Case No. 17-01233 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Appeal BRIEF PER ORDER OF MAY 26, 2017 Filed On June 7, 2017

Stan J.
Caterbone
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
Freedom From Covert Harassment &

Surveillance,
Registered in Pennsylvania
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
www.amgglobalentetainmentgroup.com
stancaterbone@gmail.com
717-327-1566
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
_______________________________________________
In Re:
STANLEY J. CATERBONE, PETITIONER
CASE NO. 17-01233

Case No. 17-10615REF
BRIEF FOR APPEAL AS PER NOTICE OF MAY 26, 2017
On this 6th day of JUNE 2017, I Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner, do hereby file this BRIEF FOR
APPEAL AS PER NOTICE OF MAY 26, 2017.
JUNE 7, 2017
___________/S/____________
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant

Freedom From Covert Harassment & Surveillance,
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
717-528-2200
Notice and Disclaimer: Stan J. Caterbone and the Advanced Media Group have been slandered, defamed, and
publicly discredited since 1987 due to going public (Whistle Blower) with allegations of misconduct and fraud
within International Signal & Control, Plc. of Lancaster, Pa. (ISC pleaded guilty to selling arms to Iraq via
South Africa and a $1 Billion Fraud in 1992). Unfortunately we are forced to defend our reputation and the
truth without the aid of law enforcement and the media, which would normally prosecute and expose public
corruption. We utilize our communications to thwart further libelous and malicious attacks on our person, our
property, and our business. We continue our fight for justice through the Courts, and some communications
are a means of protecting our right to continue our pursuit of justice. Advanced Media Group is also a member
of the media. Unfortunately due to the hacking of our electronic and digital footprints, we no longer have
access to our email contact list to make deletions. How long can Lancaster County and Lancaster City
Continue to Cover-Up my Whistle Blowing of the ISC Scandel (And the Torture from U.S. Sponsored Mind
Control and the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE from the COINTELPRO PROGRAM)?
ACTIVE COURT CASES
J.C. No. 03-16-90005 Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals -
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIALMISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY re 15-3400 and 16-1149; 03-16-900046 re ALL
FEDERAL LITIGATION TO DATE
U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 16-6822 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI re Case No. 16-1149
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert
U.S.C.A. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 16-1149 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;15-3400
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;; 16-1001; 07-4474
U.S. District Court Eastern District of PA Case No. 16-4014 CATERBONE v. United States, et.al.; Case
No. 16-cv-49; 15-03984; 14-02559 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert; 05-2288; 06-4650, 08-02982;
U.S. District Court Middle District of PA Case No. 16-cv-1751 PETITION FOR HABEUS CORPUS
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board Case No. 2016-462 Complaint against
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Judge Leonard Brown III
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case No. 353 MT 2016; 354 MT 2016; 108 MM 2016 Amicus for Kathleen Kane
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Summary Appeal Case No. CP-36-SA-0000219-2016, AMICUS for Kathleen
Kane Case No. 1164 EDA 2016; Case No. 1561 MDA 2015; 1519 MDA 2015; 16-1219 Preliminary
Injunction Case of 2016
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 08-13373; 15-10167; 06-03349, CI-06-03401
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Case No. 17-10615; Case No. 16-10157
ARGUMENT FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In Re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006)

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) has added a
new eligibility requirement to 109 of the Bankruptcy Code. New subsection (h)
provides that a person intending to file bankruptcy must first undergo credit counseling:
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), and notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an
individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day
period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group
briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the
opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related
budget analysis.
11 U.S.C. 109(h)(1). Because Congress placed this requirement in 109, the section that
govern the fundamental eligibility to "be a debtor," this new provision has been described as a
"first level requirement for someone seeking bankruptcy relief." In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 890-
91 (Bankr.D.Minn.2005). As the Court in Wallert noted Congress's goal seems to be to discourage
the practice of hastily filing for bankruptcy, even if that be in the face of foreclosure, repossession,
or garnishment, and to discourage debtors from deferring their first consideration of bankruptcy
until the very eve of such decisive events in the exercise of creditors' remedies.
332 B.R. at 889. However, the requirement is not without its exceptions. For example, paragraph
(3) ofsubsection (h) provides:
(3)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with
respect to a debtor who submits to the court a certification that (i) describes exigent
circumstances that merit a waiver of the requirements of paragraph (1);
(ii) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services from an approved nonprofit budget
and credit counseling agency, but was unable to obtain the services referred to in paragraph *696
(1) during the 5-day period beginning on the date on which the debtor made that request; and
(iii) is satisfactory to the court.
(B) With respect to a debtor, an exemption under subparagraph (A) shall cease to apply to that
debtor on the date on which the debtor meets the requirements of paragraph (1), but in no case
may the exemption apply to that debtor after the date that is 30 days after the debtor files a
petition, except that the court, for cause, may order an additional 15 days.
It is clear that the The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) was passed by Congress to prevent fraud and abuse in the filing of Federal Bankruptcy
Petition. The Petitioner, Stanley J. Caterbone, has filed this Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition for the
following reason, as stated in the CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION PLAN and DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT filed on February 16, 2017 which states the following:
THE PURPOSE OF THIS REORGANIZATION AND DISCLOSURE PLAN IS TO FORMALIZE

THE INTENT OF THE LITIGATION OF THE DEBTOR, STAN J. CATERBONE, AND TO
ERMARK A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE FUTURE SETTELMENTS FOR THE CREDITORS
NAMED HEREIN.
In order to provide this Court with adequate information to make an intelligent and legal
OPINION for this motion, the following is background information, also filed in the CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATION PLAN and DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed on February 16, 2017:
The Debtor, STAN J. CATERBONE, PRO SE, is AN INDIVIDUAL, A CORPORATION, A

FICTICIOUS NAME, ALL CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE COMMOWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA SINCE 1986 UNDER VARIOUS NAMES AND REGISTRATIONS. SEE THE
FOLLOWING RESUME AND BIOGRAPHY FOR SPECFIC DETALS.
This Plan of Reorganization (the Plan) under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Code The Code) proposes to pay creditors of STAN J. CATERBONE, PRO SE DEBTOR
(the Debtor) from PROCEEDS FROM THE MYRIAD CLAIMS OF VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, VIOLATIONS OF ANTI-TRUST, VIOLATIONS OF THE RICO STATUTE, FEDERAL
FALSE CLAIMS ACT RE ISC, INSURANCE CLAIMS OF VANDALISM AND THEFTS, DAMAGES
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING, ETC., ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCRUING SINCE 1987.
THESE CLAIMS ARE CURRENTLY IN LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS.
THESE CLAIMS HAVE ARE ALL WELL SUBSTANTIATED AND ARE SUPPORTED WITH
IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF DOCUMENTS, AUDIO RECORDINGS, AND
VIDEOS. HOWEVER DUE TO THE HISORY OF STAN J. CATERBONE, THISE CLAIMS HAVE
BEEN POLITICIZED SINCE 1987 AND THE FBI COINTELPRO'S PRGOGRAM HAS BEEN
USED TO OBSTRUCT EFFORTS IN ALL OF THE COURTS. IT IS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND
CRIMINAL TO ALLOW THIS CONDUCT TO PROCEED AND NOT ALLOW THIS
REORGANIZATION PLAN TO BE CONSUMATED FOR THE SAKE OF THE CREDITORS, WHO
HAVE BEEN UNJUSTLY PUNISHED JUST AS THE DEBTOR, STAN J. CATERBONE. MANY OF
THSES CASES HAVE RESULTED IN ORDERS GRANTING PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW
WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNTIL THE UNDOINFLUENCE, COMPUTER HACKING,
HARASSMENT, VADALISM, ETC., IS REMOVED FROM THE DEBTORS LIFE SO THAT THESE
CLAIMS CAN BE FULLY LITIGATED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OR SETTLEMENTS
REACHED. ALL OF THE USECURED CLAIMS IN THIS CASE HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY
DISPUTED DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CLAIMS WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE
VIOLATIONS OUTLINED HEREIN AND ARE NOT LEGALLY THE DEBT OF THE DEBTOR,
STAN J. CATERBONE. IN ADDITION DUE TO THE COMPUTER HACKING TO THE DEBTOR,
STAN J. CATERBONE, MOST IF NOT ALL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS WERE AND ARE SUBJECT
TO ERRORS AND/OR FALSE LEDGER BALANCES.
April 20, 2016
Stan J. Caterbone/Advanced Media Group Biography
Present - Advanced Media Group, President, Owner, and Founder.
In 1987 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner became a federal whistleblower for the case of local
defense contractor International Signal and Control, or ISC. ISC was a black ops program for the
NSA and CIA that was convicted in 1992 for an elaborate scheme to arm Iraq and other Middle
Eastern countries with a broad array of weapons, most notably cluster bombs. It was the third
larges fraud in U.S. History at that time. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner has been a victim of
organized stalking since 1987 and a victim of electronic and direct energy weapons since 2005.
Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had also been telepathic since 2005. In 2005 the U.S.
Sponsored Mind Control turned into an all-out assault of mental telepathy; synthetic telepathy;
hacking of all electronic devices; vandilism and thefts of personal property, extortions, intellectual
property violations, obstruction of justice; violations of due process; thefts and modifications of
court documents; and pain and torture through the use of directed energy devices and weapons
that usually fire a low frequency electromagnetic energy at the targeted victim. This assault was
no coincidence in that it began simultaneously with the filing of the federal action in U.S. District
Court, or CATERBONE v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al., or 05-cv-2288. This assault began after
the handlers remotely trained/sychronized Stan J. Caterbone with mental telepathy. The main
difference opposed to most other victims of this technology is that Stanley J. Caterbone,
Petitioner is connected 24/7 with the same person who declares telepathically she is a known
celebrity. Over the course of 10 years Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner has been telepathic
with at least 20 known persons and have spent 10 years trying to validate and confirm their
identities without success. Most U.S. intelligence agencies refuse to cooperate, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's Office refuse to comment and act on the
numerous formal complaints that are filed in their respective offices. Most complaints are focused
on the routine victimization's of a targeted individual including but not limited to stalking,
harassment, threats, vandalism, thefts, extortion, burglaries, false imprisonments, fabricated
mental health warrants or involuntary commitments, pain and torture to the body, and most often
the cause of obstruction of justice is the computer hacking.
I have a very sophisticated and authentic library of evidence of the use of U.S. Sponsored Mind
Control technologies on my father and brother that dates back to the 1940's while my father was
in the U.S. Navy after he graduated with honors from Air Gunners School in Florida, including an
affidavit motorized and authenticated by my father in 1996. My brother served in the U.S. Air
force and was victim to LSD experiments of the infamous MKULTRA program in the late 1960's.
In 2016 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was the AMICUS for Pennsylvania Attorney General
Kathleen Kane in the Pennsylvania Superior Court Case No. 1164 EDA 2016 in the
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. Kane which included perjury charges during the alleged
leaking of grand jury information. Kathleen Kane took on the Good Old Boy network regarding
judicial reform in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in an effort to rid the state of the long
standing public corruption ring that was evident from local law enforcement to Supreme Court
Justices, and everyone in between.
In 2015 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner filed an amicus curie on behalf of Lisa Michelle
Lambert who was convicted in 1992 of the murder of Laurie Show, both of Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner currently is in litigation in the U.S. Third Circuit
Court of Appeals and in February of 2016 Lisa Michelle Lambert published her book titled
Corruption in Lancaster County My Story, which is available in bookstores and on
Amazon.com. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner is in frequent contact with her co-author, Dave
Brown of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
In 2009 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner Proposed an ORGANIZED STALKING AND DIRECTED
ENERGY WEAPONS HARASSMENT BILL to Pennsylvania House of Representative Mike Sturla
(Lancaster, Pennsylvania) and City of Lancaster Mayor Richard Gray in 2009. The draft legislation
is the work of Missouri House of Representative Jim Guest, who has been working on helping
victims of these horrendous crimes for years. The bill will provide protections to individuals who
are being harassed, stalked, harmed by surveillance, and assaulted; as well as protections to keep
individuals from becoming human research subjects, tortured, and killed by electronic frequency
devices, directed energy devices, implants, and directed energy weapons. Stanley J.
Caterbone, Petitioner again reintroduced the bill to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 2015
and frequented the Pennsylvania Capitol trying to find support and a sponsor; which Stanley J.
Caterbone, Petitioner still does to this day.
In 2006 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner began his role as an Activist Shareholder for Fulton
Financial, which is listed as "FULT" on the NASDAQ stock exchange. As a founder of Financial
Management Group, Ltd., a full service financial firm, Stan J. Caterbone has drawn upon the
success in developing the strategic vision for his company and the experience gained in directing
the legal affairs and public offering efforts in dealing with Fulton Financial. Stanley J. Caterbone,
Petitioner has been in recent discussions with the Fulton Financial Board of Directors with
regards to various complaints dealing with such issues as the Resource Bank acquisition and the
subprime failures. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner believes that Fulton Financial needs
management to become more aggressive in it's strategic planning and the performance it expects
from it's management team in order to increase shareholder value. Expanding the footprint of the
regional bank has not yielded an increase to the bottom line that is consistent with the
expectations of shareholders. Lancaster County has seen several local banking institutions
acquired by larger regional banks, thus increasing the competition Fulton Financial will see in it's
local marketplace as well as in it's regional footprint.
In 2005 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner, as a Pro Se Litigant filed several civil actions as
Plaintiffs that are in current litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the United States Third District Court of Appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, The Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. This litigation include violations of intellectual
property rights, anti-trust violations, and interference of contracts relating to several business
interests. Central to this litigation is the Digital Movie, Digital Technologies, Financial Management
Group, Ltd,/FMG Advisory, Ltd., and its affiliated businesses along with a Federal False Claims Act
or Federal Whistleblowers Act regarding the firm of International Signal and Control, Plc., (ISC)
the $1Billion Dollar Fraud and the Export violations of selling arms to South Africa and Iraq. This
litigation dates back to 1987. Stan J. Caterbone was a shareholder of ISC, and was solicited by
ISC executives for professional services. The Federal False Claims Act is currently part of RICO
Civil Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, as docket no. 05-2288.
In 2005 Advanced Media Group/Project Hope filed a Civil Action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lancaster County against Drew Anthon and the Eden Resort Inn for their attempts to withhold the
Tourism Tax and Hotel Tax that supports the Downtown Lancaster Convention Center & Marriot.
We also proposed an alternative plan to move the Convention Center to the Hotel Brunswick and
Lancaster Square to all of the major stakeholders. The Lancaster County Convention Center is
finally under construction with a March 2009 Opening date.
In 2005 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was selected to attend the Clinton Global
Initiative in New York City after submission of an essay with and application. Stanley J.
Caterbone, Petitioner received the invitation from Bruce R. Lindsey, Chief Executive Officer of
the William J. Clinton Foundation.
In 2005 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner began a philanthropic endeavor by spending our

energies and working with such organizations as; ONE.org, Livestrong.org, WoundedWarriors.org,
The Clinton Global Initiative, Lancaster Convention Center Authority, Lancaster Chamber of
Commerce, Toms Project Hope, People to People International, GlobalWarming.org, Contact
Lancaster/24 Hour Suicide Hotline, Schreiber Pediatric Center, and numerous others.
In 2004 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner embarked on our past endeavors in the music and
entertainment industries with an emphasis on assisting for the fair and equitable distribution of
artists rights and royalties in the fight against electronic piracy. We have attempted to assist in
developing new business models to address the convergence of physical and electronic mediums;
as it displaces royalties and revenues for those creating, promoting, and delivering a range of
entertainment content via wireless networks.
In 2000 to 2002 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner developed an array of marketing and

communication tools for wholesalers of the AIM Investment Group and managed several
communication programs for several of the company wholesalers throughout the United States
and Costa Rica. We also began a Day Trading project that lasted until 2004 with success.
In 1999 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner developed a comprehensive business plan to develop

the former Sprecher Brewery, known as the Excelsior Building on E. King Street, in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. This plan was developed in conjunction with the Comprehensive Economic
Development Plan for the Revitalization of Downtown Lancaster and the Downtown Lancaster
Convention Center for the former Watt & Shand building.
In 1999 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner contributed to the debate, research, and

implementation of strategies to counter the effects of the global Y2K threat to the worlds
computer technologies. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner attended the U.S. Sponsored Y2K
symposium and Conference in Washington, D.C. hosted by the Senate Y2K Subcommittee and
Senator William Bennett.
In 1998 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had began to administer the charity giving of Toms
Project Hope, a non-profit organization promoting education and awareness for mental illness and
suicide prevention. We had provided funding for the Mental Health Alliance of Lancaster County,
Contact Lancaster (The 24/7 Suicide Prevention Hotline), The Schreiber Pediatric Center, and other
charitable organizations and faith based charities. The video "Numbers Don't Lie" have been
distributed to schools, non profit organizations, faith based initiatives, and municipalities to
provide educational support for the prevention of suicide and to bring awareness to mental illness
problems.
In 1996 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had done consulting for companies under KAL, Inc.,
during the time that Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was controller of Pflumm Contractors,
Inc., Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner, was retained by Gallo Rosso Restaurant and Bar to
computerized their accounting and records management from top to bottom. Stanley J.
Caterbone, Petitioner had also provided consulting for the computerization of accounting and
payroll for Lancaster Container, Inc., of Washington Boro. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was
retained to evaluate and develop an action plan to migrate the Informations Technologies of the
Jay Group, formally of Ronks, PA, now relocated to a new $26 Million Dollar headquarters located
in West Hempfield Township of Lancaster County. The Jay Group had been using IBM mainframe
technologies hosted by the AS 400 computer and server. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was
consulting on the merits of migrating to a PC based real time networking system throughout the
entire organization. Currently the Jay Group employees some 500 employees with revenues in
excess of $50 Million Dollars per year.
In 1993 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was retained by Pflumm Contractors, Inc., as

