The Gamma Phi Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity is suing Wesleyan University in Middlesex Superior Court, alleging it forbid members to live in their own house at 276 High St., Middletown. In September 2014, Wesleyan announced a three-year requirement for the co-education of its residential fraternities, including Delta Kappa Epsilon. In January 2015, the university revoked DKE's housing status. The trial began June 6, 2017, in Middletown.
Original Title
Memo of Decision: Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity vs. Wesleyan University
The Gamma Phi Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity is suing Wesleyan University in Middlesex Superior Court, alleging it forbid members to live in their own house at 276 High St., Middletown. In September 2014, Wesleyan announced a three-year requirement for the co-education of its residential fraternities, including Delta Kappa Epsilon. In January 2015, the university revoked DKE's housing status. The trial began June 6, 2017, in Middletown.
The Gamma Phi Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity is suing Wesleyan University in Middlesex Superior Court, alleging it forbid members to live in their own house at 276 High St., Middletown. In September 2014, Wesleyan announced a three-year requirement for the co-education of its residential fraternities, including Delta Kappa Epsilon. In January 2015, the university revoked DKE's housing status. The trial began June 6, 2017, in Middletown.
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DOCKET NO. CV-15-6013185, ‘ SUPERIOR COURT.
KENT LITERARY CLUB OF
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY AT
MIDDLETOWN, ET AL d JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
v. ‘ MIDDLESEX
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, ET AL 7 APRIL 26, 2017
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
‘The plaintiffs, Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan University at Middletown (Kent Literary
Club), Gamma Phi Chapter of DKE at Wesleyan (fraternity), and Jordan Jancze,' commenced this,
action by service of process on the defendants, Wesleyan University (university), Michael Roth, and
Michael Whaley on February 20, 2015. ? The plaintiffs’ filed their third amended complaint
(operative complaint) on March 10, 2016, and the complaint sounds in (1) violations of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act § 42-110b (CUTPA); (2) promissory estoppel; (3) negligent
misrepresentation; and (4) tortious interference with business expectancies. The facts in this case
have been extensively recited in the memorandum of decision on the plaintiffs' motion for temporary
injunction and defendants’ motion to strike. See Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan University v.
Wesleyan University, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-15-6013185-S
(une 2, 2015, Domnarski, J); Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan University v. Wesleyan University,
Superior Court, judicial district of MiskessrtnDorket No. CV-15-6013185-S (June 17, 2016,
‘Superior Court
Vitale, J.) RECEIVED
APR 26 2017
Judicial District of Middlesex
‘State of Connecticut
' The plaintiffs filed a motion to cite in-an additional party and amend the complaint on
December 1, 2015, to add Jordan Jancze, a Wesleyan undergrad and a member of the fraternity to
this action. The motion was granted on December 14, 2015.
? Individual plaintiffs Tucker Ingraham and Zac Cuzner have been removed from this action.
WEE fie‘The fraternity is a chapter of the male-only international fraternity Delta Kappa Epsilon. Kent
Literary Club is an alumni organization of the fraternity and owns the property at 276 High Street,
Middletown, CT, known as DKE House (DKE House). Jancze is a student atthe university and a
member of the fratemity. The defendant Roth was president of the university at all times relevant
to the operative complaint, and Whaley was Vice President for Student Affairs at the university at
all times relevant to the operative complaint.
The university has a policy that all undergraduate students are required to live in housing
approved by the university as the residential experience is an essential part of the liberal arts
education. The university allows upperclassman to apply for program housing, and applicants to
program housing are approved based on criteria established by the members of each program house.
In order for DKE House to be offered as a program house, as it had been, the fraternity had to sign
a standards agreement, which was to be renewed or refreshed annually.’ Additionally, all university
students were required to sign the housing.‘ (Defs. Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. C.)
In September, 2014, the university announced that all residential fratemities were required
to become coeducated within the next three years. After the announcement, Whaley informed the
plaintiffs that coeducation of the fratemity itself would not be necessary, instead coeducating DKE
House would be sufficient. The fraternity and Kent Literary Club were requested to submit their
plans for coeducating DKE House to Whaley by December 19, 2014. Whaley later extended the
deadline to January 5, 2015. The fraternity and Kent Literary Club submitted their plan for
> The standards agreement is a contract between the university and Greek organizations. The
standards agreement is required in order for Greek organizations to provide housing.
