Hazard Risk Assessment Study-Vopak

January 2014
VOPAK FUEL 3
Specialist study: Major Hazard

Risk Assessment
Prepared by Danil J E Rademeyer -
Submitted to:
Vopak (Pty) Ltd
Vopak Terminal Durban,
105 Taiwan Road,
Island View Bluff,
Durban,
4001
REPORT
Report Number: 13615314 - 12530 - 4

Distribution:
1 x copy: Vopak
1 x copy: Golder Associates Africa (Pty) Ltd
VOPAK FUEL 3: MAJOR HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT
Executive Summary
Introduction
The Vopak Terminal in Durban (Vopak) operates a storage terminal at the port of Durban. The four sites at
the terminal are primarily designed for chemical imports via ship and distribution by rail, road and drums. The
current storage facilities in Durban are inadequate to meet the growing inflows and outflows of both
petroleum and chemical products in the region. The lack of suitable land in the Durban Port for expansion of
the storage facilities has resulted in a strategy to optimise the existing sites, to better suit future business and
market requirements.
Vopak proposes decommissioning and demolishing some existing tanks and infrastructure and replace these
by constructing new infrastructure on their Fynn and Blend sites. Thus, chemical storage on the existing sites
will be replaced by an increased capacity for fuel storage.
This report is the major accident specialist risk assessment that was undertaken as part of the Vopak
Environmental Safety, Health and Social Impact Assessment.
Specialist study scope and objectives

Potential major accident hazards at the fuel handling installations were identified and the risks were
estimated. Units that were included were the ship berth offloading pipelines, transfer pipelines across sites,
bulk storage at the Fynn site, rail tanker loading at the Fynn site and road tanker loading at the Blend site.
The objective was to assess the risks and compare them against acceptable criteria in order to determine
the impact of these major accident hazards on the work force and the surrounding environment and local
public. This will allow improvements to be incorporated in the design of the installations and related facilities,
in order to reduce the impacts of major accident hazards to acceptable levels; thus ensuring the approval of
the project by the authorities and the acceptance by the surrounding communities.
Assessment of potential major accident hazard impacts

Hazards that were identified as potential major accident hazards were fires and explosions from the large
releases of fuels from containment, due to rupture of piping, bursting of tanks, failure of tanker loading arms,
and also due to the overfilling of tanks, followed by ignition. These hazards may give rise to either jet or pool
fires, or both. Alternatively, the liquid can evaporate and the vapour cloud can travel some distance down
wind. If it is then ignited, a flash fire or explosion will result with the flame envelope or blast wave extending
across the site boundary leading to fatalities or injuries. Similarly a release of some of the additives
containing toxic components, forming a cloud, will drift down wind and cause gassing effects on people.
Although potentially hazardous to workers, a flange leak will not have a serious effect inside or outside the
site boundary.
The worst hazardous effects (impact on people, not risk) outside the site will be a flash fire, following a petrol
tank pipe burst at the Fynn site which could cause serious burn injuries or fatalities up to a distance of 357 m
away from the site. A jet fire from a Berth 2 petrol pipe rupture, could similarly lead to serious thermal burn
injuries up to a distance of 110 m from the pipeline. The Fynn to Blend site is a much smaller event due to
the smaller pipe diameter and will thus not have effects as far as events on the berth and Fynn installations.
Hazards, which have the potential to have impacts beyond the site boundaries, i.e. harm members of the
public, are regarded as major accident hazards. Facilities from where they originate are classed as Major
Accident Hazard Installations, according to some international, as well as to the South African Major
Installation Regulations in the Occupational Health and Safety Act. The Vopak installations have the
potential to harm members of the public and are therefore classified as a Major Accident Hazard Installation.
During decommission, demolishing and construction, there will be existing installations in the vicinity
handling and storing hazardous materials, so that the impact of a major accident hazard during
decommissioning, demolishing and construction could be similar to the impacts during normal operation.
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The major contributors to the risks on the site from the operation of the new Vopak installations are
explosions and fires caused by overfilling, and the bursting of a fuel storage tanks and piping, followed by
ignition.
It was found that, overall, the individual risk of being exposed to fatal flammable hazards, e.g. fires, would at
-4
most be a 7 * 10 chance of a fatality per person per year at the centre of the Fynn site, and would reduce to
-6
less than 1 * 10 at a distance of approximately 150 m away, which is outside the Island View boundary in
-6 -6
the public domain. Maximum risk at the transfer pipelines and Blend sites is 1,6 * 10 and 5 *10
respectively.
In terms of the acceptability of risks to the public, the United Kingdoms Health and Safety Executives
Criteria, which are well developed, conservative and yet not stringent to the point of inhibiting industrial
-6
development, were used. Their criteria regard an individual risk of less than 10 chance of a fatality /per
-4
person /year as acceptable and less than 1 * 10 as tolerable. Risk outside the Vopak sites exceeds the
-6 -4
target of 10 , but not 10 and are thus tolerable, i.e. as low as reasonably practical, with the planned
preventative and protective measures incorporated. It must therefore be proactively managed or reduced
where practical and cost effective.
-3
A risk level of a 10 chance of a fatality per person per year (i.e. one in a thousand) is accepted in the United
Kingdom as being the maximum tolerable risk to which employees within a typical organisation could be
-5
exposed. A risk of less than 1*10 would be totally acceptable. This risk is similar to the risk of suffering a
fatal or near fatal accident in normal life, i.e. the work situation is not adding significantly to an employees
-4
general risk level. Thus the maximum risk of 7 * 10 per person per year posed to the Vopak employees on
the site is tolerable, and therefore needs to be managed.
According to the United Kingdom societal risk criteria, 50 or more fatalities are intolerable if the event can
occur more than 0,0002 times per year and 50 or more fatalities are unacceptable if the event can occur more
than 0,00002 times per year. Societal risk from the Vopak installations is below the acceptable target for rare
hazards with a high severity (e.g., a tank burst) and tolerable for more frequent hazards with a low severity
(e.g. overfilling a tanker).
In terms of environmental effects, smoke evolution from fires will rise, so that there will be no significant
impact in terms of smoke particles or carbon monoxide gassing on the surrounding environment. Spillages of
liquids, although regarded in this assessment as safety hazards, may be an environmental issue, but is in
any case minimised by suitable containment.
Mitigation measures
Measures that should be applied during decommissioning should include the following:
Isolation, lockout, and permit to work clearance procedures
Training of decommissioning personnel
Study of decommissioning hazards and a risk assessment
Containment, and fuel separation from draining and washing of tanks and piping
Emergency procedures;
Measures that should be applied during construction should include the following:
Permit to work clearance procedures
Training of construction contractor personnel
Study of demolition and construction hazards and a risk assessment
Restricted access and fencing to operational tanks
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
Wearing of personal protective equipment
In order to prevent or protect against major accident hazard risk impacts during commissioning and
beneficial operation, a major accident hazard management system should be implemented. This should
include:
Providing procedures and instructions for safe operation;
Maintaining operating information;
Providing procedures for systematically identifying major hazards, and evaluation applied to all relevant
stages from project conception through to decommissioning (Study of operation hazards and a risk
assessment);
Making arrangements for considering lessons learned from previous incidents, i.e. accident recall
sessions;
Training of operating personnel;
Permit to work clearance procedures;
Integrity assurance of the plant and equipment (scheduled inspection and maintenance, inspection of
loading arms);
Wearing of personal protective equipment;
On-site and off-site emergency plan;
Planning for emergencies, action plans;
Providing procedures for modifications;
Monitoring performance, e.g. housekeeping fugitive leaks, spillages, ignition sources, firefighting
equipment, maintenance permit to work, offloading and filling operations, flame proof electrical
equipment, filling arm or hose integrity, pipe condition, relief and blow down devices, alarm, interlock
and trip testing, filling batch meter calibration and shut off, tank bund integrity, water deluge on storage
tanks;
Auditing and reviewing.
Specific preventative and protective measures would include:
Prevention of overfilling of tanks, rail and road tankers with automatic independent high level shut off;
Remote shut off of bottom outlets on fuel tanks in the event of a major pipe leak or a rupture.
Elimination of electrostatic spark ignition of flammable liquids during tanker filling and offloading, by
earthing and by limiting flow velocities;
Providing containment, impounding and handling systems for spillages;
Fire prevention and protection;
Record keeping of near miss incidents related to the process risks.
Residual impacts and conclusion

Implementation of all the preventative, mitigation and protective measures will still leave some residual
impact due to risk from major accident hazard events, which must be accepted. Residual impact is
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
-6
considered acceptable internationally if the individual risk to a member of the public is less than 1 * 10
-5
fatalities per person per year or to employees less than 1 * 10 fatalities per person per year.
Addition of more preventative, mitigating and protective measures will reduce the risks further, but each
reduction will be accompanied by an increase in capital as well as in operating costs, which will make the
Vopak project not viable, and the benefit will then be lost.
More residual impact from risk can be tolerated up to an individual risk to a member of the public of less than
-4 -3
1 * 10 fatalities per person per year or to employees less than 1 * 10 fatalities per person per year, known
as the as low as reasonably practical principle (abbreviated as ALARP). This is acceptable if the
implementation of additional preventative, mitigating and protective measures would be impractical or
unaffordable.
Based on the above assessment it can be concluded that the proposed Vopak project will not have an
unacceptable impact as a result of possible major accident hazards, on the people, the environment, the
region and the country, provided all the mitigation measures listed above are incorporated.
In conclusion, impacts associated with the proposed Fuel 3 project are rated as low following mitigation
measures and the overall proposed project is viewed as having a lower Major Hazard Risk (MHI) than
current operations on the respective sites, due to technology incorporated in the design (e.g. high level trips
to prevent tank overflow and resulting fires, as well as, but not limited to, emergency shut off systems in the
event of pipe failures).
Definitions
Definitions of some terms frequently used in this report and the interpretation / meaning attached to each of
these are listed below.
A situation that has the potential to harm people, the environment or physical
Hazard property, through a fire, explosion or toxic release, e.g. the use, storage or
manufacture of a flammable or toxic material;
An occurrence due to use of plant or machinery or from activities in the workplace,

that leads to an exposure of persons to hazards e.g. the rupture of a vessels and
Incident
loss of containment of flammable or toxic material ( also referred to as a
hazardous event);
Occurrences that give rise to a hazardous incidents e.g. failure of a temperature

Causative events
indicator or pressure relief, etc.;
The physical effects of hazardous incidents and the damage caused by these
Consequences
effects;
Severity The seriousness of the consequences, e.g. death or injury or distress;
The overall probability of a particular type of consequence of a particular type of

Risk
incident affecting a particular type of person;
The evaluation of the risk in comparison to certain known level of risk in other
Acceptability
areas;
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Study SiteVopak Terminal Durban.............................................................................................................. 2
1.1.1 Project Location ...................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Current Operations ....................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1 Fynn Site ................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2.2 Blend Site................................................................................................................................................ 3
1.3 Information on Topography, Ecology and Meteorology ................................................................................ 4
1.4 Modifications ................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.4.1 Upgrade Phase Fynn Site ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.4.1.1 Demolition ............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.4.1.2 Construction ........................................................................................................................................ 6
1.4.2 Upgrade Phase Blend Site ...................................................................................................................... 7
1.4.2.1 Demolition ............................................................................................................................................ 7
1.4.2.2 Construction ........................................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.3 Tank design ............................................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.4 Interconnecting pipelines ........................................................................................................................ 9
1.4.5 Fire prevention and protection .............................................................................................................. 10
1.4.6 New infrastructure ................................................................................................................................. 10
1.4.6.1 Storm and waste water ...................................................................................................................... 10
1.4.6.2 Nitrogen ............................................................................................................................................. 10
1.4.6.3 Waste Management........................................................................................................................... 10
1.4.7 Utilities .................................................................................................................................................. 11
1.4.8 Design Standards and Criteria .............................................................................................................. 11
1.5 Operational Phase ...................................................................................................................................... 11
1.5.1 Plant ...................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.0 RELEVANT LEGISLATION ..................................................................................................................................... 12
3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................. 12
3.1 Method used in this risk assessment .......................................................................................................... 12
3.2 Identification of hazards .............................................................................................................................. 13
3.2.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process...................................................................................................... 13
3.2.2 Physical and flammable properties ....................................................................................................... 13
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 i
3.2.3 Toxic Hazards ....................................................................................................................................... 14
3.2.4 Material toxic data ................................................................................................................................. 14
3.2.5 Material incompatibility and interactions................................................................................................ 15
3.2.6 Hazardous Breakdown Products ........................................................................................................... 15
3.2.7 Environmental Hazards ......................................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Operational experience ............................................................................................................................... 16
3.3.1 Vopak .................................................................................................................................................... 16
3.3.2 Island View site ..................................................................................................................................... 16
3.3.3 South Africa .......................................................................................................................................... 16
3.3.4 Worldwide ............................................................................................................................................. 16
3.3.4.1 Petrol ................................................................................................................................................. 16
3.3.4.2 Diesel................................................................................................................................................. 17
3.4 Hazard analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 17
3.4.1 Hazardous event identification .............................................................................................................. 17
3.4.2 Cause analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 17
3.4.2.1 Primary causes .................................................................................................................................. 17
3.4.2.2 Secondary causes ............................................................................................................................. 18
3.4.2.3 Minor and rare causes ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.4.3 Event analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 18
3.5 Consequence analysis ................................................................................................................................ 19
3.5.1 Hazard event development ................................................................................................................... 19
3.5.1.1 Fires and explosions .......................................................................................................................... 19
3.5.1.2 Toxic releases ................................................................................................................................... 19
3.5.2 Consequence severity........................................................................................................................... 19
3.5.2.1 Effect distances ................................................................................................................................. 19
3.5.3 Hazard Effect Zones ............................................................................................................................. 24
3.5.3.1 Fire Radiation .................................................................................................................................... 24
3.5.3.2 Explosion overpressures ................................................................................................................... 26
3.5.3.3 Toxic effects ...................................................................................................................................... 27
3.6 Qualification as a major hazard installation ................................................................................................ 27
3.6.1 Classification ......................................................................................................................................... 27
3.6.2 Reporting of Emergency Occurrences .................................................................................................. 28
3.7 Likelihood analysis...................................................................................................................................... 28
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 ii
3.7.1 Event frequency .................................................................................................................................... 28
3.7.2 Risk levels ............................................................................................................................................. 31
3.7.2.1 Risk Contours .................................................................................................................................... 31
3.7.2.2 Risk Profiles ....................................................................................................................................... 32
3.7.2.3 Societal Risk ...................................................................................................................................... 33
3.7.3 Acceptability .......................................................................................................................................... 35
3.7.3.1 Public individual risk .......................................................................................................................... 35
3.7.3.2 Employee individual risk .................................................................................................................... 35
3.7.3.3 Societal risk ....................................................................................................................................... 35
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL .................................................................................................................................................. 35
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 36
5.1 VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................... 36
5.2 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION ..................................................................................................................... 36
5.3 Severity and risks ....................................................................................................................................... 36
5.3.1 Severity ................................................................................................................................................. 36
5.3.2 Individual risks ...................................................................................................................................... 37
5.3.3 Societal risks ......................................................................................................................................... 37
6.0 RATING AND DISCUSSION OF IMPACTS ............................................................................................................ 38
6.1 Impact Assessment Methodology ............................................................................................................... 38
6.2 Upgrading ................................................................................................................................................... 38
6.2.1 Decommissioning .................................................................................................................................. 39
6.2.1.1 Fynn and Blend Sites......................................................................................................................... 39
6.2.2 Construction .......................................................................................................................................... 40
6.2.2.1 Fynn and Blend Sites......................................................................................................................... 40
6.3 Operation .................................................................................................................................................... 41
6.3.1 Fynn and Blend Sites ............................................................................................................................ 41
6.4 Cumulative impacts .................................................................................................................................... 42
7.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES ................................................................................................................ 42
7.1 Protective systems...................................................................................................................................... 42
7.2 Occupied buildings ..................................................................................................................................... 43
7.3 Integrity assurance ..................................................................................................................................... 43
7.4 Instrumentation ........................................................................................................................................... 43
7.5 Operating information ................................................................................................................................. 44
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 iii
7.6 Emergency plan .......................................................................................................................................... 44
7.6.1 Installation Emergencies ....................................................................................................................... 44
7.6.2 On-Site Emergencies ............................................................................................................................ 44
7.6.3 Off-Site Public Emergencies ................................................................................................................. 44
7.7 Organisational measures ............................................................................................................................ 44
8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 45
9.0 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................................... 46
TABLES
Table 1: Listed activities triggered by the proposed project........................................................................................................ 1
Table 2: Physical properties ..................................................................................................................................................... 13
Table 3: Flammable and reactive properties ............................................................................................................................ 14
Table 4: Acute Health effects ................................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 5: Toxic data ................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 6: Combustion Breakdown Products .............................................................................................................................. 15
Table 7: Effect categories......................................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 8: Effect distances .......................................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 9: Events with maximum effect distances ....................................................................................................................... 24
Table 10: Likelihood or frequency of hazard events ................................................................................................................. 28
Table 11: Population data ........................................................................................................................................................ 34
Table 12: Impacts of the project ............................................................................................................................................... 38
Table 13: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Decommissioning activities .......................... 39
Table 14: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Construction activities................................... 40
Table 15: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Operation Phase........................................... 42
Table 16: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Cumulative impacts ...................................... 42
FIGURES
Figure 1: The location of the Vopak Terminal in relation to the rest of South Africa ................................................................... 2
Figure 2: Aerial photo of the four Vopak sites in the Port of Durban. Note King/ Farwell sites are shown for
reference and are not included in the Vopak Fuel 3 upgrade project. ....................................................................... 3
Figure 3: Aerial photograph of A) Fynn Site and B) Blend Site .................................................................................................. 4
Figure 4: Average annual wind rose for the Durban area (South African Weather Service, 2013). ............................................ 5
Figure 5: Fynn Site layout showing tanks to be removed ........................................................................................................... 6
Figure 6: Layout of tanks on the modified Fynn Site .................................................................................................................. 7
Figure 7: Blend Site layout showing proposed demolition. ......................................................................................................... 7
Figure 8: New layout of the Blend Site ....................................................................................................................................... 8
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 iv
Figure 9: Typical arrangement of a petrol and diesel storage tank........................................................................................... 12
Figure 10: Radiation 4 kW/m2 for various pool fires ................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 11: Radiation 4 kW/m2 for various jet fires .................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 12: Flash fire radiation cover circles for various releases .............................................................................................. 26
Figure 13: Late explosion 2 kPa overpressure circles for various releases .............................................................................. 26
Figure 14: Late explosion overpressure versus distance for various releases ......................................................................... 27
Figure 15: ERPG 1 (5 ppm) effect zone for additive releases .................................................................................................. 27
Figure 16: Individual risk contours as the chance of a fatality /person/year ............................................................................. 32
Figure 17: Risk profile across pipelines (A A) ....................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 18: Risk profile across Fynn site (B B) ...................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 19: Risk profile across Blend site (C C) ..................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 20: Depot site, and surrounding population areas ......................................................................................................... 34
Figure 21: Societal risk F-N cure, (frequency / year versus number of fatalities) ..................................................................... 35
Figure 22: The 10 top societal risk contributors ........................................................................................................................ 37
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Document Limitations
APPENDIX B
Threshold Criteria for Classification of a Major Hazard Installation
APPENDIX C
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
APPENDIX D
Wind weather data used in this risk assessment
APPENDIX E
Hazard Analysis
APPENDIX F
Consequence Methodology
APPENDIX G
Modelling Input Data
APPENDIX H
Likelihood Analysis
APPENDIX I
Risks
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The current storage facilities in Durban are not adequate to meet the growing inflows and outflows of both
petroleum and chemical products in the region. Durban harbour is strategically located to serve Inland
Regions because of its proximity and capacity. Vopak Terminal Durban (Vopak) already operates a storage
terminal at the port of Durban. The four sites at the terminal are primarily designed for chemical imports,
which are imported by ship and distributed throughout the Republic of South Africa (RSA) by rail, road and in
drums . The lack of suitable land in the Durban Port for expansion of the terminal has resulted in a strategy
to optimise the existing sites to better suit future business and market requirements in RSA. Vopak propose
3
a 60 000m upgrade project as a necessity to meet the growing needs of RSA.
Vopak propose upgrading the Fynn and Blend Sites by removing some existing infrastructure and
constructing new infrastructure to comply with leading industry standards. Vopaks current infrastructure on
the Fynn and Blend Sites are used for the temporary storage of chemical and fuel products. Vopak wish to
minimise the chemical storage components on their site and increase their capacity for fuel storage on the
Fynn and Blend Sites.
The proposed project triggers three activities listed under Listing Notice 1 of NEMA (R544 of 2010; Table 1)
and requires a Basic Assessment (BA). As part of the BA process, a Major Hazard Impact study is required.
Table 1: Listed activities triggered by the proposed project
Activity Activity description Proposed Project
Contamination may be present on the
Fynn and Blend Sites (Due to historical
operations).
The decommissioning of existing facilities or Vopak propose erecting six new fuel
infrastructure, for storage tanks of approximately 10 000
(iv) activities, where the facility or the land on which it 3
Activity m each for the temporary storage of
27 is located is contaminated. diesel and ULP.
v) storage, or storage and handling, of dangerous
goods of more than 80 cubic meters; Twenty three storage tanks are being
removed at the Fynn Site to
accommodate six larger capacity
storage tanks.
The expansion of existing facilities for any process or

