BARRAMEDA, Paul Isaac A.

4C/3C

JONAR SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN

A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, lodged a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter alia, that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule 12.07 and
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when the latter executed an
affidavit in favour of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the hearing of the case, respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.
In his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the complainant and uttered insulting
words nor veiled threats against the latter. He however admitted that he executed an affidavit in
favour of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing
his client but interposed the defense that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on
substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice."
Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since
they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the
ends of justice.
The IBP, while finding that administrative offense was committed by respondent for
violating the notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for alleged violation of
Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the present action was commenced.

ISSUE:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative to the cause of the party which he is
actively representing in a case without violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
YES. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,
except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-
client relationship. The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task
of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are
expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those
who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of
propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same
time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of
the case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters
life and liberty are at stake. Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as
defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction.
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients,
since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at
his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in
his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of
its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits,
a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations
of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the
State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary,
as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be
an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his
testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession
require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
BARRAMEDA, Paul Isaac A.
4C/3C

DOROTEO M. SALAZAR vs. JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004, October 19, 2007

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
In a Complaint dated November 10, 2004, complainant Doroteo M. Salazar charged
respondent Judge Antonio D. Marigomen of Bogo, Cebu RTC Branch 61 with gross ignorance of
the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and rendering a decision violative
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution in
connection with Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789. Specifically, the complaint pointed out
that Judge Marigomens manifest partiality was shown by allowing the counsel for the adverse
party to testify on behalf of the client of which such counsel was actively representing in the trial
of the case in gross violation of Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting lawyers to testify on behalf of their clients except as to formal matters such as
mailing and authentication of documents, or to substantial matters in the interest of justice. Such
allegation was not denied by the respondent Judge.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the complaint meritorious and thus
recommended that the respondent Judge be sanctioned accordingly. Hence, the present action
was instituted.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent Judge err when he allowed the counsel of the adverse party to testify
on behalf of his client during the trial of the case?

HELD:
YES. As correctly found by the Office of the Court Administrator:

Respondent judges bias for Mancio was further shown by respondent judge when he
allowed one of the counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify despite the
vigorous objection of Salazar through his counsel, as the testimony was in violation of
Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. The Rule prohibits a
lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client, except on formal matters such as the
mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases
where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice. In this case, Atty. Roeles was
allowed to testify on matters not contemplated by the exceptions. As admitted by
respondent judge, he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify to prove that he is one of the legal
panel (sic) of the protestee; that he was at the Municipality of Madridejos last May 12,
2001 to May [1]5, 2001; and that there was (sic) no goons, terrorism and other election
activities as alleged by the protestant. Surely, the matters testified to by Atty. Roeles are
neither formal matters nor essential to the ends of justice; rather, they were self-serving
declarations intended to strengthen Mancios cause.
 Thus, in Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Santiago City, Isabela, the Court observed:

. . . [T]he lack of candor he has shown by the misrepresentation which he

made before the Court is incongruent with the primordial character which a
magistrate must possess, especially so in this case where the act of dishonesty was
committed against the Court. A member of the bar owes candor, fairness, and
good faith to the Court. He must not do any falsehood or consent to the doing of
any in court; neither shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice. The moral standard of honesty is equally, if not much more, expected
from members of the Judiciary, as they are the agents through which the
Court ensures that the end of justice is served. Dishonesty is anathema to the
very nature of functions which a magistrate performs. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Judge is thus found GUILTY of manifest bias and dishonesty amounting to grave
misconduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of P25,000.