Case Doctrines on Transportation Law
prejudice or discrimination. Common carriers in this
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that
private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a
requisite for the incurring of liability. That liability arises
the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier,
without regard to whether or not such carrier has also
complied with the requirements of the applicable
regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has
been granted a certificate of public convenience or other
franchise. To exempt private respondent from the
liabilities of a common carrier because he has not
secured the necessary certificate of public convenience,
would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be
to reward private respondent precisely for failing to
comply with applicable statutory requirements.
Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA
It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the
ordinary course of business, operates as a common
carrier, transporting goods indiscriminately for all
persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun
Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were
under the employ of the shipowner and therefore
continued to be under its direct supervision and control.
Hardly then can the charterer be charged, a stranger to
the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his
cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the
means in doing so. This is evident in the present case
considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of
the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage
and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were
all consigned to the officers and crew who were
screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. It is
therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as
such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion
of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter
is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter
or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes
both the vessel and its crew, that a common carrier
becomes private, at least insofar as the particular
voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains possession and control of the ship, although her
holds may, for the moment, be the property of the
charterer.
Fisher vs. Yangco
In construing Act 98 for the alleged violation, the
test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives
without qualification or conditions may have the effect of
subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such
explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary
jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular
class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient
reason the discrimination for such is reasonable and
necessary. YSC has not met those conditions.
The nature of the business of a common carrier
as a public employment is such that it is within the power
of the State to impose such just regulations in the
interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper.
US vs. Quinahon
There is no pretense that it actually cost more to
handle the rice for the province than it did for the
merchants with whom the special contracts were made.
There was a clear discrimination against the province
which is prohibited by the law. It is however not believed
that the law prohibits common carriers from making
special rates for the handling and transporting of
merchandise, when the same are made for the purpose
of increasing their business and to manage their
important interests upon the same principles which are
regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and
pursuits. Absolute equality is not required in all cases. It
is only unjust, undue and unreasonable discrimination
which the law forbids. The law of equality is in force only
where the services performed in the different cases are
substantially the same and the circumstances and
conditions are similar.
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. CA
Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private
carrier because it was not issued a CPC; it did not have
a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and there
was only one shipper, one consignee for a special
cargo.
The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier.
It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC, and
this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage
of the goods in question was periodic, occasional,
episodic or unscheduled.
First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. CA
Based on Article 1732 NCC, there is no doubt
that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to
all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The
fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. (De
Guzman Ruling upheld)
Respondents argument that the term common
carrier as used in Section 133(j) of the Local
Government Code refers only to common carriers
transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water is
erroneous. The definition of common carriers in NCC
makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as
long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that
the transporting of the passengers or goods should be
by motor vehicle.
Home Insurance Company vs. American Steamship
Agencies, Inc.

The NCC provisions on common carriers should
not apply where the common carrier is not acting as
such but as a private carrier. Under American
Jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a
special cargo or chartered to a special person only
becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is valid.
The stipulation in the charter party absolving the
owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its
agent would be void only if strict public policy governing
common carrier is applied. Such policy has no force
where the public at large is not involved, as in the case
of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party.
The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for
negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is
deemed valid. Recovery cant be had, for loss or
damage to the cargo against shipowners, unless the
same is due to personal acts or negligence of said
owner or its managers, as distinguished from agents or
employees.
San Pablo vs. PANTRANCO
Considering the environmental circumstances of
the case, the conveyance of passengers, trucks and
cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat
service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service.
Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog
and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway.
While a ferry boat service has been considered as a
continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or even
lakes, which are small body of waters - separating the
land, however, when as in this case the two terminals,
Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can
not be considered as a continuation of the highway.
Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate
CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise
shipping service in accordance with the provisions of
law. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely
amended to include this water service under the guise
that it is a mere private ferry service.
The contention of private respondent
PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a
private carrier, not as a common carrier for its exclusive
use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo
trucks is absurd. PANTRANCO does not deny that it
charges its passengers separately from the charges for
the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they
board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to
Allen, PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing
tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and
not as a common carrier. The Court does not see any
reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a
private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in
passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea
between Matnog and Allen. Indeed evidence to this
effect has been submitted.
National Steel Corporation vs. CA
In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did
not offer its services to the general public. It carried
passengers or goods only for those it chose under a
special contract of charter party. It is a private carrier that
renders tramping service and as such, does not
transport cargo or shipment for the general public. Its
services are available only to specific persons who enter
into a special contract of charter party with its owner.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and
NSC, including their respective liability for damage to the
cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their
contracts of private carriage or charter party.
Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier,
private carriage does not involve the general public.
Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial
goods as a private carrier.
KMU vs. Garcia
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is
determined by public need. The presumption of public
need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no
need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity
generally means something fitting or suited to the public
need. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a
CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the
proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of
the public and supply a need which the existing facilities
do not adequately supply. The existence or non-
existence of public convenience and necessity is
therefore a question of fact that must be established by
evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data;
statistics and such other means necessary, in a public
hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and
purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to
look out for, and protect, the interests of both the public
and the existing transport operators.
