TANADA v TUVERA146 SCRA 446FACTS:

The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders being enacted to be published first in
the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law can be made valid
inaccordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for
its effectivity.

HELD:
For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees
beingenacted by their government, sufficient appropriation of time and publication is necessary.
According toArticle 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be given 15 days upon its publication in
the Official Gazette for itto be enacted. This is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of
such laws as well as to respecttheir right to be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact
that the Official Gazette maynot be the most effective medium for the people to be educated of
certain new laws given its erraticpublication dates as well as its limited number of readers, with
lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of general circulation because of
its wide readership and regular datesof printing. The court nevertheless rules that such
periodicals are not what is required by the Civil Codeand such amendments are left to the
legislative branch of the government. Having said this, the courtfinds in favor of publishing all
laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,executive orders, and
administrative orders with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take intoeffect

Wassmer vs Velez12 SCRA 648

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on
August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. As
expected, all the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event.
However, two days before the wedding, Francisco Velez left a note for Beatriz
informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed
the union. The following day, he sent her another note stating that the wedding will
push through as planned. Francisco Velez never showed up and has not been heard
since then. Beatriz subsequently filed suit for damages.

ISSUE: WON Beatriz Wassmer has a right to file for damages for breach of promise
to marry?

HELD: Yes. Beatriz Wassmer can claim for damages. Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code,
Beatriz can claim damages for the actions of Francisco Velez. While it is true that
 breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, the court reasoned that what
Velez committed could hardly be described as a simple breach of promise to marry.
To leave the bride two days before the wedding, after making all the necessary
preparations, with no justifiable reason, is morally reprehensible. His behavior is
verily against societys concept of good morals and customs. Beatriz Wassmer can
collect compensation for damages arising from Velez reckless, oppressive and
malevolent actions.

Labo vs Comelec GR 86564

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of
votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a
petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his
Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.

From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified
from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2 nd highest number of votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor.

Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

Note:
1. Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.
2. Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.
3. A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached together with the COC.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

Facts: March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos
did not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the

COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate
was the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. April 24, 1995 COMELEC
Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejos
petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy
void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation
to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the
proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the
winner of the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to
be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.

Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of
the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her
Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the
residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections.
This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the
First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after
marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual
residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change
residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When she got
married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in
Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to
wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or
intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her
choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG
chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article
78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting
jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.

Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground
of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any
event, Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident
that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction
over the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections. No. The
HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring): All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she
married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the
right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since
1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring): Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos

has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both
places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Romero, J. (Separate): Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands
death is evident in this case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal
residency requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate): It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been
declared disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less
than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for
dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring): The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which
they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be
questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto
or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the
HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting): Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The

controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law
is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be
counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting): A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets
married. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift
to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting): A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government

branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs
resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers.
In agreement with Regalado, re: woman s domicile.
De Leon v Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987.)

The 1987 Constitution took effect on 2 February 1987.

F: The case arose due to Art. III, Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 3, which provided that:
"All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order
or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from 25 February 1986."

De Leon was a barrio captain in Taytay, Rizal. On 9 February 1987, he was replaced
by the MLG (DLG). So the question arose as to when the 1987 Constitution took
effect. If it took effect on 2 February, the replacement was no longer valid, since
Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. But if it took effect on 11 February
(the date of proclamation), the replacement would have been valid.

The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to make it effective on the date of its ratification.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 27 clearly provided that "this Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite."
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987, superseding the
Provisional Constitution. Consequently, after that date, respondent OIC Governor
could not designate respondents to the elective positions occupied
by petitioners. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure.

The dissenting opinion pointed out that by contemporaneous construction, the 1973
Constitution had a similar provision as the present one in issue (Art. XVII, Sec. 16,
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite), and yet it took effect on the day of the proclamation.
The 1981 and 1984 amendments contained similar provisions (valid when
approved), and yet the
practice has always been to make the date of proclamation, the date of effectivity.

Furthermore, if the effectivity was 2 February, then

the appointments made by the President to CA posts
after that date would be invalid for they were not submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council. On this point, however, Teehankee noted that the President issued the
appointments in the end of January.

A concurring opinion noted the debate between Davide (date of proclamation) and
Bernas (date of
ratification), and Davide's comment that he was giving up due to tyranny of number
s.
VV: The SC was correct for that was the clear intent of the framers. The ones to be
blamed are the framers themselves. Effectivity should really be
the date of proclamation.

One, how can one can be expected to comply with the provisions of the Constitution
when, prior to its proclamation, there is no way to determine if it has been ratified
or not? Should the Director of Prison continue the scheduled electrocution of a
death row convict on 3 February in view of the abolition of capital punishment in the
1987 Constitution; if he does, he would technically be violating the constitution
under the above holding. If he does not, he would be in dereliction
of duty, in case the constitution is not ratified.

Two, no analogy can be made between the election to office of a public officer who
is deemed elected on the day of election), and the effectivity of the constitution,
because a public officer, though deemed elected,
does not assume office on the day of his election, not even on
the day of his proclamation.