controller, and was responsible for saving the company from a potential bankruptcy. At that time,
due to several unpaid contracts, the company was facing extreme pressure from lenders and the
bonding insurance company. We were responsible for implementing computerized accounting,
accounting and contract policies and procedures, human resource policies and procedures,
marketing strategies, performance measurement reporting, and negotiate for the payment of
unpaid contracts. The bonding company was especially problematic, since it was the lifeline to
continue work and bidding for public contracts. The Bank of Lancaster County demanded a
complete accounting of the operations in order to stave off a default on the notes and loans it was
holding. We essentially revamped the entire operation. Within 3 years, the company realized an
increase in profits of 3 to 4 times its previous years, and record revenues.
In 1991 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was elected to People to People International and the
Citizen Ambassador Program, which was founded by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956. The
program was founded to To give specialists from throughout the world greater opportunities to
work together and effectively communicate with peers, The Citizen Ambassador program
administers face-to-face scientific, technical, and professional exchanges throughout the world. In
1961, under President John F. Kennedy, the State Department established a non-profit private
foundation to administer the program. We were scheduled to tour the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe to discuss printing and publishing technologies with scientists and technicians around the
world.
In 1990 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had worked on developing voice recognition systems
for the governments technology think tank - NIST (National Institute for Standards &
Technology). Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner co-authored the article Escaping the Unix Tar
Pit with a scientist from NIST that was published in the magazine DISC, then one of the leading
publications for the CD-ROM industry. Today, most all call centers deploy that technology
whenever you call an 800 number, and voice recognition is prevalent in all types of applications
involving telecommunications.
In 1989 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had founded Advanced Media Group, Ltd., and was
one of only 5 or 6 U.S. domestic companies that had the capability to manufacture CD-ROM's. We
did business with commercial companies, government agencies, educational institutions, and
foreign companies. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner performed services and contracts for the
Department of Defense, NASA, National Institution of Standards & Technology (NIST), Department
of Defense, The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Defense Mapping
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA), IBM, Microsoft, AMP, Commodore Computers,
American Bankers Bond Buyers, and a host of others. Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner also was
working with R.R, Donnelly's Geo Systems, which was developing various interactive mapping
technologies, which is now a major asset of Map Quest. Map Quest is the premier provider of
mapping software and applications for the internet and is often used in delivering maps and
directions for Fortune 500 companies. We had arranged for High Industries to sell American Helix,
the manufacturer of compact discs, to R.R. Donnelly. We had brokered a deal and the executives
from Donnellys Chicago headquarters flew to Lancaster to discuss the deal and perform due
diligence of the manufacturing facility located in the Greenfield Industrial Park.
In 1987 Power Station Studios of New York and Tony Bongiovi retained me as executive
producer of a motion picture project. The theatrical and video release was to be delivered in a
digital format; the first of its kind. We had originated the marketing for the technology, and
created the concept for the Power Station Digital Movie System (PSDMS), which would follow the
copyright and marketing formula of the DOLBY technology trademark.
We had also created and developed marketing and patent research for the development and
commercialization of equipment that we intended to manufacture and market to the recording
industry featuring the digital technology. Sidel, Gonda, Goldhammer, and Abbot, P.C. of
Philadelphia was the lead patent law firm that We had retained for the project. Power Station
Studios was the brainchild of Tony Bongiovi, a leading engineering genius discovered by Motown
when he was 15. Tony and Power Station Studios was one of the leading recording studios in the
country, and were responsible for developing Bon Jovi, a cousin. Power Station Studios clients
included; Bruce Springsteen, Diana Ross, Cyndi Lauper, Talking Heads, Madonna, The Ramones,
Steve Winwood, and many others. Tony and Power Station Studios had produced the original
Sound Track for the original Star Wars motion picture. It was released for distribution and was
the number one Sound Track recording of its time.
Tony Bongiovi was also active in working and researching different aerospace technologies. * We
had developed and authored a Joint Venture Proposal for SONY to partner with us in delivering the
Digital Movie and its related technologies to the marketplace. The venture was to include the
commercialization of technologies, which Tony Bongiovi had developed for the recording industry
simultaneously with the release of the Digital Movie.
I also created the concept for the PSDMS trademark, which was to be the Trademark logo for the
technology, similar to the DOLBY sound systems trademark. The acronyms stand for the Power
Station Digital Movie System. Today, DVD is the mainstay for delivering digital movies on a
portable medium, a compact disc.
In 1987 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had a created and developed FMG Mortgage
Banking, a company that was funded by a major banking firm in Houston Texas. We had the
capability to finance projects from $3 to $100 million dollars. Our terms and rates were so
attractive that we had quickly received solicitations from developers across the country. We were
also very attractive to companies that wanted to raise capital that include both debt and equity.
Through my company, FMG, we could raise equity funding through private placements, and debt
funding through FMG Mortgage Banking. We were retained by Gamillion Studios of Hollywood,
California to secure financing of their postproduction Film Studio that was looking to relocate to
North Carolina. We had secured refinancing packages for Norris Boyd of and the Olde Hickory and
were in the midst of replacing the current loan that was with Commonwealth National Bank. We
had meetings and discussions with Drew Anton of the Eden Resort, for refinancing a portion of his
debt portfolio. We were quickly seeking commitments for real estate deals from New York to
California. We also had a number of other prominent local developers seeking our competitive
funding, including Owen Kugal, High Industries, and the Marty Sponougle a partner of The Fisher
Group (owner of the Rt. 30 Outlets). We were constantly told that our financing packages were
more competitive than local institutions.
In 1986 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had founded Financial Management Group, Ltd
(FMG); a large financial services organization comprised of a variety of professionals operating in
one location. We had developed a stock purchase program for where everyone had the
opportunity for equity ownership in the new firm. FMG had financial planners, investment
managers, accountants, attorneys, realtors, liability insurance services, tax preparers, and estate
planners operating out of our corporate headquarters in Lancaster. In one year, we had 24 people
on staff, had approximately 12 offices in Pennsylvania, and
several satellite offices in other states. We had in excess of $50 million under management, and
our advisors were generating almost $4 million of commissions, which did not include the fees
from the other professionals. We had acquired our own Broker Dealer firm and were valued at
about $3 to $4 million.
In 1985 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner developed the Easter Regional Free Agent Camp, the
first Free Agent Camp for the Professional Football industry; which was videotaped for distribution
to the teams scouting departments. (See Washington Post page article of March 24, 1985)
Current camps were dependant on the team scouts to travel from state to state looking for
recruits. We had developed a strategy of video taping the camp and the distributing a copy, free of
charge to the teams, to all of the scouting departments for teams in all three leagues FL, CFL and
WFL. My brother was signed at that camp by the Ottawa Roughriders of the CFL, and went on to
be a leading receiver while J.C. Watts was one of the leagues most prominent quarterbacks. My
brother also played 2 years with the Miami Dolphins while Dan Marino was starting quarterback.
We were a Certified Agent for the National Football League Players Association. Gene Upshaw, the
President of the NFLPA had given me some helpful hints for my camp, while we were at a
Conference for agents of the NFL. The Washington Post wrote a full-page article about our camp
and associated it with other camps that were questionable about their practices. Actually, that was
the very reason for our camp. We had attended many other camps around the country that were
not very well organized and attracted few if any scouts. We had about 60 participants, with one
player coming from as far away as Hawaii. We held the camp at Lancaster Catholic, with a
professional production company filming the entire camp, while Stanley J. Caterbone,
Petitioner did the editing and produced the video. The well respected and widely acclaimed
professional football scout, Gil Brandt, of the Dallas Cowboys, had given me support for my camp
during some conversations We had with him and said he looked forward to reviewing the tapes for
any hopeful recruits.
In 1985 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was elected Vice President of the Central
Pennsylvania Chapter of the International Association of Financial Planners, and helped build that
chapter by increasing membership 3to 4 times. We had personally retained the nationally
acclaimed and nationally syndicated Financial Planner, Ms. Alexandria Armstrong of Washington
D.C.; to host a major fundraiser. More than 150 professionals attended the dinner event that was
held at the Eden Resort & Conference Center. Ms. Armstrong discussed financial planning and how
all of the professions needed to work together in order to be most effective for their clients. We
attracted a wide variety of professionals including; brokers, lawyers, accountants, realtors, tax
specialists, estate planners, bankers, and investment advisors. Today, it has become evident that
financial planning was the way of the future. In 1986 executives approached us from Blue Ball
National Bank to help them develop a Financial Planning department within their bank.
In 1984 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner had helped to develop strategic planning for Sandy
Weill, former President of Citi Group (the largest banking entity in the U.S). We were one of
several associates asked to help advise on the future of Financial Planning and how it would
impact the brokerage and the investment industry at large. Mr. Weil was performing due diligence
for the merger of American Express and IDS (Investors Diversified Services). We were at that
time a national leader in the company in delivering Fee Based Financial Planning Services, which
was a new concept in the investment community and mainstream investors. That concept is now
widely held by most investment advisers.
SUMMARY: It is evident, that the Petitioner, Stanley J. Caterbone, had filed this Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petition in GOOD FAITH to PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE CREDITORS, NOT TO
ABUSE THE Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). In
addition, as indicated by the preceding Biography and Resume, the Petitioner, Stanley J.
Caterbone, has the expertise and experience far exceeding any Credit Counselor that would be
administering the Credit Counseling Certification.
This Court must use it's DISCRETIONARY POWER, AND THE OPINION IN DiPinto,
336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) and REINSTATE THIS CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY
PETITION FOR THE SAKE OF THE CREDITORS.
JUNE 7, 2017
___________/S/____________
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant

Freedom From Covert Harassment & Surveillance,
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
717-327-1566
Notice and Disclaimer: Stan J. Caterbone and the Advanced Media Group have been slandered, defamed, and
publicly discredited since 1987 due to going public (Whistle Blower) with allegations of misconduct and fraud
within International Signal & Control, Plc. of Lancaster, Pa. (ISC pleaded guilty to selling arms to Iraq via
South Africa and a $1 Billion Fraud in 1992). Unfortunately we are forced to defend our reputation and the
truth without the aid of law enforcement and the media, which would normally prosecute and expose public
corruption. We utilize our communications to thwart further libelous and malicious attacks on our person, our
property, and our business. We continue our fight for justice through the Courts, and some communications
are a means of protecting our right to continue our pursuit of justice. Advanced Media Group is also a member
of the media. Unfortunately due to the hacking of our electronic and digital footprints, we no longer have
access to our email contact list to make deletions. How long can Lancaster County and Lancaster City
Continue to Cover-Up my Whistle Blowing of the ISC Scandel (And the Torture from U.S. Sponsored Mind
Control and the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE from the COINTELPRO PROGRAM)?
ACTIVE COURT CASES

J.C. No. 03-16-90005 Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals -
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIALMISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY re 15-3400 and 16-1149; 03-16-900046 re ALL
FEDERAL LITIGATION TO DATE
U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 16-6822 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI re Case No. 16-1149
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert
U.S.C.A. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 16-1149 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;15-3400
MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert;; 16-1001; 07-4474
U.S. District Court Eastern District of PA Case No. 16-4014 CATERBONE v. United States, et.al.; Case
No. 16-cv-49; 15-03984; 14-02559 MOVANT for Lisa Michelle Lambert; 05-2288; 06-4650, 08-02982;
U.S. District Court Middle District of PA Case No. 16-cv-1751 PETITION FOR HABEUS CORPUS
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board Case No. 2016-462 Complaint against
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Judge Leonard Brown III
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case No. 353 MT 2016; 354 MT 2016; 108 MM 2016 Amicus for Kathleen Kane
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Summary Appeal Case No. CP-36-SA-0000219-2016, AMICUS for Kathleen
Kane Case No. 1164 EDA 2016; Case No. 1561 MDA 2015; 1519 MDA 2015; 16-1219 Preliminary
Injunction Case of 2016
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 08-13373; 15-10167; 06-03349, CI-06-03401
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Case No. 17-10615; Case No. 16-10157
DOCUMENT DIVIDER
600 F2d 600 Hampton v. Hanrahan http://openjurist.org/print/210031
Published by the ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
Published on OpenJurist (http://openjurist.org)

Home > 600 F2d 600 Hampton v. Hanrahan
600 F2d 600 Hampton v. Hanrahan

600 F2d 600 Hampton v. Hanrahan
600 F.2d 600
Iberia HAMPTON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
Edward V. HANRAHAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Honorable Joseph Sam PERRY, Appellee,
v.
Jeffrey H. HAAS, Attorney at Law, Contemnor-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Honorable Joseph Sam PERRY, Appellee,
v.
G. Flint TAYLOR, Attorney at Law, Contemnor-Appellant.
Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 and 77-1370.
United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.
Argued Aug. 14, 1978.

Decided April 23, 1979.
As Amended April 30, 1979.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 12, 1979.
Jeffrey H. Haas, G. Flint Taylor, Jr., James D. Montgomery, Dennis Cunningham, Charles
Hoffman, Jonathan C. Moore, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John O. Tuohy, Camillo F. Volini, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, and SWYGERT and PELL, Circuit Judges.
SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal concerns a civil rights action for monetary damages brought by members of the
Black Panther Party and the mothers of two deceased party members against federal and state
law enforcement officers. The suit arises from a gun battle which occurred in Chicago during the
early morning hours of December 4, 1969. Two Black Panthers were killed and four other
COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 272 of 538

481 Monday December 5, 2016
1 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Panthers were injured by the gunfire. The
action was tried in the district court before a
jury in 1976-1977. At the close of plaintiffs'
case, the district court directed verdicts for
some of the defendants. The district court
directed verdicts for the remaining defendants
at the conclusion of the trial. We reverse as to
most defendants and remand for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND
At 4:30 a. m. on December 4, 1969, fourteen

Chicago police officers, detailed to the Special
Prosecutions Unit of the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, arrived at an apartment
building located on the near west side of Chicago. They were equipped with a search warrant
issued the previous day by a judge of the Cook County Circuit Court authorizing the search for
and seizure of "sawed-off shotguns and other illegal weapons," at the first floor apartment, 2337
West Monroe Street. This apartment was occupied by nine members of the Black Panther Party
("BPP"). Seven officers took "cover" positions at the front and rear entrances of the apartment;
seven entered the apartment. Immediately upon the police entry there was an enormous burst of
gunfire. Two of the occupants, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, died as a result of the gunfire and
four others, Ronald Satchel, Blair Anderson, Brenda Harris, and Verlina Brewer, were wounded.
Louis Truelock, Deborah Johnson, and Harold Bell escaped without physical injury.
Many reverberations followed the incident. Among these were the arrest and imprisonment of the
surviving occupants of the apartment, their prosecution by the Cook County State's Attorney for
criminal offenses, a coroner's inquest, and an internal investigation by the Chicago Police
Department. A federal and two state grand jury investigations were initiated. Indictments were
returned by the Special Cook County Grand Jury against several of the present defendants for
conspiring to obstruct justice. The case terminated when defendants' motions for acquittal were
granted at the close of the prosecution's case. Finally, this civil action was initiated.
The mothers of Hampton and Clark, as administratrices of their sons' estates, and the seven
survivors of the December 4 incident filed four separate actions in 1970 against a number of city
and state defendants. The actions were consolidated in an amended complaint filed in the district
court in April 1972.1
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied the motions by the
fourteen police officers participating in the raid. The court dismissed the complaint as to the
remaining defendants.2 Upon appeal this court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Hampton v.
City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39
L.Ed.2d 471 (1974), ("Hampton I ").3 Thereafter plaintiffs requested this court to supplement its
2 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
mandate by directing that the case be reassigned to another judge for trial. We denied the
request.
In December 1974 plaintiffs amended their complaint by naming four additional defendants, all
connected with the federal government. In October 1975 plaintiffs moved to have the district
judge recuse himself or to reassign the case. The motion was heard by another district judge and
was denied.
The trial began January 5, 1976 and lasted approximately eighteen months. Thirty-seven
thousand pages of testimony were taken. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants
moved for directed verdicts with costs. The motion was granted except for the seven police
officers directly participating in the shooting incident, the court ruling that "no Prima facie case of
a conspiracy or joint venture has been established as alleged in the Amended Complaint . . . ."
The trial continued as to the seven remaining defendants and at its conclusion the case was
submitted to the jury. After three days deliberation the jury announced it was deadlocked. The
trial judge then directed verdicts in favor of these defendants and assessed costs against
plaintiffs for $100,000. This appeal followed.
view counter
8
During the trial, Jeffrey H. Haas and G. Flint

Taylor, attorneys for the plaintiffs, were found
guilty of contemptuous conduct in the
courtroom. They appeal from the contempt
judgments.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the

trial judge erred in directing verdicts for the
defendants. We are convinced that he did err.
Among the other issues presented which we
deem necessary to discuss are the breadth of
the official immunity available to defendants,
the scope of discovery, the circumstances of the issuance of the search warrant, the companion
diversity action filed by Verlina Brewer, the attorneys' fees and costs, and the contempt
judgments. Before a discussion of the directed verdicts and these other issues, we believe it
would be helpful to list the names of the defendants and to summarize the amended complaint.
Federal Defendants
10
Marlin Johnson Special Agent-in-Charge of Chicago office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
11
3 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Robert Piper Supervisor of the Racial Matters Squad of the FBI, Chicago office.
12
Roy Martin Mitchell Special agent of the FBI, Chicago office, assigned to the Racial Matters
Squad.
13
William O'Neal Paid informant for the FBI.
State Defendants
Cook County State's Attorney's Office
14
Edward Hanrahan Cook County State's Attorney.
15
Richard Jalovec Assistant State's Attorney and supervisor of the Special Prosecutions Unit of the
State's Attorney's Office.
16
James Meltreger Assistant State's Attorney.
17
Sheldon Sorosky Assistant State's Attorney.
Raiders
18
Shooters: Daniel Groth, James Davis, Joseph Gorman, George Jones, Raymond Broderick,
Edward Carmody, and John Ciszewski.
19
Nonshooters: William Corbett, Lynwood Harris, Fred Howard, Robert Hughes, Philip Joseph,
William Kelly, and John Marusich.
20
All of the above defendants were Chicago police officers detailed to the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office.
Chicago Police Crime Laboratory
21