activity where such expansion will result in the need
for a new, or amendment of, an existing permit or
license in terms of national or provincial legislation Vopak will need to amend their current
Activity governing the release of emissions or pollution, licenses (AEL).
28 excluding where the facility, process or activity is
included in the list of waste management activities
published in terms of section 19 of the National
Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act
No. 59 of 2008) in which case that Act will apply.
The expansion of facilities for the storage, or storage The storage capacity on the sites will be
3
Activity and handling, of a dangerous good, where the increased by up to 40 000 m
3
42 capacity of such storage facility will be expanded by (from approximately 20 000 m to
3
80 cubic metres or more. approximately 60 000m ).
The Major Hazard Risk study will comprise of the following:
Identifying the likely major hazards expected to be associated with the operation of the installation
including the causes, consequences and effects of these hazardous events;
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 1
Quantifying the hazards in terms of their magnitude (release rate and duration);
Quantifying the consequences of the hazards and the severity of the effects, using dispersion, radiation
and explosion modelling;
Determining the lethality of the effects of the hazardous consequences;
Quantifying the likely frequency of the hazardous events;

1
Estimating the individual risks by combining the severity (lethality) and the likelihood of the various
hazards;
2
Estimating the societal risk by taking the surrounding population into account;
3
Comparing risks with international acceptability criteria ;
Reviewing the suitability of the emergency plan and organisational measures in terms of the risks; and
Proposing measures to reduce or eliminate the risk where not acceptable.

1.1 Study SiteVopak Terminal Durban
This section presents the project location and the current operations on the Fynn, and Blend sites as part of
the Vopak Terminal.
1.1.1 Project Location

The location of the Vopak Terminal Durban in relation to the rest of South Africa has been shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The location of the Vopak Terminal in relation to the rest of South Africa
Vopak operates from four locations within and adjacent to the Cutler Complex, in Island View (Figure 2). The
Cutler Complex is located to the south of the Port of Durban. Three of the sites, namely Farewell, King and
1
The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards.
2
This is the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards.
3
A standard or a norm.
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 2
Fynn, are located within the Complex. The Blend site is located outside the Cutler Complex, adjacent to its
southern border. Please note that the King and Farwell sites are discussed below for reference only and are
not directly part of the proposed Vopak Fuel 3 upgrade project.
1.2 Current Operations

The operational activities at the Vopak Fynn and Blend sites are summarised below.
1.2.1 Fynn Site

3
The Fynn Site is the second largest site in terms of storage capacity (28,500m ) but the smallest in terms of
2
area (approximately 12,500m ), Figure 3A below. There are 40 tanks on this site, with sizes ranging from 23
3 3 4
m to 5,100 m . Vopak stores its high-flash chemicals at this site. The operations occurring at this site
include road tanker and rail car handling, drum filling, container handling, and shipping.
Figure 2: Aerial photo of the four Vopak sites in the Port of Durban. Note King/ Farwell sites are shown for reference and
are not included in the Vopak Fuel 3 upgrade project.
1.2.2 Blend Site

The Blend site is located on the border of Island View, see Figure 3B below and covers an area of
2 3
approximately 15,500m . It has a smaller storage capacity relative to the other sites (1,200m ). Twenty (20)
3 3 2
tanks are present at the Blend site. Volumes range from 23m to 83m . A large (2,400m ) drumming
5
warehouse is present at this site. Low flash and high flash chemicals are stored and handled at this site.
Current operations at the site include road tanker handling only, basic in-tank blending, drum filling and
warehousing and container handling. There is also a training centre , maintenance workshop, and office
block.
4
High-Flash sites can only store products that have a flash point of greater than 55C. These are therefore less flammable/volatile chemicals.
5
Low-Flash sites store the more volatile chemicals. These sites are only permitted to store products that have a flash point of less than 55C.
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1.3 Information on Topography, Ecology and Meteorology

The area around the Vopak Sites is essentially flat and surrounded by tall structures and tanks with the
seawater in the bay. There is a hill towards the east at the bluff area and the ocean is to the southeast.
There is no vegetation in the harbour area, except grass and small bushes outside the harbour area towards
the east on the bluff hill area.
Figure 3: Aerial photograph of A) Fynn Site and B) Blend Site
Meteorological conditions are typically coastal with high humidity and morning and evening sea winds from
the north and northeast. Winter nights are cool with some temperature inversions. Generally days are clear,
windy and sunny. Rainfall is in the summer.
The dominant wind directions are from the north-north east (21.5 % of time) and the south-west (20.9 % of
time), with occasional winds from other directions. The wind blows most of the time across the area parallel
to the coastline. See annual wind rose for the area in Figure 4 below (South African Weather Service 2013).
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N
16.0
NNW NNE
14.0
NW 12.0 NE
10.0
8.0
WNW 6.0 ENE
4.0
2.0
W 0.0 E
WSW ESE
SW SE
SSW SSE
S
Figure 4: Average annual wind rose for the Durban area (South African Weather Service, 2013).
1.4 Modifications
As mentioned above, Vopaks current infrastructure at the Fynn and Blend Sites is used for the temporary
storage of chemical and fuel products. Vopak wishes to replace the chemical storage components on the
sites and to increase the capacity for fuel storage on the Fynn and Blend Sites. The following sections detail
the proposed upgrade (i.e. upgrading phases) and operational phases at the Fynn and Blend Sites.
1.4.1 Upgrade Phase Fynn Site

This section details the upgrading activities which are proposed for each Vopak site.
1.4.1.1 Demolition
The Fynn Site will be converted for maximum storage capacity for diesel and unleaded petrol (ULP) products
after demolition of some of the existing infrastructure. Tanks T117, T118, T120, T121, T122, T128 and T129
and the rail weighbridge and rail lines will remain. Figure 5 below, illustrating the tanks to be removed.
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Figure 5: Fynn Site layout showing tanks to be removed
1.4.1.2 Construction
The following will be erected and constructed (Refer to Figure 6 below):
3
Construction of 6 new tanks (~10000m each);
Loading gantries;
Tanker loading facilities;
Ancillary infrastructure (connecting pipelines, pump bays, sewers, and firefighting infrastructure);
3
Installation of a 1200 m /hr loading pump;
3
A new 1200 m /hr transfer pump;
3
A new 1200 m /hr standby pump;
3
Three new 250 m /hr product pumps;
A new substation (<270kv) and associated infrastructure;
The conversion of three small tanks to internal floating roofs (T122,T128 and T129);
Constructing internal floating roofs in three of the six new tanks;
Upgrading the waste water separator;
A new administration building and ablution facilities; and
Space reservation to add two tanks to the manifold area
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Figure 6: Layout of tanks on the modified Fynn Site
1.4.2 Upgrade Phase Blend Site

1.4.2.1 Demolition
On the Blend site the remainder of the horizontal tanks; and half or the entire warehouse will be demolished;
see Figure 7 below.
Figure 7: Blend Site layout showing proposed demolition.
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1.4.2.2 Construction
The following will be erected and constructed (See Figure 8 below):
A new loading gantry with four bays (with space for two future bays);
A new weigh bridge;

6
A new vapour recovery system ;
A new substation (<275Kv);

3 3
Installation of 2 ethanol tanks (450m each) and 2 fame tanks (250m ) each
Two additive dosing pumps (ULP and Diesel);
Two entry gates;
Upgrading the wastewater separator;
Demolition of the warehouse;
Demolition of horizontal tanks; and
New office block and 2 truck inspection bays.
Figure 8: New layout of the Blend Site
1.4.3 Tank design

The new tanks will be made of carbon steel with fixed /geodesic roofs for ULP and diesel. The tanks will also
be designed with a self-supporting and a floating roof for ULP tanks. The tanks will have a minimum height of
25m.
6
Vapour recovery units are the preferred option however options of thermal treatment and recovery into fuel are being explored. All options are compliant with South African
legislation (e.g. Air Quality Act, 2004)
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The diesel and petrol tanks will be equipped with the following:
Shell
Minimum of two shell manholes;
Tank high suction/outlet with emergency block valve and diffusers;
Tank low suction;
Connection for venting the tank line/TRV;
Water draw-off;
Foam nozzles;
Drenching system;
Sample nozzle for combined 3 sample points (top, middle, bottom);
Spare 8 nozzle; and
Recirculation nozzle.
Base
The floor and bottom ring of the tanks will be internally coated;
The floor design will consist of a lowest point with a sump where an early leak detection system will be
installed.
Roof
Diesel tanks will have a single fixed roof whereas petrol tanks will have a fixed roof as well as an
internal floating roof;
Emergency venting valve;
Roof manhole;
Continuous pressure measurement gauge linked to operations control room;
Level gauge tank auto-level gauging and temperature systems with a facility for a remote read-out in
operations control + link to stock management system (PEPI);
Connections for top sampling and tank cleaning purposes;
Independent overfill level with, high-high settings and an interlock linked to automatically close or shut
the tank inlet/outlet mortised valve;
Sampling and calibration nozzles distributes crosswise on roof;
Stillwell for temperature and level measurements; and
Petrol tanks will be equipped with pressure vacuum (PV) valves designed for maximum in and outflow
of the product.
1.4.4 Interconnecting pipelines

Between the Fynn Site, the berths, and the Farewell Site the following will be constructed:
Construction of one 16 pipeline from Fynn site to Farewell, via Berths 5 and 6;
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One 16 line from Berths 5 and 6 to Fynn site for offloading of ships;
Three 8 pipe lines from the Fynn site to the Blend site to transfer fuel product to the new road loading
gantry;
Two 12 lines from Berth 2 to Fynn site for off-loading of ships; and
A 4 line between the Blend Site and the ship berths and between the Fynn Site and the ship berths for
transfer of product.
1.4.5 Fire prevention and protection

Fire prevention measures will include the following;
Nitrogen blanketing on petrol tanks with internal floating roofs;
Exclusion of ignition sources, e.g. smoking, hot work and electrical area classification (Zones 1 and 2);
Earthing of tanks, piping and equipment for static accumulation and lightning;
Submerged filling to minimise static built-up.
Fire protection (fighting) measures will be the following;
Flame detectors on roof rim of tanks activating an alarm;
Fire water sprays on shell and roof of tanks from manual activation;
Foam application into the tank bunds with foam pourers, from Island View main foam supply;
Fire water sprays road and rail tanker loading bays from manual activation;
Mobile foam trolleys at road and rail tanker loading bays;
Fire water hydrants with monitors all around the tank farm;
Portable fire extinguishers at strategic locations; and
Assistance can also be obtained from the Island View Emergency Services and Ethekweni Fire
Department.
1.4.6 New infrastructure

1.4.6.1 Storm and waste water
The first flush system will be used for this development, i.e. the separator system will be relocated at Fynn
Site. Blend Site will use the existing separator system.
1.4.6.2 Nitrogen
Nitrogen is supplied at a pressure of 10 bars from an external supplier for tank blanketing, purging and line
displacement operations. A nitrogen network is already established at Fynn Site.
1.4.6.3 Waste Management

