Peyton Morris

Dr. Packer
PLSC 467
9 February 2017

Fire and Water:

An Analysis of the Arab and Israeli Arguments Regarding the Origins and Nature of the
Palestinian Exodus

The Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflict is a complex and perplexing international

relations dilemma that is the result of decades of historical, cultural, and ethnic concerns
and tensions. At the heart of the debate are the conflicting claims made by Arab
Palestinians and Jewish settlers in regards to the heritage and claim of Palestine.
Principally, decades of a largely successful Zionist campaign, and extensive Jewish
immigration into Palestine, escalated ethnic tensions into a territorial war and, then into
an international crisis. An escalation of tensions, exacerbated by foreign involvement,
produced two separate nationalist movements, which evolved into two divisive
nationalist identities. Subsequently, frequent and violent explosions of tensions between
these entities have characterized the modern history of the conflict. Specifically, the
1947-1948 war was a watershed event in the history of Palestines Arabs, as well as its
Jews (Tessler 1994). This period, known collectively by the Palestinians as the al-
Naqba, the catastrophe, saw the mass exodus of approximately 750,000 refugees from
Palestine and the new state of Israel during and after the war (Tessler 194). Not only did
this devastate Palestinian nationalist ambitions, but also was the catalyst for international
debate in regards to the nature and intentions of the Israeli campaigns that either
ultimately, persuaded or forced, Palestinians to flee the region (Packer 2017). The Arabs
argue that the Palestinians had been deliberately driven out of their homes through a
conscious Israeli campaign of intimidation and terror (Tessler 1994). They defend that
the Israeli attack on Deir Yassin and the subsequent massacre of its Palestinian residents
exemplifies this. Pro-Israelis advocate, however, that these incidents were the result of
military operations against legitimate threats to the development and security of the
Israeli settlements (Packer 2017a). Due to the conflicting nature of reports and statements
from the Arabs and the Israelis, this paper seeks to address and analyze these arguments
in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the origins of the Palestinian exodus.
These concerns continue to shape modern Middle Eastern relations, which are broad in
scope, and as such, have important consequences in international relations.
In regards to the Palestinian exodus, it is the Arab position that large numbers of
refugees were driven from their homes in a deliberate Zionist campaign of intimidation
and terror (Tessler 1994). According to Arab advocates, this point is best illustrated by
the massacre at Deir Yassin, which was but one horrendous incident in a systematic and
calculated Zionist campaign of terror designed to drive Palestinians from the area
(Tessler 1994). Additionally, the Arab argument emphasizes Zionist statements and the
reports of foreign observers as evidence of an intentional and strategic Israeli ethnic
cleansing campaign (Tessler 1994). According to John Glubb, who overheard a Zionist
leader in December 1947 reportedly say that there wouldnt be any Palestinians left in
Israel, as a few calculated massacres will soon get rid of them (Tessler 1994). Arabs
saw additional aggravated attacks by Israeli forces on Arab villages, such as the incident
at Nasr al- Din, as further evidence of such calculated massacres (Tessler 1994).
One of the most controversial arguments of the Arabs is that the attacks against
Palestinian civilians were not restricted to the underground Jewish forces, but that
Zionist institutions were informed and involved, as well (Tessler 1994). Notably, Arabs
claim that officials of the Hagana, the regular defense force of the Yishuv, were
responsible for approving the attack on Deir Yassin (Tessler 1994). They defend this
notion by remarking upon the ratification of an agreement for cooperation between the
Hagana and the Irgun shortly after the Deir Yassin episode (Tessler 1994). The Arabs
are certain to emphasize that the Zionist General Council, the governing body of the
Zionist movement during the early stages of Israeli statehood, was responsible for the
ratification of the agreement (Tessler 1994). Although they acknowledge that the attack
was physically carried out by the Irgun, Arab supporters defends that the official-Zionist
Hagana knew of the planned attack, and subsequently rewarded the Irgun for their
efforts via the cooperation agreement (Tessler 1994). Thus, they argue that the
involvement of the Israeli government was not only restricted to an administrative role,
but that they carried out attacks, as well (Tessler 1994). Pro-Arab defenses maintain this
point through evidence gathered from interviews with Palestinian refugees from the
Galilee that were conducted in Lebanon and Syria (Tessler 1994). In one of the cases,
the Israeli force was limited but a deliberate attempt to intimidate the local population is
nonetheless described (Tessler 1994). Despite the minimal number of terrorist incidents,
Arabs argue that these testimonies testify vividly to the fear that gripped the Arab
population (Tessler 1994). Thus, Arab supporters maintain that the Israeli government
was not only complicate in the administrative elements of the Zionist campaign, but was
involved militarily, as well.
Although Palestinian villages often raised armed resistances, Arabs argue that
Palestinians feared the consequences of remaining in their homes and therefore fled in
panic (Tessler 1994). An Arab representative maintains that these Palestinian fears did
not result from the disorder and confusion that occurs in any wartime situation, but
instead were the results of an intentional Zionist ethnic cleansing campaign (Tessler
1994; Packer 2017b). As such, the incidents of Israeli massacres were not isolated events,
but were parts of a larger psychological and political campaign directed against the
Palestinian population (Tessler 1994). Analysts such as Edgar OBallance and Rony
Gabbay maintain that these efforts contributed to a wider array of psychological warfare
in which the Arabs believe that the Zionists utilized fear and intimidation tactics to force
Palestinians from their homes (Tessler 1994).
Arabs also bring to attention the formation and implementation of Plan Daleth.
Plan Daleth, or Plan D, was approved in November 1947, and was formulated as a
contingency plan for defending a Jewish state from invasion by the main Jewish
