Professional Documents
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LITERAL INTERPRETATION
1. Verba Legis
a. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
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NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc,
respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to run for and hold public office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during
the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the
position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of
the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of
the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by
Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so
patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of
the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted
to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
FALLO:
Petition is dismissed
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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/170589.htm
On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy
of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon
City.
The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties
failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered
the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds
that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before
the trial court. The trial courts decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact,
reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of
the envelope containing respondents Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondents return
address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.
HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper
substituted service of summons upon the respondent.
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although
unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place
of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first
sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover,
respondents claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993 without informing his
family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even more
implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial courts decision on September
20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of
Appeal indicated the same address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate
courts order for a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is
unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted by the same lawyer, none of
them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.
Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his
original home, if he actually did leave his home.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, the
respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the
charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused to disclose his true address because
of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/161952.htm
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The newguidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-
list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it
is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the
case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then
with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall benot more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
Hence,
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that
only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to
also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled toadditional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given
their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%
each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly,
in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining
seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling
up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of
the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is
that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate
the party-list system.
3. Literal import must yield to intent
a. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, G.R. No. L-26406,
October 31, 1969
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Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating
that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.
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c. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, G.R. No. 174168, March 30,
2009
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d. CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971
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FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of
a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that
the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not
yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is
to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
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FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was
made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government
Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint
Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June
8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On
the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same
position.
On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent
Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.
ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is
entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated
by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the
mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.
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FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and
serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar
checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from
prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ
of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign
lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign
currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD
Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
___________
NOTES:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On
February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the
following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking
Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door
Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
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FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking
institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent
(APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP).1wphi1.nt
On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory
employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor
organization duly-registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more
supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was
no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5) no
certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the petition.
On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification
election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the unions petition. It sought to prevent
the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or
highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon
the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioners
appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the unions registration.
RULING:
(1) Petitioners explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information
specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field
of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to
be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in
union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of
rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties
they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed,
however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations
information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting,
or joining a union.
(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of
Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor
Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labororganization.16 Nothing is said therein that
prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the
issue of the validity of the unions registration. On this score, petitioners appeal was correctly
dismissed.
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Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid
exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business
of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to
supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board
of Examiners in Optometry.
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FACTS:
TMPCs application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is exclusive. In
its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPCs application for a
CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and
financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO. The constitution provides in Section 11, Article XII that: No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines,
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. The
Constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in
character.T his constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other
hand, PD No.198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that
are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other
person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents
thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to
the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.
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