA granted: There
was no valid service of summons. MR denied.
8. Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Who between Pepsi Cola and PEPSICO is the real party-in-interest for purposes of valid summons
Pepsi Cola
2. WON service of summons valid YES
RATIO:
First Issue
1. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-
defendant. It is the registered owner of the truck involved, and it still existed as a corporation
when the cause of action accrued.
2. The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made a party
to a suit.[1]
Second Issue
1. (Note that summons was served when Pepsi Cola was already dissolved) Since our law
recognizes the liability of a dissolved corporation to an aggrieved creditor, it is but logical for the
law to allow service of process upon a dissolved corporation. Otherwise, substantive rights
would be lost by the mere lack of explicit technical rules.
2. To be sure, this Court has ruled that service on a mere employee or clerk of a corporation is not
sufficient. But a liberal interpretation of Section 13, Rule 14 has been adopted in the case of G
& G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
3. Although it maybe true that the service of summons was made on a person not
authorized to receive the same ..., nevertheless since it appears that the summons and
complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds
that there was substantial compliance, with the rule on service of summons.
4. The rationale of said rule is explained in Delta Motors Sales v. Mangosing:
5. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt
and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do
with the legal papers served on him. In other words, 'to bring home to the corporation
notice of the filing of the action'.
6. Whomsoever Miss Sison was acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the
notice of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO with whom she is
admittedly connected. We rule that there was substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14
because the purpose of notice was satisfied.
7. It is clear that private respondent is aware that the liabilities of Pepsi Cola are enforceable
against it upon the dissolution of Pepsi Cola. By virtue of the assumption of the debts, liabilities
and obligations of Pepsi Cola, "any judgment rendered against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is
a 'liability' of PEPSICO, Inc., within the contemplation of the undertaking." Hence it was
incumbent upon respondent PEPSICO, Inc., to have defended the civil suit against the
corporation whose liabilities it had assumed.
8. Even assuming that jurisdiction over the private respondent can be acquired only by way of
service of summons in literal compliance with Section 14, Rule 14, the petitioners cannot be
faulted for having brought the case naming Pepsi Cola as one of the defendants so that the
summons was addressed only to the defendants named therein and not to the private
respondent. At the time of the commencement of the suit below, the petitioners had no
knowledge of the legal dissolution and the undertaking assumed by PEPSICO. The publication
of the notice of dissolution and the assumption of liabilities, done in June 1983 or eight months
before the vehicular accident, cannot serve as a notice to the petitioners who were not yet
creditors having a claim upon a quasi-delict.
[1]
Corporation Code, sec. 122, par. 1: A dissolved corporation shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time
when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.
 MAGDALENA ESTATE V. NIETO
1983 | RELOVA, J. | MODES OF SERVICE

PETITIONERS/INTERVENORS: MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC.

RESPONDENTS: RENE NIETO and HELEN GARCIA

SUMMARY: Defendants default on their installments in a perfected deed of sale. Petitioners demand for
collection of sum/specific performance of their obligation to pay balance, but serve summons by publication
rather than in person, claiming defendants are in hiding. Court rules that such summons is void anyway,
because in actions in personam, personal service of summons is crucial to obtaining jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant and necessary to respecting the latters right to due process. Summons by publication
will not suffice.
DOCTRINE: Pantaleon vs. Asuncion ruled that "in an action strictly in personam, personal service of
summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction divert the person of the defendant, who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot
consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rightsconfer upon the court jurisdiction over said
defendant."
The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of
the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, Section
1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the
summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid.

FACTS
1. Petitioners sold parcel of land located at New Manila Subdivision, QC to defendants. Even if
defendants had not fully paid the consideration for the said lot, by special arrangement, were
able to have the title to said lot transferred in their names. They had made partial payments only
and the balance of their account (P12,000) was secured by a promissory note, which provided
for the conditions of monthly installments with 7% interest and an escalation fault should they
default in one.
2. They defaulted and, despite repeated demands, failed to pay their installments in arrears.
Plaintiffs resorted to legal measures.
3. There was an ex-parte reception of evidence because the defendants-appellants had been
declared in default, plaintiff having complied with the court's order allowing service of summons
and copy of the complaint upon the defendants-appellants through publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation (Daily Mirror), pursuant to Section 16, Rule 14 ROC.
4. Defendants now appeal to SC, arguing that in allowing service of summons by publication, and
consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendants-appellants, and the
decision is therefore void

ISSUES/HELD: WON there was valid service of summons No

1. Fontanilla vs. Dominguez held that service of summons by publication is proper in all actions
without distinction, provided the defendant is residing in the Philippines but his Identity is
unknown or his address cannot be ascertained.
2. However, a later case, Pantaleon vs. Asuncion ruled that "in an action strictly in personam,
personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
divert the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of
the court. In other words, summons by publication cannotconsistently with the due process
clause in the Bill of Rightsconfer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant." And any
 statute allowing publication to substitute for personal service of summons under such
circumstances is unconstitutional.
3. The action of herein plaintiff-appellee, being in personam, the doctrine laid down in Pantaleon
vs. Asuncion (supra) finds application.
4. The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real
or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be
attached under Rule 57, Section 1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be
deemed valid and effective. (JBL Reyes)
5. In the present case no jurisdiction was acquired. Decision set aside and case remanded for
proper service of summons.
 UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V ONGPIN
October 26, 2001 | MENDOZA, J. | Modes of Service

SUMMARY: Bobby Ongpin was surety of Philippine Apparel. PA Failed to pay so UCPB filed complaint
against Ongpin. Service was made to Exec. Sec. of PILTEL where Ongpin was Chairman of Board of
the Directors because Ongpin changed his residence to Hong Kong.
DOCTRINE: It does not necessarily follow that the regular place of business of a chairman of the board
of directors is the same as the address of the corporation as it is possible for him to hold office
elsewhere.

FACTS
1. Philippine Apparel, Inc. (PAI) entered into a credit agreement with United Coconut Planters
Bank for a credit line in the amount of US$500,000.00. Roberto V. Ongpin, then controlling
stockholder of PAI, signed as surety, binding himself jointly and severally liable with PAI for the
same amount. PAI availed of the credit line by drawing on short-term loans and opening letters
of credit for the importation of goods, which amounted to US$650,986.34.
2. As PAI failed to pay its obligations, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Ongpin with
the Regional Trial Court Makati to enforce his obligation as surety of PAI. UCPB sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the 3 grounds, one of which is that respondent,
in fraud of creditors, had transferred residence to Hongkong.
3. A writ of attachment and a notice of garnishment were issued by the trial court, addressed to the
president and corporate secretary of the Dominion Asian Equities, garnishing shares of stock
belonging to Ongpin.
4. Ongpin, making a special appearance through counsel, moved to dismiss the complaint and to
quash the writ of attachment and garnishment on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent, the summons prepared on October 30, 1995 having
been unserved as of November 17, 1995. The trial court denied the urgent motion as well as
respondents subsequent motion for reconsideration.
5. Ongpin filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the orders of the trial court. CA held that
the issuance of a Writ of Attachment together with the Notice of Garnishment is validated: but
the implementation of the Writ of Attachment/Garnishment is prohibited until after the Court shall
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, either through voluntary appearance
or service of summons. CA denied MR.
6. During the pendency of the petition, UCPB filed with the trial court a Motion for Leave to Serve
Summons Through Publication. Its motion was granted, but the publication was held in
abeyance on October 2, 1996. On the same date, petitioner entered into an agreement with
TODAY for the publication of the summons on October 4, 11, and 18, 1996. UCPBr received the
trial courts order at the close of office hours on October 3, 1996. They were not able to inform
the court or TODAY. TODAY published the summons on October 4, 1996. It was only on
October 8, 1996 that petitioner was able to inform the newspaper.
7. UCPB filed a petition for certiorari with SC. Again, during the pendency of the case, UCPB filed
with the trial court another Motion to Serve Summons through Publication with Leave of Court.
In the meantime, SC issued a resolution dismissing petitioners petition for review on certiorari
for failure of petitioner to comply with procedural requirements.
8. Deputy Sheriff Parra, together with Atty. Baculi, representative of petitioner, went to the PILTEL
office at the Bankers Center Building in Makati City to serve summons on respondent, who was
then the chairman of the board of PILTEL and was expected to attend a board meeting on that
day. Upon arrival, they asked the receptionist if Ongpin would attend the meeting. Cuenco
conferred with Anne V. Morallo, executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, who then called
respondents office at the BA Lepanto Building in Makati City. Morallo was informed that he was
not going to attend the meeting. Sheriff Parra and Atty. Baculi waited until 11:30 a. m. They
 proceeded to BA Lepanto Building. The security guard at BA Lepanto told them that respondent
was holding office at the 14th floor, but when they reached the said floor, they were told by a
member of the Internal Security Personnel that respondent was not known at that place.
9. In the afternoon of the same day, Sheriff Parra returned to the PILTEL office to serve the
summons on Ongpin. Morallo, who told him that she was authorized to receive court processes
for and on behalf of respondent even though the latter was not holding office in the building.
Morallo was so advised by Atty. Joseph Santiago, Chief of the Legal Department of PILTEL.
Thus, Sheriff Parra served the summons on Morallo who received it accordingly. However, when
Morallo tried to forward the court process to respondent, the latters lawyer, Atty. David S.
Narvasa, refused to receive it.
10. After serving summons through Morallo, Sheriff Parra implemented the writ of attachment by
serving notices of garnishment.
11. Ongpin filed with the trial court an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) to Dismiss; (b) for Prohibition of
the Implementation of the Writ of Attachment (c) for Quashal of the Notice of Garnishment and
(d) for Release of Properties attached thereby. The trial court denied respondents motion for
lack of merit. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
12. UCPB filed a petition for certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on
December 27, 2000, annulling and setting aside the orders of the trial cour on the ground that
PILTEL was not the regular place of business of respondent and that, even if it was, Morallo
could not be considered a competent person in charge of respondents office, as she was the
executive secretary of the president of PILTEL and not of respondent.

