PALE 5th Batch(147-190)

147. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City.

FACTS: On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana,
who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts of
misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited such a frame of mind and
observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the legal
profession," ordered his disbarment.

On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs of
his honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral character
(clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu, Police
Department of Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of
City Courts and of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club,
Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu,
Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.)

the Court resolved that respondent , as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass,
regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his
filing with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of
the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their
subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C.
Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the
lawyer's oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this
Supreme Court.

Issue: whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by
positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his
character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a
profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.

Law applicable: no provision mentioned but the statutory basis for the
reinstatement is the power of the court to reinstate based on its constitutional
prerogative to promulgate rules on the admission of applicants to the practice of
law. (see UP reviewehahaha)

In the case at bar, respondent Carlos C. Rusiana allowed to take anew the lawyer's
oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this court the requisite fees and
after complying with the above-resolution of the court.

148. A.C. No. 126 October 24, 1952

In re: Atty. TranquilinoRovero.

FACTS: The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against
Atty. TranquilinoRovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent
TranquilinoRovero, having been found in a final decision rendered by then Insular
Collector of Customs to have violated the customs law by fraudulently concealing a
dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times the customs duty
due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently
found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent
TranquilinoRovero was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice
against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised
Administrative Code." The respondents admits the existence of the of the decision
of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up
the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law,
especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely
discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or
in the exercise of his legal profession.

Issue: whether conviction of a lawyer in a smuggling case is a ground for

disbarment

Law applicable: section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office as lawyer.

Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals

certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The
ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the fact that the
respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the Government.

Wherefore, the respondent TranquilinoRovero is hereby disbarred from the practice

of law.

149. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,versus JUDGE FLORENTINO V.

FLORO, JR.

FACTS: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A
pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic
Services (SC Clinic) revealed (e)vidence of ego disintegration and developing
psychotic process. Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed
problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits,
paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998
reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty.
Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City,
on 4 November 1998.

Judge Florofaced a total of 13 charges calling for his disbarment and removal from
his office as a judge. Some of the charges against him were the act of circulating
calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct; for rendering resolutions
without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused
which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct; for appearing in
personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of
hearing; for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system; for the use of highly
improper and intemperate language during court proceedings; for violation of
Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

Judge Floro also claimed that he has certain psychic powers such as the power to
see the future, the power of bilocation, the power to type letters while he is in a
trance and the power to see and consult with his little friends or the duwendes.

ISSUE: WON Judge Floro is guilty of Violation of Code of Judicial Conduct when he
openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System? WON is unfit
to serve as a judge

LAW APPLICABLE: (various provisions of canon were violated but because it is

under Canon 1 of the syllabus - Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct hahaha)

Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of
the law, freeof any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

In the case at bar, Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC
Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him
unfit to discharge the functions of his office

With the foregoing, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation
of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Floro also violated the
Code of Judicial Ethics when he declared that he was pro-accused.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense
justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be
believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well.
He is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that
he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical
explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to
influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a
judge and is thus in the right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a
very awkward position.
A judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He
must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge
Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little
friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt
on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge.
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity are thus substantially
supported by evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of
the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend
that Judge FlorentinoFloro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge,
effective immediately.

150. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO
CORDERO

G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

FACTS:

Abundio Lagunday, conspired with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose
true names, identities and whereabouts were unknown and helped one another,
with treachery, to take advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and
ignominy, and with the use of force and violence took ANGEL ALQUIZA , a 7 y.o.
minor, into a warehouse.

They covered her mouth, slashed her vagina, hit her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabbed her neck and had carnal knowledge of ANGEL against her will
and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO"
 and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death
immediately thereafter.

Her cadaver was later seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of
Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was
seen clad only in a light colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds
on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia,
and with her head bashed in.

All the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot
by police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D.
Vidad) pleaded "Not Guilty."

After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense,
the trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both
accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided
for by law."

Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" in place of the original penalty (reclusion
perpetua).

Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
Judge, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death
under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape
with Homicide.

LAW APPLICABLE:

Rule 1.01., Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct

A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

RULING:
 YES

If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless

Judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.

Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which
respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he
was bound by its provisions.

Under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is
not Reclusion Perpetua but Death.

It is the judges bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for
a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the
law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-
defined instances.

CONCLUSION:

Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

151. ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON.

BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.

FACTS:

Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila.

After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police

identified Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime.
 Go, accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station.

He was arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan.

The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

Later, an information for murder was filed against Go before the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died.

Counsel for Go filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion praying for Go's
immediate release and for a preliminary investigation.

Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's

being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.The case
was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who
,approved the cash bond posted by Go and ordered his release.

Judge Pelayo issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation.

However, Judge motu proprio issued an Order which: (a) recalled the July 12,
1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours
from notice; (c) cancelled the Order granting leave for the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated Gos omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation as a petition for
bail.

Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the

Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial
court a motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the
petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by
respondent judge.

Go voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM.

NBI wrote a letter to the trial court requesting that custody of petitioner be
transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal possession of
firearms involving petitioner.

Go filed a Motion for Recusation praying that respondent judge inhibit himself
from hearing the case.

Go filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro

Manila which was denied by respondent judge.
ISSUE:

WON the Judge Pelayo demontstrated partiality.

LAW APPLICABLE:

Rule 1.02., Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct

A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

RULING:

No

The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the

requirements of due process.

Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity

on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and
being just.

Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would
be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
play favorites."

The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the
benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the
judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in
the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution.

The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" is an

imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public
business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising
standard in the proper dispensation of justice.

While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under
Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, the established rule is that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough.

There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. Bare
allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice.

Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a

judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
 The act of respondent judge of not suspending hearing of case after denial of
petitioner's motion for recusation and during pendency of petition challenging
his orders denying the motion for recusation and the motion to suspend
proceedings and transfer venue outside metro manila is not proof of partiality.

The act of respondent judge of overruling petitioner's objection to the

admissibility of the extrajudicial statement of a prosecution witness who did
not testify thereon is not proof of bias

The act of respondent judge of considering the cancellation of bail

proceedings ripe for resolution and refusing to allow petitioner's counsel to
present anymore witnesses is not motivated by bias

Respondent judge's order allowing petitioner's arraignment and trial without

benefit of preliminary investigation is not necessarily proof of partiality.

CONCLUSION:

Judge Pelayo did not demonstrate partiality in the proceedings.

152. HADJIRUL TAHIL vs.ATTY. CARLITO A. EISMA, Municipal Judge of

Parang, Sulu

A.M. No. 276-MJ June 27, 1975

FACTS:

Municipal Judge Carlito A. Eisma, of Parang, Sulu, is charged by complainant

Hadjirul Tahil with dishonesty in not reporting regularly to his office, contrary to
the recitals of his daily time record.

In his "Investigation, Report and Recommendation", Judge Felix V. Barbers of the

Court of First Instance of Sulu, who investigated the case, recommended the
dismissal of the charge.

According to the findings of the Judge Barbers, Judge Eisma has been regularly
reporting to his office except on certain days when he marked himself absent
during which he explained, his salary was correspondingly deducted therefrom.

The filing of this complaint, Judge Eisma declared, is motivated by hatred, anger
and revenge on the part of Tahil.
 This is occasioned by the fact, when Tahil brought the bail bond of his nephew
Bakkal Ilahal who was charged of murder but disapproved by Judge Eisma.

Again on another occasion, Tahil filed in the Court of Judge Eisma a motion to
dismiss a criminal case wherein the same nephew of Tahil, Bakkal Ilahal, is also
charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms.

Judge Eisma denied his motion because the evidence upon which accused thru
counsel relies in their motion to dismiss are documentary in nature and the Court
is not in a position to accept this kind of evidence without confronting persons
who executed and prepared the documents in question.

Furthermore, some of the documents presented by accused thru counsel are

merely certified true copies, the validity and originality of which are subject to
question.

In relation to the

ISSUE:

WON Judge Eisma acted judiciously on the matter.

LAW APPLICABLE:

Rule 1.03., Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct

A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary and resist any pressure from whatever source.

RULING:

YES.

The Court finds that respondent acted judiciously on the matter.

His disapproval of the bail bond without the bondsmen appearing before him
in the first case (murder) is correct, because as the approving officer he must
satisfy himself that those who made, the undertaking to bail the accused are
the same persons whose names appear on the bail bond and whose
signatures are affixed thereto, otherwise, if only for the sake of friendship to
accomodate Tahil, would make the bond a useless scrap of paper, and which
Judge Eisma can be held responsible.
 As to the order denying the motion to dismiss in the other case (illegal
possession of firearm), the Court finds and is convinced that respondent
acted legally.

A scrutiny of the motion to dismiss and the grounds thereof, are grounds that
could be taken and proven during the trial on the merits of the case.

Respondent not having been satisfied with the documents annexed to the
motion which are purely certified copies made by the clerk of the accused's
counsel, respondent acted correctly and legally.

It appears, however, that in the aforementioned Criminal Case for murder

against Tahils nephew, Judge Eisma admitted having granted bail to the
accused upon the request of a congressman, despite his belief that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

On the basis of this admission, the Judicial Consultant recommends that the
respondent Judge "be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for one (1)
month and warned that a repetition of such a breach of integrity will be dealt
with more sternly."1wph1.t

Judge Eisma's admission that he granted bail because of the request of a

congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong, is indeed reprehensible. But it is not clear from the record whether
or not a summary hearing was conducted by respondent Judge in Criminal
Case No. 241-N for the purpose of bail and, on the basis of his appreciation of
the evidence submitted, granted bail to the accused.

CONCLUSION:

Considering his admission, however, he is hereby admonished to demonstrate a

greater degree of competence, intellectual courage and independence in the
discharge of his judicial duties, for only in that manner can he merit the judicial
position that he occupies and the support and confidence of the people.

153.MAYOR ROGER S. PADILLA v. HON. ROBERTO V. ZANTUA, JR., Municipal

Trial Court, Jose Panganiban, CamarinesNorte [A.M. No. MTJ-93-888
October 24, 1994]

Facts: In a sworn complaint, Mayor Roger S. Padilla of the Municipality of Jose

Panganiban, CamarinesNorte charged respondent Judge Roberto V. Zantua,
Municipal Trial Court of Jose Panganiban, CamarinesNorte with serious irregularities
and grave misconduct in the performance of his official duties for:

(1) failure to decide cases within the prescribed period;

(2) unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases which have been prejudicial to
litigants;
(3) manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and
(4) fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases in his sala.

He alleged that several pending cases have not been tried and that the opposing
counsel, Atty. Augusto B. Schneider, to such cases, was always seen eating and
drinking in the constant company of respondent Judge in public establishments in
the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, CamarinesNorte. Because of delays in the
disposition of these cases and the perceived partiality of respondent Judge of Atty.
Augusto Schneider, the people's confidence in the judiciary is being eroded.
Respondent denied said allegations and explained the actions taken pertinent to the
alleged pending cases. He also argued that he was not fraternizing with lawyers
with pending cases in his sala, explaining that in the case of Atty. Schneider, he is
the only lawyer in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban and it is but natural for
respondent Judge to be friendly with him but maintains that their friendship has
never been a hindrance to the proper disposition of the cases in his sala as his
impartially is known not only in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, but also in the
province of CamarinesNorte as shown by his decisions in MTC Mercedes, MTC
Paracale and MTC Basud. Charges were dismissed.

Issue: Whether respondent committed the act of fraternizing with lawyers who
have pending cases in his sala?

Law: Code of Judicial Conduct, Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

Ruling: Yes.

We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge. Constant company

with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that
favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may
find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in
public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well arouse
suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may undermine the peoples faith in the
administration of justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only
lawyer in the locality. [Padilla vs. Zantua, Jr., 237 SCRA 670(1994)]
A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. [Padilla vs. Zantua, Jr., 237 SCRA 670(1994)]
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen. [Padilla vs. Zantua, Jr., 237 SCRA 670(1994)]

On the issue of unreasonable delaying of disposition of cases.

Complainant in the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the cases
referred to in the complaint which remained undecided after the lapse of
the required 90-day period to decide cases; hence, the dismissal of
charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order. The delay in the trial of
the cited cases in the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936,
Criminal Case No. 5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of
herein respondent Judge. The delay was caused by the numerous postponements
both by the prosecution and the defense. However, respondent Judge should be
reminded of the directive in Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989
requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial which is to be
terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing. [Padilla vs.
Zantua, Jr., 237 SCRA 670(1994)]

Conclusion: Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and

camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be asked from respondent
judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of eating
and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may
well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the
litigants in the impartiality of the judge.

Dispositive: respondent Judge is hereby ADMONISHED with a warning that a

repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Judge is reminded to be prompt in the disposition of cases pending in his sala.

154. RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, [Re:

Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No.
103692, 564 SCRA 365(2008)] [A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA.September 9,
2008.*] (Note: Sobranghabangkasonato at most likely madamingtanongsi
sir dito so mas okay nabasahinyung detailed facts)

Facts (detailed facts provided below): This is regarding the GSIS-Meralco

bribery case heard by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. This complex case
began with a complaint filed by the GSIS with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the Philippines (SEC) questioning the unvalidated proxy votes used
by the Lopez family in the last board election of the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco). The SEC issued a cease and desist order (CDO) against Meralco, which
was ignored by the latter. A show cause order (SCO) was then issued by the
SEC, whereupon Meralco petitioned the Court of Appeals, questioning the
jurisdiction of the SEC. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to the SEC while the Special 9th Division composed of Associate Justices
Vicente Q. Roxas, Jose L. Sabio Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal heard the case. Roxas
was assigned as the ponente while Sabio was the acting chairman, during the
absence of J Mendoza. J Mendoza reported back for work and a question arose as to
whom between J Mendoza and J Sabio the case should remain.

Later, Sabiocalleged that an emissary of Meralco tried to bribe him with P10 million
to have a case transferred to another appeals court justice. The criminal charges
are obstruction of justice and malfeasance in office. Sabio did not mention any
names, but businessman Francis de Borja stepped forward and claimed that he was
the alleged emissary, accusing Sabio of asking for a P50 million bribe to side with
Meralco, in response to De Borjas question What will it take for you to resist the
governments offer? The alleged government offer was a Supreme Court position.
In the latter course of the investigation, Sabio let slip that his brother, PCGG
Chairman CamiloSabio, called him up twice to urge him to side favorably with the
government. The late admission of the allegedly unethical and criminal action called
into doubt the innocence of Sabio in coming forward with his expose and the
veracity of his entire story. These acts are alleged to be punishable under Article
208 and 243 of the Revised Penal Code respectively.

It also came out during the course of the Supreme Court investigation that Court of
Appeals Justice Vicente Roxas, the ponente of the controversial Meralco decision,
had himself committed improprieties. One such impropriety was that
Roxaspreempted the legal opinion of Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez that the
Special 9th Division should have ruled on the case as per the Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (IRCA), and not the 8th Division to which Roxas was transferred,
and which eventually promulgated a ruling in favor of Meralco, with Justices Reyes
and ApolinarioBruselas hastily signing the ponencia without going over or reading
the memoranda submitted by concerned parties.

Issue: Whether the Justices of CA violated the Code of Judical Conduct?

Law Applicable: Canon 1 of Code of Judicial conduct.

Sec. 1 Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of
the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Sec. 2. In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial

colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent
to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with and
influence by the executive and legislative branches of government but must also
appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Ruling: Yes. (Note: May ibang justices pa nanadamay ditto pero nag focus
langakosa Canon 1)

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x xx free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other

relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate

connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to
be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of
Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on
to the Meralco case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced
by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the
following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the
chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice
Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously
prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to
perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for Justice
B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9 th Division, which he probably
intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the
TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had
been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had
he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case.
However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the
chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when
Justice Sabios designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of
Justice Reyes leave of absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn
insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude
towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper
interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to
aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather
fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior
unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part
of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications
between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery
attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice
Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and
the institution to which he belongs.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and
imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De
Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute
simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals
which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal

The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of
Investigators, to wit:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she

allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco
decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties memoranda and
without the deliberation among members of the Division required by
the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30,
2008 some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed
herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the
decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices
of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed
weakness and lack of independence on her part. [139]

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are

instructive in this regard:

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the

basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from

judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to
make independently.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure

constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should
be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.
Conclusion: While it is true that Justice Sabio could not have possibly known prior
to his brother's call that his brother intended to speak to him about the Meralco-
GSIS case, the fact remains that Justice Sabio continued to entertain a call from his
brother, who also happens to be an officer of the executive branch, despite realizing
that the conversation was going to involve a pending case. Justice Sabio asks the
Court if he should have immediately slammed the phone on his brother. Certainly,
such boorish behavior is not required. However, as soon as Justice Sabio realized
that his brother intended to discuss a case pending before him or in his division,
Justice Sabio should have respectfully but firmly ended the discussion.That Justice
Sabio did not do as his brother asked is of no moment. Section 5, Canon 1 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct maintains such a high bar of ethical conduct that actual
influence is not a prerequisite before a violation is deemed committed. If a
magistrate's actions allow even just the appearance of being influenced, it is
deemed a violation. [Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. A.M. No.
08-8-11-CA]

Dispositive: The Supreme Court, voting 121, ordered the dismissal of Roxas after
he was found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service.

Sabio was suspended for two months after he was found guilty of simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the CA. Vasquez was severely
reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the
incidence that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, Reyes was found guilty
of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance, and Vidal was found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a justice of the appellate court for being too compliant"
when she allowed herself to sign the decision without reading the parties
memorandum.

Detailed Facts:During the May 27, 2008 stockholders meeting, GSIS' President
Winston Garcia obtained an SEC cease-and-desist order to stop and defer the
counting of proxy votes held by the Lopez group until questions on its validity were
resolved. GSIS accused the Lopezes of rigging the process.[14] GSIS failed to gain
control of Meralco after a TRO from the Court of Appeals is issued, and the SEC
order placed on hold. Meralco retained its 5 seats, the government its 4, while the 2
others are independent directors ArtemioPanganiban and Vicente Panlilio. Aside
from Manuel Lopez, the Meralco directors elected are Jesus Francisco, Felipe Alfonso,
Christian Monsod and Cesar Virata, while the government board members elected
aside from Garcia, are Bernardino Abes, Daisy Arce and Jeremy Parulan.

On May 30, the said temporary restraining order from the Philippine Court of
Appeals, against the SEC order from the 9th division, composed of Justices Roxas
and Vidal was released. They are joined by substitute Justice Jose Sabio,
replacement for Justice Bienvenido Reyes who was on leave. Despite the return of
Justice Reyes in time from his leave, and his trying to claiming back his post, Sabio
refused to give up the position. The TRO is released with Sabio signing instead.[15]
Senior Associate Justice Rodrigo Cosico retires, and the Court of Appeals undergoes
a mandatory reorganization. Following court rules, the case followed the Justice-
writer assigned to it, Justice Vicente Roxas. The case moved to the 8th division,
composed of Justice Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas.

The Courts 8th Division renders a 57-page judgment authored by Justice Vicente
Roxas on July 24 against the GSIS, affirming Meralcos stance that the SEC has no
jurisdiction over the issue.[10][16]

A large scale negative media blitz is launched by unknown persons against the
author of the decision Justice Roxas.

Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, together with Justice Jose Sabio, former special 9th
Division members, challenged the decision, per letter to CA Presiding Justice
Conrado Vasquez Jr., thus: "How can the 8th Division issue an order when it is the
9th that has been hearing the complaint of alleged irregularities in the Meralco
election?" It is also the 9th Division that issued the temporary restraining order on
the SEC order to Meralco on May 30."

Assistant Clerk of Court, lawyer Manuel Cervantes, said no irregularity had been
committed when the 8th division came out with the decision instead of the 9th,
simply a result of the reorganization of the court. "The case goes with
the ponente(justice assigned to pen the case), Cervantes explained. Justice
Vicente Roxas is the ponente. Even with the change in division, the case stays with
him." Due to the retirement of some justices, Justice Vidal was reassigned to the
6th Division while Reyes became chair of the 8th, Cervantes said. Roxas was
moved to the 8th division, Vidal went to the 6th, and Sabio to the 9th. And since the
rule is that the case goes with the ponente,the 57-page decision was issued by the
division of which Justice Roxas was now a part, he said.[17] Permission is not
required from the previous division nor its justices.

He said the IRCA (Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) does not require the
justices who issued the TRO be the same justices to render the decision.
The Court of Appeals Reorganization Office Order No. 200-08-CMV was issued by
Presiding Justice Vasquez on July 4, three weeks before the decision was released.

Justice Jose Sabio refuses to let go of the Meralco GSIS case, and insists on being a
part of the division to decide the case. He submits the case to the internal rules
committee of the court, headed by Justice Edgardo P. Cruz. The Court of Appeals
committee decides as early as June 20 that the committee, which clarifies internal
rules of the court, rejects Justice Sabios argument that the pending case should go
with him following a court reorganization. By the rules, the division headed by
Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes should hear the leadership row at Meralco. Sabio
disregards Cruz's recommendation on the basis he was only a "junior justice".[15]

On July 26, Justice Sabio, with the encouragement of Justice Vidal (his colleague in
the 9th Special Division) broke a bribery attempt news and wrote to P.J. Vasquez, Jr. .
[18] He joined Justice Vidal, initiating further, a media expose of their squabbles,
alleging something stinks in the Meralco court ruling. Presiding Justice Vasquez
released his opinion, also, per his July 24, 2008 Letter to Justices Bienvenido L.
Reyes & Vicente Q. Roxas.[19][20][21]

Businessman Francis de Borja emerges and reveals to the media a notarized and
sworn affidavit that it was Justice Sabio who brought up a P50 million price for him
to act in favor of Meralco in its dispute with the GSIS. Mr. de Borja asserts that
Mr.Sabio had told him a Supreme Court seat was being offered in exchange for a
ruling in favor of the GSIS, which is trying to wrest control of Meralco from the
Lopezes. Expecting Sabio to answer that he would not be swayed by any offer and
would rule according to his conscience, De Borja asked what it would take for him to
resist the supposed government offer of a seat on the Supreme Court and money.
He was taken aback when Sabio replied "P50 million, and then left.[22]

Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez comes under fire in the newspapers. Vasquez is
criticized of having been able to spare the Court this trouble on the court's integrity
had he followed the recommendation of the rules committee. With Vasquez's
opinion favoringSabio despite the reorganization, and the lack of a preliminary
injunction that would exempt Meralco from being transferred to Reyess and Roxas's
division, doubt is cast on Vasquez's motivations. [15]

Manolo Lopez calls the accusations of Sabio a malicious and a pure fabrication. He
vehemently denied the allegations, especially Sabio's accusation that he (Lopez)
was waiting in the car during the meeting. He said he was out of the country for a
medical check-up when the incident supposedly happened, and returned only last
July 13. As proof, he showed tickets showing his departure dated June 27 and his
arrival dated July 13.[23]

The panel investigation finds out that Chairman CamiloSabio of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government(PCGG) called up his brother, Justice Jose Sabio Jr.
twice. The first time on May 30, to lobby his brother to adopt the position of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Manila Electric Co. (Meralco).
This was hours before the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals (temporarily
headed by Sabio) issued a temporary restraining order in Meralcosfavor. Camilo
called up Jose at 8 a.m., when the courts practice is to hand down its decisions at
10 a.m. Then, after the Court of Appeals decided the case with finality on July 23,
Camilo called up Jose again, asking why he hadnt signed the decision.

When Camilo called the first time, he informed Jose that he was going to be the
acting chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the court; and that furthermore, a
TRO against the Securities and Exchange Commission order that the GSIS desired
was being prepared. Camilo suggested to Jose that the latter shouldnt sign the
TRO. When Camilo called once more, it was to ask why the 8th Division, and not the
Special 9th Division had decided. Justice Jose had lobbied strenuously to head the
8th even after Justice Bienvenido Reyes, the person he was substituting for, was
back on the job.

Retired Supreme Court Justice Romeo Callejo Sr., one of those conducting the
investigation, castigated Justice Sabio why he didnt bring up the intervention of his
brother previouslyor reprimand his brother. Why did you not report your brothers
attempt to influence you? That was unethical. You did nothing; you are a professor
of ethics. Did you not consider that your brothers attempt was criminal? Callejo
asked.

Sabios replies alternated between the irrelevant (his brother was older than he, he
said) to patent hair-splitting (there was no outright offer of a bribe from his brother).
They only reduced the reasonable doubt so far supporting Sabio by reducing the
options the justice operated under to three: he was hopelessly nave; he has been
too clever for his own good; or he is a bumbling prisoner of circumstance, who has
blown the lid off a legal system so thoroughly tainted it cannot absolve itself the
longer the inquiry continues.

This called into question Justice Sabios squabble with fellow Reyes over who should
have jurisdiction over the case. It explained why Justice Sabio would, in turn, on July
1, meet lawyer Francis de Borja to discuss a case he had every reason to know
would be brought up by a party friendly to Meralco. Its either that the Ateneo de
Manila Law Schools professor of legal ethics had no comprehension of the subject
he teaches or he is a plain and simple hypocrite. He brags about his being a
righteous professor of legal ethics which we can never believe now after knowing
from the investigation his lapses to perform what is expected of a member of the
court.