Tatad vs. Garcia
In law, there is a clear distinction between the
"operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the
facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The
right to operate a public utility may exist independently
and separately from the ownership of the facilities
thereof. One can own said facilities without operating
them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a
public utility without owning the facilities used to serve
the public. The devotion of property to serve the public
may be done by the owner or by the person in control
thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
Samar Mining Company, Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd
The validity of stipulations in bills of lading
exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to
the goods when the same are not in its actual custody
has been upheld. There is no doubt that Art. 1738 finds
no applicability to the instant case. The said article
contemplates a situation where the goods had already
reached their place of destination and are stored in the
warehouse of the carrier. The subject goods were still
awaiting transshipment to their port of destination, and
were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last
seen and/or heard of.
Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit.
Under said article, the carrier may be relieved of the
responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon
actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier
to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined
as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and
the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the
buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive
the goods as his representative for the purpose of
custody or disposal. By the same token, there is actual
delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when
possession has been turned over to the consignee or to
his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given
him to remove the goods. The court a quo found that
there was actual delivery to the consignee through its
duly authorized agent, the carrier.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the
cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the
Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed
primarily by the Civil Code. However, in all matters not
regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the
provisions of the Civil Code.
(2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over goods, according to all the circumstances
of each case. Common carriers are responsible for the
loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other
natural disaster or calamity;
Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the
vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase
"natural disaster or calamity. However, the Court said
that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or
calamity. This must be so as it arises almost invariably
from some act of man or by human means. It does not
fall within the category of an act of God unless caused
by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. It
may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the
carrier.
As the peril of the fire is not comprehended
within the exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735
of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those
mention in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law.
And even if fire were to be considered a "natural
disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code
that the "natural disaster" must have been the
"proximate and only cause of the loss," and that the
carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence
of the disaster. This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to
establish satisfactorily.
National Development Company vs. CA
Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of
Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the
shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for
damages arising from collision due to the fault or
negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed
on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the
universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or
captain is merely the representative of the owner
who has the actual or constructive control over the
conduct of the voyage.
The agreement between NDC and MCP shows
that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough to
include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact
MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of
the vessel, including the power to contract in the name
of the NDC. Both owner and agent should be declared
jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is
the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act
and did not arise from contract.
Gelisan vs. Alday
The court has held in several decisions that the
registered owner of a public service is responsible for
damages that may arise from consequences incident to
its operation or that may be caused to any of the
passengers therein. The claim of the petitioners that he
is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by
and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from
liability to 3rd persons, cannot be sustained because it
appears that the lease contract had not been approved
by the Public Service Commission. It is a settled rule in
our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a
Franchise is transferred or lease to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not
binding upon the public and 3rd persons. However,
Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to
be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may be
required to pay. This is due to the fact that the lease
contract in question, although not effective against the
public is valid and binding between the contracting
parties.
Benedicto vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The prevailing doctrine in common carriers
make the owner liable for consequences having from the
operations of the carrier even though the specific vehicle
involved may have been transferred to another person.
This doctrine rests upon the principle in dealing with
vehicles registered under Public Service Law, the public
has the right to assume that the registered owner is the
actual or lawful owner thereof. It would be very difficult
and often impossible as a practical matter, for members
of the general public to enforce the rights of action that
they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being
negligently operated if they should be required to prove
who the actual owner is. The registered owner is not
allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the
alleged transferee. Thus, contrary to petitioners claim,
private respondents are not required to go beyond the
vehicles certificate of registration to ascertain the owner
of the carrier.
PHILTRANCO Service Enterprise, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals
We have consistently held that the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like
petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the
tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and
several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article
2194 expressly provides:
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer's liability is primary, direct
and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid
from its employee who committed the fault or negligence
which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict.
Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the
claim.
Santos vs. Sibug
Although SANTOS, as the kabit was the true
owner as against VIDAD, the latter, as the registered
owner/operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly
and primarily responsible and liable for the damages
caused to SIBUG, the injured party, as a consequence of
the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. This
ruling is based on the principle that the operator of
record is considered the operator of the vehicle in
contemplation of law as regards the public and third
persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had
been sold to another where such sale had not been
approved by the then Public Service Commission.
Lita Enterprises Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated
under an arrangement, comonly known as the "kabit
system", whereby a person who has been granted a
certificate of convenience allows another person who
owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise
for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special
privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this
privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be
countenanced. Although not outrightly penalized as a
criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and,
therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will
not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will
leave them both where it finds them.
Teja Marketing vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The ruling in Lita Enterprises Inc. vs. IAC is upheld. The
defect of in existence of a contract is permanent and
cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. The
mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that
are null and void.
Magboo vs. Bernardo
The features which characterize the boundary system
are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between
the parties from that of employer and employee. The
owner continued to be the operator of the vehicle in legal
contemplation and as such, he is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation. To exempt from
liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it
under the boundary system on the ground that he is a
mere lessor would be not only to abet flagrant violations
of the Public Service Law but also to place the riding
public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers.
Ganzon vs. CA
Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of
the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art. 1734.