* A university student must sign the housing contract in order to reside in university housing. The
university reserved the right to change or alter the terms of a student’s occupancy and the contract
remains in effect until the student no longer attends the university.coeducating the house by the extended deadline. In a letter dated January 21,2015, Whaley informed
the plaintifis that the plaintiffs’ plan for coeducation was sufficient as a starting part, but in order to
be eligible for program housing for the 2015-2016 academic year the university would need
confirmation by February 6, 2015, from the fraternity of: (1) the name of the sorority that the
fraternity would partner with in coeducating DKE House; (2) residential policies, use of facilities,
rule and administrative proceedings; (3) conversion of three rooms for female occupancy in the
2015-2016 academic year, with those residents allowed to have full and equal access to common
areas; and (4) continued efforts to coeducate DKE House within three years. On February 6, 2016,
despite subsequent efforts and compliance with above terms, the university suspended DKE House’s
cligibility for 2015-2016 academic year. On February 13, 2015, the university notified the plaintiffs
that it was terminating the standards agreement as of June 18, 2015. On July 8, 2015, Kent Literary
Club and the fraternity submitted a plan to the university. On October 17, 2015, Roth informed the
plaintiffs that the university would not discuss any program housing plans, submissions, or
applications by Kent Literary Club or the fratemity while the organizations maintained a lawsuit
against the university. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.
On July 5, 2016, the defendants filed their answer, denying most of the allegations in the
third amended complaint (operative complaint). The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, amemorandum oflaw in support, and exhibits on November 16,2016. The plaintiffs filed
a memorandum in opposition on December 21, 2016. The defendants filed their reply brief on
January 10, 2017. Short calendar was heard on January 30, 2017.cussion of the Law and Ri
“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. .. . The motion for summary judgment is designed
to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried. . ..
However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury
the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his
entitlement to summary judgment.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).
“To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and
that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact... As the
burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
“opponent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223,228, 116 A.3d
297 (2015).
“{N}tis only [o}nce {the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary |
judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists
justifying a trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310
Conn. 304, 320, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). When documents submitted in support of a motion for
summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue. .. . Once
the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for theopposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact...
are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence
properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].” Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn.
223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015). “The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such
issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement
that an issue of fact does exist. .. . To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the
nonmovant must recite specific facts... which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and
documents.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn. App.
347, 358, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).
‘The defendants have moved for summary judgment (#186) on all counts. The defendants
argue in their motion for summary judgment that the plaintiffs? claims fail as a matter of law as they
are precluded by the unambiguous language of both the standards agreement and the housing
contract. The defendants specifically argue that the plaintiffs’ claims of violations of CUTPA are
meritless as the defendants were within their contractual rights to terminate the standards agreement
“without cause.” The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ claims of promissory estoppel and
negligent misrepresentation are meritless because the defendants did not misrepresent what would
be required to coeducate DKE House, did not engage in misleading conduct, and the plaintiffs did
not rely to their detriment on any representations by the defendants. The defendants argue that Kent
Literary Club’s claim of tortious interference with business expectations fails because the defendants
were within their contractual rights to terminate the standards agreement.
‘The plaintiffs counter that their claims are not barred by either the housing contract or the
standards agreement as their claims do not tum on a breach of either contract. Furthermore, theplaintifi3 argue that their claims of CUTPA violations are premised on negligent misrepresentation,
not a breach of contract. The plaintiffs additionally argue that there are genuine issues of material
fact as to their claims of negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference
with business expectancies.
‘The defendants reply that the housing contract is dispositive of Jancze’s claims and they
cannot be liable for terminating the standards agreement as the university acted within its contractual
rights. The defendants argue that they did not misrepresent the criteria for DKE House to remain part
of the program housing initiative and there was no secret objective to force the plaintiffs from using,
DKE House. Finally, the defendants argue that the claims of negligent mistepresentation, and
promissory estoppel fail as the defendants did not make any misrepresentations and plaintiffs did not
rely on the alleged negligent misrepresentation.