The existing oil/water separator will be used at the Fynn and Blend sites as well as the waste water
treatment facilities on Farewell Site for this development as per existing processes and procedures. As per
the current management practice, only storm water and water from the containment pits in working areas is
allowed into the separator where it is separated through the oil separation and then kept in effluent holding
tanks for sampling prior to release. Storm water in the bunds is tested and if the water quality is adequate, it
gets released directly out of site to the storm water canal.
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In the event of product spillage within the bund, product contained in the bund would be recovered and
stored in alternative tanks, and the residual sludge would be pumped into slop tubes or tanks for treatment,
recycling or disposal.
The management of waste generated during operations on its sites is managed together with the Customer
to ensure opportunities for re-use, recycling are considered prior to the last option of disposal. Local
legislation and product requirements define how generated waste is to be dealt with. Vopak ensures that all
waste disposed from the site is disposed of safely and all certificates of cleanliness and safe disposal are
kept on file.
More detailed information regarding the types of waste likely to be generated on site and Vopaks Waste
Management and Waste Handling Philosophy and Soil and Groundwater Remediation Plan is provided in
the Water and Waste Specialist Study.
1.4.7 Utilities
The following will be provided in the tank pit areas:
Fixed water supply for potable water for tank cleaning;
Nitrogen tank for tank purging;
Compressed air point for portable air pumps; and
Electrical power points for level gauges, electrical actuators and operational lighting.
1.4.8 Design Standards and Criteria

The new tanks and pit areas will be designed according to the latest editions of:
SANS 1089 - 2005: Code of Practice for the Petroleum Industry Part 1; The Handling, storage and
distribution of petroleum products;
SANS 10108 - 2005: The Classification of hazardous Locations and the Selection of Electrical
apparatus for use in such locations;
Vopak Tank Design Manual;
API 650;
Atmospheric Storage tanks:EN14015;
ANSI / NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code American National Standard;
BS 5306 Sections 6.1 & 6.2 - Fire Extinguishing Installations on Premises;
Electrical: SANS 1089 - 2005: Code of Practice for the Petroleum Industry Part 2; Electrical Code;
SANS 10123 - 2005: Code of Practice for the Control of undesirable Static Electricity;
SANS 10142- 2005: Code of Practice for the Wiring of Premises; and
Tank Inspection: API 653 - Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction 1995.
1.5 Operational Phase
1.5.1 Plant
The Fynn site is essentially a fuel storage terminal for receiving fuels offloaded from ships and rail tankers,
storage and distribution to customers in rail and road tankers. All the tanks are vertical and located inside
bunded areas. Volatile fuel (e.g. petrol) will be stored in tanks fitted with internal floating roofs to minimise
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vapour losses as well as a pressure / vacuum relief device on the roof. Fuel is filled into the tanks via a
bottom inlet valve and pumped out via a separate bottom outlet valve. Typical arrangement of a fuel storage
tank is shown in Figure 9 below.
VACUUM BREAK / PRESSURE RELIEF ON PETROL TANKS
WATER SPRAYS
NITROGEN FLOATING ROOF
BLANKETING ONLY ON IN PETROL TANKS
PETROL TANKS
FILLING
FOAM POURER PUMP OUT
BUND
BUND
EARTH
Figure 9: Typical arrangement of a petrol and diesel storage tank
Pumps on site are generally centrifugal. Levels in tanks are monitored with electronic level transmitters and
displayed in the control room. Batch flow totalising meters are provided for filling of rail tankers.
On the Blend Site fuels transferred from the Fynn Site are blended and filled into road tankers for distribution
to customers.
Different combinations and sizes of road tankers will be loaded at the Blend Site via the new road loading
gantry infrastructure. This could include road tankers with trailers, or single tankers. The maximum combined
3
tanker and trailer capacity for this site is 40 m . All road tankers will be bottom loading.
2.0 RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Port Rules of the National Ports Act No. 12 of 2005 (March 2009);
Merchant Shipping Act No. 57 of 1951;
Occupational Health and Safety Act No. 85 of 1993 and its regulations;
Maritime Safety Regulations of 1994; and
IMDG Code and the National Road Traffic Act No. 93 of 1996.
3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
3.1 Method used in this risk assessment
The focus of this assessment is on those hazards that can lead to injuries or fatalities that can affect the
outside public or neighbouring installations. It is therefore not a detailed audit of all the possible risks to plant
equipment, operating personnel, etc.
The expertise and knowledge of the operating personnel were initially used to determine which events are
most likely to be significant and, furthermore, which of these significant events is likely to affect the outside
population and installations. Thereafter, all the categories of hazards in each area were evaluated
qualitatively and quantitatively to confirm which hazards are major hazards.
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Therefore, general hazards from the storage of large quantities of hazardous materials, such as burns and
possible death of personnel, were deemed to be localised and not able to affect the outside public or
neighbouring installations, and are hence not considered in detail in this report. Similarly, issues such as
ecological, environmental and financial risks within the organisation were not considered.
The methodology followed can therefore be summarised as follows:
Description of the plant, the location, and the meteorological conditions;
Identification of all the possible categories of hazards, by listing all the materials used in the process
with their hazardous properties, and by dividing the plant into sections with consideration of the possible
equipment related hazards in each section;
Selecting in a qualitative manner, the worst incidents within all these categories and then quantifying
these;
Evaluating the consequences of the incidents in order to determine which events were likely to affect
only the local plant and which could possibly effect the outside public (potential major hazards);
Quantification of consequences in detail in terms of toxic cloud movements, explosion damage circles,
etc.;
Major hazards with potential consequences which may affect the local plant were not considered
further, while the severity of the remaining major hazards was determined and a frequency of
occurrence estimated;
Estimating the risk and comparison with certain acceptability criteria;
Reviewing emergency procedures in the light of the possible major incidents; and
Drawing of conclusions and proposing recommendations.

3.2 Identification of hazards
3.2.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process
The chemical materials of concern here are the large inventories of hydrocarbon fuels, which have the
potential to create major hazards if released.
Other materials also handled on the site, are additives in small quantities. These will not have any significant
major safety implications for the public outside, if lost from containment.
The tables in the following sections summarize the properties, safety, health and environmental information
extracted from Material Hazard Data sheets and from the available literature (Weiss 1986 & Genium 1998).
3.2.2 Physical and flammable properties

Physical properties shown in Table 2 provide an indication of the capability of the material to cause a hazard.
Table 2: Physical properties
Material Petrol Diesel Additive
Boiling point at 1 atm. [C.] 43 193 178
Vapour pressure @ 20 C. 0,52 @38

0,0003 0,03
[bar] C
Melting point C -60 -34 ND
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Liquid density at 20C [kg /
3 0,75 0,85 0,86
m]
Gas density air = 1 3,5 4 3,84
ND No data
Flammable and reactive properties in Table 3 provide an indication of the conditions necessary to initiate a
fire or explosion hazard.
Table 3: Flammable and reactive properties
Flash point (C) -34 38 42 - 62
Auto ignition temperature

220 229 ND
(C)
Explosive limits in air % v 1,4 7,6 1,3 - 6 0,9 - 6
Stable, Stable, Stable,

reacts with reacts with reacts with
Reactivity
strong strong strong
oxidiser oxidiser oxidiser
ND No data
3.2.3 Toxic Hazards
Acute (immediate) toxic hazards directly affect people and are applicable in terms of major hazards for which
the properties are given in Table 4. Thus, chronic and ingestion effects are not considered.
Table 4: Acute Health effects
Irritant to mucous
Irritation of respiratory membranes and respiratory
Irritation of respiratory tract,
tract, cough, mild tract. May cause
cough, mild depression,
Inhalation depression, cardiac drowsiness, headache.
cardiac arrhythmias
arrhythmias Prolonged high
concentration may cause
loss of consciousness
Irritant. Prolonged contact

Skin contact Mild irritation of the skin Mild irritation of the skin
may cause dermatitis
3.2.4 Material toxic data

Exposure limit values for the materials on the installation are listed in Table 5 below. These are defined as
follows.
Odour threshold, the concentration a person will smell the material.
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Threshold Limit Value (TLV), the time weighted average concentration a person may be exposed for 8
hours per day for a 40 hour week, is really only applicable to workers inside the factory. Outside the site
boundary the criteria of the TLV divided by 50 (fifty) is often used as an acceptable ground level
concentration, unless there is an Ambient Air Pollution criteria, which is then considered binding.
Short term exposure limit (STEL), the concentration a person may be exposed to for more than the time
weighted average (TWA) limit, but with a maximum of 4 excursions to this limit per day for a maximum
duration of 15 minutes each with at least 60 minutes between exposures, again applicable to employees in a
factory.
Immediately dangerous to life and health value (IDLHV), concentration represents a maximum level from
which a person could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or irreversible
health effects.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) categories adopted from the American Industrial
Hygiene Association for 60 minutes exposure are defined as follows:
ERPG 1: Suffer only mild transient health effects and objectionable odour.
ERPG 2: Not suffer irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair abilities to
take protective action.
ERPG 3: Will not suffer life threatening health effects.
Table 5: Toxic data
Odour TLV STEL IDLHV
Material ERPG 1 ERPG 2 ERPG 3
(ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
500 (30
Petrol 0,25 300 NA NA NA NA
min)
Diesel 0,7 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Additive 20 30 ND 3* 30* 150*
ND No data, NA Not applicable
* Determined from Dow Chemical Exposure Index method:
Trimethyl benzene: ERPG 2 = STEL = 30 ppm, ERPG 3 = 5 x ERPG 2 = 5*30 = 150 ppm,
ERPG 1 = ERPG 2/10 = 30 /10 = 3 ppm
3.2.5 Material incompatibility and interactions

All the materials on this installation are compatible, i.e. can be mixed in any proportion.
3.2.6 Hazardous Breakdown Products

Should any of the materials be exposed to fire, it is possible that the combustion products could be a
significant hazard and hence the need to identify any such compounds.
Table 6: Combustion Breakdown Products
Material Combustion Breakdown Products
Petrol Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot
Diesel Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot
Additive Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot
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3.2.7 Environmental Hazards

Environmental effects are not relevant to the Major Hazard Installation Regulations with the exception of
elements mentioned in the Environmental Conservation Act of 1973. Although the effects on the environment
from a major hazard may be identified in this assessment, no environmental risk assessment will be carried
out as part of the Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment.
3.3 Operational experience

A search was carried out to locate instances of incidents, accidents or unusual occurrences, related to
petroleum fuels, which had effects inside and outside of site boundaries. This will lend support to the hazards
identified and give a general view of the possible extent of the risk later on in the assessment.
3.3.1 Vopak
No major fire, explosion or toxic release incidents have occurred on this terminal since it was originally
commissioned. Tankers have driven off while still connected during filling, ripping off the hose, which
resulted in spillages of fuel. No ignition occurred and the spillage wascleaned up as part of the emergency
response.. During 2002 a small fire occurred in the drumming shed due to operator failing to earth the
system. The fire was extinguished by the operating personnel, while the Island View emergency sevice were
kept on standby. Subsequently an interlock was added to disable drumming if not earthed.
3.3.2 Island View site

On 19 September 2007 at the Island View Storage (IVS) chemical storage company at Durban harbour,
while a person was on top of a flammable storage tank, it exploded and lead to fires on eight other nearby
tanks, which continued till the next day. The person on top of the tank died.The cause of the explosion could
not be determined..
3.3.3 South Africa

On Monday night (2007/11/19) a storage tank with more than seven million litres of petrol caught fire at the
Engen refinery in Durban, apparently after it was struck by lightning. There were no reports of death or injury,
but the blaze caused fear and panic in several neighboring residential areas
3.3.4 Worldwide
Incidents related to the fuel storage depots were searched for in the IChemE 1999 accident database, and
significant incidents are described below.
3.3.4.1 Petrol
There is a total of 5753 incidents recorded involving petrol; most were related to transport and refineries.
Some significant incidents are listed below:
During December 2005, a large fuel storage site at Buncefield in the UK, suffered explosions and fires
resulting in extensive damage due to the overflowing of a petrol tank, followed by ignition. No injuries or
fatalities were reported (Powell 2006).
A blowtorch was used on top of a petrol tanker to solder the sensor wires and caused the tanker to explode
killing the mechanic. Another explosion occurred when welding was done on the bottom of a tanker during
maintenance (Kletz 2003).
On 14 July 1994 petrol was spilt from a tanker and ignited during offloading. The fire destroyed the filling
station and resulted in two fatalities (OSE 1993).
th
On 16 December 2011, at Shell in Alberton, the bellows on a pump failed and released approximately 160
tonnes of petrol into the bund, which then leaked into the nearby stream due to an open bund valve, resulting
in an environmental incident.
Several incidents have occurred in South Africa where fuel tankers on the road were involved in collisions
with other vehicles, or from overheated brakes on the wheels, ignited and were destroyed by the fires.
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3.3.4.2 Diesel
There is only record of 6 incidents involving diesel fuel. Most, again, are associated with transportation. The
following incidents are noteworthy:
In the USA on 24 September 1977, lightning struck a 190 foot diameter cone roof tank containing diesel
fuel. Roof fragments were hurled 240 feet away and struck a 100 foot diameter covered floating roof
gasoline tank. A 180 foot floating gasoline tank at 80 feet distance was also struck by debris. The
entire surfaces of the cone and internal floating roof tanks ignited immediately. The rim fire on the
floating roof resulted in the roof sinking after about four hours. The two largest tanks were full. The
smallest about half full. The two larger tanks and their contents were destroyed. The fire in the internal
floating roof tank was extinguished after about two hours.
Date and location unknown, two workers welding a 150 gallon diesel fuel tank were fatally injured when
the tank exploded. After the explosion it was found that diesel fuel in the tank was contaminated with
gasoline.
3.4 Hazard analysis

3.4.1 Hazardous event identification
The site was broken down into discrete sections in order to facilitate the analysis of possible hazards. These
sections are:
Pipeline import of petrol and diesel from ships at Berth 2 into storage tanks at the Fynn site;
Pipeline import of petrol and diesel from ships at Berth 4 and 5 into storage tanks at the Fynn site;
Fuel transfer from the Fynn site tanks via pipelines to the Blend site;
Cross transfer of fuels via pipelines between Fynn and Farewell sites;
Bulk storage of petrol and diesel at the Fynn site;
Fuel blending and rail tanker loading at the Fynn site;
Fuel blending and road tanker loading at the Blend site; and
Additive offloading from road tankers, storage and blending into fuels at Fynn and Blend sites.
The possibility of the following hazards was considered in each of the above areas:
Physical burst;
Fire (external), e.g. pool fires, jet fires; and
Explosion (unconfined).
3.4.2 Cause analysis

3.4.2.1 Primary causes
As the hazards being assessed will originate mostly from loss of containment, i.e. a release, the following
generic primary causes were identified:
Creation of an open end, e.g. overflowing of a tank due to human error or failure of level instrumentation
equipment;
Integrity failure due to deterioration of the plant (material of construction failure) causing burst of
equipment and piping. This may be as a result of a crack developed in the piping or equipment due to
fatigue from vibration, stress corrosion cracking or an inherent manufacturing defect not detected during
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inspection. A pressure surge or hydraulic hammer in the piping and a high head in tanks could then initiate
such a burst;
Overpressure burst due to thermal expansion of trapped liquid in piping;
External damage of piping and equipment, e.g. earthworks, cranes; and
Failure of the protective systems (instrumented, hardware and human).
3.4.2.2 Secondary causes

Possible causes for ignition (fire & explosions) of released materials are the following:
Hot work;
Static spark discharges and lightning;
Electrical faults;
Smoking; and
Hot surfaces, friction and impact.
Possible causes for toxic exposure or gassing of people from released materials are:
not wearing personal protective equipment;
lack of awareness; and
failure to evacuate.
3.4.2.3 Minor and rare causes

Since the assessment mainly deals with likely major hazards of explosion, fire and toxic releases, the
following causes were excluded:
Joint leaks on liquid and gas pipes due to, e.g. poorly installed gaskets, or pressure surges, or
expansion of trapped liquids;
Blowing of relief valves from over pressurisation following failure of the control and protective systems;
Small general leaks, which may include valve spindle seal leaks, leaks due to normal wear, or improper
maintenance;
Natural events (earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.);
External or internal sabotage as a result of personnel grievances; and
Aviation accidents.
The causes are also analysed in detail in the section Likelihood Analysis, in Appendix H.
3.4.3 Event analysis

Major and significant hazards identified are analysed in terms of the causes, consequences and preventative
and protective measures in the Hazard Analysis in Appendix E.
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3.5 Consequence analysis

