EN BANC SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,

ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,

Petitioners,
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE - versus -
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, THE SECRETARY OF THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
*
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA, RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA, AKLAN,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,** x--------------------------------------------------x
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and DECISION
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
REYES, R.T., J.:

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated, of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial Court
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
THE LANDOWNERS OF Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
BORACAY SIMILARLY
 [3]
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination.The island is also home
to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. [7]
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
[8]
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
[9]
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982,
to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
[10]
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular
did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone,
it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
[11]
Code, as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and
PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
[12]
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
[18]
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized
[19] [20] [21]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in
[22]
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
[13]
of their respective memoranda.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more appealed to the CA.
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO
2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
[15]
5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on follows:
August 7, 1933.[16]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision
RTC and CA Dispositions of the lower court.[24]

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading: The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
petition under Rule 45.
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
[17] G.R. No. 173775
SO ORDERED.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
[26]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
[27]
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito,
other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
[30]
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their
prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right
over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department,
not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
[33]
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
Issues
[28]
and
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR
AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
 CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
[36]
IMPERFECT TITLE? confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later
[37] [38]
amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued
III.
[39]
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE- Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
under these laws and executive acts.
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE of the public domain.
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC.
4(a) OF RA 6657.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring
supplied) classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May

167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these

portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
other pertinent laws.
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation

Our Ruling
 [45]
of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
[46]
Constitutions.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
[47]
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
[48]
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is
up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership.
The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
[49]
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
[50]
Spanish Crown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well
as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information
[55]
title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
[56] [57]
adverse, from the date of its inscription. However, possessory information title had to be
perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the
[58]
lands would revert to the State.
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and
timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means
of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It also provided the definition
by exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the
[64]
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)
 On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
[66]
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease
[67]
or purchase lands of the public domain. Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26,
[68]
1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as
the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December
1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. [71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD
[73]
No. 1073, which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12,
[74]
1945, or earlier.
[75]
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
[76]
evidence in land registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the
effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands,
including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. [81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. [83] To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
[84]
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
[85]
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
[86]
is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
[87]
assumed. They call for proof.
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should
be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through
which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the
courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
[91]
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. This was the Courts
ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to
private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands
[94]
are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber
or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership
and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification
was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class
or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land
and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in
each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry
or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery
of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
 public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
[95]
Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts
[96]
of each case, except those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in
1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable,
96-a
mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
[97]
determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the
propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if
the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was
supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed
by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to
determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa
v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as
[104]
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
[105]
cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We
have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did
not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions
of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted
the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,
 for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the
friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
[109]
under PD No. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority [110]
certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the
public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705,
all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may
seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly
stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather
than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on
[111]
the island; that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its
character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution [112] classifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry [114] is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
[116]
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that
the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare
areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
private ownership.
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as
a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
[117]
land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands and areas declared as alienable and
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
alienability.[119]
makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII,
Section 3 provides:
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
supplied)
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name
a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue
of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
[120]
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that
it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
[121]
lands.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested
rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. [123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall
form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order
No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
[124]
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result.In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
 land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the
of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
[126]
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill
this point:
of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and
of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the rights.[130]
meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There
are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
[128]
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
land of the public domain.
 Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title
to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based
on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private
claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also
notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may
[131]
look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales
[132]
patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There
[133]
is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up
the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no
longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important
as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more
urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
 resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. [135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3894 March 12, 1909
JUAN IBAEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa
applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent, situated in
the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles opposing
the request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated March 21,
1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question was the property of
the Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the Insular Government; that
the title of ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the
19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the
land in question, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant had not been made in
accordance with the laws then in force on the subject, and because the said governor had no
authority to make such a grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss the application with costs.
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former petition, and
relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the time
he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in the plan then submitted, the
aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles
to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in question, the applicant availing
himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of
his land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54, Chapter VI, thereof,
and prayed the court to take into consideration the amendment of his petition.
Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and on February 2, 1907, the judge of
the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the opposition
offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, and ordered the cancellation of
the entry made of the said property in the record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume 2 of the
municipality of Surigao.
The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his motion was overruled to which
he also excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved and
submitted to this court.
The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan
Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and,
ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in
force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or
corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of this Archipelago the occupation or
material possession together with the improvement and cultivation for a certain number of years, as
fixed by the laws of the Indies, of given portions of vacant Government lands, was the method
established by the Government to facilitate the acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the
royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the State
and that of sales by public auction were instituted as the means of acquiring such lands.
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the proceedings instituted for this
purpose, the royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set out in said decree.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No. 926, relating to public lands, in
accordance with the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the United
States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public
lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands,
as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by a war or force majeure,
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three, four, and five of this section must
establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein
required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That
such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land, the
registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the State could
alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time the person in
possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the same manner that he had
made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act of Congress, as well as
the provisions of the abovecited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason
that the said land is neither mining nor timber land.
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of the land whereon was built the
greatest cities of the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in these
Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the commencement of the occupation of this
Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands, the latter were rural and
agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle and foundation of the present
cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added to the number
of their dwellings, the farms gradually became converted into town lots.
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to be seen that are erected on
lots that form part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the advantage
of the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may later on again
become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the owner, again be made to yield
fruit.
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a
field, and planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in
its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it
is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may
again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three
classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have
ceased to be agricultural land.
In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government, No. 3793 (10
Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense.
It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign powers that have successively
promulgated the said laws, to place those in possession of building lots under title of ownership in an
anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible for them to obtain legal titles to
the lands appropriated by them, and denying them the care and protection of the law to which they
were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in their behalf, and for the
benefit of the cities and towns in which they reside, contributing to the wealth and increase of the
country.
In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of this
Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the
supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had been duly acquired;
therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated
within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in
force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a
building lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not
appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of the 25th of June, 1880, says: "In
the Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner, or, which
have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable crown lands for the effects of
the regulation, and in accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novsima Recopilacin;" that
article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of February, 1894, states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and
mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are
not included within the following exceptions: (1) Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to
the forest zone; (3) those comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved for the use in
common by residents of the community; and (4) those lands which are susceptible of private
appropriation by means of composition or possessory information;" and that although section 13 of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of the Philippine Islands to classify public
lands that are neither forest nor mining lands according to their agricultural character and
productiveness, section 14 authorizes and empowers the said Government "to enact rules and
regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public
lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had
fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom
of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title, etc.;" and
section 15 authorizes and empowers the said Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as
it may prescribed, by general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain,
other than timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it may deem wise, etc."
From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception of
those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign
nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of
the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by
any private or judicial person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to
which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban lands or building lots being
included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral
and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as
the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.
If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other hand is
susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude it
from being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that classification, the
benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason that it
has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13 years prior to the
26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause
to exclude urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the interpretation that
urban real estate, that is not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to fall within the
classification of agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to public interests.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all such
persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of the same shall be
granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is made as to costs. So
ordered.
Willard, J., concurs.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C. J., concurring:
The land that is the subject of the petition in this case, is described in the judgment of the court
below, whose conclusions of fact are of the following tenor:
The object of registration in this case is a lot situated on McKinley Avenue, in the
municipality of Surigao, province of the same name; it comprises an area of 3,375 square
meters, and is bounded on the north by the seashore; on the east by the land of the heirs of
the late Andres Ojeda; on the south by the aforesaid street; and on the west by the premises
of the government building.
In order to acquire the said property, which is a building lot situated in the inhabited portion
of the said municipality of Surigao, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa on June 11, 1889, filed a
petition with the politico-militar governor of the 3d District of Mindanao to whom then
belonged the municipality and Province of Surigao, claiming the said lot as being abandoned,
and requesting that he be granted a title of ownership thereto. In view of the said petition,
D. Juan Cirlot y Butler, major of Infantry, who at the time was governor,
directed bandillos (proclamations) to be published for three successive nights in the said
municipality of Surigao, calling on all persons who considered that they were entitled to the
said lot; after the bandillos had so been published, and no one appearing to claim the lot,
and it appearing from the report of the governadorcillo and principales of said municipality
that the lot was unoccupied and that no one had ever been known to own the same, the
governor, on the 19th of the said month of June, granted to the said Telesforo Ibaez de
Aldecoa title of ownership to the said lot in order that he might forthwith build a house
thereon. The document setting forth the said concession was a certificate issued on the
same date, the 19th, by the aforesaid governor; and by order of the Court of First Instance of
Surigao, the same was entered in the record of public instruments of the said court
corresponding to said year on the 22d of October. A certified copy of the document so
recorded was obtained and attached to the record of the case, and was recorded on the 23d
of March, 1896, in the registry of property of the said Province of Surigao, lot No. 408, first
entry.
After the title of ownership to the lot in question had been granted in the manner above
stated, the grantee, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, immediately took possession and within a
short time had it fenced in and took care to keep the fence in good repair; and thus keeping
the land constantly fenced in he continued to possess it publicly, in his own name and as the
owner thereof, without any interruption or opposition from anyone until he died in the year
1902. "After the death of the said Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, his widow succeeded him in
the possession of one-half of the lot in question for the reason that it pertained to the bienes
gananciales (property acquired during marriage), and his son, the petitioner herein, as sole
heir of the deceased, inherited the other half. He also has kept the land fenced in, and lately
replaced the fence with a wire one. Toward the month of March or April, 1903, the
provincial board of Surigao, in spite of the opposition and protests on the part of the
aforesaid possessors, ordered the removal of and did remove the fence around the lot above
referred to, claiming that the said lot belonged to the Province of Surigao; that for this
reason their possession was interrupted until March, 1904, when the said possessors, after
having filed their application for registration in these proceedings, erected monuments on
the lot. And that lot has never been devoted to cultivation, neither is it by its nature suitable
for any kind of cultivation.
Such are the facts that should be considered as proven in these proceedings.
From the facts set forth it evidently appears:
First. That the land in question is a building lot situated within the inhabited portion of the town of
Surigao.
Second. That since June, 1889, the said lot had been possessed with the knowledge and consent of
the said municipality, peacefully and without any opposition up to March or April, 1903, to-wit,
approximately fourteen years; that prior to the said adjudication, the gobernadorcillo and
the principales of said municipality had been cited and heard on the subject.
Third. That the little of ownership issued by the provincial official of Surigao was entered in the
registry of property of said province on the 23d of March, 1896.
Fourth. That from March or April, 1903, until March, 1904, the material possession suffered
interruption on account of an abusive and arbitrary act of intrusion of the provincial board of Surigao
which had absolutely no authority to commit such an act of spoliation; and,
Fifth. That in March, 1904, after the peaceful and quiet possession was resumed, the petitioner
instituted these proceedings for the purpose of obtaining a new title of ownership in accordance with
the Acts of the Philippine Commission that created the new registry of property.
The present opposition is based on the supposition that the said lot was a parcel of land subject to
composition, as if it were vacant Government land; that as such vacant and Government land, it had
not been duly granted by composition when in June, 1889, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa obtained his
title of ownership from the politico-militar governor of said province, who was not the person called
upon to grant titles by composition after the promulgation of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, and
that of December 26, 1884; and the Court of Land Registration, assuming on the contrary that the
said land is not vacant crown land, it not being devoted to agriculture but to building purposes, and
because "by reason of its nature it is not suitable for agriculture but is destined exclusively to building
purposes, and is therefore not agricultural, it believes that the same can not be the subject of
adjudication under the provisions of the Act of Congress and Act No. 926 of the Philippine
Commission, and that in the opinion of the court, paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 is not
applicable to urban real estate."
An established rule which has been repeatedly laid down by this court, is that only the vacant Crown
lands were subject to composition; that is, rural lands devoted to cultivation. In the present case the
petitioner finds himself between the horns of a dilemma: As to whether the land in question is urban
or rural property; if it is rural, the Attorney-General argues that it has not been subjected to
composition, and that the possession thereof is consequently illegal; and if it is urban, the lower court
rejects it as not being susceptible of acquisition under the title of ownership that has been newly
created and organized. In conclusion it appears: First, that the owners of urban real estate can not
obtain Torrens titles through possession for ten years, nor by a possessory information recorded for
that or a longer period of time. Second, that urban real estate, possessed for more than fourteen
years with knowledge and consent of the authorities of the town wherein it is located, may be
recovered by the Government on the ground that it is public land that had not been alienated by it,
for the reason that it is not agricultural, nor is it mineral or timber land.
It would be necessary to demonstrate that this building lot, which was recorded in the registry of
property with possessory information, and continuously and materially possessed as private property
since June, 1889, until the 11th of April, 1899, without opposition from the Spanish Government, was
public land transferred by the treaty of Paris to the public domain of the present sovereignty, and
that under said character of public land it is not agricultural land that may be conveyed to private
dominion according to section 13 of the Act of Congress, and section 54 of Act No. 926.
It is true that at the time above referred to, June of 1889, the politico-militar governor of Surigao had
no authority to issue titles by composition. And as a matter of fact, at that time, the said governor did
not issue to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa a title by composition. So that this is not the question.
What he did was to adjudicate to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa a building lot in the town of Surigao,
and to that effect he issued to him a title of ownership to the said lot. And this is a question anent
which absolutely no argument has been made in the whole proceedings.
It is argued that the said provincial governor had no authority to issue the title, and that the said title
is null on the unwarranted supposition, that it was a title of composition such as was provided for by
the royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, which is entirely incorrect.
What should have been proven was, either that the said lot, though a building or town site (not rural
property or arable land) could not be acquired otherwise than by composition, in accordance with
the aforesaid royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, or, that the politico-militar governor of a province
could not adjudicate the ownership of land situated within the town to a resident thereof as such
building lot or urban real estate, and still less as vacant Crown land, although within the inhabited
portion of the town, as it is desired to consider the same. And in this sense nothing has been proven
or sought to be proven in the whole case.
The question is merely one supposition. The Attorney-General has supposed that it was vacant Crown
land, and as such, agricultural land which was possessed without title by composition. The court
below has supposed it to be a building lot or urban property, not agricultural land, entirely excluded
from the benefits of Act No. 926 of the Commission. And in either form the said land or building lot
possessed as private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, can not be recorded in the new
registry of property.
Was it an illegal possession? Was the possession held from 1889 to the 11th of April, 1899, usurped
from the Spanish Government so that at the latter date, the land thus possessed should be
considered as part of the public property which Spain transferred to the United States by the treaty
of Paris?
According to Article VIII of said treaty, Spain cede all real property which under the law was of public
domain, and as such belonged to Spain. It was held that this cession could in no way affect the
ownership or rights which, in accordance with law, corresponded to the peaceful possessor of
property of every class, that is to say, the property of private individuals.
Ever since the year 1889, the land in question has been owned by a private individual, and was not
public property belonging to the Spanish Government. It was possessed as such, and in order to
deprive it of this status it was necessary that the Spanish Government or its assignee should recover
possession of the same by due process of law. And in order to recover it, it would be necessary to
prove that the said lot, which formed a part of the inhabited portion of Surigao, belonged to the
Spanish Government on the 11th of April, 1899. This has not been advanced by the opposition;
recovery of possession has not been sought, but the title adjudicated in 1889 is repudiated on the
ground that the provincial governor of Surigao had no authority to adjudicate it to the said private
individual.
But, from the enforcement of the Laws of the Indies, provincial governors were authorized to
organize towns and distribute land for building purposes. Law 1, title 12, book 4, of
the Recopilacin of the Laws of the Indies, reads:
It is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go out to people the new
territories, houses, building lots, lands peonias and caballerias in the towns and places which
may be assigned to them by the governor of the new settlement . . . . After selecting the
territory, province and locality where the new community is to be founded, and after
ascertaining the conveniences and resources that may exist thereon, the governor within
whose district the same is located shall announce whether it is to be a city, town or village. .
. . (Law 2, title 81 of the same book.)
First let there be set aside whatever land may be necessary for solares (building lots) for the
people, commons, and abundant pastures whereon the cattle owned by the residents may
graze, and as much again for the use of the natives; the rest of the territory shall be divided
into four parts, one of them, which he may select, shall be for the person who obliged to
form the town, and the other three parts shall be distributed among settlers in equal parts.
(Law 7 of the same title and book.)2
Law 8 provides as to how temples shall be constructed:
"Somewhat distant from the plaza, where it will be separated from any other building not necessary
for its use or adornment." . . . . "Building lots being assigned near it but not in continuation, for the
erection of casas reales (government buildings) and booths in the plaza for public use . . ." it seems
that the lot in question in the case at bar is contiguous to the government building or casa real of
Surigao.
Law 14 of the same title 7, book 4, is a fundamental law which, as a complement to the foregoing
organic laws of towns, provides for the separation of the land constituting the inhabited portion of
the town from land properly called vacant (baldos), of which so much is spoken in these land
registration cases. It reads as follows:
Sufficient land having been set aside for the town common, and to allow for the growth of
the town as already provided, let all persons authorized to discover and establish new
townships indicate pasture lands adjoining the common in order that work cattle, horses,
and cattle for slaughtering purposes, together with other cattle which by ordinance the
settlers are bound to have, may graze thereon, together with an additional amount, all of
which shall be the property of the council, and the balance shall be farm lands to be drawn
by lot; there shall be as many of the latter as there are building lots in the township; and if
there should be irrigated lands, they shall likewise be divided and distributed by lot in the
same proportion among the original settlers. All other lands are to remain vacant in order
that we may grant them to new settlers. From said lands the viceroys shall reserve such as
they may think advisable to assign to towns unprovided with any, to assist them to pay the
salaries of their mayors; they shall provide commons and sufficient pasture grounds, as
provided by law, and they shall act accordingly.
Building lots are not vacant lands, and the building lots used to be distributed and adjudicated by the
governor of the province or district to which the town belonged, after hearing
the gobernadorcillo and the notables of such town. As urban property, building lots forming part of
the inhabited portion of a town, passed beyond the sphere of the administrative laws to enter that of
the civil law. Thus, all questions arising in connection with them, after they had been ceded or
granted, could only be decided by the civil law, even though raised by the Government, through
action brought before the ordinary courts of justice, and not before the administration, nor the
contentious tribunals which the Government itself had established in its relations with persons under
its administration, as has already been held by this court in the case of Roura vs. The Insular
Government (8 Phil. Rep., 214).
Vacant lands were those which remained at the disposition of the King or the supreme government at
the capital of the nation after due assignment and distribution of what was needed for the newly
formed town; such vacant lands were adjudicated by sale or by composition, or in the form of free
grants to new settlers.
We can not affirm the reason given for denying the title of ownership applied for in this case, that the
subject of the petition was a building lot, which, not being agricultural land was not entitled to the
benefits of section 54 of the Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54, which determines the persons who may obtain confirmation of their
rights, reads: "All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and the occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902," and what are agricultural lands as defined by the said
Act of Congress has already been declared by this court (Mapa vs. The Insular Government, 10 Phil.
Rep., 175).
On this ground the confirmation and title applied for herein should be granted.
Mapa, J., concurs.
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish
said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien,
he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining
the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw
the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down
by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in
this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we
have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to
avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal
only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should
not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal
was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted
and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason
whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this
Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept
for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally
one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had
been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we
grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins
his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice,
issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant
seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is
now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow
interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences
that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be
taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may
never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but
to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to
disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a
future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent
offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days
and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
 or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental
policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification
existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural
lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is
also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in
long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.)
And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining
or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of
agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because
it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides,
the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with
respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is
not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those
lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted
the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1
Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical
meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in
that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to
have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction
requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in
which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal
meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is
to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution."
(59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public
Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale
of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens,
which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands,
for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land
Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes,
but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer
to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now
XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands
for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public
lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that
the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he
intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became
the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the
late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration,
and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and
executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in
Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under
section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a
word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference
between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But
such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such
a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part
of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as
indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the
prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come
when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if
not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were
used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for
no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first
draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands,
and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same
would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to
which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands
can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words
"no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural
land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject
matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen
from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of
the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and
other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their
posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of
the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered
in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the
privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who
said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural
resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we
shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional
Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of
the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is
ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court,
namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under
Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said
section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner
and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except
to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under
this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may
authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent
improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the
event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the
last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act,
such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the
penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land
Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.
 SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or
in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not
be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act,
such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens,
grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public
domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
"private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural
and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under
the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the
Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that
mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it
even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes
and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by
future generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of
the land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have
refused to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act
as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our
people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for
unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and
ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at
us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial
moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and
boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have
prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of
our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme
Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming
catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our
decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when
an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the
residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the
application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to
acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of
Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo,
appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one
stated in the first assignment of error as follows:
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos
who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the
Japanese addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting
the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by
appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici
curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of
1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December,
1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was
among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila.
The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this
Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be
submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3,
1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially
on the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands.
An overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31,
1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question,
which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty
gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable
terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional
question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be
decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant
Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four
printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the
next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their
stand on the question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again,
we deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the
constitutional question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There
were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked
out. On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident
purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the
all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave
its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing
any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since
February 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is,
whether this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of
the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has
been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a
definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice
Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to
deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr.
Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have
the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the
Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the
opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days
later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice
Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in
6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast
for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the
registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public
polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio,
and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice
which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual,
corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five
years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other
classes of urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or
encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of
land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5,
Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural
land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in
conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the
practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on
November 15, 1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the
so-called Parity Amendment to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and
corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the
same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the
acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or
pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest
therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may
be entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents
shall be denied unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or
order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so
that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section
200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated
upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final
result of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution
adopted on August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for
decision, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the
adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion
(Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon,
Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A
redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras
proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the
latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to
three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to
withdraw is considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling
the previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy.
He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court
and, on a moment's notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all
the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of
one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of
Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the
inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to
participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and
necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that
when the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two
days after this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny,
and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules, the petition should have
been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by
Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the
result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was
decided to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new
voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for
allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice
Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were
filed, about one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up
again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might
have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the
voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he
changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no
formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up
once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was
over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he
was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the
allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been
denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding
was arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that
last two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of
the Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging
that it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus
giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the
Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending
litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to
the promulgation of our decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official
actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July,
1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been
crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands
in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense
on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public
interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the
doubt among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated,
there will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This
Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should
not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the
Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so
that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one
of the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending
generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests,
depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from
the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris
and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and
Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch,
French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the
greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his
life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless
struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on
grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who
were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other
religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by
the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the
uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience,
resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with
tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from
the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious
orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of
confession and other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they
were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in
order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders
and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes, leaving in
destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under
the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of
the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national
revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to
unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty
to insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the
wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same
way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range
detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to
ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial
safety and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be
needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the
ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever
our action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very
words, that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed
to all departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make
more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural
resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our
natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional
amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession
the only exception allowed by the Constitution no foreigner may by any means acquire any
land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the
Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates,
that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was
what the Committee on Style the drafter of the final text has written in the Constitution, and
that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the
sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case
cannot be overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have
been transferred to and registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be
created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create
complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective
lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P.
Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:
 It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck,
in 1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute
void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands,
most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal
in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature
repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies
had completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more
and more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had
been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear
their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under
the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New
Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and
he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told
Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up
for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary.
Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact
that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the
finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and
courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a
stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence
on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due
to legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of
Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic
proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands,
although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates
to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made
in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per
se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the
Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down
and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations
which may have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a
Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale
made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court
acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.
HILADO, J., concurring:
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in
behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I
ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the
votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation,
with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of
the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the
withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when
appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred
in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination
of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the
resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in
opinion, such a motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case
upon the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a
government like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all
concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The
very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should be
maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of
each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence
in each department must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of
that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective
department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in
this direction with respect to this Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of
Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential,
commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview
of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the
self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should
this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional
mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty,
peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion,
given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract
in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course,
none of us the other governmental departments included would desire such a situation to
ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question
here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or
building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by
the Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede aadir ni quitar nada, tal es su
acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para
unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular
y extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas
deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este ao,
confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por
cierta parte de la prensa impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo
celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion
del patrimonio nacional se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la
sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del ao.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha
habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y
justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha
sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado,
antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos
ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de
las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que
se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no
habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte
en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario incidente que practicamente vino a
impedir, a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio
persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de
esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar
ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador
General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido
arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos
ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino
que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando
vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato
igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de
saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este
asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid
con los abogados del apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la
sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose
casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad
en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion
para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo,
el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con
las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en
favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de
un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de
esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la
sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo
dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e
industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el
asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la
cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida,
como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva
de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la
Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso la
interdiccion constitucional ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la
Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y
sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del
Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en
medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia
expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de
retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia
integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de
transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del
mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion
sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud
de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos
urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero
que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular
dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento la
prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos y
authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las
escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros,
siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre
que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple
tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la
prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es
precisamente el objeto del presente asunto venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion
discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente,
el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta
Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su
resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion
consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General. Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte
Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian
registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso
no es extrao quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947,
pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran
porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now
moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la
apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which
amends Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to
aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for
withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the
1
question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino
de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en
los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde
existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias
del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar
vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a
alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion
y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo
tradicioninviolada e inviolable maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el
inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando
venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era
tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era
muy sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales,
bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres
de todaingerencia extraa. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se
hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino
tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su
propia hechura. No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron
gobernantesde otra raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y
dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad
en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara
expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando
instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la
circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi
sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade
esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del
Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que
tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde
justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este
articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para
enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta,
ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200
del Codigo Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at
Manila. When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of
deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the
fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the
certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon
the suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon
consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of
registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the
step to be taken or memorandum to be made.
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al
Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion
contenida en la circular num.14. Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal
Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el
23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala
decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque
estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la
prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia
pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, unless and /or until
otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the
party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to
appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus
funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones
que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la
intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los
poderes del Estado, es usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si
esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la
situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada
con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En
casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion
constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si
bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el
opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa
la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos
Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages ni
eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la
apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b)
para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de
soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon
serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un
asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio
de la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza
como sigue:
 Rule 52, SEC. 4 An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of
appelle's brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o
disconformidad de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e
imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino
quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre
un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y
significacion el pueblo filipino ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima
del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no
tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o
doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver
de otra maera. Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa?
Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o
inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de
extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la
compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad
de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante,
Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion
de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14
como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a
extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las
disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion
constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual
Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente
concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto
porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de
que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos
terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. Podemos hacer la
misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley?
Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes,
consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan
bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado
paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto
que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de
Rellosa contra Gaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan
sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la
evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si
hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de
tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme
ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe
soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otra manera, reservando dicha
cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria
un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso
no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros
asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un
poco de parsimonia, lentitud.
Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? Habia
alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario,
nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo
debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia
de todos del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o
negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin
zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir
sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de
que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este ao
(8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de
retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora
naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion
de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado,
como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que
se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela
avanzado de la Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner
en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de
las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho
menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones,
