League of Cities v.

Comelec

Action:

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities
of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad
rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.

The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION G.R. No 179579,
February 1, 2012

FACTS:

The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1) importer

or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these
factors, wheat would be classified further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3%
or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%. The regulation also provides for an exclusive
list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of
origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2)
that the regulation classified them to be a feed grade supplier without prior
assessment and examination, (3) the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers differently from flour
millers for no reason at all, and (4) the retroactive application of the regulation is
confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1)
the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper, (3) CM 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not
legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the respondent were speculative and
premature. On March 10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in
favour of the respondent. It held that the jurisdiction is properly held because the
subject matter is quasi-legislative in nature. It also held that the petition for
declaratory relief was proper remedy and that the respondent was the proper party
to file it. On matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that the
regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were
not complied with. The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was,
however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Was the issuance of CMO 27-2003 within the powers of the Commissioner of
Customs?
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC.

GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for
12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to
February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral
and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770,
representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages
as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50,
representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential
and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042,
which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042,
which reads:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment

without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with
bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-
ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.

All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the
hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for
seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a
child with her.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was
afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from
him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his
firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for

1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to

wives/women and not to husbands/men.

2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence
by men against women.

3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children
and other women.

4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal
violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.

5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an

abused wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.

Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:

1. Safeguard Human Rights,

2. Ensure Gender Equality and

3. Empower Women

International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights
and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.

1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the

2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,

3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

4. Convention Against Torture, and the

5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.

UDHR

As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under
the UDHR are the following:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood.

xxxx

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.

Declaration of Policy in RA 9262

enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by
providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological,
and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the
victim.

The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to
ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished
the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653,
petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for
prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board
shall:

(c) Establish a human resource management system which shall govern the
selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel.
Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the
principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].
Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is that
the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees
in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-
exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class
legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.

Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does
not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 1235;

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate

prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing
professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the BSP;

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the
deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives
of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the
SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial
institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and

e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file
and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP
officers.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner
also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the
other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994
BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no
force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the
legal issue involved.

Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the
equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed
in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative
autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends

the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is
based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy
of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject
to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

ISSUE:

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the
last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of
the laws."
Disini VS Secretary of Justice

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361,
and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
IMBONG VS OCHOA

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of

the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge

Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:

Right to life

Right to health

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

Due process clause

Equal protection clause

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge

Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

COMELEC VS CRUZ

FACTS

Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from
the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official was elected.

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan
City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the
constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and

not retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a

violation of the equal protection of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso
retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials

The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA
No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991
or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law.
The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA
No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further
asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when
expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no
vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid
objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially
involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right to
inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle. The COMELEC
lastly argues that there is no violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the
matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually
embraced within the title of the law.
Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal
Code to R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004)

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this
union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January
12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of
Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica,

may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance
with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262
provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.