4 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
David Purtell Director.
22
John Koludrovic Supervising officer of the Mobile Crime Laboratory Unit.
23
John Sadunas Firearms examiner.
24
Chicago Police Department Internal Investigations Division ("IID")
25
Harry Ervanian Captain, Chicago Police Department, director of IID.
26
Robert Kukowinski Lieutenant, Chicago Police Department, head of Excessive Force Unit of the
IID.John Mulchrone Deputy supervisor, Chicago Police Department.
27
John Meade Sergeant, Chicago Police Department.
28
The amended complaint contains seventeen counts. For convenience we shall segregate the
counts into different categories.
29
Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the four federal defendants are named in Counts 1, 2, 3, and
4. Counts 1 and 2 charge these defendants with intentionally and negligently depriving the
occupants of the apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street of their civil rights under the Constitution
and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by participating in the planning and execution of the raid. Count 3
describes a conspiracy to deprive the occupants of the apartment of the equal protection of the
laws, violating 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), as well as the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Count 4 alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1986, that
these defendants failed to prevent the wrongs perpetrated in violation of section 1985(3).
30
Counts 5 and 6 are directed against Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the police officers participating in
the raid. Count 5 alleges intentional deprivation of the occupants' civil rights by false
imprisonment in violation of their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and their rights
secured under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Count 6 charges a conspiracy for the deprivation of the
occupants' civil rights by false imprisonment under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3). Count 7 charges all defendants named in Count 6 and, in
addition, Mitchell, Piper, and Johnson, with failing to prevent the alleged conspiracy and illegal

5 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
acts described in Count 6, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1986.
31
Count 8 charges all defendants, except O'Neal, with conspiring to deprive the occupants of the
equal protection of the laws and their due process rights by malicious prosecution in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3). Count 9 charges the
same defendants as listed in Count 8 with intentional deprivation of civil rights by malicious
prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Count 10 alleges that these defendants neglected to
prevent harm from the execution of the conspiracy charged in Count 8, thereby violating 42
U.S.C. 1986.
32
Count 11 charges a conspiracy among Hanrahan, Jalovec, Groth, O'Neal, Mitchell, Johnson, and
Piper to obstruct the "due course of justice" with intent to deny the occupants of the apartment
the equal protection of the laws and their Sixth Amendment right to counsel as protected by 42
U.S.C. 1985(2).
33
Counts 12 and 13 charged the City of Chicago and Cook County with the deprivation of the civil
rights of the occupants of the apartment, directly and under the doctrine of Respondeat superior.
The district court dismissed these counts and there is no appeal from this ruling.
34
Count 14 is a wrongful death action against Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the four federal
defendants under both federal and state law by the estates of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark
through their respective administratrices.
35
Verlina Brewer is the sole plaintiff in Counts 15, 16, and 17 which are based on diversity
jurisdiction. These counts name Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders as defendants. Count 15
charges assault and battery, Count 16, false imprisonment, and Count 17, malicious prosecution.
II. DIRECTED VERDICT
36
We first consider the rulings of the district court directing a verdict for twenty-one of the
defendants at the close of plaintiffs' case in chief, and for the remaining seven defendants (who
fired their weapons during the raid) after the jury was deadlocked. On appeal plaintiffs assert that
the trial court disregarded the proper legal standard in granting the directed verdicts and that
their claims justified submission to the jury.
37
This court has enunciated on numerous occasions the rule that a motion for a directed verdict
must be denied when the evidence reveals that reasonable persons "in a fair and impartial
exercise of their judgment may draw different conclusions therefrom." Hannigan v. Sears,
6 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902, 90 S.Ct. 214, 24
L.Ed.2d 178 (1969). The function of the trial court considering such a motion was further
discussed in Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 9 (7th Cir. 1972), a civil rights action involving facts
similar to the case at bar. In Byrd we emphatically stated that the court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the jury and accordingly we reversed a ruling by the district judge granting
defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that the court had weighed the
testimonial evidence and had passed on the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The function of the
trial judge is to review the testimony most strongly against the moving party "(a)nd if there is
doubt, or the question is close, the case should go to the jury." Keaton v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe RR. Co., 321 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1963).
38
On appeal our task is equally well established. We must consider all the evidence disregarding
conflicting, unfavorable testimony and extract all the reasonable inferences therefrom. Viewing
such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the question is whether
a prima facie case has been presented against any of the defendants. Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070, 95 S.Ct. 657, 42 L.Ed.2d 666
(1974); Kish v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 426 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970); Pinkowski v. Sherman
Hotel, 313 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1963).
39
At the conclusion of this trial, the district judge prepared a lengthy "Summary" of the evidence
which illuminated the court's rationale in directing the verdicts of April 15 and June 20, 1977.4
Upon a comparison of the extensive record, including the received and improperly rejected
evidence, and the trial judge's Summary, there can be no doubt that the district judge erred by
supporting his grant of the directed verdicts with evidence which was considered in the light most
favorable to the defendants. Furthermore, we are compelled to conclude that, once again, as in
Byrd, the district judge weighed the evidence, thereby invading the province of the jury.
40
We recite the facts adduced at trial to determine whether the plaintiffs presented a prima facie
case against any defendant which warranted submission to a jury. The facts can be considered
in three stages: pre-raid, the raid itself, and post-raid.
A. Pre-Raid
41
In August 1967 the FBI initiated a national covert counterintelligence program called
"COINTELPRO" which was designed to neutralize a variety of political organizations including
those which the Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups." Directives from
Washington ordered the Chicago office of the FBI to implement the program in the Chicago area.
While the Black Panther Party was not an original target of this program, it was included within
the ambit of COINTELPRO's scrutiny by September 1968.5 The trial court's Summary stated that
the "purpose of the counterintelligence program, as it was implemented in Chicago as to the
Panthers was to prevent violence." The plaintiffs, however, presented considerable evidence to
compel a different conclusion.6 Perhaps the most damning evidence indicating the
COINTELPRO was intended to do much more than simply "prevent violence" comes from the
7 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
files of the FBI itself. An FBI memorandum from February 1968 described the goals of
COINTELPRO as:
42
1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups . . . .
43
2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the militant nationalist movement . .
. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position . . . .
44
3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups . . . .
45
4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting
them . . . .
46
5. . . . prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among
youth.
47
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence

Activities, The FBI's Covert Action Program to Destroy the Black Panther Party, S.Rep. No.
94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 187 (1976). These goals were incorporated into the various
directives which Marlin Johnson, the special agent-in-charge of the Chicago FBI office, received
instructing him to establish the program in Chicago.
48
The national COINTELPRO program adopted a variety of tactics which seemingly were aimed
not at preventing violence, but at neutralizing the BPP as a political entity. These tactics included
efforts to discredit the BPP among "liberal" whites, the promotion of violent conflicts between the
BPP and other groups,7 the encouragement of dissension within the BPP, and the disruption of
the BPP's Breakfast Program for Children. Memoranda from Washington directing the local
employment of such tactics were transmitted to Johnson, Robert Piper (after March 1969 the
chief of the Racial Matters Squad of the Chicago FBI which was responsible for FBI programs
regarding the BPP), and Roy M. Mitchell (special agent assigned to the Racial Matters Squad in
Chicago).
49
The evidence presented by plaintiffs indicates that when the local chapter of the BPP opened in
Chicago in November 1968, the Chicago FBI was quick to implement the tactics mandated by
Washington. One of the key figures in the Chicago FBI's program to disrupt the Panthers was
William O'Neal. O'Neal was a paid FBI informant whom Mitchell originally had contacted while
8 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
O'Neal was incarcerated in the Cook County Jail. Mitchell recontacted O'Neal and instructed him
to join the BPP. O'Neal walked into the BPP office at 2350 West Madison Street the day it
opened in November 1968 and joined, soon becoming the local chief of security for the Panthers.
50
The local FBI was able to effectuate many of its plans to disrupt the BPP through O'Neal. O'Neal
informed Mitchell about a proposed merger between the BPP and a local black gang, the
Blackstone Rangers. The Chicago office, with Johnson's approval, then sent an anonymous
letter to Jeff Fort, the leader of the Rangers, telling Fort that the Panthers had a "hit out" on him.
The purpose of the letter was to prevent a merger and to induce the Rangers to initiate reprisals
against the BPP. O'Neal also falsely accused a member of the Vice Lords, another black Chicago
gang, of being a police informant, thereby squelching another possible merger. O'Neal, according
to plaintiffs' evidence, encouraged the Panthers to initiate and participate in various criminal
activities, to obtain more weapons, and to increase their use of violent tactics.
51
O'Neal also facilitated the FBI's efforts to discredit the BPP leadership and to frustrate their
attempts to garner support among white groups. O'Neal provided Mitchell with information that
enabled local police to serve an arrest warrant on Fred Hampton, the leader of the BPP in
Chicago, just prior to his appearance on a local television interview show. O'Neal also
encouraged the distribution of racist BPP cartoons, thereby fostering a rift between the BPP and
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). For his efforts, O'Neal received several pay raises
from Mitchell with Johnson's approval.8 After March 1969 Piper also lent his approval to O'Neal's
efforts as a part of the FBI's counterintelligence program.
52
The FBI had other means of monitoring the BPP in Chicago. Johnson and Piper requested and
received authorization for a warrantless wiretap on BPP headquarters. And in June 1969 the FBI,
based on information provided by O'Neal, executed a fugitive arrest warrant at Panther
headquarters. No shots were fired; however, several Panthers were arrested for harboring a
fugitive and weapons were seized. All the charges against the arrested Panthers ultimately were
dropped.
53
The FBI in Washington urged its offices implementing COINTELPRO to develop liaisons and
working relationships with local law enforcement officials to comply with the FBI's mandate to
provide information to these agencies as well as to help effectuate the FBI's counterintelligence
goals. In Chicago the FBI had an ally which also was quite concerned about the growth of
militant black groups. In November 1968 Edward V. Hanrahan was elected Cook County State's
Attorney. Hanrahan appointed Richard Jalovec an Assistant State's Attorney and made him the
chief of the office's Special Prosecutions Unit (SPU). By April 1969 the primary focus of the SPU
was on black street gangs. About this same time Mitchell contacted Jalovec and told him that the
FBI had an informant, O'Neal, within the Chicago BPP.
54
Before June 1969 the State's Attorney's Office had relied on its own police force which it used
9 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
only for routine matters. At that time, however, the State's Attorney's Office requested that nine
Chicago police officers Groth, Davis, Carmody, Jones, Ciszewski, Howard, Marusich, Kelly, and
Joseph be assigned to the SPU. Groth was next in command after Jalovec, to whom all the
officers reported.
55
Tension and hostilities between the BPP and local law enforcement agencies in Chicago
escalated throughout the summer and fall of 1969. Shooting incidents involving Chicago police
and Panthers occurred at the BPP headquarters in July and October. On July 21 and October 3
the BPP headquarters was ransacked by Chicago police. And on November 13, 1969 two
Chicago policemen were killed in an ambush-shootout with Jake Winters, who was closely
associated with the BPP.9 Winters also was killed and seven other Chicago police officers were
wounded.
56
On the evening of the Winters incident, Mitchell met with O'Neal and showed him photographs of
the dead police officers. Soon thereafter, on November 19, Mitchell again met with O'Neal and
with O'Neal's aid constructed a floorplan of the apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street to which
Hampton recently had moved. The floorplan included the layout of the rooms, the placement of
doors and furniture, the identity of the apartment's occupants and frequent visitors, and the
location of the bedroom which Hampton shared with Deborah Johnson. And, either on the basis
of this or previous conversations with O'Neal, Mitchell compiled a list of weapons which O'Neal
said were in the apartment and incorporated the list into a memorandum dated November 21.
This memorandum, however, failed to mention the presence in the apartment of two federally
illegal weapons a sawed-off shotgun and a stolen police riot gun which O'Neal had told Mitchell
about. There is evidence that the appropriate FBI procedure would have been to notify the
Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco Division of the Treasury Department about these weapons. This
was not done.
57
After his meeting with O'Neal on November 19, Mitchell met with members of the Chicago Police
Department's Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) and conveyed to them the information contained in
the floorplan. Mitchell also told them that a large quantity of weapons was stored at the
apartment, including the sawed-off shotgun and the stolen police gun.10 Piper was aware of the
transfer of this information to the GIU and at a meeting with Johnson informed him of the
same.11 On the basis of this information, the GIU planned a raid on the apartment to seize the
weapons.
58
Shortly thereafter O'Neal told Mitchell that the weapons had been removed from the Monroe
Street apartment. Mitchell relayed this information to Piper who in turn informed Johnson.
Johnson ordered Piper to inform all local agencies which had received the prior information about
the weapons that they had been removed. Piper transmitted this order to Mitchell, who phoned
Officer Bizewski of the GIU. Johnson, on November 24, also phoned Thomas Lyons, director of
the GIU, and told him that the BPP expected the raid and had removed the weapons from the
apartment. Lyons told Johnson that he would cancel the raid.

10 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
59
Within two days of the cancellation of the GIU raid, Mitchell called Jalovec and told him that the
weapons had been returned to the apartment.12 Mitchell also informed Jalovec that Hampton
and Johnson were living at the apartment, that other members of the BPP frequented the
apartment, and that a variety of weapons, illegally purchased, was kept there. About the first of
December Mitchell told Jalovec that a sawed-off shotgun and a stolen police gun were in the
apartment. Shortly thereafter, according to plaintiffs' evidence, Mitchell met with Jalovec and
Groth and, with Piper's prior approval, showed them the floorplan of the West Monroe Street
apartment. Mitchell also told them that a BPP political education meeting was scheduled for the
evening of December 3 and that the occupants of the apartment likely would be absent then.
60
At trial, Groth did not recall attending the meeting with Mitchell. Groth did claim, however, to have
received a phone call sometime during the late afternoon or evening of December 2 from an
unidentified informant who provided information paralleling the information transmitted by
Mitchell. Groth stated that this unidentified informant who was unpaid was a member of the
BPP.13
61
Groth met with Jalovec on December 3 and had a discussion with him about the information
Groth received from his informant. Jalovec said that he had received essentially the same
information from Mitchell. Groth also told Jalovec that he had surveyed the premises at 2337
West Monroe Street on his way to work that morning. Later that day Groth instructed Davis and
Kelly to survey the premises, and they returned with a street diagram of the surrounding area.
Groth told Davis, Kelly, and a few other officers assigned to the SPU that they would be going to
the apartment at 8:00 p. m. that night to search the premises for illegal weapons.
62
At midday on December 3 Jalovec and Groth met with Hanrahan and recounted the information
they had received from their sources. At this meeting Jalovec told Hanrahan that they intended to
obtain a search warrant for the Monroe Street apartment. Jalovec and Groth drafted the warrant.
The affidavit stated that Jalovec had received information from a reliable informant Mitchell was
not mentioned by name that sawed-off shotguns and other weapons were kept in the apartment.
It also stated that a reliable informant had told Groth that the apartment contained numerous
weapons including three sawed-off shotguns. The warrant and affidavit were shown to Hanrahan
and then taken to a Cook County Circuit judge who was formerly Hanrahan's first assistant when
Hanrahan was United States Attorney. The warrant was issued that afternoon.
63
After the warrant was issued, Jalovec and Groth busied themselves with the final preparations for
its execution. They decided that fourteen men would take part in the mission. Groth described
the plan to some of the police officers who would be accompanying him. Jalovec phoned the
Chicago Police Department to obtain approval to bring certain weapons, including a machine
gun, when they served the search warrant. Jalovec also approved Groth's revised decision to
serve the warrant at 4:00 a. m., rather than in the evening, so that the sleeping occupants in the
apartment could be taken by surprise. At trial Jalovec and Groth indicated that they did not
11 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
discuss the use of tear gas, sound equipment, or other means to gain entry to the apartment.
64
Jalovec met with Hanrahan and detailed the final plan for the search of the apartment. He told
him that Groth would be leading twelve to fourteen men. Again the testimony indicated that there
was no discussion of alternative ways of gaining entry to the apartment or of the use of any
equipment besides guns. Hanrahan told Jalovec to tell the men to be careful. Jalovec related his
conversation with Hanrahan to Groth, and told Groth to call him at home after the raid.
65
This same day, on December 3, 1969, Johnson and Piper approved a counterintelligence
memorandum sent to the Director in Washington. The memorandum stated that local police14
planned "a positive course of action" based on the information regarding the West Monroe Street
apartment which the Chicago FBI had provided local law enforcement officials.
B. Raid
66
The fourteen raiders met at the State's Attorney's Office for a briefing at 4:00 a. m. the morning of
the raid. Groth described the apartment's layout and informed the other officers that it was a BPP
dwelling frequented by Fred Hampton. Armed with a machine gun, a sawed-off shotgun, a
semi-automatic .30-caliber carbine, and other weapons, they arrived at the apartment at 4:30 a.
m. Groth instructed seven officers (the nonshooters) to guard the apartment's exterior. Groth,
Jones, Gorman, and Davis approached the front of the apartment while Broderick, Carmody, and
Ciszewski circled to the rear door.
67
Before the raid began, Clark, Truelock, Bell, and Harris were in the living room on chairs and
mattresses scattered around the room. Satchel, Anderson, and Brewer were asleep in the front
bedroom which was located directly south of the living room. The rear bedroom of the apartment,
directly south of the front bedroom, was occupied by Hampton and Johnson. A diagram of the
apartment is shown here:NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT
VIEWABLE
68
A factual dispute exists as to the activity inside the apartment. Plaintiffs' testimony depicts a
violent, well-armed, unprovoked attack on the apartment. Plaintiffs testified that the officers did
not announce their purpose when they arrived at the apartment. After hearing a knock at the
apartment door, Truelock and Bell ran to the rear bedroom to awaken Hampton. Davis burst
through the door into the living room and began firing into the darkened room. Clark, in the
northwest part of the room about three or four feet from the door, was struck in the heart by a
bullet from Davis' rifle. According to Harris, Clark's gun went off as he fell. Groth also began firing
into the living room from the apartment doorway. Harris was shot as she lay in bed. She testified
at trial that she neither fired nor handled a gun during the raid.
69
12 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
The attack from the rear of the apartment was precipitated by the sound of a shotgun blast from
within. Carmody broke through the back door and entered the kitchen. Using a .38 revolver, he
fired five times. Corbett, Ciszewski, and Broderick followed him into the kitchen, the latter two
firing into the two bedrooms from the dining room area. Bell, Truelock, and Johnson emerged
from the back bedroom during a pause in the shooting.
70
Meanwhile, Gorman had entered the living room and began firing his machine gun into the south
wall toward the bedrooms. Davis also began firing into the south wall. Carmody entered the back
bedroom and found Hampton lying on his bed.15 Carmody went to the head of the bed clutching
a revolver in his right hand. During the course of the firing, Hampton was shot several times in
the body and the head. The bullets which went through his brain were never found. Carmody
emerged from the bedroom dragging Hampton's body by the left wrist. In Carmody's firearms
report, he indicated that he had critically wounded a suspect. He recorded that his first shot was
fired from a distance of ten feet and noted the distance of his second shot by a question mark.
71
Meanwhile the other shooters were moving toward the front bedroom where Satchel, Anderson,
and Brewer lay huddled on the floor. Broderick, located in the bathroom, and Ciszewski,
positioned in the dining room, fired several blasts from their shotguns into the front bedroom.
Simultaneously, Gorman advanced down the hallway and approached this bedroom. Seeing the
forms of Anderson and Brewer rising between the beds, he aimed and fired his machine gun into
the bedroom. At that point Carmody charged through the front bedroom doorway and the
occupants surrendered. When the guns were stilled, Satchel had been struck four times,
Anderson and Brewer, twice. All three plaintiffs denied firing weapons. While the survivors were
gathered into the kitchen the nonshooters entered the apartment. According to the survivors'
testimony, they were then physically and verbally abused.
72
The evidence introduced by defendants at trial produces a portrait of the incident which barely
resembles the one depicted by plaintiffs. All the officers testified that they were fired on from
within the apartment as they attempted to serve the search warrant. Groth testified that he and
his men announced their purpose to the occupants on the morning of December 4 while standing
on the apartment porch. After receiving no response, Davis struck down the front door of the
apartment. As he lunged into the living room a shotgun blast flashed through the room from
Clark's gun. Seeing Harris' gun directed at the front entrance door, he fired and hit her in the leg.
Fearing for Davis' life, Groth stepped into the living room and was met by the barrel of Harris' gun
aimed in his direction; believing that she had fired a shot at him, Groth responded by firing at her.
Davis noticed Clark rising from his chair, "pumping" his shotgun, and turning toward him. Davis
fired three shots while simultaneously rushing at Clark. A struggle for Clark's gun followed and
the men dropped to the floor. In the meantime, Gorman had entered the living room and grabbed
the shotgun from Harris who was sitting on a bed next to the south wall of the living room. The
officers testified that during the next few seconds they observed flashes of firing exiting from both
bedrooms. Testimony was given that a cease-fire was called, but was broken by two shots, one
from each bedroom.
73