una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de
lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales.
Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del
principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta
concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo
transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las
cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su
circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o
litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no
tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la
circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su
pleito no en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por
esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia
votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que
antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico
aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una
sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es
sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra
jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna
porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale
"a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento
de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio
nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe,
de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por
razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de
la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la
apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno
estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas
queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en
la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado
Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se
leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no
obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5
contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. Donde
esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba
como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la
conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de
Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo
denegada.Pregunto otra vez: donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr.
Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por
eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno
de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor
delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas
observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea,
aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde
miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural)
usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?
Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe
interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados
deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o
suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo
tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente.
Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de
dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos
enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de
corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales
ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may
determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations
may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law" 4 ;y la seccion 5 es
la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se
emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte
comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del
apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se
define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir
solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de
la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie
consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala
doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902
(LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales,
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir,
que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen
nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene
talsignificado y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente por que esa misma palabra
empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado?
Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno
privado? Donde esta esa definicion? O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud
de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de
terrenopublico o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno
privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi
expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no
definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion
clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con
relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion
de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria
ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade
miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me
cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar
la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero
indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli
habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli
estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede
la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y
humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras
autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia
figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon
Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-
miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la
Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el
ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de
un articuloenque un vocablo el vocablo "agricultural" tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una,
aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta
la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica,
diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en
cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas
logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre
terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar
enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin la establecida en la
jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir,
que la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales,
comerciales, e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical
sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted
by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are
used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that
sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural"
referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al
diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se
entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de
que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria
unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo
seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones
especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces como no el lexico vulgar, con su
infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?
Ahora mismo no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? Hay acaso uniformidad en
la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los
disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario
Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in,
tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo
Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate
agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of
agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra
"agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos,
"land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or
cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or
educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its
greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que
determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o
al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho
de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se
handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en
mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los
pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e
industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede
ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar
latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y
de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados que normas claras,
concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? Podrian trazarsefronteras
inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? Podria
hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de
diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e
industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero resolveria esto la dificultad?
Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado
poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este
criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. Que
terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este
asunto, dice: 'La montaa mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la
mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard aade las siguietes
observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que nos
ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de
cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de
lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta,
en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace,
destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre
estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es
de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este
respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente
urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas
zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes
extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice
aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster que normas segfuras se podrian
establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras
agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso
asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido
la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama
el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio
establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos
concomitantes citados criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y
arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al
Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso
puedo determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous,
corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la
aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos
residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian
excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion
3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueos de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad;
no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e
industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por
elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las
deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio
no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas
trade se aadio la palabra calificativa agricola"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir
quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el
de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a
los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural"
en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla
razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e
industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una
significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario
juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien
residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal
significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico.
Ahora bien; que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la
calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La
unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical en que el uno es del Estado y el otro es
de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva en que vulgarmente hablando
pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la
influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la
formacion popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del
conceptovulgar una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es
exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar.
La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los
abogados? Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de
purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado espaol?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el
precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia,
por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al
concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que
propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la
tamizacion delprecepto se aadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de
dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran
que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas
arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la aadidura, tal como
esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que
es puro bizantinis mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de
inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar
grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este
genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha
hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado
sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or
the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to
examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the
proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and
satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive
from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el
problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los
Delegados? Y como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el
pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono
predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la
Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el
patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la
posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable;
significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono
pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el
diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto
constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el
papel particula que desempeaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por
Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia
horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse
que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos
filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con
los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede
caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea
Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor
Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre
propiedad publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de
agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de
poder se dueos de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes
de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los
filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos
Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion
de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia
exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian
bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag.
595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea
Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe
breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un
rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel
patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a
government that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre
y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el
Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 aos. Querianos, puesd
asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los
cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual parodiando al Delegado Montilla la tierra y
losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o
el abreviamiento dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las
cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de
nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia
agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas
centenares de milliones economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas
partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon,
sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y
militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso
problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra,
instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello
implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y
sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba
y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion
el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la
Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el
apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.
Que de extrao habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un
articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha
dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones
filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos
filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado
principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de
capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos
residenciales comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir
y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban
tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra. Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio
extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que
estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente
que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a
estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que
se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna
reforma constitucional la llmada reforma sobre laparidad para equipararlos a los filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to
the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that
intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as to
conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained
from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law
should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
IV. Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la
propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion
legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que
semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en
manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre
la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia.
Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los
tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una
reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela
ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se
escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente como ha del pueblo en un
asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para
reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma
como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important
question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural
land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority
opinion, lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no
doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity
come under any of the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the
approval of the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the
conclusion which is at once absurd and anomalous that private timber and mineral lands may
be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however,
contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1,
Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public
agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating
that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely
proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and
although, after the approval of the Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it
does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already of private ownership also became
part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the possession of occupants
and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such
possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the
Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the
pronouncement in Cario vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not
be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that
some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or
mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands, why did the framers of
the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII,
and merely of "lands" in section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing
prior to the enactmentof such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the
enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation,
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The
latter section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive
classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we
have shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor
justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and in
not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands,
and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as
denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced
within the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred
merely to "private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind
of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution
prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted
with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said
prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine
economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional
prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt
such elastic policy as may from time to time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or
difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy
safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban
properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms "private land"
was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands
can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may
be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any
qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with
the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the
majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private
agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private residential
lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private timber or
mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable
Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in
supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to
urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member
of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with
regard to the agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Seor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta
cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la
sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para
que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con
gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, seores. Parece
que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion,
como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en
el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son
argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la
ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes
despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que
el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del
latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden
publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del
articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon
en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos
limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar
el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece
que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades
urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en
las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con
facilidad, y desde alli los pequeos propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para
intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos
grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad
no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan
dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado
nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por
nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el
mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los
ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera.
Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que
existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo
daos a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de
los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos
conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen
laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian
en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la
herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto
al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que
efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o
exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la
Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente
disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su
padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede
dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo
con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero
determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics
del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque el
Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente
no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la
prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa
de que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros
opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de
que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional
dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida,
primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo,
cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para
disponer la expropiacion.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho
menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta maana
y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos se ha mentado la posibilidad de que
los comunistas hagan un issue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los
comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el
limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base!
Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea
Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma
Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. Quien esta en disposicion de
terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene
de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este,
pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros
fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante
expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de
terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va
aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios
no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se
ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel
primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.
Por estas razones, seor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar
fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding
and acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to
the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are
engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the
Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed
discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these
reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because
many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate
Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of
Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the
sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as
that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma
to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of
owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate
Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the
remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real
estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands",
under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely
"agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and
his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general
nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more
specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban
propeties. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental
recollections) of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific
recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is
surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that
case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," the definition held
to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the
only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section
13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the
only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the
phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the
approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired
in any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly
implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition
contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally
acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not
originally of the public domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to
be public agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition
under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands retained their original
agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think,
that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us,
however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under
said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public
Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of
aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the
Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act
No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid
while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks
of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the
approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land,
which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider
said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that
was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government
Judicial, Legislative and Executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is
rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked
by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential
lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us
particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of
Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential,
commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural."
Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of
the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the
prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private
agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is
applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request
of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130,
dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941,
holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII
(formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial
or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or
order of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered
pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not
an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article
XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
 Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks
of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural
lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the
meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not
conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1,
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the
prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment
of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not
agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or
utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial
or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public
agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction
against transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said
Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On
November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First
rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held
that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No.
29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines
contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National
Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall
acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including
buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal
succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to
have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely
suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the
question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his
Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous
transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered
without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the
majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do
not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit
myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to
attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written
words purport to convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that
entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our
independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment
or by Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the
conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should
have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we
reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a
court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action
was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been
opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52
which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in
its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where
a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice
Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the
eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any
previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a
vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the
result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under
the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later
deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real
explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the
vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in
the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all
registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference
with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we
grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not
by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while
this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for
wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-
appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only
to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of
aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of
Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of
the appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the
Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this
Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said
of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of
private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh
Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question
raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and
notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant
and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd
in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5
of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an
"interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the
appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved
in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not
allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul
the circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot
accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted
by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution,"
because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of
upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the
impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify
the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand,
the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to
pass upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in
Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But even
disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally
reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will dispute their sales of
residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition.
Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the
issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to
other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases.
That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional
problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented
from passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to
play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to
seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the
constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of
Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the
registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to
perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally
affected like heirs or or creditors of the seller may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens,
invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively
arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs as in this
case have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for
reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately
touched or improperly considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales
will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity
out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption
that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential
lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their
validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for
such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the
conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against
international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily
involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose
of landowners at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who
7
should become landowners after the approval of the Constitution;
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in
the United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the
worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between
the United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places
under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying
such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the
parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready
to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are
popularly understood not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is
founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the
prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying
it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly
expensive process of a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or
intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for
residence is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the
Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are
included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority
invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that
urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion
of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for
residence in the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of
the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands
of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land
of the public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral, could not be
disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential
lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the
classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would
hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-
168), and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore,
that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of
public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended
to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to
attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as
understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was
Act No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and
corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their
own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No.
2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last
preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other
denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the
time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent
improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however,
That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this
Act shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not
used for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to
the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such
lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force
at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such
 persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding
section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations,
associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by
reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any
person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the
provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for
industrial or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such
land issued for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act
or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor
to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that
were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by
aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121,
Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the
Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified
persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of
citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all
the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens
from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It
adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not
"suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with
timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874
was in force for nearly sixteen years from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals
of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a
departure from the policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by
purchase or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for
industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution
intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or
residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes were not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every
reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in
force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being
nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter
which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. If the term
"private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for
residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition
found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence.
The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the
raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for
industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all
other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included
among the excluded, because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the
land grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal
Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act
No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always
been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of
the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the
term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by
the people that adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the
Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the
appellant who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by
the appellant whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or
a private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212
U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section
123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, which providesthat
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or
in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section
unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known
as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it
violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed
upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress
to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid
offending against the constitutional provision referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits
of the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If
discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally
avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be
decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional
question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36
Phil., 116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions
of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government
may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such
interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be
deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a
constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action
submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives
effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple
that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers
had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness
of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case,
notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it
were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to
pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the Court were
unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might
be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon
such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority
of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate
branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous
and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the Constitution a costly process
would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal
of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question.
It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom,
foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive
possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this
Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the
well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a
constitutional amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant
and consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons
hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the
Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that
we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive
things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble
understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal
result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General
gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used
in this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the
pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort
and by law authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a
construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to
be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to
be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity,
ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and
common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of
expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of
philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature
founded on the common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for
common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people
adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense,
and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss.
(1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to
have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said."
(Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no
basis for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some
unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and
to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at
liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.
(12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal
interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no
technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is
understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands
proceed from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural,
residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In
prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary
implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one
thing excludes all others of the same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can
see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New
international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or
engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this
definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or
used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They
are either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided
into residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to
say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its
improvement as agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under
consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that
the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report
recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands;
and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by
persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this
Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee
of seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the
committee on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and
preservation of lands and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of
the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the
committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands
provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands.
(2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh
alteration in the phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first
draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of
private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee
later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we
to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to
agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of
agricultural character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby
eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended.
In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in
this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the
conclusions do not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the
scope of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose
than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of
messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land"
produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish as
witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well
enough alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the
final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the
Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement
that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in
different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after
consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation.
"We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it,
did not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will
be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that
it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical
inferences. The theory is against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a
constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the
immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no concealment,
generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey,
the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be
understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have
said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally
proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of
reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men
of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar,
inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is
from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar
rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber
land or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private
ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not
agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential,
commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be
decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for
home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential,
commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was
this well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then
prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The
classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of
private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous
decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or
mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the
nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came
up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of
public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very
simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands
agricultural can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are
preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and
there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it
would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves
will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows
the conveyance of private forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in
view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose
principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July
1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated
and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that
natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural
lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a
dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-
agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural resources are
defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United
States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above
mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by
a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the
circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as
expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The
United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration,
exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local
authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of
scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with
which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by
nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential
purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be
regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law
or constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say
that agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely
said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands
should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different
aim. This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such
as faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for
decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or
agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with
reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public
residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private non-
agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to
see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private
timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the
object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws
covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of the
intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private non-
agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or
agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5
of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the
special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups,
there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification;
and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction
between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section
5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other
than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on
constitutional law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it
occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary
rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically,
that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore
the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that
the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses
and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to
subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds,
who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in
some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by
which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it
were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes,
and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes,
and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions?
And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is
employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely,
its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument."
(1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and
that the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public
lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we
are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and
ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in
the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have
acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed
to have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex
post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase
having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it
is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not
a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the
popular mind, "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that
is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed
for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed
from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied
to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this
Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other
structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of
the Constitutional Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The
sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have
reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close.
If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need
not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of
a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5
of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of
all lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the
change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and
resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language.
This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of
human writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that
one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands,
minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation."
In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are
included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the
statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an
expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men,
and every one knows we don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified
into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply
means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning.
Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that
are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of
alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my
humble opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What
to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that
Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel
classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the
inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No.
141, section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc.
And these are lands of the public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article
XIII, which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating
public lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse.
Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and
industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to
the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted
the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with
reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any
comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that
opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a
homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes,
which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is
the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the
law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority
say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be
consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested
counsel for the government in a judicial action is as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is
still more incorrect both in theory and in practice then this Court should have given heed to the
motion for withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in
line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No.
141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent
private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien
possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's
theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they
public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not
agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5
of Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner
under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree,
or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute
eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly
say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the
Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of
sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to
own a piece of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store
and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of
it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor
cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He
can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino
nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for
hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in
the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so
fundamental for communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the
government finds need of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it
necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire
cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be
looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political
complexion or scene of the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private
agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the
result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and
hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields and a
host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments
like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at
liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work
inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do
with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional
government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General
dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop
such excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution
has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not
prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size
of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may be
dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets,
golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from
entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original
draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better
policy to leave to the political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition
of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand.
The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands,
through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation
extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present
Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same
direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the
opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given
serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and
also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In
truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly
who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I
add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was
a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional Convention?
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed
DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed
DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered
by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9
to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines,
3
through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
4
claim of ownership. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
5
father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
6 7
1964, Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by
its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on
January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such
as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
10
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
11
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The
Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug
mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the
June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted
the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered
in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of
Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge
Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil.
749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from
the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the
locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands
located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located
claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they
were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid
mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in
a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location and perfection,
the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337;
Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining
claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and
the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
 Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.)
"When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of
a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the
claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining
locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the
issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner
is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good
as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain,
and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them.
The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they
cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes
of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver,
by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the
case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility
was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with
grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
18
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
19
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only
partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on
or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the
trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N.
TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY,
JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE
M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA,
SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA,
ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE,
INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
1
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which,
in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
2
reforestation."
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
4
Constitution.
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
 "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control
6
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
 3
Id. at 23-25. When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into
the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
of the laws." attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the
IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27. indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a
grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
6
Id. at 27-28.
This Opinion discusses the following:
7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