ISSUES
1. W/N respondent Ongpins continuous special appearances before the court for five
years may be deemed voluntary appearance as contemplated by the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure on acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant? No
2. W/N the substituted service of summons on Anne V. Morallo, executive secretary of the
president of PILTEL, was valid? No

RATIO
1. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said
court based on the ground, e. g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case,
although respondent had indeed filed numerous pleadings, these pleadings were
precisely for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
respondent on the ground that there was no valid service of summons on him. It would
be absurd to hold that respondent, by making such appearance, thereby submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. UCPB cites the ruling in Macapagal v. Court of Appeals for its contention that the feigned
unawareness of a defendant is equivalent to voluntary appearance. The facts of
Macapagal are, different from the facts of this case. In that case, this Court considered
the petitioner to have been validly served summons since it was served on the legal
counsel of the two corporations and its officers and directors. Petitioners defense that at
the time of the service of summons he was no longer connected with both corporations,
having resigned from them before such service, was dismissed by this Court as flimsy.
The finding of this Court on the feigned unawareness of petitioner was based on the fact
that Philfinances woes were widely publicized. In contrast, summons in this case was
served on the executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, a company which is not a
party to the present action. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the person of
 respondent even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with
summons.
3. Rule 14, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if, for
justifiable causes, personal service cannot be effected on defendant, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. The word office or the phrase regular place of business refers to the office or
place of business of the defendant at the time of service. The rule specifically designates
the persons to whom copies of the process should be left. It does not necessarily follow
that the regular place of business of a chairman of the board of directors is the same as
the address of the corporation as it is possible for him to hold office elsewhere.
4. PILTEL, where substituted summons was served was not even a party to the present
suit. Respondent was sued in his personal capacity. Even from the initial inquiries made
by the sheriff and petitioners representative in the office of PILTEL, it was evident that
respondent was not holding office there. As the PILTEL office is not respondents regular
place of business, it cannot therefore be said that Morallo was authorized to receive
service of process on behalf of respondent.
5. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents address was either at ATA Capital
Corporation, or South China Morning Office, both in Hongkong. Under the Rules, if a
defendant is a non-resident and his property in the Philippines had been attached,
service may, by leave of court, be effected outside the Philippines or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. In the same manner, if the whereabouts of the
defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by
leave of court, likewise be effected by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The records show that petitioner attempted to serve summons by publication, but later
abandoned its effort.

HELD: Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

 GUIGUINTO CREDIT CORP v. TORRES
September 15, 2006 | Ynares-Santiago | SUMMONS > Service of summons >> Modes of service

PETITIONER: Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, INC. (GUCCI)

RESPONDENTS: Aida Torres, Nonilo Torres and Sheryl Ann Torres-Holgado

SUMMARY: GUCCI filed a collection case against respondents. Summons were served through
Pagtalunan, Aidas secretary. GUCCI presented evidence ex parte, and thereafter RTC ruled in favor of
GUCCI. Respondents argue that they were not validly served with summons since there was no
explanation why substituted service of summons was made through Pagtalunan. The SC ruled in favor
of respondents since a report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a
relationship of trust and confidence was lacking.
DOCTRINES:
1. Substituted service may only be availed of when the respondents could not be served
personally within a reasonable period of time. Such impossibility of prompt service must be
shown by stating that earnest efforts have been made to find the respondents personally and
that such efforts have failed.
2. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an
extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of summons. Any substituted
service other than that authorized under Section 7 is deemed ineffective and contrary to law.

FACTS:
1. Respondents are members of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI). They availed of
loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates despite demands.
2. Hence, GUCCI filed a complaint before the RTC for collection of sum of money and damages.
3. Summons against respondents were served through Pagtalunan, the personal secretary of Aida
Torres.
4. The Return of Summons was filed 2 days later by the process server.
5. GUCCI filed a motion to declare respondents in default, which was granted by the RTC.
6. GUCCI presented evidence ex parte.
7. RTC: rendered judgment in favor of GUCCI.
8. GUCCI thereafter moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted by the RTC.
9. CA: issued a TRO.
10. Respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.
11. CA: annulled the judgment of the RTC; denied MR.
a. RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents
i. They were not validly served with summons
ii. They did not voluntarily appear in court.
b. The service of summons to Pagtalunan was in violation of Section 6, Rule 14.
i. There was no explanation why resort to substituted
service of summons was made.
12. Respondents were deprived of their right to due process.
13. GUCCI filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, arguing:
14. The service of summons to Pagtalunan at the respondents address was valid pursuant to the
rules and applicable jurisprudence.

ISSUE/HELD:
W/N whether summons was validly served on the respondents.NO

RATIO:
1. Since substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service, there should be a report
stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a relationship of trust and
confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified of the summons issued in
their names.
2. Substituted service may only be availed of when the respondents could not be served
personally within a reasonable period of time.
a. Such impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating that earnest efforts have
been made to find the respondents personally and that such efforts have failed.
3. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an
extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of summons.
a. Any substituted service other than that authorized under Section 7 is deemed ineffective
and contrary to law.
4. Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres, there is no showing that the
Pagtalunan had indeed a relationship of trust and confidence with the three respondents.
5. The process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without
ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents.
a. Such service of summons is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and Sheryl Ann Torres
whose relationship with Pagtalunan was neither readily ascertained nor adequately
explained in the Return of Summons.
b. No earnest efforts were made to locate respondent Aida Torres who was allegedly
working abroad at the time summons was served on her person.
c. No explanation why substituted service was resorted to through Pagtalunan was stated
in the Return.
d. Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
6. Laus v. Court of Appeals: substituted service must:
a. Indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
b. Specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners;
c. State that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein.
7. There was an undue, haste to serve the summons at the first attempt without making sure that
personal service was an impossibility because either the respondents had left for a foreign
country or an unknown destination with no definite date of returning within a reasonable period,
or had gone into hiding to avoid service of any process from the courts.
8. Since the substituted service was not validly effected, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of the respondents.
9. The order of default, the judgment by default, the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the
auction sale of the respondents properties levied on execution are, therefore, null and void.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

 Guanzon vs. Arradaza
December 6, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Summons; Modes of Service

PETITIONERS: ERLINDA GUANZON

RESPONDENTS: ANDREW P. ARRADAZA, FRANCISCA MAIDIN and ERLINDA LEBITA
(Digesters note: Syllabus says Arrandoza. But I checked and it really is supposed to be Guanzon vs.
Arradaza.)

SUMMARY: A jeepney passenger injured in a collision between the jeepney and a truck filed a complaint for
damages against the drivers and owners of both vehicles. The owners and the driver of the jeepney filed a
cross-claim against the driver and owner (Guanzon) of the truck. Guanzon was not available for personal
service of summons in any of her alleged addresses. Summons was instead via substituted service on her co-
worker. Two years later, Guanzon argues that the service of summons on her is defective. Court held that it
was valid, as it complies with the rules on substituted service.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that summons should be served personally on the defendant. It is ONLY when
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
allowed.

FACTS:
1. Andrew Arradaza was injured when the jeepney (owned by Francisco Maidin and Erlinda Lebita, and
driven by Reynaldo Lebita) that he was riding in collided with a dump truck owned by Erlinda Guanzon
(and driven by Escarilla).
2. Arradaza filed with the MeTc of Manila an Amended Complaint for Damages.
3. Owners of the jeepney filed an Answer with cross-claim against the owner and driver of the dump truck.
4. Driver of the jeepney filed an Answer with cross-claim against the driver of the dump truck (Escarilla)
and Guanzon Lime Development Co. (owned by Erlinda Guanzon).
5. Summons was not served on Escarilla on the ground that he was no longer connected with the firm
(GLDC).
6. Summons was first attempted to be served on Guanzon at the address stated in the motor vehicle
registration document of her truck. However, she was not found at that address.
7. A General Information Sheet of her company was obtained from SEC to obtain her real address.
8. Guanzon was not found. Hence, the complaint was instead given via substituted service to a certain
Susan Ador, who was employed in the same place where Guanzon was working.
9. Guanzon failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
10. Almost two years later, Guanzon filed an MTD arguing that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person due to defective service of summons.
11. MeTC denied the MTD and the MR.
12. MeTC decided in favor of Arradaza, and held that the other defendants can recover from Guanzon the
amounts that they will have to pay Arradaza as damages.
13. RTC affirmed.
2. Petition for Review was filed before the CA. CA dismissed.
3. Guanzon filed Petition for Review on Certiorari before SC.

ISSUES/HELD - WON the substituted service of summons on Guanzon was defective. NO

1. RATIO: The service of summons, first attempted by personal service, and subsequently by
substituted service, more than meets the requirements set by the ROC and the due process
clause.
2. The general rule is that summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted
service may be resorted to.
3. Substituted service may be effected by
a) Leaving copies of the summons at defendants dwelling place or residence with a person of
suitable age and discretion who is also residing therein; OR
b) At his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof
4. It is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendants regular place of business be
specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge.
 POTENCIANO II V. BARNES
AUGUST 20, 2008 | CARPIO, J. | MODES OF SERVICE

PETITIONER: Benedicto B. Potenciano II

RESPONDENT: Gregory P. Barnes

SUMMARY: Potenciano files complaint for damages against Barnes. Sheriff serves summons to certain Mr.
Herrera, allegedly a representative of Barnes counsel, E. Himan Law Office. RTC ruled in favor of Potenciano.
Barnes files a Motion for New Trial, but RTC denies, arguing that sheriff validly served summons. CA
disagrees. SC affirms CA, ruling that (1) there was no attempt whatsoever by sheriff to personally serve
summons to Barnes; and (2) that the handing of a copy of summons to Mr. Herrera does not qualify as
substituted service.
DOCTRINE: The requisites of substituted service of summons are: (1) the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time; and (2) the impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed, and this statement should be
made in the proof of service. (Note Rule 14, Secs. 6 and 7.)