This provided circumstantial evidence for concluding that Sabio was playing off both
sides to see who might bid highest, confirming, incidentally, many details in De
Borjas affidavit while calling into question the completeness, and ultimately the
veracity, of Sabios own statements.
Justice Sabio move to come forward to virtuously blow the whistle is cast in doubt
by his selectivity. He denied allegations of Palace blandishments to do the GSIS
bidding, but he left out his brothers intervention. He is looking more and more like a
double-dealer who got a juicy Palace offer but tried to cash in quickly by basically
making it obvious to the other side he would be open to a counteroffer. [5]
As a government official, Camilos act of calling his brother to influence his decision
is punishable under Article 243 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 243 (orders or
requests by executive offices to any judicial authority) states that :"Any executive
officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with
respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of

justice shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine."

As an official of the Court, Justice Sabio is mandated under Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code to report any possible violation of the law, with negligence and
tolerance as the offending act. Article 208 states: The penalty of prison correctional
in its minimum period (six months and 1 day to 2 years and four months) and
suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer or officer of the law who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting
prosecution for the punishment of violations of the law, or shall tolerate the
commission of offenses. [6] The public is in anticipation whether criminal charges
for bribery and violation of Article 208 of the RPC will be filed against Sabio the
soonest possible time to determine the extent of his culpability.
155. LUCILA TAN, complainant, vs. Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
[Tan vs. Rosete, 437 SCRA 581(2004)] [A.M. No.MTJ-04-1563. September 8,
2004.* (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)]

Facts:Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and
Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines v. Alfonso PeSy and
pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then
presided by respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge
allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant
along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her
that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of
the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge's unsigned Decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120dismissing the complaints against the
accused. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to
respondent's demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well
supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by
respondent judge. Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S.
Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan,
Metro Manila,1 for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019)
Respondent judgedenied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it
was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision.
Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada,
to obtain judgment in her favor. Respondent further stated that complainant kept
bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in
Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to
a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also
claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was
planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, he said that he had entrusted to
Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left
for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to
thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any
member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct?

Law: Sec. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in

relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

Ruling: Yes.

After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the
documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant's version
more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also
presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his
staff. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judge's draft
decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the
people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant
the reversal of a case's disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the
decision.The respondent's evidence did not overcome the facts proved by
complainant. We note that the testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses
contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed complainant's claim that she
met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea
(Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand,
denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never
went out with respondent judge in non-office functions.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of

judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded
from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial system is
founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes
the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office
in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is
therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach. Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with
complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with
litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of
judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute
gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[Tan vs. Rosete, 437 SCRA 581(2004)]

Conclusion: [Respondents] act of sending a member of his staff to talk with

complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with
litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of
judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench.

Dispositive: Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office

without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.

Canon 1 Judicial Conduct

156. Dimatulac v Villon

Issue:

WON Judge Villon Acted in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment
an in denying the petitioners motion to set aside arraignment despite his
knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and submission of vital evidence to prove
the murder not homicide was committed.

Held:

Yes. The judge, on the other hand, should always be imbued with a high sense of
duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of
justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest
in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge
must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and
confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a
judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not
unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judges
action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the State
and offended party to due process of law.

Facts:

The heirs of SPO3 Dimatulac filed a complaint for murder against the Mayor Yabutet.
Al. Thereafter, warrants of arrest were issued by the respondent judge against the
private respondents. The latter were also ordered to file their counter-affidavits, but
among the 17 who were impleaded, only four submitted their C-A. Finding probable
cause, the judge ordered the forwarding of the entire records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for further action.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation despite

the accused being at large. Her resolution was appealed to the Secretary of DOJ by
the accused.

Judge Villon, respondent judge, issued an order resetting arraignment of the

accused. On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilt .
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Arraignment, citing the resolution of 30 April 996 of the Court of Appeals
which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining
order until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent; stressed
that the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was clearly
unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable attendance of
circumstances qualifying the killing to murder.

Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners motion to set
aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs right to a speedy trial.
RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.c

157. Romero v Valle

Issue:

WON the judge is guilty of grave misconduct

Held:

Yes. , respondent judge exhibited shortness of temper and impatience, contrary to

the duties and restrictions imposed upon him by reason of his office. In Calalang vs.
Fernandez, Adm. Case No. 175-J, June 10, 1971, Westated that a judge should show
no shortness of temper for it merely detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness
that should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. In the case at bar,
respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging complainant in a heated
discussion, not only failed to observe the proper decorum expected of judicial
officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise failed to preserve and enforce order
in his court. Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that
without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel
to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very
well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums
by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom.

Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but such explanation
cannot be taken as carrying a satisfactory. for his having chosen to carry the same
in plain view of the complainant and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he
came out of his chambers on his way to the stairs. Taken in the light of what had
just transpired, the actuation of respondent judge was not an innocent gesture, but
one calculated to instill fear in or intimidate complainant. We cannot let this pass
unnoticed. Respondent judge's behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a
serious violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but
also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach." Moreover, it reveals an
attitude diametrically opposed to our pronouncement in De la Paz v. Inutan, 64
SCRA 540. that "the judge is the visible representation of law, and more importantly,
of justice." Certainly, one who lives by the uncivilized precept of "might is right," is
unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to uphold the rule of law.

Facts:

Atty. Arturo A. Romero charged Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr;.of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch XII with grave misconduct and oppression for having uttered
in "You step out and we will finish the matter without declaring a recess during a
court proceeding. That complainant saw respondent judge outside the courtroom
holding a gun with his right hand.

Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges and
branded the same as "exaggerated, sensationalized, fabricated and inherently
improbable and contrary to human experience and one-sided. Respondent judge
likewise explained that he has been issued by the provincial commander the
necessary permit to carry his licensed pistol outside his residence on account of a
threat on his life from the New People's Army. By way of prayer, he asked that
complainant be suspended from the practice of law for a certain period of time.

CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL ACTIVITIES

RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. chan robles
virtual law library

158. Castillo v Calanog

Issue:
WON the penalties of AttyCalanog should be lifted

Held:

Yes. Atty. Calanog is a relatively young man of 54. If his contributions during the four
years that he was an RTC judge were any measure of his potentiality for public
service, he has productive years still ahead of him which should not be foreclosed.
The penalty of disqualification from appointment to any public office should be lifted
so that the opportunity for public service in other fields may be opened to him. His
return to the judiciary may not be feasible at this time considering the recency of
our decision, but certainly in the vast field of public service there should be room for
the gainful employment of his talents. Indeed in the past this Court showed
compassion in imposing penalties, taking into account the peculiar circumstances of
the case. In one instance it modified a judgment of dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of a judge.

Facts:

Atty. Calanogwas found guilty of immorality and ordered dismissed from the service
"with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a
government-owned or controlled corporation, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
He pleads for mercy, to be exempted from further service of the penalty imposed on
him. In support of his petition he alleges that sufficient time has elapsed since his
dismissal and that since then he has been "sufficiently punished and disciplined;"
that he has undergone moral reformation and he promises never again to be
involved "wittingly or unwittingly with any person or activity which may adversely
affect his character and integrity;" and that except for this case he had an otherwise
exemplary record as an RTC judge. As proof of his moral regeneration, Atty. Calanog
alleges that he has become active in religious and civic activities.

159. Macalintal v Teh

Issue:

WON the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

Held:

Yes. Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not
only be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or
doubt both in its fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible representation of
the law and, most importantly, of justiceshould be the embodiment of
independence, competence, and integrity.../../../../../DemonStar/1997/03-
12/am_rtj_97_1375.htm - _edn12 Once again, the Court would also wish to say that
a member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments and show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules
and authorities doctrines. Not for a moment, indeed, does the learning process in
law cease.

In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the acceptable norm
for judges is clearly manifest. In Castaos vs. Escao, Jr.,the Court has had occasion to
state:

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all,
faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.

Facts:

It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty.
Macalintal in an aforenumbered election case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the
resolution, via a petition for certiorari, before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC"). While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh actively
participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still later,
an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith filed a motion to prevent
respondent Judge from further acting on Election. Instead of acting on the motion
for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and filed his answer before his own
court. Thereafter, he was charged with gross ignorance of the law

Law:

RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

160.) G.R. No. 112684.April 26, 1994.*

RODOLFO E. PARAYNO, CLEMARTIN B. ARBOLEDA, EDUARDO R. PEREZ,
CASIMIRO C. CARANCHO, DIOSDADO T. SAMSON, MAXIMO G. SUMERA and
MARCELINO M. DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ILUMINADO MENESES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, LORENZO M. MATEO, ARTURO ESTRADA, NORMA
LUSTINA and PABLO MERCADO, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The other petitioners are members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the municipality who, along with Parayno, are the protestees in separate
election protests now still pending with the court a quo.
The mayoralty protest involving Parayno, was originally raffled and assigned
to Branch 45 of RTC , presided over by Judge Manuel Villanueva. The councilors
protest, involving the other petitioners, was assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court, with JudgeIluminadoMeneses presiding.
A motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner Parayno,
which the court promptly granted. The records of mayoralty case were thus
forwarded to Executive Judge Romulo Abasolo, the latter, directed the assignment of
the case to Branch 46 of the court but only after its presiding Judge, Hon. Roger
Domagas, agreed to hear and try the case. Claiming impropriety in the assignment
of the case, petitioner Parayno assailed before this Court the order of the Executive
Judge. The Court issued a TRO and promptly remanded the case to the CA for
proper disposition. The appellate court set aside the questioned order of and it
directed the Executive Judge to instead include the case in the regular raffle for
reassignment. The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the
councilors protests were then pending. A Motion to Use Revision Committee
Report Blank Form was filed by protestant, private respondent Lorenzo Mateo, thus
he manifested and claimed that there seems to be a certain degree of greater
sympathy of the Judge to the Protestees. The following day, respondent judge
issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing the two cases. The
motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of inhibiting himself from further hearing the
two cases is valid?
LAW APPLICABLE: Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No to judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, or
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a judge,
sitting in a case, will at all times be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well
capable to render a just and independent judgment. A litigant, we often hear, is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge. Due process requires it.
Indeed, he not only must be able to so act without bias but should even appear to
so be. Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the need for some kind of
manifestation of its reality.
Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself
voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical
grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some
tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative is that it is the
judges sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor.
CONCLUSION: The order of Judge is improper since it is not grounded with just
and valid reasons. Hence, the order of inhibiting himself is set aside and he was
directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at bar.
161.) MERCEDITA G. LORENZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE PRIMO L.
MARQUEZ, respondent.
Adm. Matter No.MTJ-88-141.June 27, 1988.*
FACTS: In a sworn statement dated October 11, 1987 executed by Mercedita
G. Lorenzo and in an indorsement of December 2, 1987 of the Chief State
Prosecutor transmitting the report of the National Bureau of Investigation dated
November 5, 1987, the herein respondent Judge Primo L. Marquez of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon is charged on three counts, and among which
is, his violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in deciding Civil Case No.
1202 entitled Kilusang Bayan PampananalapingSariaya vs. Gilda Balid, et al., when
he was the former counsel of the plaintiff. The complaint was filed by Crisostomo L.
Luna, president and board chairman of the plaintiff, who is his uncle. The
respondent was then a member of the board of directors of the plaintiff. In an order
of November 28, 1986, Judge Parentela declared defendants in default for failure to
file their answer. When the respondent assumed office he issued an order on
February 10, 1987 requiring plaintiff to secure the services of another counsel in his
place and he set the case for hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision. on April 2, 1987, he rendered a
decision favorable to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: whether or not judge is guilty of misconduct?
LAW APPLICABLE: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows: Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in
which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged that since
there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the
case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he
must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much
less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by
them and entered upon the record.
CONCLUSION: The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules
of conduct betrays his unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over
and above his sworn duty to administer the law impartially and without any fear or
favor, thus, he is guilty of grave and serious misconduct for deciding Civil Case of
KBPS vs. Gilda Balid, et al., wherein he was a former counsel for plaintiff in violation
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent is hereby DISMISSED from the service.
162.) Adm. Matter No.R-281-RTJ.August 26, 1986.*
PONCIANO A. ARBAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE MELECIO B. BORJA, Regional
Trial Court. Branch 20, Naga City, respondent.
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed against judge Borja wherein it
was alleged that he hit with the pistol he was carrying the herein petitioner on the
left side of his head, sending him sprawling to the floor and rendering him
momentarily unconscious gun and threatened his companions. Thereafter, he fired
with his gun the balcony of the apartment he was lodging in. The case was referred
to Justice Ejercito of the Intermediate Appellate Court for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Answer, Judge Borja denied the charge against him.
Neither the complainant nor his counsel appeared at the subsequent
scheduled hearings. Instead, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw the
Petition. The respondent judge also made a public apology which the petitioner was
duly satisfied with. Hence, Justice Ejercito recommended the dismissal of the case,
however, the Court ordered further investigation. In accordance with the resolution
of the Court, Justice de Pano conducted further hearings of the case, and designated
the then Acting Court Administrator Arturo Buena to investigate the matter. Based
on the memorandum of Acting Administrator Buena, stating that a prima facie case
of the reported pistol whipping of Engineer PoncianoArban by Judge Borja has been
established, although lacking in details, thus Court issued a resolution resolved to
refer this matter to Associate Justice Ejercito for investigation, report, and
recommendation. This Court also suspended Judge MelecioBorja effective
immediately from office until further orders. Media reported that the incident was
caused by jealousy over a woman, who, with two other women, was with Arbans
group, then left Arban to join the Judge, but later decided to again join Arbans
group.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the complaint and the public apology
made by Judge Borja is sufficient to exonerate him from liability?
LAW APPLICABLE: Canon 4 of Code of Judicial Conduct.
No. Whatever the motive may have been, the violent action of the
respondent in a public place constitutes serious misconduct and the resultant
outrage of the community in Naga City is a blow to the image of the entire judiciary.
Judge Borja violated the established norm for judicial behavior that a judges
official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Hence, the fact that the
complainant filed a motion to withdraw his complaint and the fact that the public
apology of Judge Borja satisfied the petitioner as far as his personal interests in the
case were concerned is not very material nor controlling. The truth is what is
important. Did the respondent Judge commit an act of serious misconduct, one
which degrades the integrity of the judicial office and serves as a demoralizing
example to the public?
The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice.
From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him
an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station
of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact
with the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return
that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law.
CONCLUSION: Motive for hitting Arban is immaterial in this administrative case
against Judge Melecio B. Borja, since judges are required to be free from any
impropriety, thus, he is thus guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service.
163.) A.C. No. 4497.September 26, 2001.*
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
FLORANTE E. MADRONO,1 respondent.
FACTS: Complainant VenustianoSaburnido is a member of the PNP Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a
former judge of the MCTC, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental. Previous to this
administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases
against respondent: charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the
judiciary for having been found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at
complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation; in the case
of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroo, where he it was alleged that he reduced the bail
in a criminal case without prior notice; and in the case of Sps. Saburnido v. Judge
Madroo, spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain
confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the
goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the
goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent
was found guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been
harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them because they have filed
the abovementioned administrative case against him, namely: 1. serious irregularity
for extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the
then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group; 2. Of falsification, for inserting an entry in
the police blotter regarding the loss of Saburnidos firearm; 3. evasion through
negligence, for taking custody of a prisoner who escaped without permission from
his superior; and against RosaliaSaburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.
IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent
indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction and recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
ISSUE: whether or not the act of filing numerous cases against the Spouses
constitutes misconduct which justifies his disbarment?
LAW APPLICABLE: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. x xx
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein
complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act
evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another
individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the
judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against
complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the
obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge. However, suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
CONCLUSION: Filing multiple complaints constitutes misconduct since it reflects
on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession because his tenacity in
pursuing several cases against the complainants is not about obtaining justice for
someone who has been grievously wronged but because of exact revenge.
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
164. SALVADOR SISON v. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. [A.M. No. RTJ-03-
1771. May 27, 2004]

