Beauty as it speaks to life

Study in how Platonic Form of Beauty relates to our interaction with beautiful objects

Emma Yun

First Reader: Professor Danielle Macbeth

Second Reader: Professor Joel Yurdin

Abstract: Beautys relation to art and the good life is mostly obscure, though the topic has
been much debated in the course of Western Philosophy. In this essay, I hope to revive the
relationship between beauty and goodness, as understood in Platonic times. My main argument
centers on Platos understanding of beauty, which claims that a beautiful object is a particular
body manifesting the Form of Beauty. To understand the nature of beauty, separation between
the Form and the body is needed. I explain how this separation is possible when one makes the
progression from appreciating the beauty of the body to creating artworks, to contemplating the
nature of beauty in a philosophical discourse. For Plato, goodness is a life spent in philosophical
discourse. In my paper, I take goodness to mean a life devoted to understanding the nature of our
existence. Only by understanding the nature of our existence, we can develop empathy and
tolerance. These attributes are necessary in order for us to lead a flourishing life, since our
existence is not individuated. Because the Form is intricately woven into the particular body that
is connected to life, one who appreciates the Form is drawn to exploring more of the body that
leads to exploring more about life itself. Therefore, I argue that understanding the nature of
beauty ultimately leads us to the world of the particulars where the good and the bad, happiness
and sorrow, are interconnected. It is this dichotomy that has led scholars to resist the claim that
beauty ultimately converges with goodness. I conclude that understanding the nature of our
existence does converge with goodness, even when existence itself is not purely good.
Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks to Professor Danielle Macbeth, whose keen insights and lively presence made

this whole project possible from the beginning. I also thank Professor Joel Yurdin for his helpful

comments on my first draft; and Professor Michael Krausz (Bryn Mawr College) for helping me

develop my topic. Also, many thanks to Irene Lin for giving me helpful feedbacks on several

incomplete drafts I made her read; Zachary Dutton, Cherry Yum, Samara Thomas and many

others for the much-needed moral support in order to finish this thesis, and Dean Phillip Bean,

for all his help on many occasions throughout my college-career. Finally, I would like to thank

my mom, who made me everything I am today. Thank you.

1

Section 1: Introductory Discussion

Beauty has puzzled its beholders throughout history. On the one hand, we have a good

relationship with beauty, since we are stimulated, euphoric and hopeful about life1 in its

presence. Therefore, we naturally desire objects of beauty. On the other hand, beauty is accused

of being superficial, and placing too much emphasis on appearance. Some believe that following

our desire for beauty can lead us to a hedonistic and one-dimensional life, where we do not take

seriously anything that is not good-looking. Still others argue that it is us who engage in a

superficial relationship with beauty, if an object is appreciated solely for its beauty and not loved

for itself.

As a response to the first objection, some argue that physical appearance is not the only

means through which beauty can manifest itself. An object that is not necessarily good-looking

can carry a beautiful message. Similarly, a kind and intelligent person is beautiful, even when he

or she is not outwardly so. We can agree that beauty is not solely limited to appearance, and

therefore not one-dimensional, but can manifest itself in various parts of a particular object.

Consequently, physical beauty of an object can be thought of as independent, but not exclusive,

of the object as a whole, i.e. a person is good-looking not because he/she is kind or intelligent,

but simply because of his/her good looks. A good-looking person may be kind, but not

necessarily so. Therefore, it is possible to consider beauty as a being of its own, and an object of

beauty as having this abstract being somehow manifested in it. And while the two beings (that

of beauty and the particular object of beauty) are closely-related, they need not have a

1
Many accounts of the felt experience of beauty echo these descriptions. For more discussion on

these accounts, see Section 3. 2. 2. (p.16).

2

codependent relationship. This understanding of beauty closely resembles the discussion on the

Form2 of Beauty in the Platonic dialogues.

In response to the second argument that a thing of beauty is unjustifiably given a

superficial treatment, some claim that loving an object and seeing beauty in it cannot possibly be

distinguished from one another. This view also makes possible the development of personal

taste3. Based on many accounts of everyday examples, we are aware that not everyone finds the

same things beautiful. The discrepancy in taste necessitates an account of beauty that portrays

seeing beauty in a particular object as a result of mutual interaction between the subject and the

object. If our love for an object is the reason we find it beautiful, then since not everyone loves

the things we love, it is possible for others to not share our taste. On the other hand, if we argue

that beauty is a separate entity that resides within the object, (i.e. the Form of Beauty2) then an

explanation regarding why some recognize its beauty and some do not, would be needed.

My thesis formulates an attempt to combine the above two arguments. Within an object

commonly agreed to be beautiful, the Form of beauty may be quite obvious, possibly manifested

in the body; e.g. a good-looking person. Some other particular object with less obvious beauty

may have the Form in the more obscure parts of its being. E.g. A kind, intelligent person may

have the Form of Beauty in his soul. Therefore, granting there is the Form embodied within all

particular beautiful objects does not preclude one from having personal taste, which answers to

why everyone does not agree on whether a particular object is beautiful. Further, recognizing the

Form of beauty made manifest in the less obvious places within a particular object, resembles

2
More discussion on the Forms in Section 2. 1. p. 4.

3
Detailed discussion on personal taste in Section 3. 4. p.21.

3

seeing the side of a friend after one is fully acquainted with him/her. Just as sharing private

information between close-friends creates an intimate bonding experience4, one who finds beauty

in an object where others do not, builds an intimate relationship between us and the object. This

relationship is similar to the one resulting from the second view described above, which claims

love of beauty is love of the object as a whole. The difference between the two views, however,

is that in this case because one seeks to get to the Form of Beauty, one is more focused on

understanding what makes all things beautiful, not just what makes a particular beautiful.

Therefore, the relationship with beauty leads one to understand not just a particular object, but all

things in the world.

The premise of my thesis is that beauty is an entity of its own, or in its Platonic Form,

separate from a particular object, while at the same time, is that which allows for personal taste.