FACTS:
1. Potenciano worked as Operations Manager of Executive Dinner Club International, a member-
company of GP Barnes Group of Companies.
2. He filed with RTC Muntinlupa City a complaint for damages against Barnes, the owner and
president of GP Barnes Group of Companies, for alleged harassment and maltreatment.
4. A certain Jaime S. Herrera (Mr. Herrera), a representative of E. Himan Law Office, secured from
the trial court copies of the complaint with annexes and the summons intended for Barnes. Mr.
Herrera indicated on the courts copy of the summons that E. Himan Law Office was Barnes
counsel. On the same date, the deputy sheriff issued a Return of Summons.
5. A month later, Potenciano filed a motion to declare Barnes in default.
6. E. Himan Law Office, represented by Atty. Jose Valentino G. Dave (Atty. Dave), by way of
special appearance for the sole purpose of questioning the validity of the service of summons,
filed its Comment/Manifestation: the law office does not represent Barnes because he has not
yet engaged the services of the law office. Hence, the law office has no authority to bind
Barnes.
7. RTC issued an Order of Default. E. Himan filed urgent MR, but denied. RTC then rendered
resolution in favor of Potenciano.
8. Potenciano filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
9. Barnes, now formally represented by Diores Law Offices, filed a Motion for New Trial as
Remedy Against Judgment by Default with Opposition to Execution Pending Appeal.
10. RTC denied the Motion: Sheriff did not commit fraud when he certified in his Return of
Summons that Barnes was duly served with the summons when a representative of E. Himan
Law Office, claiming as counsel of Barnes, secured a copy of the summons and the complaint
against Barnes. MR also denied.
11. Barnes filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary prohibitory injunction.
12. CA granted petition: No valid service of summons since neither Mr. Herrera nor E. Himan Law
Office was the defendant. Sheriff did not exert any effort to comply with Section 6, Rule 14 of the
 Rules of Court, either by handing a copy of the summons to Barnes in person and should
Barnes refuse to receive and sign the summons, by tendering it to him.
13. Potenciano filed with SC a petition for review.

ISSUES:
1. WON there was valid service of summons NO
2. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Barnes by voluntary appearance - NO

RATIO:
First Issue
1. There was no attempt whatsoever on the part of the deputy sheriff to serve the summons on
Barnes himself, who was the defendant in the complaint. The deputy sheriff just handed a copy
of the summons, complaint, and the annexes to a certain Mr. Herrera who is a representative of
E. Himan Law Office, which claimed to be the counsel of Barnes.
2. The handing of a copy to Mr. Herrera cannot even qualify as substituted service under Section 7
of Rule 14. The requisites of substituted service of summons are:
a. the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time; and
b. the impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed, and this statement should
be made in the proof of service.
3. In this case, the deputy sheriff never made any effort to serve the summons on Barnes himself.
Neither was the copy of the summons served at Barnes residence nor at his office or regular
place of business, as provided under Section 7 of Rule 14. The deputy sheriff just handed a
copy of the summons to a messenger of E. Himan Law Office who came to the office of the trial
court claiming that E. Himan Law Office was the counsel of Barnes. Giving a copy of the
summons to a messenger of a law firm, which was not even the counsel of the defendant,
cannot in any way be construed as equivalent to service of summons on the defendant.
4. Since there was no service of summons on Barnes, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over Barnes and the trial courts order of default and the judgment by default are void.
Second Issue
1. Other than valid service of summons on the defendant, the trial court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the defendant by his voluntary appearance, in accordance with Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. However, this is not the case here. There is no evidence on record that Barnes
authorized E. Himan Law Office to represent him in the case. In fact, E. Himan Law Office filed a
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that Barnes had
not yet engaged the services of E. Himan Law Office, which could not therefore represent
Barnes. Thus, the receipt of the summons by E. Himan Law Office and its filing of a
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default cannot be considered as
voluntary appearance on the part of Barnes.
2. It was only on 15 August 2001 that Barnes made his first appearance in the trial court by filing a
Motion for New Trial through his counsel of record, Diores Law Offices. The motion was
precisely to question the validity of the order of default and the subsequent judgment for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

MANGILA V. CA
2002 | CARPIO, J. | MODES OF SERVICE
PETITIONERS: ANITA MANGILA
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA

SUMMARY: petitioner defaulted on payments by installment, prompting respondent to file for collection of sum
of money. By then petitioner has left for Guam, but instead of asking leave of court to serve summons by
publication, the sheriff implements a writ of attachment on petitioners property instead. The court rules that the
implementation or enforcement of such a coercive process assumes that jurisdiction has already been
acquired over the person of [petitioner].
DOCTRINE: Grant of provisional remedy of attachment involves 3 stages: (1) the court issues the order
granting the application; (2) the writ of attachment issues; and (3) it is implemented. For the initial two stages, it
is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
TC cannot enforce coercive processes without first obtaining jurisdiction over the person. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over person because
the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.

FACTS

1. Petitioner is an exporter of sea foods and doing business under the name and style of Seafoods
Products. Private respondent is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a
single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business. January 1988,
petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of private respondent for shipment of
petitioners products to Guam.
a. Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery. Private respondents invoice
stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of
suit, the same invoice stipulates attorneys fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due
plus costs of suit.
b. Petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95.
June 10, 1988, private respondent filed before the RTC Pasay City for collection of sum of
money.
2. On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not served
on petitioner. A woman found at petitioners house informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred
her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had
left the Philippines for Guam.
3. As this was probably done with intent to defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion
for Preliminary Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of
Preliminary Attachment against petitioner. TC issued.
4. The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterparts in RTC,
Pampanga. Thus, on October 28, 1988, Sheriff of RTC Pampanga served on petitioners
household help in San Fernando the Notice of Levy.
5. On November 7, 1988, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without
submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had
not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court
had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. TC granted the motion without touching on issue
of jurisdiction.
6. October 6, 1989, TC scheduled the presentation of private respondents evidence ex-parte on
October 10, 1989 (due to petitioners counsel not showing up to pre-trial and trial). On
November 20, 1989, the petitioner received a copy of the Decision of November 10, 1989,
 ordering petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25
percent attorneys fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed.

ISSUES/HELD: W/N because of failure to serve summons on petitioner before or simultaneously with the writs
implementation trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person and thus the service of the writ is void.

1. Distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of writ of attachment. It is

necessary to distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired to validly implement the writ.
2. Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy at the commencement
of the action or at any time thereafter, i.e. date of filing of the complaint. The reference plainly
is to a time before summons is served. whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of
attachment and writ of attachment - these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the courts authority.
3. Grant of provisional remedy of attachment involves 3 stages: (1) the court issues the order
granting the application; (2) the writ of attachment issues; and (3) it is implemented. For the
initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be
first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988.
However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after
the implementation of the writ of attachment.
4. ROC provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a
party.
a. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that whenever the defendants whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, after attempt to
personally serve failed, respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of
summons by publication on petitioner.
b. In fact, defendant of the case being out of the country temporarily (Guam) is exactly the
case contemplated by the rule.
5. In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed
to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such
a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
 Montefalcon v. Vasquez
June 17, 2008 | QUISUMBING, J. | Modes of Service

SUMMARY: Montefalcon filed complaint for acknowledgement and support against Vasquez, a
seafarer. Substituted service by Naga Sheriff was returned by his mother to the court. Substituted
service by Taguig Sheriff succeeded the second time around. He was declared in default. He appealed,
stating that service of summons should have been personal or by publication as substituted service is
proper only if a defendant is in the country. Court held that substituted service was proper as Section 16
of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Additionally, as a seafarer, he had two
residences, one in the city and one in the province where he came from. Thus, the service to his Taguig
residence was valid.
DOCTRINES:
1. Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods
of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer
2. A Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas, where majority of
the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where
he originates.

FACTS
1. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and
support Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son, Laurence, is the
illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support too-
petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
2. A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on
Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquezs grandfather received them as
Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquezs mother returned the documents to the clerk of court,
who informed the court of the non-service of summons.
3. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in
default. The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons.
4. The court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at Signal
Village, Taguig, Metro Manila upon petitioners motion. A Taguig deputy sheriff served it
by substituted service on Vasquezs caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriffs return
incorrectly stated Lazaro as Vasquezs surname. Another alias summons was issued,
also received by Bejer.
5. On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in
default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez
was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at Taguig, but these were
returned as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address. The court
granted petitioners prayers, it added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations
by his silence.
6. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of
appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. The appellate
court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was defective as there was no
explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service
and set aside the TCs decision. MR was denied.
7. Noting that Vasquezs seamans book indicated that he left
the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000, Petitioners
argued that any attempt at personal service of summons was needless as Vasquez
already left for abroad. Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of
 summons should have been personal or by publication as substituted service is proper
only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that the sheriffs return did not
state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.