13 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
At the same time, Carmody broke through the kitchen door into the rear of the apartment.
Observing flashes of firing exiting from the back bedroom, he lunged into the kitchen. He
advanced to a position in the dining room and fired into the bedroom. Ciszewski and Broderick
followed Carmody's lead. Ciszewski pointed his flashlight into the back bedroom and Bell
surrendered.
74
A second cease-fire was called. It too was broken when flashes were observed again in the rear
of the apartment. When Gorman and Davis fired through the living room wall, their volleys were
returned by more firing from the bedroom.
75
Truelock and Johnson emerged from the back room during a third cease-fire. Carmody then
entered the back bedroom where he saw Hampton's body on the bed. While Carmody dragged
the body from the room, Ciszewski entered to remove weapons. A bullet ripped through the north
wall of the bedroom and struck Ciszewski in the ankle.
76
Having secured the living room and back bedroom, the raiders concentrated their efforts on the
front bedroom. Gorman ran to the bedroom after shooting through the south wall of the living
room. He fired his machine gun into the front bedroom as he saw Anderson rising between the
beds with a shotgun clutched in his hands. Anderson was hit by Gorman's volley. Gorman also
spotted Brewer with an object in her hands, but no shots were exchanged. Carmody and
Broderick also fired into the north bedroom. According to a tape of a radio dispatcher's
communication with the raiders that morning, the apartment was under control within seven
minutes.
77
In addition to the raiders' testimony, the statements of several plaintiffs given to their lawyers
after the incident were presented by the defense at trial. In these statements, both sworn and
unsworn, several plaintiffs said they picked up weapons during the course of the raid and
Truelock said he fired two shots at the raiders. These statements were offered as further proof
that the officers were fired at and that they perceived themselves to be in great danger during the
course of the raid.
78
Countering this defense evidence and in support of their trial testimony in which the survivors
denied firing at the raiders, plaintiffs introduced the expert testimony of Robert Zimmers, a
ballistics examiner with the FBI crime laboratory. Zimmers also was qualified as an expert to
testify regarding the angle a shot entered a surface based on evidence of its impact point.
According to his testimony, he examined the weapons seized from the apartment, the shooters'
weapons and their bullets, bullet fragments, and shotgun casings and cartridges found in the
apartment. He also analyzed impact points on the walls and furniture in the apartment. On the
basis of this examination and his analysis, he concluded that there was no evidence of a shotgun
blast coming from the corner of the living room where Harris was during the raid. He also
concluded that there was no evidence of shotgun shots exiting from the front bedroom where
14 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Satchel, Anderson, and Brewer were sleeping, and found no evidence of a shot being fired from
within the rear bedroom where Johnson, Hampton, Truelock, and Bell were located.
79
On the other hand, Zimmers determined that there were forty-two bullet holes created by shots
fired from the living room through its south wall into the front bedroom. Additionally, there were
thirty-three bullet holes of entrance found in the south wall of the front bedroom (the wall between
the front and rear bedrooms), twenty-five of which entered from the living room. There were
fourteen bullet holes of entrance found in the south wall of the back bedroom occupied by
Hampton and Johnson. Six of these bullet holes came from shots that originated in the doorway
of the north bedroom. Zimmers also testified that on the basis of his examination only one shot
shell was identified with the seized weapons and that this shell corresponded with a hole of exit
in the living room door; further, he stated that a bullet removed from the body of Hampton was
fired from the .30-caliber carbine carried on the raid by Davis.C. Post-Raid
80
After the firing ceased, Gorman telephoned Jalovec from the back bedroom to report what
occurred and to inquire whether Jalovec would be directing the evidence collection at the
apartment. Jalovec responded that the men should leave the apartment immediately to avoid
creating a riotous situation and should bring the seized weapons to the State's Attorney's Office.
The other raiders were searching the apartment, overturning furniture and seizing books and files
in the process. The raiders retrieved bullets and other ballistics material but failed to identify the
recovered items. According to Groth, the seized weapons were neither tagged for identification
purposes nor fingerprinted, and the locations were not specifically recorded. Consequently, when
the Mobile Crime Unit of the Chicago Police Department arrived at approximately 5:15 a. m. to
collect evidence, its task was hindered greatly by the raiders' search. The Unit, headed by
Koludrovic, nevertheless recovered a number of ballistics items from throughout the apartment
which were taken to department headquarters for examination by experts in firearms
identification. The officers retained their own weapons, and the weapons found inside the
apartment were taken to the State's Attorney's Office.
81
Immediately after the raid, the four wounded occupants were taken to a hospital and the three
other survivors were incarcerated in Cook County Jail. On the basis of sworn complaints which
stated that the plaintiffs fired at the raiders, charges of attempted murder, aggravated battery,
and unlawful use of weapons were filed against the survivors. Bond was set for each at
$100,000. (Several survivors remained in jail until December 21 when their bond was lowered.)
82
As the day unfolded, an atmosphere of confusion and tension developed in Chicago's black
community. Hanrahan met with the raiders and decided to engage in a series of media activities
because "there were no methods of getting the officers' story to the public as effectively." The
initial phase began around noon on December 4 when he issued a statement to the press in the
presence of Jalovec, Groth, and other raiders. Although aware of conflicting stories, he adopted
the raiders' version of the incident and urged the support of the citizens of Chicago for the
courageous actions of the police officers. He frequently emphasized his words by pointing to a
display of seized weapons and, in particular, to a revolver which he said was "used by Hampton
15 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
in the course of the attack on the police."
83
On December 8, amidst the continuing storm of controversy surrounding the raid, Hanrahan
called his second press conference. Reading from a prepared statement, he reiterated the
raiders' account of the incident and summarily dispelled conflicting reports referred to by
reporters. Despite further potential pre-trial prejudice to the survivors' criminal defense, Hanrahan
continued to publicize the incident and decided to employ additional media tactics to promote the
raiders' version of the incident. At his behest the Chicago Tribune published an exclusive
interview with the raiders on December 11. The article stated that the occupants initiated the
firing and contained photographs provided by the State's Attorney's Office which showed holes in
walls and doors of the apartment which purportedly represented shots originating from guns fired
in the bedrooms. At trial a reporter for the newspaper testified that his sole source of material for
the article was the information obtained from Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders during an
interview.
84
The following day a reenactment of the raid was filmed by CBS-TV in Chicago. Hanrahan asked
the broadcasting company to film the story for television without editing by CBS. A set was
constructed at the State's Attorney's Office, and Jalovec assisted the production directors. All the
raiders were present for the event and those who participated in the reenactment were informed
that the film could be cut as the raiders desired. To insure the production's conformity with his
previous press statements, Hanrahan visited the set during portions of the taping. The broadcast
was aired the same evening. Hanrahan held his final press conference the following day. When
confronted with questions from reporters that focused on the photographic misrepresentations
contained in the Chicago Tribune article, Hanrahan again confirmed the accuracy of the officers'
stories without investigating the conflicting reports. At trial Hanrahan testified that he believed his
publicity efforts were necessary to maintain the integrity and reputation of law enforcement in the
community.
85
The role of the federal defendants continued in the post-raid period. Mitchell, Piper, and Johnson
testified that they first learned of the raid through the news media the morning of December 4.
Later that day, they received information from the State's Attorney's Office that Hampton's body
had been positively identified. Johnson then approved the transmission of an "urgent" teletype to
FBI headquarters in Washington reporting the raid. Pursuant to Piper's instructions, Mitchell
spoke with Jalovec and Groth at the State's Attorney's Office to obtain more details. At this
meeting Jalovec asked Mitchell whether he would be concerned if "it got out" that Mitchell was
the source of the preliminary information for the raid.
86
The FBI continued to monitor BPP activities through O'Neal's assistance, and it was during this
early post-raid period that FBI officials wrote a series of memoranda highlighting their
involvement in the raid. Piper sent a memorandum to Bureau headquarters on December 11
which requested a bonus for O'Neal. The request was "justified" on the grounds that the raid was
based on information furnished by O'Neal and that this information was not available from any
other source. Shortly thereafter, a three hundred dollar bonus was approved. On December 12
16 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Mitchell wrote a memorandum which stated for the first time that federally illegal weapons had
been present in the apartment a few days prior to the raid. The memorandum also noted that the
FBI communicated with the State's Attorney's Office around the first of December regarding the
illegal weapons. Mitchell's memorandum was not sent to the Washington office of the FBI but
instead was placed in the Chicago FBI's "O'Neal" file which also contained the floorplan that had
been furnished to Mitchell prior to the raid.
87
A series of investigations and inquests followed the December 4 raid. On December 12