3.5.1 Hazard event development
3.5.1.1 Fires and explosions
If a release of flammable liquid is ignited, a jet flame will result immediately, otherwise the liquid will form a
pool on the ground. Early ignition will cause a fire to burn on the pool (pool fire), or evaporation will take
place from the pool to form a vapour cloud, which will drift away assisted by the wind. Later ignition of the
vapour cloud will result in a flash fire, which could flash back and ignite the pool fire and the jet fire. The
overpressure generated by a flash fire is negligible and can be discounted.
However, if the flammable vapour cloud enters a congested region and ignition occurs then this may result in
a confined vapour cloud explosion. Referring to the earlier site lay-out in Figure 7 and 8, it can be seen that
there are only tanks with large open spaces between them, which do not present any confinement. In order
to have significant confinement an array of pipes and beams must be present forming narrow channels or
tunnels. Therefore no areas of congestion or confinement are present at the Fynn and Blend Sites and thus
the possibility of a vapour cloud explosion is very small.
In general, pool fires will only affect persons in the immediate vicinity of the fire. Jet and flash fires are more
likely to affect areas outside the installation since the fire is much more energy intensive than pool fires.
Persons exposed to the radiation from fires, may suffer severe burn injuries.
In summary then the following flammable incidents from a release of materials were considered in detail:
Pool fire, either in a bund or on the ground;
Jet fire from liquid emerging from a rupture pipe;
Flash fire; and
Explosion.
3.5.1.2 Toxic releases

The release of toxic vapours is generally the hazard that is of most significance to the public outside the
boundaries of any installation (Lees 1990 and ICI 1986).
In this assessment, releases of flammable or combustible liquids or gasses, e.g. diesel, petrol, etc. do not
have significant toxic properties and therefore was not considered in terms of toxic risks. The only toxic
hazard evaluated was from the release of additives.
3.5.2 Consequence severity

In order to interpret the physiological effects of varying exposures, three categories were adopted for fire,
explosion and toxic releases as detailed in Appendix D.
Use was made of the computer programme DNV PHAST 6.7 to model each release in terms of the flow rate,
pool formation, evaporation, dispersion and resultant radiation for fires, overpressures from explosions and
concentrations for toxic releases. This was done for two weather conditions: Inversion with a wind speed of
1.5 m/s and neutral with a wind speed of 5 m/s. These represent both low and high wind speed conditions as
well as day and night conditions as per the weather data presented in Appendix C. The input data to these
modelling calculations, which are based on the cause analysis, is given in Tables A1 and A5 in Appendix G.
3.5.2.1 Effect distances

In order to interpret the effects of explosion, fire and toxic releases, the following three effect categories are
defined as shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Effect categories
Category 1 2 3
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Explosion overpressure kPa 2 14 21

(1% fatal) Partial (20 % fatal) Steel frame
(0,1 % fatal, ear drum collapse of walls building distorted and
Effect
rupture) Missile limit and roofs of pulled away from
houses foundations.
2
Fire radiation kW/m 4 12 38
Effect (0,1 % fatal, pain) (1% fatal) (100% fatal)
Toxic concentration ERPG 1 ERPG 2 ERPG 3
Not suffer
irreversible or
Suffer only mild other serious
transient health health effects or Will not suffer life
Effect
effects and symptoms that threatening health effects
objectionable odour could impair
ability to take
protective action
Severity effect distances for the 3 effect categories, determined by the consequence modelling, are shown
for each hazard event (releases) in Table 8 below. This gives an indication of how far away from the hazard
source certain effects (radiation, overpressure, concentration) will extend.
Table 8: Effect distances
Maximum distance from
source in m
(Most severe effect 3)
Consequence Categories
Hazardous Event Cat 1
No Effects Cat 2 Cat 3

Fire (pool) Radiation 97 -
31
Explosion (late) Overpressure 481 -
Petrol berth 2 ship -
Jet fire Radiation 178 110
1 offload pipe rupture 136
Fire ball Radiation - -
-
Flash fire Radius - 357
-
Release Concentration - -
Fire (pool) Radiation 83 31 -
Explosion (late) Overpressure - - -
Diesel berth 2 ship Jet fire Radiation 17 7 -
2
offload pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Flash fire Radius - - 7
Release Concentration - - -
Explosion (late) Overpressure 297 - -
Petrol Fynn to Blend Jet fire Radiation 76 59 46
3
pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
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Diesel Fynn to Blend Jet fire Radiation - - -
4
Petrol Fynn to Farewell Jet fire Radiation 132 103 85
5
Diesel Fynn to Jet fire Radiation - - -
6
Farewell pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol berth 4&5 to Jet fire Radiation 161 124 102
7
Fynn pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Diesel berth 4&5 to Jet fire Radiation 16 7 -
8
Fynn pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Fynn storage Jet fire Radiation 231 170 126
9
tank overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Fynn bulk Jet fire Radiation 6 3 2
10
storage tank burst Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Fynn storage Jet fire Radiation 129 63 49
11
tank pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 21

Diesel Fynn storage Jet fire Radiation - - -
12
tank overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Fire (pool) Radiation 114 -
46
Explosion (late) Overpressure - -
-
Diesel Fynn bulk Jet fire Radiation - -
13 -
storage tank burst Fire ball Radiation - -
-
Flash fire Radius - 1
-
Release Concentration - -
Diesel Fynn storage Jet fire Radiation 12 7 5
14
tank pipe rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Fire (pool) Radiation 28 19 6
Petrol Fynn rail loading Jet fire Radiation 44 25 18
15
arm rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Fynn rail Jet fire Radiation - - -
16
tanker burst Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Fynn rail tanker Jet fire Radiation - - -
17
overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Diesel Fynn rail Jet fire Radiation 5 3 2
18
loading arm rupture Fire ball Radiation - - -
Diesel Fynn rail Jet fire Radiation - - -
19
Flash fire Radius - - -
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 22

Diesel Fynn rail tanker Jet fire Radiation - - -
20
overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Petrol Blend road Jet fire Radiation 44 25 19
21
Petrol Blend road Jet fire Radiation - - -
22
Petrol Blend road Jet fire Radiation - - -
23
tanker overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Diesel Blend road Jet fire Radiation 5 3 2
24
Diesel Blend road Jet fire Radiation - - -
25
Diesel Blend road Jet fire Radiation - - -
26
tanker overfilled Fire ball Radiation - - -
Jet fire Radiation - - -
27 Additive tank overfilled
Fire ball Radiation - - -
Release Concentration 250 28 1
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 23

Additive Blend tank Jet fire Radiation - - -
28
burst Fire ball Radiation - - -
Additive Blend pipe Jet fire Radiation 1 - -
29
burst Fire ball Radiation - - -
Note * The hazard effect does not occur.
Using the Table 8 above, the hazard events, which have effect the longest distance away from the source
(hazard end points), are summarised in Table 9 for each severity category.
Table 9: Events with maximum effect distances
Category 1 2 3
Effect Maximum effect distance m Event
(9, 10, 11) (9, 10, 11)
Radiation: Pool fire 134 45 9, 10, 11. Petrol Fynn storage tank
overfilled, burst, pipe rupture
(15, 17, 18, 20
9 15, 17, 18, 20. Fynn petrol and diesel rail
tanker arm bursts and overfilling
(1) (1) (1)
Jet fire 178 136 110 1. Petrol berth 2 ship offload pipe rupture
(1)
Flash fire 357 1. Petrol berth 2 ship offload pipe rupture
Explosion 795 NA NA 10. Petrol Fynn storage tank pipe rupture
(28) (28) (28)
Toxic release 265 32 1 28. Additive Blend tank burst
NA Not applicable, effect does not occur
The Table 9 above shows that if any of the events had to occur, one could possibly expect, as a minimum,
some serious hazardous effects as far away as 110 m for a jet fire from a Berth 2 petrol pipe rupture, and
357 m for a flash fire following a petrol tank pipe burst at the Fynn site. In other words, this is the distance up
to which injuries might occur. These results do not include any escape or shielding factors, i.e. it is for a
person in the open, stationary at that distance. Neither do these results include likelihood (frequency) of the
events happening. Account is only taken of the probability.
3.5.3 Hazard Effect Zones

Severity is further illustrated by graphical outputs of some of the significant effects on plot plans of the site
and surrounding areas.
3.5.3.1 Fire Radiation

The following fire radiation radii for various releases are shown on maps of the site on the figures below
(Figure 10- Figure 12).
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 24
Figure 10: Radiation 4 kW/m2 for various pool fires
Figure 11: Radiation 4 kW/m2 for various jet fires
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 25
Figure 12: Flash fire radiation cover circles for various releases
3.5.3.2 Explosion overpressures

Late over pressure for unconfined explosions are shown in Figure 13 below. The graph in Figure 14
illustrates that due to the lack of confinement or congestion, very low explosion overpressures are developed
when a release of petrol is ignited.
Figure 13: Late explosion 2 kPa overpressure circles for various releases
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 26
Figure 14: Late explosion overpressure versus distance for various releases
3.5.3.3 Toxic effects

Toxic ERPG 1 effect zones for additive releases are shown on a map of the entire harbour site below.
Figure 15: ERPG 1 (5 ppm) effect zone for additive releases
3.6 Qualification as a major hazard installation

3.6.1 Classification
Petrol, diesel, paraffin or any other material in a single container are not listed in the Schedule A of the
General Machinery Regulations in the OHS Act and, therefore, the Vopak sites are not classified as
compulsory Major Hazard Installations.
It can be seen, though, from the results in the previous section, including radiation and flash fire circles
2
displayed on maps of the site, that the fire 12,5 kW/ m radiation effects for various releases, e.g. petrol and
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 27
diesel tank ruptures, as set out in the criteria in Appendix A, extend outside the Vopak site boundaries. In
addition a flash fire on the Fynn site will extend off Island View into the public domain. This confirms that the
Vopak sites are classified as Major Hazard Installations.
The risk assessment should be reviewed within the next 5 years, i.e. 2018, or earlier if the installation is
modified, capacities increased or more hazardous materials are stored, for which this risk assessment is
then not valid.
3.6.2 Reporting of Emergency Occurrences

Since the Vopak facilities are major hazard installations, all incidents on the installations, which require the
emergency procedures to be activated, must be reported to the local emergency services as well as to the
Provincial Director.
3.7 Likelihood analysis

3.7.1 Event frequency
The likelihood of a hazardous event was determined by first drawing fault trees which represent the
development of the causes to eventually become the event. Failure data was then used to calculate the
likelihood or frequency of the event. The fault trees are given as Diagrams 1 and 2 in Appendix H. The
average expected frequency from the fault trees are listed in Table 4-9 below.
In order to reveal the real risk, account was taken of other similar events that can contribute to the hazard,
e.g. several liquid pipes can burst. Therefore, to obtain the total hazard frequency, the frequency of each
single event, was multiplied by the number of items involved in the hazard, as shown in the Table 10below.
Table 10: Likelihood or frequency of hazard events
Incidents = Frequency x F
Representative Frequency Frequency Incidents
No Allowance for items (F)
event source per year per year
Allowed for 1000 m pipeline
24 hrs/day, 365 d/y, but only
Petrol berth 2 ship -4 250 m, petrol half the time, 8 -7
1 Diagram 1 1,0 * 10 6 * 10
offload pipe rupture hr / week, i.e. F =
250/1000*8/24*52/365*0,5 =
0,006
Diesel berth 2 ship -4 250 m, diesel half the time, 8 -7
2 Diagram 1 1,0 * 10 6 * 10
offload pipe rupture hr / week, i.e. F =
250/1000*8/24*52/365*0,5 =
0,006
Petrol Fynn to Blend -4 24 hrs/day, 365 d/y, but 2200 -4
3 Diagram 1 2,0 * 10 1,1 * 10
pipe rupture m, petrol half the time, i.e. F =
2200/2000*0,5 = 0,55
Diesel Fynn to Blend -4 24 hrs/day, 365 d/y, but 2200 -4
4 Diagram 1 2,0 * 10 1,1 * 10
pipe rupture m, diesel half the time, i.e. F =
2200/2000*0,5 = 0,55
24 hrs/day, 365 d/y, but 2500
Petrol Fynn to -4 m, 8 hr/week, petrol half the -6
5 Diagram 1 2,0 * 10 2,5 * 10
Farewell pipe rupture time, i.e. F = 0,5*
2500/2000*8/24* 52/365 =
0,012
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 28

24 hrs/day, 365 d/y, but 2500
Diesel Fynn to -4 m, 8 hr/week, diesel half the -6
6 Diagram 1 2,0 * 10 2,5 * 10
Farewell pipe rupture time, i.e. F = 0,5*
2500/2000*8/24* 52/365 =
0,012
Petrol berth 4&5 to -4 1400 m, petrol half the time, 8 -6
7 Diagram 1 1,0 * 10 3,3 * 10
Fynn pipe rupture hr / week, i.e. F =
1400/1000*8/24*52/ 365*0,5 =
0,033
Diesel berth 4&5 to -4 1400 m, diesel half the time, 8 -6
8 Diagram 1 1,0 * 10 3,3 * 10
Fynn pipe rupture hr / week, i.e. F =
1400/1000*8/24*52/ 365*0,5 =
0,033
Petrol Fynn storage -6 Allowed for filling one tank a -6
9 Diagram 1 2,5 * 10 7,5 * 10
tank overfilled week, but 3 tanks, i.e. F = 3
Petrol Fynn bulk -6 Allowed for 1 tank, but 4 petrol -6
10 Diagram 1 5 * 10 2 * 10
storage tank burst tanks, i.e. F= 4
Allowed for 10 m per tank, but
Petrol Fynn storage -6 -6
11 Diagram 1 1 * 10 20 m per tank, 4 tanks, i.e. F = 8 * 10
tank pipe rupture
20/10*4 = 8
Diesel Fynn storage -6 Allowed for filling one tank a -6
12 Diagram 1 2,5 * 10 7,5 * 10
tank overfilled week, but 3 tanks, i.e. F = 3
Diesel Fynn bulk -6 Allowed for 1 tank, but 6 diesel -6
13 Diagram 1 5 * 10 3 * 10
storage tank burst tanks, i.e. F= 6
Allowed for 10 m per tank, but
Diesel Fynn storage -6 -5
14 Diagram 1 1 * 10 20 m per tank, 6 tanks, i.e. F = 1,2 * 10
tank pipe rupture
20/10*6 = 12
Allowed for 365 tanker fills per
3
year @ 0,5 hr, but 220000 m
/y/arm 482 tonnes/day
Petrol Fynn rail -5 -4
15 Diagram 1 3,8 * 10 482/40 = 12 rail tanker/ day 2,3 * 10
loading arm rupture
12 * 365 = 4380/year 50%
petrol, i.e. F = 4380/365 * =
6
Allowed for 1 rail tanker whole
Petrol Fynn rail -5 year site, but block of 20, once -5
16 Diagram 2 1 * 10 1,4 * 10
tanker burst a week for 1 day, petrol 50%,
i.e. F = 20*52/365 * = 1,4
Allowed for 7300 rail tankers
Petrol Fynn rail -1 filled per year, but petrol 50%, -2
17 Diagram 2 3,3 * 10 2,4 * 10
tanker overfilled 20/week, i.e. F = 20*52/7300
* = 0,07
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 29
Allowed for 365 tanker fills per

3
year @ 0,5 hr, but 220000 m
/y/arm 482 tonnes/day
Diesel Fynn rail -5 -4
18 Diagram 2 3,8 * 10 482/40 = 12 rail tanker/ day 2,3 * 10
loading arm rupture
12 * 365 = 4380/year 50%
diesel, i.e. F = 4380/365 * =
6
Allowed for 1 rail tanker whole
Diesel Fynn rail -5 year site, but block of 20, once -5
19 Diagram 2 1 * 10 1,4 * 10
tanker burst a week for 1 day, diesel 50%,
i.e. F = 20*52/365 * = 1,4
Allowed for 7300 rail tankers
Diesel Fynn rail -1 filled per year, but diesel 50%, -2
20 Diagram 2 3,3 * 10 2,4 * 10
tanker overfilled 20/week, i.e. F = 20*52/7300
* = 0,07
Allowed for 27375 road
tankers filled per arm per
3
year@ 0,5 hr, but 220000 m
Petrol Blend road -3 -3
21 Diagram 2 3,1 * 10 /y/arm 482 tonnes/day 17 1,1 * 10
loading arm rupture
road tankers/arm/ day, 50%
petrol, 6 arms, i.e. F =
17*365/27375*0,5*6* = 0,34
Allowed for 1 tanker full time
on site, 17 per day per bay, 6
22 Diagram 2 6,6 * 10 bays, on site 2 hr, petrol 50%, 7,7 * 10
tanker burst
i.e. F = 17*6 *2/24/365* =
0,011
tankers filled per year, but
3
220000 m /y/arm 482
23 Diagram 2 6,5 * 10 tonnes/day 17 road 4,4 * 10
tanker overfilled
tankers/arm/ day, 50% petrol,
6 arms but petrol 50%, i.e. F =
17*365/27375*6 * = 0,68
Allowed for 40560 fills per
Diesel Blend road -3 year, but diesel 25%, 1 out of -3
24 Diagram 2 3,1 * 10 1,1 * 10
loading arm rupture 2 gantries, i.e. F = 0,25 * =
0,13
Allowed for 1 tanker full time
on site, 17 per day per bay, 6
Diesel Blend road -6 -8
25 Diagram 2 6,6 * 10 bays, on site 2 hr, petrol 50%, 7,7 * 10
tanker burst
i.e. F = 17*6 *2/24/365* =
0,011
tankers filled per year, but
3
220000 m /y/arm 482
Diesel Blend road -1 -2
26 Diagram 2 6,5 * 10 tonnes/day 17 road 4,4 * 10
tanker overfilled
tankers/arm/ day, 50% diesel,
6 arms but petrol 50%, i.e. F =
17*365/27375*6 * = 0,68
Allowed for 52 fills per year,
Additive tank -6 -4
27 Diagram 1 2,5 * 10 no high level protection, i.e. F 4,8 * 10
overfilled
= 0,00048/0,0000025 = 192
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 30
Additive Blend tank -6 Allowed for one tank, but 2, -5