ISSUE
1. Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with
jurisdiction over his person;
2. Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

RATIO
1. It is common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has
a temporary residence in the urban areas, where majority of the manning agencies
hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates. In
this case, Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed. He has established a residence in either place.
2. Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the
country. Service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of
Court: When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within
the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.(Emphasis supplied.)
3. Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may
and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed
under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-
seaman.
4. Personal service of summons was not practicable since
the defendant was out of the country. Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about
Vasquezs whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to substituted
service.
5. Substituted service in Taguig was valid. Diligent efforts
were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of
their official duty. The period of 8 months between service at Naga and Taguig show that
it was futile. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and
discretion, then residing at Vasquezs dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really
Vasquezs residence, as evidenced by his employment contract, executed under the
supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
6. He had enough time to have the default order set aside.
The default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. But he did nothing.
7. A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendants
residence, office or regular business place. He need not know where a resident
defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to
ensure that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to
the defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that
defendant does not receive actual notice.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED

 ELMER V DAKILA TRADING
August 14, 2007 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J. | SUMMONS

SUMMARY: Elmer and Dakila Trading entered into an agreement for distributing laboratory instruments, etc.
However, Elmer unilaterally terminated said contract. Dakila Trading now files a complaint for sum of money
and damages, lodging said case at RTC Mandaluyong. Elmer contends that Dakila Trading has no cause of
action against them, that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over them, and that the venue was improperly
laid. The SC rules in favor of Elmer, stating that although Dakila trading may have cause of action against
Elmer and that the venue was properly laid, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over herein petitioner.

DOCTRINES:
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of ROC, there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-
resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit:
(1) When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) When the action relates to, or the
subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest,
actual or contingent; (3) When the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) When the
defendant non-residents property has been attached within the Philippines.

FACTS:
1. R is a PH company engaged in the
business of selling and leasing out laboratory instrumentation and process control
instrumentation, and trading of laboratory chemicals and supplies. While PEIA (Perkin-Elmer
Instruments Asia) is a SG company engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing,
selling or distributing various laboratory/analytical instruments. Both parties entered into a
Distribution Agreement in which PEIA appointed R as the sole distributor of its products in the
PH.
3. PEIA unilaterally terminated the Agreement, prompting R to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong
a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment against PEIA and PEIP (PH-based affiliate of P; Perkin-Elmer Instruments
Philippines).
4. RTC denied Rs prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment.
5. R filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Rs
General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside of the Philippines GRANTED.
Alias Summons (4 September 2000) was issued by the RTC to PEIA but was served on 28
September 2000 and received by Perkin Elmer Asia, owned by the P and, allegedly, a separate
and distinct entity from PEIA.
6. PEIP moved to dismiss the Complaint for stating no cause of action. PEIA sent letters to R and
to the RTC to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon PEIA.
7. R filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, together with the Amended Complaint
claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship owned by P, and subsequently changed its
name to Perkin-Elmer Asia.
8. R then filed another Motion[17] for the Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize
Respondents General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside the Philippines.
General Manager went to Singapore and served summons on the petitioner.
9. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by PEIP, compelling the latter to file its Answer to the
Amended Complaint.
10. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss Rs Amended
Complaint based on the ground that, among others, RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the P.
 11. RTC denied Ps MtD, ratiocinating: (a) Ownership by P of shares of stocks in the PEIP would
reveal that there is an allegation of personal property in the Philippines. Thus, it follows that
even though the Amended Complaint is primarily for damages, it does relate to a property of the
P which will make it fall under one of the requisite for extraterritorial service under Section 15,
Rule 14 ROC. Thus, it could be gainfully said that the summons had been validly served for the
RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the P; (b) A MTD hypothetically admits the truth of the facts
alleged in a complaint. When a dismissal based on the absence of a cause of action is filed, the
issue must be passed upon on the basis of the allegations and declare them to be false,
otherwise it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to R; (c) The stipulation as
to the venue of a prospective action does not preclude the filing of the suit in the residence of
the R under Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court, especially where the venue stipulation was
imposed by the plaintiff for its own benefit.
12. P moved for the reconsideration DENIED.
13. P filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction before the
CA alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
14. CA denied P; affirmed RTC.
15. P now files a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: (MAIN) W/N there was proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over the
person of the petitioner NO proper service of summons.

RATIO:
1. Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the
action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. The said
extraterritorial service of summons is for the purpose of complying with the requirements
of fair play and due process. The summons informs the defendant of the pendency of
the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to
him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. Thereby, he can take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
2. Extraterritorial service of summon herein is erroneous. The
case for the collection of a sum of money and damages is an action in personam as it
deals with the personal liability of P. Being an action in personam, personal service of
summons within the Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the P. This is not possible in the present case because the
P is a non-resident and is not found within the PH. The extraterritorial service of
summons herein was not validly effected and thus failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the P.
3. Herein case does not fall within any of the four instances
under Section 15, Rule 14, ROC. However, even if the service of summons upon the
defendant in a civil case is defective, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over his
person when he voluntary appears in court or submits himself to its authority.
Nonetheless, voluntary appearance, as a mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this case. It is settled that a party who makes
a special appearance in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of said
court, based on the invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case, P has
been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons upon it and the
jurisdiction of the RTC over its person.
 4. P did not submit itself voluntarily to the authority of the
court a quo; and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC utterly failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the P. Petition granted.

REGNER V. LOGARTA
19 October 2007 | J. Chico-Nazario| Summons: Modes of service

SUMMARY: Petitioner filed an action in personam against the respondents. Summons was validly served on
Teresa, but not on Cynthia who is a non-resident. Teresa filed a MTD, alleging that Cynthia, who is an
indispensable party, was not issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with
summons, without her who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter, there can be no proper
determination of the case. RTC ruled in favor of Teresa and the CA affirmed. Petitioner appeals to the SC, and
the Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, stating that a co-donee to an action to declare the nullity of the
deed of donation is an indispensable party, and that definitely, Cynthia was not properly served with the
summons as the service was not done in any of the authorized modes under Rule 14.
DOCTRINE:
As Cynthia is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The third mode, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where Cynthia resides.

FACTS:
1. Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the
daughters of Luis Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria Regner is the second
wife of Luis.
2. In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa, with the help of another sibling, defrauded
Luis who was then very ill and was unable to write into placing his thumbmark on a Deed of
Donation. In said Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary Ownership Certificate pertaining
to membership shares in the Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void
because the placing of the thumbmark by Luis was done without the latters free will and and
involuntarily considering his physical state; that it was done without Luiss lawyer; that the
ratification made by Luis before he died is likewise void because of similar circumstances.
3. In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff
could not deliver the summonses against Cynthia and Teresa because apparently, although they
are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are residing in California. It was only in the year
2000 that one of the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa, when she came back
to the Philippines.
4. Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Victoria failed to prosecute her
case for an unreasonable length of time. Naturally, Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa, in her
rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed because Cynthia, who is an indispensable
party, was not issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with
summons, without her who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter, there can
be no proper determination of the case.
5. RTC ruled in favor of Teresa; CA affirmed

ISSUES/HELD:
 1. W/N a co-donee is an indispensable party in an action to declare the nullity of the deed of
donation YES
2. W/N delay in the service of summons upon one of the defendants constitutes failure to
prosecute that would warrant dismissal -- YES

RATIO: Petition denied for lack of merit; CA decision affirmed

1. In Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that no final determination of a case could be made if an indispensable party is not
legally present therein:
2. Arcelona v. Court of Appeals: xxx were the courts to permit an
action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any
given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the
other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property
might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of
the title asserted against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits
by requiring the person asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-
plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole
matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
3. Any decision in Civil Case No. CEB 23927 cannot bind Cynthia,
and the Court cannot nullify the donation of the property she now co-owns with Teresa, even if
limited only to the portion belonging to Teresa, to whom summons was properly served, since
ownership of the property is still pro indiviso. Cynthia is an indispensable party in Civil Case No.
CEB 23927 without whom the lower court is barred from making a final adjudication as to the
validity of the entire donation. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.
4. Being an indispensable party in Civil Case No. CEB 23927, the
trial court must also acquire jurisdiction over Cynthias person through the proper service of
summons. To determine whether Cynthia was properly served a summons, the nature of the
action must first be identified. The case was evidently an action against Cynthia and Teresa on
the basis of their personal liability for the alleged fraudulent transfer of the subject Country Club
membership to their name, the membership certificate from the Cebu Country Club being a
personal property. Thus, the action instituted by petitioner before the RTC is in personam. Being
an action in personam, the general rule requires the personal service of summons on Cynthia
within the Philippines, but this is not possible in the present case because Cynthia is a non-
resident and is not found within the Philippines.
5. The trial court was correct in dismissing petitioners complaint,
since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon Cynthia was not done by any of the
authorized modes: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
6. The complaint herein was filed on 15 June 1999. The summonses
for Cynthia and Teresa were served on their sister Melinda at the Borja Family Clinic in
Tagbilaran City, but the latter refused to receive the same. It was only on 1 June 2000 that
summons was served on Teresa at Room 304, Regency Crest Condominium, Banilad, Cebu
City, when she was in the Philippines for a visit. However, the summons for Cynthia was never
served upon her.
7. Although Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules, imposes upon the clerk
of court the duty to serve summons, this does not relieve the petitioner of her own duty as the
plaintiff in a civil case to prosecute the case diligently. If the clerk had been negligent, it was
petitioners duty to call the courts attention to that fact. It was not even petitioner who called the
courts attention that summons had not been served on Cynthia, but Teresa. This despite the
fact that petitioner was aware, as early as 15 June 1999, when she filed her complaint, that the
summonses could not be served on Teresa and Cynthia, as she admitted therein that Teresa
and Cynthia were residing abroad. Petitioner should have asked that Cynthia and Teresa be
summoned by publication at the earliest possible time
 PHIL. COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. ALEJANDRO
Sept. 21, 2007 l J. Ynares-Santiago l Modes of Service

PETITIONER: Phil. Commercial International Bank

RESPONDENT: Joseph Anthony Alejandro

SUMMARY: PCIB was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment (WPA) against Alejandro by
alleging that the latter is guilty of fraud and was not a resident of the Philippines. The lower court, on
Alejandros motion, quashed the writ finding that (1) Alejandro was not guilty of fraud and (2) that he
maintained a residence and office in the Philippines. SC overruled PCIBs contention and held that
even on the allegation that Alejandro was a resident temporarily out of the Philippines, PCIB was still
not entitled to a WPA because the lower court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted
service instead of attaching the property of Alejandro. The misrepresentation of PCIB that Alejandro
was not a resident of the Philippines was thus a deliberate move to ensure that the application for the
writ will be granted.