The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid
authority for petitioner to carry out. In any case, the
intervention of the municipal officials was not of a
character that would render impossible the fulfillment by
the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duly
bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the
scrap of iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient
proof that the issuance of the same order was attended
with such force or intimidation as to completely
overpower the will of the petitioners employees.
By the delivery made during Dec. 1, 1956, the
scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession
and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt
by the carrier of transportation, the contract of carriage
was deemed perfected. Consequently, Ganzons
extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods commenced. According to Art
1738, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only
upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or
persons with right to receive them. The fact that part of
the shipment had not been loaded on board did not
impair the contract of transportation as the goods
remained in the custody & control of the carrier.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals
The heavy seas and rains referred to in the
masters report were not caso fortuito but normal
occurrences that an ocean-going vessel, particularly in
the month of September which, in our area, is a month of
rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of
routine. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable.
These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would
encounter and provide for, in the ordinary course of a
voyage. That rain water (not sea water) found its way
into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication
that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the
ship's hatches so that rain water would not find its way
into the cargo holds of the ship.
Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso
fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on
the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary
diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in
order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the
goods that it had admittedly carried in this case. No such
evidence exists of record. Thus, the carrier cannot
escape liability.
Sarkies Tours Phils vs. Court of Appeals
Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them, and this
liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier
for transportation until the same are delivered, actually
or constructively, by the carrier to the person who has a
right to receive them, unless the loss is due to any of the
excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof.
Where the common carrier accepted its
passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it
placed in the vehicle by its own employee, its failure to
collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own
lookout. It is responsible for the consequent loss of the
baggage. In the instant case, defendant appellant's
employee even helped Fatima Minerva Fortades and her
brother load the luggages/baggages in the bus' baggage
compartment, without asking that they be weighed,
declared, receipted or paid for. Neither was this required
of the other passengers.
Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs.
Court of Appeals
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may
validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests
solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from
liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even
by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article
1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid
because it is freely entered into by the parties and the
same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of
private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We
stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties
may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which
perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract
involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied
to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private
carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein
is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that
lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts
involving common carriers.
Yobido vs. Court of Appeals
The explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous
event. There are human factors involved in the situation.
The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was
entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was
properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact
that the tire bought and used is of a brand name noted
for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not
explode within five days use. It is settled that an
accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito.
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure. A common carrier must
still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death
or injury resulting from the accident. Thus, having failed
to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear
and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held
liable for damages.
Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of
North America
The receipt of goods by the carrier has been
said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and
deliver, and if actually no goods are received there can
be no such contract. The liability and responsibility of the
carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods
commence on their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the
carrier or an authorized agent and delivery to a lighter in
charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it is
the custom to deliver in that way, is a good delivery and
binds the vessel receiving the freight, the liability
commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter and,
similarly, where there is a contract to carry goods from
one port to another, and they cannot be loaded directly
on the vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring
the goods to it, the lighters are for the time its
substitutes, so that the bill of landing is applicable to the
goods as soon as they are placed on the lighters.
Whenever the control and possession of goods
passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by
the shipper, then it can be said with certainty that the
relation of shipper and carrier has been established. A
bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a
contract of carriage. The bill of lading is juridically a
documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions
agreed upon by both parties. The liability of the carrier
as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the
goods for transportation, and not merely with the formal
execution of a receipt or bill of lading; the issuance of a
bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and
acceptance. Even where it is provided by statute that
liability commences with the issuance of the bill of
lading, actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to
bind the carrier.
Lu Do vs. Binamira
While delivery of the cargo to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them,
contemplated in Article 1736, because in such case the
goods are still in the hands of the Government and the
owner cannot exercise dominion over them, we believe
however that the parties may agree to limit the liability of
the carrier considering that the goods have still to
through the inspection of the customs authorities before
they are actually turned over to the consignee. This is a
situation where we may say that the carrier losses
control of the goods because of a custom regulation and
it is unfair that it be made responsible for what may
happen during the interregnum.
American President Lines, Ltd. vs. Klepper
With regard to the contention of the carrier that
COGSA should control in this case, the same is of as
moment. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that
the laws of the country to which the goods are
transported shall govern the liability of the common
carrier in case of loss, destruction and deterioration.
This means that the law of the Philippines on the New
Civil Code. Under 1766 of NCC, in all matter not
regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by Special Laws. Art. 1736-1738, NCC
governs said rights and obligations. Therefore, although
Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be
liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless
the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper
and asserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely
supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Servando vs. Phil. Steam
The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in
question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is
not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since
the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or
constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the
loss is chargeable against the appellant.
It should be pointed out, however, that in the
bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the
parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for
the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment
therein the following stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such
loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall
carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by
force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other
waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
We sustain the validity of the above stipulation;
there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or
public policy.
Appellees would contend that the above
stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in
fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that
they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the
pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, where the same issue was resolved in this
wise:
While it may be true that petitioner had not
signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the
provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to
be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what
is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it
has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the
other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent."
Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Except as may be prohibited by law, there is
nothing to prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the
execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual
possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be
transported. There is no law which requires that the
delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the
covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or,
for that matter, that the former should precede the latter.