PER CURIAM:

The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, an MMDA traffic
enforcer, filed a verified Complaint charging Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff
Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, with grave
abuse of authority which stemmed from an Order in Criminal Case No. 99-002 which
the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to
explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant, and to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt. The said Order reads, thus:
Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on
September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of said date, said
authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an official
errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifaniodelos Santos Avenue while he
was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a
right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the
right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off
and not readily visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as
the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and showed to the accused
the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof
introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers,
and accordingly begged that he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that
there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic
violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated
the drivers license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did
the same to somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.

The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his
arrogance and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and
accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the
Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.

Because of the complainants failure to appear before the respondent judge as

directed, the latter, after verifying that the said order was duly served on the
complainant, issued another Order for the complainants arrest and commitment,
and for the latter to appear for hearing before his sala. The respondent sheriff then
served the order on the complainant. On the scheduled hearing, the complainant
appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a mistake
and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge, thereafter, lifted
the first Order.

In his complaint, the traffic enforcer alleged that he greatly surprised when
respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him without any warrant of
arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor
vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las Pinas City who ordered him
detained in the Las Pias City Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his
family to inform them where he was because he failed to return home in the
evening and the next day he was informed that there will be a hearing of
his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Pias
City. During the hearing, the complainant was made to admit by the respondent
Judge that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son, conscious that he
committed the gravest abuse of his authority, and perhaps in anticipation of the
legal action the undersigned complainant may take against him after he is
discharged from detention.

The complainant prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the
service. In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations
against him, contending that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to
the courts of law. The respondent narrated that on September 8, 1999, he ordered
his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure
certain records. While on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant
for an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant that he was
on an errand for his father, the respondent judge, to which the complainant
reportedly uttered, Walang Judge, Judge Caoibessa akin; kahaponnga,
abogadoanghinuliko.

ISSUE:

Whether the judge was guilty of impropriety.

HELD:

YES. The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of
Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual
respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative.
First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause
resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet
know at the time) because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only
doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving
into a one-way street from the wrong direction,regardless of the office or position of
the violators father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the
circumspection expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were
invited by Caoibes IIIs attempt to bluff his way out of the apprehension because he
was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds
to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son
should have challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the
pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also
administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither
was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the
apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the drivers license after September
29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows
that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead
of Sison.

The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by
which to consider Sisons apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. The act of a
judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of
retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge should so behave at all times to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The very
delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and
confidence of the people, for he is the visible representation of the law. The
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the
judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.

For being guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, the judge was DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

165. ATTY. DAVID G. OMPOC v. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES [A.M. No. MTJ-86-
11 September 27, 1989]

PER CURIAM:

The letter-complaint charged respondent Judge with gross misconduct in office,

stating, among other things, that "Judge Norito Torres is wanting of that degree of
moral fiber required of a member of a judiciary. He is unfit to hold such an exalted
position and his removal from such will pave the way to cleanse the judiciary of the
corrupt and graft-prone judges.The complaint alleged that in an ejectment case
where the complainant was the counsel of one of the parties, after the case was
raffled, the judge invited him at his residence at Banawa, Cebu City and instructed
him to bring his client, Mr. Charlie Taguiam, proprietor of Deco Sales. The judge
allegedly guided them what evidence and arguments should they present. As the
conversation progressed he requested Mr. Charlie to install a brand new
airconditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace and said airconditioner was installed without
Judge Norito Torres paying for it. After that Judge Norito Torres allegedly had been
pestering his client Mr. Charlie Taguiam with request for loans which he never
acknowledged by means of a receipt and was given sums of money totalling Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in various amounts and on different dates. Before
he penned his decision on May 2, 1986, xeroxJudge Torres pressured him to enter
into an amicable settlement with the plaintiff by paying the back rentals amounting
to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) because he may have entered into
an agreement with the plaintiff in the division of the spoils just in case his client
would accede to it, but Mr. Charlie refused to enter into any kind of settlement
because he believed in the justness of his cause.

HELD: After having carefully examined the records in this case, the Court is
convinced that respondent Judge did commit the acts with which he was charged. In
receiving P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 from a party to a litigation before him, as loans
which he never paid back and which to all appearances he never intended to pay
back, and in refusing or failing to pay for an airconditioner installed in his wife's
automobile van by a shop owned by a party litigant before him, respondent Judge is
guilty of serious misconduct in office and of acts unbecoming a member of the
judiciary.

Members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all
times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion.
The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly of justice.
From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him
an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. Thus, for the judge to
return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example
for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law.

The judge was dismissed from service and was required to show cause why he
should not be disbarred.
166. RE: INHIBITION OF JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, RTC -Branch 39, Polomolok,
South Cotabato in Crim. Case No. 09-5668 [A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC. October
30, 1998]

This refers to the order of inhibition which respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato issued in Criminal Case
No. 09-5668, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Tauro, et al. It appears
that the case was initially tried in the RTC, with Judge Rojas as public
prosecutor. While the case was pending, respondent was appointed judge of the
trial court. As the original counsel for the accused did not interpose any objection,
Judge Rojas tried the case. Later, however, Judge Rojas decided to inhibit himself
from the case. Taking note of the aforesaid order of inhibition, SC required Judge
Rojas to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
sitting in a case in which he had previously acted as counsel for one of the parties.
Judge Rojas tries to justify his failure to inhibit himself from the beginning by the
flimsy excuse that it was only after a close scrutiny of the TSN that he discovered
and remembered that he had handled the criminal case as public prosecutor years
ago and tries to minimize the seriousness of his breach of judicial ethics by claiming
that anyway he did not conduct a full-blown trial.

In his order of April 13, 1998, Judge Rojas stated that he had not inhibited himself
because the previous counsel of the accused, Atty. Rosalie Cario, did not object to
his sitting in the case as the judge. Certainly, he would not have asked Atty. Cario
for any objection if he had not known that he could not sit in the case as judge
because he had previously acted as public prosecutor therein. Indeed, the Court is
at a loss how Judge Rojas could have missed noticing that the case was one in which
he had appeared as public prosecutor considering that the records indicate the
appearances of counsels. Judge Rojas contends that, in any case, he never
conducted any full-blown trial in the case, and, therefore, there was no need for his
immediate inhibition from the case.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE JUDGE MUST BE DISCIPLINED.

HELD: YES. Rule 137, 1 of the Rules of Court expressly states, however, that no
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he ...has been counsel [for a
party] without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record. To sit in a case means to hold court; to do any act of a
judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court, grand jury, legislative body, etc. To
be formally organized and proceeding with the transaction of business. The
prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the
parties but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing
orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. The purpose of the
rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should administer justice
impartially and without delay.

In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668
from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the written consent of
both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the record of the
case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates
of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and
for the defense.Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. The
failure of Judge Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct betrays
his interest in the case which he allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to
administer the law impartially without any fear or favor.

In Lorenzo v. Marquez, a judge was dismissed from the service for sitting in a case
in which he had previously acted as counsel for the plaintiff without the written
consent of all the parties in interest, in violation of Rule 137, 1, and for illegally
issuing a subpoena for the appearance of a prison inmate at the trial of a criminal
case before him. In the instant case, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommends that Judge Rojas be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for violating
Rule 137, 1. The Court believes that the penalty recommended is appropriate, given
the fact that unlike the judge in Lorenzo v. Marquez, Judge Rojas breach of judicial
ethics is confined to his failure to inhibit himself from the case in which he had
previously acted as public prosecutor.

167. In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO AGUAS for

contempt of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA. [G.R. No. 12.
August 8, 1901. ]

FACTS: During the progress of a trial then being held before the CFI - Bacolor,
Pampanga, the judge cautioned Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at
the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge who was at the
time examining him. It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning,
and the judge thereupon arose from his seat and approaching the witness, seized
him by the shoulders, and using the expression, "Lingonangmucha" ("Look at me"),
either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the defendant, or only turned him
about, as claimed by the judge and others. Whether the witness was shaken or only
turned about, at all events "seizing him," brought the defendants attorney to his
feet, who, protesting against the action of the judge as coercive of the witness,
demanded that a record be made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of
the case be postponed. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record a recital
of the incident substantially as above, and also a statement that on other and prior
occasions the attorney, MarcelinoAguas, had been wanting in respect to the court
by making use of "improper phrases," and by interrupting opposing counsel in their
examination of witnesses. The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in
contempt of court and suspended him from the practice of his profession for a
period of twenty days. The attorney appealed, but his appeal having been
disallowed by the lower court, he asked to be heard in justification, which was
granted.

On the hearing in justification evidence was taken touching the contempt alleged to
have been committed by SeorAguas, from which the court found that during the
trial of the case of Roberto Toledo v. ValerianoBalatbat, the judge, having had
occasion to seize the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulders to turn him around,
SeorAguas, attorney for defendant, had risen from his seat in a "menacing
attitude," and "with a voice and body trembling" protested that the action of the
judge was coercive of the witness; and further that his attention being called to the
fact that he was wanting in respect to the court and that he should sit down, he
waived his right to go on with the trial and moved a postponement of the hearing.
On this finding the court again adjudged the attorney guilty of contempt of court,
and suspended him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty days.
From this judgment SeorAguas appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the contempt order was proper.