Hanrahan requested Chicago Police Superintendent Conlisk to initiate an internal police
investigation. Internal investigations generally were conducted by Ervanian and Kukowinski,
director of the Internal Investigations Division of the Chicago Police Department (IID) and head of
the Excessive Force Unit of the IID, respectively. This investigation, however, was placed under
the direct supervision of Mulchrone, a deputy police superintendent. Meade, a police department
legal advisor, was placed in charge of the investigation by Mulchrone. Meade designed a few
questions based on Groth's official report and typed in answers which, as Mulchrone stated,
"would justify the use of entry and force by the officers." Ervanian and Kukowinski were informed
of the limited nature of the inquiry and of Meade's and Mulchrone's decision that all of the raiders'
statements were to be identical. Although dismayed at the proposed procedures, neither
protested. Copies of Meade's material were distributed to Assistant State's Attorneys Sorosky
and Meltreger who were advising the officers at the December 16 questioning. Jalovec,
Kukowinski, Ervanian, Mulchrone, and Meade also were present at the interviews. Prior to the
commencement of the inquiry, Groth was shown the prearranged questions and answers and
then requested to give his account of the raid. Thereafter the other raiders met privately with
Jalovec and Sorosky and were shown copies of both the Meade material and Groth's statement.
During the interviews each officer was asked substantially the same four questions:
88
Does Groth's statement describe what occurred at the apartment?
89
Did you use excessive force in effecting these arrests?
90
Did other officers use excessive force in effecting these arrests?Is there anything you wish to
add?
91
Each of the raiders answered "yes" to the first question and "no" to the next two. They gave a
varied assortment of immaterial answers to the fourth question.16 The survivors were asked to
participate in the IID investigation by filing complaints, but declined.
92
While the internal investigation was underway, Sadunas, a ballistics analyst for the Chicago
Police Department Crime Laboratory, had been conducting a series of firearms identification
17 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
tests based on the materials recovered by the Mobile Crime Laboratory Unit. Sadunas was urged
by the State's Attorney's Office and some of the raiders to complete his report as quickly as
possible. On December 17 he issued his findings which included an identification of two shells
with the gun allegedly fired by Brenda Harris. Sadunas, however, failed to include the raiders'
weapons in his testings. The Sadunas report was sent to the IID for consideration. On December
18, six days after Hanrahan's request for the investigation, the IID submitted its report to Conlisk.
He determined that no disciplinary action was warranted against the fourteen raiders. At trial both
Kukowinski and Ervanian characterized the investigation as less than thorough and admitted that
the irregular nature of the proceeding might be attributed to the involvement of the State's
Attorney's Office. According to Mulchrone, "(the) purpose of the investigation was not to in any
way serve to later destroy (the police officers') testimony before a criminal trial" which the IID
knew was going to take place in Cook County Circuit Court.
93
Additional state investigations during the post-raid period included a January 1970 Cook County
Special Coroner's Inquest into the deaths of Hampton and Clark. Testimony was taken from the
raiders and Crime Laboratory personnel. The survivors refused to testify at the inquest. A finding
of justifiable homicide was made by the Coroner's office. Plaintiffs challenged this finding at trial
with evidence that Groth made several statements at the inquest which he later contradicted,
including testimony in which he denied being aware prior to the raid of the interior design of the
apartment.
94
Also, during the month of January, a Cook County grand jury returned an indictment for
attempted murder and aggravated battery against the seven survivors of the raid. Hanrahan was
responsible for the presentation to the grand jury of evidence consisting mainly of the police
officers' testimony and the Sadunas report.
95
A federal grand jury had been convened in December 1969 to investigate whether the occupants'
civil rights had been violated. Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division, was assigned by the Department of Justice to present evidence to the grand jury,
and Leonard Treviranus served as case agent for the grand jury on behalf of the FBI.17 Johnson
instructed Treviranus that all requests for evidence from the grand jury and Leonard were to be
channelled through Johnson. Additionally, Johnson and Leonard met throughout the
investigations and Leonard revealed to Johnson what information he was seeking for
presentation to the grand jury.
96
The grand jury began to hear evidence in January 1970 and Johnson was requested to appear
before it to testify concerning the June 1969 raid on the BPP headquarters. Treviranus sent a
memorandum to FBI headquarters in Washington which assured that Johnson's testimony would
not relate to "the circumstances" of the December 4 raid, insuring that "no exposure" to the
Bureau would occur. Leonard, however, informed Johnson that the grand jury was interested
additionally in what information the FBI had supplied to local authorities prior to the raid. Johnson
asked a member of his staff to brief him on the information that had been disseminated. Although
Johnson knew Mitchell had provided information about the BPP to local authorities, he asked
18 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
neither Mitchell nor Piper about these communications. On February 11, 1970 Johnson testified
before the grand jury. He stated that the Chicago office of the FBI was not aware that illegal
weapons were in the apartment prior to the raid. Additionally, Johnson failed to mention that a
floorplan was furnished by Mitchell to the State's Attorney's Office. On the same day that
Johnson testified, Mitchell wrote the FBI Director on behalf of the Chicago office for authorization
to continue paying O'Neal as an informant. In the letter Mitchell justified the request, as Piper had
justified the earlier bonus for O'Neal, by reminding headquarters that O'Neal had provided a
detailed floorplan of the apartment, as well as other information, which subsequently "saved
injury and possible death to police officers" participating in the December 4 raid.
97
Neither Mitchell nor Piper testified before the grand jury. The Racial Matters Squad, however,
which was under Piper's supervision, regularly provided Treviranus with selective intelligence
information on the BPP and the raid. Included in this information flow were Bureau files on the
survivors, a report on Hampton's activities one week before the raid, and Mitchell's November 21
weapons memorandum listing the legally purchased weapons reported by O'Neal to be in the
apartment. Conspicuously absent was information on the floorplan and Mitchell's December 12
memorandum concerning the presence of illegal weapons in the apartment prior to the raid.
O'Neal was never made available to testify before the grand jury nor to be interviewed by the
prosecutors in charge of the grand jury despite Bureau instructions issued in September 1969
that efforts should be made to convince informants to testify about information they had furnished
concerning the BPP.
98
During the first weeks of February 1970, Zimmers conducted exhaustive tests of the ballistics
evidence and weapons involved in the raid. Zimmers concluded that the spent shells identified in
the Sadunas report as having been fired from Brenda Harris' gun actually had been fired from
Officer Ciszewski's weapon. Sadunas was informed of this discrepancy in mid-February. Upon
receiving the evidence and weapons from the FBI, Sadunas retested the shotshells and test-fired
Ciszewski's gun for the first time. His findings confirmed Zimmers'. Several weeks later Sadunas
appeared before the federal grand jury and testified to his previous error. Hanrahan, who was in
charge of the state prosecution, learned of Sadunas' error in March. He discussed the corrected
findings with the raiders and asked if they wanted to make further statements. Hanrahan and the
raiders decided that the raiders should testify before the federal grand jury to relate their
accounts of the incident. At the same time Hanrahan was considering dismissal of the state
indictments.
99
According to Leonard, Hanrahan, the raiders, and other police officers eventually became
"targets" of the federal grand jury investigation. Hanrahan was warned of this several weeks
before he was requested to testify. Subsequently Leonard discussed the potential indictments
with Johnson and informed him that "an arrangement" had been made between Hanrahan and
him, whereby the raiders' testimony would be given to Hanrahan after they testified and that
Hanrahan would drop the indictments against the survivors within thirty days. Leonard hoped that
the survivors would then testify before the federal grand jury. Shortly after this discussion,
Johnson informed Treviranus of the "arrangement" and, on the basis of this conversation,
Treviranus sent a teletype to FBI headquarters on April 8. The teletype stated that the dismissal
19 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
of the local indictments would be based on the change in Sadunas' testimony.18 Enclosed with
the teletype was a draft of the first chapter of the grand jury report.
100
Groth and the other raiders began their testimony before the grand jury on the same day that
Treviranus dispatched the teletype and the report. Groth was not requested to reveal the identity
of his informant even though Leonard's assistants had requested this information from the State's
Attorney's Office and Groth in early February. At that time the State's Attorney's Office informed
the assistants that "Jalovec was informed by a federal employee: (and) Groth may consider
course of action if asked before the Grand Jury." The raiders refused to conform their testimony
to the ballistics evidence and physical evidence shown them by the federal prosecutors prior to
their appearance.
101
On May 4 Hanrahan appeared before the grand jury and testified that it was his intention to
dismiss the indictments based on the revised Sadunas report. Four days after Hanrahan's
appearance, the indictments against the survivors were dropped. The Government sought the
seven survivors' testimony before the grand jury on May 11; however, the plaintiffs refused to
testify. No indictments were returned and the federal grand jury was discharged on May 15.
102
In June 1970 a special prosecutor was appointed by the Chief Judge of the Criminal Division of
the Circuit Court of Cook County to inquire into the police and Black Panther actions on
December 4. A special state grand jury was convened in December 1970 which returned
indictments against Hanrahan, Jalovec, Mulchrone, Meade, Sadunas, Koludrovic, Groth,
Broderick, Carmody, Ciszewski, Corbett, Davis, Gorman, and Jones for conspiring to obstruct
justice. On October 25, 1972 these defendants were found not guilty after a bench trial in the
Criminal Court of Cook County.
103
These facts provide the basis for a determination of the legal issues concerning the directed
verdicts. The plaintiffs' principal claim is that defendants conspired to deprive them of their civil
rights.19 The plaintiffs also assert claims against individual defendants for intentional and
negligent violations of their rights. We now seek to outline generally the governing legal
principles regarding civil conspiracies. This discussion will be followed by an analysis both of
these standards and of the individualized claims as applied to the facts presented in the three
stages of plaintiffs' case.
III. CONSPIRACY CLAIMS
104
A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an
unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an
agreement between the parties 'to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,' and 'an overt
act that results in damage.' " Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.
1973) (citation omitted). In order to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is not
20 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
required to provide direct evidence of the agreement between the conspirators; "(c)ircumstantial
evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy." Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447
F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-42 (7th Cir.
1969). Absent the testimony of a coconspirator, it is unlikely that direct evidence of a
conspiratorial agreement will exist. Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not
be taken from the jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can
"infer from the circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had a 'meeting of the minds' and
thus reached an understanding" to achieve the conspiracy's objectives. Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
105
A plaintiff seeking redress need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the "exact
limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein." Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., supra,
447 F.2d at 875. An express agreement among all the conspirators is not a necessary element of
a civil conspiracy. The participants in the conspiracy must share the general conspiratorial
objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or
possess the same motives for desiring the intended conspiratorial result. To demonstrate the
existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was "a single plan,
the essential nature and general scope of which (was) known to each person who is to be held
responsible for its consequences." Id.
106
Keeping these standards in mind, when we examine the evidence presented by both sides in this
case in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude that the district court erred when it
ruled that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of conspiracy. Our analysis of the
plaintiffs' case leads us to conclude that the plaintiffs did offer sufficient evidence to warrant a jury
determination of whether a conspiracy existed. The fact that "all of the evidence . . . does not
point in one direction and different inferences might reasonably be drawn from it" does not justify
judicial intrusion into the jury's role in determining whether a civil conspiracy existed. Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 700-01, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 1411, 8 L.Ed.2d
777 (1962). In such a situation, "it is the jury which 'weighs the contradictory evidence and
inferences' and draws 'the ultimate conclusion as to the facts.' " Id. (citation omitted). When a
plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to violate civil rights, "(t)he existence or nonexistence of a
conspiracy is essentially a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, should decide." Adickes,
supra, 398 U.S. at 176, 90 S.Ct. at 1618 (Black, J., concurring.)
107
We do wish, however, to make one observation about the nature of the conspiracy described by
plaintiffs' evidence in this case.20 We believe that plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case,
not of a single conspiracy, but of two conspiracies designed to violate their rights in distinct ways.
These conspiracies share many of the same participants who form "the common nucleus of
separate conspiracies," Varelli, supra, 407 F.2d at 743, but they are not identical conspiracies.
The first conspiracy, as we view the evidence, involves the state and federal defendants who
participated in the pre-raid preparations and planning, and the raid itself. The second conspiracy,
involving many of these same defendants, was the alleged coverup of evidence regarding the
instigation, preparation and execution of the raid, and the post-raid legal harassment of the
plaintiffs. These two conspiracies required entirely different kinds of activities, both legal and
21 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
illegal, to achieve their ends. But more importantly, these two conspiracies had distinct
objectives. The first conspiracy was designed to subvert and eliminate the Black Panther Party
and its members, thereby suppressing both a potential source of unrest, turmoil, and even
violence in the black community, and a vital, radical-black political organization. The second
conspiracy harassed the survivors of the raid. Moreover, the post-raid conspiracy was intended
to frustrate any redress the plaintiffs might seek and, more importantly, to conceal the true
character of the pre-raid and raid activities of the defendants involved in the first conspiracy.
108
Reference to the law of criminal conspiracy suggests that this distinction between the substantive
criminal conspiracy and the subsequent concealment of the crime is important. The Supreme
Court stated in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957):
"Acts of covering up, even though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy,
cannot themselves constitute proof that concealment of the crime after its commission was part
of the initial agreement among the conspirators." Id. at 401-02, 77 S.Ct. at 972. Thus, in order to
prove that acts of concealment constitute a part of the initial conspiracy, the prosecution must
present "direct evidence (of) an express original agreement among the conspirators to continue
to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, traces of the crime after its
commission." Id. at 404, 77 S.Ct. at 973-74. Absent such evidence, the concealment is
independent of the original conspiracy; the original conspiracy is not considered ongoing simply
because concealment of the conspiracy continues. Thus, persons who participate in the
concealment are not Ipso facto participants in the original conspiracy.
109
These principles are instructive in analyzing the case presented by plaintiffs. Many of the state
defendants are named in plaintiffs' complaint only for their participation in the post-raid coverup.
Without direct proof that an agreement to conceal was part of the original conspiracy, these
defendants should be liable only for damages arising out of the post-raid conspiracy. Defendants
who are proved to have participated in both the pre-raid and post-raid conspiracies are liable, of
course, for damages arising out of both conspiracies.
110
We do not decide now that plaintiffs' case involves two conspiracies and that liability must be
determined on the basis of that conclusion. Plaintiffs' discovery was hampered unduly by the trial
court, See infra, pp. 639-642, and we cannot be certain that the plaintiffs, given full discovery,
would be unable to prove that an agreement to conceal the facts concerning the preparation and
execution of the raid existed as part of the original conspiracy. And, as we have noted before,
111
(s)ince the existence of multiple conspiracies is really a fact question as to the nature of the
agreement, it is for the jury to decide whether there is one agreement or several. United States v.
Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961); Green v. United States, 332 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1964);
United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F.Supp. 810 (N.D.Ill.1967).
112
Varelli, supra, 407 F.2d at 746. Thus the trial court upon remand should provide jury instructions
22 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
that will insure that the jury is aware of the alternatives of finding single or multiple conspiracies
in the evidence presented by plaintiffs.
113
The defendants raise several questions about the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' conspiracy claims
which must be discussed. First, defendants contend that in order to have an adequate claim for
relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and prove both a conspiracy and an actual
deprivation of rights; mere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim.
This statement of the law is correct, See Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n.2
(7th Cir. 1975), but we do not see how this affects the viability of plaintiffs' claims in the instant
case. Plaintiffs' prima facie case offers a number of constitutional deprivations to accompany
their conspiracy allegations; clearly, the evidence would support a finding of injury which would
constitute deprivation of constitutional rights. Thus, this requirement of a section 1983 claim has
been satisfied.
114
The federal defendants also contend that section 1983 is inapplicable to them since its
prohibitions are directed only against state actors. Yet when federal officials are engaged in a
conspiracy with state officials to deprive constitutional rights, the state officials provide the
requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983. The Second
Circuit has stated: "When the violation is the joint product of the exercise of a State power and of
a non-State power then the test under the Fourteenth Amendment and 1983 is whether the
state or its officials played a 'significant' role in the result." Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 449
(2d Cir. 1969) (citation omitted.) Our recent decision in Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.
1976), is not to the contrary. In Askew the state officials did not play a significant role in the
conspiracy: "(B)oth the impetus for and the execution of" the conspiratorial plan derived from the
federal officials. Id. at 678. Plaintiffs' evidence in the instant case indicates that the federal and
state defendants shared in instigating and preparing for the raid. There can be no question that
the state defendants "played a 'significant' role in the result." Kletschka, supra, 411 F.2d at 449.
115
Defendants also contend that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under section 1985(3)
because they have not proved that a racial or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus was behind the conspirators' actions.21 Proof of a class-based animus underlying the
conspiracy is, of course, a requirement of a section 1985(3) claim. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Griffin itself held that race was such a
class-based animus, but did not establish what other types of class-based animi were sufficient
to state a claim. The conspiracy alleged in this case, however, does not require an intensive
analysis into either the meaning of Griffin or Congress' intent in drafting section 1985(3) to
determine whether the class-based animus requirement was satisfied. The statute was intended,
perhaps more than anything else, to provide redress for victims of conspiracies impelled by a
commingling of racial and political motives.22 And this is precisely the sort of conspiracy alleged
by plaintiffs in this case.
116
A brief recital of some of the evidence presented by plaintiffs substantiates this conclusion.23
The BPP was a black organization with a distinct political ideology and a variety of politically-
23 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
oriented programs. FBI documents offered by plaintiffs demonstrate that certain FBI activities
directed against the BPP transcended mere "law enforcement," and were designed to
"neutralize" the BPP as a political voice on racial issues. Hanrahan testified that two of the
principal goals of the unit his office assigned to investigate the BPP were to combat the
anti-police propaganda the BPP had been disseminating in the black community and to mobilize
support among blacks for police. And one of the purposes of the post-raid coverup was to
prevent the development of widespread sympathy for the BPP cause which might have arisen
out of a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the raid and the deaths of Clark and Hampton.
Such purposes, if proven, bespeak of a class-based discriminatory animus which is at the heart
of section 1985(3)'s prohibitions. There is no doubt that the plaintiffs have satisfied this
requirement for proving a section 1985(3) claim.
117
Reviewing the facts presented by plaintiffs in light of these standards, we find that the trial court
erred when it directed verdicts as to plaintiffs' conspiracy claims against Hanrahan, Jalovec, the
raiders, and the federal defendants regarding their participation in the planning and execution of
the raid. Plaintiffs presented considerable evidence, including FBI documents and express
statements by Hanrahan, from which reasonable persons could conclude that these parties
shared a "class-based or otherwise discriminatory" desire to undermine the BPP. These
defendants also engaged in an extensive series of communications which could demonstrate to
a reasonable person the existence of an agreement either tacit or express to act in concert to
achieve their shared objective.24 Plaintiffs need not prove that the individual motives underlying
a common, illegal desire to achieve the conspiratorial objective were identical. The essence of a
conspiracy is the agreement, and a reasonable jury could find that the actions of these
defendants demonstrate that they had agreed at least tacitly to work together to eliminate the
BPP.
118
The state defendants argue that they never heard of a FBI counterintelligence program called
"COINTELPRO" and thus they cannot be liable as coconspirators with the federal defendants.
Similarly, the federal defendants contend that because they never met with any of the raiders in
fact, they had never heard of most of them they cannot be part of a conspiracy which includes
the raid on the BPP apartment. As we stated earlier, however, each participant in a conspiracy
need not know the "exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein."
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., supra, 447 F.2d at 875.
119
For example, the fact that Special Agent-in-Charge Johnson never spoke to Carmody (one of the
raiders) does not preclude their being conspirators. Johnson closely supervised his subordinate
FBI officials' activities vis-a-vis the BPP. These agents, in turn, had their contacts among the
state defendants. The communications between Jalovec and Mitchell, in particular, were
essential to the planning and successful execution of the raid. Without the information the federal
defendants furnished the state defendants, the state defendants could not have acted in
furtherance of the purpose which plaintiffs contend the state and federal defendants shared
inflicting injury to the BPP. The absence of a sole instigator who personally communicated with
all the participants in the conspiracy and orchestrated each of their actions does not preclude a
jury from concluding that a conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence from which
24 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
a reasonable person could find that all the defendants named in the initial conspiracy performed
discreet functions in concert to further a common plan the raid.
120
Liability for civil conspiracy requires proof of more than an agreement among conspirators; a
plaintiff must show that an actual deprivation of his rights resulted from the conspiracy. See
supra, p. 622. The raid and the injuries suffered by plaintiffs as a result of the raid reasonably
could be found to constitute this actual deprivation of rights. Thus, plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case under sections 1983 and 1985(3) for civil liability: a conspiracy to violate their
civil rights and actual deprivation of those rights arising from the implementation of the
conspiratorial plan.
121
IV. CLAIMS OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS BEFORE AND DURING THE RAID
122
As an alternative to the conspiracy allegations, plaintiffs assert that these defendants are subject
to individual liability under section 1983 or directly under the Constitution. The gist of their claims
is that these defendants are liable for the intentional and negligent deprivation of rights which
occurred during the raid.25
A. Shooters
123
Plaintiffs seek recovery against the shooters on the ground that these defendants, acting under
color of state law, made an illegal entry into the West Monroe Street apartment and used deadly
and excessive force in addition to committing assault, battery, and other abusive acts on its
occupants. Our discussion of the facts concerning the propriety of the search warrant which
defendants assert justified their entry into the apartment is found in our analysis of Groth's
refusal to identify the informant he used to support the affidavit for the warrant. See infra, pp.
635-639. Even if the officers were acting pursuant to a search warrant validly issued, the
question remains for the jury's determination whether the force used by the raiders within the
apartment was reasonable under the circumstances. The officers had a right to use some degree
of force in executing the warrant and defending themselves. As noted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "it would be unreasonable to require that
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." The record is replete
with factual disputes regarding the activities of the shooters on the morning of December 4. For
example, it reasonably could be inferred that Mark Clark's gun fired during his struggle with Groth
rather than when the police officers first broke through the door. Additionally, plaintiffs testified at
trial that none of the survivors fired a gun during the raid. And Zimmers' expert testimony
corroborated these assertions. Numerous other questions of fact are present in the record,
including the issue of whether Fred Hampton was drugged at the time of the raid and shot
deliberately after Johnson, Truelock, and Bell had left the bedroom.
124
Assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence are matters within the sole
25 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
province of the jury. In granting the directed verdicts, the trial judge repeatedly usurped this
function. For example, the judge concluded in his Summary that "Brenda Harris fired a shot
which went past Groth's shoulder." This finding was made in disregard of Harris' testimony to the
contrary and the physical evidence offered at trial. Additionally, the trial court ignored the
testimony of Johnson and Truelock and determined that "the evidence is conclusive that
(Hampton) was shot three times and that he was dead when Deborah Johnson and Louis
Truelock left the bedroom." The court also weighed the conflicting evidence of the experts and
found that the evidence introduced by plaintiffs' toxologist, Dr. Eleanor Berman, was "in error."
125
In light of the evidence presented by plaintiffs, the question of the seven shooting police officers'
liability should have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the verdicts directed in
favor of these police officers on the individual counts.
B. Nonshooters
126
In addition to their conspiracy allegations, plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case under
section 1983 against the nonshooters on the basis of their nonfeasance at the BPP apartment.
This court previously imposed liability in damages for nonfeasance in Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6
(7th Cir. 1972). The facts in Byrd are strikingly similar to those alleged in the case at bar. In Byrd
Chicago police officers failed to deter other officers who, in their presence, beat the plaintiff with
fists and clubs. Holding that purposeful nonfeasance of such magnitude could serve as the basis
of tort liability under section 1983, we stated that "one who is given the badge of authority of a
police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who
summarily punish a third person in his presence." 466 F.2d at 11.
127
Plaintiffs in this case assert that the nonshooters are liable, under the rule in Byrd, for failing to
assist or protect the wounded occupants. The officers entered the apartment immediately after
the firing ceased and plaintiffs testified that the nonshooters were present during the beatings
and abuse which they said followed the shootout. In light of our decision in Byrd, the fact if found
by a jury determination that these men did not personally participate in the abuse, but instead
callously chose to watch, would not preclude their liability. Accordingly, this issue should have
been submitted to the jury. We hold that the directed verdicts in favor of the nonshooters
regarding their activities in the raid were improperly granted by the trial court.*
C. Hanrahan and Jalovec
128
Plaintiffs contend that the alleged failure of Hanrahan and Jalovec to supervise properly the
officers attached to the SPU creates a cause of action based on section 1983. We agree. In
Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), we held that supervisory personnel are
proper party-defendants to a section 1983 action
129