From this premise, I argue that by appreciating Beauty of the Form, one is led to understanding

more about the nature of the particular object, which in turn leads to understanding more about

the world surrounding it. This understanding of the world surrounding a beautiful object is at its

maximally inter-subjective when our focus is not on the particular, however much we may love

it, but on the nature of beauty, that encompasses life.

Section 2: Orienting Section

2. 1. Form of Beauty

As mentioned in the Introduction, it is possible to consider beauty as a thing of its own,

independent of the rest of the characteristics of an object because a particular can have various

4
See Lawrence Thomass article Friendship for this view.

4

aspects in which it can be beautiful. This corresponds to the Platos discussion on the Form of

Beauty, described as the abstraction of perfect beauty that also manifests itself in the particular

objects5. Beauty of the Form is superior to that of the particular sensible objects that participate

in them, because the Forms are described as purely real (Republic, 477-9) and again as perfectly

real (597), whereas a particular beauty is less reliable due to its connection to the unstable body.

Therefore, a beautiful object is said to be an imperfect representation of the Form.

Since the Form explains what it is to be beautiful (as with Nehamass claim that Form of

Justice is what it is to be just6), for Plato, appreciating beauty of a particular cannot be

distinguished from appreciating the Form of Beauty. In Republic, Socrates compares someone

who believes in beautiful things, but doesnt believe in the beautiful itself as living in a dream

rather than a wakened state (Book V, 476c). Therefore, it is only in its Form that proper

understanding of beauty is possible.

However, this does not imply that Form of Beauty is always outwardly or obviously

manifested in the particulars. In everyday understanding of beauty, it is even more desirable for

the objects we find beautiful to not correspond to the beauty that everyone agrees to, since this

5
Plato describes this view in several of his middle dialogues. In Phaedo: It is true then about

some of these things that are not only the Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but

there is something else that is not the Form but has its character whenever it exists (103e); and

Symposium: [Form of beauty is] not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or

in heaven, or in anything else, but in itself by itself with itself" (211b).

6
More on this view in Nehamass Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World (1999), pp.

138-58. and SelfPredication and Plato's Theory of Forms (1999), pp. 176-95.

5

allows for the possibility of developing personal taste. The fact that most people do not find

beauty in the things we find beautiful makes us experience a strange sense of ownership that in

turn defines our individuality. As explained in the Introduction (p.3, last paragraph), many

disagree on whether a particular object is beautiful, not because beauty in the object is unrelated

to the Form, but because the latter is sometimes manifested in more obscure parts of the object.

A particular beauty, therefore, invites one to understand its nature, in an attempt to locate

where its Form of Beauty is. Beauty of a particular boy that induces desire for possession at first,

also prompts one to write poetry and legislations, and finally leads one to contemplate about the

nature of beauty itself. This progression from love of a boy to the life of philosophy, according to

Plato, stems from the motivation to move closer to the Form from the particular7.

7
In Symposium, near the end of his speech, Socrates, said to be repeating the words of a wise

woman named Diotima, explains the hierarchy of different levels of lovers and the objects of

their love. At the lowest stage, there are the lovers of the particular, i.e. men attracted to beauty

of the body - either of beautiful boys or of women, and which induces in the latter case,

pregnancy and the begetting of children. From this stage, one is then led to the love of two kinds:

first, those of fame and second, those of the beautiful boys, whose beauty inspire men to create

poetry and legislation, benefitting both the lovers and the city. Writing poetry and legislation in

turn leads one to the third and the highest stage of love, i.e. Form of Beauty, or love of wisdom,

which in the presence of beauty leads one to pursue discourse and contemplation, culminating in

the life of philosophy.

6

2. 2. Beauty as Love

The second argument discussed in the Intro Section (p.3, line 3) describes an account that

does not allow superficial interaction with beauty. One who holds such view is Alexander

Nehamas, who claims that beauty is only the necessity outcome of eros, or love. In his book,

Only a promise of happiness, Nehamas claims that beauty cannot be abstract, and separate from

the object that embodies it; i.e. it is impossible to love the beauty of a boy without loving the boy

himself. His argument for the mutually-dependent relationship between love and beauty is that:

beauty induces our desires and emotions, which eventually turn into love for the object.

Therefore, all of beauty also is that of love. Conversely, our love for an object makes the latter

appear as the most important thing to us, the same way beautiful objects stand out among others.

Thus, all qualities of an object of love are those of an object of beauty. According to Nehamas,

this bi-conditional relation between love and beauty (i.e. we see beauty of an object if and only if

we love it), brings understanding of beauty back to everyday life, with love of particular objects

rather than as representation of the perfect Form.

This account of beauty as love may seem contradictory to the view discussed in the

previous section (p.6) that describes how beauty of a particular boy leads one to the life of

philosophy. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Nehamas himself disagrees with this claim,

generally attributed to Plato, that says: one is willing to leave behind a beautiful person as soon

as he becomes aware of a higher beauty, for example the beauty of poetry or legislations, which

he will also abandon as he makes his way up, till he reaches the perfect beauty of the Form itself.

But Plato didnt believe that, Nehamas writes, and more to the point, he didnt have to believe

it (100). Nehamas maintains that loving beauty of a person is inseparable from loving the

person and that it means loving his particular beauty, not just the idea of beauty embodied by

7

him. Because of this, he holds that one does not abandon the object once he becomes aware of a

higher beauty.

Because beauty is connected to love in Nehamass account, he also likens the experience

to close interpersonal relationships. He claims that an object we find beautiful is one we do not

fully understand. We are inclined to spend more time with a friend, for example, because we do

not completely understand him/her yet, but hope to learn more through our continued interaction.

Similarly, our interest in a beautiful object thrives on the aspects we do not understand. This

interest is based on the hope that our life would be better if the beautiful object/person were a

part of it, a hope that is in turn kept alive by our love for the object. Therefore, desire for the

particular beauty, according to Nehamas, does not look back at what we have learned, but at

what, without knowing what it is, we hope to learn and experience in the future (2007, p. 55).