HELD: NO. The action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the
shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference with that
freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while
giving testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant had the
right to protest and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record. That
he did so was not contempt, providing protest and demand were respectfully made
and with due regard for the dignity of the court. The only question, therefore in this
case is, Was the appellant respectful and regardful of the courts dignity in
presenting his objection and asking that it be recorded in the proceedings? The
witnesses say and the judge finds that "his attitude was menacing"
(bastanteamenazadora) in the moment of making his protest, but beyond that there
is nothing in the record which even tends to show that he was disrespectful to the
court or unmindful of its dignity. In the absence of the facts from which it was
deduced, is wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt. The statement that
the attorneys attitude was "menacing" tended no more to competently establish
the alleged offense of contempt than if the witnesses had testified and the court
had found that his conduct was "contemptuous or lacking in respect." The specific
act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing should have been
testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and failing that, the record
does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the conclusion that he was
disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.

The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered, with
costs de oficio.

168. LongboanvsPolig, A.M. No. 704-RTJ, June 14, 1990

FACTS
This letter-complaint involved a dispute for collection of a sum of money between
the complainant as plaintiff and one Arsenic Cunaden as defendant. The
complainant obtained a favourable judgment from Municipal Circuit Judge Flora Tel-
equen. Pending appeal, the complainant was informed by the presiding judge of the
RTC by then that his predecessor (yung dating presiding judge napinalitanniya), was
in possession of the records of the original Civil Case. The complainant sent five
registered letters inquiring about the status of the said case to Judge Polig but he
failed to reply as well to tracers sent to him. The Supreme Court then ordered
respondent judge to show cause why no disciplinary or administrative action should
be taken against him and that he should comply with the inquiry of the
complainant. He was suspended because he disregarded SCs order.

His defense: He was unable to submit his comment within the time allotted because
the record of the said Civil Case was mislaid on account of his transfer to Ifugao.
That he failed to show cause to the SCs resolution due to awful shock and anxiety
at the thought that the record of the said case may have been lost beyond recovery.

APPLICABLE RULE:

Canon 3, Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative

responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management and
facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court
personnel.

ISSUE
Whether or not missing records of cases is a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

RULING

Yes. Respondent judge impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his successor on
account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and disorderly
system in the recording of cases assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be
conveniently laid on the court personnels mismanagement of the records of the
case, proper and efficient court management is as much the judges responsibility
for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a Judges responsibilities.

A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are
intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss
of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable
negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist,
judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose
acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites
attached to said office must be weeded out.

CONCLUSION
Respondent judge dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits.

169. Abad vsBleza, A.M. No. 227-RTJ, October 13, 1986

FACTS

Admin Case 1: Attempted/Frustrated Homicide

Abad was shot by the bodyguard of Potenciano Ponce after a cockfight because
Abad and Ponce were in an argument. Abad filed a case against Ponce for
attempted homicide and frustrated homicide for Ponces bodyguard. The Court ruled
that Ponce is acquitted for Attempted Homicide, while his bodyguard was convicted
for Frustrated Homicide with mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
incomplete self-defense and without any intention to kill the victim. Abad charged
Judge Bleza with rendering a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, and misconduct as a judge for the decision he rendered.

Associate Justice Kapunan of the IAC recommended reprimand for the judge
because he erroneously ruled that Ponces bodyguard had no intent to kill Abad. He
said that if there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is only liable for
physical injuries. Therefore, the fact alonet hat respondent found Sabater (the
bodyguard) guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide would prove that he had not
doubt in his mind that Sabater had the intent to kill Abad. Respondents
appreciation as mitigating circumstance of lack of merit to kill in favour of Sabater is
palpably out of place.

APPLICABLE RULE

Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose the training and other facilities
which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

ISSUE

Whether an error committed by a judge is AUTOMATICALLY subject to disciplinary

action.

RULING

No. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,

the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. However, while judges should not be disciplined for
inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is
highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles. They
are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statues and
to keep themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting
their jurisdiction.

The records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias on the part of the respondent
judge. His decision pointed out, one by one, the glaring inconsistencies in the
prosecutions evidence which led to the exculpation of defendant Ponce.

CONCLUSION

Admin cases against respondent judge are DISMISSED and APPROVED the
recommendation that the respondent judge be retired from office due to
hypertensive heart disease and congestive heart failure.

Admin Case 2: Damage Suit

PacificioOcampo filed a damage suit against Ricardo Ortiz before Manila

International Airport Authority. One Cruz persuaded Ocampo to withdraw the
complaint, threatening him that he will cause the latters dismissal if he does not do
so. After trial, respondent judge ruled in favour of PacificoOcampo. He ordered
complainant Cruz to pay Ocampo moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Cruz now contend that respondent judge disregarded the
defendants incontrovertible evidence and knowingly a wrong judgment against
him.

Respondent Judge defense: subject matter is pending before the IAC.

--- Walang ruling. Haha.

170. MaquiranvsGrageda, A.M. RTJ-04-1888, February 11, 2005

FACTS

Complainant is the Chairman of the Banned Chemical Research and Information

center., association of Filipino claimants banana plantation workers who were
exposed to a certain chemical dibromochloropropane used in the plantation which
caused ill-effects on their reproductive organs. Filipino victims together with the
other victims from 12 countries filed civil cases for mass torts and damages against
the U.S. based multinational corporations with the US courts, which dismissed the
cases on ground of forum non conveniens; and required the claimants to file actions
in their home countries. The cases were globally settled in the US by virtue of a
document known as the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity and Hold Harmless
Agreements, referred to as the Settlement. Plaintiffs and defendants in this subject
case move for the approval of the settlement.
One of the civil cases was raffled to respondent judge. Respondent judge issued an
Omnibus Order approving the Settlement by way of judgment on compromise. The
judge issued a writ of execution lodged by the plaintiff. Defendant corporations filed
their separate motions for reconsideration of the issuance of the writ of execution
and for the quashal thereof, insisting that there is nothing left to execute since
plaintiffs claims had already been paid in accordance with the compromise
agreements. They prayed for the reception of evidence to prove their defense.
Respondent issued an Order granting defendants separate motions for reception of
evidence in the US at the expense of defendant corporations. He filed a letter
requesting permission to visit her daughter in Neyw York which was granted. But in
the US, he conducted proceedings in the Consular Office in California. The
complainant contended that Grageda erred in conducting such proceeding.

His defense: He conducted the subject proceedings abroad as part of his faithful and
lawful performance of his duties and functions as a judge to properly solve the
issues brought before his court in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

APPLICABLE RULE

Canons of Judicial Ethics. Canon 22 The judge should be studiously careful himself
to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to
others.

ISSUE

Whether administrative remedy is the proper remedy when the issue pertains to the
judicial function of a judge.

RULING

No. As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not
subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. While respondent issued
the Order dated June 30, 2003 for the reception of evidence in the U.S. and the
Order dated September 29, 2003, which may not be in accordance with the rules, it
cannot be a basis for administrative action under this charge since there was no
showing that he intentionally and willfully rendered it knowing it to be unjust. The
failure of respondent to correctly interpret the law does not render him
administratively liable.

The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for,
these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature.
It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his
criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

CONCLUSION

It is the act of respondent in conducting the judicial proceedings abroad without

authority from the Court that constitutes gross misconduct for which he should be
administratively liable. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
misconduct is a serious charge punishable by dismissal from the service; suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; and a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00. The fact that this is respondents first offense in his 9 years of judicial
service with a good performance record is a mitigating circumstance.

171. De la Cruz vs Pascua, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1461, June 26, 2001

FACTS

Ricardo dela Cruz filed with the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Pascua, an
election protest against Mayor Jose Bunoan, Jr. Thereafter, Ocana and Cuaresma
lodged a motion for intervention which was denied by respondent judge for having
been filed out of time. Ocana and Cuaresma filed a Petition by Appeal on Certiorari
with the COMELEC and was dismissed for lack of merit.

Dela Cruz now alleges that respondent judge committed falsification when she
issued the order deferring the hearing of dela Cruzs election protest until further
orders. In her order, she state that a Petition by Appeal on Certiorari was filed with
the SC by Ocana and Cuaresma. According to him, they did not filed with the SC,
but to COMELEC. Dela Cruz also alleges that she issued an order directing
motupropio that the election protest be archived stating that it cannot take action
because it already gone to the SC. Because the case was archived, there was a
delay of more than 6 months from the time the hearing was deferred.

Dela Cruz counsel moved to withdraw the election protest which has been pending
for 2 years and 6 months for the reason that it would only end up in an empty
victory.
Respondent Judge defense: she admitted that she committed an honest and
innocuous error when she stated that the intervenors interposed an appeal to the
SC instead of the COMELEC.

--Judge Pascua compulsorily retired

APPLICABLE RULE

Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates, among others, that a judge
should perform his official duties with DILIGENCE. The same Canon specifically
provides that a judge should maintain professional competence and decide cases
within the required periods.

ISSUE

Whether an error leading to delay of disposition of the case is subject to disciplinary

action.

RULING

Yes. What she should have done was to read the Petition by Appeal on Certiorari
carefully and ascertain where it was filed. It bears stressing that even if the
intervenors Petition was brought to the SC, respondent judge should not have
issued the challenged orders. By issuing the said orders, respondent judge was
negligent in her duties, tantamount to inefficiency which, in turn, caused the undue
delay in the disposition of complainants election protest.

The conduct of respondent judge is improper and censurable. She should have
remembered that she is presumed to be conscious of her duties under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Indeed, as a member of the Bench, she should be the embodiment
of competence and assiduousness in her responsibilities. Unfortunately, respondent
judge failed to live up to this standard. By issuing the orders in question, she
evidently manifested inefficiency and overtly transgressed basic mandatory rules
adopted to assure the expeditious resolution of cases.

CONCLUSION

Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and
dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary or brings it to
public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt
with and punished accordingly.

GUILTY of inefficiency and fined P10,000 to be deducted from her retirement

benefits.

172.
A.M. No. 1312-CFI January 31, 1978

Raquiza v. District Judge Mariano Castaneda, Jr.

I. ISSUE: WON respondent judge shall be held liable.

II. LAW/DOCTRINE: Liabilities of Judge

III. APPLICATION

No. As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust

and illegal judgment), respondent Mrs. Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi
Estate because by testamentary provision approved by final judgment,
NatividadCastellviRaquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of the estate
although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had been transferred to her children by virtue of
a compromise agreement. Said case is still pending hearing and decision according
to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after careful study of the records.

As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):

Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant

is highly improbable; that complainant did not describe the' shouting spree' incident
faithfully because:

Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with
his official functions and without promising complainant anything, advised the latter
to see respondent in his office; that the following morning when complainant went
to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and other lawyers and two or three of
the court's personnel were inside the chamber; that complainant then pleaded for
help that he would be able to go to the United States for his eye treatment, saying
that after all the first release was authorized by the President precisely for that
purpose; that complainant wanted in the corresponding order to be issued by
respondent that so much amount of his children's shares in the second release
should be specifically ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way,
respondent explained to complainant of the unsettled claims of creditors of the late
that even more complainant was not the movant but his children and what his
children would want to lend him is a matter between him and his children;

As to Charge IV - (Bribery):

Petitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converse with. To
talk to her, one has to speak loud or shout. She could much less be whispered to.
This considering, one could not ask something from her without being heard. Write
her a note, for evidence in order to be caught This is absurd. After a careful study of
all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated.

IV.FACTS

Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the
sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castaeda to another branch and
administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft
Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by
means of oppression; and (4) bribery.

These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from
the second release of P1,000,000.00 for the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able
to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. Complainant further claims
that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the Castellvi Estate and in
the case of Mrs. Gozun she has no right to be given a share of the second release as
it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.

V.CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the

respondent judge is exonerated and the administrative case against him is dismissal
The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge is denied.

173.

A.M. No.75-6-DJ January 17, 1978

DANIEL B. GALANGI v.GEORGE C. MACLI-ING

I.ISSUE: WON respondent judge shall be held liable

II. LAW/DOCTRINE: Liabilities of judges

III. APPLICATION

No. After deliberating on the foregoing facts, we hold that there is no legal and
factual basis for this Court to take disciplinary action against Judge Macli-ingWe
should not review the Presidential action exonerating him.

This Court can discipline a Judge of the Court of First Instance if he is guilty of
serious misconduct or inefficiency (Sec. 67, Judiciary Law).
The charge against respondent Macli-ing refers to his conduct' as a prosecutor. He
was exonerated of that charge by no less than the Chief Magistrate of the land.

Inasmuch as no imputation has been made against him as a Judge of the Court of
First Instance, there is no justification for this Court to take any disciplinary action
against him.

IV. FACTS

Galangi, the vice-mayor of KianganIfugao, lodged in the Department of Justice an

administrative charge against George C. Macli-ing the provincial fiscal of Ifugao, for
supposed ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority.