A
CUTPA
Section 42-110b (a) provides in relevant part that““[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”
“It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the
criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice
is unfair: (1) [WJhether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or
otherwise-in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfaimess; (2) whether itis immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businessperson] ....All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be
unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets
all three.” Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 19,938 A.2d 576 (2008). [A]
violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . .. or a
practice amounting to a violation of public policy. . .. Whether a practice is unfair and thus violates
CUTPA is an issue of fact. ...” (Citation omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha
of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins, Co., 269 Conn. 424, 434, 849 A.2d 382 (2004).
1
Fratemity and Kent Literary Club
‘The plaintiffs Kent Literary Club and the fratemity filed claims of CUTPA violations against
the university, Whaley, and Roth. The defendants collectively rely on Ramirez v. Health Net of the
Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 1, for the proposition that the defendants could not be liable for
a violation of CUTPA because the university was within their contractual right to terminate the
standards agreement for any reason. The defendants’ reliance on Ramirez, however, is unavailing
because the plaintiffs do not allege breach of contract as a basis for the defendants’ violation of
CUTPA. Instead, Kent Literary Club and the fraternity allege a violation of CUTPA on the basis of
representations made to the plaintiffs regarding coeducation criteria in order to keep DKE House
available as a housing option in the 2015-2016 academic year. In Ramirez, the court held that “the
plaintiff's claims failfed] as a matter of law because he ha{d] alleged nothing more than that, in
terminating his membership, the defendant had availed itself of the rights afforded under the plain
and unambiguous terms of the agreement, none of which was hidden or otherwise withheld ftom theplaintiff.” 1d,, 22. In other words, in Ramirez, the plaintiff's alleged that the breach of his contract,
was a CUTPA violation.
In thepresent case, the conduct alleged to violate CUTPA is not based ona breach of contract
or the improper motivation for terminating the contract between the parties, but instead the
defendants’ alleged negligent misrepresentations, which the plaintiffs allege were made expressly
to prevent DKE House from continuing to be a housing option. The defendants, therefore, fail to
show that they are entitled to summary judgment, as amatter of law, because there are genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the defendants engaged in immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous behavior when the defendants represented what changes were necessary in order for
DKE House to remain a housing option for Wesleyan students. Therefore, the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment fails as to counts one, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen,
fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen of the operative complaint.
2
Janeze
The housing contract requires students to live in university approved accommodations and
does not guarantee the students the right to a specific housing accommodation, “[A] court that is
asked to enforce an asserted contract between a student and his university must examine the oral and
written expressions of the parties in light of the policies and customs of the particular institution.
. Because a student bases his or her decision to attend a college or university, in significant part,
‘onthe documents received concerning core matters, such as faculty, curriculum, requirements, costs,
facilities and special programs, application of contract principles based on these documents and other
express or implied promises, consistent with the limitations expressed in Gupta v. New BritainGeneral Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996), appears sound.” Burns v. Quinnipiac
University, 120 Conn. App. 311, 321, 991 A.2d 666 (2010).
In the present case, Jancze admits that he was not guaranteed housing at DKE House, but he
testified that he made his decision to attend the university on the basis of the house being one of the
availablehousing options-a representation that Jancze alleges came from the university’s staff. Third
Am. Compl., '50. At the time Jancze made his decision to attend the university, however, he had
not seen, let alone agreed to, the housing contract. See Burns v. Quinnipiac University, supra 120
Conn, App. 321 (2010) (plaintiff's claims failed because plaintiff had signed financial aid form that
clearly stated that students with unpaid tuition were not in good standing). Janeze testified in
response to a question,
“A: For the record, I don’t recall signing it. It was part of orientation week. I had to
sign in order to come to the school, but I don’t remember signing it.
Q Do you recall being presented with the housing contract?
A; Lrecall going through orientation and that entails seeing the housing contract, so
ipso facto yes.
See Defs. Mot. for. Summ. J., Ex. p. 6.
In the present case, the housing contract cannot bar Janeze’s claim because he alleges
negligent misrepresentations that occurred prior to the acceptance of said contract. The university,
therefore, fails to show that itis entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, because there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants engaged in immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous behavior when the university represented that DKE House would beavailable as a housing option. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to count two is
denied.
B
Negligent Misrepresentation
“{Our Supreme Court] ha{s] held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be
actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the
truth. ... Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish
(1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have
known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4)
suffered pecuniary harm as result.” (Citations omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola
Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Lid. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 351-52, 71 A.3d 480
(2013). “Whether evidence supports a claim of... . negligent misrepresentation is a question of fact.”
