Legal Prof Finals Assignment

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA VS. ATTY. LEONARDO C.
ADVINCULA
A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749), June 14, 2016
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated June 16,
2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula
(Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula)
In her complaint, Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and
immoral acts;[2] that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual
relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); that the extra-marital relations bore a
child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria); that Atty. Advincula failed
to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea
Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources; that he admitted in
the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage
with Ms. Gonzaga; that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of
late registration of birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly
entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in
itself still unlawful; that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way
below the standards of morality required of every lawyer; that contracting a subsequent
marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an unlawful conduct; that
making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable under
the Revised Penal Code; and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his
children showed his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer] Dr.
Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred.
In his answer, Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the
subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their youngest Jose
Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not agree on various
matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr. Advincula
abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with her parents; that despite
their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their children; that
during their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not
contract a second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga.
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms.
Gonzaga, a child was bom and named Alexandra; that in consideration of his moral obligation
as a father, he gave support to Alexandra; that he only learned that the birth of Alexandra had
been subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in school; that it was Ms.
Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer in
order to enroll the child; that he strived to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a
reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided
to live with her parents, bringing all of their children along; that nevertheless, he continued to
provide financial support to his family and visited the children regularly; that Dr. Advincula
intimated to him that she had planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse abroad
because her medical practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing
school expenses; that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a
nurse; that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to such
arrangement to avoid further division of the family; that during the same period he was also
busy with his law studies; that Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their children migrate to the
USA but he opposed the proposal because he would not be able to practice his profession
there; that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to join her, then she would just get the
children to live with her; that when Dr. Advincula came home for a vacation he was not able to
accompany her due to his extremely busy schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the General
Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of Investigation; and that when they finally met
arguments flared out, during which she threatened to file a disbarment suit against him in
CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

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order to force him to allow her to bring their children to the USA. Atty. Advincula prayed that
the disbarment case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD
After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission on

Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and observations, and recommended the
following sanctions, to wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers comes this
provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character. Remember we
must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer has
the required qualifications foremost of which is the presence of that character earlier
mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the weakness of the
flesh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as a moral
obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had committed an
adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land defined as
immoral conduct: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."
xxxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo
Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what respondent forgot is
that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity: and render help and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented

evidencing the fact that he supported their children financially. Such conduct could not
illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the blame why their
marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together would indicate that harmony between
them was out of the question.
The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that ignited the flame of
discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend the supreme
penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such honored station in life would result in

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irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest degree pursuant to the Honorable
Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission
of having committed an extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least one month with the
additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty would be
imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did
was not grossly immoral.
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of the penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple immorality and also
taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months.[30]
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as final and
executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as follows:
That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution suspending the
undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two (2) months under "A.C. No. 9226
(formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula) x x x
That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the undersigned
attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up to December thereby
refraining himself from the practice of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) x x x
That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of his
compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to practice his law
profession again.[31]
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice
of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx

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Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only
be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless
as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To
be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on

the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, the
extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife
and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a
lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also married. In another
case we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child with a former
client. In Samaniego v. Ferrer, suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on
the philandering lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the
child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the
immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not as
grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar.
Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into
proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for three months to be
condign and appropriate.
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013
that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him
from the practice of law for two months as final and executory; that he had then gone on leave
from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and lasting until the end of
December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining from performing his duties
as a Legal Officer of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it
is only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did
not possess such power, rendering its recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is
the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the
service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with the recommended
two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his work at the NBI.
Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the
practice of law should include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice.
This is so considering that his position mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in