Due to this emphasis on the love and resulting relationship with a particular object,

Nehamas argues that there is no clear answer to whether beauty will converge with goodness,

and no reason to expect one. In Platonic understanding, it is the unstable body that is

unpredictable, and therefore involvement with an object complicates our interaction with beauty

which can be in both the particular and in the Form. However, for Nehamas, it is desirable [t]o

think of beauty as only a promise of happiness is to be willing to live with ineradicable

uncertainty, finding [happiness] in a surprising twist (130). Nehamas claims that there are many

cases where one is blinded by the love of an object of beauty, and is led to undesirable actions

that harm his own life. Two of the examples he mentions in the book are 1). the case of

Aschenbach in Thomas Manns novella, Death in Venice, and 2). Nehamass own fixation with

Manets painting: Olympia.

8

 In Thomas Manns novel, Death in Venice (1913), a middle-aged German author, Gustav

Aschenbach, was struck by the beauty of a young Polish boy, Tadzio, during the formers visit to

Venice. Aschenbachs fascination with Tadzio quickly turned into an obsession. He watched the

boy constantly, and secretly followed him around the city. This obsession then led him to

become the person he had formerly considered despicable (e.g. dying his hair and painting his

face to look more youthful, and spending time with high-spirited youths, while wearing wigs,

false teeth, and makeup). And despite the warning about a cholera epidemic spreading Venice,

Aschenbach, unable to tear himself away from the Polish boy, decided to stay in the city, which

then led to his eventual death. With Aschenbachs example, Nehamas claims that pursuing8

beauty of a particular boy gives us pleasure, or happiness, because we are on the path to fulfill

the desires to learn more about the object of beauty. The important point in Nehamass thesis is

that we get such pleasures, even when the object of beauty is not in our presence, and more

importantly, even if our desires are not in fact fulfilled:

Aschenbachs love does not express itself only in his feelings when he gazes
upon the boy but in his actions when Tadzio is absent as well the pleasures and the harm are
parts of the same phenomenon (Nehamas, 104).

And also at the end of the book: only the promise of happiness is happiness itself (138).

As a second example to illustrate the unpredictability of pursuing beauty, Nehamas

describes his experience with Manets painting, Olympia (See Appendix for pictures). When first

exhibited in 1865, the painting stirred a big uproar of controversy. Although modeled closely

after Titans painting, Venus, Olympia presents the number of complications incomprehensible to

8
More on the discussion of pursuit in Section 3.1 (p.12, last paragraph).

9

the contemporary audience. What shocked the contemporary audience was not Olympia's nudity,

nor even the presence of her black maid9, but her confrontational stare, slight distortion

between the right and left side of her face, and a number of inconsistent details, among those that

identify her as a courtesan waiting on a client. These include the orchid in her hair, her bracelet,

pearl earrings and the oriental shawl on which she lies, symbols of wealth and sensuality. The

black ribbon around her neck, in stark contrast with her pale flesh, and her cast-off slipper

underline the voluptuous atmosphere. Whereas Titian's Venus delicately covers her privates,

Olympia's hand firmly protects hers, as if to emphasize her independence and sexual dominance

over men. Manet replaced the little dog (symbol of fidelity) in Titian's painting with a black cat,

which symbolized prostitution. Olympia ignores the flowers presented to her by her servant,

probably a gift from a client. Some have suggested that she is looking in the direction of the

door, as her client barges in unannounced. Nehamas claims that Olympia is in fact posing for a

photograph, in order to advertise herself to her middle-class clients. Although Nehamas says that

"my attention to the Olympia has literally changed the shape of my life" (222), he admits he

himself does not know if the love for the painting has led him to a fuller, richer life or rather one

idly spent in obsession over nudes.

2. 3. Beauty that leads to Inter-subjective space

Nehamass account, described above, claims that appreciation of beauty and the desire to

learn more about a beautiful object are intricately related, since we want to know what makes an

object of love different from everything else in the world. He also claims that this desire leads us

to discover more about the particular objects, which, because they are more embedded in life

9
See T.J Clark The painting of Modern Life and Michael Frieds Manets Modernism.

10

than the Forms, leads to better understanding of the nature of existence than the Form of Beauty

could. Elaine Scarry explains an alternative view on how beauty connects us with the life of

others in her book, On Beauty and Being Just. Scarry claims that our focus on the particulars of a

work of beauty can make us aware of the ethical particulars of the world. She argues that desire

for beauty, and formal characteristics of the beautiful, such as visual symmetry and coherence,

paves the way towards realization of equality implied by aesthetic balance, a sense of balance

which ought to be as omnipresent in society. Upon encountering an object of beauty, the love of

its formal characteristics induces a desire in us, to replicate its symmetrical relations to our

surroundings and even to our relations with other people. Beauty, therefore, takes us outside of

our egoistic comfort zone and leads us towards the world of others. Through this interesting,

albeit seemingly far-fetched idea, Scarry claims that beauty prepares one for justice and

goodness. Kathleen Wall shares a similar view in her recent article Ethics, Knowledge and the

Need for Beauty published in University of Toronto Quarterly. She writes: exploration of beauty

is an exploration of knowing and being. Wall, Scarry and Nehamas all agree that having an

artistic taste that is different from that of others, constitutes an important part of ones

personality. Through this intensely personal nature, beauty creates a connection between people.

This connection in turn balances the individual and the inter-subjective because my pleasure

will open up a space outside myself for you to step into. We will have to talk about it, negotiate

it. And one of the things well have to negotiate is beautys relation to truth and justice, how it

speaks for many truths and how it creates justice by modeling the delights of opening that inter-

subjective space. Therefore, in addition to creating a pleasant atmosphere, beauty also gives us

hope, and inspires us to strive for equality and justice.

11

Section 3: Main Discussion

3. 1. Differentiation between the Form and a particular

As mentioned in Section 2.2. (p.7, line 2), Nehamas believes that loving beauty of a

particular object involves loving the object as a whole. This love, he claims, in turn results from

our curiosity regarding what makes the object beautiful, because:

To understand the beauty of something we need to capture it in its particularity, which

calls for knowing how it differs from other things To love something and to want to come to
know and understand it cant possibly be separated from each other (Only a promise, p.120).