26 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
whether the plaintiffs' constitutional rights are violated as a result of police behavior which is the
product of the active encouragement and direction of their superiors or as a result of the
superiors' mere acquiescence in such behavior.
130
Id. at 1086. See also Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976). Plaintiffs have
established a prima facie case against Hanrahan and Jalovec on the basis of their roles as
supervisors of the police officers who participated in the raid. They approved Groth's selection of
men and weapons carried on the raid. Additionally, they approved of the early morning timing of
the execution of the search warrant. It was for the jury to determine whether the consequences of
these actions were foreseeable. We believe that the trial court improperly directed verdicts in
favor of these defendants on the nonconspiracy counts.
D. Federal Defendants
131
Finally, we fail to see the distinction which plaintiffs make between "joint activity" under section
1983 and conspiracy under sections 1985(3) and 1983 regarding the federal defendants' liability
for damages resulting from the raid. The same legal standards apply to each form of liability. As
stated by Prosser,
132
joint tortfeasor liability arises when persons "who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to
commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend
aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit are
equally liable with him." Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 292.
133
The evidence which plaintiffs presented to support their nonconspiracy theory against these
defendants is identical to that which was aimed at establishing their conspiracy claims.
Accordingly, although we fail to see the need to allege this redundant theory of recovery, we hold
that plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support their joint activity claims.26
V. CLAIMS OF LIABILITY FOR POST-RAID ACTS
134
On the basis of the post-trial facts, plaintiffs claim that defendants conspired to cause the false
arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution of the survivors of the raid. All defendants are named as
participants in the post-raid conspiracy. As a further result of the conspiracy, plaintiffs allege that
the Cook County criminal prosecution against them was prolonged to May 8, 1970 and that they
incurred unnecessary legal expenses and suffered mental anguish and injury to their reputations.
Relief is sought under sections 1983 and 1985(3).
135
A. Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants

27 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
136
We hold that plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that
Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants participated in a post-raid conspiracy
to harass the survivors of the raid and to conceal the facts surrounding the raid, thereby injuring
plaintiffs.27
137
On the morning of December 4 several raiders met with Hanrahan and Jalovec to discuss the
raid. Mitchell met with Groth and Jalovec the same morning and left immediately prior to
Hanrahan's first press conference. From these conversations emerged an allegedly distorted, if
not false, account of the raid which justified the officers' actions. In the days that followed,
Hanrahan instituted a promotional campaign. Despite their awareness of conflicting stories,
Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders continued to circulate reports to justify the continuation of
plaintiffs' detention. And it was the raiders' testimony which provided much of the basis for the
indictments Hanrahan brought against the survivors.
138
The irregularities in the series of official investigations into the raid also constitute evidence from
which there could be found a concerted effort to suppress facts about the planning and execution
of the raid and to justify the charges filed against the survivors. For example, at the internal
investigation (IID) conducted by the Chicago Police Department, customary procedures were
abandoned. Detailed statements normally taken were never obtained. Jalovec and Sorosky,
present at Hanrahan's direction, met with the raiders immediately before the raiders supplied
their previously prepared, uniform answers to predetermined questions. At the same time, a
ballistics report, compiled under pressure from the State's Attorney's Office and several of the
raiders, was issued by Sadunas of the Chicago Police Department. Despite its lack of
completeness, the report immediately was used to support the raiders' account of the raid, the
IID findings, and the Cook County indictments.
139
The concerted effort to suppress facts is further evidenced by the obstruction of the federal grand
jury investigation, caused by the failure of the federal defendants to turn over materials sought by
the grand jury. The evidence shows that a jury could find that Johnson's testimony before the
grand jury was false and misleading and concealed the involvement of FBI headquarters and the
roles of Piper, Mitchell, and O'Neal in the planning of the raid. Additionally, Johnson participated
in the arrangement between Hanrahan and Leonard whereby Leonard agreed not to obtain
indictments against any state officials for their actions with regard to the raid in exchange for the
dismissal of the state indictments against the survivors. And during the pretrial discovery in this
suit, the federal defendants continued to engage in dilatory and obstructive tactics to conceal
evidence of their involvement in the planning of the raid. See infra, pp. 639-642.
140
A jury reasonably could infer that a conspiracy existed to conceal the facts of the raid and to
continue an unfounded prosecution against plaintiffs.28
B. Purtell, Koludrovic, and Sadunas

28 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
141
We hold that plaintiffs' evidence does not present a prima facie case as to Purtell and Koludrovic.
Purtell was the director of the Chicago Crime Laboratory and the supervisor of Koludrovic and
Sadunas. There is, however, no evidence that he participated in any agreement or effort to distort
the evidence found inside the apartment on December 4. Similarly, plaintiffs' case against
Koludrovic is insufficient. In his official report he stated that more than one shot was fired at the
raiders as they entered the apartment and he reiterated this conclusion at the Coroner's inquest.
There was, however, no evidence of an agreement, either tacit or express, between him and any
other defendant to conceal or distort facts about the raid. His task at the apartment was made
especially difficult by the raiders' disruptive search prior to his arrival and, if his examination of
the premises was less than thorough, the evidence suggests that this was the result, at worst, of
negligent rather than intentional conduct.
142
There is, however, evidence and reasonable inferences pointing to Sadunas' participation in the
post-raid conspiracy. Sadunas' initial ballistics test was incomplete; he compared spent
shotshells from the apartment only with the weapons seized at the apartment and ignored the
weapons which had been used by the raiders. His examination resulted in a crucial
misidentification which would have remained uncorrected absent Zimmers' subsequent tests and
conclusions. When he learned of Zimmers' findings, Sadunas retested the shells comparing them
with all the weapons including those of the raiders. After these tests, Sadunas readily admitted
his mistake. Given this set of events, we think that the determination whether his misidentification
was the result of professional incompetence or conspiratorial conduct should have been left for
the jury.
C. Participants in the IID Investigation
143
Meade and Mulchrone, through their participation in the IID investigation, were not involved in the
dimension of the conspiracy which resulted in the imprisonment and prosecution of the survivors
without legal basis; rather, their actions reasonably could have been found to have encouraged
the continuation of the unfounded prosecution by suppressing the development of inconsistent
evidence against the raiders, Hanrahan, and Jalovec. Police Superintendent Conlisk initiated the
investigation at Hanrahan's request and ordered Mulchrone to supervise the proceedings.
Mulchrone admitted that the purpose of the investigation was not to test the veracity of the
raiders' stories, but to prevent the emergence of contradictory testimony. Meade designed the
perfunctory questions and supplied the uniform answers for the inquiry. Accordingly, the facts
were sufficient to include Meade and Mulchrone in a post-raid conspiracy charge.
144
Plaintiffs did not present a prima facie case for conspiratorial liability against Ervanian,
Kukowinski, Sorosky, and Meltreger. A reasonable jury might find, however, that these
defendants violated 42 U.S.C. 1986. Section 1986 provides:
145
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and
29 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or
aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act
be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages
caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented;
and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty
of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action.
146
Ervanian and Kukowinski, who normally conducted IID investigations, were replaced for the
Hampton investigation. They were aware of and later acknowledged the irregular character of the
investigation. Although they were not active participants in the "whitewash," they took no steps to
correct it. Similarly, plaintiffs presented no evidence that Assistant State's Attorneys Sorosky and
Meltreger participated in the preparation for the perfunctory interrogation of the raiders. Prior to
this examination, however, they were shown the questions and answers which had been
prepared for the raiders, and Sorosky, with Jalovec, met with the raiders immediately before their
interviews. And, like Ervanian and Kukowinski, Sorosky and Meltreger made no attempt to
prevent the irregular conduct of the investigation. Thus, although these defendants could not be
liable on the basis of the existing record under plaintiffs' conspiracy claims, there is sufficient
evidence to support the claims brought against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1986.
147
Plaintiffs also contend, in addition to their conspiracy claims, that there was no legal basis for the
arrest and imprisonment of the survivors of the raid and therefore that Hanrahan, Jalovec, and
the raiders are liable under section 1983 for the intentional deprivation of civil rights by false
imprisonment. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Joseph v.
Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968). Several survivors were jailed on the basis of the officers'
sworn complaints that the occupants committed attempted murder and aggravated battery
against the raiders. Hanrahan and Jalovec authorized the filing of these charges. As a result of
the charges, the high bond set at the request of the State's Attorney's Office, and the denial of
plaintiffs' demand for a preliminary hearing, these survivors were imprisoned until December 21.
148
Plaintiffs' claim, of course, hinges on the question whether defendants were acting with probable
cause when they filed charges against the survivors. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct.
1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Banish v. Locks, 414 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1969). See also pp.
631-635 Infra. The question of whether the facts known to a defendant amounted to probable
cause should be determined by the court when there is no disagreement as to the facts or
circumstances surrounding the detention. Banish v. Locks, supra, 414 F.2d at 641. In light of the
numerous disputes regarding the facts defendants knew or reasonably believed, however, the
trial court should have submitted the issue of probable cause to the jury.
149
Plaintiffs argue that all defendants (except O'Neal) are liable individually under section 1983 for
malicious prosecution. An action for malicious prosecution may be brought under section 1983 if,
acting under color of state law, the defendant has subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of
constitutional magnitude. Hampton I, supra; Banish v. Locks, supra; Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d
110, 126 (5th Cir. 1963). Plaintiffs contend that the raiders, Hanrahan, and Jalovec instituted an
30 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
unfounded prosecution and that they, along with the other defendants, supported its continuation.
Relief is sought for the constitutional deprivations and injuries arising from this prosecution.
150
The absence of probable cause is an essential element of an action for malicious prosecution.
Banish v. Locks, supra, 414 F.2d at 640. Under the general tort principles of malicious
prosecution,
151
The defendant may be liable Either for initiating or for continuing a criminal prosecution without
probable cause. But he cannot be held responsible unless he takes some active part in
instigating or encouraging the prosecution. He is not liable merely because of his approval or
silent acquiescence in the acts of another, nor for appearing as a witness against the accused,
even though his testimony is perjured. . . . On the other hand, if he advises or assists another
person to begin the proceeding, ratifies it when it is begun in his behalf, or takes any active part
in directing or aiding the conduct of the case, he will be responsible (emphasis added).
152
Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 836-37.
153
Plaintiffs referred to essentially the same evidence to support their individual malicious
prosecution claims as they did to substantiate their conspiracy claims regarding malicious
prosecution. We reach the same conclusion here as we did earlier. We hold that plaintiffs failed
to establish a prima facie case against defendants Purtell, Koludrovic, Kukowinski, Ervanian,
Sorosky, and Meltreger. The malicious prosecution claims against the remaining defendants
should have been submitted to the jury and, accordingly, we reverse the trial court's directed
verdicts as to these defendants.29VI. CLAIMS OF IMMUNITY
154
The Supreme Court stated many years ago that the "very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). When Congress adopted
section 1983, it decided that "every person" who, under color of state law, deprived another of a
constitutional right, privilege, or immunity was liable to the victim for damages. Since then,
however, the courts have recognized certain exceptions to the unrestricted language of this
provision and have afforded immunity to persons acting in specified official capacities.
155
Both the state and federal defendants claim that they enjoy official immunity for their actions in
connection with the raid on the apartment on West Monroe Street. The entreaties of public
officials for immunity for their official wrongdoing, however, should be treated with
circumspection. Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975). We should be hesitant to expand
the scope of official activity which, from the perspective of a victim seeking civil redress, stands
beyond the constraints of the Constitution. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98
31 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). For us to hold that all of the actions of the defendants in this
case should be immune from liability as a matter of law would require us to expand radically the
parameters which the Supreme Court has set for the doctrine of official immunity. This we are
unwilling to do.
A. State Defendants: Absolute Immunity
156
State defendants Hanrahan, Jalovec, Meltreger, and Sorosky (the Cook County State's Attorney
and three of his assistants) contend that they cannot be found liable for the damages alleged by
plaintiffs because they enjoy absolute immunity for their actions under the rule of Imbler v.
Pachtman,424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The other state defendants claim
a qualified immunity. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24
(1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). We hold that the four state
prosecutors have absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for some of their post-raid
activities. Most of their allegedly illegal actions, however including all of their pre-raid activities
must be tested by the standards of qualified immunity.
157
The Supreme Court in Imbler did not hold that all official actions of a state prosecutor are
absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. Imbler held only that a prosecutor has absolute
immunity "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Imbler, supra 424 U.S. at
431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 569 F.2d 10 (1977), Cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978) (prosecutor's immunity limited to
his "advocacy" functions). The Court left standing circuit decisions which, by focusing on "the
functional nature of the activities" rather than the "status" of the prosecutor, held that certain
official actions by state prosecutors are entitled only to qualified immunity. Imbler, supra, 424 U.S.
at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995. See, e. g., Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974);
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1973); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d
533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965). These cases clearly indicate that when a state prosecutor is
performing investigative rather than advocacy functions, he is not wrapped with absolute
immunity.30 See Briggs, supra, 569 F.2d at 16-17.
158
In Hampton I, supra, we examined the claim of Hanrahan and Jalovec to absolute immunity for
their pre-raid conduct. We concluded that their
159
alleged participation in the planning and execution of a raid of this character has no greater claim
to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under (their) direction.
160
Hampton I, supra, 484 F.2d at 609. Neither Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, nor our
fuller consideration of the issue aided by the evidence produced at trial alters that conclusion.

32 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
161
More difficult questions are presented by the claims of the defendants from the State's Attorney's
Office Hanrahan, Jalovec, Meltreger, and Sorosky to absolute immunity with respect to their
post-raid conduct. Resolution of these claims requires a close analysis of the nature of the
defendants' activities. We hold that while some of their actions fall within the ambit of Imbler's
Protection, others do not.
162
Hanrahan's decision to file charges against the survivors of the raid, his presentation of evidence
before the state grand jury, and his deal with Assistant Attorney General Leonard to drop the
state charges all comprise part of his "quasi-judicial" duties as state prosecutor "initiating a
prosecution and . . . presenting the State's case . . . ." Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at
995; Butz, supra, 438 U.S. at 512-517, 98 S.Ct. at 2914-2916. Thus, Hanrahan and any
Assistant State's Attorney who aided him in these phases of his post-raid activity are absolutely
immune from civil liability for their conduct.
163
Other post-raid actions of these defendants, however, do not warrant absolute immunity. To the
extent that plaintiffs can both show injuries arising from this conduct and demonstrate that the
defendants' actions were illegal and unprotected by their qualified immunity, the defendants will
be liable for damages. In particular, the State's Attorney's Office's generation of post-raid
publicity, which may have caused pre-trial prejudice to the plaintiffs and encouraged the alleged
coverup of the true facts of the raid, is not protected by absolute immunity. Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), said that a federal official who, even maliciously,
issues a false and damaging publication the issuance of which is within the parameters of his
official duties, is absolutely immune from liability for libel. However, the Supreme Court this term
noted that
164
a quite different question would have been presented had the officer ignored an express
statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority.
165
Barr did not, therefore, purport to depart from the general rule, which long prevailed, that a
federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed
on his powers.
166
Butz, supra, 438 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 290. Thus, Barr does not control in this case where the
state officials' post-raid public relations activity allegedly violated specific statutory and
constitutional guarantees.
167
Further, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Butz and Imbler do not suggest that a state