While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an
airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of
goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill," a
further reading and a more faithful quotation of the
authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may
contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus
become something more than a contract between the
shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as between the
shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been
delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the
carrier from showing the true facts . . . Between the
consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill
of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable
presumption that such goods were delivered for
shipment. As between the consignor and a receiving
carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the
acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a
presumption that all terms therein were brought to the
knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in
the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from
thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This
rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts
a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents, and
acceptance under such circumstances makes it a
binding contract. In order that any presumption of assent
to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a
carrier may arise, it must appear that the clause
containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a
part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A
stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of
lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite
as effective as if printed on its face, if it is shown that the
consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper
accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to
be found on the back, such receipt comes within the
general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted
and to be bound by the conditions there to be found.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil
Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common
carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to
the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and
effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises
the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only
after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance,
of the goods by the consignee or such other person
entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the
carrier when the goods are ready for and have been
placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control
of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where
such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier,
the liability of the common carrier commences. Only
when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally
established can the liability for loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier,
absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach
and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article
1735 be invoked.
Macam vs. CA
The extraordinary responsibility of the common
carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the
cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a
right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in
the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the
notify party. However, in the export invoices GPC was
clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred
to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent
WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This
premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the
cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably
with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to
receive them was proper.
The real issue is whether respondents are liable
to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the
bills of lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of
petitioner, we gather that he has been transacting with
GPC as buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3)
years already. When mangoes and watermelons are in
season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities of
respondents is twice or thrice a week. The goods are
released to GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to
request the shipping lines to immediately release
perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh
mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his
"people." In transactions covered by a letter of credit,
bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping
lines prior to releasing the goods. But for buyers using
telegraphic transfers, petitioner dispenses with the bank
guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. In
his several years of business relationship with GPC and
respondents, there was not a single instance when the
bill of lading was first presented before the release of the
cargoes.
Maersk Line vs. CA
While it is true that common carriers are not
obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise,
and persons are not vested with the right to prompt
delivery, unless such common carriers previously
assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time,
delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made
within a reasonable time.
While there was no special contract entered into
by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject
shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware
of the specific date when the goods were expected to
arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this
regard, there arises no need to execute another contract
for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. In the
case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery of the
goods spanning a period of two months and seven days
falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness.
Ysmael vs. Barretto
Limiting the common carriers liability for loss or
damage from any cause or for any reason for less than
1/8 the actual value of the goods is unconscionable and
therefore against public policy. A common carrier cannot
lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such
exemption is just and reasonable and the contract is
freely and fairly made.
Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines
It can not be said that a contract has been
entered into between a passenger and the common
carrier, embodying the conditions as printed at the back
of the ticket. The fact that those conditions are printed at
the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are
hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the
passenger was aware of those conditions such that he
had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. The
passenger is considered not having agreed to the
stipulation on the ticket, as manifested by the fact that he
did not sign the ticket.
Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals
While it may be true that the passenger had not
signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the
provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to
be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what
is known as a contract of "adhesion", in regards which it
has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the
other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent. A contract limiting liability
upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the
policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against
his own negligence.
Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. IAC
Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of
or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of
carriage so governed by the laws of the country of
destination and the goods in question were shipped from
the United States to the Philippines, the liability of
common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily
by the Civil Code. Applying the Civil Code provisions
(Article 1749 and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading
limiting the liability of the common carrier for loss or
damages to the shipment covered by said rule unless
the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays
additional charges is valid and binding on the consignee.
Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. CA
Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the
liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing
in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares
a greater value, is binding. Furthermore, a contract fixing
the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper
for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is
valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed
upon.
In this case, the award based on the alleged
market value of the goods is erroneous. It is provided in
a clause in the BOL that its liability is limited to
US$2.00/kilo. The consignee also admits in the
memorandum that the value of the goods does not
appear in the bill of lading. Hence, the stipulation on the
carriers limited liability applies.
Everett Seamship Corp. vs. CA
In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that
all claims for which it may be liable shall be adjusted and
settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus
freight and insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event
shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits
or any consequential loss. Its liability would only be up to
One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However,
the shipper, had the option to declare a higher valuation
if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited
liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not
declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not
complying with the stipulations.
The commercial Invoice does not in itself
sufficiently and convincingly show that the common
carrier has knowledge of the value of the cargo as
contended by the shipper.
British Airways vs. CA
The contract of transportation was exclusively
between the passenger and common carrier BA. The
latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of
the formers journey to PAL, as its subcontractor or
agent. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous
air transportation. Well-settled rule that an agent is also
responsible for any negligence in the performance of its
function and is liable for damages which the principal
may suffer by reason of its negligent act. When an action
is based on breach of contract of carriage, the
passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the latter
was not a party in the contract.
The contention of BA with respect to limited
liability was overruled although it is recognized in the
Philippines, stating that BA had waived the defense of
limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the passenger)
to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the
misplacement of his luggage, without any objection.