DOCTRINE: In actions in personam against residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the court need
not always attach the defendants property in order to have authority to try the case. Where the plaintiff
seeks to attach the defendants property and to resort to the concomitant service of summons by
publication, the same must be with prior leave of court, precisely because, if the sole purpose of the
attachment is for the court to acquire jurisdiction, the latter must determine whether from the allegations
in the complaint, substituted service will suffice, or whether there is a need to attach the property of the
defendant and resort to service of summons by publication in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case and to comply with the requirements of due process.

FACTS:
1. P filed against R a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment (WPA).
2. P alleged that R executed in favor of P a promissory note obligating himself to pay P249M plus
interest. R assigned deposits as security for the loan. P requested R to put up additional
security.
3. In praying for a WPA, P alleged that (1) R is not a resident of the Philippines (but of Hong Kong)
and (2) R fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to P
not to withdraw the same prior to their assignment as security for the loan.
4. TC granted the application for and issued writ ex parte after P posted a bond.
5. Bank deposits of R with RCBC were garnished.
6. R filed a motion to quash the writ. R alleged (1) that P knew that he maintains a permanent
residence in QC and an office address in Makati (Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De
los Angeles where he is a partner) and (2) that the withdrawal of the deposits was not fraudulent
as it was approved by P.
7. TC quashed the writ. It found that (1) the withdrawal of the deposits was not intended to defraud
P and (2) that P misrepresented and suppressed the facts regarding Rs residence. CA
dismissed petition for certiorari filed by P. SC dismissed petition for late filing of minute
resolution. TC decision became final and executory.
8. R filed a claim for damages in the amount of P25M on the attachment bond on account of the
wrongful garnishment of his deposits.
9. TC awarded the damages prayed for by R.
10. CA affirmed TC but reduced amount of damages awarded.
11. R filed petition for review with SC
ISSUE: WON P is liable for damages YES. P is not entitled to WPA. P acted in bad faith. Affirmed
CA and TC but reduced further the amount of damages awarded.

RULE:
Rule 57. SEC. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or at
any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following
cases: xxx (e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to
do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; (f) In an action against a party who resides out of the
Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

RATIO:
1. Even on the allegation that respondent is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines,
petitioner is still not entitled to a WPA because the TC could acquire jurisdiction over the
case by substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The
misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent does not reside in the Philippines and its
omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure that the
application for the writ will be granted.
2. Purposes of preliminary attachment: (a) to seize property of debtor in advance and to
hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment (as in the grounds stated in par (a) to (e)
Sec 1 of Rule 57) or (b) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
seizure of property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons
on the defendant cannot be effected (as in par (f) of the same provision).
3. Where defendant does not reside and is not found in PH (and hence personal and
substituted service cannot be effected) the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the
court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the defendant. It becomes a matter of
course for the court to convert actions in personam into a proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem.
4. HOWEVER, where defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the PH,
attachment of his/her property in an action in personam is not always necessary in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case to attach defendants property.
5. Modes of service of summons available: (1) extraterritorial service and (2) substituted
service of summons.
6. Extraterritorial service (Sec 15 and 16 Rule 14): (a) personal service out of the PH, (b)
publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and
the court order to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient.
7. Substituted service of summons (Sec 7 Rule 14): the normal mode of service of
summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents
temporarily out of PH. Service of summons may be effected by (a) leaving copies of
summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable discretion residing
therein, or (b) by leaving copies at the defendants office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
8. In the case at hand, the writ was issued by TC mainly on the representation of P that R
is not a resident of the PH. Had P disclosed that R has a residence in QC and an office
in Makati, TC could have served summons by substituted service.
 MASON v. CA
October 13, 2003 | Quisumbing, J. | SUMMONS > Modes of service

PETITIONERS: Spouses Efren Mason and Digna Mason

RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation

SUMMARY: Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason filed a complaint for rescission of contract against
private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation before the Pasay City RTC. Summons was served
upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, whom the sheriffs return described as a mere
secretary to the corporate president. The trial court found for petitioners but the CA ruled in private
respondents favor, declaring that summons was not properly served in accordance with Sec. 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court affirmed the CAs ruling and concluded that the enumeration in
Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules, which revised Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted,
limited, and exclusive.

DOCTRINE:
1. Sec. 11, Rule 14, Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. (13a)

2. (FOR REFERENCE) Sec. 13, Rule 14, 1964 RoC. Service Upon
Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

3. Unlike in the 1964 Rules of Court, the enumeration under Sec. 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the
rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, there
must be strict compliance with Section 11 of Rule 14.

FACTS:

1. Private respondent Columbus

Philippines Bus Corporation entered into a lease contract with petitioners spouses Efren and
Digna Mason, under which private respondent was to construct a building on petitioners
property at the end of the third year of the lease. When private respondent failed to comply
with this stipulation, petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of contract before the RTC of
Pasay City.
2. Summons was served upon private
respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described her as a
secretary to the corporate president.
3. Private respondent failed to file its
answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare the former in
default, which was granted. The trial court rendered judgment for petitioners and declared the
 contract rescinded. Private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of default, which the trial
court denied.
4. On appeal, the CA ruled for private
respondent. It held that the service of summons upon Ayreen Rejalde, who was a mere filing
clerk in private respondents office, was not valid for not complying with Sec. 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON there was valid service of summons on private respondent NO
2. WON private respondents motion to lift order of default was in order N/A (MOOT)

RATIO:
1. On the first issue:
a. Petitioners contend that while Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules clearly specifies the
persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, the said
provision did not abandon the substantial compliance rule. Citing Millenium Industrial
Commercial Corp. v. Tan, petitioners stress that even though the summons was received
by a mere filing clerk, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 11, Rule 14 because
the summons actually received private respondent. This can be inferred from private
respondents motion to lift order of default where the validity of the service of summons
was not questioned.
b. However, the issue of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under
Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules has been settled in E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
v. Judge Benito. There, the Court ruled that the enumeration in Sec. 11, Rule 14, which
revised Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court is restricted, limited, and exclusive,
following the canon of expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Consequentially, neither can
petitioners invoke the Courts ruling Millenium, since the said case was decided when
the 1964 Rules were still in effect.

2. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction due to the

invalidity of the service of summons, the second issue is moot.
 Millenium v. Tan, 326 SCRA 563 (2000)
MILLENIUM v TAN
FEBRUARY 28, 2000 | MENDOZA, J | MODES OF SERVICE | Ang

PETITIONERS: MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION

RESPONDENTS: JACKSON TAN

SUMMARY:
Millennium mortgaged its real property to secure its indebtedness to Tan but defaulted. Tan filed a
complaint for foreclosure of mortgage. The sheriffs return showed that summons and a copy of the
complaint were served on Lynverd Cinches, Millenniums alleged draftsman/OIC/employee. Millennium
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no valid service of summons upon it. The Court
reversed the decision of the CA, dismissing the case against Millenium, as there was neither a valid
service of summons nor a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction by raising an affirmative defense.

DOCTRINE:
1. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action
against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the
defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the
rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to
make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any
legal papers received by him. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on
persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
2. In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of substantial compliance: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person
served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served;
(b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of
the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served.
The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on
service of summons is attained. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by
the corporation through the person served must be shown.
3. In La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA, the Court also ruled that jurisdiction over the person must be
seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense.
Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative
defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.

FACTS:

1. December 1994: Millennium Industrial Commercial Corporation (P) executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over its real property covered by TCT No. 24069 in favor of Jackson Tan (R).
2. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of Millenium's indebtedness to Tan for P2M,
without monthly interest, but which, at maturity date on June 10, 1995, was payable in the amount of
P4M
3. November 9, 1995: Tan filed against Millenium a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the
RTC Cebu City.
4. November 21, 1995: Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon Millenium trough
a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, dated November 23, 1995, as "a Draftsman,
a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-
Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of the Court."
5. Millenium moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service
of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
6. Millenium invoked Rule 14, Sec 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on
Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is not one of the authorized
persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.
7. Millenium also sought the dismissal of the complaint against it on the ground that it had satisfied
its obligation to Tan when the latter opted to be paid in shares of stock under a stipulation in the
mortgage contract
8. Millenium further prayed for "other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
9. December 15, 1995: RTC denied Millennium's MTD
Millenium has availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which the Court has to
hear and receive evidence by interposing that the obligation was already paid and extinguished.
For the Court to validly decide the said plea of the defendant it necessarily had to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, defendant is considered to have then
abandoned its first ground (lack of jurisdiction) and is deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court.
It is a legal truism that voluntary appearance cures the defect of the summons, if any.
1. MR denied
2. September 18, 1997: CA dismissed Milleniums petition for certiorari.
Although Millenium denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it, its
actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss, hence, the
purpose for issuing summons had been substantially achieved.
Millenium voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by including the affirmative
defense that it had already paid its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its MTD

ISSUES/HELD

ISSUE 1. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT ONE
OF THOSE UPON WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN CASE OF A DEFENDANT
CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS VALID NO

1. Millenium objects to the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the service of
summons for two reasons: (1) the enumeration of persons on whom service of summons on a
corporation may be effected in Rule 14, Sec 13, is exclusive and mandatory; (2) even assuming that
substantial compliance is based on an unfounded speculation because there is nothing in the records
to show that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the
corporation.
2. Millennium contends that it was able to file a motion to dismiss only because of its timely
discovery of the foreclosure suit against it when it checked the records of the case in the trial court.
3. Court: summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an
action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If
the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, Sec 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. Rationale: service
must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori
presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
received by him.
 4. Millenium contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, Sec 13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid.
5. Court: This is the general rule. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving
summons on persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
6. G & G Trading Corporation v. CA: although the service of summons was made on a person not
enumerated in Rule 14, Sec 13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by
the corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been attained.
7. Porac Trucking, Inc. v. CA: requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring
possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served
must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the
corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served.
8. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule
on service of summons is attained.
9. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled.
10. With respect to the third, CA held that Millenium's filing of MTD the foreclosure suit is proof that
it received the copy of the summons and the complaint.
11. HOWEVER, there is no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation.
12. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was direct evidence,
such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through
the person upon whom it was actually served.
13. It is not allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the
person on whom summons was served.
14. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through
the person served must be shown.
15. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint
against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is serious
doubt if Lynverd Cinches is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there
is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
16. There is nothing improbable about Millennium's claim that it came to know about the summons
and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its mortgage,
contrary to Tans assertion. Millenium was in default; it received demand letters from Tan. Thus, it had
reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed against it.
17. Thus, receipt by Millenium of the summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.