33 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
prosecutor's publicity actions should be absolutely immune from civil liability. In Butz, one of the
actions plaintiff complained of was the defendants' issuance of a deceptive press release. Butz,
supra 438 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 2898. And the language in Butz suggests that the defendants
were absolutely immune for most of their conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff. However, "the task of
applying the foregoing principles" to the particular claims against the defendants in Butz was left
to the district court on remand. Id. 438 U.S. at 517, 98 S.Ct. at 2916. A close reading of Butz
suggests that the boundaries of the absolute immunity afforded prosecutors in administrative
proceedings do not encompass their publicity campaigns. The Court said that "the decision to
initiate or continue a proceeding" and "the role of an agency attorney in conducting a trial and
presenting evidence on the record to the trier of fact" are cloaked in absolute immunity but made
no intimation that a prosecutor's issuance of a press release warrants the same treatment. Id.
438 U.S. at 516-517, 98 S.Ct. at 2916. Significantly, one of the safeguards the Butz Court
persistently referred to in justifying its extension of absolute immunity to certain "quasi-judicial"
actions of administrative prosecutors the scrutiny a prosecutor's discretionary decisions receive
in the adjudicatory process, Id. 438 U.S. at 516-517, 98 S.Ct. at 2916 is absent in the publicity
context.
168
Imbler 's imposition of absolute immunity on the "judicial phase" of a prosecutor's duties likewise
does not protect a prosecutor's publicity campaigns. Imbler 's justification for granting absolute
immunity to all of a state prosecutor's "quasi-judicial" activities has been sharply criticized, See,
e. g., Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 432-47, 96 S.Ct. 984 (White, J., concurring); Developments in
the Law: Section 1983, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1133, at 1200, 1204 (1977), but even on its own terms the
justification does not extend to a prosecutor's decision to publicize his actions or actions taken by
others in the community. Neither the prosecutor's judgment "in deciding which suits to bring and
in conducting them in court," Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 424-25, 96 S.Ct. at 992, nor "the
functioning of the criminal justice system," Id. at 426-27, 96 S.Ct. at 993, would be undermined
by maintaining the exposure of a prosecutor's public relations decisions to section 1983 liability,
subject only to a qualified immunity. There is no compelling justification for extending absolute
immunity to these decisions. Thus, we hold that Hanrahan's post-raid press conferences and the
participation of Hanrahan and Jalovec in the exclusive interview with the Chicago Tribune and in
the CBS-TV reenactment of the raid are protected only by a qualified immunity.
169
State defendants Jalovec, Sorosky, and Meltreger contend that they are absolutely immune from
liability for their participation in the IID investigation. In our earlier review of Sorosky's and
Meltreger's claims for absolute immunity, Hampton I, supra, we observed that the plaintiffs
essentially alleged that these defendants had engaged in "the deliberate preparation of perjured
testimony." Id. at 609 n. 9.31 We concluded that such conduct "clearly exceeded the scope of
their quasi-judicial immunity." Id.
170
Since our decision in Hampton I, however, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra. Applying that decision, we recently held that prosecutors who with local police
allegedly destroyed and falsified a line-up report and police tapes of incoming phone calls, were
protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th
Cir. 1978). The actions of Jalovec, Sorosky, and Meltreger at the IID investigation constituted
34 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
failure to prevent conduct which was essentially indistinguishable from the prosecutorial activity
encapsulated in the allegations in Heidelberg. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that Jalovec,
Sorosky, and Meltreger are absolutely immune from liability for their actions at this hearing.
B. Federal Defendants: Absolute Immunity
171
The federal defendants, Johnson, Piper, Mitchell, and O'Neal, seek absolute or at least qualified
official immunity for their allegedly illegal actions. They rely on Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79
S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), as the basis for their claim to absolute immunity. But as we
noted earlier, Supra at p. 632, the Supreme Court recently explained that Barr does not afford
protection to a federal official who has exceeded an express statutory or constitutional limitation
on his authority. "(A) federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the
controlling law has placed on his powers." Butz, supra, 438 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 2902.
Plaintiffs have presented considerable evidence to support their allegations that the federal
defendants violated both constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority. Thus, the
absolute immunity granted to federal officials pursuant to Barr does not apply to the federal
defendants in this case.
172
Butz made clear that federal officials should receive no more judicial protection from liability for
violating an individual's civil rights than their state counterparts. The Court stated:
173
. . . in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for according to
federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional
infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical
violation under 1983.
174
Id. 438 U.S. at 500, 98 S.Ct. at 2907.32 It must be remembered, though, that while Butz
concluded that federal officials exercising discretion generally are protected only by qualified
immunity for their official actions, there are "exceptional situations" where "absolute immunity is
essential for the conduct of public business." Id. 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. The situation
of these federal defendants is not exceptional. They were, according to their own
characterizations, law enforcement officials investigating potential wrongdoing. It is a firmly
established rule that such activity by state law enforcement officials warrants only qualified
immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). And as the
Supreme Court observed in Butz : "We see no sense . . . in distinguishing between state and
federal police participating in the same investigation." Butz, supra, 438 U.S. at 500, 98 S.Ct. at
2908. Thus we conclude that the federal defendants in this case are not absolutely immune from
liability for their actions and are protected only by the doctrine of qualified official immunity.
C. Qualified Immunity
175

35 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
The test for applying the doctrine of qualified immunity to a given defendant was most recently
restated by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 54 L.Ed.2d
24 (1978). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court in Procunier
described the two circumstances in which an official ordinarily insulated by qualified immunity
would be exposed to section 1983 liability. First, the Court said:
176
(T)he immunity defense would be unavailing to petitioners if the constitutional right allegedly
infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or
should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have known that their conduct
violated the constitutional norm.
177
Procunier, supra, 434 U.S. at 562, 98 S.Ct. at 860. See Wood, supra, 420 U.S. at 322, 95 S.Ct.
992. Alternatively, the Court stated that qualified immunity is not available
178
where the official has acted with "malicious intention" to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional
right or to cause him "other injury." This part of the rule speaks of "intentional injury,"
contemplating that the actor intends the consequences of his conduct. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts 8A (1965).
179
Procunier, supra, 434 U.S. at 566, 98 S.Ct. at 862.
180
The allegations of plaintiffs in this case clearly complain of official misconduct which is outside
the ambit of the doctrine of qualified immunity. If plaintiffs prove their case against the
defendants, the doctrine of qualified immunity will not thwart recovery of damages. The rights
which plaintiffs contend that defendants have violated are clearly established. Plaintiffs have
presented evidence which could suggest that the defendants both as part of a conspiracy and
individually violated, among others, their clearly established First,33 Fourth,34 and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.35 And defendants have not shown as a matter of law that they should not
have known either that these rights existed or that their alleged conduct violated them. See
Procunier, supra, 434 U.S. at 562, 98 S.Ct. 855. Thus, we hold that the question whether
defendants reasonably believed that their conduct did not violate a constitutional right, given the
evidence presented at trial, should have been submitted to the jury.36
181
In summary, Hanrahan's decision to file criminal charges against the survivors, his presentation
of evidence to the grand jury, and his eventual decision to drop these charges, are absolutely
immune from civil liability under the Imbler doctrine. Similarly, the activities of Jalovec, Sorosky,
and Meltreger at the IID hearing are absolutely immune. All the remaining activities of the
defendants in this controversy are protected only by a qualified immunity, and a determination of
36 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
whether their actions satisfy the conditions for this defense must await the retrial.
VII. VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
182
The police officers who went to 2337 West Monroe Street on December 4, 1969 were acting
pursuant to a warrant issued by a Cook County circuit judge. The warrant was supported by an
affidavit in which Groth stated that a reliable informant had provided information that illegal
weapons were present in the Monroe Street apartment. Groth's complaint for the search warrant
further stated that Jalovec told Groth that he too had a conversation with a reliable informant who
told him that illegal weapons were stored in the apartment.
183
The plaintiffs seek disclosure of the identity of Groth's informant.37 The plaintiffs contend that
only disclosure of the identity of Groth's informant if, in fact, one exists will permit a full inquiry
into whether probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. If Groth did not have an
informant, or his informant did not provide the information contained in the affidavit, or the
informant was unreliable, the validity of the warrant would be in jeopardy and plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment violation claims would be strengthened.38 Further, plaintiffs contend that the search
warrant was merely a pretext for the raid and that misrepresentations in the affidavit would
constitute evidence of a conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the plaintiffs. If Groth did not
receive the information contained in his affidavit from a reliable informant, this contention would
be strengthened.
184
In his complaint for the search warrant, Groth stated that his informant had been inside the
Hampton apartment on December 1 and had seen illegal weapons. The complaint also stated
that this informant had provided reliable information which led to two prior, successful raids for
illegal weapons and information which led to several convictions. At his deposition five years
later, Groth said that this informant had told him about illegal weapons, persons who frequented
the apartment, and the layout of the apartment. When asked about the informant's identity and
reliability, however, Groth refused to elaborate further upon the information contained in the
affidavit, saying that to do so would endanger the lives of other persons.
185
At trial Groth persisted in his refusal to answer questions which related to the identity of the
informant. Plaintiffs moved to compel his testimony. The trial judge then held a private, In
camera, off-the-record meeting with Groth in which he asked him only one question the identity
of his informant. Groth refused to answer, saying that he would maintain his silence even if it
would lead to "consequences" for him. On the record the court repeated the question and
received the same answer. The court then denied plaintiffs' motion to compel Groth's testimony.
186
The trial court did not permit the development of a record on the questions of Groth's credibility
regarding the existence and reliability of his informant and the danger the informant might be
subjected to if his identity were disclosed. The court concluded that the reliability of Groth's
37 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
informant was established by the results of the raid and, therefore, inquiry into his identity was
irrelevant. At the end of trial, the judge refused to give instructions to the jury which would have
allowed it to decide whether the informant existed and whether information about the informant
was relevant to the conspiracy and Fourth Amendment claims of plaintiffs.
187
Since Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), it has been
clear that the so-called informer's privilege (the privilege that protects the identity of a person
which otherwise would be required to be disclosed during the course of litigation) is not
absolute.39 In Roviaro the Court said, "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way." Id. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. The Court went on to explain
the test to be applied to determine when disclosure is required:
188
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right
to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must
depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other
relevant factors.
189
The Roviaro test has been applied in the context of civil litigation in a variety of cases, See e. g.,
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977) Cert. denied, 436 U.S.
962, 98 S.Ct. 3082, 57 L.Ed.2d 1129 (1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 122
U.S.App.D.C. 65, 351 F.2d 762 (1965), and we see no reason to depart from this
well-established rule. The language employed by the Court in Roviaro encompasses civil
litigation as well as criminal litigation, and the competing interests underlying the privilege and its
exceptions are essentially the same in both contexts.40 See Westinghouse, supra, 122
U.S.App.D.C. at 72, 351 F.2d at 769. As the Westinghouse court concluded, "The Roviaro
balance should be struck in each case, civil and criminal, in deciding whether disclosure 'is
essential to a fair determination of a cause.' 353 U.S. at 61, 77 S.Ct. at 628." Id. And in striking
this balance, the court should examine the "relevance" of the informer's information to "possible
defenses,"41 the "possible significance" of the information, and "the seriousness of the litigation."
Id. 122 U.S.App.D.C. at 74, 351 F.2d at 771.
190
The trial judge never attempted to apply the Roviaro balancing test or to determine whether
disclosure was essential to a fair determination of plaintiffs' cause of action. The judge, in fact,
resisted plaintiffs' efforts to develop a record on these issues. Ordinarily, we would remand the
disclosure issue to the trial court for adjudication under the appropriate legal standards. In this
case, however, enough evidence relevant to the validity of Groth's assertion of informer's
privilege has been amassed throughout the trial to make such a remand unnecessary.
191

38 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
A considerable amount of evidence was introduced leading to the conclusion that either Groth
did not have an informant and merely repeated information he had received from Jalovec in the
affidavit for the warrant or that O'Neal was Groth's informant as well as the ultimate source for
Jalovec's information. First, Groth had no record of payments to his informant since, according to
Groth, the informant's information was provided for advancement in other areas. Groth never
elaborated what these incentives were. Further, the similarity of the content and the timing of the
information received by Jalovec and Groth is striking: Each said that on December 2 his
informant told him about the weapons, inhabitants and visitors to the apartment, the apartment's
layout, and the BPP meeting on December 3. And while, as the state defendants correctly
indicate, this could mean simply that the reports provided by two different sources were
corroborated, the fact that each report was similarly incorrect about the number of sawed-off
shotguns in the apartment casts doubt on this explanation. Groth's destruction of all the
information he received from his informant, including the floorplan he allegedly constructed
based on his informant's description of the apartment, also undermines Groth's claim that he had
an independent source. More importantly, Jalovec asked Mitchell after the raid if he cared
whether it was disclosed that he was "the source" for the information leading to the raid. And
both Piper and Mitchell sent memoranda to the FBI in Washington which said that O'Neal was
the only source for the preraid information about the weapons and the apartment.42
192
A determination that Groth's informant did not exist would have significant ramifications for
plaintiffs' case. The warrant used to gain entry to the apartment would be supported only by the
misrepresented, triple hearsay Groth received from Jalovec, and Groth's own perjured statement.
Perhaps more importantly, such a conclusion would bolster plaintiffs' conspiracy claims. It would
be powerful evidence of Groth's bad faith vis-a-vis plaintiffs. And it would highlight the importance
of the federal defendants in the alleged conspiracy. If O'Neal was the only eyewitness informant
able to provide the crucial pre-raid information about the apartment, there could be no question
that he and his conduit to the state defendants, Mitchell, were indispensable to the entire
operation.
193
Even if Groth did have an informant, disclosure of his identity would be important to a resolution
of the case since that informant might be a critical figure in the conspiracy alleged by plaintiffs. If
O'Neal, who was being paid for his work by the federal defendants, was also the informant Groth
relied on in his affidavit, plaintiffs would have additional evidence of the federal involvement in the
raid itself. Further, the person described by Groth as his informant according to Groth a member
of the BPP could be a coconspirator. Groth said that his informant asked when he was going to
"move on the crib," and provided information about the weapons when told that the presence of
weapons in the apartment would precipitate a raid. Also, as a member of the BPP, Groth's
informant may have been in the apartment or at least with Hampton the night before the raid an
important fact given the testimonial and scientific evidence introduced by plaintiffs suggesting
that Hampton had been drugged prior to the raid.
194
Disclosure of Groth's informant's identity is "essential to a fair determination" of this case.

Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S. at 61, 77 S.Ct. 623. The plaintiffs' request for disclosure is based
neither on mere speculation about the informant's identity, See United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d
39 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
995 (9th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 790, 50 L.Ed.2d 780 (1977), nor on a
desire to extract punitive damages from an additional defendant. See Black v. Sheraton Corp. of
America, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 564 F.2d 550 (1977). We are mindful of "the public interest in
protecting the flow of information," Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 629, but we also
are aware of the need to maintain the integrity of and confidence in the criminal justice system.
The assertion of informer's privilege by a law enforcement official defending against a civil suit for
damages based on his own alleged official misconduct should be scrutinized closely.
195
This case, in which plaintiffs have alleged gross misconduct by federal and state law
enforcement officials and have presented serious evidence to support these claims, is of
paramount significance. There is a serious factual controversy focusing on the existence or
identity of Groth's informant, and a resolution of this controversy is essential to a just adjudication
of plaintiffs' claims. Thus, we conclude that the public's interest in encouraging the flow of
information to law enforcement officials cannot prevail in this case, and that Groth must disclose
the identity of his informant. In order to minimize both the risks to this particular informant and
any adverse effects on law enforcement generally, we suggest that the appropriate parties move
at the retrial for a protective order to set the terms of this disclosure.
VIII. CHALLENGED DISCOVERY RULINGS
196
Even though the judgments for the defendants must be vacated and the cause remanded for a
new trial because of the trial judge's errors in directing verdicts for the defendants, we deem it
necessary to discuss a separate issue: the delaying and obstructive tactics of the federal
defendants and their counsel in matters of discovery. To demonstrate the importance of the delay
and its crippling effect on plaintiffs' case, a full summary must be undertaken. Only for the sake of
brevity do we refrain from reciting all the details.
A. Pre-Trial Discovery
197
In March 1974 a subpoena duces tecum was issued for FBI Agent Roy Mitchell's deposition
calling for all information furnished by O'Neal on plaintiffs and the BPP from 1968 through 1970.
In April 1974 thirty-four documents were turned over by the defendants. By affidavit the FBI
represented that these were the only ones within the scope of the subpoena. Government
counsel affirmed this in open court.
198
In July 1974 a subpoena duces tecum was served on Marlin Johnson for FBI files on plaintiffs
and the BPP. No documents were produced, and Johnson refused to answer questions on
deposition about the FBI's counterintelligence program and the federal grand jury proceedings.
199
In the latter part of 1974 plaintiffs subpoenaed FBI Agent Robert Piper and the Special Agent-
in-Charge of the Chicago FBI office, Richard Held, for depositions duces tecum. No documents
40 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
were furnished. Assistant United States Attorney Arnold Kanter informed the court that he had
reviewed the FBI files and found the thirty-four documents already furnished were the only ones
that were relevant. Piper refused to answer deposition questions on matters such as the
counterintelligence program, wiretaps, and informants.
200
In response to the Held subpoena, Government counsel, in February 1975, delivered a packet of
counterintelligence documents to the trial judge for an In camera inspection on the representation
that the documents were "irrelevant." Over plaintiffs' protest the judge examined the documents
before plaintiffs could be heard on the propriety of the submission. The judge ruled that the
counterintelligence information which he had examined In camera was "irrelevant and
immaterial." Later it was discovered that among the documents submitted were the Jeff Fort "hit
letter;" a memo which applauded the December 4, 1969 raid as a counterintelligence
achievement; documents which showed O'Neal to be implementing counterintelligence
operations and acting as a provocateur; and a directive from the FBI headquarters in Washington
which called for measures to "cripple" the BPP.
201
In March 1975 the trial judge entered an order at plaintiffs' request requiring the production of
documents that contained information relating to plaintiffs or the raid. In June 1975 plaintiffs
received 193 documents in response to this order.
202
The FBI witnesses continued to refuse to answer any questions on deposition that related to their
counterintelligence activities on the BPP. In August 1975 plaintiffs renewed their attempts to
subpoena documents from the FBI files. Government counsel resisted and made representations
to the effect that plaintiffs had received all pertinent documentary material. The subpoena was
denied by the trial judge. Three additional attempts made by plaintiffs prior to trial brought similar
results. In fact, the last effort to obtain relevant documents was denied by the judge before
Government counsel filed their response.
B. Trial Discovery
203
When the trial started in January 1976 plaintiffs had received over 200 extensively excised
documents from the FBI. On the opening day of trial, plaintiffs issued trial subpoenas on Held,
Mitchell, Piper, and Johnson calling for relevant counterintelligence documents. After the jury was
selected, the judge admitted that he had made a "mistake" in allowing the federal defendants to
determine the relevancy of the documents. He thereupon ordered the complete O'Neal and
plaintiffs' files maintained by the FBI to be turned over to plaintiffs as well as the
counterintelligence documents which plaintiffs had previously sought. In response to the order,
Government counsel turned over approximately 100 documents which contained many deletions.
Hearings were held to determine the propriety of the deletions. The court sustained all deletions
which did not mention the BPP directly.
204