H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray
Three kinds of stipulations have often been
made in a bill of lading. The first is one exempting the
carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage
occasioned by its own negligence. The second is one
providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to
an agreed valuation. And the third is one limiting the
liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the
shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate
of freight. According to an almost uniform weight of
authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations are
invalid as being contrary to public policy, but the third is
valid and enforceable.
If a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice
of two rates and if the shipper makes such a choice,
understandingly and freely, and names his valuation, he
cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he
thus places upon his property. A limitation of liability
based upon an agreed value does not conflict with any
sound principle of public policy; and it is not conformable
to plain principles of justice that a shipper may
understate value in order to reduce the rate and then
recover a larger value in case of loss.
Sweet Lines Inc. vs. TEVES
Considered in the light of circumstances
prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the
country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14
printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held
as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first,
under circumstances obligation in the inter-island
shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind
passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the
back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14
is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14
subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of
proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice
rights and interests of innumerable passengers located
in different places of the country who, under Condition
No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the
City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to
prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most
probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition
will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice.
Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices
in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can
afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing
of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much
less prejudice, petitioner.
Under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code, moral
damages are justly due in breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Both the
Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was
bad faith on the part of petitioner in that:
(1) Defendants- Appellants did not give notice to
plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the
vessel;
(2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than
fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine,
defendants- appellants instead made announce ment of
assurance that the vessel would leave within a short
period of time, and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to
leave the port and gave up the trip, defendants-
appellants employees would come and say, we are
leaving already.
(3) Defendants- appellants did not offer to refund
plaintiffs-appellees tickets nor provide them with
transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan.
Quisumbing Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
The highjacking-robbery was force majeure. The
hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant
display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms, hand-
grenades, dynamite, and explosives are introduced into
the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning
and stealth, although there is an occasional use of
innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a
plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal.
PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the
force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. Hijackers do not
board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower
and violent fury. Firearms and grenades are brought to
the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been
faulted for want of diligence, particularly for failing to take
positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics
Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from
carrying firearms on board the plane. The use of the
most sophisticated electronic detection devices may
have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly
determining hijackers.
Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Rapadas
The Warsaw Convention governs the availment
of the liability limitations where the baggage check is
combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. In
the case at bar, the baggage check is combined with the
passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The
passenger ticket complies with Article 3, which provides:
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's
journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a
country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw
Convention may be applicable and that the Convention
governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers
for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or
damage to baggage.
The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to
govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of
luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the
airline and receiving the plane ticket, was expected to be
vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the
passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the
stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the
liability limitations.
The facts show that the private respondent
actually refused to register the attache case and chose
to take it with him despite having been ordered by the
PANAM agent to check it in. In attempting to avoid
registering the luggage by going back to the line, private
respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on
allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a
reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and
jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and
placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper
or plastic envelope.
The alleged lack of enough time for him to make
a declaration of a higher value and to pay the
corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his
failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude
the application of limited liability.
Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The Warsaw Convention's provisions, do not
regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract
by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage, Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt from
any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of
carriage, which is absurd. In the case at bar, no bad faith
or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the
employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage
was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but
without appreciable damage.
There can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent
profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned to
panic and finally despair, from the time she learned that
her suitcases were missing up to the time when, having
gone to Rome, she finally realized that she would no
longer be able to take part in the conference. Certainly,
the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that
prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the
transport of baggage.
She is not, of course, entitled to be
compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As
already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately
delivered to her in Manila, tardily, but safely.
Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
Fairness demands that in measuring a common
carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be
given to the reliance that should be reposed on the
sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a
passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to
the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of
his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to
privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot
be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests
the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears
to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other
words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of
a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries
are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a
policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service
manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the
passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the
passenger had already declared that the box contained
mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have
justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
Mecenas vs. CA
The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan"
in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the
time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply
unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to
whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven
hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted.
Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-
duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite
immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in
contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours
for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common
carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of
extraordinary diligence.
The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank
within ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes after initial contact
with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt.
Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the
process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of
measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel
after collision, did not cause the collision by themselves,
such failures doubtless contributed materially to the
consequent loss of life and, moreover, were indicative of
the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt.
Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and
men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels.
The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he
had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the
"imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual
collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don
Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been
certified as allowed to carry.
Under these circumstances, a presumption of
gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers
and crew) and of its ship-owner arises.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CA
The Duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to
take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying
capacity of the vessel. (Same Ruling with Mecenas)
Korean Airlines Co., LTD. vs. CA
The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was
changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his
name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for
its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration
and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been
confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus
committed a breach of the contract of carriage between
them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.
This Court has held that a contract to transport
passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is
mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail
themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the
part of these employees toward a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a
common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers,
if the employees of the common carrier could have
prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear
that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees,
the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was
made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary
at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its
buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation
manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary
precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and
its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to
see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline
with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting
their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets
such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board
could have been employed without violating the
passenger's constitutional rights.
The acts of Maranaos could not be considered
as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by
the PC.
No contributory negligence could be attributed to
the deceased. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for
the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the
collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in
which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men
actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from
the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt
to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life.