ISSUE 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN A MOTION

TO DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED UNDER PREVAILING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
1. There is no acquisition of jurisdiction by estoppel. The rule prior to La Naval was that if a
defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for dismissing the action other than lack of
jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This rule no
longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional. We ruled in La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA, Jurisdiction over the person must be
seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense.
Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative
defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
 2. Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioners prayer for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss. In
De Midgely v. Fernandos, we held that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be
deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance.
3. Superseded by the ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional it would be absurd to hold that Millenium unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the only relief that
it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint against it.
 Manotoc v. CA
August 16, 2006 | Velasco Jr., J. | Summons: Modes of Service

PETITIONERS: Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc

RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Agapito Trajano (on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano)

SUMMARY: Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a summons addressed to
petitioner at Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The summons and a
copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at
the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in
default. Petitioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her
person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

Trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss and relied on the presumption that the sheriffs substituted
service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of
proof to the contrary. CA, affirmed the decision of the trial court stating that there was a valid substituted
service. However, the SC ruled that there was no valid substituted service for failing to comply with
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons.

DOCTRINE:

1. The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid
service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it.
The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to
present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect ones right to due process.

2. Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which
applies to this case can be broken down to the following requirements: (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service (2) Specific Details in the Return (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion (4) A Competent Person
in Charge

FACTS
1. Petitioner is the defendant in a civil case for filling, recognition, and enforcement of a foreign judgment
by a District Court in Hawaii.
2. Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons on July 6, 1993 addressed
to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig City.
3. On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky
de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed
to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Orderdated October 13, 1993.
4. On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.
The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra
Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee,
nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of
summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this
case would be ineffective and futile.
5. During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who
testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also identified the
Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and
at the time the Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also presented her
Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued by the Immigration Service of Singapore
to show that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the person referred to in plaintiffs Exhibits A to
EEEE as Mrs. Manotoc may not even be her, but the mother of Tommy Manotoc, and granting that she was the
one referred to in said exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the infrequent
number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra Homes did not at all establish plaintiffs position that she was
a resident of said place.
6. On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs estate, presented Robert Swift, lead counsel for
plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he participated in the
deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioners
residence was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. In addition, the entries in the logbook of Alexandra
Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriffs Return,
were adduced in evidence.
7. TC: Rejected the Motion to Dismissed due to the strength of the documentary evidence and
presumption that the subsituted service was made in regular performance of duty, unless contrary proven.
Reconsideration by the petitioners was also rejected.
8. CA: Affirmed the decision the TC. It noted that the passport doesnt prove the residency of the petitoner.
9. Hence, they filed review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES/HELD
1. Whether or not there was a valid substituted service? NO, because requisites for a valid substituted
service were not met.

RATIO:

INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE DUE TO FAILURE TO MEET:

(1) Specific Details in the Return:

Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return, which reads:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons with
complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the
defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or
Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the
day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.
That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted to in accordance with the
Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr)
Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the said defendant at the
given address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but he refused to sign (emphases
supplied).
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of origin, duly served for its record
and information.
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993.

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious
efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the
Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become
impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during the day, and to no avail for the
reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises. Wanting in detailed
information, the Return deviates from the ruling in Domagas v. Jensen and other related cases that the
pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in
the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the
present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding
the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were informed, and
so [they] allege about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so,
in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or house is doubtful or has not been clearly
ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.

Reiterating Domagas v. Jensen, it has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons
must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances
authorized by the rules.

(2) Recipient must be of suitable age and discretion AND recipient must reside in the house or resident of
defendant

Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident
caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator
of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her
employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners
right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons
must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
 Pascual v. Pascual, 607 SCRA 288 (2009)
CONSTANTINO PASCUAL, substituted by heirs as represented by ZENAIDA PASCUAL, vs. LOURDES
S. PASCUAL
4 December 2009 | Peralta | Summons > Modes of Service

SUMMARY: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent. The process server made 3 attempts to effect
personal service of summons, but failed hence he effected a substituted service on his last attempt. Since R
didnt file a responsive pleading, not having received the summons, RTC declared her in default. CA granted
Rs appeal, so P appealed to the SC. SC said the summons was not validly served.

DOCTRINE: Personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said
summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is
no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.

Note: Parang nalito yung Court dito. They kept interchanging petitioner and respondent

FACTS:
1. Petitioner (P) filed Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with Damages, RTC Malolos, against Respondent (R).
2. Process server (PS) in his 21 May 2002 Return of Service stated that R was not at her Quezon
City home on 20 May 2002 to receive the summons and complaint. Only Rs maid was there, and she refused
to receive the summons. The Brgy. Clerk certified that PS exerted effort to serve the summons but failed.
3. RTC issued an alias summons. However, PS 3rd attempt to serve the summons still failed.
4. PS then effected a substituted service of summons on 14 Aug 2002, serving the summons to
Rs maid, who was of age but refused to sign it, however.
5. P filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on 17 Sept 2002. R filed an
Opposition/Comment and claimed she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the complaint. RTC
declared R in default and allowed P to file his evidence ex parte.
6. R filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set-aside the RTC order declaring her in default.
RTC denied the MR and ruled in favor of P.
7. R then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default on the ground of non-service of summons.
RTC denied. The judgment became final and executory. R filed an MR, which was denied. A Writ of Execution
was issued.
8. R then filed a Rule 65 certiorari petition which the CA granted.
9. P now brings a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid substituted service of summons - NO

RATIO:
1. W/N a valid and substituted service of summons would determine w/n jurisdiction over the
person of P was acquired.
2. Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court.
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
3. Personal service should and always be the first option. Only when summons cannot be served
within a reasonable time should the PS resort to substituted service.
4. Manotoc vs. CA provides the nature and requisites of substituted service.
a. Impossibility of prompt service - party relying on the substituted service/sheriff must
show that defendant cannot be served properly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
i. Reasonable time = time necessary under circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do what should be done
ii. Service has no set period
iii. When plaintiff asks sheriff to make return of the summons and sheriff
submits, validity of summons lapses
iv. Several attempts = at least 3 attempts
v. One month may be considered reasonable time, as to the sheriff
b. Specific details in the return - sheriff must describe in the Return facts and
circumstances surrounding attempted personal service. Efforts must be clearly narrated in the details.
c. Person of suitable age and discretion - if substituted service to be made @ defendants
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein
i. Must know how to read and understand English to comprehend
summons, must have relation of confidence with defendant to ensure that
the latter would receive the summons
d. Competent person in charge - if substituted service to be made @ defendants place of
business, it should be left with said competent person in charge of the place
5. PS manner of substituted service was invalid and ineffective. Hence, Rs due process rights
were violated. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
6. Rs Rule 65 certiorari petition with the CA was proper. The RTC decision was void and did not
attain finality.
 DOLE v QUILALA
July 9, 2008| QUISUMBING, J.| Summons > Modes of service

PETITIONERS: DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (TROPIFRESH DIVISION)

RESPONDENTS: HON. REINATO G. QUILALA in his capacity as pairing judge of RTC-Makati City, and ALL
SEASON FARM, CORP.,

SUMMARY: All Season Filed a complaint against Dole with RTC Makati. Summons was served through a
legal assistant employed in Dole Pacific General Services which is another entity. Dole filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the court had not jurisdiction over the person of Dole because summons was served upon
a person not included in the enumeration in Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The SC
ruled against Dole since the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Dole after it had sought affirmative relief by filing an
Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time.