(Citations omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, 104
Conn. App. 194, 201-202, 932 A.2d 472 (2007).
1
Fratemity and Kent Literary Club
Kent Literary Club and the fraternity filed claims of negligent misrepresentation against the
university, Whaley, and Roth. Kent Literary Club and the fraternity were informed in September,
2014, that they had three years to fully coeducate the fratemity. Then in December, 2014, the
defendants informed Kent Literary Club and the fraternity that it would be sufficient to coeducate
DKE House, instead of coeducating the fraternity. The defendants initially requested that Kent
Literary Club and the fraternity provide plans for coeducation by December 16, 2014. The date was
10later extended until January 5, 2016, which Kent Literary Club and the fraternity complied with. On.
January 21, 2016, Kent Literary Club and the fraternity were informed that their preliminary plan,
submitted by the January 5, 2016 deadline, might be acceptable but would require additional
information and details. Whaley informed Kent Literary Club and the fraternity that such information
must be provided by February 6, 2016, or DKE House would not be available as a program housing
option for the next academic year, See Defs.” Mot. for Summ, J., Ex. M. Whaley also testified that
he believed the approval process would be an “iterative process;” See Def®.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex.
G, p. 144; which juxtaposes the defendants’ hard deadline of February 6, 2015. Furthermore, in
Whaley's November 25, 2014 email to Kent Literary Club, he wrote “[aJbsent a plan, even some
draft ideas, we'll [hJave to revisit program housing status for 2015-16.” See Defs. Mot. for Summ,
J,, Ex. 2, p. 6. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the university engaged in
misleading conduct by not informing Kent Literary Club and the fratemity of the February 6, 2015
deadline until January 21, 2015, and what would be necessary for DKE House to remain available
as a program house. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to counts five,
twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, and twenty-six is denied.
2
Jancze
Jancze filed aclaim of negligent misrepresentation against the university only. The university
argues that Jancze did not suffer pecuniary harm because he does not know if he paid for housing,
and therefore, as a matter of law, his claim of negligent misrepresentation must fail. In response to
a question regarding tuition and housing costs, Jancze stated in his deposition, that:
“Q. Have you ever paid any rooming costs during your time at Wesleyan?
re‘A. [don’t know. Idon’t know how my actual fees turn out to, you know, where I get
allocated. I take~I get about 50 percent from the university, and take out about, like
another 30 [percent] in loans, and the rest ’'m responsible individually from summer
earnings and essentially loans from my grandfather to pay the rest.”
See Defs.’ Mot. for Sum. J., Ex. T, p. 6.
‘The university argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine
issue of material fact that Janeze did not suffer pecuniary harm. Jancze alleges that he had to pay
more in housing because he was unable to live in DKE House. The university has not presented
evidence that Jancze would not have had to pay more to live in other university accommodations.
Consequently, if the cost of living in DKE House would have been less then Janeze would have been
responsible for paying a smaller tuition fee. Furthermore, the university has not presented evidence
that Jancze’s scholarship was allocated to include housing irrespective of the potential difference in
cost. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Jancze suffered a pecuniary harm, and
therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to count six is denied.
c
Promissory Estoppel
‘The defendants’ argue that, because there was a valid contract between the fratemity and
Kent Literary Club with the defendants, there can be no claim of promissory estoppel. “Under the
law of contract, a promise is generally not enforceable unless it is supported by consideration. ...
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel [a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
12... A fundamental element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and definite
promise which a promisor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is
not liable to a promise who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no
reason to expect any reliance at all... . Although the promise must be clear and definite, it need not
be the equivalent of an offer to enter into a contract because [tJhe prerequisite for... application [of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel] is a promise and not a bargain and not an offer. .. . This, of
course, is consistent with the principle that, although [a]n offer is nearly always a promise ... all
promises are not offers. ...” Saye v. Howe, 92 Conn. App. 638, 647-48, 886 A.2d 1239 (2005).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) “[T]he question of whether statements are
promissory should be considered as a question of fact . . . .” Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 17 n.6, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).