28 Diagram 1 6,6 * 10 1,3 * 10
burst i.e. F = 2
Additive Blend pipe -6 -6
29 Diagram 1 1 * 10 Allowed for 10 m, i.e. F = 1 1 * 10
burst
3.7.2 Risk levels

Two types of risk were evaluated in this risk assessment and are defined as follows:
Individual risk: The chance that a particular individual at a particular location will be harmed. It is usually
described in numerical terms such as number of fatalities per person per year or one fatality per
6, -1 -2 -6 -7
person per, e.g. 1000, 10 000, 100 000, 10 etc. years or chance of 10 , 10 .10 , 10 of a fatality
per person per year. Assessment of individual risk does not take account of the total number of people
at risk from a particular event.
Societal risk: Estimates the chances of numbers of people being harmed from an incident. The
likelihood of the primary event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the
consequences are assessed in terms of level of harm and numbers affected, to provide an idea of the
scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed.
The individual risks were determined based on the combination of frequency or likelihood of events and their
severity, taking into account ignition probabilities and the distribution of the weather conditions in terms of
stability, wind speed and direction. Estimates were also made of the societal risks incorporating the
population distribution and the ability of people to escape indoors.
Detailed analysis of the population distribution, relative vulnerability, etc. outside the boundary of the site,
was not included. Use was made of the computer model DNV 6.7 SAFETI (previously PHAST RISK) to
obtain the risk results.
3.7.2.1 Risk Contours

Individual risk contours as injuries (fatalities) per person per year (/p/y) have been plotted on a map of the site as
shown on Figure 16 below. These contours may also be interpreted as the chance (0,1, 0,001, 0,001, 0,0001,
-5 -6 -7
10 , 10 , 10 ) of a fatality / person per year.
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 31
B
B
A
Figure 16: Individual risk contours as the chance of a fatality /person/year
3.7.2.2 Risk Profiles

On the map of the risk contours in Figure 16 above, vertical and horizontal transects (lines across contours)
were drawn. The transects enabled risk profiles to be produced as shown in Figure 17, Figure 18 and
Figure 19. These graphs plot the variation of unmitigated individual risks (no allowance for escape or wind
direction) against distance over the site along the transects.
Figure 17: Risk profile across pipelines (A A)
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 32
Figure 18: Risk profile across Fynn site (B B)
Figure 19: Risk profile across Blend site (C C)
3.7.2.3 Societal Risk

Societal risk depends on the population distribution normally surrounding the site, as well as whether
persons are indoors or outdoors, i.e. their ability to escape from the hazard area. Societal risk is a way to
estimate the chances of numbers of people being harmed from an incident. The likelihood of the primary
event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the consequences are assessed in terms of
level of harm and numbers affected, to provide an idea of the scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed
or harmed. Evaluation of societal risk is useful for town planning as it gives an indication of how many of the
population may be harmed. Population areas for the Vopak sites on a map are demarcated as shown in
Figure 20 below.
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 33
Figure 20: Depot site, and surrounding population areas
An estimate of the number of people in the populated areas was done and the population density was
calculated based on the surface area. A probability that people would be indoors was assigned to each
population area, based on the guidelines Green Book 1992. See Table 11 below.
Table 11: Population data
Time Residential Industrial north
Population area Harbour area
south west
People 20 000 3390 5330
2
Day Population density (persons / m 0.008 0,0025 0.004
Fraction indoors 0,93 0,93 0,93
People 5090 6780 1330
2
Night Population density (persons / m 0,002 0,005 0,001
Fraction indoors 0,99 0,99 0,99
Societal risks were determined by using the individual risks to calculate the number of fatalities in a specific
population area, taking account of the population density, the probability that people will be indoors, the wind
direction distribution and ignition probabilities associated with the population and other activities. Societal risk
is then expressed in frequency fatality (F-N) curves as shown on a graph in Figure 21 below as a blue
curve denoted Combination 1, which is the combination of day and night societal risk curves. In this
evaluation the population on site was included. Incidents, which will incur a large number of fatalities, are
less likely to occur. There is a lower limit line (green), below which the risks are totally acceptable and an
upper limit line (red) above which risks are totally unacceptable. The risk region between these two limit lines
is regarded as tolerable.
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 34
Figure 21: Societal risk F-N cure, (frequency / year versus number of fatalities)
3.7.3 Acceptability
3.7.3.1 Public individual risk
Referring to section 3.7.2 and the contours in Figure 16 as well as the risk profiles displayed in section
4.7.2.2, the individual risks from flammable hazards, exceed the acceptable target stated in Appendix I of a 1
-6
* 10 chance of a fatality per person per year outside along the top east boundary of the Island View
-4
storage complex, which is considered public area. Risk outside Island View do not exceed 1 * 10 . Thus the
Vopak fuel storage installation individual risks can be regarded as tolerable, i.e. risks should be proactively
-6
managed or reduced where practical and cost effective. Risks exceeding 1 * 10 outside Island View, stem
from operations at the Fynn site, which is close to the north-east boundary. The individual risks determined
in this assessment include the panned preventative and protective measures.
If areas outside the Vopak sites inside Island View are considered public, then individual risks Vopak sites
-4
pose to adjacent installations are not totally acceptable, but are tolerable, i.e. do not exceed 1*10 (see blue
-4
10 contours in Figure 16).
3.7.3.2 Employee individual risk

The maximum individual risk from fires, explosions or toxic releases at all the Vopak installations where
-4
employees are exposed (see risk profiles) are at most 7 * 10 chance of a fatality per person per year at the
-4 -5 -3
Fynn site and 5 * 10 at the Blend site. This is more than a 1 * 10 , but less than a1 * 10 chance of a fatality per
person per year stated in Appendix I. Thus, the risks at the Fynn and Blend sites are tolerable. Risks on the fuel
-6
transfer pipelines are no more than 1,6 * 10 and thus are acceptable.
3.7.3.3 Societal risk

Societal risks for persons on-site and off-site, shown on the F-N curve, are totally acceptable for the rare high
severity incidents and tolerable for frequent low severity incidents, i.e. risks should be reduced where
reasonably practical and cost effective, or proactively managed. The societal risks determined in this
assessment include the panned preventative and protective measures.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL
Petrol and diesel float on water and can result in environmental hazards with large spills into waterways. It is
harmful to aquatic life in high concentrations loss of containment of fuels may lead to pollution of the nearby
water steams and to complaints of discomfort and of unpleasant smells from neighbours in the area or from
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 35
the public. In the event of a fire or an explosion, toxic combustion fumes may enter the atmosphere as a gas,
possibly with entrained particulate or black smoke. The heat generated in the fire will assist in initially
dispersing the fumes and these are likely to descend some distance away and affect the environment with
toxic deposits, etc. There may also be the visual impact from the smoke.
A fire on the sites with the resultant use of large quantities of firewater could pose an environmental problem
if not suitably contained and directed to the effluent system or a controlled storm water system.
Major leaks or ruptures during offloading may spill large quantities of fuels into the storm water drains. There
is, however, a separation sump from which fuel can be recovered before discharging water into the storm
water drain.
The expected frequencies of releases and fires are such that any environmental incident would be extremely
infrequent, i.e. much less than once a century. Therefore, this installation will not pose any significant
environmental risk from flammable and toxic release hazards.
Further, all spillages of fuel will be contained and recovered, as per an on-site emergency plan.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

From the above analyses, risk assessment, emergency plan and organisational evaluations, the following
conclusions can be drawn:
5.1 VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT

This assessment is valid for the installations and materials listed in Section 2.6.3 as at November 2013.
5.2 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION

In terms of material hazards associated with the process or operations there are:
Flammable liquids (petrol); and
Combustible liquids (diesel).

Causes of hazards for the plant and equipment used are:
Potential bursting of road tankers and storage tanks;
Potential rupture of piping;
Ignition of fires following bursts and ruptures;
Ignition of pool and jet fires following releases;
Ignition of flash fires; and
Ignition of weak explosions.

5.3 Severity and risks
5.3.1 Severity
Operation of the fuel installations has the potential to seriously affect members of adjacent installations and
the public outside the site boundary up to a distance of 110 m for a jet fire from a Berth 2 petrol pipe rupture,
and 357 m for a flash fire following a petrol tank pipe burst at the Fynn site. Therefore, the Vopak sites and
installations are classified as Major Hazard Installations in terms of the OHS Act regulations. The risk
assessment must be submitted to the authorities.
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Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 36
5.3.2 Individual risks

Maximum risks at the centre of the sites where employees are exposed (see risk profiles) are approximately a
-6 -4 -3
1,6 * 10 , 7 * 10 and 5 * 10 chance of a fatality per person per year for the transfer pipelines, Fynn and
-6
Blend Sites respectively. Risks reduce to less than a 1 *10 chance of a fatality per person per year at a
distance of approximately 150 m away for the Fynn Site, which is inside the Island View site boundary. The
-6
transfer pipelines and Blend site risks reduce to less than 1 *10 chance of a fatality per person per year within
10 and 30 m respectively.
Overall, the individual risks from the installations posed to employees and the public are tolerable. Since
overfilling of a petrol tank poses a high risk and is dependent on operator intervention, a high level
automatic trip of the petrol supply valve independent from the normal level indication, was incorporated as a
means of reducing the risk. Overflowing of a fuel tank was the cause of the Buncefield tank farm fires and
explosions in the UK.
5.3.3 Societal risks

The top ten contributions to societal risk, which include employees on other nearby installations, are as
shown on the bar chart in Figure 23 below.
Figure 22: The 10 top societal risk contributors
Contributions to societal risk are as follows:
Petrol Blend site road tanker overfilled 32%

Petrol Fynn site tank pipe rupture 23%
Petrol Fynn site rail tanker overfilled 18%
Petrol Fynn site storage tank overfilled 7,8%

Petrol Fynn site rail tanker burst 7,6%
Additive tank overfilled 5,4%
Petrol Fynn site tank burst 4,1%
Others less than 1%
Societal risks are tolerable for frequent low severity hazards and totally acceptable for infrequent high
severity hazards.
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6.0 RATING AND DISCUSSION OF IMPACTS

This section outlines the methodology used to assess impacts associated with the proposed Project.
Potential positive and negative impacts associated with the proposed Project are also discussed.
6.1 Impact Assessment Methodology

Impacts associated with the proposed project were assessed according to their Direction, Magnitude,
Duration, Scale and Probability of occurrence (Table 12). These terms are briefly described below.
The following factors and criteria have been used to assess the impacts of the project.
Table 12: Impacts of the project
MAGNITUDE DURATION
10 - Very high/dont know 5 Permanent (longer than 10 years)
4 - Long-term (7 to 10 years; impact ceases after site
8 High
closure has been obtained)
3 - Medium-term (3 months to 7 years; impact ceases after
6 Moderate
the operational life of the activity)
2 - Short-term (0 to 3 months; impact ceases after the
4 Low
construction phase)
2 Minor 1 Immediate
SCALE PROBABILITY
5 International 5 - Definite/dont know
4 National 4 - Highly probable
3 Regional 3 - Medium probability
2 Local 2 - Low probability
1 - Site only 1 Improbable
0 None 0 None
Significance Points (SP) = (Magnitude + Duration + Scale) x Probability
Therefore:
SP >60 Indicates high An impact which could influence the decision about whether or not to
environmental proceed with the project regardless of any possible mitigation.
significance
SP 30 60 Indicates An impact or benefit which is sufficiently important to require

moderate management and which could have an influence on the decision
environmental unless it is mitigated.
significance
SP <30 Indicates low Impacts with little real effect and which will not have an influence on
environmental or require modification of the project design.
significance
+ Positive impact An impact that is likely to result in positive consequences/effects.
6.2 Upgrading
From an environmental assessment perspective the following summarises the potential impacts that are
related to the upgrading phase of the Fynn and Blend Sites (i.e. decommissioning and construction
activities), and provides a significance rating for each impact before and after mitigation.
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 38
6.2.1 Decommissioning
6.2.1.1 Fynn and Blend Sites
Upgrading the sites will involve decommissioning of tanks (i.e. removal of old tanks to make space for new
tanks) and other infrastructure such as:
Pumping empty of tanks to be demolished;
Positive isolation of piping to tanks that will remain, i.e. closing valves, inserting slip plates;
Washing out with water small amounts of remaining fuels;
Sweeping of tanks and piping with nitrogen to remove remaining fuel vapours; and
Finally sweeping pipes and tanks with air and declaring safe for demolishing (Unbolting, flame cutting).
Major hazards during upgrading will be similar to major hazards during operation, except the likelihood will
be slightly increased in work on tanks and piping containing fuels. Hazards may include the following:
Fuel releases from leaks;
Errors during decommissioning (inadequate isolation);
Fires and explosion due to ignition of spilled fuels; and
Pollution from spillages of fuels during draining or washing out of tanks and piping.
Mitigation or protective measures that should and will be in place are as follows:
Isolation, lockout, and permit to work clearance procedures;
Training of decommission personnel;
Study of decommissioning hazards and a risk assessment;
Containment, and fuel separation from draining and washing of tanks and piping;
Emergency procedures; and
Wearing of personal protective equipment.

Table 13: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Decommissioning
activities
ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE
Major Hazard Accident Impacts Before mitigation After mitigation
M D S P Total SP M D S P Total SP
Fynn site fires 8 1 2 4 44 M 8 1 2 2 22 L
Fynn site explosions 4 1 3 4 32 L 4 1 3 2 16 L
Fynn site toxic releases 2 1 1 4 16 L 2 1 1 2 8 L
Fynn site pollution 8 2 2 4 48 M 2 2 1 2 10 L
Blend site fires 6 1 3 4 40 L 6 1 3 2 20 L
Blend site explosions 4 1 2 4 28 L 4 1 2 2 13 L
Blend site toxic releases 2 1 1 4 16 L 2 1 1 2 8 L
Blend site pollution 6 2 2 4 40 M 2 2 1 2 10 L
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6.2.2 Construction
From an environmental assessment perspective the following summarise the potential impacts that are
related to construction activities during the upgrade phase, and provides a significance rating for each impact
before and after mitigation.
6.2.2.1 Fynn and Blend Sites

During the upgrade phase, construction activities will involve the following:
Construction site establishment (personnel, equipment, materials, workforce, services)
Demolition of existing tanks and piping (cutting, dissembling, removal of scrap and rubble)
Excavating, blasting, casting of foundations and building (civil work)
Erection of new tanks and installation of piping and equipment (cutting, welding, assembling)
Finishing (painting, removal of redundant items)
At the Flynn and Blend Sites major hazard during the upgrade phase will be similar to major hazards during
operation, except the likelihood will be increased due to the upgrade activities taking place close to
operational tanks. At the Blend Site, major hazards during its upgrade will be unlikely as there will be no fuel
operating installations on the site. Hazards common to both sites (Table 14) may include the following:
Fuel releases from damage of live piping with cranes, earth working equipment and vehicles
Errors during construction (cutting into live piping)
Fires and explosion due to ignition of fuels from hot work
Pollution from construction waste
Permit to work clearance procedures
Training of construction contractor personnel
Study of demolition and construction hazards and a risk assessment
Restricted access and fencing to operational tanks
Wearing of personal protective equipment
Emergency procedures
Table 14: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Construction activities
Fynn site explosions 4 1 2 4 28 L 4 1 2 2 14 L
Blend site fires 6 1 3 4 40 M 6 1 3 2 20 L
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6.3 Operation
From an environmental assessment perspective the following summarises the potential impacts that are
related to the operational phase of the proposed project and provides a significance rating for each impact
before and after mitigation.
6.3.1 Fynn and Blend Sites

Operation of new tanks and infrastructure will involve the following activities:
Commissioning of the new tanks and infra-structure (opening valves, filling tanks, starting pumps; and
Operation of the new tanks and infra-structure (filling, storage, transfer to other sites of fuels and
loading of rail tankers.
Major hazards during operation will be as per major hazard accident risk assessment. Hazards common to
both sites (Table 15) may include the following:
Fuel releases from leaks due to loss of integrity of material of construction of tanks and piping
(deterioration, corrosion);
Fuel releases from damage of piping with cranes, and vehicles
Releases of fuel due to rupture of rail tanker filling arms (loss of integrity, pulled away while connected);
Errors resulting in overfilling of tanks and rail tankers with fuel;
Fires and explosion due to ignition of fuels from static discharges, lightning, electrical faults, hot work;
Toxic releases from spillages of additive; and
Pollution from leaks or overfilling of tanks and rail tankers.

Operating procedures;
Permit to work clearance procedures;
Training of operating personnel;
Tank level indication, high level alarms and interlocks to close isolation valves;
Integrity assurance (scheduled inspection and maintenance);
Study of operation hazards and a risk assessment;
Wearing of personal protective equipment;
Tank bunds;
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Effluent ponds, separators and safe disposal measures; and
On-site and off-site emergency plan.

Table 15: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Operation Phase
Fynn site explosions 6 1 3 3 30 M 6 1 3 2 20 L
6.4 Cumulative impacts

The Vopak sites and pipelines, as classified Major Hazard Installations, are adjacent and close to other
flammable and toxic storage sites, which all are major hazard installations. Based on this assessment,
radiation levels will extend sufficiently far across the Vopak site boundaries to have an effect on the
operations of other organisations, as was shown on the consequence maps. Fire radiation will be catered for
by cooling with water drenching systems and will be shielded to some extent by bund and other walls in
between. Relevant impacts are rated below in Table 16.
Table 16: Environmental Impact Assessment Matrix for the proposed Project Cumulative impacts
Major Hazard Accident impacts Before mitigation After mitigation
Fynn site explosions 6 1 3 3 30 M 6 1 3 2 20 L
7.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES

7.1 Protective systems
The following protective features are incorporated in the design of the installation to minimise major hazard
incidents:
Open structure for good ventilation to minimise accumulation of flammable or toxic vapours.
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All tanks are bunded to contain at least 110% of the inventory of the largest tank in the common bund;
Emergency diesel driven firewater pumps in the event of an electrical power failure;
Portable fire extinguishers and fire water hydrants with hoses and nozzles. Fire team on site, assistance
available from Island View Emergency Services (5 minutes);
Water-cooling on tanks via fire water sprays;
Non-return valves on all other tanks;
Foam pouring into the bunds;
All petrol tanks are fitted with vent and vacuum relief devices, whereas diesel may only have a vent;
Cables in high fire risk areas are fire proofed;
All fuel tanks are provided with a level indicator and high alarm for filling and emptying as well as for
monitoring inventory;
All fuel tanks are with a high level interlock independent from the normal level indication. to
automatically close the tank bottom valve in the event od overfilling
All tanks are fitted with Class 0 fire safe actuated valves on the bottom outlets which can be remotely
closed in the event of a pipe burst or leak,
Road tanker loading incorporates a high level switch on the tanker with a communications lead, which
will close off the filling valve when tanker is overfilled; and
Driving off with a road tanker still connected will break the communications lead, which will
automatically close the filling valve.
7.2 Occupied buildings

On installation where major hazards can occur as a result of releases followed by fires and explosions, it is
essential that the manned buildings must be of such a design to ensure the survival of operating personnel.
7.3 Integrity assurance

The storage installation has been designed and constructed according to high standards, and measures
(condition monitoring and scheduled inspections) are in place to ensure that the integrity is maintained and
any deterioration is detected and plant and equipment are restored to the original condition
API Standard 653 is appropriate for tanks and stipulates the following inspections:
In service routine external visual inspection; once per month.
In service formal external visual inspection; every 5 years.
In service, ultrasonic shell thickness measurements; five years after commissioning, and then once the
corrosion rate is known, at intervals which are the smaller of {remaining corrosion allowance] / [2 * shell
corrosion rate] or 15 years.
Internal inspection; within 10 years to determine bottom plate corrosion followed by setting the interval
such that the corrosion rate will not be less than 1,2 mm at next inspection, but not greater than 20
years.
7.4 Instrumentation
Adequate instrumentation exists, comprising alarms, interlocks, and trips. These must be tested on a regular
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basis, e.g. every 3 months.
7.5 Operating information

Operating, technical and training manuals are available. Although there is a site layout drawing with some
piping, as well as a diagram of the fire water and foam system, no formal and standard Piping and
Instrumentation (P & I) diagram for the fuel system was yet available, and needs to be drawn up. All the
information should be updated whenever any change takes place, as identification of valves, piping,
equipment and instrumentation is essential for proper operation and for maintenance. Accidents originating
from, e.g. modifications or operations based on inadequate information will thus be avoided.
7.6 Emergency plan

There are usually three levels of emergency response to be considered:
Installation emergencies;
Site emergencies; and
Emergencies that involve the outside public and local authorities.
7.6.1 Installation Emergencies

These are normally of a small nature, e.g. leaks, small fires and can in almost all cases be dealt with by the
operator. It is included as part of the operating procedures, which are simple and straightforward. Therefore,
these were not considered any further.
7.6.2 On-Site Emergencies

These are emergencies that result from a fire or explosion which usually only has an effect on the installation
itself within the boundaries of the site.
The plan needs to be reviewed for the new installations and updated every 3 years. This needs the
involvement of the local emergency services, other industries, etc. At present Vopak review emergency
procedures annually.
7.6.3 Off-Site Public Emergencies

There should be an offsite emergency plan (Disaster Management Plan). The offsite emergency plan or
procedure needs to be reviewed for the new installations in consultation with the local emergency services.
At present the off-site plan for Vopak is tested annually.
7.7 Organisational measures

A Process Safety Management System (PSM) should address the following elements:
ORGANISING
Organisation & responsibilities;
Allocation of resources;
Appraisal and accountability;
Competence;
Co-operation & involvement;
Communications; and
Organisation for emergencies.
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PLANNING AND IMPLEMETATION

Hazard identification and risk assessment;
Identifying, scheduling and prioritising improvements;
Key risk control systems;
Operational control;
Management of change; and
Planning for emergencies & response.
MEASURING PERFORMANCE
Active monitoring;
Monitoring progress;
Task observation;
Process safety system development;
Review of quality; and
Accident / incident investigation.
AUDIT AND REVIEW

Process safety measures as part of the organisational risk management must be audited and review on a
regular basis to identify any shortcomings that can be rectified or improved..
8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

(Note that the numbers in the { } brackets refer to the sections where the background and reasons are
detailed).
i) Revise and update this risk assessment in 2018 or earlier, if the installation is again modified by
increasing the total capacity in excess of the maximum used in this assessment, or if it is converted for
handling other materials {3.6.1}
ii) Review and update the on-site emergency plan to include aspects identified in this risk assessment
{7.6.2}.
iii) Request the local emergency services to draw up an off-site emergency plan {7.6.3}.
iv) Incorporate and implement process safety measures on the sites where cost effective and practical
{7.7}.
In conclusion, impacts associated with the proposed Fuel 3 project are rated as low following mitigation
measures and the overall proposed project is viewed as having a lower Major Hazard Risk (MHI) than
current operations on the respective sites, due to technology incorporated in the design (e.g. high level trips
to prevent tank overflow and resulting fires, as well as, but not limited to, emergency shut off systems in the
event of pipe failures).
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9.0 REFERENCES
a) South African Weather Services, Sanjeev Sewnarain, Client Liaison Officer- Kwa-Zulu Natal, 2013.
b) Lex Patria Publishers, Occupational Health & Safety Act 85 of 1993.
c) IChemE, 1999, The Accident Database version 4.1, CD-ROM, Rugby, UK.
d) Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials 7th ed. - National Fire Protection Association 1978.
e) Weiss G 1986, Hazardous Chemical Data Book 2nd ed. - Noyes Data Corporation.
f) Genium Material Safety Data sheet Collection, Genium publishing, New York
g) Pirhonen P, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 1992, Vol 5 Number 5 pg. 292
h) Lees, F.P, 1996, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd Ed, Butterworth Heineman, Great
Britain.
i) ICI, Process Safety Guide No 10, 1986 - Risk Assessment Methodology.
j) HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People, HSE Books, Section 132, 2001.
k) Kletz T, Still Going Wrong, Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters and How They Could Have Been
Avoided, Gulf Professional Publishing, 2003.
l) Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, 1999.
m) Hazard & Operability Study Manual, ISHECON, 2009
n) Powell T, The Buncefield Investigation Second Report , UK, May 2006.
o) Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials 7th ed. - National Fire Protection Association 1978.
p) South African National Standard 089 Part 1, Storage and Distribution of Petroleum Products in an
above-ground bulk Installations, 1999.
q) LPB, Major Hazards Assessment Panel, draft paper, The effects of explosions in the process industries,
Report of the Overpressure Working Party, Loss Prevention Bulletin, 068, April 1986.
GOLDER ASSOCIATES AFRICA (PTY) LTD.
Specialist - Daniel Rademeyer

Major Hazard Risk Assessor
Golder - Nelius Scheepers Golder - Ed Perry

Project Manager Project Reviewer
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4 46
Associate / Divisional Leader of Environmental Services
NS/EP
Reg. No. 2002/007104/07

Directors: SAP Brown, L Greyling, RGM Heath
Golder, Golder Associates and the GA globe design are trademarks of Golder Associates Corporation.
\\dur2-s-fs3\gaadata\projects\13615314_vopak_fuel3\6_deliverables\6.1_reports\appendices\app d_spcial rprts\risk\13615314-12530-4_vopak_fuel_3_mhi_study.docx
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APPENDIX A
Document Limitations
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APPENDIX B
Threshold Criteria for Classification of a Major Hazard
Installation
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Definitions in the regulations state that a Major Hazard Installation is an installation where a substance is
stored that is listed in Schedule A of the General Machinery regulations of the Occupational Health and
Safety Act and the quantity exceeds those stipulated.
The materials handled are hazardous substances listed in SABS 0228 under both the specific and generic
type names.
It is an installation where a substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in such a form and
quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident. A Major Incident is an event or occurrence of
catastrophic proportions resulting from the use of plant and machinery, or from activities at a workplace. This
may be interpreted in technical terms as follows:
Catastrophic relates to the effects on the general public, i.e. persons outside the boundary of the premises of
the installation.
People entering the premises through gates, although members of the public will be regarded as employees
for the duration of the time that they remain on the premises.
A fatality to one or more members of the public may be regarded as catastrophic.
Exposing a member of the public to hazardous effects which exceeds the following thresholds:
2
Thermal radiation: 12 kW / m for 1 minute.
Blast overpressure: 14 kPa.
Toxic gas dose: Equivalent Emergency Planning Response Guideline ERPG 3 for 1 hour and chance of
fatality > 1 %.
Toxic liquid drench: More than 50 % body coverage [severe injuries or fatalities].
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APPENDIX C
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
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APPENDIX D
Wind weather data used in this risk assessment
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GENERAL WEATHER INFORMATION: DURBAN

Altitude - 0m
Atmospheric Pressure - 100 kPa Abs
o
Min Temp Winter - 10 C
o
Min Temp Summer - 18.2 C
o
Max. Temp winter - 20 C
o
Max. Temp summer - 38 C
o
Lowest Recorded Temp - 5 C
o
Average All Year Round - 22 C
Relative Humidity Winter - 70 %
Relative Humidity Summer - 65%
WIND SPEEDS, DIRECTIONS AND THERMAL STABILITIES

The following information sources were used:
Weather Bureau data from Durban Airport weather office.
Tyson P D, Diab R D & Preston-Whyte R A, Stability Wind Roses for Southern Africa, Environmental
Studies Occasional Paper No 21, Dept. Of Geography & Environmental Studies, Univ. Wits, Jhb. RSA.
Three Pasquill stability conditions are normally applicable namely:
Unstable: Sunny hot day (A, B, C).
Neutral: Overcast day or night (D).
Stable: Clear, cold night (E, F).
The above choice was based on climatological data for the east coast area (Tyson, Diab, Preston 1979) with
the following distribution over a year (information for mornings were not available):
Condition Night Day Total
(01:30) (13:30)
Unstable 2 58 30
Stable 54 39 47
Inversion 44 3 23
100% 100% 100%
Thus, as a simplification Unstable and Stable (Pasquill Unstable & Neutral) were grouped together and used
as D stability class and Inversion (Pasquill Stable) as F class.
Hence occurrence Night Day Whole day
D: 2 + 54 = 56 % D: 58 + 39 = 97 % 77 %
F: 44 % F: 3 % 23 %
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The time during a year that the wind blows in given directions were scaled to a 100 % and given in the table
below.
W
DAYTIME N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE
Direction
Unstable+stable D5
97 2.0 4.7 4.4 1.7 1.4 0.5 0.6
=
Inversion F1.5 = 3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
W
NIGHTTIME N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE
Direction
Unstable+stable D5
56 1.2 2.7 2.5 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.4
=
Inversion F1.5 = 44 3.0 6.9 6.5 2.5 2.1 0.8 1.0
Totals Durban 6.5 14.8 13.8 5.4 4.6 1.6 2.0
SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW

1.2 3.2 4.1 5.0 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 31.70
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.19
SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW 0.00
0.7 1.8 2.4 2.9 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 18.30
1.8 4.7 6.0 7.3 2.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 46.81
3.7 10.1 12.9 15.6 5.4 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 100.00
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APPENDIX E
Hazard Analysis
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Use was made of the Hazard & Operability Study 2009 (Stage 2 technique) and the Process Hazard Reviews to
identify the major and significant hazards. These hazards were then analysed in terms of the causes,
consequences and preventative and protective measures. The findings are shown in the table below.
EXTERNAL FIRE
Preventative and
Section Causes Consequences
Protective Measures
Emergency
procedures, e.g.
Pipeline rupture due to isolation
Potential for overheat
Pipelines for offloading mechanical damage Fire extinguishing
damage of nearby
of ships, and transfer e.g. vehicle
tanks Integrity assurance,
across sites of petrol Leak due to loss of
and diesel Radiation injuries to maintenance, e.g.
integrity, e.g. corrosion inspection, testing
employees, possible
Ignition sources outside public Electrical classified
(Pool, jet, flash fires) present, e.g. hot work,
Damage of nearby area
electrical sparks,
buildings Hot work procedures
static, smoking
Smoking prohibited
Earthing
Level indication and
Overfilling of tank and high alarms
roof seam shear Emergency
Catastrophic rupture Potential for overheat procedures, e.g.
Bulk petrol storage of a tank, e.g. integrity damage of nearby isolation
loss tanks Fire extinguishing
Bulk diesel storage Tank pipeline rupture Radiation injuries to Integrity assurance,
due to mechanical employees, possible maintenance, e.g.
damage e.g. vehicle outside public inspection, testing
Leak due to loss of Damage of nearby Electrical classified
(Pool flash fires)
integrity, e.g. corrosion area
buildings
Ignition sources e.g.
Hot work procedures
hot work, electrical
sparks, static, smoking Smoking prohibited
Earthing
Fire extinguishing
Emergency
Potential for overheat
Rupture of a loading damage of nearby
procedures, e.g.
arm due to mechanical isolation
Road and rail loading of tankers
damage (tanker drives Integrity assurance,
petrol and diesel
off still coupled) Radiation injuries to maintenance, e.g.
employees, possible
Ignition, e.g. hot work, inspection, testing
(Pool, jet, flash fires) outside public
electrical sparks, Electrical classified
Damage of nearby
smoking, hot work area
buildings
Hot work procedures
Smoking prohibited
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Fire extinguishing
Potential for overheat Emergency
Rupture of a tanker damage of nearby procedures, e.g.
Road and rail loading of due to integrity failure tankers isolation
petrol and diesel or mechanical impact Radiation injuries to Integrity assurance,
e.g. collision employees, possible maintenance, e.g.
(Pool, jet, flash fires) Ignition, e.g. friction, outside public inspection, testing
impact Damage of nearby Electrical classified
buildings area
Smoking prohibited
ACUTE TOXIC RELEASES

Preventative and
Plant Section Causes Consequences
Protective Measures
Wearing protective
equipment
Emergency
Rupture of piping and Gassing of personnel procedures
All sites
tanks and health effects First aid and medical
treatment Integrity
assurance,
maintenance
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APPENDIX F
Consequence Methodology
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HAZARD MAGNITUDE
Magnitude depends on the amount or rate of release of the hazardous material following loss of
containment, as a liquid.
It was determined by normal fluid flow calculations in terms of the size of the hole and the pressure drop,
head loss or in some cases from equipment specifications (pumps).
The duration of a release affects the magnitude of the hazard, e.g. a large release for a very short time may
be as hazardous as a small release for a long time.
Although injuries may be inflicted on a person when directly exposed to a release, the principal hazard stems
from the effect when experiencing the fire radiation or blast wave or inhaling the gas. Therefore, in addition
to the magnitude of release, the gas emission rate is also needed for determining the risk to people.
Salient aspects pertaining to some of the calculations are described below:
HOLE SIZE
Four possible cases were considered:
Case 1 - Guillotine cut open end damage of a fixed pipe, or sheared off valve, i.e. full diameter as below:
Case 2 - Totally open flow path, e.g. when there is an instantaneous release following a rupture of a vessel
under pressure.
Case 3 - Totally open flow path, e.g. when there is an instantaneous release following a rupture of a tank.
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Case 4 Tank overflow

RELEASE RATE
It was assumed that when a release occurs as a result of a pipe rupture, liquid or gas will flow from the
vessel through a valve, pipe reduction, some length of straight pipe, three elbows, and an enlargement at the
opening where the break occurred as depicted below, before emerging into the atmosphere.
The upstream pressure and temperature were taken as that prevailing inside the vessels or containers and
the maximum flow rate was calculated using a computer program capable of handling two phase and gas
flow.
In the case of complete rupture of a vessel or tank, it was taken that the entire content is instantaneously
released as a liquid.
DURATION OF RELEASE
It was assumed that a release will continue until some action had been taken by the operating staff to isolate
the leak, e.g. closing a valve, or if isolation is not possible, until the entire contents had been lost. Knowing
the rate of release and the content, allowed the duration to be calculated. It should be noted that in respect
of the duration of the incidents, the UK Health & Safety Executive standards (Lees 1980) were used:
1 min Detection via a sensor followed by automatically isolation with an actuated shut off valve.
Remote manual isolation, e.g. operator responds to panel alarm and can isolate either on
5 mins
the panel or at strategically located external isolation valves.
Operator is required to isolate manually directly at or very close to the source of the release,
20 min e.g. required to don breathing apparatus set, and move through the vapour cloud to close a
valve.
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EMISSION
When a liquid above its normal boiling point emerges from a rupture, instantaneous adiabatic flashing
occurs, the temperature falls, and the vapour is dispersed immediately. The remaining cooled liquid
descends onto the ground forming a pool from which evaporation takes place over an extended period,
which will add to the flash evaporation to give the total atmospheric emission.
A pool formed outside in the open will spread radially outwards or follow the land contours, or enter a drain
or water way. This will tend to spread the emission of vapour, which will then be dispersed by the wind. If the
area is bunded, the containment walls would fix the pool dimensions, and the evaporation would be fairly
constant.
POOL FORMATION
The average depth of a liquid pool will be in the order of about 10 mm with the diameter depending on the
amount of liquid released.
DISPERSION
Dispersion of vapour or gas releases is handled by using dispersion programme PHAST 6.7.
EXPLOSION
Explosions were modelled using the TNO multi energy method, based on the un- and confined strength, and
the confined fraction of the gas cloud. No significant confinement was identified on the site, hence no
explosion results were produced
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APPENDIX G
Modelling Input Data
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Table A1 Interconnecting piping

ESD Actuated Emergency Shut Down isolation valve, EXFV Excess flow valve, N Normal, NA Not applicable
Release Liquid
Equipment & Normal Size of Pressure bar Bund Release Emission
No Material duration Temp C release rate Notes 2
hazardous event inventory kgs hole mm (m H head) area m height m (kg/s)
(s) kg/s
6 000
0 +10 m ship 250 m 50*50 =
Petrol berth 2 ship 300 300 tonnes in 8
1 6 000 000 Petrol 20 head + 90 m long, NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
offload pipe rupture (12) ESD hr 208
pump head 4 valves = 0,1
kg/s
0 +10 m ship 6 000 250 m 50*50 =
Diesel berth 2 ship 300 300
2 6 000 000 Diesel 20 head + 90 m tonnes in 8 long, NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
offload pipe rupture (12) ESD
pump head hr 208 4 valves = 0,1
220000
3
m /y/ arm
0 +32 mH 2200 m 50*50 =
Petrol Fynn to 300 at Blend (6
3 7 500 000 Petrol 200 (8) 20 head + 30 m long NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
Blend pipe rupture ESD arms,
petrol)
16,7
220000
3
m /y/ arm
0 +32 mH 2200 m 50*50 =
Diesel Fynn to 300 at Blend (6
4 7 500 000 Diesel 200 (8) 20 head + 30 m long NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
Blend pipe rupture ESD arms,
diesel)
16,7
Petrol Fynn to 0 +32 mH 3 2500 m 50*50 =
400 300 1200 m /h
5 Farewell pipe 7 500 000 Petrol 20 head + 60 m long NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
(16) ESD 267 kg/s
rupture pump head 4 valves = 0,1
Diesel Fynn to 0 +32 mH 3 2500 m 50*50 =
400 300 1200 m /h
6 Farewell pipe 7 500 000 Diesel 20 head + 60 m long NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
(16) ESD 267 kg/s
rupture pump head 4 valves = 0,1
0 +10 m ship 6 000 1400 m 50*50 =
Petrol berth 4&5 to 400 300
7 6 000 000 Petrol 20 head + 90 m tonnes in 8 long, NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
Fynn pipe rupture (16) ESD
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0 +10 m ship 6 000 1400 m 50*50 =

Diesel berth 4&5 to 400 300
8 6 000 000 Diesel 20 head + 90 m tonnes in 8 long, NRV, 2500 h 8 NA
Fynn pipe rupture (16) ESD
0 +32 mH 3 50*50 =
Petrol Farewell to 400 300 1200 m /h 1600 m
9 7 500 000 Petrol 20 head + 60 m 2500 h 8 NA
NMPP pipe rupture (16) ESD 267 kg/s long
pump head = 0,1
0 +32 mH 3 50*50 =
Diesel Farewell to 400 300 1200 m /h 1600 m
10 7 500 000 Diesel 20 head + 60 m 2500 h 8 NA
NMPP pipe rupture (16) ESD 267 kg/s long
pump head = 0,1
Table A2 Fynn site

Release Liquid
No Material duration Temp C release rate Notes 2
hazardous event inventory kgs hole mm (m H head) area m height m (kg/s)
(s) kg/s
Petrol Fynn 0 +10 m ship 6 000 75*75 =
300
11 storage tank 6 000 000 Petrol 1200 20 head + 120 m tonnes in 8 5625 32 NA
(12)
overfilled pump head hr 208 h=2
75*75 =
Petrol Fynn bulk
12 7 500 000 Petrol - 600 20 0 + 32 mH 5625 1 NA
storage tank burst
h=2
75*75 =
Petrol Fynn storage 500
13 7 500 000 Petrol 1200 20 0 + 32 mH 5625 1 NA
tank pipe rupture (20)
h=2
Diesel Fynn 0 +10 m ship 6 000 75*75 =
300
14 storage tank 6 000 000 Diesel 1200 20 head + 120 m tonnes in 8 5625 32 NA
(12)
overfilled pump head hr 208 h=2
January 2014
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75*75 =
Diesel Fynn bulk
15 7 500 000 Diesel - 600 20 0 + 32 mH 5625 1 NA
storage tank burst
h=2
75*75 =
Diesel Fynn storage 500
16 7 500 000 Diesel 1200 20 0 + 32 mH 5625 1 NA
tank pipe rupture (20)
h=2
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Petrol Fynn rail 80 10 driver 14 (loading
17 7 500 000 Petrol 20 30 m pump 3 m long 25 h = 1 NA
loading arm rupture present rate)
head 0,1
5*5 =
Petrol Fynn rail
18 32 000 Petrol - 600 20 0 + 3 mH 25 h = 1 NA
tanker burst
0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Petrol Fynn rail 10 driver 14 (loading
19 7 500 000 Petrol 80 20 30 m pump 25 h = 3 NA
tanker overfilled present rate)
head 0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Diesel Fynn rail 80 10 driver 14 (loading
20 7 500 000 Diesel 20 30 m pump 3 m long 25 h = 1 NA
head 0,1
5*5 =
Diesel Fynn rail
21 32 000 Diesel - 600 20 0 + 3 mH 25 h = 1 NA
tanker burst
0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Diesel Fynn rail 10 driver 14 (loading
22 7 500 000 Diesel 80 20 30 m pump 25 h = 3 NA
head 0,1
Table A3 Blend site

Release Liquid
No Material duration Temp C release rate Notes
(m H head)
2
hazardous event inventory kgs hole mm area m height m (kg/s)
(s) kg/s
January 2014
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0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Petrol Blend road 80 10 driver 14 (loading
23 7 500 000 Petrol 20 30 m pump 3 m long 25 h = 1 NA
head 0,1
5*5 =
Petrol Blend road
24 5000 Petrol - 600 20 0 + 2 mH 25 h = 1 NA
tanker burst
0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Petrol Blend road 80 10 driver 14 (loading
25 7 500 000 Petrol 20 30 m pump 25 h = 3 NA
head 0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Diesel Blend road 80 10 driver 14 (loading
26 7 500 000 Diesel 20 30 m pump 3 m long 25 h = 1 NA
head 0,1
5*5 =
Diesel Blend road
27 5000 Petrol - 600 20 0 + 2 mH 25 h = 1 NA
tanker burst
0,1
0 + 32 mH 5*5 =
Diesel Blend road 10 driver 14 (loading
28 7 500 000 Diesel 80 20 30 m pump 25 h = 3 NA
head 0,1
Trimethyl 7*7 =
Additive tank 10 driver 0 + 2 mH + 30
29 20 000 benzene 50 20 49 4 NA
overfilled present m pump head
(modelled) h=2
Trimethyl 7*7 =
Additive Blend tank
30 80 000 benzene - 600 20 0 + 6 mH 49 1 NA
burst
(modelled) h=2
Trimethyl 7*7 =
Additive Blend pipe 0 + 6 mH + 30
31 80 000 benzene 50 1200 20 50 m long 49 4 NA
burst m pump head
(modelled) h=2
January 2014
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APPENDIX H
Likelihood Analysis
January 2014
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FAILURE DATA USED IN THIS STUDY

Data from Purple Book
Full containment atmospheric tank (i.e. semi-explosion and missile penetration proof double containment
tank) - instantaneous release 1e-8
Atmospheric tank with protective outer shell - instantaneous release 5e-7

- small release to secondary container 1e-4
Single walled atmospheric containment tank - instantaneous rupture - 5 e-6

- 10-minute release of entire inventory - 5 e-6
- 10 mm hole - 1 e-4
Pressure vessel - instantaneous rupture 5e-7

- 10 min release of entire inventory 5e-7
- 10mm hole 1e-5
Process vessels and reactors - instantaneous rupture 5e-6

- 10 min release of entire inventory 5e-6
- 10mm hole 1e-4
Pumps (canned) - catastrophic failure 1e-5

- leak 5e-5
Pressure relief valve fails open - 2e-5
Storage of explosives - mass detonation 1e-5
Pipes Diameter < 75 mm - rupture - 1e-6 /m

- leak 5e-6 / m
75 < d < 150 mm - rupture 3e-7/m
- leak 2e-6/m
d > 150 mm - rupture 1e-7 /m
- leak 5e-7 /m
Road tanker (atm) - inst rupture - 1e-5

- large leak - 5e-7
- hose rupture - 4 e-6/h
- hose leak - 4e-5/h
- arm rupture - 3e-8/h
- arm leak - 3e-7/h
Road tanker (press) - inst rupture - 5e-7

- large leak - 5e-7
- hose rupture - 4 e-6/h
- hose leak - 4e-5/h
- arm rupture - 3e-8/h
arm leak - 3e-7/h
Human Failure
January 2014
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Failure Rate
Source Person Task Level
Prob of Error
-4
ICI Operator Simplest 1 * 10
-3
Routine 1 * 10
-2
Must take care, e.g. a checklist is needed 1 * 10
-1
Non routine 1 * 10
-1
Checking another operator 1 * 10
-2
Supervisor Checking an operator 1 * 10
-3
Du Pont Operator Simple 1 * 10
-1
Checking another operator or shift change-over 1 * 10
System Factors
The standard of inspection and maintenance, integrity assurance and general safety management systems
in place on a site can have a significant effect on the failure rates used. Pitblado (Ref. 19 pg 115) states that
one can adjust generic data depending on the particular plant effectiveness with respect to maintenance and
safety systems.
The minimum standard should be a factor of 1. Some plants fall below this standard; hence failure data must
actually be increased up to a maximum of one order of magnitude. For those that are of world class
standard and have much more that the basic safety systems in place the failure data can be reduced by a
factor of 0,5.
Evidence of Inspection, maintenance and

FACTOR
process safety systems
Nothing in place 10
9
Something in place 8
7
6
Bare minimum in place 5
3
Typical average system 1
0.9
0.75
The very best fully accredited PSM 0.5
FAULT TREE GENERATION

It should be noted that there is a range of frequency data that could be used. Typically, frequency numbers
vary within a range of two orders of magnitude. This means that the risk estimates will also be average
numbers within a range of approximately one order of magnitude on either side.
Most of the failures leading to the identified potential major hazards are associated with loss of containment
as a result of vessel or pipe rupture, or due to leaks.
In order to account for the entire system, the frequencies of the representative events were multiplied by the
number of items involved to obtain the incident rate.
January 2014
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A fault tree is essentially a logic diagram, which represents the development of events from the root causes
with failure data in terms of their frequency or probability of occurrence to the final 'top' event or hazard as
illustrated below.
COMPONENT 1 FAILS
SUB CAUSES
OR
COMPONENT 2 FAILS
COMPONENT n FAILS
AND HAZARD
PROTECTION SYSTEM 1 FAILED

PROTECTION SYSTEM 2 FAILED
PROTECTION SYSTEM n FAILED
The quantified fault trees are given in the diagrams below and for convenience are presented from left to
right. Each input is described and detailed in Table A.
TABLE A LOGIC DIAGRAM (FAULT TREE) INPUTS
Ref. no: Description, calculations and notes

From appendix H in the report, Purple Book failure of piping > 150 mm
1 'Berth pipe >150 mm fails' given as 0,0000001/y. Piping length based on 1000 m from dock onto site,
hence failure rate 0,0000001 * 1000 = 0,0001/y
2 'System factor (integrity The piping is regularly checked and maintained if deterioration noticed, i.e.
assurance)' schedule inspection, maintenance and safety systems F = 0,5
3 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions moisture from sea and salt e.g. corrosion, F = 2
Berth pipe damaged by a vehicle or earth working machine, e.g. grader
unlikely, but assume crane working close by once every 10 years,
procedures in place to protect pipes, from ICI failure data human failure on
4 'Berth pipe impact damage'
action embedded in the procedure is 0,003 and despite procedure,
earthwork machine operator slips with simple task where care is required
of 0,01, then f = 1/10 * 0,003 * 0,01= 0,000003/y
5 'Interconnecting pipe >200 given as 0,0000001/y. Base interconnecting piping length on a 2000 m
mm fails' from one to other location on the site, hence failure rate 0,0000001 * 2000
= 0,0002/y
7 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions moisture from sea and salt e.g. corrosion, F = 2
Berth pipe damaged by a vehicle or earth working machine, e.g. grader
unlikely, but assume earth work is carried out once every 30 years,
procedures in place to protect pipes, from ICI failure data human failure on
8 'Berth pipe impact damage'
action embedded in the procedure is 0,003 and despite procedure,
earthwork machine operator slips with simple task where care is required
of 0,01, then f = 1/30 * 0,003 * 0,01= 0,000001/y
Storage tanks are filled weekly from ships, 52 weeks per year, hence f =
9 'Atmospheric tank filled'
53/y
From ICI failure data, general error of commissioning or not noticing tank
10 'Tank already full'
already full e.g. misreading data P = 0,003
From radar level transmitter supplier Endress & Hauser, failure rate is
11 'Level indication fail'
0,0085/y. Calibrated every 6 months, fractional dead time fDt =1/2 * f * T =
January 2014
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1/2 * 0,0085 * 0,5 = 0,0021
From ICI failure data, operator will neglect to monitor level i.e. simple
12 'Operator monitoring fail'
routine task P = 0,001
From ICI failure data:
For Rudder dip level switch use Mobrey float level switch fail to danger of
0,1/y
13 'High level alarm fail' Relay 0,004
West Guardian indicating alarm 0,02
Total 0,124
fDT = 1/2fT = 1/2*0,124*0,5 = 0,031 (tested every 6 months)
14 'Operator ignores alarm' From Lawley failure data, operator will ignore a level alarm P = 0,05
Failure rates: From radar level transmitter supplier Endress & Hauser,
failure rate is 0,0085/y.
Trip amplifier Bailey 0,08
Relay 0,004
15 'Hi tank level shut off fail'
Motorised valve 0,18
Total 0,264
Calibrated every 6 months, fractional dead time fDt =1/2 * f * T = 1/2 *
0,264 * 0,5 = 0,066
From appendix H, Purple Book catastrophic failure of atmospheric tank
16 'Atmospheric tank failure'
given as f = 0,000005/y average
18 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions e.g. corrosion from sea moisture and salt, F = 2
19 'Tank piping > 150 mm
given as 0,0000001/y. Tank piping about 10 m, hence failure rate
fails'
0,0000003 * 10 = 0,000003/y
21 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions e.g. corrosion from sea moisture and salt, F = 2
From Purple Book failure data, articulated loading arm fails 0,00000003
22 'Loading arm failure'
per hour operation per year i.e. f = 0,00000003/y/hr
Severe wear conditions e.g. corrosion from moisture and salt near the sea
24 'Severe wear conditions'
i.e. F = 2
25 'Rail tanker load time' Rail tanker load time is approximately 0,5 hours i.e. t = 0,5 hr
From ICI failure data, tanker pulled away while still coupled with shunting
procedure by others once in 10 000 operations, however supervision and
26 'Tanker pulled off with arm
not coupled to locomotive, so can reduce by 10000 ( not coupled, rails
coupled'
locked, supervision = 0,03*0,03 = 0,00009 ~ 0,0001) i.e. P = 0,0001/10000
= 0,00000001
Rail tankers loaded daily, 7 days per week, 52 weeks per year i.e. f = 365 /
27 'Rail tankers loaded'
y (need to be corrected for specific material offloaded every day)
28 'Rail loading stations' There 1 rail tanker loading stations, i.e. f = 1
From appendix H, catastrophic failure of atmospheric rail tanker is given
29 'Rail tanker failure'
by Purple Book as f = 0,00001/y
January 2014
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Severe wear conditions e.g. corrosion from moisture and salt near sea, F
31 'Severe wear conditions'
=2
32 'Rail tankers filled' Assumed 20 rail tankers filled per day, i.e. f = 20 * 365 = 7300/y
From ICI failure data, general error of commissioning e.g. misreading data
33 'Batching incorrect'
P = 0,003
From ICI failure data, load cell fail completely 0,019/y. Calibrated 3
34 'Weighbridge faulty' monthly, then fDt = 1/2*f*T = 1/2*0,019*0,25 = 0,0023. But 3 cells, 2oo3
voting , so fDT = (f*T)^2 = 0,0023*2 * 0,0023*2 = 0,00002
Each tanker is checked physically through opening hatch for levels and
empty, the batching system is set up to only permit the correct quantity to
35 'Batching permissive
be entered, hence probability tanker not empty or wrong quantity allowed
wrong'
to be entered, from ICI failure data simple arithmetic error with self-
checking P = 0,03
From ICI failure data, high stress, happens rapidly, operator unable to stop
36 'Operator fail to stop filling'
overflow 50:50 chance, i.e. P = 0,5
From operating personnel, 75 road tankers loaded per every working day
37 'Road tankers loaded'
i.e. f = 75 * 365 = 27375/y
From Purple Book failure data, articulated loading arm fails 0,00000003
38 'Loading arm fails'
per hour operation per year, i.e. f = 0,00000003/y/hr
40 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions, e.g. corrosion near the see, F = 2
41 'Road tanker load time' Road tanker load time is approximately 0,5 hours, i.e. t = 0,5 hr
From ICI failure data, a road tanker pulled away coupled once in 10 000
42 'Tanker pulled arm
operations, but driver in attendance during loading, does not sit in truck,
coupled'
hence can reduce likelihood by 10, i.e. P = 0,00001
43 'Atmospheric road tanker From appendix H, catastrophic failure of atmospheric road tanker is given
fails' by Purple Book as f = 0,00001
45 'Severe wear conditions' No severe wear conditions e.g. corrosion, F = 1
From ICI failure data tanker incidents on other roads 16 per million km
(assumed done per 10 years). On site only travel 10 km per year and
46 'Tanker collision'
further assume only 1 out of 100 tankers will rupture on collision, thus f =
16 /1000 000 * 10/100 = 0,0000016/y
From operating personnel, 75 road tankers loaded per every working day
47 'Road tankers filled'
i.e. f = 75 * 365 = 27375/y
From ICI failure data, general error of commissioning e.g. misreading data
48 'Batching incorrect'
P = 0,003
From ICI failure data, variable flow totalising meter failure 0,68/y.
49 'Meter faulty'
Calibrated 3 monthly, then fDt = 1/2*f*T = 1/2*0,68*0,25 = 0,085
Each tanker is checked physically by security through opening hatch for
levels and empty, the batching system is set up to only permit the correct
50 'Batching permissive
quantity to be entered, hence probability tanker not empty or wrong
wrong'
quantity allowed to be entered, from ICI failure data simple arithmetic error
with self-checking P = 0,03
From ICI failure data:
51 'High level shut off fail'
Magnetron float level switch 0,052/y
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4

Trip module 0,001
Solenoid shut off valve 0,02
Total 0,073
fDT = 1/2fT = 1/2*0,073*0,5 = 0,018 (tested every 6 months)
From ICI failure data, high stress, happens rapidly, operator unable to stop
52 'Operator fail to trip filling'
overflow 50:50 chance, i.e. P = 0,5
January 2014
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January 2014
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January 2014
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APPENDIX I
Risks
January 2014
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RISKS ESTIMATION
Risk is the product of the likelihood of the event (F) and the severity (S) of the consequences, i.e. R = F x S.
F was determined earlier by an estimate of the frequency of the events as incidents per year.
Severity is the consequence effect (C) at a specific distance from the hazard source and the probability P) of
the injury effect, i.e. death at that distance.
S=CxP
Thus R = F x C x P as a function of distance from the source.
The total risk at a point = Sum of all the risk contributions (Explosion, fire, toxic releases).
Flammable risks
Ignition probabilities used are as follows:
On site
Time Immediate PIgnition Delayed PIgnition Operating

P
Day 0,063 0,065 0,001
Night 0,063 0,065 0,001
Vehicles on the roads
Time PIgnition Speed m/s Vehicles / hr
Day 0,2 33 240
Night 0,2 33 6
Areas surrounding site
Time PIgnition Duration (s) Operating P
Day 0,01 10 0,01
Night 0,01 10 0,01
The explosion risk was based on the peak overpressure at a location where a person may be present
follows:
Peak overpressure bar: Probability of fatality %

< 0,1 0 outdoors and indoors
> 0,1 0 outdoors, 2,5 indoors
> 0,3 100 outdoors and indoors
The risk from a fire was based on the radiation intensity at a location where a person may be present as
follows:
Probability of fatality via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn I t where I Radiation kW/m , t time in
n 2
minutes.
The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, e.g. the Purple Book 1999.
Toxic risks
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
The risk from a toxic release was based on the concentration at a location where a person may be present
as follows:
Probability of fatality via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn c t where c ppm and t time in minutes.
n
The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, or alternatively it could be derived from
the LC50 based on the method in the Purple Book 1999.
Probit constants for petrol and diesel additive

From Atosol 115 MSDS, section 11, typical fuel additive components
Product/ingredient name Result Species Dose Exposure
p-xylene LC50 Inhalation Gas. Rat 4550 ppm 4 hours
cumene LC50 Inhalation Vapour Rat 39000 mg/m3, 4 hours
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene LC50 Inhalation Vapour Rat 24000 mg/m3, 4 hours
1,2,4-trimethylbenzene LC50 Inhalation Vapour Rat 18000 mg/m3, 4 hours
ethyl benzene LC50 Inhalation Vapour Rat 55000 mg/m3, 2 hours

3
Average = (39000+24000+18000)/3 = 27 000 mg/m 5501 ppm
3
MW = 120, X ppm = (Y mg/m )(24.45)/(molecular weight)
From above average LC50(4 hr) = 5501ppm

1/2 0,5
LC50 (t =30 mins) = LC50 (t = 4 hr)*(4*60/30) = 5501*(4*60/30) = 15559 ppm
For rat species f = 0,25
LC50 human(30 mins) = 0,25*LC50(30 mins) = 0,25*15559 = 3890 ppm
B = 1 and N = 2
n 2
Then A = 5 logn {[LC50 human (30 mins)] * 30} = 5 logn{3890 *30} = 5-logn 453822313
A = 5-19,9 = -14,9
Where these constants are not available or could not be calculated, the toxicity was based on dangerous dose.
January 2014
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RISK CONTOURS
By drawing, circles of the total risk against distance around the source gave a set of uniform risk contours.
Note the risk along a contour is constant. See Figure below.
Hazard source
Risk contours
Risk contours Risk contours
It was necessary to take into account that the wind blows in several directions and the proportion of the time
that it blows in each direction differs. This has the effect of increasing the flammable and toxic risk in certain
areas while decreasing it in others. Percentages of the time during a year that the wind blows in given
directions are tabulated in Appendix B.
The risks determined earlier for a uniformly distributed wind were proportioned to each of the 16 directions
according to the wind direction distribution by multiplying it with an appropriate factor:
F=1/100 * (Number of wind directions, e.g. 16) * (% of time wind blows in direction)
This adjustment gives the variation of the fatal risk with the distance from a toxic release in any specific
direction. In order to elucidate the effect, use was made of a map of the area surrounding the installation.
Sectors, according to the 16 wind directions were marked out from each installation as centre and risk
contours were drawn as in the illustration below.
-6
Risk contours are shown for 10 injuries (fatalities) per person per year (/p/y) for the installation. This may
-6
also be interpreted as a risk contour for a 10 chance of a fatality / person per year.
RISK PROFILES
By drawing a centre line from left to right or from bottom to top, across the contours and plotting the risks
against distance allows a risk profile to be drawn. This gives an indication of the risk with distance from the
installation as illustrated in the Figure below.
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
Distance
APPENDIX I - ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK
In deciding what acceptability criteria to use, there are two factors to keep in mind. Firstly, if incidents
happen too often, the reaction of the public would be such as to cause the facility to be closed. Secondly, if
too stringent targets were set, the penalties on operation or the cost of preventing the incidents would be
intolerable burdens on the business.
INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA

Public
A criterion used for deciding the acceptability or tolerability of a chemical installation to the public in general,
is based on everyday life involuntary risks. This roughly requires that a hazardous installation should not
pose an individual risk to the public greater than 10 times that of being killed by a lightning strike, i.e.10-6
deaths per person per year. The Health and Safety Executive in the UK have adopted this limit (see HSE
2001). A risk > 1 * 10-4 would be totally unacceptable, and will not be granted approval for either
construction or continued operation. For existing installations, if the risk is > 1 * 10-6 but < 1 * 10-4, then
serious consideration needs to be given to reducing the risk.
Employees
People inside the facility site are looked upon as being employees who are different from the public as far as
safety is concerned. They have been trained in handling all the potential hazards on the site, i.e. emergency
procedures, availability of suitable protective equipment (PPE). Criteria by the Health & Safety Executive in
the UK (HSE 2001) a target risk of 10-3 for employees is regarded as the absolute tolerable maximum. A risk
of less than 10-5 would be totally acceptable.
SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA

This was adopted from the UK Health and Safety Executive, HSE 2010, which specifies upper and lower
societal limits as follows:
Intolerable if fatalities of 50 or more people in a single event can happen with a frequency of more than 1 in
5000 per year (2 * 10-4).
Acceptable if fatalities of 50 or more people will not occur with a frequency more than two orders of
magnitude less that that regarded above as intolerable, i.e. 1 in 50 000 per year or 2 * 10-5 per year.
When used on an F-N curve, the slope of the limit lines shall pass through the above point with a slope of 1
and be parallel to each other as shown below.
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
F - N CURVE
Tolerable
Acceptable
1.E-02
FREQUENCY / y
1.E-04
1.E-06
1.E-08
1 10 100 1000
FATALITIES (N)
The straight lines on the F N curve indicate these limits. The upper line represents the tolerable limit and
the lower line the risk acceptance. The region between the upper and the lower line is denoted the ALARP
area (As Low As Reasonable Practical). For scenarios with risk levels that lay between these two lines the
risk should be reduced if practical, typically subject to cost benefit analysis. For scenarios with risk levels
above the upper line, measures must be implemented to reduce the risk. Below the lower line risk is
acceptable and no measures need to be implemented.
January 2014
Report No. 13615314 - 12530 - 4
Golder Associates Africa (Pty) Ltd.
PO Box 29391
Maytime, 3624
Block C, Bellevue Campus
5 Bellevue Road
Kloof, 3610
KwaZulu-Natal
South Africa
T: [+27] (31) 717 2790

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January 2014

Specialist study: Major Hazard

Report Number: 13615314 - 12530 - 4

Specialist study scope and objectives

Assessment of potential major accident hazard impacts

Study of decommissioning hazards and a risk assessment

Permit to work clearance procedures

Training of construction contractor personnel

Study of demolition and construction hazards and a risk assessment

Restricted access and fencing to operational tanks

Wearing of personal protective equipment

Providing procedures and instructions for safe operation;

Maintaining operating information;

Training of operating personnel;

Permit to work clearance procedures;

Wearing of personal protective equipment;

On-site and off-site emergency plan;

Planning for emergencies, action plans;

Providing procedures for modifications;

Auditing and reviewing.

Specific preventative and protective measures would include:

Providing containment, impounding and handling systems for spillages;

Fire prevention and protection;

Record keeping of near miss incidents related to the process risks.

Residual impacts and conclusion

An occurrence due to use of plant or machinery or from activities in the workplace,

Occurrences that give rise to a hazardous incidents e.g. failure of a temperature

Severity The seriousness of the consequences, e.g. death or injury or distress;

The overall probability of a particular type of consequence of a particular type of

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Study SiteVopak Terminal Durban.............................................................................................................. 2

1.1.1 Project Location ...................................................................................................................................... 2

1.2 Current Operations ....................................................................................................................................... 3

1.2.1 Fynn Site ................................................................................................................................................. 3

1.2.2 Blend Site................................................................................................................................................ 3

1.3 Information on Topography, Ecology and Meteorology ................................................................................ 4

1.4 Modifications ................................................................................................................................................. 5

1.4.1 Upgrade Phase Fynn Site ....................................................................................................................... 5

1.4.1.1 Demolition ............................................................................................................................................ 5

1.4.1.2 Construction ........................................................................................................................................ 6

1.4.2 Upgrade Phase Blend Site ...................................................................................................................... 7

1.4.2.1 Demolition ............................................................................................................................................ 7

1.4.2.2 Construction ........................................................................................................................................ 8

1.4.3 Tank design ............................................................................................................................................ 8

1.4.4 Interconnecting pipelines ........................................................................................................................ 9

1.4.5 Fire prevention and protection .............................................................................................................. 10

1.4.6 New infrastructure ................................................................................................................................. 10

1.4.6.1 Storm and waste water ...................................................................................................................... 10

1.4.6.2 Nitrogen ............................................................................................................................................. 10

1.4.6.3 Waste Management........................................................................................................................... 10

1.4.7 Utilities .................................................................................................................................................. 11

1.4.8 Design Standards and Criteria .............................................................................................................. 11

1.5 Operational Phase ...................................................................................................................................... 11

1.5.1 Plant ...................................................................................................................................................... 11

2.0 RELEVANT LEGISLATION ..................................................................................................................................... 12

3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................. 12

3.1 Method used in this risk assessment .......................................................................................................... 12

3.2 Identification of hazards .............................................................................................................................. 13

3.2.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process...................................................................................................... 13

3.2.2 Physical and flammable properties ....................................................................................................... 13

3.2.3 Toxic Hazards ....................................................................................................................................... 14

3.2.4 Material toxic data ................................................................................................................................. 14

3.2.5 Material incompatibility and interactions................................................................................................ 15

3.2.6 Hazardous Breakdown Products ........................................................................................................... 15