Gatchalian vs. Delim
The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or
negligence on the part of respondent common carrier.
The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone
wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard
and made known to him by the passengers, instead told
them that it was normal. The driver's reply necessarily
indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been
heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only
mean that the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that
the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is
obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and
limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and
repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to
look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus,
coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the
mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping
sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers,
constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a
common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in
respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common
carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not
be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. A cursory examination of the purported waiver
will readily show that appellees did not actually waive
their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's
failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that
said document proves is that they expressed a "desire"
to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as
making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the
kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his
or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian
is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before mishap. A scar, especially
one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily
integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration
to her condition ante.
Del Castillo vs. Jaymalin
Common carriers are responsible for the death
of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil
Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the
defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence
that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733
and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that
Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this
knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-
ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In this
he failed.
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC
The principle about "the last clear" chance,
would call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would
be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
It is the rule under the substantial factor test that
if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm
or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable. The bus driver's conduct is not a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus
was travelling at a fast speed when the accident
occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet
within the speed limit allowed in highways.
Bustamante vs. CA
The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.
In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is
usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced
that the respondent Court committed an error of law in
applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between
the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit
brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against
both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.
Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the
owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
Lara vs. Valencia
The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to
accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the
duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be
transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is
established by weight of authority that the owner or
operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited
guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and
not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by
increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle
in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary
care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence as required by our law.
A passenger must observe the diligence of a
father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means
that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately
caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be
held liable.
Necessito vs. Paras
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of
the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to
answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at
all discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of
the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of
the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will
not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no
privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment;
hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier
usually has.
Japan Airlines vs. CA
Accordingly, there is no question that when a
party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force
majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held
liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily,
when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred,
cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL
assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their
unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
It has been held that airline passengers must
take such risks incident to the mode of travel. In this
regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic
changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
consequences of which the passenger must assume or
expect.
While JAL was no longer required to defray
private respondents' living expenses during their stay in
Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the
duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport
private respondents on the first available connecting
flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation
to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it declassified private respondents
from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a
result of which private respondents were obliged to
make the necessary arrangements themselves for the
next flight to Manila.
Layugan vs. IAC
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus:
"Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. The doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under
the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the
road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road
would be of no moment taking into account the warning
device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed
three or four meters from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the
Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the
private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked
cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident
the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and
left foot. It is clear therefore that the absence or want of
care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. It follows that the doctrine of
Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, making the employer of
the driver liable for the negligence of his employee.
La Mallorca vs. CA
The liability of the carrier for the child, who was
already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away
from the bus for her safety under the contract of
carriage, persists. The relation of carrier and passenger
does not necessarily cease where the latter, after
alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or
employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation
of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination,
but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances.
Aboitiz Shipping Co. vs. CA
The rule is that the relation of carrier and
passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule
is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and
prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the
person transported has been carried to his destination if,
for example, such person remains in the carrier's
premises to claim his baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in
the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every
right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had
already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in
petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim
had to claim his baggage which was possible only one
hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly
standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels
that the unloading operations shall start only after that
time.
Mallari Sr. vs. CA
Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of a passenger of the jeepney, was
the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger
jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly
operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art.
2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of
the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees. This liability of the common carrier
does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
its employees.
Bayasen vs. CA
It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on
greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without
fault on account of the manner of handling the car.
Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the
car under circumstances not necessarily implying
negligence. It may occur without fault.
Under the particular circumstances of the instant case,
the petitioner- driver who skidded could not be regarded
as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so
that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure
from his regular course.
Cervantes vs. CA
Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said
Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to
the legal counsel of PAL was necessary, he cannot use
what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said
agents, acted without authority when they confirmed the
flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the New
Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter
ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore,
when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the
agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the
principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If
the said third person is aware of such limits of authority,
he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages
from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the
principal's ratification.
Calalas vs. CA
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is
a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it
is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code
are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well
as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
The driver of jeepney did not carry safely as far
as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took
in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
the jeepney. These are violations of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore, there is no
assumption of risk by the passenger.
Pestao vs. Sumayang
In the case at bar, Pestao, as a professional
driver operating a public transport bus, should have
anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous
maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme
caution.
Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
owners and managers are responsible for damages
caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master
or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily
showing that the employer exercised the care and the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee.
Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad
While a passenger is entitled to protection from
personal violence by the carrier or its agents or
employees, since the contract of transportation obligates
the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his
destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only
to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid
through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence
required of it. In the present case, the act of the train
guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the
passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured
against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was
entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The
latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the
two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every
personal rancor that might exist between each one of its
many employees and any one of the thousands of
eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in
question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the
definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the
law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable
under the given circumstances; and pursuant to
established doctrine, the resulting breach of the
company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased
was excused thereby.
Maranan vs. Perez
The basis of the common carrier's liability under
NCC for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers
rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or
(2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to
transport the passenger safely.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the
carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not
sufficient that the act be within the course of employment
only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and
also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is
no defense for the carrier that the act was done in
excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense
that it practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees. Art. 1759, evidently
follows the rule based on the second view.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to
select its drivers and similar employees with due regard
not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total
personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral
fibers, and social attitude.