That charge was provoked by Fiscal Macli-ings filing in March 1974 of a contempt
charge against Galangi in the Court of First Instance of Ifugao at the instance of the
provincial board- and pursuant to section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Judge Francisco Men Abad ordered Galangi's arrest.

Before that contempt incident occurred, Galangi had already been accused before
Fiscal Macli-ing of falsification of a municipal resolution. The preliminary
investigation of that case dragged on for a long time. That investigation culminated
but Fiscal Macli-ing in the Court of First Instance of Ifugao of an information for
falsification against Galangi, as principal and his aunt, Councilor Paulina Bulahao as
an accomplice.

However, the case remained pending because in the meantime, or on January 23,
1976, respondent Macli-ing was appointed Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Benguet.

V. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE.this case is considered closed and terminated.

174.

A.M. No. 480-MJ March 22, 1977

FELICIDAD GUERRA VDA. DE LAPEA v.MUNICIPAL JUDGE JOSE L. COLLADO

I.ISSUE: WON respondent judge shall be held liable.

II. LAW/DOCTRINE: liabilities of judges

III. APPLICATION

No. As found by the Investigating Judge, respondent properly deferred the

resolution of the motion and amended motion for the deposit of the tobacco and
corn crops, pending the determination of a vital issue involved in the corresponding
civil case.

It is, however, obvious that this single aberation was not due to malice or bad faith
of respondent. Rather, it was due to his Carelessness, negligence or reliance upon
his employee.Thus, in Secretary of Justice v. Bullecer,1 We stated:

... It is desirable that a judge should at all times manifest fidelity to the
trust reposed in him. Necessarily, an adequate grasp of the codal and
statutory provisions, not to mention the Constitution, as well as of legal
doctrines is of the essence. That he should be impartial is likewise a
truism. Of equal importance, however, is the promptness with which
cases in his sala are disposed of. The people's faith in the
administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low
income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in
coming, more so from trial courts, which unlike collegiate tribunals
where there is need for extended deliberation, could be expected to
act with dispatch. Unfortunately, it cannot be denied that delay still
attends the performance of the judicial task. It could amount to serious
inefficiency, arising either from lack of skill in the handling of
authoritative legal materials or the lack of a proper system in the
handling of court business. For that matter, negligence, if reckless in
character, could amount to serious inefficiency. ...

IV. FACTS

Respondent Municipal Judge was charged with falsely certifying, on two occasions,
that all petitions and motions which had been submitted to him for determination
for a period of ninety (90) days had been determined by him on or before the
respective dates of the certifications.

As per the investigator's Report, respondent denied having falsified his certifications
on the given dates, alleging that the petitions for preliminary injunction had been
denied by him in open court in the presence of the parties, and that the resolution
of the motion and amended motion for the deposit of the tobacco and corn crops
had been deferred by him pending final determination of whether the defendants
involved were really squatters.

V. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, respondent Municipal Judge Jose L. Collado is hereby exonerated of
the charges against him, but he is admonished to act with due care in executing his
Certificates of Service.

175.

A.M. No. L-207-J April 22, 1977

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HONORABLE PIO MARCOS District Judge, Second

Judicial District, CFI of Benguet and Baguio City, Branch I, stationed at the
City of Baguio

I. ISSUE: WON respondent judge shall be held liable.

II. LAW/DOCTRINE: Liabilities of judges

III. APPLICATION

No. The conclusions reached by Justice Gatmaitan follow: "From foregoing,

Investigator come to the conclusions that Respondent: 1st Issued subject search
warranty after examining the witnesses as well as complainant thereof under oath,
that the examination sufficiently complied with the requirement as to the
description of the place to be searched and the object to be seized and that the
knowledge of the witnesses was not hearsay but on their own knowledge; however,
insofar as the fact that the written deposition of witness Sgt. De Vera was not taken
down and the same attached to the record, Respondent violated Sec. 4 of Rule 126;
2nd There was probable cause to issue the warrant; but the warrant itself
suffered of the defect that it was for two (2) offenses and one of these was not even
specified by stating with precision what Central Bank circular or regulation had been
infringed contrary to Rule 126, See. 3; 3rd As to the delay in the return, and as to
the seizure of brass bars and a saber not mentioned in the warrant, Therein
Investigator has not seen that Respondent should be made liable.

Then came his recommendation: "In view whereof, while Investigator believes that
aforecited defects in the search warrant might perhaps have justified setting it aside
on certiorari, this being however an administrative case, maybe something more
should have been shown to justify punishment, for otherwise, all Judges whose
orders are assailed and annulled under the extraordinary legal remedies must be
visited with definite sanctions, something more should have been shown, some
partiality, bias, prejudice, wrongful motive, but which Complainant has not shown
nor even attempted to show, and Investigator after some reflection having come to
believe that in the extreme urgency in which Respondendt had found himself, even
other judges, even investigator himself, would have fallen into the same mistake,
therefore, he respectfully desist from recommending a specific severe or even less
than severe punishments, this subject of course to his Highest Court's other wiser
criterion.

What immediately attracts attention in the above sentence of Justice Gatmaitans

recommendation is the extreme care he took to indicate that he is not to be
understood as intruding in and way with the full discretion that appropriately
belongs to his court. It reflects his high sense of delicadeza. Nonetheless, it would
appear obvious, considering the exhaustive report and the 'language employed
after his painstaking appraisal of the evidence of record, that there is not sufficient
warrant for any disciplinary action against respondent, As he correctly pointed out,
a certiorari proceeding could have been availed of for correctly purposes. Moreover,
it must have been Justice Gatmaitans sense of realism fortified by long years of
service as a trial judge and possibly excessive modesty that did lead him to say that
he could have fallen into the same mistake.

IV.FACTS

Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos filed an administrative complaint for gross
inefficiency against the then respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the Court of First
Instance of Benguet and Baguio City, now retired after having reached the age of
seventy, arose from the issuance of a search warrant past 12:00 midnight of April 4,
1971, and thereafter served and executed approximately two hours later, long
before dawn. The grounds alleged were that the search warrant was not limited to
one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central
Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be
seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his
witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return
and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not
actually submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized
delivered only about a week later on April 19.

The grounds alleged in the complaint to show inefficiency he classified in the

following: The first, the failure to follow the legal Procedure by respondent Judge
when he issued tile warrant,; the second, the defects manifest on the face thereof
as two offenses were included and the description of the premises to be searched
and the object to be seized being too general; the third, the absence of the probable
cause; and the fourth, the article seized having included objects not mentioned in
the warrant and the delay in the delivery thereof to respond judge.

V.CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross inefficiency against Judge Pio
Marcos is dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be placed on his record.
Liabilities of Judges

176. In re: Impeachment of Horilleno, 43 Phil 212

Issue:

Whether Judge Horilleno should be removed from office for alleged serious
misconduct and inefficiency

Law:

Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code, the grounds for removal of a judge
of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency.

Facts:

Respondent Judge was charged by AbundioEnrile of (1) In negligently and carelessly

delaying the case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, entitled,
Abintestato del finado Nicolas Nuez y Enrile (Intestate Estate of Nicolas Nuez y
Enrile, deceased, and (2) in that Judge Horrilleno was a political judge. Abintestato
del finado Nicolas Nuez y Enrile, begun on April 23, 1912, and still in litigation. The
complainant charges that the respondent judge has willfully delayed the hearing of
this case and has taken no action, although his attention has repeatedly been called
to the numerous irregularities committed by the administrator in the performance of
his duties. It is said that six cases, which were submitted for adjudication to the
respondent much later than that in which the complainant is interested, have
already been decided. Insinuation are also made that the judge has lived on a
parcel of land constituting a portion of the property involved in the action.

Ruling:

Serious misconduct on the part of Judge Horrilleno has not here been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. The most
that can be said for the charges made by complainant, would be that the judge may
have been careless in the performance of his judicial duties. There is extant
absolutely no proof that the respondent judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or
corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively. On the contrary, the testimony of the most
prominent citizens of Mindanao and Sulu including the Sultan of Sulu, Senator
HadjiButu, DatuUssman, Governor Charles M. Moore, and practically the entire bar
of Zamboanga, Jolo, and Davao is unanimously in favor of the excellent reputation
of Judge Horrilleno. Sufficient of the cases tried by Judge Horrilleno have been
elevated to this court for all of us to have become conscious of the careful
performance of his onerous and responsible duties, and familiar and the excellent
quality of his judicial output. We would be remiss ourselves if, knowing of the
publicity which has been given to the attacks on the good name of Judge Horrilleno,
we should not as publicly announce our faith in his judicial character. Judge
Horrilleno justly merits and is granted completely exoneration.
It results that in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,
sufficient cause does not exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency on the
part of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno, judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District, as justifies the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-
General.
177. In re: Climaco, 55 SCRA 107

barjavsbercacio

Issue:

Whether respondent Judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or

arbitrarily or oppressively in acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte

Law:

Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code, the grounds for removal of a judge
of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency.

Facts:

Respondent judge was charged with gross malfeasance in office, gross ignorance of
the law, and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The aforecited charges
stemmed from the order of respondent dated September 5, 1968 and his decision
acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21, 1968, in
Criminal Case No. 690, entitled "People the Philippines versus IsabeloMontemayor,
et al.," for Robbery in Band with Homicide. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Zulueta, of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental, filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against
thirteen (13) persons as principals, seven (7) persons as accomplices, and two (2)
persons as accessories, with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in
Criminal Case No. 690. The case was assigned to Branch I, Silay City, presided over
by the respondent. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime, only
Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged principals, including
IsabeloMontemayor, remained at large), while of the persons charged as
accomplices and accessories, the case with respect to them was dismissed at the
instance of the prosecution or with its conformity.
Ruling:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law
or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice.
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service.Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest
injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied,
in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment
or discretion, is not liable criminally, for any error he commits, provided he acts in
good faith.
In issuing the order of Sept. 5, 1968, respondent Judge as stated in his answer, was
guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments
on the Rules of Court. Whether in taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the
order of September 5, 1968, respondent Judge erred or not, it is believed, this is not
the proper forum to dwell on the matter. Since this is an administrative case against
him the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
such
order
From a review of the record, We find that the decision respondent contains clearly
and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. We cannot conclude on the
basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment, much
less could it be held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to
observe the diligence, prudence and care required by law.

Grounds for Discipline

178. Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258

Issue:
 Whether respondent judge's unjustified actions constitute serious misconduct
or at best gross ignorance

Law:

Facts:

Municipal Judge Francisco Collado of San Fernando, La Union is charged

administratively for his unjust refusal to deposit with the Municipal Treasurer of the
same municipality the amount of P42,000.00 representing the accrued rentals
deposited by the defendant in an ejectment case pending in his court. During the
pendency of the ejectment case, defendant William Go had been depositing with
respondent judge the accrued monthly rentals from January 1980 totalling
P42,000.00. When complainant discovered that the rentals consigned with
respondent's court had not been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of San
Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of section 93 of Republic Act No. 296
but instead were in the personal possession of respondent judge, she sent a letter
to respondent judge, dated February 24, 1981, requesting that the deposited rentals
be transferred to the custody of the Municipal Treasurer. When no action was taken
by respondent judge on the letter-request of complainant, he was charged
administatively.

Ruling:

When complainant made demands, through letters and motion, to have the
rentals deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of San Fernando, La Union,
respondent judge should have immediately done so, to forestall or erase any
possible suspicion that he had misused or misappropriated the funds. By his totally
unjustified actions, respondent judge placed his honesty and integrity under serious
doubt. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the disposition of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and above all
must be above suspicion. Although every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law
must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official and
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice. Respondent's failure to deposit the funds
with the municipal treasurer or to produce them despite his promise and the
deadline given him amount to grave misfeasance, if not malversation.
Considering that the records of the case sufficiently provide a basis for the
determination of respondent's administrative liability, there is no need to conduct a
formal investigation of the charges. Respondent judge's unjustified actions
constitute serious misconduct or at best gross ignorance which warrant his
separation from the service.

179. Barja vs. Bercacio, 74 SCRA 355

Issue:

Whether respondent judge guilty of dishonesty and misappropriation to his own use
of fiduciary funds

Law:

Facts:

Complainant filed the present administrative case charging respondent Bonifacio B.