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good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will not be a penalty if it does not
negate his continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different, this
exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a
mockery because he can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on
leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of
immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of THREE MONTHS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to
report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the
Personnel Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from
office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the date of
commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Service
Commission for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
COBALT RESOURCES, INC. vs. ATTY. RONALD AGUADO (A.C. No. 10781[Formerly CBD
Case No. 10-2764])
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
lawyer's oath.
The Antecedents
In its Complaint,1 CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests
bearing the mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group
(PASG), hi-jacked its delivery van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3
million; that Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery van, and his
companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at the Country Hill and
Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who
immediately reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking
Device installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNPCIDU tracked down the location of
the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the
PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found three (3) vehicles
parked in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado,
(2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that
when the PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased
by the police officers and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the
reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the police officers knew, at that
time, of his participation in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the
cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the
PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest
bearing the mark PASG.
CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission
order when it flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as
the assistant team leader and authorized the armed men to seize CRIs cellular phones; that
the PASG issued a certification stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty. Aguado

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carried an ID bearing his picture and name which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant;
and that this ID was likewise fake as evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.
Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes,

CRI concluded that it was Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded
the crime as he was the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its
execution; and that it was he who recruited the armed men who actually executed the
hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery3 and Carnapping4 were filed against
Atty. Aguado and several others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he
failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.
In his Conference Brief,5 Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March
5, 2010, at about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"6 his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68
was carnapped along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the
incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened by relatives
informing him that his name was on the front page of several tabloids in a story connecting
him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the ID found
hanging in his carnapped vehicle.
In its Report and Recommendation,7 dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the
Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that he be
suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty. Aguados purported
participation in the alleged hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the
CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years.8
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration9 praying that the May 3, 2011 report
of the IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado
be issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the
falsification of public documents was sufficiently established and, as the CBD knew, he
masterminded the hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for Reconsideration10 of the March
20, 2013 Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the
complaint. He averred that the charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against
him had been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not
be presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was never in possession of the
falsified ID and mission order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty.
Aguado asserted that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution
of the robbery and carnapping charges against him.

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In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
motions and affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.
Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for
review12 before the Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the
penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his
involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying
for the dismissal of the complaint.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is

separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed
independently of each other.13 A finding of guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily
mean a finding of liability in the administrative case.14 In the same way, the dismissal of a
criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is also a
respondent in an administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him administratively
because the quantum of evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required.15 "In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant."16 Preponderance of evidence means "evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto."
Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was
in possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order
identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty.
Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis of an ID found
hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,18 his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon),
during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID and
mission order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:
ATTY. HARON:
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called
mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.
ATTY. AMON:
I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
Im showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F".
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Machine copy.
ATTY. HARON:
This is the copy.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Take a look, is that a machine copy?

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ATTY. HARON:
Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of
the team by mission order.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking
whether that document is authentic or not.
ATTY. AMON:
Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Yes, he is the one.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order were
found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.
ATTY. AMON:
Of which he is the owner, yes.
ATTY. HARON:
Admitted also, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the
PASG are genuine and duly executed. Im showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your
Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguados

participation in the crime as follows:
xxx
2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing
hijacking. Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli
sa mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming
paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.
3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na
nakatalaga sa Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.
4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin
ng kung pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya
ng "budget" upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng seizure operations.
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay

pinapanatag niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty.

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Aguado ang magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa
PASG Malacaang para ma-flag down ang delivery van".
6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming
abogado. Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman
ko kay James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De
Rosas alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na
kulay berde na may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton
Street upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton
Street.
8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street
kung saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi
L-300 ng Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming
ginawang pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing
delivery van sa Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming
nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.
Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang
ruta ng delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng meeting kay Atty. Aguado.
10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonalds Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting
kami. Ang mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong
kami ay nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay
nagusap.
11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang
kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty.
Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down
ang delivery van ng Cobalt.
12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at
Joe Almonte sa McDonalds Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty.
Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kayat
kaming apat ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si
Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.
13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may
plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung
saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na
gagawin namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner
Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van
ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga
nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na
tama ang delivery van na ipa-flagdown.
Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