PNR vs. CA
When a train boarded by the deceased
passenger was so over-crowded that he and many other
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open
platforms between the coaches of the train, the common
carrier is negligent.
Likewise when the train did not even slow down
when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under
repair at the time, neither did the train stop, despite the
alarm raised by other passengers that a person had
fallen off the train at lyam Bridge, there was negligence.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its
passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury
suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the
presumption that it was negligent in the performance of
its obligation under the contract of carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears
that the deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform
between the coaches of the train, he should have held
tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at
the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the
speeding train.
Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co.
If the carriers employee is confronted with a sudden
emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he
would otherwise, be required in the absence of such
emergency.
By placing his left arm on the window, petitioner is guilty
of contributory negligence. It cannot however relieve the
carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. 1762). It is a
prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers
on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no
recovery can be had for an injury.
Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA
The running amuck of the passenger was the
proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a
commotion and panic among the passengers such that
the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving
each other resulting in the falling off the bus by
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal
injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed
another passenger in the bus is within the context of
force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier
may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it
is not enough that the accident was caused by force
majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was
not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such
accident. In this case, Bachelor was negligent.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus
at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding
from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it
was opened or gave way while the bus was still running;
the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people
had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not
properly equipped with doors in accordance with law.
Cariaga vs. LTB Co
The income which deceased could earn if he
should finish the medical course and pass the
corresponding board examinations must be deemed to
be within the same category provided for by Art. 2201 of
the Civil Code, which are those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach and which the
parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen
at the time the obligation was constituted.
LTB could not be held liable to pay moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of
breach of its contract of carriage because it did not act
fraudulently or in bad faith. LTB had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with
the discharge of their duties and so it must be
considered an obligor in good faith.
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA
Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also,
an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by
private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole
element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason
has been given to warrant its disregard and the
adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary
standard, such as a four-year rule.
When the liability of common carrier had been
fixed at a minimal rate of only of P2,184.00 a year, which
is the annual salary of deceased at the time of his death,
as a young "training assistant" and when the deceaseds
potentiality and capacity to increase his future income
was not considered said liability may be enforced upon
finality of the decision.
Pan American World Airways vs. IAC
By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said
flight, defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the
contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her
place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. Bad
faith was also present. Self enrichment or fraternal
interest and not personal ill will may have been the
motive of defendant, but it is malice nevertheless. The
fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in
order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned
by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off
non- Caucasian to accommodate whites is very
regrettable.
Defendant having breached its contract with
plaintiff in bad faith, it is not error to have awarded
exemplary damages. The rationale behind exemplary or
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
an example or correction for public good . In view of it
nature, it should be imposed in such amount as to
sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of
contract in the future by defendant and other airlines.
An award of attorney's fees is also in order,
having found bad faith on the part of defendant.
Soberano vs. MRR
In case of physical injuries, moral damages are
recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next
of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the
contrary. In this case it was Juana Soberano, not her
husband Jose, who sustained the bodily injuries.
Attorneys fees may only be awarded when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his
interest, or when the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim. It will be
observed that the defendant companies offered to settle
the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum
of P5,000. The Soberanos, however, rejected the offer
and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total
sum of P76,757.76.

Marchan vs. Mendoza
It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction
to adjudicate the exemplary damages since there was
no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor counterclaim of
error for the same by the respondents. It is to be
observed however, that in the complaint, plaintiffs
"prayed for such other and further relief as this Court
may deem just and equitable." Now, since the body of
the complaint sought to recover damages against the
defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for
indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result
of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's
employee and since exemplary damages is intimately
connected with general damages, plaintiffs may not be
expected to single out by express term the kind of
damages they are trying to recover against the
defendant's carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs
prayed in their complaint for such other relief and
remedies that may be availed of under the premises, in
effect, therefore, the court is called upon the exercise
and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive
or exemplary damages even though not expressly
prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. Exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, but that they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the discretion of the court. If the amount
of exemplary damages need not be proved, it need not
also be alleged, and the reason is obvious because it is
merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may
award as compensatory damages.
De Caliston vs. Court of Appeals
The deletion of the P10,000.00 awarded for loss
of pension is unjustified. Under Article 2206 of the Civil
Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. .
The pension of the decedent being a sure
income that was cut short by her death for which
Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir of the
former is entitled to the award of P 10,000.00 which is
just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have
received for one year if she did not die.
On the other hand, the P5,000.00 paid to the
herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus
which figured in the accident may be deemed to have
come from the bus owner who procured the insurance.
Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the
death caused by his driver is subsidiary and, at bottom,
arises from the same culpa, the insurance proceeds
should be credited in favor of the errant driver.
Philippine Airlines vs. CA 185 SCRA 110
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally
recognized and applied by the courts in the United
States" that "the controlling element in determining loss
of earnings arising from death is, as established by
authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the
beneficiary, whichever is shorter. However, resort to
foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or
jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy.
Even in the absence of local statute and case law,
foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive.
For the settlement of the issue at hand, there
are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence.
Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code,
the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his
beneficiary.
Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab
While under the law, employers are made
responsible for the damages caused by their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task, plaintiff, in
the present case, does not maintain his action against all
the persons who might be liable for the damages caused
but on an alleged breach of contract of carriage and
against the defendant employer alone. However, the
defendant taxicab company has not committed any
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries against the
plaintiff. The one that committed the offense against
plaintiff is the driver of defendant's taxicab but he was
not made party defendant to the case. Therefore, plaintiff
is not entitled to compensation for moral damages as his
case does not come within the exception of paragraph 1
of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The present case does not come under any of
the exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, specially of paragraph 2 thereof, because
defendant's failure to meet its responsibility was not the
cause that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur
expenses to protect his interests. The present action
was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant
amount for moral damages and naturally the defendant
did not and could not yield to such demand. This is
neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of said
Article because the Lower Court did not deem it just and
equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees, on
which point this Court agrees.
Fores vs. Miranda
The exception to the basic rule of damages now
under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of
a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and
ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased". But the exceptional rule of Art.
1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty
of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se
constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on
the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no
other evidence of such malice to support the award of
moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof
of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as
required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
legislation.
Lopez vs. Pan American
As a proximate result of defendant's breach in
bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered
social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and
mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first
class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were
given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were
expected to be among the first-class passengers by
those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found
among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating
to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully
to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore.
International carriers like defendant know the prestige of
such an office. And he was former Vice-President of the
Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the United
States to attend a private business conference of the
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid
rank and position were by no means left behind, and in
fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the
United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in
his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. For the
moral damages sustained by him, therefore, an award of
P100,000.00 is appropriate.
A written contract for attorney's services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. A
consideration of the attorneys prominence as well as
comparison of the defense counsels fees could well
establish the reasonableness of the attorneys fees, such
as in this case.
Ortigas Jr. vs. Lufthansa
It is Our considered view that when it comes to
contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of
care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of
the passenger to be accommodated in the class
contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which
entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in
accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. But in the
instant case, the breach appears to be of graver nature,
since the preference given to the Belgian passenger
over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard
of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and
as a Filipino, who may not be discriminated against with
impunity. What worsened the situation of was that
Lufthansa succeeded in keeping Ortigas as its
passenger by assuring him that he would be given first
class accommodation at the next stations, the proper
arrangements therefor having been made already, when
in truth such was not the case.
A passenger contracts for first class
accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself
and pays a higher price therefor, and it is certainly not for
the airplane to say later, after it deprives him of his
space in order to favor another passenger, that economy
class is anyway just as good as first class.
We have uniformly upheld the right of a
passenger to damages in all cases wherein, after having
contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly
confirmed and validated, he is transferred over his
objection to economy, class, which he has to take in
order to be able to arrive at his destination on his
scheduled time.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Esguerra
Moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, as in the instant case, in view of the
provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil
Code. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved
that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if
death does not result. The Court of Appeals found that
the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of
the road. In other words. both vehicles were in their
respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of
the other. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud
or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. This being
the case, no moral damages are recoverable.
Trans World Airlines vs. CA
Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class
passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the
sake of economy. Such inattention and lack of care for
the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their
convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the
passenger to the award of moral damages. More so in
this case where instead of courteously informing private
respondent of his being downgraded under the
circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed by an employee
of petitioner.
At the time of this unfortunate incident, the
private respondent was a practicing lawyer, a senior
partner of a big law firm in Manila. He was a director of
several companies and was active in civic and social
organizations in the Philippines. Considering the
circumstances of this case and the social standing of
private respondent in the community, he is entitled to the
award of moral and exemplary damages.
Armovit vs. CA
The gross negligence committed by private
respondent(Northwest Airlines) in the issuance of the
tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure
and without changing or correcting the error when the
tickets were presented for re-confirmation and the
manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that
they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice
and bad faith and establish that private respondent
committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners
to moral damages.
The deletion of the nominal damages by the
appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of
actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with
actual or compensatory damages.
Philippine Airlines vs. CA 106 SCRA 391
There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing
Capt. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the
accident, even if he was sick, having tumor on his nose.
No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one
suffering from the disease. One month prior to the crash-
landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet,
private respondent warned him that they were not in the
vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. The
dizziness, headaches and general debility of private
respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. And
therefore there is causal connection between the
accident and said after-effects. The negligence of PAL is
clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. 2219(2) is
applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages.
Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an
employee-employer relationship between it and private
respondent arising from the contract of employment,
private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in
view of the finding of bad faith or malice, applying the
provisions of Article 2220.
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport
Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion
which although mild can admittedly produce the effects
complained of by her and that these symptoms can
develop after several years and can lead to some,
serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other
sickness. Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be
more real and intense than an ordinary person.
Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of
moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides: In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
grave negligence. The rationale behind exemplary or
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
an example or correction for the public good.
Respondent driver was running at high speed after
turning to the right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala
Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear. Failing
to notice petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes
and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the
collision. Much more, it was raining that time and the
roads are slippery. The frequent incidence of accidents
of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands
corrective measures.