SEPARATE OPINION
D. The Philippine Constitutions
PUNO, J.:
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
PRECIS
A. Indigenous Peoples
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard 1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Posner1 wrote:2
2. Their Concept of Land
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, A. Legislative History
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and
do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources,
control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains
and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the
IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA
may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into
the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy
of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds
of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at
such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by
them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper
deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands
became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took
charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military
5
and civilian. Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by
6
the various modes of land grant from the Crown.
7
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The
Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as
the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish
land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural
lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In
1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial
treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had
lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment,
asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the
State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws
which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The
question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as
against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in
the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a
specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it
was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and
11
the Royal Cedula of 1754.
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the
king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some
private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the
occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a
time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription
were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that
mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed
by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by
the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the
decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's
principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the
parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated,
without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
15
they will be granted to others."
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied"
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the
earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the
proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
16
remained the absolute owner."
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
17
action by the State." Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government
from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the
State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the government's title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the
22
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was
passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the
23
same privileges. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law
and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the
transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth
24
period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or
the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public
and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim
25
copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, which, in turn, followed the principles
and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned
it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the
government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims
to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land
conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
28
natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. 31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum x x x."
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
which traces its origin to native title.
more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
measure and the limit of the grant."