Bercacio, judge of the municipal court of Tabaco, Albay with (a) dishonesty, (b)
malicious delay in the disposal of cases and (c) conduct unbecoming of a judge and
partiality. The charge of dishonesty is based on respondent judge's having deposited
in his personal account with the Metropolitan Bank branch at Tabaco a check for
P8,000.00 posted on June 21, 1973 as cash bail bond by Nestor Locsin, who was
accused in Criminal Case No. 4577 pending in respondent's court, obviously
converting the trust fund to his own use. Notwithstanding that said accused upon
motion granted by respondent substituted the said cash bond with a surety bond on
June 26, 1973, respondent could not then and there return to him the cash (which
should have remained intact) and returned to him the sum of only P5,000.00almost
a month later on July 20, 1973 and up to this very date, has failed to return the
balance of P3,000.00. The investigating judge submitted the recommendation that
"the respondent be suspended from office for not less than one (1) year, (to) refund
the amount of P3,000.00 to Nestor Locsin with legal interests to be counted from
June 26, 1973 until fully paid and, after service of his suspension, (that) the
respondent be considered resigned and/or retired from the judiciary. In considering
him resigned and/or retired, in a final act of compassion, the Honorable Supreme
Court is asked that he be declared still entitled to the benefits granted him under
existing laws".

Ruling:

The Court is constrained to reject such recommendation of leniency. His grave

acts of dishonesty and misappropriation to his own use of fiduciary funds (the cash
proceeds of the check) which came into his possession and by law should have been
immediately deposited by him with the municipal treasurer as official custodian of
such funds, compounded by his subsequent false claims and statements that were
"as unbelievable as they are illogical" (to borrow a phrase of the investigating
judge) and show a callous disregard of the truth, and his dismal record warrant no
less than the imposition of the severest penalty of dismissal from the service and
consequent forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
In a previous administrative case against respondent, Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo vs.
Mun. Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio, respondent already showed a weakness in
handling funds entrusted to him when he obstinately failed and refused to return to
the therein complainant the sum of P3,500.00 which said complainant had
deposited with him for the purpose of exercising her right to legal redemption of a
certain property and which he returned only after therein complainant had to
engage the services of another counsel who secured the corresponding court order
requiring respondent to return the sum. The Court found therein as follows:
Respondent's obstinate refusal or failure to accede to complainant's
request for almost a year led the latter to secure the services of
another counsel who was compelled what to him must have been an
unpleasant task to ask from no less than a member of the Judiciary
the return of the P3,500.00 deposited with the latter otherwise he
would have to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his
client. That demand of Atty. Madrid was made in March of 1973, but
instead of delivering the amount, respondent still held it putting up the
excuse in a letter to Atty. Madrid (See pp. 4-5 of this Decision) that the
money did not belong entirely to Mrs. Aonuevo and that the latter had
agreed to his keeping the money during the pendency of the case. That
of course was untrue, because, first, there was nothing in the record to
show that the P3,500,00 belonged to persons other than Mrs.
Aonuevo from whom respondent received it, and secondly, it was Mrs.
Aonuevo who had personally been asking all along for the return of
said amount. It is to the discredit of respondent that it took a court
order issued on September 13, 1973, for him to return complainant's
money to Atty. Madrid.
In the decision of November 27, 1975, the Court found him guilty of illegally
engaging in the practice of law despite his disqualification as a municipal judge and
of failure to return promptly the amount deposited with him. The Court therein held
that "(W)hile the Court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made
use of the money deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations,
respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt", and meted upon
him the penalty of six (6) months' suspension from office "with the warning that
commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will warrant a more severe penalty
from the Court."
There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards
of judicial conduct and integrity. As Justice Muoz Palma stated for the Court in said
earlier case against respondent, "(A)lthough every office in the government service
is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law
must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice. To a certain degree, respondent herein failed
to meet these exacting standards of judicial conduct."

180. HAW TAY vs SINGAYAO

A.M. No. R-592-RTJ September 17, 1987

Facts:
Complaint filed by, Mr. Juanito L. Haw Tay charged Judge Eduardo Singayao of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City, with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and with gross
ignorance of the law. The respondent Judge filed his Answer, denying the allegations
of the complaint and claiming instead that complainant had subjected him to
systematic harassment. In respect of the charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Report of the Investigating Justice shows that on several
occasions in respondent Judge, either by himself or through his Court Interpreter,
Mr. Benjamin Pascual, asked for and received from complainant differing sums of
money and a round trip airplane ticket.

Issue:
WON the judge be disciplined for the acts complained for?

Law Applicable:
Art 8 sec 11 of Constitution; SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached
the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Ruling:
The acts of respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a
party-litigant before his court constitute serious misconduct in office. This Court
condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge. It is
this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged
with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly
and surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without which government
cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity. The respondent's
ignorance of the requirements of the Rules of Court and of elementary rules of
Commercial Law, is equally conspicuous. Respondent Judge combines in himself the
twin evils of corruption and ignorance of the law and thus constitutes a deseased
member which must be decisively severed from the body of the judiciary and cast
aside.

Conclusion:
The Court makes clear that had respondent Judge's resignation not been
accepted by the President, respondent Judge would be dismissed from the service
forthwith. In addition, the Court RESOLVES to declare respondent disqualified from
re-employment in any position in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and as having
forfeited all his accused retirement benefits and leave and other privileges, if any.
The Court also RESOLVES to require respondent to show cause, within 10 days from
notice hereof, why he should not be disbarred for the acts of which he has been
found guilty.

181. Lecaroz vs Garcia

A.M. No. 2271-MJ September 18, 1981

Facts:
A complaint filed by Francisco Lecaroz, Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Marinduque, against Municipal Judge Segundo Garcia of said municipality, for
alleged "misconduct or improprieties". The improper conduct of Judge Garcia in
soliciting for donations of office equipments) from Marcopper Mining Corporation, an
entity which at some time or another may be a party in litigation before Judge
Garcia himself As a matter of fact, at the time the office requirements were
donated and delivered, Mr. Cirilo Cachero, the Personnel Officer of Marcopper Mining
Corporation, has a pending criminal case against him before the Municipal Court of
Santa Cruz for Perjury, docketed and said case is still pending disposition by Judge
Garcia. In the face of the instant situation, how can the complainant in the Cachero
case believe in the cold impartiality of Judge Garcia? Without going through the
propriety of making representations with the office of the Mayor and/or office of the
Municipal Treasurer in order that the donated equipments (sic) can be issued for the
use of his office, Judge Garcia took it upon himself to accept delivery of the
equipments (sic) from Atty. Teodulo Gabor, Jr., a Marcopper lawyer, and placed said
equipments (sic) inside his office where they are situated up to the present. Such
abject lack of decorum and courtesy could hardly be expected from a man of the
bench. Respondent Judge alleged that the office desk, swivel chair and a long
carriage typewritter donated by. Marcopper Mining Corporation to the Municip0lity
of Santa Cruz were physically received by former Mayor Percival Morales, who
allocated the same to the office of the respondent; that as they were second hand,
the same had to be refurbished or fixed, so that they were actually delivered to the
office of respondent and were inventoried as properties Of the Municipality of Santa
Cruz .

Issue:
WON the conduct of the judge constitutes misconduct or impropriety?
Law Applicable:
- Canons of Judicial Ethics Paragraph 3, "(a) judge's official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach. "
- Canons of Judicial Ethics Paragraph 29 a judge should not accept any
presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing before him.

Ruling:
Apparently, respondent Judge would claim justification for having solicited
directly office equipment and furniture not only from the Marcopper Mining
Corporation but also from other civic-spirited citizens and entities, not for personal
gain but to refurnish and improve the municipal court.. His conduct of soliciting for
the office equipment in question would show that he openly transgressed the
established norm for judicial behavior as contained in Paragraph 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which provides that "(a) judge's official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach. " Paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics likewise provides
that a judge "should not accept any presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers
practicing before him. " Respondent Judge should have avoided giving ground for
any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office or the
influence of his name to solicit donations from private parties. Marked attention and
unusual hospitality on the part of private parties to a judge engender
misinterpretation of his motive and should thus be avoided. Judges, in general,
should refrain from pursuing such a course of conduct, which, in the normal course
of events reasonably to be expected, might bring their actuations into conflict with
the impartial performance of their official duties, which present hazards to the
proper administrative of justice.
Under the circumstances, the act of respondent Judge discloses a deficiency in the
prudence, discretion and judgment that a member of the judiciary must exercise in
the performance of his functions, if the bench is to command the respect due
thereto. In his effort to furnish and equip well his office, respondent Judge should
not lose sight of the proper judicial norm.

Conclusion:
Judge was ADMONISHED and enjoined to act with proper judicial perspective,
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior should be
beyond reproach, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

182. BALAGOT VS OPINION

A.M. No. MTJ-90-439 March 20, 1991
Facts:

Ruben Balagot complained against respondent Municipal Judge Emilio Opinion

due to alleged frequent postponements of the trial of Criminal Case No. 1138-85
which resulted in the termination of the said case Respondent in his behalf alleged,
that the frequent postponements and resettings of the trial were not due to his
absence but upon motions of the parties litigants and other justifiable causes.
Respondent did not deny and in fact admitted that the decision was rendered only
on February 1, 1990 or after a period of almost three (3) years and eight (8) months
from the time the case was considered submitted for decision on April 23, 1986
(should be July 23, 1986). He, however, attributed the cause of delay to the
following factors and circumstances: a) failure of his stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes despite of two (2) memoranda issued to her dated March 22,
1988 and August 22, 1988, for her to comply with her duties and responsibilities;
and b) from May, 1987 to June 6, 1988, he was designated as Acting Judge of
Branch 55 of the same Court in addition to his regular duties and functions and for
said reason, he was overloaded with cases, overworked and over burdened which
accounted to the fact that he must have forgotten to follow-up the status of the
case .

Issue:
WON Judge should be liable for the postponements that lead to termination of
the case?

Law Applicable:
- Art 8 sec 11 of consti. SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
- RA 296 sec 5. Section 5. Judge's certificate as to work completed. -
District judges, judges-at-large, cadastral judges, judges of municipal courts,
and justices of the peace shall certify on their applications for leave, and
upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the pay rolls
upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications,
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more
have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the
certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without
such certificate.

In case any special proceeding, application, petition, motion, civil or criminal case is
resubmitted upon the voluntary application or consent in writing of all the parties to
the case, cause, or proceeding, and not otherwise, the ninety days herein
prescribed within which a decision should be made shall begin to run from the date
of such resubmission.
Ruling:
Respondent judge's reasons for the delay in disposition of Criminal Case No.
1138-85 do not constitute a defense. SC cannot ignore nor countenance such
inaction of the respondent for more than three (3) years for it will defeat the spirit of
a speedy disposition of justice. Neither can his designation as Acting Judge of
Branch 55 relieve him of his duty to decide the case within the reglementary period
considering that he was designated only in May, 1987 or seven months after the
due date of the decision on October 21, 1986. The period within which to decide a
case should be reckoned from the date a case was submitted for decision. A delay in
the transcription of stenographic notes cannot be considered a valid reason for the
delay in rendering judgment in a case. Precisely, judges are directed to take down
notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions
without waiting for the transcript of stenographic notes. Furthermore, we have
already ruled that with or without the transcribed stenographic notes, the 90-day
period for deciding cases should be adhered to."

Conclusion:
Respondent Judge is found guilty of neglect of duty for deciding the aforesaid
criminal case beyond the ninety-day period as required by the Constitution and
Section 5, R.A. 296. ACCORDINGLY, a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is
imposed on respondent Judge.

183. ARAZA vs REYES

Facts:
Respondent Municipal Judge Juanito C. Reyes of Zummarraga, Samar, is
charged by complainant Prisca V. Araza with (a) serious misconduct in office; (b)
falsification of public document; and (c) ignorance of the law.
Respondent's alleged serious misconduct in office is contained in four (4,)
specifications. The first attributes to respondent the imprudence of having approved
in Criminal Case No. 9358 (Grave Threats) the bond submitted by Anacita Lamograr,
although she is already long deceased. The second specifically charges respondent
with having wilfully delayed the approval of the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 9270
(Theft of Large Cattle), while the third specification accuses respondent of having
unduly delayed the disposition of Criminal Case No. 9271. These three (3)
specifications have been found groundless by the Investigating Judge, as Anacita
Lamograr does not appear to be one of the bondsmen in said criminal case and
respondent had actually acted with reasonable dispatch in the other cases. In
connection with the fourth specification, respondent is charged with having
deliberately and wilfully delayed the disposition of Civil Case No. 318 (Restituto
Centino v. Jesus Tizon, for Forcible Entry) because the counsel of the plaintiff, Judge
Emeterio Geli, is his respondent's cousin-in-law. In connection with the other
charges such as that of falsification of public document and ignorance of the law,
these have all been found by the Investigating Judge to be without any factual basis
or evidentiary support.

Issue:
WON judge should be disciplined for causing dealy in termination of a
civilcase?