DOCTRINE:
Service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that
expressio unios est exclusio alterius

FACTS:

1. R All Season Farm Corporation (All Season) filed a complaint filed with the RTC Makati City, presided
over by Judge Quilala, for the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages against Dole Philippines,
Inc. (Dole) and its officers.
2. According to Dole, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal
assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.
3. May 20, 2003, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
a. the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons;
b. the complaint failed to state a cause of action;
c. All Season was not the real party in interest; and
d. the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their
official capacities as corporate officers of Dole.
4. February 6, 2004, the RTC denied MTD
5. Dole moved for partial reconsideration - Denied.
6. Petition for certiorari with the CA, contending that summon was not properly served affirmed order of
the RTC
a. Acc to the CA, Doles president had known of the service of the alias summons although he did not
personally receive and sign it.
b. It also held that in todays corporate setup, documents addressed to corporate officers are received in
their behalf by their staff
7. MR w/ CA - denied
8. Dole files petition for review assailing decision of the CA with the SC

ISSUES/HELD
Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the corporate defendant No but the RTC acquired jurisdiction after Dole filed Entry of Appearance
(#3 in Ratio)

RULE:
SEC. 11, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

RATIO:
1. Doles argument: the RTC, without proper service of summons, lacks jurisdiction over petitioner as
defendant
a. for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over a domestic corporation, summons must be served only
on the corporate officers enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
b. the alias summons was not validly served on it since the alias summons was served on Marifa Dela
Cruz, an employee of Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and distinct from
petitioner
c. even if she were an employee of the petitioner, she is not one of the officers enumerated under Section
11, Rule 14
2. R All Seasons argument: the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received
the alias summons through its president on April 23, 2003.
a. According to private respondent, there was full compliance with Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa Dela
Cruz received the summons upon instruction of Doles president as indicated in the Officers Return.
b. Dole had admitted that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time
filed on May 5, 2003.
3. SC:
a. Rules
i) Service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
ii) filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
b. On May 5, 2003, Dole filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time.
i) It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but
an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons
and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading
ii) Dole having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
iii) It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
 Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006)
VELAYO FONG V. VELAYO (2006) | AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. | SUMMONS

FACTS:
1. Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, Spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident
of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the
Philippines, Spouses Velayo-Fong prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fongs properties found in
the Philippines.
2. Spouses Velayo filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served to Velayo-Fong at
her Two Condominium Suites. One at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos
Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati. Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion.
3. Then, the Process Server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts to
serve the copy of summons and complaints issued at the given addresses of Velayo-Fong,
finally, the Process Server was able to serve personally the summons together with the copy of
the complaint upon Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel, right in
the presence of a lobby counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in receipt thereof.
4. Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-
Fong, upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming
that she was prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against
respondents complaint because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officers
Return, no summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to
refute respondents material allegations. The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs
order.
5. Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon
her as she did not remember having been served with summons but remembers that a man
hurled some papers at her while she was entering the elevator and, not knowing what the
papers were all about, she threw back the papers to the man before the elevator closed; that
she has a valid and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of respondents
complaint. She also argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial
service since she is a non-resident.

ISSUE: How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?

RULING:
Under Sec. 17, Rule 14, when the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons
may be served extraterritorially. This kind of service of summons applies only where the action is in rem
because in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite
to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done, however, if
the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
In the present case, Spouses Velayos cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages, plus
attorneys fees, be awarded in their favor affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an action in personam. As such, personal service
of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
 ANG PING v. CA
July 15, 1999 | Romero | Summons > Service of summons >> Return of service

PETITIONER: HARRY ANG PING

RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 149 and
UNIBANCARD CORPORATION

SUMMARY: Urbanicard filed a collection suit against Ang Ping for defaulting on his payments. The
summons addressed to Ang Ping was delivered by substituted service, with a certain Jonas signing as
the one who received the summons. Without him appearing in court the RTC ruled against Ang Ping.
The CA dismissed his petition to annul the RTC judgment. The SC granted Ang Pings petition saying
that judgment sought to be executed against Ang Ping was indeed rendered without jurisdiction as he
was not properly served with summons and neither did he voluntarily submit himself to the authority of
the trial court.

DOCTRINE:
Rule 14, Sec. 4. Return. When the service has been completed, the server shall, within five
(5) days therefrom, serve a copy of the return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel,
and shall return the summons to the clerk, who issued it, accompanied by proof of service.
Id; Sec. 18. Proof of service. The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by
the server and shall set forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which
have been served with the process and the name of the person who received the same; and shall be
sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy.
When substituted service is resorted to, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendants behalf is one with whom such defendant has a relation of
confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified of the summons issued in his
name.

FACTS:
1. Juan Tingson applied for and was issued a credit card by Unibancard, with Ang Ping as co-
obligor.
2. Tingson defaulted on his monthly charges and despite repeated demands, failed or refused to
settle his accounts with Unibancard.
3. Unibancard filed a collection suit with the RTC.
4. The summonses for both Tingson and Ang Ping were allegedly served on their respective
residences.
a. In both cases, the person who received the summons was a
certain Jonas Umali.
b. To emphasize, the summons addressed to petitioner Ang Ping
was delivered by substituted service, with a certain Jonas Umali signing as the one
who received the summons.
5. RTC: rendered judgment holding Tingson and Ang Ping jointly and severally liable.
6. A writ of execution was subsequently issued and the same was enforced on at Ang Pings
address where Ruth Ang Ping, Harrys sister, informed the sheriff that Harry was no longer residing at
the said address.
7. On motion of Unibancard
A. An alias writ of execution was issued and a notice of garnishment
was served on San Lorenzo Bus Service Co. covering shares believed to be
owned by Ang Ping.
 B. Another alias writ of execution was issued by virtue of which, the
sheriff levied on certain personal properties found inside Harrods Haberdashery at
SM Megamall, the Certificate of Business Name of which was issued to Ang Ping.
8. During the enforcement of the writ, Ang Ping tried to stop the sheriff from carrying away
personalty from the establishment and a scuffle between them ensued, with Ang Ping grabbing the
sheriff by the neck while pulling him to the door, causing injury to the sherrif.
9. Ang Ping filed with the CA a petition to annul the judgment of the RTC.
A. He alleged that the judgment in question was rendered without
due process of law as he was not given his day in court, since there was no valid
service of summons upon him and he never appeared before the court by himself
or by counsel.
B. Hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over his person, and
the judgment cannot be enforced against him.
10. CA: dismissed petition.
A. There was a valid service of summons on Ang Ping because the copy of the
summons addressed to him was signed by a certain Jonas Umali
B. Ang Ping filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, arguing:
C. The RTC never acquired jurisdiction over his person since he was never validly
served with summons and neither did he appear in court.
D. The substituted service of summons was irregular:
i. The same person, a certain Jonas Umali, received
the summonses for both Tingson and Ang Ping on the same date at different
addresses.
ii. The process server failed to file the proof of service
together with the return thus dispensing with the explanation as to why
substituted service was resorted to.

ISSUE/HELD:
W/N service of summons was validly served to Ang Ping.NO

RATIO:
1. Summons must be served upon the defendant himself.
a. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable
time that substituted service may be resorted to and such impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed.
2. The service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim
made against him.
3. The presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions finds no application
in this case.
a. There must be, at the very least, compliance with the procedure outlined in
Sections 4 and 18 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (see doctrine)
b. The process server did not file any proof of service in this case.
4. Since substituted service was resorted to, there should have been a report indicating
that the person who received the summons in Ang Pings behalf was one with whom
petitioner had a relation of confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be
notified of the summons issued in his name.
5. The judgment sought to be executed against Ang Ping was indeed rendered without
jurisdiction as he was not properly served with summons and neither did he voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the trial court.
6. Petition granted; Reviewed decision reversed.
 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001)
UCPB v ONGPIN
October 26, 2001 | J. Mendoza | Voluntary Appearance

Summary: PIA and Ongpin entered into a Credit Agreement where the latter entered as surety. PIA failed to
pay, so UCPB went after Ongpin, attaching on several of his assets. Since Ongpin was in HK, he filed special
appearances alleging lack of jurisdiction over his person. UCPB attempted to personally serve with the
Executive Secretary of the President of PILTEL, where Ongpin was the Board Chairman. The SC held that the
continuous special appearances made by Ongpin did not amount to voluntary appearance, and that the
substituted service of summons was invalid, as it did not conform to the rules set by the Rules of CivPro and by
jurisprudence.
Doctrine:
1. Special appearance based on invalidity of summons cannot be considered to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. Although he filed numerous pleadings, such were filed for the purpose of
assailing the jurisdiction of the Court over his person on the ground of the absence of a valid
service of summons.
3. Rule 14, Sec 7 (1997 Rules on Civil Procedure): if for justifiable cause, personal
service of summons cannot be done, it may be effected by: (a) leaving vopies at the residence
with a person of suitable age and discretion, (b) or at the office or place of business with a
competent person-in-charge.
4. Office in this context refers to the office or place of business at the time of
service.
5. UCPB is not without remedy as they are given the option to cause the publication
of the summons. It would appear that it attempted to do so, but for unknown reasons,
abandoned the effort and resorted to attempts of personal service.

FACTS:
1. Nov. 17, 1994: Phil. Apparel Inc. entered into a Credit Agreement with UCPB for $500k. Roberto
Ongpin, controlling stockholder, signed as surety.
2. PAI failed to pay obligation, so UCPB filed complaint with RTC Makati to enforce obligation, seeking
Preliminary injunction, alleging therein that Ongpin ran to his residence in HK, among others. Such was
granted.
3. Nov. 16, 1995: writ of attachment (WoA) and notice of garnishment (NoG) was issue against 8,315,600
shares of stock owned by Ongpin in Dominion Asian Equities.
4. Nov. 21: Ongpin, through special appearances, filed Motion to Dismiss and quashal of WoA and NoG,
alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over his person and that he was not served summons. Such was
denied, including his MR.
5. Mar. 24, 1996: Filed Petition for Certiorari (Pfc) with CA. During th pendency of the case, UCPB filed a
Motion for Leave to Serve Summons through Publication (MtoSSP). Granted, but held publication in abeyance.
Meanwhile, UCPB entered into an agreement with TODAY to publish such summons, without knowing of the
aforementioned order of abeyance. UCPB failed to prevent the publication, and such was published once.
6. CA: validated WoA, but prohibited the implementation until courts acquired jurisdiction over Ongpin.
UCPBs MR was denied, so they filed PfC with SC. Pending such, they filed another MtoSSP with the trial
court. The PfC was dismissed for lack of procedural requirements.
7. Nov. 27, 1997: Sheriff 1 and rep of UCPB went to PILTEL office at Ayala to serve summons on Ongpin,
Chairman of PILTELs Board, who was expected to attend a board meeting. Morallo, after contacting Ongpins
office in BA Lepanto, told them that he would not be attending. When they went to Lepanto, they were told by
the security guard that he hekd office on the 14th floor, but upon inquiry on said floor, no one knew of him.
8. On the same day, Sheriff 2 went to PILTEL, and was informed by Morallo that she was authorized to
receive court processes for/on behalf of Ongpin, contending that she was advised by PILTELs Chief Legal
Counsel. When Morallo tried forwarding the summons to Ongpins counsel, the same refused to receive it.
9. Sheriff 2 implemented the WoA and the NoG on several assets of Ongpin.
10. Ongpin, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to: (a) dismiss, (b) prohibit implementation of
WoA, (c) quash NoG, (d) release property attached. Such was denied.
11. Ongpin then filed PfC with TRO and PI with the CA. CA reversed, contending that PILTEL was not the
place of business of Ongpin, and that Morallo was not a person-in-charge.