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LEGAL PROFESSION
14. Kayat kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing
Petron Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa
tao si Atty. Aguado.
15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonalds Quezon
Avenue noong ika-1 ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si
Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area
samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.
16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty.
Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula
kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.
17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas-8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya
lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang
operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.
Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado
dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw
ang mga papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.
18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw
ang operation kinabukasan (ika-5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay
kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.
19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron
Gasoline Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang
alas-8:30 ng umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang
ZDW 764 at may kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."
Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na
sakay ng nasabing Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus
ay nagpakarga lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na
rin sila. Sumunod namang umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron
upang ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at
sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James,
"ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa area."
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van
upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez
Street.
Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay
blue-green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at
nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong
napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na
nabilang ang dami nila.
22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito.
Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo
lang sila pag malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod ." Pagkatapos noon ay
umalis na sila.
23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery
van. Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang
Page 10
LEGAL PROFESSION
puti." Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang
delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng
tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing
pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime
as charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified
documents found in his possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as
evidenced by the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the crime. The well-settled
rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who
used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."21 Atty. Aguado
failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the
carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to support his
denial of the crime. He also failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in testifying
against him whom he claimed to have met only in February 2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:
He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the
hijacking was staged by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a
perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm
sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in
his sworn statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the
same in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement before the police
authorities expecially because he supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant, even if the report on the time of the
carnapping incident would have been properly made, the hijacking took place much earlier and
therefore the same does not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the
reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness
account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed.22
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with

conditions,23 and granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice.24 As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, lawyers are burdened with
the highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.25 They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also this high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.26
Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully
discharge his bounden duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to
practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or omission which might

Page 11
LEGAL PROFESSION
diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal
profession.27
In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed
the supreme penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by
falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, 28 the Court disbarred the lawyer when he
falsified a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell his client's property. In
Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,29 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who
authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.
CONRADO QUE versus ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.
In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio

Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of
the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn
the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful
detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard,
repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that
these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful
detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order
to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal
gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration
of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the
presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up
his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in
supporting the above falsehood.[4]
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed
the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do
so.

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan

Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less
fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to
take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the
unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his
siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions
to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these
petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over
the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico,
and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he
discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the complainant and
his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for
annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of

dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and
the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open
court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with
respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error
by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having
represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The
respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The
respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor
General to represent his clients in the case.
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful
or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good
faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer
to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent
additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel,
Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings before the IBP that the present complaint
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on
which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was
filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his
clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan (Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and
rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that
it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and
the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage
multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan

noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of
the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the
respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment
and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample
evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his
petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico
and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue.
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the
respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the
litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely
glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the
litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his
misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that
only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for
and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution
No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration,
the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one
(1) year.
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for
the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been

Page 14
LEGAL PROFESSION
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., we suspended
the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the
court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a
suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to
six (6) months.
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty
of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the
execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against
these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892)
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to
question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the
respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy,
still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent
again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in
a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC
with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-
38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property
involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both
dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions
for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising
their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent
based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a
part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four
petitions he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of
judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for
declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution
of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are
already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and
RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

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LEGAL PROFESSION
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may
be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent
petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts
to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing
the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.
This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and
declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer
decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberatefalsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon
City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The
extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file
the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them
away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and
fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the
attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants
therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion
for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25]
These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting
the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that
only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the
Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented
by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply
impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent
signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this
underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its
resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court
and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both
counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open

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LEGAL PROFESSION
court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel
as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED
AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE
REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was
actually for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing
on the adverse partys motion to dismiss.[28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held
in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the
motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge
of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes
as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion
for Reconsideration are not true. how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without
stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no
indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by
the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are
all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what
allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his
dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31]
The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an
indispensable participant in the administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to act
candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal
the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his
duties to his clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to
deal candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless
appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to

Page 17
LEGAL PROFESSION
prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed
what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the
respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and
accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the
adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his
accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in
the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the
respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void
ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed
wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively
maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice

represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for
annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the
other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that
he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We
find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned
lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30
years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University
of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of
compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real
charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly
represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title,
the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the
Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where
he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a
surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint
on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may
not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or,
in the absence thereof, without leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a

Page 18
LEGAL PROFESSION
lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants
disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious

advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though
the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill
will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced
from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the
person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of
his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the
Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC
and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his
petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and
honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of
avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is

not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.[44] As
we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can
never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He
must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case
with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only
as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the
oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by
ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed
because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject
this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case
against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate
disbarment case against the respondent.