This desire to find out more about beauty in a work of art corresponds to William

Hogarths idea of intricacy in aesthetic appreciation. According to Hogarth, beauty of an object

is discovered, bit-by-bit, through the game of pursuit. Intricacy, one of his six principles that

affect beauty, arises from the love of pursuit. Every difficulty in understanding beauty enhances

the pleasure of overcoming it, in order to continue the pursuit, since the active mind is ever bent

to be employed. Pursuing is the business of our lives; and even abstracted from any other view,

gives pleasure. Every arising difficulty that for a while attends and interrupts the pursuit, gives a

sort of spring to the mind, enhances the pleasure, and makes what would else be toil and labor

become sport and recreation (Hogarth). Ronald Paulson, however, points out the inherent

contradiction in the game of pursuit as: the pursuit does not pass beyond the solution of a

puzzle, the winning of a game. The chief object, to judge by the metaphors of sexual pursuit and

the chase, is a woman or a fox; but when the pursuit passes beyond seduction or capture to

possessing or killing, it is no longer within the range of the Beautiful (Beautiful, Novel, and

Strange. 44). This is similar to one of the important themes in the Nehamass discussion of

beauty, where he claims, the art we love is art we dont fully understand (Only a Promise of

12

Happiness, 76). He writes, The pleasures of imagination are pleasures of anticipation, not

accomplishment. The irony is that if your guess proves to be completely correct, when you have

found everything a beautiful thing has to give you will have lost what had made it beautiful, the

promise of more, and with it the love that desired what was promised (ibid).

According to Nehamas, once we fully understand an object, it ceases to be beautiful to us.

This forward-looking, hopeful feeling requires that beauty in the object be somewhat elusive to

us. Further, he claims that we cannot give reasons for our love for the beautiful object because

we do not yet know what they are, but are hopeful that being in its presence will enrich our life,

and bring us happiness. The end of pursuit would also mean the end of love. However, if we

agree with his earlier claim that we love the beauty of an object because we love the object as a

whole, it is surprising to learn that we grow out of love once we understand what makes it

beautiful. As with the complex nature of love, we very often find ourselves fall out of love

with those we were once passionate about. However, it is not necessarily the case that we fall out

of love only when we understand the object. There are many cases where we have yet to

understand the object, yet have lost interest in learning more about it. And conversely, we very

well love the object even after we understand what makes it beautiful.

Nehamas is right to claim that the desire to understand what makes an object beautiful is

a necessary consequence of seeing the beauty in an object. I take this desire to learn about what

makes an object beautiful as an attempt to find out where the Form is embedded in the object.

That is, one wants to know what makes a particular object beautiful only because he/she

recognizes that this beauty (of the Form) is distinct from the objects being. However, as

explained in the Intro Section, because the Form of beauty can manifest itself in various parts of

a particular object, seeing in beauty in a particular _even though this beauty is a representation of

13

the Form_ does not grant that we have a grasp of what makes it beautiful. One can easily answer

that an object is beautiful because it has the Form manifested in it. However, someone fascinated

with an object of beauty would not be satisfied with a simple account as such. One is interested

in finding out in which exact parts of the body the Form is embedded in, and the relation

between the body and the Form. If love of beauty of an object is indistinguishable from love of

the object as a whole, this sense of inquiry on what makes it beautiful would be irrelevant. And

we can very well love an object we understand. Therefore, the driving curiosity about the object

in Nehamass account would be less of an answer to what makes the object beautiful than the

answer to the love of Hogarthian pursuit (p.10, last paragraph).

Now I will attempt to explain why there is a need to separate the Form from the particular

beauty. First of all, I believe that it is not the case that we need to separate the Form from the

body when we see an object of beauty, but is the case that we naturally do so. If we agree with

Nehamas that appreciating a particular beauty means loving the object, then an account of

unpredictable consequences through involvement with the body inevitably follows. This is

because as described in Section 2.2 (p.8), the unstable body complicates our interaction with the

Form. Nehamas grants this, and likens the experience to close interpersonal relationships. As

mentioned from pages 7-8, our interest in the beautiful objects or friends is based on the hope

that our life would be better if they were a part of it. There is emphasis on this hope, because we

very well know, as Nehamas claims, that there is no reason to expect that involvement with a

beautiful object would make our life better. This uncertainty presumes two of the following

assumptions: 1). There is something of the good in those things that are beautiful; and 2).

Involvement with a particular body is unpredictable. Without assumption 1). we would not hope

anything life-enriching would come out of interaction with beauty. And without assuming 2). we

14

would be nave and think that all things with outward physical beauty are good. Based on these

two assumptions, I argue that we naturally consider Beauty as separate from the body and the

many agenda of the individual we find beautiful.

When discussing the dangers of beauty in his article Beauty, Goodness and Education

Joe Winston gives the account of a beautiful boy in the Nazi rally as an example where objects of

beauty do not necessarily come from a good background. However, in this example, when one

appreciates the beauty of the boy in the Nazi rally, one does not suddenly reason that the Nazi

regime is good. This is because as described above we naturally see Beauty and the particular

beautiful object or person as separate. In this example, an encounter with the beautiful boy would

not make us want to join the rally much less endorse the regime. However, we are still open

enough to appreciate the beauty of the boy. Because of this separation, our beliefs are not easily

affected by those of the object, but our life still has room to be influenced by its beauty.

Appreciation of this beauty possibly induces the birth of contradictory emotions in us: e.g.

happiness brought on by the sight of the boys beauty, and sadness by realizing his cause.

With this understanding, we inevitably attempt to separate, perhaps conceptually, the

beauty from its body that is connected to the good and the bad in life. The treatment is slightly

different regarding art objects. In works of art, including literature and music, the underlying

message rarely holds a singular meaning, even when it contradicts our beliefs. Because we do

not always interpret the work as an artist or creator has initially intended, it is possible to

appreciate beauty with minimal attention given to the message behind. The possibility of

multiple interpretations paves the way towards enjoying a work of beauty without being

influenced by the ideologies of its creators.

15

3. 2. Why the Form?