underground army in Palestine, the Hagana (Isseroff 2001). Later that year, the plan was
revised in response to the partition plan for the Palestinian territory, but the plan was
meant to be activated only after the British left (Isseroff 2001). In April of 1948,
however, the Hagana implemented Operation Nachson, which is widely considered to be
an aspect of Plan D (Isseroff 2001). Yitzhak Levi, the head of the Hagana intelligence
agency, however, did not identify Operation Nachson as an element of Plan D, and
strongly refuted any notions that the Plan was anything but defensive in nature (Isseroff
2001). Pro-Arab advocates, however, describe it as a blueprint for preventing the
emergence of a Palestinian state and expelling the Palestinian population (Tessler 1994).
The Plan was not officially declared until May 14, but critics argue that Plan D was a
guiding doctrine for the Hagana months before (Tessler 1994).
Naturally, the Israelis maintain that their actions were defensive, as they were in
the best interests of the safety of Israeli settlements and national security. Researcher
Benny Morris, argues that campaigns, such as that of Plan D, were governed by military
considerations and was geared to achieving military ends, the most important of which
was defense of the territory assigned to the Jewish state (2001; Tessler 1994). That
being said, Morris acknowledges that securing the interior of the Jewish State for
impending battle along its borders meant the depopulation and destruction of villages
that hosted hostile local militia (2001; Tessler 1994). The examination of reports and
documents from the Zionist archives, however, has shown that the Arab population in
Israel posed significant threats to the legitimacy of the new Jewish state. For instance, in
one particular correspondence in summer 1948, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok
wrote Weizmann urging him to explore all possibilities of getting rid, once and for all,
of the huge Arab minority which originally threatened them (Shertok; Tessler 1994).
The Israeli contingency, however, argues that if the Arabs had not rejected the
United Nations Partition Resolution, then there would have been no war. In 1958, Abba
Eban, the Israels UN representative, delivered a speech in which he quoted, Once you
determine the responsibility for that war, you have determined the responsibility for the
refugee problem (Tessler 1994). In an earlier statement to the Higher Arab Committee,
Eban asserted that the Palestinian refugee crisis was the direct consequence of the action
of the Arab states in opposing partition and the Jewish state (Tessler 1994). As such,
pro-Israeli advocates maintain that the refugee crisis and the expulsion of Palestinian
Arabs was the result of the Arabs uncompromising stance in regards to the creation of
Israel. That being said, Israeli spokesmen also assert that Zionist behavior during the
war, regardless of why it started, was not characterized by a deliberate campaign to
completely eliminate Palestinians from the country. Furthermore, according to such
spokesmen, charges against widespread Jewish atrocities have been wildly exaggerated
by Arab propagandists (Tessler 1994). Supporters acknowledge that it would be foolish
to deny involvement and responsibility for regrettable incidents, but they maintain,
most of the allegations about Zionist terrorism are either false or grotesquely inflated
(Tessler 1994). They also emphasize that some of these allegations come from observers
who do not hesitate to criticize Israel on other grounds (Tessler 299).
In support of this argument, Benny Morriss investigation has had profound
implications on the understanding of the Israeli governments role in the conflict.
Contrary to notions upheld by the Arabs, Morriss investigation identified many specific
abuses by Jewish forces, but nonetheless found that there was no explicit or official
expulsion policy (Morris 2001; Tessler 1994). At the time of the first wave of
Palestinian refugees, Morris reveals that there was no Yishuv plan or policy to expel the
Arab inhabitants of Palestine, and that the developing refugee crisis caught the Yishuv
leadership, including the authors of Plan D, by surprise (Morris 2001; Tessler 1994).
With the evidence of an explicit IDF General Staff order to avoid destruction of Arab
villages and expulsion of Arab communities, Morris ultimately concluded that the
Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, and that it was
fundamentally an indirect consequence of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted,
bitter fighting (Morris 2001; Tessler 1994).
Benny Morriss study also revealed significant conclusions in regards to the
inevitability of the conflict; specifically that the crisis was nearly unavoidable. He points
to the the geographical intermixing of the population, the history of tension amongst
the Arabs and Jews, and the mutual rejection of a binominal solution as the factors that
ultimately contributed to the crisis (Morris 2001; Tessler 1994). The structural
weaknesses that characterized Palestinian society on the eve of the war only further
accelerated the dislocation process. Particularly, instable ethnic relations, and economic
and social processes already left large segments of the rural population displaced and the
wider Palestinian community fragmented (Morris 2001). The depth of the Arab
animosity toward the Jews and their overarching fear of Jewish sovereignty only
heightened tensions and contributed to a near-national rejection of partition, which would
have left segments of the Palestinian population under Jewish rule. Thus, when
confronted with a unified Zionist campaign and military attacks, Palestinian society
dissolved.
Word Count: 1865
 References

Isseroff, Ami. 2001 [2005]. Plan Daleth (Plan D). http://www.mideastweb.org/pla

nd.htm (August 5, 2017).

Morris, Benny. 1999 [2001]. Critical Analysis of the Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
Crisis. In Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999.
New York and Toronto: Random House, Inc.
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Palestine-
Remembered/Story562.html (August 4, 2017).

Packer, Robert. 2017. Plan D and the Origin of Israeli National Security Doctrine.

Packer, Robert. 2017. Palestinian Refugees Righteous Victims or Dangerous Fifth

Column.

Packer, Robert. 2017. Al Nakba the Palestinian Disaster.

Tessler, Mark. 1994. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington and

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.