Page 19
LEGAL PROFESSION
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the
court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal
motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the
case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to
the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and
the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss
over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced.
He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor
and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the
expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly
administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent
this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then
has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents professional
legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

Page 20
LEGAL PROFESSION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the
Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule
19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that
the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
10.) Rule 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule on Revealing Clients Identity
General Rule: A lawyer may not invoke privilege communication to refuse
revealing a clients identity. (Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122, September 20,
1996)
Exceptions:
a.) When by divulging such identity, it would implicate the client to that same controversy
for which the lawyers services were required.
b.) It would open client to civil liability
c.) The disclosure of such identity will provide for the only link in order to convict the
accused, otherwise, the government has no case.
Requisites of Privileged Communication:
a.) Atty.-client relationship (or a kind of consultancy relationship with a prospective client
b.) Communication made by client to lawyer in the course of lawyers professional
employment
c.) Communication is intended to be confidential (see Rule 130, Sec. 21(b), Rules of Court)
When communication is not privileged:
a.) After pleading has been filed
b.) communication intended by the client to be sent to a third person through his counsel (it
loses its confidential character as soon as it reaches the hands of third person)
c.) Even if the communication is unprivileged, the rule of ethics prohibits him from
voluntarily revealing or using to his benefit or to that of a third person, to the
disadvantage of the client, the said communication unless the client consents thereto.
d.) This is applicable to students under the Student Practice Law Program
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule on Conflicting Interest
It is generally the rule based on sound public policy that an attorney cannot represent
adverse interest. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. The proscription
against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interest
arises with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intention and motives were honest and he
acted in good faith. However, representation of conflicting interest may be allowed where the
parties consent to the representation after full disclosure of facts. (Nakpil vs. Valdez, 286 SCRA
758).
General Rule: An attorney cannot represent adverse interest.

Exception: Where the parties consent to the representation after full disclosure of facts.

Page 21
LEGAL PROFESSION
The TEST in determining Conflicting Interest: The test is whether or not the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of individual
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness in double-dealing in the
performance thereof.(Tiana vs. Ocampo)
CPR PROVISIONS
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client
in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a
division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept
any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the
client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;

Page 22
LEGAL PROFESSION
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from
his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates
thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with
members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case
except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
Quantum Meruit it means as much as he deserves, and is used as the basis for
determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by
him from his client. It is in line with the fundamental principle against just enrichment at the
expense of another.
Quantum Meruit is resorted to where:
1.) There is no express contract for payment of attorneys fees agreed upon between the
lawyer and the client
2.) When although there is a formal contract for attorneys fees, the stipulated fees are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court.
3.) When the contract for attorneys fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects
of execution
4.) When the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion
5.) When lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys fees.
An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort
in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.
Contingent Fee vs Champertous Contracts
Contingent Fee- A contingent fee that is conditioned to the securing of a favorable

judgment and recovery of money or property and the amount of which may be on a
percentage basis
Champertous Contracts (void) Lawyer stipulates with his client that in the
prosecution of the case, he will bear all the expenses for the recovery of things or
property being claimed by the client and the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of
the thing/property recovered as compensation.
Page 23
LEGAL PROFESSION
*** A champertous contract is void being contrary to public policy. It differs from a
contingent fee in that, a contingent fee may be paid in cash, whereas, a champerty can
be paid only in kind. In contingent fee, the counsel does not undertake to bear all the
expenses of litigation, whereas in a champertous contract, there is such an undertaking.
Retaining Lien Charging Lien
Passive Lien: It cannot be

actively enforced. It is a general Active Lien: It can be enforced by
1. Nature lien execution. It is a special lien.
Lawful possession of papers,

documents, property belonging Securing of a favorable money
2. Basis to client. judgment for the client.
Covers only papers, documents

and property in the lawful Covers all judgments for the
possession of the attorney by payment of money and executions
reason of his professional issued in pursuance of such
3. Coverage employment judgments.
As soon as the attorney gets As soon as the claim for attorneys