Issues:
WON Ongpins continuous special appearances before the Court for 5 years may be deemed voluntary
appearance? NO
WON substituted service of summons to Morallo was valid? NO

Held: No merit.
1. Special appearance based on invalidity of summons cannot be considered to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the Court
a. Although he filed numerous pleadings, such were filed for the purpose of assailing
the jurisdiction of the Court over his person on the ground of the absence of a valid
service of summons.
b. It is ABSURD that he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of th Court, conisdering the
foregoing.
c. UCPB: (Macapagal v CA) feigned unawareness of a defendant is equivalent to
voluntary appearance. The facts, however, are not on all fours with the case at bar.
In such a case, the fact that the summons was widely published and that counsel
had been given authority to receive summons was considered by the Court.
d. In this case, however, summons were served on the Executive Secretary of the
President of PILTEL, Morallo, such company not being a party to the suit. Further,
Ongpin entered special appearances to question the Courts jurisdiction over his
person due to the failure to serve summons.

2. CA did not err in ruling that the substituted service of summons was invalid.
a. Rule 14, Sec 7 (1997 Rules on Civil Procedure): if for justifiable cause, personal service
of summons cannot be done, it may be effected by: (a) leaving vopies at the residence
with a person of suitable age and discretion, (b) or at the office or place of business with
a competent person-in-charge.
b. Office in this context refers to the office or place of business at the time of service.
c. (Mapa v. CA) office is not at all times the same as that contemplated, as it refers to the
actual place of business (ex. Summons served at office building where defendant was
Board Chairman is invalid if the defendant actually holds office in his residence).
d. In this case, PILTEL was not even a party to the suit. Ongpin was sued in his personal
capacity and Morallo was not really authorized to receive summons in his behalf.
3. It is not clear that Ongpin could be personally served summons as he has taken up residence in
HK.
a. According to the Rules, if the defendant is a non-resident and his property in the PH is
attached, service may, by leave of Court, be effected outside of PH or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. If the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown, same,
but plaintiff must show that the address is not known and cannot be ascertained even
with the exercise of due diligence.
b. If he is a resident, and his correct address cannot be determined, he needs to show that
address is not known, along with the publication.
c. UCPB is not without remedy as they are given the option to cause the publication of the
summons. It would appear that it attempted to do so, but for unknown reasons,
abandoned the effort and resorted to attempts of personal service. CA Ruling Affirmed.
 OROSA v CA
September 3, 1996 | J. Bellosillo | Voluntary Appearance

PETITIONER: RAMON OROSA, JOSE OROSA, LIZA TRINIDAD, MYRNA DESTURA,

ALFREDO MENDOZA
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, BERTRAN PRESS, ANTONIO BERTOSO

SUMMARY: Respondents filed complaint against petitioners. Pursuant to such, summons were served to their
employees. Petitioners contend that they were not validly served summons since no earnest effort was made
to serve such summons to them personally, hence, the court had no jurisdiction over their persons. SC
disagreed and upheld the jurisdiction of the lower court due to the fact that they filed a motion for additional
time to file their answer, which was indicative of their voluntary submission to the Courts jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: The sheriff's return dated 8 February 1993 is bereft of any particulars on the impossibility of
personal service on petitioners within a reasonable time. However, they are deemed to have waived any flaw in
the court's jurisdiction arising from a defective service of summons. For, instead of entering a special
appearance questioning the propriety of the service of summons, hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court over petitioners, they filed a motion for additional time to file answer on 24 February 1993, which was
beyond the reglementary period. In effect, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Consequently, whatever defect there was in the mode of service of summons was deemed waived and the
court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary submission thereto.

FACTS:
1. Respondents filed complaint for a sum of money before RTC Manila. RTC issued summons to be
served upon petitioners.
2. Per sheriffs return on 8 Feb 1993, summons were served on 6 Feb upon Orosas. Trinidad, and
Destura through Secretary, Viernes; upon Mendoza through his employee, Besana.
3. 24 Feb 1993: Petitioners filed a Motion for Additional Time to Answer. However, upon Urgent Ex-parte
Motion, the RTC issued its Order (8 Mar 1993), declaring petitioners in default for failing to answer within
reglementary period.
4. 30 Mar 1993: Petitioners then filed MR, attaching therewith their answer. RTC denied MR and
expunged answer from records (22 Mar 1994)
5. 19 Apr 1994: Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. CA dismissed petition
and denied issuance of writ of Preliminary Injunction. MR was also denied.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion, affirming the lower courts misinterpretation (of the issues
in our nation, misunderstanding our vocation loljk) of Sec. 7 and 8 of Rule 14, and declaring them in default?

RATIO:
1. Petitioners:
a. No valid service of summons, as there is no showing that earnest effort was exerted to serve summons
personally, hence, the Court had no jurisdiction over their persons.
b. Summons were served on them only on 9 Feb 1993, so their Motion for Additional Time to Answer was
still within the 15-day period.
2. Sec. 7 deals with the personal service of summons, while Sec. 8 lays down the rules in Substituted
Service of summons.
3. [on (a)] The sheriff's return dated 8 February 1993 is bereft of any particulars on the impossibility of
personal service on petitioners within a reasonable time. However, they are deemed to have waived any flaw in
the court's jurisdiction arising from a defective service of summons. For, instead of entering a special
appearance questioning the propriety of the service of summons, hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court over petitioners, they filed a motion for additional time to file answer on 24 February 1993, which was
beyond the reglementary period. In effect, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Consequently, whatever defect there was in the mode of service of summons was deemed waived and the
court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary submission thereto.
4. [on (b)] As between the sheriff's return which clearly indicates that the summons was served on 6
February 1993and petitioners' allegation that they actually received the summons only on 9 February 1993,
because it was only then that it was delivered to them by their employees, the sheriff's return has more
probative value. The certificate of service of summons by the sheriff is prima facie evidence of the facts set out
in such certificate. To overcome the presumption arising from the sheriff's return, the evidence must be clear
and convincing. Petitioners, however, failed to overcome the presumption. Hence, motion was filed beyond
period.
 LHUILLIER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS
March 15, 2010 | J. Del Castillo | Special Appearance

PETITIONERS: EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER

RESPONDENTS: BRITISH AIRWAYS

SUMMARY: P filed damages complaint vs. R before RTC Makati. R by way of special appearance through
counsel filed MTD alleging lack of jurisdiction over both the case (that pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,
only courts of London or Rome have jurisdiction over the complaint) and the person of the respondent
(particularly because of defective service of summons). RTC granted MTD and denied Ps MR. SC affirmed the
RTC, that R did not voluntarily submit itself to the courts jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What
the rule on voluntary appearance - the first sentence of the above-quoted rule - means is that the voluntary
appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

FACTS:

1. On April 28, 2005, P filed a Complaint for damages against R before RTC of Makati City. She alleged
that (1) while on board Rs flight, she allegedly requested a flight attendant to assist her but instead she
allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300
passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!" (2) when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy,
another flight attendant singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture
on plane safety. (3) upon arrival in Rome, Rs ground manager did not offer an apology once P asked for it.
2. On May 16, 2005, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on R through Violeta
Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
3. On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, MTD on grounds of (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent, alleging that pursuant to Warsaw
Convention, only the courts of London, United Kingdom (where R is domiciled) or Rome, Italy (where ticket
was bought and destination), have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services,
Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.
4. Instead of filing a Comment/Opposition, P filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Formal Amendment
to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias Summons: that upon verification with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, she found out that the resident agent of respondent in the Philippines is Alonzo Q. Ancheta.
5. Makati RTC granted the MTD and denied Ps MR. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure
questions of law. P argues that R has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when the
latter stated in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that R is the one making a special
appearance.
6. R, meanwhile, cites La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals: Even if a party challenges the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also
invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to
have waived his objection to the jurisdiction over his person.

ISSUES/HELD
Is R, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, deemed to have
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court? NO
RATIO:
Special appearance to question Court's jurisdiction over his person, even if he invokes other grounds
for dismissal, is not voluntary appearance.
1. Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides: The inclusion, in a motion to
dismiss, of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.
2. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What
the rule on voluntary appearance - the first sentence of the above-quoted rule - means is that the voluntary
appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
3. La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current
view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court--challenging its jurisdiction over the person
through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds--is not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
(The Court also ruled on the applicability of the Warsaw convention.)
1. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, we held that: The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
2. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred,
was an international carriage between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the
Warsaw Convention.
3. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: (1)
the court where the carrier is domiciled; (2) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; (3)
the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or (4) the court of the
place of destination. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case
before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. Under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the
option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Under the fourth, petitioner may bring her action
before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have
jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
4. Also, it is settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the
course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.