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National
Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
- the right to stay in the territories;
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural - the right in case of displacement;
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources - the right to safe and clean air and water;
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with - the right to claim parts of reservations;
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable - the right to resolve conflict; 32
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of
transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated
33
consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance
and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their
culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own
sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of
seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the
Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay
and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon
Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. 38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The
NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from P100,000.00
to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of
"IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO)
41
Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions
and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some
or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and
utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds
of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs
who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their
own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their
traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of
110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao,
Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of
Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya,
Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or
Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro;
Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of
Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and
Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of
Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros
Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the
Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon,
Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of
Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of
Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon,
Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur;
Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental;
Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog
of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo
of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and
Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to
30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural
features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences
from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and
traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially
homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary
factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common
ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored
similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had
languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media
of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods. 49 They
fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be
part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality
of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they
called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits.
The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the
objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to
their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature. 51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. 52 The barangay was basically a
family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different
and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and
promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of
government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
53
war.
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation
to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs
54
and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. The written laws were those
55
that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. The oldest
known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old
56
codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. Whether customary or
written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership,
crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose,
these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the
barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by
arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters. 57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs
merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the
family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore,
participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member
of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual
sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership
of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to
those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their
positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to
either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and
to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. 61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by
Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction:
Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato
toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but
was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a
provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
64
cession or sale of land.
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They
65
were not economies geared to exchange and profit. Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
66
into numerous small and separate communities.
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living
in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks
imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in
67
a reduccion. As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize
these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same
69
laws."
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the
church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards
attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make
the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately
adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to
72
the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of
public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and
law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or
colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to
land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First
were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations.
Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and
was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as
76
the lowest classes.
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila
and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue
them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of
Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
77
the infieles, in effect, relative security. Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the
78
Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. Their
own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the
existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization,
the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity
and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian
Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and
more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
82
relationship apart from settled communities."
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the
BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including
those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the
bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine
83
cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then
was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian
Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration
of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a
tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands
and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the
Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their
lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government
87
in the name of national development.
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition
and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into
the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their
89
original lifeways beside the larger community." In short, while still adopting the integration policy,
90
the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands
Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the
national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. 91 In 1979,
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar
Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized
by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie
plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the
national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to
the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created
the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their
right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They
are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of
self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the
rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial
threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to
erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture.
The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying
the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately
applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary
owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of
ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners.
Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present
generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and
spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
101
families who are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the same locality
who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary
laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest
products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture
and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right
to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in
common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
103
Code. Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly
discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
104
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered
to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a
105
non-member of the ili.
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our
national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and
House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive
version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one
national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the
Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of
indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their
Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were
pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the
massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they
became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our
system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
109
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land
long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they
ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their
dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment
in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political,
economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to
this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending
on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based
on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence
passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the
case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling
has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D.
1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws,
explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the
existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator
Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented
the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard
shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic
when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the
ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral
land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power
of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons
suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality
in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and
none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor
113
by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain
that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that
remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a
need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall
bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they
be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cario v.
Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment
115
of the Spanish and American regimes.
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do
Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and
[b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer
be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but
not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
116
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except
that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are
also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands
include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the
IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in
identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role
in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51
and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53
of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding
by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
122
Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. The allocation of lands within the ancestral
domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs
123
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. With respect to ancestral lands
124
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds
in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native
title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned,
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of
128
the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to
have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
129
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v. Insular
130
Government. Cario firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares
of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the
property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cario
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
131
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. In 1901, Cario obtained a
132
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The North American colonial
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him
to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a
U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including
Cario, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute ownership to the land.
Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of
Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine
135
Supreme Court affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S.
136
Supreme Court. On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and
contended that Cario failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other,
asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed
part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were
held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that,
as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How
far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
137
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the
new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process"
138
as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." It was based on the strong mandate
extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose
of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do
justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902,
chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to
suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably
its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of
rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is
hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did
not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become
such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the
profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give
140
the applicant the benefit of the doubt."
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or
memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to
"never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees
did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize
that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in
the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words,
Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even
into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm
those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was
theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the
powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey
to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of
such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was
"not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land
under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong
142
"due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. This title was
sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
143
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of
the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by
the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have
been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had
lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument
to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had
not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cario decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of
Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine
 146
Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law. This article was made after
Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin
147
and development of Philippine land laws. He discussed Cario extensively and used the term
"native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined
by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American
148
Indians. This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American
regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native
149 150
Americans. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao,
Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans,
including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the
ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent
settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized
customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they
roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and
how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of
the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the
United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of
154
a tribe or tribes of Indians. It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive
order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the
"aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the
actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense
that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action,
although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their
aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their
boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held
and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive
statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson
& Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two
(2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being
private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the
government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out
that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition,
said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war,
to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which title
160
might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements
upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted
the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants
have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire
Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or
Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of
the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by
purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the
discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from
the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title
unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has
never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged
162
with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the
163
universal recognition of this principle.
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without
having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens. 164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia
enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or
permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor.
The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for
the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into
their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the
protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and
the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part
of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not
that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by
the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on
themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a
people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with
treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
169
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee, this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the
Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants
of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-
either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only
the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself.
Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all
asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.
170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands
occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of
occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the
policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the
171
protection of complete ownership. But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically
172
recognized as ownership by Congress. It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
173
possession is not a property right. It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government
174
who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. Thus,
aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous
use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within
the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor
to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the
individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
177
tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to
designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land which
has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On the other hand, an Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of
Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the
Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of
indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second,
indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be
183
drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans. Despite the similarities between
native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether
jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes
the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have
passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. 184 The protection of aboriginal title
185
merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government. Although
there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these
lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral
188
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between
its application in the Philippines vis--vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on
the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cario is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes
native title. The long line of cases citing Cario did not touch on native title and the private
character of ancestral domains and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter
altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land.
When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the
possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the
189 190 191
land. The land ceases to be part of the public domain, ipso jure, and is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession
that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under
the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of
acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and
members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed
of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be
first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-
owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or
for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their
ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a
slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval
of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural
lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements
of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically
 198
with lands of the public domain. Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or
concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been
199
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so." Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are
private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts
his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or
over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a
limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the
date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony
of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b)
forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions
ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire
IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and
201
space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary
laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of
the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life
into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens
to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or
incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or
not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any
203
real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether

disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural
land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be
confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights
of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427,
428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines
through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights.
It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to
205
enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, the
206
right to consume the thing by its use, the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy
the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other
person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of
ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal
210
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. Co-
ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The
Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is
211
concerned. To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary
212
law of the community but of the very community itself.
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less
corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject
213
to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance. Every stockholder has the right to
214
disassociate himself from the corporation. Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
215
voluntarily or involuntarily.
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to
all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred,
sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal.
These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the
members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to
the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
216
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," the IPRA, by legislative fiat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary
law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where
no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the
Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities. 220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized,
and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is
merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by
virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize
the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land,
being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and
the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to
the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
222
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government
to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers
and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to
integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints
be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
 a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights
by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration
or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers
(a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and
natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of
displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and
water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve
conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains,
Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the
same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure
a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does
Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control
and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;
 4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly
undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private
224 225 226
sector through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through
Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-
scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with
foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
(R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing,
may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining
activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the
traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not
cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies
with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of
the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands.
These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to
use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests
over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7
(a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership
over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources.
Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is
Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the
law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants
the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to
effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations,
"benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and
conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental
protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of
ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral
domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or
negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that
the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that
the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national
and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-
scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of
natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and
others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and
survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these
resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by
their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written
agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own
decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may
exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under
the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources
within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains
obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for
commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law
recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the
development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a
period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition
that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or
exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there
is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential
rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said
doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the
light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources,
may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in
the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which
the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow
such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into
an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement
shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State,
as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it
may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local
or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically
give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose
which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to
solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The
ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates
that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation.
Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of
the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their
subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after
a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with
this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural
resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation
shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained.
Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend
any project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs
have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that
the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the
ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA
apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS
INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources.
First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples
controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN
238
Declaration on Human Rights. The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the
attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility
of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's
Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82
240
and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights
and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national
governments' inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human
rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
242
international agenda.
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on
243
IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. The World Bank now seeks to
apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential
244
model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State
policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The
246
IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, and is
heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United
247
Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the
prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law
made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to
removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of
these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through
the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
252
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. It is
through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution
of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos
253
as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is this Court's duty to
acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS., represented by the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Regional Executive Director, (DENR Region XI) and MARION V. ABUNDO,
SR., Conservation Officer (DENR Region XI), petitioners, vs. MARILYN A. PERALTA, ROSIE A.
LAVALAN, GRACE A. REYES, ALBERTO B. ALONDAY, MERCY B. ALONDAY, RICHELIEU B.
ALONDAY, AZUCENA B. ALONDAY AND JANETA A. BALURAN, and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53440 which upheld the orders, dated February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 13.[2]
The Antecedents
On September 26, 1994, Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A. Lavalan, Grace A. Reyes, Alberto B.
Alonday, Mercy B. Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday, Azucena B. Alonday, Benedicto B. Alonday, and
Janeta A. Baluran filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real property with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, against the defendants Republic of the Philippines,
the Regional Executive Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Conservation Officer in said region. The plaintiffs alleged therein, inter
alia, that they are the heirs of Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted Homestead
Patent No. V-11244 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DENR) over Lot 3561
with an area of 237,898 square meters; the said lot was a portion of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre
located in Guiang, Davao City and that on the basis of said patent, Benedicto Alonday was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-275 over the said property by the Register of Deeds; they purchased
the said property from their father Benedicto and were issued on April 25, 1988 Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-134231 in their names; the property was allegedly alienable and disposable property
within Project 1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as per LC Map No. 1412 approved by the Director of
Bureau of Forestry, as confirmed by the letter of the petitioner Regional Director, dated February 15,
1994; they had been in possession of the said property as owner thereof since November 1965 and
that some time in 1969, officers of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) sought his permission to
use a portion of said property with an area of five hectares; the BFD caused the construction of a big
concrete building on said portion of the property; on June 28, 1971, Benedictos lawyer wrote a letter
to the BFD demanding that it vacate the said portion of his property on which the building was
constructed but said letter was ignored; on February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion
Abundio, Sr. asked permission from Benedicto to allow the BFD to install on a portion of the subject
property consisting of twenty-five square meters a small generator to provide electricity to the
existing building and compound of the Philippine Eagles Acclimatization and Breeding Center;
Benedicto did not give his assent to these requests of the aforenamed government officials despite
which they still caused the construction of the building and installation of the generator unit; the
plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the property on July 14, 1994 but the latter
refused. The plaintiffs prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and
that the defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay the plaintiffs damages and
litigation expenses.
The plaintiffs appended as annexes to their petition copies of the aforesaid title and letters of
the BFD officials. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed the special and affirmative defenses that: (a) the complaint did not state a
cause of action against them; (b) the building constructed by the defendants was within the
perimeter of the Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under Proclamation No. 59, as amended, of
the President of the Philippines, and not on the plaintiffs property; (c) the installation of a generator
unit did not push through; (d) Project 1-B, under which the subject property was declassified as
alienable and disposable property per Land Classification Map No. 1412, should not prevail over
Proclamation No. 59, as amended; (e) the suit was against the State which cannot be sued without its
consent; (f) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing their
[3]
complaint. The defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
The parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs. After the requisite pre-trial conference, the RTC
issued an Order, dated August 29, 1995, constituting a panel of commissioners composed of Engineer
Roderick R. Calapardo, as Team Leader, and Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio Zantua, as
members, to conduct a relocation survey and determine if the respondents property is part of the
Mt. Apo National Park. After the survey, the panel submitted its report to the trial court, dated
November 7, 1995, stating that: the land in case is 92,216 square meters within the certified
Alienable and Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682 square meters is
[4]
within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation.
In their comment on the report, the plaintiffs claimed that the survey team altered the
boundary line of their property in the course of the survey and that the team did not take into
account Project 1-B per Land Classification Map No. 1412 approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry. The defendants, on the other hand, insisted that the survey team did not alter the boundary
line of the property and that it took into account Project 1-B and Land Classification Map No. 1412 in
conducting the survey and preparing its report. On motion of the plaintiffs and with the conformity of
the defendants, through Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortez, the RTC issued an order on
March 7, 1997 declaring that there were no factual issues involved in the case and that it would
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda of the parties as well as the
commissioners report.
On May 6, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants finding and declaring that the property occupied by the defendants was part of the
plaintiffs property. The RTC ordered the defendants to vacate the property, restore possession
thereof to the plaintiffs and remove all the improvements thereon made by them. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the validity and legality of the
plaintiffs right of ownership and possession over that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of Davao City. Defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the portion
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City
alluded to by the plaintiffs and to restore peaceful possession of the same to them. Defendants are
[5]
further ordered to remove all the improvements they have introduced thereon.
The RTC declared that the report of the panel did not take into account Property 1-B for LC Map
1412; hence, the said report had no probative weight. According to the RTC, the torrens title of the
property prevails over the relocation survey of the panel of commissioners and that the Director of
Forestry declassified the respondents property pursuant to Section 1827 of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code.
On May 30, 1997, five days before the expiration of the period to file an appeal, the defendants
filed, through registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the RTC decision. On June 11, 1997,
the RTC issued ex parte an order expunging the said motion for reconsideration on the ground that it
was a mere scrap of paper for failure of the defendants to incorporate any notice of hearing as
required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Unaware of the June 11, 1997 Order of
the RTC, the defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with Notice of Hearing on Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of hearing of their May 30, 1997
Motion for Reconsideration.
In the meantime, on July 18, 1997, the defendants received a copy of the June 11, 1997 Order of
the trial court expunging their motion for reconsideration. On July 22, 1997, the defendants filed their
notice of appeal from the decision of the court. The plaintiffs, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal of the defendants on the ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was
a mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did not toll the running of the reglementary period for
appeal. Thus, the defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the court
within the reglementary period. On August 11, 1997, the RTC received the defendants notice of
appeal.
Meanwhile, the presiding judge of Branch 13 retired, and for a time, the said RTC branch
remained vacant. On January 28, 1999, the RTC, through the newly-appointed judge, issued an order
giving due course to the defendants appeal declaring that they still had a period of five days from July
18, 1997 when they received a copy of the order expunging their notice of appeal or until July 23,
1997 within which to perfect their appeal from the June 11, 1997 Order. Since the defendants filed
their notice of appeal on July 22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal within the reglementary
period. The RTC further declared that although the defendants May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration was defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed. The RTC forthwith
directed the branch clerk of court to forward the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
On February 5, 1999, however, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the defendants
appeal on its finding that in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention, they failed to perfect their
appeal within the reglementary period. When the defendants received the February 5, 1999 Order of
the RTC, they filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, set for hearing on February 19, 1999. On
February 8, 1999, the RTC issued an order declaring that the hearing set on February 19, 1999 was
mooted by its Order dated February 5, 1999 which dismissed the defendants appeal. The plaintiffs
filed on February 10, 1999 a motion for execution, claiming that the RTC decision had become final
and executory. On February 18, 1999, the RTC issued an order granting the plaintiffs motion and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 26, 1999 of the February 5, 1999 Order of the RTC dismissing their appeal and their
opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants were unaware that in the interim,
the RTC had already granted the plaintiffs motion for a writ of execution on February 18, 1999. The
plaintiffs opposed the defendants Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999.
 On May 6, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying the defendants motion for reconsideration
and at the same time denying the plaintiffs motion for execution on the ground that public policy
prohibited the issuance of a writ of execution against the government. The RTC recalled the writ of
execution it earlier issued.
Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the February
5, 1999 and May 6, 1999 Orders of the RTC alleging that the:
I The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999 AND ORDER DATED MAY 6, 1999.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OVER A PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 134231. [6]
On April 27, 2001, the CA rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The appellate court held that petitioners May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC decision did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended; hence, a
mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the
RTC decision had already become final and executory. According to the appellate court, the RTC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners appeal therein. As such, they
were not entitled to a writ of certiorari. The CA further held that the petitioners, through the
negligence of the OSG, failed to perfect their appeal. The CA opined that to nullify the title of
respondents over the subject property, the petitioners should have instituted a petition for reversion,
and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended.
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision of the CA. The petitioners allege that the appellate court committed reversible error in
finding and declaring that they failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the trial court within
the reglementary period. The CA likewise allegedly erred when it held that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the
petitioners appeal via its February 5, 1999 Order. The petitioners contend that by dismissing their
petition, the CA thereby sustained the validity of the respondents title despite strong evidence that
the said property is part of the public forest and, therefore, inalienable. The petitioners further argue
that even if their notice of appeal was belatedly filed, the rule on perfection of appeals should be
suspended and that their appeal should be given due course on grounds of equity and substantial
justice. They submit that if their appeal is not reinstated, the Republic of the Philippines will be
deprived of a part of the Mt. Apo National Park consisting of no less than 145,682 square meters. The
[7]
petitioners cite the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals.
The petition is meritorious.
defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written
notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph
2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties
concerned at least three days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the
notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the
hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed
by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.[8]
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or
opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant
to set the time and place of hearing of its motion.[9] The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the
motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and
which the court has no authority to act upon.[10] In cases of motions for a new trial or for the
reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or
pendency of said motion.[11]
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC;
hence, they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion
for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply
with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that the respondents were
actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
 The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M. Padilla that his omission was
sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in preparing numerous pleadings and in the
almost daily attendance in court for naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage, among
others. Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he offered no specific details as to
what pleadings he prepared and the hearings he attended which prevented him from complying with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor Padilla was able to prepare
within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration, he offered no valid
justification for his failure to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a simple one-paragraph
notice of hearing which could have been accomplished in a few minutes. What is so nettlesome is
that the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was signed not only by Solicitor
Padilla but also by Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla, through his
negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for reconsideration the requisite notice of hearing,
the Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed the omission before she affixed her signature
thereon and sought the immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor Padilla before said motion was
filed.She did not. She offered no valid explanation for her faux pas either. The general rule is that the
clients are bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel. [12]
In a case of recent vintage, the Court took to task the OSG for its lackadaisical attitude and
complacency in the handling of its cases for the government and reminded the OSG that:
just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility apply
with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. These
ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they
have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service.Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to
perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalism, intelligence and skill and
to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public.[13]
Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this case. The CA cannot be faulted for
ruling that having lost their right of appeal through the negligence of the OSG the petitioners are not
entitled to a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure. [14]
However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners plea that it
suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the reopening of the trial of the
case for the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court excepts this case from the said
rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of justice to the State through the
negligence of the OSG. The State has the right to adduce its evidence, testimonial and
documentary. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right but,
instead, afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of its
[15]
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. The trial court no less declared in its January 28,
1999 Order that although the petitioners May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was defective,
the Rules of Court should be liberally construed only to make a volte face and issue ex parte an order
dismissing the appeal of the petitioners and canceling the hearing on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration set on February 19, 1999.
What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting of no less than 145,682 square
meters or less than fifteen hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo National Park as shown by
the relocation survey of the panel of commissioners. The case is one of public interest. If the
aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right to
adduce their evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the present petition, the said property would
be forever lost to the prejudice of the State. In Republic v. Imperial,[16]this Court held that:
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion
efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and
granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellants brief. Petitioners appeal
presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due
[17]
course.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents as it ordered the petitioners to
vacate that portion of the subject property occupied by them and to return possession thereof to the
respondents, without requiring the parties to adduce evidence on the factual issues of (a) whether or
not the property covered by the title of the respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park (a forest
reserve); (b) whether or not the building constructed by the petitioners is inside the forest reserve;
and (c) whether or not the petitioners installed a generator unit in the respondents property.
It bears stressing that the trial court formed a panel of commissioners to conduct a relocation
survey of the subject property. The panel of commissioners found that 145,682 square meters which
is a portion of the Mt. Apo National Park had been included in the respondents title to the subject
property. The trial court ignored this and did not even bother to receive the parties respective
evidence on the said report. The panel of commissioners was not even called to testify on its
findings. The appellate court will be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial court and
ascertain whether there has been a travesty of justice to the gross prejudice of the State.
The respondents will not suffer substantial prejudice if the trial is reopened. The records show
that the trial court denied respondents motion for a writ of execution although the trial court had
dismissed the appeal of the petitioners. The respondents did not even assail the order of the trial
court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, dated
February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 23,168-94 are SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial
Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to enable the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The
Office of the Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent the petitioners during the trial. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 83290 September 21, 1990
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for petitioner.
CORTES, J.:
This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court.
In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land Registration) of Zambales, through
Judge James Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de Perio
over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, Decree No. 9328 was issued by the
court ordering the registration of the two (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On December 6,
1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of Zambales was issued to De Perio.
Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697
sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand eight hundred twenty square
meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters
(10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of Zambales. The sale was annotated at the
back of OCT No. 48. In 1954, OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes
de Valencia pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate. In 1962, De Valencia sold
Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia
subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was cancelled and TCT Nos.
11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to the
portion previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the Republic of the Philippines. In
1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica
Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-
12054 and T-12055 were issued to petitioner. Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and
subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots which it sold to individual buyers.
In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of
Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De
Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to Baloy). Respondent
alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was
inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been
released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as
private property. Named defendants were De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife and the
Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint.
With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-intervention. Later, petitioner filed
its first motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata, which the Court of
Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.
Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence, consisting of a land classification map
prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and disposable
only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then proceeded to present its evidence. This was,
however, cut short when the Republic moved to amend its complaint to include as party defendants
all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed its amended complaint. Petitioner again
moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to shorten the
proceedings.
The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as a bar to an action for annulment
of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition.
After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course to the petition and, as required,
the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990 because, as stated in the
resolution:
...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear the oral
arguments of the parties on issues which are considered determinative of the case,
including the following:
1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced back to the turn of
the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and originally titled in 1912 to De
Perio; and
2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to seek the annulment
of the decree of the Court of Land Registration issued in favor of De Perio, his title,
and the titles of his successors-in-interest.
The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were required to submit their
memoranda in amplification of their arguments.
The question presented before the Court is whether or not respondent CA committed reversible
error of law in denying petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res
judicata.
As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must concur for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, Identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281 (1940);
Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9
SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589; Aroc v.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350;
Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. 66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R. No.
L-25660, February 23, 1990].
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled because the land registration
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the respondent Republic puts in issue
the presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue before the Court is whether or not
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein.
Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the nature of the subject parcels of
land in light of the laws prevailing at the time the judgment in the land registration case was
rendered.
Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum, was as follows:
17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the court found
from the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the two parcels of land in
question were agricultural lands as the phrase is used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo de
Perio had been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof
for at least 10 years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the said parcels
of land was in the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed Justo de Perio's
title thereto and ordered their registration in his name. If the Attorney General, the
Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands and the Director of Public Works opposed
the application, then it must be presumed that the court declared the said two
parcels of land to be agricultural lands over their opposition. If they did not oppose,
then it must be presumed that they agreed with the court that the said lands were
really agricultural lands. It must be pointed out that the question as to whether the
two parcels of land in question are agricultural lands and not timber lands is a
question of fact and the finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can not
be reviewed by this Honorable Court at this point in time [Petitioner's
Memorandum, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 211-212].
Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels of land, as described in Decree
No. 9328, debunk the contention that they are forest lands. The parcels of land were bounded by
privately owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice published in the March 1912
issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767 as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of Olongapo,
situated in the municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, P. I." [Annex "A" of Petitioner's
Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].
On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended:
Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11, 1908, then
Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval purposes certain lands of the
public domain in Subic, Zambales which included the parcels of land embraced
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was
only in 1961 that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance,
Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February 2, 1961 and
such portions already classified as alienable and disposable and not needed for
government purposes were declared open for disposition under R.A. No. 274, in
relation to C.A. 141 and Act No. 3038. This means that the lands, subject matter of
the case, were portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open for
disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 230].
Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original Certificate of Title No. 48 was issued on
December 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was
not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest Development as
alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid].
It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7, 1927 ... shows that the parcels of
land covered by OCT No. 48 were still part of the unclassified public forest at the time of the
registration" [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].
Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the Republic has failed to make out a
convincing case for the annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been
established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land, and that
OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No. 48 are valid.
Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which
took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his title
to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may
apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under
the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session and
occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904
could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and occupied.
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) parcels of land after due notice
and hearing. From this, the following conclusions may be derived:
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law, i.e., that they are neither timber
land nor mineral land [Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)];
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the two (2) parcels of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904;
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904, although it was confirmed only later in
1912.
These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions determinative of the case.
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have
been forest land as claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification map
notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were in the
Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been
prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval
purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of private rights, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva orden y separo
para reserva naval, salvo los derechos privados, todos y cada uno de los terrenos
publicos comprendidos dentro de los siguientes limites, a saber: [Proclamation del
Gobernador General de las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885
(2 December 1908)].
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden interest in the annulment of the
decree and the certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his successors
after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of the land has been developed by
petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of residences have been built thereon. At this point in
time, that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area wherein the two (2) parcels of land are found, were
released from the unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic naval reservation
way back in 1961.
Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1961. In a few more
months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through
acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code [Art. 1137].
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving
the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were originally filed by the
Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De
Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public
forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after
the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification
of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said
'contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a
naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons
discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's
regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of
hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public
Works and the Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and that
Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP No.
06259.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as
they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the
Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
1
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. The decision was
2
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in
1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing
lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been
4 Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
5
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No.
141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are
also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they
cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or
in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available
for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change
of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in
the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never
be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
 The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that
the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on
March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in
which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not
of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.
10 11
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, reiterated
the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
12
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive
when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
 planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not (b) Lumber, and
have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may (c) Mineral lands,
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
14
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court agreed with Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove open to disposition or concession under this Act.
or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only
twelve days after the De Porkan case.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or
agricultural lands or forest lands.
purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
(a) Agricultural;
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our
public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and
in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus: to another.