4. When Lien possession of the papers fees had been entered into the
takes effect documents or property records of the case
Client need not be notified to Client and adverse party must be

5. Notice make it effective notified to make it effective
Generally, it is exercisable only

May be exercised before when the attorney had already
judgment or execution or secured a favorable judgment for
6. Applicability regardless thereof. his client
DISBARMENT OF LAWYERS
A disbarment proceeding is an investigation conducted by the Supreme Court, by the
IBP or other authorized body and Office of the Solicitor General. to determine the fitness of a
lawyer to remain in the Roll of Attornies. The ultimate authority to decide the matter of
disbarment rests in the SC alone. The IBP investigates through its Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD). The CBD is the investigating arm of the IBP.
The CA and RTC can investigate and take action only against lawyers who appear for
litigants in cases pending before them. They can ONLY investigate but NOT DISBAR.
Characteristics of Disbarment Proceedings:
*** SUI GENERIS- a class of its own.
1.) Neither a civil nor criminal proceedings;

Page 24
LEGAL PROFESSION
2.) Double jeopardy cannot be availed of in a disbarment proceeding;
3.) It can be initiated motu propio by the SC or IBP. It can be initiated without a complaint;
4.) It is imprescriptible;
5.) Conducted confidentially;
6.) It can proceed regardless of the interest of the lack thereof on the part of the
complainant;
7.) It constitutes due process.
Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension:
1.)Deceit;
2.)Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
3.)Grossly immoral conduct;
Grossly immoral is jurisprudentially defined as an act that is so corrupt to institute an
offense. An act committed under scandalous manner as to shock common sense of
normal person or decency. It is willful, flagrant and shameless to show moral
indifferences.
4.)Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5.)Violation of oath of office or of the Lawyers Oath;
6.)Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
7.) Corrupt or willful appearance as attorney for a party to case without authority
to do so (Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC)
Procedure for Disbarment
***A complaint for disbarment may be filled directly to the SC, the IBP National Office or
in any IBP Chapter Offices in the country.
1.) Institution either by:

2.) the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or
3.) the IBP, motu proprio, or
4.) upon verified complaint by any person
5.) Six copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or
Secretary of any of its chapter and shall be forwarded to the IBP Board of Governors.
6.) Investigation by the National Grievance Investigators.
7.) Submission of investigative report to the IBP Board of Governors.
8.) Board of Governors decides within 30 days. There is a need of Formal voting. A Vote of
at least 5 members of the Board is needed.
9.) Investigation by the Solicitor-General
10.) SC renders final decision for disbarment/suspension/dismissal.
***Quantum of Proof Required: CLEARLY PREPONDERANT evidence.
***Burden of Proof: Rests on the COMPLAINANT, the one who instituted the suit.

Page 25
LEGAL PROFESSION

Legal Prof Finals Assignment

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Legal Prof Finals Assignment

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MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA VS. ATTY. LEONARDO C.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission on

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Was his conduct grossly immoral?

Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

Ruling of the Court

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes,

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is

I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.

This is the copy.

Take a look, is that a machine copy?

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Yes, Your Honor, as written here.

Yes, he is the one.

Of which he is the owner, yes.

Admitted also, Your Honor.

What is your proposal Atty. Haron?

x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]

Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguados

5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

CONRADO QUE versus ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.

In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan

The Courts Ruling

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Abuse of court procedures and processes

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Willful, intentional and deliberatefalsehood before the courts

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLWU SCHOOL OF LAW

The Respondents Defenses

We find no merit in the respondents defenses.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious