Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise
said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because
the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all
educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private
education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that
are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control
and regulation by the State over all schools.
Tan v. Macapagal
Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence
of its enforcement.
2. NO.
At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any
resolution that would radically alter the 1935 constitution therefore not
yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con
has actually does something already. Then the court may actually
inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions
of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length
of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for
this case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different
from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There
are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is
contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years
of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas
F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the
revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays
that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz :
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
-vs-
Facts:
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as
reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic
act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169,
the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right
entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided
into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM
in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which
will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and
B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE
shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the
coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters,"
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines
of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal
waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to
include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to
remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled
to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the
negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental
protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and
the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or
modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be
further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which
was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the
right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of
which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.
Issues:
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the
laws
Ruling:
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of
the Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of
Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan
Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus
standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if
include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in
alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can
be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as
an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for
justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be
benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the
MOA-AD.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the
petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again
be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions
are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to
the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has
become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully
at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain,
hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to
the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is
the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince they
allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in
any law to the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be
no question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee
the indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it
shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the
protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the
indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it
would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at
the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
RULING:
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise
to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
Davide, Jr., J:
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its
protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato
Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and the
imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KI
LOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this
petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by
respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)is
hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.
RATIO:
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the
prohibition can be allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a
franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that
"in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of
rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most
strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or
privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove
his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed,
and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by
probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.
Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various
litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do
not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are
being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that
of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that
funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to
bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President
of the Philippines.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different.
Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of timber
licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art.
II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts.
That provision states:
Issue:
whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition?
Ruling:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself. 6 But the most important are the
first two (2) requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in
an
action. 7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall
be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. 8Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
9
right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a
case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the
10
fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when
a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
11
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and
in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by
private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its
president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity
to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA"
for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
Issue:
Ruling:
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the
petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of
citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to
disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth
billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent
PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to
comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
xxx
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54] while the Court noted that the
petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a
showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress
taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[55] that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power.
This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal
standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to
the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of
Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court
on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of
the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic
destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the
deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the
slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain
written in our statute books.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Legal Standing
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006
Prepared By: Israel C. Sayao
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition
and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and
three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches
the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
Ruling:
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People
v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Therefore, the
court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered
direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43
(E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of
the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner,
which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect,
injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to
seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Issues :
Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant
suit.
Held :
Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power
as member of Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they
can seek redress in our domestic courts.
Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the
ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the President for
ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the
same to the Senate for concurrence.
The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring
the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity
of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate. The participation of the legislative branch
in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check
on the executive in the field of foreign relations.
The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds
the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose
of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.
Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya
Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling
35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral
concerns, however the project pushed through.
ISSUES:
RULING:
1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental
importance to the public that the case demands. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise
of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural
barrier.
2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association,
company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign. The language
of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or
privilege to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO cannot exercise it
in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other
party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase.
By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor
can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.
Estrada Vs Sandiganbayan
Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine
FACTS:
An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and
John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
1. YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law
o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice
o can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction
o a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
o the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms
o overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases.
UMALI v GUINGONA
Facts:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. However, a confidential memorandum against him
was sent to President Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential
Commission on anti-graft and Corruption for investigation. Umali
complied with the pleadings and hearings set #$ PC"C. Umali and
his lawyer did not raise clarificatory questions during the hearing.
PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support the charges and
President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He appealed to the
Office of the President but was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging
that he was not accorded due process and deprived of security
of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the decision
and was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the
constitutionality of PCAGC as a government agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest
opportunity?
Ruling:
In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the
constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only posed petitioner in his motion
for reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late to raise the
said issue for the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings.
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi
Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by
the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter
to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit
that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
Held:
1. The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated.
Issue 2:
W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality
of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have
been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of
HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this
case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is
whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the
groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is
the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be
revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the
constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality
of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met
in this case.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the
declarationof RA 342 as unconstitutional retroacted to 1945 when EO
32 was first issued. Between1944 when the loan matured and
1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15 yearshad elapsed. [The
orthodox view was announced by Mr. J. Field, in the caseof Norton
vs. Shelby County where the court held that:"xxx. An unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposesnod u t i e s
; it affords no protection; it creates no offi
c e ; i t i s , i n l eg a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n , inoperative, as if it
had not been passed.But if we take the unorthodox view, as
the SC did, the action couldstill prosper. The period from 1945
when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when itwas declared
unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose
ofprescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative
during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59).
Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could
not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt.
Facts:
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as
two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs.
Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO,
it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as
vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to
the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two
groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory
Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions
before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation
of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received those
benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent
really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to
review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the
report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and
(2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition
scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and
subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land
acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was
assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
YES.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose
members were admittedly employed by HLI and whose names and
signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being qualified
beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are
certainly parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment
recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply
with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular
farmworkers, but are in the category of "other farmworkers" mentioned
in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, 89 thus only entitled to a share
of the fruits of the land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not
detract from the fact that they are still identified as being among the
"SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring
an action upon the SDP.
CONSTITUTIONAL.
>> FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to
stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of
the Constitution.106
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or
legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential
requirements are first met, to wit:
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.108
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue
must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis
mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being
critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to
avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental act.110 If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law,
such recourse is favored.111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will
undertake judicial review means that the Court will not pass upon a
question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application
of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show
that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.112 (Italics in the original.)
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally
taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged)
and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with
the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-
compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any
of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into
the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per
se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said
provision in the SDP that is flawed.
FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,
Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar.
On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
"Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at
her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the
ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the
owner thereof."
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO.
>> Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was
entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018
of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No.
1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code.
YMBONG VS OCHOA
Facts:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues
of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and
their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political
activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-
intervention.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised,
the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of
one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the
RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
ISSUE/S:
RULING:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.