Now that I have explained how we naturally separate the Form from the particular body

upon encounter with a beautiful object, I will focus this section on why appreciating the Form of

beauty is more desirable than appreciating the particular.

3. 2. 1: In an article on the psychoanalytic model of the sense of beauty, George

Hagman says we need beauty as a source of hope, because a civilization that does not value

beauty would be one that cannot hope and that cannot assert life over the inevitable and

ubiquitous forces of entropy and death (2002, p. 672). As explained through Nehamass

description, and also through personal experience, we can agree that beauty does give us hope,

even in times of disintegration. However, the nature of entropy is such that in any isolated

system, disorder only grows over time10. This means order in the universe, including symmetry

and formal idealization, is hard to achieve and easy to disintegrate. A thing of beauty, therefore,

is always unstable due to its inherent entropy-defying nature. An admirer will strive to make the

beautiful object last, in its physical form, as an image in his mind, as a portrait or subject of an

art form, and through any vehicle he can possibly conceive of.

3. 2. 2: First encounter with beauty spurs various extraordinary feelings in us.

The description of the felt qualities associated with the initial encounter with beauty varies across

literature. Vaillancourt describes his experience with Picassos Guernica as beauty of the

painting induces a feel-good emotion, along with a sense of wonder and profound

satisfaction (2007). He writes that the painting captivates him, that he feels drawn to it, and

inspired to explore it further (Vaillancourt et al., p. 233). Iris Murdoch also describes a moment

10
See the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

16

of beauty as centering on change: In that moment everything is altered (1997, p. 369). As with

Vaillancourt, Murdoch speaks of a sense of shock, a rapid change of consciousness, an object

that becomes salient in a sudden and demands our exclusive attention, and most importantly

transformation of the sense of self after the moment of beauty (ibid). Stendhal (1959) recounts

his moment of beauty as leaving him the feeling as if the well-spring of life was dried up in

him, since the moment had demanded all of it. Goodall mentions her moment of beauty, most

elegantly, as when [she] felt that all of history was coming together (2006, p. 110). Because

these first moments with beauty have such a great impact on us, we are drawn to the object as

much as we resist it, fearing that it might become too salient of an object, unfitting with the rest

of our life. Because we naturally like order and coherence in our life, we strive to make this first

moment of beauty recurs and has a stable pattern, like the rest of our everyday routine.

Therefore, in addition to wanting to possess an object of beauty because it gives us pleasures, our

desire for continued interaction with the object also stems from innate tendency to avoid

uncoordinated profound moments. Gabrielle Starr describes this in the article Ethics, Meaning

and the Work of Beauty, as: Human beings have problems with the unique; gripped in habit, we

want to make beauty like other things. Having experienced a moment of beauty, we wish to call

it up wholesale; if we cannot get the thing itself, we want to keep thinking it is in our possession

even if it is not (Starr, 2002. p. 369). The attempts to relive this experience saves us the trouble

of recreating it within ourselves and allows us to hope that we may receive it afresh from

without (Starr, 369).

From 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2, we can see that a thing of beauty is unstable, and that we, as

lover of beauty, want to make this thing last forever. This tension between an unstable object of

beauty and our desires to make it permanent creates an unpredictable relationship, which fails to

17

satisfy our natural desire for calming presence of beauty. Due to the unstable nature of the body,

the attempt to recreate the first moment of beauty, as discussed in 3.2.2, is therefore only

successful in the idea of beauty, in its Platonic Form. This is because upon encountering a

beautiful object, the desire to make the experience last, becomes compromised simply as the

understanding of its formal idealization; i.e. we come out of the experience with the knowledge

that some things can be and are in fact formally ideal, since we have had first-hand experience

with them.

3. 3. Why the particular?

Although appreciation of the Form is necessary if we long for a soothing presence of

beauty, which rests the burning desires of our wants and needs, involvement with a particular

body is also significant during our encounter with a beautiful object. This is because as human

beings we have instinctive desires for food, shelter, and sex that only possession of a particular

body can fulfill. These instinctive desires correspond to those of Appetite11, as discussed in

Platos Republic. Therefore, Sigmund Freud sees the sense of beauty as the result of

11
Plato distinguishes the three structures of the soul as similar to the three structures of the city,

namely: appetite/spirit/reason. The tripartite structure of the soul consists of Appetite, the

instinctive desires for shelter, food, sex and other basic needs; Spirit, the acquired desires such as

those for honor and self-respect; and Reason, desire for intelligence, rationality, and love of

wisdom. A functioning human being, at peace with himself, cannot allow the three elements

which make up his inward self to trespass on each others functions or interfere with one another,

but by keeping all three in tune will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery

and order, and live on good terms with himself (Republic 443d).

18

displacement and sublimation in which libido is transferred to non-sexual objects and sexual

excitement becomes desexualized as aesthetic pleasure. He claims that enjoyment of beauty is

a sublimation of sexual attraction and that all that seems certain is its derivation from the field

of sexual feeling (1905, p. 30). In her work The Symptom of Beauty, Francette Pacteau describes

a process in which men seek to defend against the recognition of infantile helplessness and loss

through feminine beauty. The image of a beautiful woman demolishes the experience of

separateness and allows man to retain an illusion of presence and possession (Pacteau, 1994). (A

similar idea can also be found in Wheelis, 1999). Thus, according to Pacteau, beauty bestows us

the illusion of wholeness and power, as our innate fear of helplessness is restored in the face of

feminine beauty.

Sachs in The Creative Unconscious (1942) describes a way in which beauty can bring

together the three structures of the mind within an individual through a process of psychic

conflict-resolution. The predominant tension between the id, ego and superego, (roughly taken

here to mean appetite, spirit, and reason respectively), are calmed when the conflicting drives of

libido and aggression are unified in the formal perfection of beauty. Anxiety is gone, the

normally fragmented self is brought together, and a sense of transcendence predominates

(Hagman, 2002). Sachs writes: A thing of beautyor anything as far as it has beauty

represents and brings home a precise nuance of an emotional situation. In a quite unusual way,

by the stimulating perception of the senses, the possession of an Id-content [Appetite] is

conferred on the Ego [Spirit]. The effect of this activity is what we called earlier the healing of

the cleft. A split in the personality has, at least for the moment, maybe permanently, ceased to

exist, or the personality has been made more coherent and continuous. The Superego [Reason],

sharing the triumphant feeling, participates also in the activity that leads towards it (p. 151).