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves
 from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall
not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest
uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the
said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
15
Appeals, where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of
16
Lands, to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands
was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who
has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can
be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private CARPIO,
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of - versus - CORONA, and
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been
shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and
that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty COURT OF APPEALS,
17
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. These matters are not presumed but must be HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case. VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF Promulgated:
by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,
are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the Respondents. August 6, 2008
18
declarant, as we have held in countless cases.

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove D E C I S IO N
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. CARPIO, J.:
The Case
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of
title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory. This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3] Resolutions of the

SO ORDERED. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The

21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155450
represented by the Regional September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Present:
Regional Office No. 2, The Facts
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No.
[4]
381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents),
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square
meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said
[5]
Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT No.
11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in
Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
[6]
1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000
square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private
respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-
petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.
381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the
subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of
Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was
found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the
Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the
same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as
certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and
occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot
[8]
2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.
Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well
as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the
recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of
[9]
titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the
subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed
portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and,
therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was
classified as alienable and disposable.
 [10] merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Private respondents alleged
within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses
that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585
issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication
complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original
and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under
proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in
attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the
respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act.[14] (Citations omitted)
[11]
of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs
of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the
case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a
[12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of
certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
Hence, this petition.
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. [13]

The Issues
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner raises the following issues:

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions
which this court may annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available. The
Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither 2.
can such circumstances be divined from its allegations.Furthermore, such actions 3.
for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for
Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;
Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a
tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First
Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny
the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15]
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the
Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the
public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to
adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said
tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance
of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null
and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine
constitution.
xxxx
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in
the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion
thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous
for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not
have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland
area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and
[16]
of no force and effect whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul
Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land,
specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and
was not alienable and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to
allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available.
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action,
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial
or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or
final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.[18]

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action,
petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature
and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act.[19]
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a
trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the
court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete
and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we
shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued
in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject
property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues
that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the
power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[20]Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of
the action.[21]
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government,[22] we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned
by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se
alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public
purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime
[24]
or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show
that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public
purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27
May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber
[25]
land.
[26]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the
subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated
by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on
which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law
may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare
lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their
boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a
private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in
Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienableunless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise
reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts
had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither
has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed
under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court,because when the application
for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic
also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands
[28]
as provided in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable
would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been
impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid
 law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above,
those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a
decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court
had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the
applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject
land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which
had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular
case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in
1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the
disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that
the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a
certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as
required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as
agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution.[29] When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935
Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed
portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE,we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127245.January 30, 2001]
REP. OF THE PHILS vs. CA, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 30 2001.
G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.)
G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.)
Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our decision dated September 2, 1999 filed
by petitioner Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. in G. R. No.
127022, (2) private respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss dated September 15, 2000.
We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private respondent Peltan filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the judgment appealed from has
become final and executory. We find the same to be unmeritorious since it is already too late to raise
the issue at this stage of the proceedings and we rule that justice will be best served if these cases
will be decided on their merits rather than on mere technicality.
We now consider the merits of these cases.
(1) G.R. No. 127245
In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration on the following grounds:
I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASES;
II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE APPLIED,
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE WHICH IS HIGHER AND MORE COMPELLING THAN RES
JUDICATA WARRANTS THE EXEMPTION OF THIS CASE FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS;
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT UNLESS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE NOT ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE; AND
IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IS NOT RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS TO LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF
PRIME LAND NOW VALUED AT ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00.
Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in Margolles et al. vs. CA 1 230 SCRA 97.,
Peltan Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 2 270 SCRA 83., and Goldenrod, Inc. vs. CA 3 August 10,
1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present case based on the rule of res judicata, as the
said cases pertained to the superiority of conflicting titles of the parties therein whereas the present
case resolves on the validity of the judgment covering a vast parcel of land rendered at the time
when the land was still forest land; that the subject matter of the present case is the entire parcel of
land covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175 square meters, whereas the cited Margolles
case involved only a 188,254 square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. 4216. Petitioner
insists that it was not a party in the Margolles case and that its cause of action in the present case is
based on the inalienability and indisposability of the subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction
of the land registration court over the same. Thus there is no identity of parties or of subject matter,
or of cause of action that would justify application of the rule of res judicata.
Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as alienable and disposable remain so
and it is the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the Executive Department has in
fact classified the land as disposable and alienable; that under the regalian doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State,
thus, whatever title issued before such classification is considered null and void ab initio. It contends
that during the oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that initially it is the government which
has the burden of proof to show that the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid or not legal but the
burden is shifted to private respondents once the government has established the fact that the title
was issued before the land had been declared as alienable and disposable; that since the land
covered by OCT No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified forest land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal
sitting as a land registration court, which took cognizance of the land registration case and all the
proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to the issuance of the published notice of
initial hearing in the 1927 issue of the Official Gazette were invalid, that land registration courts at
the time the Ganas filed their application, had no power nor authority to determine whether the land
applied for was forest or agricultural land subject of registration since the authority to classify lands
was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 (1903) and 2874 (1919).
Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on Section 45 of Act No. 2874 at this
final stage of the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana spouses instituted their application
for land registration on confirmation of imperfect title supposedly grounded on their alleged "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" is fraught with untenable
implications since OCT No. 4216 was not evidenced by any judicial record, decision or decree; thus
private respondents invocation of "private rights" is hearsay and self serving.
On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan argue that this case must be
decided on the basis of the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929 covering the time when
the application for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) and when OCT
No. 4216 was issued; that it is not correct to say that no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by
individuals and entities in a land registration case unless the land was previously covered by an
executive proclamation declaring the land as alienable and disposable. Respondents claim that
property that was already privately owned or under private ownership at the time the Spanish crown
ceded sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States remained private property, even if
the owner had not obtained a muniment of title to his property; thus, such person who has held the
property under color of title may institute a land registration case to have the property brought
under the torrens system and have a title issue in his name; that even assuming that a particular
piece of property was not yet privately owned when the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private
individuals or entities who held "agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively and
notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day
of July 1904 were conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
"government grant" and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
4
such land, Section 54 (6) Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission otherwise known as the Public
Land Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural public land"; that there was no requirement under
Act No. 926 that the land subject of a government grant must have been previously declared as
alienable and disposable by the Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act No. 2874
that the Governor General was given for the first time the authority upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable, timber and
mineral, and to transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government
and disposition. 5 Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under Act No. 2974 just as in Act
No. 926, such power of the Governor General did not affect lands that may have already become
"private property" or have become impressed with a "private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law" 6 Section 8 Act No. 2874.and the fact that such properties were not
previously covered by a declaration by the Governor General that these lands are alienable and
disposable does not affect the validity of the titles of the owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de
San Pedro Macati, the Tuason Entail, the Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de Navotas, the Piedad
Estate, which were issued before World II. The ownership of these parties who owned property
during the Spanish regime was not affected by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred only to
public lands. They further contend that under the laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the
proceedings in LRC Case No. 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406) were conducted, and insofar as the
confirmation of imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of whether land is "agricultural
public land" susceptible of registration in the name of a private party, or "forest land" which is not
susceptible of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration court has the power
and/or jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially prescribed or formulated test i.e.,
whether the land is "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes?".
We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly considered in our decision and
we reiterate that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to annul judgment in view of
the decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's contention that it was never a party to
the Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We have stated that absolute identity of parties is not
required but only substantial identity of parties for the application of the rule on res judicata. We
agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles
case, its claim in the instant case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the
same argument and relied on the same evidence to justify invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that
said title supposedly covers unclassified public land (forest land) so that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property in favor
of the original applicants, the Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of interest as shown by the
identity of the relief sought by one person in a prior case and the second person in the subsequent
case, i. e., to declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216, is sufficient to make them "privy in
law" 7 Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 SCRA 80; Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel,
45 SCRA 289; Widows and Orphans Associations v. CA, 212 SCRA 360.for purposes of the operation of
the rule on res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment.
The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking annulment of the decision of the then CFI
of Rizal sitting as a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) was that the
court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the property subject matter thereof was "forest
land" since at the time the land registration case was filed in 1927, the Governor-General had not
issued a proclamation declaring the subject property as alienable and disposable.
Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court which rendered the
judgment in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the basis for the issuance of
OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very same evidence (FAO 4-1141 [1968]
implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-A), (namely land classification maps), that was
judicially determined by this Court as insufficient to conclusively establish the actual classification of
the land in 1929 and to overcome the overwhelming documentary evidence adduced to support the
validity of OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm the dismissal of the petition to annul the
judgment which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 4216.
We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies in favor of state ownership and
it is the individual who claims that the land is alienable and disposable who must present clear,
positive and absolute evidence to over the presumption of state ownership. While it may be true that
an applicant for original registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain, compliance with this
burden should be proven in the original proceedings instituted by the Gana spouses in 1927, and
must be legally presumed to have been satisfied as a decree was issued in favor of the petitioners-
spouses. Thus where a petition is filed to annul the said judgment on the ground that it is fatally void,
the burden of proving the nullity rests with the petitioner.
8
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 792.this Court
emphasized "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests
upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
judgment is fatally defective." 9 In that case, the petitioner contended in the proceedings filed by the
Republic in the Court of Appeals, that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge
Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.However,
petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of
the decree in 1912 which maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in
1912 and the years prior to that.Before this Court, petitioner reiterated said contention and referred,
for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and
alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.The Court held that
land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 fail to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that, and are
insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.
Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the filing of the action. 10 Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1995 edition, p.
55.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined upon the allegations
made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not to recover upon the
claim asserted therein, a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. 11 Ibid.It
bears stress that what the petitioner sought to annul was the 1929 decision of the land registration
court which became the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time the
original land registration was sought, Act No. 2874 (1919) entitled "An act to amend and compile the
laws relative to lands of public domain, or better known as "the Public Land Act" pertinently provides:
"Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into-
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.
xxx
Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or
any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. However, the Governor General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed,
or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared
open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
xxx
Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement
(2) By sale
(3) By lease.
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By administrative legalization (free patent)
(b) By judicial legalization.
Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by way of force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title, under the provisions of this chapter."
We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is legally doubtful if the authority of
the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and
recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is
quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public-domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree
which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a
determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open
and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land
registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber 12 In Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted
appropriate proceedings to have his title registered but opposition was entered by the Director of
Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by
the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with
the oppositors and excluded parcel no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower
court to register parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as follows:
'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the government, in
the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by
law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable
for agriculture than forest purposes. Great considerations, it must be stated, should and undoubtedly
will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on
forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
13
claimant." taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. Ankron vs.
Government of Philippine Islands, 40 Phil 10.
Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in the respondent Court of Appeals
contended that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at the time when the subject land
was still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is available) and rested its case
solely on the land classification map No. 2623 Project 13-A which failed to conclusively establish the
actual classification of the land in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO No. 4-1 141 signed by then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on January 3, 1968, which
provides:
"1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code, (hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the
control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with
the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the conditions
herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of
xxxxxxxx Las Pias Province of Rizal which are designated and described as alienable
or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC 2623 approved on January 3, 1968."
categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this pronouncement necessarily
includes the issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968
could possibly be all nullified." 14 Margolles vs. CA, supra.
True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably due to bureaucratic constraints,
vast tracts of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city of Manila and Quezon
City were released from classification as forestland belatedly, or long after their residential character
as private property had become a matter of judicial notice. It appears that the City of Manila was
15
declassified as forest land only in 1955 Republic vs. Alano, CA-G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City
16
only on October 24, 1989. See Comment to Motion for Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as
1961, this Court stated that an attorney-at-law "should have known that no property around the City
17
of Manila or in Quezon City is as yet not covered by torrens title". Republic vs. Aricheta, 2 SCRA
469.In this case defendant claimed that he was a possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants'
 18
own submission, Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 835-836.a part of Las Pias comprising 1200 hectares
was declared as alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:
"The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was destroyed during the
Second World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the 1200 hectares
that then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the entire Las Pias as well as part
of the adjacent municipalities as alienable and disposable on January 3, 1968."
The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration and
serves to affirm that indeed parts of Las Pias, albeit the map indicating this area has been lost, were
already open to disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there
19
are extant numerous titles covering various portions of Las Pias, Attached to respondents'
Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration is a list given by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of
at least thirty three (33) original OCTs to lands in Las Pinas, issued before World War II indicating that
there are numerous titles other than OCT No. 4216 which covers parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of
which were issued earlier than 1929.any conflict or overlapping of titles should be litigated by the
interested parties, as what happened in the Margolles, Peltan and Goldenrod cases.
In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously undermine the principle of res
judicata, an old axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age" 20 Carandang vs. Venturaza,
133 SCRA 344.and a fundamental component in every jural system 21 Ibid.that prohibits relitigation of
questions already settled by final judgment of the court, in this case, the highest court. Worse,
considering that there are numerous certificates of titles now in the hands of successors-in-interest of
the original awardees of OCT No. 4216, it will imperil the rule on the indefeasibility of titles which is a
basic underpinning of the torrens system of land registration, and which was precisely instituted to
quiet title to land. Again, contrary to the submission of the petitioner that the obtention of OCT No.
4216 has caused "property rights (to be) unsettled and destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens
system compromised", the relitigation of the question on the validity and genuineness of OCT No.
4216 would open the floodgates or pave the way for the assertion of numerous conflicting claims to
13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and Cavite covered by FAO-4-1141 22 This covers an appropriate area
of 13, 495,22 hectares, situated in Taytay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros,
province of Rizal, and in Bacoor and Imus, Province of Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968.
Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares situated in six municipalities of Rizal
and two municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory that possession before January 3,
1968 could not have ripened into ownership, the State would have to take action to cause the
reversion of the innumerable parcels of lands which were titled earlier than 1968. An attempt at this
time to single out OCT No. 4216 for cancellation and resurrect the contention that it is spurious and
irregularly obtained, despite the pronouncement of this Court positively and categorically vindicating
that very same title in three cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard for the final judgment of the
highest court and does not elicit sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT No. 4216 is put
to rest.
One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the Republic's invocation of the
regalian doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that we are here dealing with land
which although allegedly to be originally of the public domain was eventually, if belatedly, released
for disposition to private claimants. Thus the parties who have sought to assert their own title in this
case (by way of intervention) and in the cases of Peltan and Goldenrod (in petitions to cancel title)
are private parties who purportedly acquired subsequent certificates of title to, or interests in, the
same land. In short, the land in question has been the subject of overlapping or conflicting claims of
private parties. Had the Republic's cause of action been one to cause reversion to the State of public
land illegally titled because it cannot be alienated at all, e.g. military reservations, public parks, or
other lands devoted to public use, and for that reason absolutely insusceptible of private ownership,
the government's plea would have compelled concurrence. As it is, petitioners Firestone, et al., the
losing parties in the Margolles case, have asserted their "legal interest in the success of the instant
Government's action" (Motion for Reconsideration) to annul the 1929 judgment of the land court on
the basis of its subsequent title obtained in 1969 covering a portion of the property earlier titled in
the name of the Gana spouses.
Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended petition, the State does not stand to
be deprived of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Pias has already been declared as
alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion to be caused in favor of the Republic, the land
recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other private persons. With the
classification of the land in question as alienable and disposable in 1968, and in view of the failure of
the State to institute reversion proceedings before 1968, any action to cause the cancellation of
subject title at this time should be subjected to assiduous scrutiny in the light of the existence of
numerous titles covering lands within the coverage of FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495
hectares in Rizal and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap and Sons 23 96 Phil. 447; See also
Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547., this Court upheld the title of an alien who
subsequently became a naturalized Filipino before the State commenced escheat proceedings on the
ground that the "State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of
the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him". The
court rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be thwarted by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens before the State commences forfeiture
proceedings." By parity of reasoning, even assuming that it was convincingly established that the
subject land was indeed still classified as forest land at the time of the registration proceedings in
1929, the fact that the same was eventually released or classified as alienable and disposable should
stay the hand of the Government in bringing an action to question the title issued by a court of land
registration, an action which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was already resolved
with finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing torrens titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which
was issued seventy years ago, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered
thereby to new or subsequent applicants would betray a subservience to technicality that will not be
in the public interest nor serve our declared national land policies any useful purpose. This is a simple
matter of equity and good sense.
(2)G.R. No. 127022
In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration with
the following assigned errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN
PETITIONERS' TITLES (DERIVED FROM OCT No. A-S-47) BEING ADVERSE TO OCT NO.
4216, WERE DECLARED "AS NULL AND VOID" BY THE DECISION RENDERED IN G.R.
NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE).
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS,
AS MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN THE CASE BELOW, "HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN THE PROCESS, THAT PETITIONERS'
LEGAL INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY ANCHORED IN THE SUCCESS OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT ACTION.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE), "MAY NO
LONGER BE REVIVED REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE MAIN PETITION OF THE
PETITIONER REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION IS TO
AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
IV. THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITION
FILED BY PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT CONSOLIDATED CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE
DECISIONS IN THE MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".
Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there was nothing in the three (3) cases cited in
our decision which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although petitioners' titles were, in
effect, set aside in the Margolles case on the ground of superiority of titles. They further allege that
their intervention is based on their legal interest in the success of the government's action which is of
direct and material character because <="" span="">"either gain or lose" by the direct operation and
effect of the judgment. They also contend that in the event that the government succeeds and the
mother title as well as the derivative titles of the private respondents are voided, the Margolles group
had no valid cause to litigate upon the issue of superiority of title in G. R. No. 109490 and petitioners'
derivative titles become the only title to the extent of the 188,424 square meters; that the intended
revival of petitioners supposed nullified titles in the instant proceedings, by way of intervention, is
imperative in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, otherwise, without said intervention, petitioners will
have no other recourse but to commence an entirely new action for the recovery of the subject land
or possibly to institute an action to reopen the Margolles case thereby incurring unnecessary waste
of time, money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided titles of the private respondents will
have to be reverted and consolidated in the name of the Republic to the extreme prejudice of
petitioners.
We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a mere rehash of the arguments raised in
their petition , and which we have already passed upon in our decision. Moreover, Firestone
Ceramics, et al., were the private respondents in G. R. No. 109490 (Margolles case), which filed a
complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio
Margolles et al. (private respondents in present petition). What petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al.
sought to annul in that case was OCT No. 4216. With the ruling of this Court upholding the validity of
OCT No. 4216 the necessary consequence of such decision would be the nullification of the titles
adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the
main action. Hence it has been held that final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal
of said ancillary action. We find no reason to dwell on the other issues raised in view of the fact that
we are dismissing the principal action of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The motions for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are DENIED for lack of merit with
FINALITY.