Law Applicable:
- Art 8 sec 11 of constitution

Ruling:
On the basis of his findings, District Judge Segundo M. Zosa, who investigated
the case, recommended the exoneration of respondent Judge in Charge I,
Specifications 1, 2, and 3but recommended that respondent be reprimanded for his
laxity in granting postponements in Civil Case No. 318 which resulted in the undue
delay in the termination of said case. Manifestly, the peculiar nature of this action of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of property. Its purpose, regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, is that the party in peaceable and quiet
possession should not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording
this remedy, the object of the law is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder which would otherwise ensue if such remedy is withdrawn because then,
those who believe themselves entitled to the possession of property would resort to
force to regain its possession. Considering the nature of the proceeding and the
philosophy underlying the remedy, it is evident that respondent's laxity in acceding
to the successive postponements requested by the parties frustrated the very
purpose and object of the law.

Conclusion:
Court dismisses the charges against respondent, except for his laxity in
granting motions for postponement resulting in the unjustified delay in the
termination of Civil Case No. 318, for which respondent is hereby reprimanded and
warned that henceforth he should act with reasonable dispatch, especially in those
cases which the law requires to be expeditiously heard and decided.

188. A.M. No. 1574-MJ April 30, 1979

ARTEMIO ESPAYOS vs. ADELARDO G. LEE, as Municipal Judge of
Magallanes, Sorsogon

RESOLUTION

AQUINO, J.:

Facts:
The facts and circumstances concerning the charges of misbehavior and partiality
against respondent municipal judge in connection with his disposition of Criminal
Case No. 2044, People vs. Prodencio Pareja, a case of less serious physical injuries,
wherein complainant Artemio Espayos alleging that on Jan. 17, 1977 one Prodencio
Pareja threw a piece of stone at the said complainant hitting him at the right side of
his nose and as a consequence thereof the station commander of the Magallanes
police department filed with the Municipal Court of Magallanes, a criminal complaint
for less serious physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2044 and on Jan.
27, 1977, without the herein complainant's knowing it, the accused Prodencio Pareja
was arraigned, appearing in court by himself, without a lawyer and, as if somebody
had instructed him beforehand what to do, he pleaded guilty to the complaint for
slight physical injuries; that the station commander who was present in court did
not object to Pareja's pleading guilty, then Judge Lee immediately sentenced him to
15 days imprisonment. Allegedly thereafter, complainant Espayos' lawyer filed a
petition to allow Espayos to prove damages but the court denied it in an order
issued on Feb. 7, 1977. Respondent admitted that before the arraignment, he
explained to Prodencio Pareja, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2044, that after the
complaint was read to him, he should answer that he was willing to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. Pareja followed respondent's advice. The respondent convicted him
of the lesser offense and imposed upon him the penalty of fifteen days
of arrestomenor. The information was not amended.

Issue:

WON the action of Municipal Judge Adelardo Lee in connection with the criminal
case constitutes conduct of unbecoming judge and misbehavior and partiality in
administration of justice that would entail for disciplinary action in not performing
his duties properly.

Applicable Law:

A municipal judge may be disciplined if he is not performing his duties properly, or if

complaints are made which, if true, would indicate that he is unfit for the office
(Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
Ruling:

It was improper and unethical to suggest to Pareja what he should do at the

arraignment. That impropriety generated the suspicion that the respondent was in
collusion with the accused. It is the sort of misbehavior which would be resented by
the offended party and would make him surmise that the sentence meted to the
accused was fixed or is what is known in the vernacular as lutongmacao. "A judge's
official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."
(Par. 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics, adopted in Administrative Order No. 162 of the
Secretary of Justice, dated August 1, 1946, 42 O. G. 1803).

The respondent erred in not allowing the offended party, now complainant Artemio
Espayos, to prove the civil liability of the accused. Respondent's theory is that the
offended party can always file a separate civil action for damages even though he
did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. That theory is wrong. It
shows unawareness of the rule that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately (Sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of
Court).

As to respondent's admission that he allegedly stayed in the library of his residence,

whenever he had no official business to transact in his office, is another instance of
his improper discharge of his duties as a municipal judge. He is legally obligated to
observe office hours so that the parties having official business with him would
know where to find him. That means that he should stay in his office and not in his
residence. He cannot certify that he rendered full-time service if during office hours,
he remains in his house.

As well-stated by Justice Muoz Palma, reasons of public policy, the preservation of

the good image of the judiciary, and avoidance of an appearances of impropriety,
require that a judge should hold office at the regular place of business of the court
and not at his residence. A judge holding office in his house makes himself open to
suspicion and possible criticism that his official actuations cannot bear public
scrutiny, more particularly of his co-officials in the local government.
Conclusion:

For having committed the above-mentioned irregularities, showing that he had not
performed his duties properly, respondent judge is severely censured. He is warned
that a more drastic penalty will be imposed on him in case he commits similar
irregularities.

189. Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ June 29, 1982, ESTANISLAO LAPENA, JR., vs.
JUDGE MARTONINO MARCOS, and Atty. CRISOSTOMO ROQUE (Clerk of
Court)

RESOLUTION

Facts:

Complainant Estanislao G. Lapena, Jr. charges Judge Martonino R. Marcos of the

Municipal Circuit Court of Gerona and Ramos, Tarlac, and Atty. Crisostomo T. Roque,
Clerk of Court, CAR, Malolos, Bulacan, with dishonesty, breach of trust and gross
misconduct, and prays for their dismissal from the service as public officials of the
government and disbarment as attorneys.

Complainant Estanislao Lapena, Jr. and respondent Judge Martonino Marcos and
Clerk of Court Crisostomo Roque were all former members of the Board of Directors
of Tarlac Electric Cooperative, Inc. (TARELCO).

The complaint alleged that respondents, during their incumbency as members of

the Board of Directors of TARELCO, committed acts of dishonesty, breach of trust
and gross misconduct by transacting and attending business board meetings during
office hours, receiving compensation for such attendance, and making it appear
that they reported for duty in their respective offices and for which they also
received their salaries as well as diverted and converted funds of the cooperative by
using the same for payment of their personal accident policies, to the damage and
prejudice of TARELCO and its members.

Complainant also alleged that when respondent Marcos ratified applications for
membership of applicants with TARELCO, which act was authorized and tolerated by
his co-respondent as member of the Board, he received the sum of P4,236.00 on
March 12, 1977 and P1,500 on March 16, 1977 as ex-oficio notary public in his
capacity as a judge, knowing it to be a violation of the law and the by-laws of the
said cooperative.

To the charge of conspiring with the other members of the Board by diverting and
converting funds of the cooperative for payment of personal accident policies of the
members, respondent judge explained that this is a policy adopted by the Board,
Policy No. 1-20 dated August 14, 1976, providing group accident insurance policies
for each member of the Board during their incumbency in the amount of
P25,000.00. This policy was amended by Resolution No. 102-77 dated July 23, 1977,
increasing the amount of P25,000.00 to P50,000.00 and was sanctioned by the
National Electrification Administration. The said policy was ratified by the members
in their annual meeting held on July 2, 1978.

Respondent judge, however, admitted having ratified applications for membership

of applicants with TARELCO and having received the sums of P4,236.00 and
P1,500.00 on March 12, 1977 and March 16, 1977, respectively. He said that he was
prevailed upon to ratify the same, in the interest of the cooperative, pursuant to a
resolution of the Board authorizing ratifications of applications of membership of
applicants with TARELCO in his capacity as an ex-oficio notary public because no
notary public would accept P1.00 for the ratification of an application for
membership, thus saving the cooperative the amount of P22,944.00. To respondent
judge, said payment was not compensation or salary but as notarial service fees. He
claimed that he exercised great care in accepting the commission in question and
that complainant herein, who was the general manager, adviser and consultant of
the Board, approved payment of the same.

Issue:
WON respondent judge should account the notarial fees he was able to obtained.

Applicable Law:

P.D. 269, affecting eligibility of government officer or employee for membership in

any cooperative is circumscribed in Section 21 which provides that: The provision of
any law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, an officer or employee of the
government shall be eligible for membership in any cooperative if he meets the
qualifications therefor and he shall not be precluded from being elected to or
holding any position therein, or from receiving such compensation or fee in relation
thereto as may be authorized by the by-laws.

Section 76 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 expressly empowers the municipal judge in
his capacity as an ex oficio notary public to perform any act within the competency
of a notary public. Sec. 76. Miscellaneous powers of justice of the peace. A justice
of the peace shall have power within his territorial jurisdiction to solemnize
marriages, authenticate merchant's books, administer oaths and take depositions
and acknowledgment, and, in his capacity as ex-oficio notary public may perform
any act within the competency of a notary public.

The Notarial Law as contained in the Revised Administrative Code, Sections 231 to
252 and Sections 2632-2633 and the Rules of Court, Rule 141, Sections 6(h) and 9,
require that officers acting as notaries public ex oficio shall charge for their services
the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds.

Ruling:

Respondent Judge Martonino Marcos became director of the Board of Directors of

TARELCO from 1975 to 1978 when this Court has not yet stated categorically that
judges should not participate in the affairs of electric cooperatives, said respondent
judge was, therefore, qualified during his said term, to act and sit as director of
TARELCO and to receive the compensation in relation thereto.

The demands of public service also justify that the authority of the municipal judge
acting as notary public ex oficio should not be limited to notarizing documents
connected only with the exercise of their official duties. They should be allowed to
act and perform any service within the competency of a notary public. In our rural
areas and communities, there are few regular notaries and they do not keep regular
office hours. It would be more convenient and less expensive for the public,
especially the common people, to have ready access to the municipal judge at his
official station instead of travelling to the provincial capital or to the big towns
where most lawyers practice as regular notaries.

Conclusion:

The charges against respondents Clerk of Court Crisostomo T. Roque and Municipal
Judge Martonino Marcos are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Respondent Judge Martonino Marcos is, however, ordered to account and turn-over
to the Government thru the Municipal Treasurer of Gerona, Tarlac the sums of
P4,236.00 and P1,500.00 received by him as notarial fees on March 12, 1977 and
March 16, 1977 for having ratified applications for membership with TARELCO in his
capacity as notary public ex oficio and to submit proof of such payment to this Court
within ten (10) days upon notice to him of this Decision.

190. A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge,
8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte

PER CURIAM:
Facts:

The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992,
filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent,
Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful
conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross

immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had
scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela, that respondent falsely
represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract and dispensed with the
requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five
years.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent

caused to be registered as legitimate his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed
registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in
truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered
as legitimate.

The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:

(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by the
preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees beyond
the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary Public.

(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit

(executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he saw Edna Siton,
complainant in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of
fish and squid which respondent Judge received.

(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he
collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by
the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito Sagario, one
of the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid.

Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral
because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already
left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present
her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive.
He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his
first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.

He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but
he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming
that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely: Single, Widow or
Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate.
Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage
to Banzuela was honestly divulged.

On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications from the Mayor of

Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that there was no Notary
Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may be allowed to notarize documents.
He denied having charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received
by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been
receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover expenses in
maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a Certification from the Accounting
Department of the Municipal Government of Manukan to the effect that his yearly
expenditures were more than the yearly appropriations.

Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery. Finally, respondent tags as a

fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a case
pending in his sala and thereafter charged the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of
P500.00 for legal services. The complainant, he said, was the one who induced
Arcelita Salvador to execute an affidavit in support of the charge of corruption
against respondent.
On April 12, 1993, the herein administrative case was referred to Executive Judge
Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report
and recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2) counts
of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for his services; and
(2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case pending in his Court and
receiving payment for it. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation
against his Clerk of Court are found duly established and he thereafter recommends
the three months suspension of the respondent judge.

Applicable Law:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: A judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio,
the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has
ruled:

MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or

notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio perform any act
within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees
charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the municipal
treasurer (Lapea, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA
572); and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack
of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Compensation of Notaries
Public No fee, compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly
prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for any service
rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall
belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge
for their services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for
Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p.
202.)

Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended)-- Art. 269.
Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

The Family Code (Executive Order, No. 209)- Art. 177. Only children conceived and
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

Issue:

WON respondent judge is guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and and
corruption of unbecominig judge.

Ruling:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross

immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla
Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.

Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal
home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly
living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he
begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7,
1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore,
respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions
of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that,
after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation,
Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time
that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years
had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran
was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with
Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid
and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the
inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to
Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed.,
Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).

As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not

in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper
determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating
Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.

By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on

his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).

With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has
likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates of
respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that
these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry
therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975,
respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986.
As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. Legitimation is
limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two counts of
corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an
Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.

Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in Manukan

town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge
while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not, however, comply
with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of the
Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees. And there is
no way of determining the truth of his assertion that the notarial fees he collected
were mostly used to buy supplies and materials for his office, absent any
accounting.

Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him
as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the
presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.

With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a

rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from
the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to
offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA
166).

Conclusion:
The Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality,
deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in
the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.