19

 However, we desire the body not necessarily only for its sexual connotations. There are

cases where we, as humans, desire particular object as a symbol for our status. The earliest

example of this account can be found in the prehistoric artifacts, thought to represent the social

status and virtuosity of man. Evolutionarily the creation and adulation of these tools can be dated

as far back as over 1.6 million years ago, to the Acheulian hand-axes12. They are beautiful to our

eyes and are considered to be earliest form of artwork because of their symmetry, materials, and

above all meticulous workmanship (Dutton, 2009). Since the knowledge of making and using

these tools is an obvious valuable skill, it has been suggested that some of the over-sophisticated

ones were not created as much for use as for representing historically accrued social

significance (Gamble, C. 1997). Another theory suggests the special hand-axes that are much

too elaborate to be useful, were made by males to aid in their search of mates, since the tools

demonstrate the possession of sufficient strength and skill to pass on to offspring (White, MJ.

1998). Whatever their prehistoric uses were, these axes still appear beautiful to us and are

desirable because they exhibit desired qualities of man, i.e. high intellectual and physical labor

invested in their making. Because they signify the intelligence of our species, the Acheulian

hand-axes establish a sense of pride in us when we admire their beauty. Therefore, from an

evolutionary point of view, beauty is the medium through which we get in touch with the vast

arrays of human caliber. Thus one other possible purpose of beauty is to represent and signify the

skillful state of man. According to these two accounts, we wish to possess the particular body

because they can fulfill our human desires, such as desire for reproduction and for status.

12
See Appendix for pictures.

20

Possession of the body however does not lead us to interact with others, and therefore, seemingly

does not have the potential to enrich our life.

3. 4. Why loving particular beauty alone is inadequate:

To love13 something and to want to come to know and understand it cant possibly be separated

from each other, and that desire, far from closing us off from the world, leads us directly into it

(Nehamas, 120).

Before discussing how love of a particular beauty can lead us into the world, we need to

distinguish between an object of our love, usually a person, whom we do not want to share with

others, and other objects, which we are willing to share. Our love for an individual, i.e. love of a

romantic or erotic nature, eros, differs from our love for a work of art, or our friends14. Nehamas

argues that we do not want to marry our favorite novel because it is a novel, not because we do

not love it. I believe, on the other hand, that love of a novel, with which we have no sexual

13
Throughout the book, Nehamas consistently uses eros as love of beauty. However, he also

consistently compares the relationship we have with our friends to our relationship with artworks

we find beautiful. I find this problematic, since friendship is different from eros, since the former

does not involve erotic desires of the latter. Here, since we are discussing objects we are willing

to share with others, I take the love to be more in accordance with love for friends.

14
Love for friends generally does not have a sexual connotation, whereas love for works of art

can be of a sexual origin. However, even with an erotic artwork, we do not form an actual

physical relation with it. I take this lack of sexual contact (desired or ongoing), to be the reason

we are willing to share the art we love with others.

21

contact, is a different kind of love from love of a romantic partner, with whom we have either

potential or ongoing sexual relation15. In this section, love in our discussion corresponds to love

of the objects we are willing to share with others; therefore, not romantic love. I will argue that

although such love, love of various works of art, takes us to the inter-subjective space, the

scope in which they widen our horizons is limited.

As Nehamas mentions in the above quote, it is possible to imagine how love of a

particular beauty, for example that of a work of art, leads us to the world outside of our ego.

Beauty tends to motivate us to be more involved in the discussion with others about our taste.

Nehamas explains that when I am moved by a work of art and want to make it part of my life, I

also want others to make it part of their life as well (75). However, this motivation seems to be

solely originated in the desire to exert our taste on others, i.e. we want to share the object of our

love with others, only because we hope they too would find it beautiful, and in the events of

disagreements we are more likely to defend and explain the work, rather than change our mind

about it. It seems counterintuitive to imagine a case where we are motivated to share what we

find beautiful, only to be repudiated and then are compelled to reconsider why we thought such a

work is beautiful in the first place16. If someone points out why our favorite painting is not

15
It is of course contentious how much of our love for a romantic partner is rooted in sexual

desire. Even without the potential or ongoing sexual relation, love for a romantic partner is

different from love of an artwork simply because the former involves a human being we have the

possibility of developing a relationship with.

16
I suspect such cases do happen, albeit rarely. However, here Im less concerned with how we

change our mind about beauty than with the ways in which a particular work can lead us to

actively listen and be affected by the opinions of others, just as much as we wish to exert our

22

beautiful, even when their reasons are valid, I doubt we would readily shift our outlook on its

beauty. Therefore, love of particular beauty is limited in the extent to which it can expand our

understanding of the world. An instinctive desire to protect our individuality17 feeds to our

egocentric nature, which in turn, makes us rather fixed-minded when discussing the artworks we

love. For this reason, unless we are otherwise compelled to listen to others regarding their tastes

and views on beauty, we do not seem to be very far removed from our egocentric comfort zones

through interactions with beauty.

Nehamas mentions one other way through which a beautiful work of art can potentially

enrich our life. This time it does so, not by prompting us to start discussion with others, but by

making us want to understand the nature of its beauty. Through this, we could be led to reading

and discovering about the various aspects of the work, and the world at large, we otherwise

would not have come into contact with. This is an undeniable possibility, since we certainly learn

more about the historical context of the painting, the intention of the artist etc, as we try to

understand the significance of its beauty. The things we learn during our interaction with the

artwork can potentially shift our outlook and perhaps even change our deep-rooted beliefs, which

opinions onto them. If our opinions remain relatively unaffected through the interaction with

others, such interaction seems to be of little significance on our life.

17
Nehamas, citing Nietzsche, states that our taste in beauty is the exemplary form of expressing

freedom (86, Only a promise). Therefore, he argues that the kind of artworks we love, along with

the reasons we love them constitute our individuality, which makes us different from everyone

else in the world.

23

we might now find to be misguided. Therefore, learning to understand beauty seems to be able to

open up more of an inter-subjective space than discussing our taste with others.

From the two accounts mentioned above, there seems to be a somewhat reclusive

tendency to not allow much of outside opinion to enter our life. In the first case, when we engage

in discussions, we just seem to want our side of the story heard, rather than to concern ourselves

with understanding others. In the second case, we are possibly interested in understanding those

we find beautiful (artworks or people), but not others we do not normally find visually pleasing.

This can have undesirable effect not only on us but also on beautys reputation as well.

Fixating our attention only on objects we find beautiful, and not attempting to learn how those

with unpleasant exteriors can have valuable things to teach us, or even that we might find such

unpleasant things beautiful once we get to know their stories, leave us deprived of a significant

part of living18. Further, it can also lead us to such phenomenon as lookism, where beautiful

people, and less commonly objects, are favored over others without any reasonable account19.

18
Living is taken to mean understanding the nature of our existence. Such a task would be hard

to accomplish if we exclude all the things without beautiful appearances from our inquiry.

19
It is established via labor-market research that attractiveness receives a premium and

unattractiveness receives a penalty although economists cannot find justifiable connection

between good looks and increased productivity (Tietje and Cresap, 2005).

24

3. 5. How we progress from particular beauty to the Form

As mentioned in Section 2.2 (p.9), Nehamas gives Thomas Manns Death in Venice as an

example where love of beauty leads one to pursue actions destructive to ones own life. In the

novella, Aschenbachs character is portrayed as strictly following his Apollonian20 side with the

other, Dionysian side, forgotten or oppressed, until he met the beautiful boy, Tadzio. Unfamiliar

with handling the influence of his emotions, Aschenbach is taken over by the Dionysian side

until it completely consumes him and leads to his death. In fact, both of Nehamass examples

(Section 2.2, p.9) that show how pursuing an object of beauty does not lead to goodness are

examples involving works of art.

The first example, Death in Venice, although derived from Thomas Manns real life

experience with a polish boy, Wladyslaw Moes (The Real Tadzio, 2001), is still a work of

fiction. Mann was described as unable to channel his intellectual energies into any form of

extended labor shortly before his trip to Venice where he encountered Moes, an 11-year-old

Polish boy at the time. Most of the details in the story were derived from incidents during

Manns vacation, including the threat of the Cholera epidemic spreading the city. Mann in real

life, though attempted to follow Moes on some accounts, restrained his temptations, and finally

left Venice upon hearing the news on the spread of Cholera. Upon return to his hometown, Mann

connected his fascination of the Polish boys beauty with Goethe's love for 18-year-old Ulrike

von Levetzow, which had led Goethe to write his Marienbad Elegy, and inspiration from Gustav

20
In the modern literary usage of the concept, the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus

symbolizes principles of rationality versus emotions, wholeness versus individualism, light

versus darkness, or civilization versus primal nature.

25

Mahler, based on whom the character of Aschenbach is said to be drawn upon21. Beauty of the

real Tadzio, or the 11-year-old Wladyslaw Moes, therefore not only opened up inter-

subjective space for Mann by making him realize these great works of others, it also prompted

him to create a work of art on his own. And the novella in turn creates the space for Nehamas.

Therefore, the appreciation of beauty leads to successive expansion of the inter-subjective space,

all of which serves as the medium for human flourishing.

In his second example, Nehamas claims he is not certain whether his love for Manets

painting, Olympia, discussed at length in the book, has led him to goodness or just an idle life

spent poring over countless paintings of the nudes. Although we do not have enough knowledge

of all aspects of Nehamass life to adequately answer the question, one thing we do know is his

love for Olympia has led him to write, Only a Promise of Happiness, a work of philosophy

potentially contributing to overall flourishing of society, by opening up a space for further

conversation on the role of beauty in art. In Republic, Plato claims that all man is compelled to

pursue the good, but cannot do this successfully without philosophical inquiry. And in some

reading of Symposium, beautiful things and Beauty itself are said to provide a needed

environment for the creation of what is good. For this reason, Diotima tells us, one who is

pregnant whether in body or soul, becomes agitated in the presence of beauty, because he knows

that beauty alone can enable him to bring forth, and so be relieved of his discomforts (White.

F.C, 153). Surrounding oneself in the presence of various form of art is one of the ways in which

desires for love of the particular is expressed without practical restraints. The projection or

sublimation of internal desires that correspond to our Dionysiain side, onto art frees us from the

burden of reason, without having to suffer from the consequences in real life. Humans in all

21
See Katia Manns Unwritten Memories, and Gilbert Adair The Real Tadzio.

26

cultures, therefore, spend a significant amount of time engaged in activities such as listening to

or telling fictional stories (Brown, 1991; Hernadi, Sugiyama, 1996), participating in various

forms of imaginative pretense (Leslie, 1987), thinking about imaginary worlds, experiencing the

imaginary creations of others, and creating public representations designed to communicate

fictional experiences to others. It is not surprising that involvement in fictional, imagined worlds

appears to be a cross-culturally universal, species-typical phenomenon of man.

From these accounts, we can see that as described at the end of Section 2. 1, love of the

beauty of a particular body leads us to produce or find more appreciation in the various forms of

art, such as literature and painting, etc. These works of art, in turn, compel us to wonder about

the nature of beauty, since it creates a puzzling yet deeply satisfying artworks. This curiosity

about the nature of beauty in turn leads one to read more about the objects of beauty as well as

engage in discourse contemplating its nature. Therefore, love of a particular beauty, eventually

leads one to a life of philosophy, or one spent in pursuit of understanding the nature of all things

in the world.

3. 6. How exploring particular beauty leads to the inter-subjective space of mankind

In Platonic understanding, all happiness is the result of the good. In Symposium, through

relating his conversation with Diotima, Socrates claims in desiring the good, a lover desires to be

happy since happiness is that which is brought about by the possession of the good

(Symposium, 205a). If we agree with Nehamass account (Section 2. 2. p.9) and grant that one

attains happiness simply through pursuing an object of beauty, one would also be in possession

of the good (since one is already in a state of happiness). However, according to Nehamas, and

27

also through our own intuitions, we would not describe Aschenbachs case as goodness, no

matter how happy he may be with his pursuit.

However, as discussed in the previous section, the story of Death in Venice is a work of

literature resulting from Manns desire to learn more about the beauty of the boy. Therefore,

beauty ultimately opens up a platform through which we can come into contact with various

aspects of the work, all of which may enrich our lives. As explained in Section 2.3. (p.10-11), an

object of beauty that prompts discussion between its viewers creates a space where we can learn

more about the particular object and life in which it is embedded in. Although Nehamas argues

that one can never accurately predict the prospect of disappointment and delusion that pursuit of

beauty may bring about, if one is more focused on understanding the Form of beauty,

involvement with beauty ultimately enriches ones life, as is clear from both examples that

Nehamas discussed (Death in Venice and Nehamass fascination with Olympia) (Section 3.4.

p.24).

3. 7. The Dichotomy of Life: on how our existence is not individuated

The more we learn about an object of beauty, sometimes, the more of the contradictory

nature of life we come to realize. For example, the beautiful boys in the Nazi rally, as mentioned

in Section 3. 1. (p.13), instill a strong emotion in us. As spectators, we are inclined to either

denounce the boys beauty, or to hope that he will eventually be separated from the rally.

However, such extreme examples, as with Aschenbachs fascination with Tazio, also give us

certain pleasure. As explained in the previous section, Aschenbachs example is a work of

literature, more specifically: tragedy. Tragedy sheds light on the life of the characters involved in

28

a tragic event22. By having a glimpse of their life, and by experiencing any joy that tragedy might

offer us, we learn to see the nature of existence through the good lens and the bad. This also

offers us a new way to make sense of the unfortunate events in our own life. By connecting our

misfortunes with those of others, we learn to see that our experiences are not excluded but rather

embedded in the condition of mankind. This ultimately leads to a sense of belonging in the world

that makes us aware of the dichotomy inherent in existence. Through our experiences, we come

to the understanding that contradictory concepts do co-exist: that light does not fail to alternate

with darkness; justice exists only in so far as there is injustice; profanity resides within

sacredness; and that sometimes there is happiness implanted in sorrow. The good and the bad

thereby become less easily distinguishable than we have previously thought, or wished them to

be. This realization agitates the soul, in equal frustration and revel, and we are left wondering

Why? This search for a reason for beauty in the dichotomy of life can be connected to

Nehamass claim that we always hope to understand those we find beautiful and that this desire,

far from closing us off from the world, leads us directly into it (See Section 3.3, p.16).

Contrary to Nehamas, I believe that in moments of beauty, we rest in perfect stillness,

with all attention fixed on the object of beauty, contrary to Nehamass view that lover of beauty

takes on the role of the pursuer chasing to understand the object of beauty. Nehamass account is

not without relevance here since beauty does seek to be understood, and it exalts in being the

sole salient feature in our life, even for a moment. Through such moments of synthesis, as in

the Hegelian idea of Aufheben or sublation5, we are taken out of our egocentric spheres and are

presented with the inter-subjective space where an intimate understanding of someone elses life

becomes desirable and more importantly, possible. As in the example of Manets painting,

22
Nietzsches The Birth of Tragedy

29

Olympia, after grasping its meaning (that it is the painting of a prostitute posing to be

photographed in order to advertise herself to future clients), its beauty, in particular that of

Olympias blas stare halts any immediate reactions we might have regarding its social

relevance: i.e. before we are compelled to fight for the demolition of prostitution, for example,

her stare tells us to stop and calls upon us to attempt at understanding her very condition.

Olympias expression depicts not only sorrow that is apparent upon first glance, but the look of

ecstatic joy, perhaps at the fact that we are paying utmost attention to her. Here we are also

connected back with Scarry and Wall, as explained in Section 2.3 (p.10-11), who claim that

beauty leads us outside of our egocentric comfort zone and opens up the inter-subjective space

through which we are made aware of the world of others. Beauty introduces many worlds to us,

not just that of others but those within ourselves as well.

What I have described so far certainly cannot be applied as the universal understanding of

beauty, and might be shared by only select few people, if anyone at all. It is possible that we find

beauty in the things that best articulate our outlook on life. Therefore, why we find certain things

beautiful, i.e. our taste or individuality (Section 3.4, p.20) cannot be accounted for by reason.

30

Section 4: Conclusion

So far, I have described how we conceptually separate the beauty of the Form from that

of the particular beauty when we encounter a beautiful object (Section 3.1, p.12-15), and how

both the Form and the particular body are significant in our interaction with beauty (Section 3.2

and 3.3, p.16-20). Through these two claims, I argue that the space through which beauty

connects us to the world (Section 3.6, p.27-28) is at its most maximally inter-subjective, through

a combination of body and the Form, i.e. when we progress from love of a particular body to

appreciation of the Form (Section 3.5, p.25-27). By entering this inter-subjective space that

beauty has opened up for us, we get in touch with all that is present in our existence, the good

and the bad equally (Section 3.7, p.28-30). Understanding the nature of existence undoubtedly

makes us become connected to the life of others, and although the contents of this understanding

has both happiness and sorrow embedded in them, pondering the inherent dichotomy of life

nevertheless enriches our life. Therefore, I conclude that involvement with beauty ultimately

leads one to goodness.

31

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 Appendix

An Acheulean hand-axe found at Omo Kibish in Ethiopia.

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Acheuleanhandaxe.jpg; Retrieved

on April 23, 2010.

34

Manets Olympia (1863)

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Manet%2C_Edouard_-

_Olympia%2C_1863.jpg; Retrieved April 23, 2010.

35

Cover of Gilbert Adairs book, The Real Tadzio. Boy on the bottom left is the 11-year-old

Wladyslaw Moes. The boy on the right is the Swedish actor, Bjrn Andrsen, who plays Tadzio

in the 1971 flim adaption of Manns novella.

36