1
Fraternity and Kent Literary Club
‘There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Kent Literary Club and the fraternity
relied on the defendants’ statements that they had three years to fully coeducate DKE House in order
to remain in program housing. The alleged promise was not part of the standards agreement between
the parties, and therefore this cannot be construed as a breach of that agreement, but rather must be
interpreted as a breach of an independent, subsequent promise. Kent Literary Club hired an architect
to evaluate the building to determine what changes were feasible in order to coeducate the house.
See Pls. Opp. to Summ. J., Ex. 15, p. 6. Kent Literary Club and the fratemity developed a plan to
present to Whaley for approval; See Pls. Opp. to Summ. J. Ex. 15, p. 6; and negotiated with a
sorority in order to comply with the university’s representation that coeducating the House would
13be acceptable to the defendants rather than coeducating DKE itself. See Defs. Mot. for Summ. J.,
Ex. 2, p. 5-6. There are genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, the motion for summary
judgment as to count twenty-one is denied.5
2
Janeze
‘The defendants argue that the housing contract between Jancze and Wesleyan precludes his
claim for promissory estoppel. The defendants’ argument, however, is unavailing. Similar, to his
claim of a CUTPA violation, Jancze had not seen, or agreed, to the housing contract when the
alleged promise was made. Jancze accepted the contract after the conduct Jancze alleges induced him
to attend the university. The defendants have not shown that they would be entitled to judgment, as
a matter of law, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to counts four is denied.
D
Tortious Interference with Business
“A. successful action for tortious interference with business expectancies requires the
satisfaction of three elements: ‘(1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and another party;
(2) the defendant's intentional interference with the business relationship while knowing of the
5 The defendants erroneously argue that there is no cognizable basis for specific performance. See
People’s Savings Bank v. T.R. Paul, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket
‘No. CV-97-0571700-S (January 27, 2000, Beach, J.) (“[iJf there is indeed a sustainable case of
promissory estoppel, then the array of contractual remedies exist, including money damages and
perhaps specific performance”). The defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’
claims of promissory estoppel was denied, and therefore, remains a case of promissory estoppel.
Furthermore, “{t]he availability of specific performance is not a matter of right, but depends rather
upon an evaluation of equitable considerations. .. . The determination of what equity requires in a
particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.” Kakaltk
v. Bernardo, 184 Conn. 386, 395, 439 A.2d 1016 (1981). The court retains its right to evaluate
whether specific performance is required on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case.
14relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffers actual loss.”” American
Diamond Exchange, Inc. v.Alpert, 101 Conn. App. 83, 90, 920 A.24 357 (2007). “[A] claim is made
out [only] when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the
fact of the interference itself.” (Citation omitted.) Downes-Patterson Corp. v. First National
Supermarkets, Inc., 64 Conn. App. 417, 429, 780 A.2d 967, cert. dismissed, 258 Conn. 917, 782
‘A.2d 1242 (2001) (appeal dismissed June 25, 2002). “[F]ora plaintiff successfully to prosecute such
an action it must prove that the defendant's conduct was in fact tortious. This element may be
satisfied by proof that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation. . . or that
the defendant acted maliciously. ... [An] action for intentional interference with business relations
- + Tequires the plaintiff to plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper means. ...
‘The plaintiff in a tortious interference claim must demonstrate malice on the part of the defendant,
not in the sense of ill will, but intentional interference without justification. ... In other words, the
[plaintiff] bears the burden of alleging and proving lack of justification on the part of the
[defendant].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aeina Life & Casualty
Co., 249 Conn. 766, 805-806, 734 A.2d 112 (1999).
‘The defendants argue that the university was not acting tortiously when it acted within its
contractual rights to terminate the standards agreement without cause, Once again, the defendants?
argument is unavailing. Kent Literary Club’s claims of tortious interference with the university stem
from misrepresentations of what actions would be necessary for DKE House to remain available as
a housing accommodation for the 2015-2016 academic year, not that the university terminated the
standards agreement. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants intended
to drive out the fraternity and acquire DKE House for the university’s own use and benefit. See
15Rock-well v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 233, 899 A.2d 738 (holding summary judgment is not,
appropriate when moving party does not eliminate all factual issues raised by allegation of
complaint), cert, denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006). There are genuine issues of material
fact, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to counts eighteen, nineteen, and twenty
is denied as a matter of law.
In summary, the motion for summary judgment is denied as to all counts,
16