HSBC vs SHERMAN 176 SCRA 331 (1989)
justice
Facts: Eastern Book & Supply Service
(Singapore) was granted by HSBC Singapore an
overdraft facility.
Sherman, et. al. and directors of Eastern Book
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor
of HSBC. Eastern Book defaulted. Hence, HSBC
filed a suit for collection against them before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Sherman filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint
and persons of the defendants. The guarantee
provides: This guarantee and all rights,
obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall
be construed and determined under and may
be enforced in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of Singapore.
Held: Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the suit. The stipulation shall be liberally
construed. A stipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant under Sec 2 (b), Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying
or restrictive words in the agreement which
indicate that the place named is the only venue
agreed upon by the parties. The parties did not
thereby stipulate that only the courts
of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest,
have jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in
question operate to divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is
often defined as the right of a state to exercise
authority over persons and things within its
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. This
authority, which finds its source in the concept
of sovereignty, is exclusive within and
throughout the domain of the state. A state is
competent to take hold of any judicial matter it
sees fit by making its courts and agencies
assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases
brought before them.
While it is true that "the transaction took place
in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and
Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum
clause, the very essence of due process dictates
that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and
all rights, obligations and liabilities arising
hereunder shall be construed and determined
under and may be enforced in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall
have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under
this guarantee" be liberally construed. One
basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction
in International Law: a State does not have
jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable
basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings
are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be
reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on
some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
it has long been established in law and
jurisprudence that jurisdiction of courts is fixed
by law; it cannot be conferred by the will,
submission or consent of the parties.
SALVACION vs CENTRAL BANK 278 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested
for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police
recovered from him several dollar checks and a
dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He
was, however, able to escape from prison. In a
civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorneys fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the
dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section
11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for
declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE
to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby
required to comply with the writ of execution
issued in the civil case and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such
amount as would satisfy the judgment.
RATIO:
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law
makes futile the favorable judgment and award
of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully
deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No.
6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of
the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor
General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit
System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection.
However, the foreign currency deposit made by
a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and
given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few
days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of
the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
AZNAR V. GARCIA
Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines
Renvoi doctrine- a jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again
to the law of the forum. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its
law.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California.
But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens,
one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e.,
apply the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause
"if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of
the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained
in the various authorities cited above the
national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the
two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule
of the state of the decedent, if the question has
to be decided, especially as the application of
the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
CADALIN V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista,
in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other
OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an
Amended Complaint with the POEA for money
claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
(AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston,
Texas, and is engaged in construction; while
AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a
service contractor to recruit, mobilize and
deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of
the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely,
and secondarily, the payment of the interest of
the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund;
interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage
and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax
not remitted to the BIR; penalties for
committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the
contract of the parties.(WON the complainants
who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the
above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri
Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the
case. (Assuming it is applicable WON
complainants claim for the benefits provided
therein have prescribed.)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the
pleading and proof of a foreign law and
admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour
Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976,
which provides for greater benefits than those
stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief
that where the laws of the host country are
more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
then the laws of the host country shall form part
of the overseas employment contract. It
approved the observation of the POEA
Administrator that in labor proceedings, all
doubts in the implementation of the provisions
of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which
were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves,
provided that the laws of the host country
became applicable to said contracts if they offer
terms and conditions more favorable than those
stipulated therein. However there was a part of
the employment contract which provides that
the compensation of the employee may be
adjusted downward so that the total
computation plus the non-waivable benefits
shall be equivalent to the compensation
therein agree, another part of the same
provision categorically states that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that
of the host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment
contracts should be interpreted against AIBC
and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377
of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to
contracts of adhesion where there is already a
prepared form containing the stipulations of the
employment contract and the employees
merely take it or leave it. The presumption is
that there was an imposition by one party
against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that
reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in
question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel
thereof. The parties to a contract may select the
law by which it is to be governed. In such a
case, the foreign law is adopted as a system
to regulate the relations of the parties, including
questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the
foreign law, the parties may just agree that
specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract as a
set of terms. By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does
not become a foreign contract to be governed
by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the
expectation of the parties. Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the
parties own choice of the applicable law. The
choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship the parties or their transaction.
There is no question that the contracts sought
to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was
3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as
provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment
shall not actionable after the lapse of one year
from the date of the expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum (local court),
Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for
appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws
of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a
law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company
(220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue
was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code
in a case filed in the State of New York for
claims arising from said Code, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but
not under the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was
not specifically intended to be substantive,
hence, the prescriptive period provided in the
law of the forum should apply. The Court
observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of
limitations of a foreign country, and it is not
clear on the face of the statute that its purpose
was to limit the enforceability, outside as well
as within the foreign country concerned, of the
substantive rights to which the statute pertains.
We think that as a yardstick for determining
whether that was the purpose, this test is the
most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test
here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled
to succeed, for the respondents have failed to
satisfy us that the Panamanian period of
limitation in question was specifically aimed
against the particular rights which the libellant
seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a
statute having broad objectives. The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New
York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to
be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give
way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum (local
Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute
has the practical effect of treating the foreign
statute of limitation as one of substance. A
borrowing statute directs the state of the
forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute
of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law. While there are several kinds of
borrowing statutes, one form provides that an
action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued will not be enforced in the forum even
though the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this
kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or
country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended
by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light
of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as
it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of
Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forums public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection
to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that:The state shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human
Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive
period governing the filing of the claims is 3
years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10
years, as provided by the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an
obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is
primarily anchored on the written contracts
between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive
period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil
Code should govern.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO
ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
In election cases, the term "residence" has
always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or
the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons
is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements
of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Uytengsu vs. Republic: Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but
it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the
term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner
merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement.
That an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places.
Faypon vs. Quirino:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look
for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes
study in other places, practice of his avocation,
or engaging in business. When an election is to
be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from
his professional or business activities; so there
he registers himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give
up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration,
the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken
him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to
return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
Petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew
up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various
reasons.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents.
As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To
effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile
with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management, respondents.
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003)
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires
that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election.
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
specifically provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines,
(2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the
election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189,
one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country unless
he/she executes an affidavit declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration
under said Act.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and
all public authority administered.[23] Laws that
do not conform to the Constitution shall be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be
constitutional.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident
and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee.
[30]
However, under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered
synonymous with domicile.
 In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court
enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or
the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons
is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs.
Republic, this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individuals permanent home, a
place to which, whenever absent for business or
for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of the fact
of residing or physical presence in a fixed place
and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an
overseas Filipino to his residence in this
country, the framers of the Constitution
considered the circumstances that impelled
them to require Congress to establish a system
for overseas absentee voting.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country because
immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of ones residence
in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she
executes an affidavit to show that he/she has
not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1
and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law
must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for
absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual,
physical residence in the Philippines is required,
there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a
system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the
execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. To repeat, the
affidavit is required of immigrants and
permanent residents abroad because by their
status in their host countries, they are
presumed to have relinquished their intent to
return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of
Philippine domicile shall remain.
Contrary to petitioners claim that Section
5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with
the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a
system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad is not physically present in
the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and
11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No.
9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed the affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of
his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the
opportunity to express that he has not actually
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by
executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d)
and 8(c) of the law.