41 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
On February 2 plaintiffs moved to reopen discovery in order to depose the FBI defendants and
other agents. Three days later plaintiffs again issued a trial subpoena on Held, this time
requesting certain documents relating to the case, including those concerning the Racial Matters
Squad and payments to O'Neal. Government counsel moved to quash the subpoena and
Assistant United States Attorney Kanter represented to the court that the plaintiffs would be
furnished the entire O'Neal file, including all information concerning payments to him. On
February 26 the FBI completed its turnover of the O'Neal documentary material, and again it was
represented that this constituted the complete file.
205
At a later date Mitchell was called to the stand. Prior to his testimony, plaintiffs asked for a
hearing to review the Government's deletions in certain documents which had been furnished.
During the hearings relevant documents which had not been produced were discovered to exist
in the Government's files. Moreover, after Mitchell took the stand he volunteered certain
information allegedly supplied by O'Neal that was not contained in any document which had
been produced by the Government. The court ordered Mitchell to search for the document.
Kanter again represented that the complete O'Neal file had been furnished. While Mitchell was
still on the stand, he reported that he had found the document in a FBI file relating to a BPP
member who lived in Rockford, Illinois. Mitchell conceded that the document should have been
placed in the Hampton or O'Neal files but that it had not been located there. Plaintiffs then moved
for the complete Hampton and O'Neal files to be brought into open court. The court granted the
request. Although Kanter admitted that the O'Neal documents were indeed located in the
Hampton and O'Neal files, he excused the nonproduction as an oversight.
206
Despite the court's order, Kanter produced only one volume of the O'Neal file. Thereupon the
judge ordered that the entire files on Hampton, O'Neal, the plaintiffs, and the BPP be brought into
the courtroom. The Government responded that there were 135 volumes of files which
responded to the court's order. The next morning the Government produced nearly 200 volumes
of files in open court. Although acknowledging that the documents should have been produced
earlier, the judge stated that he deemed it a mistake or negligence on the part of the FBI in failing
to comply with his order. He informed the jury that they were to "blame him" rather than the
parties or their attorneys. Plaintiffs moved for sanctions, including holding the Government
attorneys in contempt. The judge refused to hear the motions, indicating that he would defer any
hearings until after the trial. The judge, however, said that he would allow plaintiffs to recall the
federal defendants to the witness stand in order to examine them on documents which plaintiffs
did not have at the time of the witnesses' examinations.43 Plaintiffs asked that the trial be
suspended until all the documents had been produced. The judge denied the request.
207
On April 8, three months after the trial began, Government counsel completed the turnover to
plaintiffs of the twelve volumes of Hampton files and sixteen volumes of O'Neal files. One of the
O'Neal files contained a document written by Piper claiming FBI credit for the December 4 raid
and asking that the FBI pay a bonus to O'Neal for his furnishing the floorplan of the apartment
and setting up the raid. At that point the Government's entire turnover consisted of fifty volumes
of documents, of which plaintiffs had received about six percent before Mitchell's inadvertent
reference to the O'Neal document.
42 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
208
On April 16, 1976 the FBI revealed to the court and plaintiffs' counsel the existence of 45
additional files in its possession pertaining to the case. On May 6 the Government furnished two
volumes of documents relating to plaintiffs. Among these documents were instructions from the
FBI's headquarters in Washington "to destroy what the BPP stood for," to engage informants in
thefts of BPP records and documents, to escalate actions against the Panther Breakfast Program
for Children and other similar activities, and to combat the adverse publicity of the December 4
raid. Many of these instructions had Piper's and Johnson's initials on them.
209
On May 11, 1976, four months into the trial, the court ordered the production of other FBI files,
including the balance of its counterintelligence program file. In response the Government
furnished thirteen additional files. These included three volumes of counterintelligence, three
volumes relating to federal grand jury proceedings, two volumes relating to the Breakfast
Program, and one volume concerning the June 4, 1969 search of the BPP headquarters. In
these files were counterintelligence documents which called for the destruction of the Breakfast
Program and for the use of local police to harass the BPP for possession of guns. Many of these
documents were approved by Johnson, Piper, and Mitchell. On June 14, 1976 the Government
furnished the plaintiffs two more volumes of documents; these related to wiretaps on the BPP.
210
On June 30, 1976 the court finally denied plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its February 26 order
which quashed the second Held trial subpoena duces tecum. The court also denied plaintiffs'
request for production of other files relating to the case, finding that their production would be
duplicative of the files already produced. The court also found that the Government's deletions
and withholdings were proper.
211
It is clear that federal defendants, Johnson, Piper, and Mitchell, and their counsel, rather than
promptly furnishing relevant documents as requested, deliberately impeded discovery and
actively obstructed the judicial process, thus denying plaintiffs the fair trial to which they were
entitled.44 Regrettably, the trial judge permitted these tactics. Moreover, he repeatedly
exonerated the federal defendants for their derelictions. Instead of applying sanctions on these
defendants and their counsel, the court assessed costs against plaintiffs in excess of $26,000 for
the Government's time in reproducing the documents which were finally furnished to plaintiffs
only under the orders of the court.
212
If there were any doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence when considered under the
applicable standard constituting a jury question on liability, the delay of the federal defendants in
meeting their obligations to produce relevant documentary material would supply a basis for an
inference that plaintiffs were unable to present all the available evidence and thus were denied
the opportunity to prove their case. On retrial the court should consider plaintiffs' contention that
they ultimately were denied full discovery. Moreover, sanctions should be imposed, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2), against the federal defendants and counsel representing them at the first
trial for repeatedly disobeying court orders to produce documentary material.45
43 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
IX. DISMISSAL OF BREWER'S DIVERSITY COUNTS
213
The state defendants challenge the appealability of the trial court's dismissal of Counts 15, 16,
and 17 of the amended complaint. Plaintiff Verlina Brewer originally filed a separate complaint
against the state defendants, including the City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. The
complaint alleged common law torts of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. 1332. In the
consolidated amended complaint the three counts of the original complaint became Counts 15,
16, and 17, respectively.
214
Prior to trial, state defendants moved to dismiss the Brewer counts for lack of diversity or, in the
alternative, to sever them for trial. The district court granted severance, and took under
advisement the dismissal aspect of the motion. At the conclusion of trial and after the state
defendants had again moved to dismiss the Brewer counts, the district court on June 30, 1977
filed an order which read in pertinent part:
215
For the reasons set forth in the State defendants' original motion, their recent motion and in the
arguments of counsel for the State defendants and based upon the entire record of this case, the
court finds that said counts 15, 16 and 17 should be dismissed.
216
The actual dismissal order was entered July 1, 1977.
217
Prior to the events just described, the district court on April 15, 1977 granted motions for directed
verdicts in favor of all defendants except the seven shooters. Later, on June 20, 1977, the court
granted directed verdicts in favor of these seven and entered judgment for all the defendants on
the basis of the directed verdicts. The court's order reads:
218
It is Ordered and Adjudged that the Court finds as a matter of law that the plaintiffs and each of
them have failed to sustain their burden of proof on the issues of each and every count remaining
in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, accordingly the defendants' motion for a directed verdict in
favor of each and every defendant and against each and every plaintiff is granted and judgment
is entered herein together with costs against each and every plaintiff and in favor of each and
every defendant.
219
On June 22, 1977 plaintiffs, including Brewer, filed a notice of appeal from the orders of April 15,
1977 and June 20, 1977.
220
44 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
It is apparent from this sequence of events that the notice of appeal filed June 22, 1977 did not
encompass the dismissal of Counts 15, 16, and 17 which occurred on July 1, 1977. No notice of
appeal was filed with respect to these specific counts. Brewer's argument is that this defect in the
notice of appeal should not be fatal because an intent to appeal the district court's ruling
regarding her common law counts can be implied. The argument is unpersuasive. Although
courts generally have held that an error in designating the judgment appealed from is not per se
fatal if an intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be inferred, Daily Mirror, Inc. v. New York
News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862, 97 S.Ct. 166, 50 L.Ed.2d 140
(1976), that rule has no application here. Because of the severance, the judgment for the
defendants based on the directed verdicts did not affect the viability of Brewer's common law
counts. Therefore no inference of inclusion in the only notice of appeal can be made.
221
Accordingly, the dismissal of the Brewer common law counts is not properly before us.
X. ATTORNEYS' FEES
222
Plaintiffs seek, in addition to a reversal of the district court judgments and a remand for a new
trial, an award of attorneys' fees for "their efforts to date." The request is based on the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (the Act), Pub.L. No. 94-559 (Oct. 19, 1976), codified
in42 U.S.C. 1988. We grant the request for an award of attorneys' fees for their appellate work,
but hold that plaintiffs presently are not eligible to receive an award for their trial endeavors.
Section 1988 as amended reads:
223
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986
of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
224
This court has recently held in Davis v. Murphy, 587 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978), that the Act permits
a prevailing plaintiff on appeal to receive fees for appellate work. Accordingly, we have the
discretion to award a reasonable fee to plaintiffs as part of their appellate costs unless special
circumstances render such recovery unjust. Fed.R.App.P. 39. See also Wharton v. Knefel, 562
F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977). A review of the record fails to disclose any special circumstances which
would render an award inequitable.46 No affidavits have been submitted by plaintiffs, however, to
support their request. Therefore, plaintiffs should submit to this Court a statement of the fees
requested supported by any relevant material and in affidavit form. Defendants shall be afforded
an opportunity to respond. Employing the standard expressed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), factors bearing on the amount of the award will
include
225
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question presented; (3) the
45 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
skill required to perform the legal services; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by client or circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10)
the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; (12) awards in similar cases.
226
Id. at 717-19, as cited in King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 3146, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978).
227
Plaintiffs also seek attorneys' fees for their trial work. The language of the Act precludes an
award to the unsuccessful party in a civil rights trial. In the case at bar, plaintiffs were not "the
prevailing party" at the trial level and therefore are not permitted to receive fees for that effort
under section 1988. In light of our decision today, however, we hold that if plaintiffs ultimately
prevail, the district court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees for the district court phase of the
case preceding this appeal in addition to any further attorneys' fees the trial court may deem
appropriate after retrial.
XI. CONTEMPT JUDGMENTS
228
In separate appeals Jeffrey H. Haas and G. Flint Taylor, attorneys for plaintiffs, asked that the
contempt judgments entered against them be reversed. These appeals have been consolidated
with the main appeal. In order to appraise fully these contempt matters, it is necessary to present
the facts in detail.
TAYLOR
229
In the last days of October 1976 plaintiffs called Robert Zimmers, the FBI firearms expert, as a
witness. On November 1, while Zimmers was on the stand, the following took place:
230
Mr. Haas (attorney for plaintiffs): I now show you what I will mark as RZ51 and ask you what type
of weapon is this, sir?
231
Mr. Zimmers: A double-barrelled Stevens shotgun, which bears serial number 43312 . . . .
232
Mr. Haas: Could we have a stipulation, your Honor, that this weapon was taken on the raid by
George Jones?

46 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
233
Mr. Witkowski (attorney for defendants): Yes.
234
The Court: So stipulated . . . Let the record show that counsel has so agreed.
235
Mr. Witkowski: Yes, your Honor.
236
Several days later Haas again presented the Jones shotgun to Zimmers on the witness stand.
237
Mr. Haas: And is that the item, RZ51, the double standard sawed-off shotgun which we have
shown you earlier, sir?
238
Mr. Zimmers: . . . Yes, this is the one.
239
Mr. Haas: And it has been stipulated that this is the weapon that was carried by Officer Jones on
the raid of December 4, 1969.
240
At that point defense counsel objected. The judge said he would hear the objection outside the
presence of the jury. Attorney John P. Coghlan, defense counsel, then argued that the
defendants had never entered into a stipulation using the word "raid." He accused Haas of a
"deliberate, wilful and intentional attempt to prejudice the jury." Haas said that his statement
about the stipulation was accurate. At that point Taylor asked for a recess so that the transcript
could be inspected. The judge denied the request.
241
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the judge announced: "Mr. Haas has deliberately and
wilfully misread a statement. I direct you (Haas) to read that statement, that stipulation,
corrected." Haas said he had stated the stipulation correctly. The judge then asked Coghlan to
"state the stipulation correctly." Coghlan extemporized:
242
Mr. Coghlan: The stipulation is that the weapon that was shown to the witness was one of the
weapons carried by the officers serving a search warrant at 2337 W. Monroe.
243

47 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
The Court: Now that is it . . . .
244
During the next two days plaintiffs' counsel repeated their requests on several occasions to
review the court's transcript because they had none of their own. Finally, on November 10, the
judge permitted the inspection.
245
The next day plaintiffs' counsel presented a motion to "Correct Prejudicial Remarks Made by the
Court to the Jury and For Mistrial," supported by the transcript showing Haas' statement was not
a misrepresentation. The judge summarily said he was taking the motion under advisement, and
gave defense counsel ten days to respond. Haas argued that the prejudice should be cured as
soon as possible. The judge refused to reconsider. At that point counsel for plaintiffs returned to
their table flinging down their papers. Taylor's hand struck a pitcher of water on the table. The
pitcher slid along the table top and fell to the floor near the jury box. The glass lining broke and
water spilled on the rug. All of this took place while the court was in recess and the jury out of the
courtroom. The transcript reads as follows:The Court: I have entered my order.
246
Now, there is one juror who has not arrived yet. We will now recess until
247
All right. Let the record show the conduct of both counsel in throwing papers around and one of
them what is it that is broken over there?
248
Mr. Coghlan: Sir, there is broken a glass water pitcher.
249
The Court: All right. Mr. Taylor, you did that, and you are now held in contempt of court, and the
Court now orders you committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for a
period of 24 hours, and orders the Marshal to take you into custody forthwith.
250
Mr. Taylor: May I be heard, your Honor?
251
The Court: No, sir.
252
Mr. Taylor: I have the right to speak before I am summarily sentenced, and I want to say
253

48 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
The Marshal: This court will stand in recess.
254
After a brief recess, the trial resumed. The judge ordered that the pitcher and debris be left
before the jury box. Haas made several requests to be heard out of the presence of the jury
concerning the incident. The requests were denied. The judge, however, did grant a request of
Special Corporation Counsel Camillo F. Volini that Volini's photographer take pictures of the
broken pitcher. Although the judge refused to permit the press to take photographs, he told Volini
that "they (the press) may have a copy of the picture that is taken." He also told defense counsel
to have the press "pay you whatever it costs," if they desired a copy.
255
After the incident, an attorney appeared on behalf of Taylor and attempted to be heard. The
judge refused the request telling the attorney to return later in the day. Near the close of the
afternoon session, the judge, without hearing argument on behalf of Taylor, entered the following
order:
256
The Court finds that a motion was made by counsel for plaintiffs herein, and the Court ordered
counsel for defendants to answer the same within 10 days. Both Jeffrey Haas and G. Flint Taylor,
two of the attorneys for plaintiffs, demanded an oral hearing, which the Court denied.
Immediately after the Court refused to hear them orally, Attorney G. Flint Taylor, In a fit of anger,
threw paper, books and other objects on the table for counsel, including a decanter with an inside
glass lining, which was broken. Water and glass were sprayed over the floor in front of the jury
box. Present in the Court were a number of spectators and representatives of the press.
257
The Court finds that such action was a contemptuous and constituted willful and deliberate
contempt of this Court in its presence at 10:30 a. m., November 11, 1976. The Court does hereby
find Attorney G. Flint Taylor in contempt of Court, and does hereby order and direct that he be
and is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for a period
of 24 hours, ending at 10:35 a. m. on November 12, 1976.
258
The Court further orders and directs the United States Marshal to immediately execute this order
and take Attorney G. Flint Taylor into custody forthwith.
259
The judge immediately amended the order by substituting the words "in the presence of the
Court" for "in a fit of anger." He also commuted the time to be served.
HAAS
260
On February 22, 1977 Hanrahan was recalled as a witness after a four-day interval during which
49 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Treviranus had testified regarding the federal grand jury investigation. Treviranus identified a
memo he had written which outlined the arrangement between Hanrahan and Assistant Attorney
General Leonard whereby the raiders would not be indicted by the grand jury and Hanrahan
would terminate the prosecution in the state court against the survivors of the raid. The court had
deferred a request to introduce the document while Johnson and Treviranus were under
examination. With Hanrahan back on the stand the transcript reads:
261
Mr. Haas: Sir, were you present at a meeting with Marlin Johnson in late March or early April of
1970 in which he indicated that there would be no indictments of police officers or yourself?
262
Mr. Hanrahan: No, sir.
263
Q: Well now, didn't Mr. Hanrahan, didn't you tell the Federal prosecutors on or about April 8 that
you were going to drop the indictments against the occupants of the apartment?
264
A: My recollection is that on the second date that I appeared before the Grand Jury I indicated
that they would review the indictments that are pending and probably dismiss them.
265
Q: You are referring to May 5th of 1970?
266
A: I am referring to the second occasion that I appeared before the Federal Grand Jury. It was
early in the year and I believe it was in May.
267
Q: But prior to that you had entered an agreement with the Federal prosecutors to drop the
charges, had you not?
268
A: No, sir.
269
Q: And hadn't you told them that the reason that
270
Defense counsel Volini objected and asked for a hearing outside the presence of the jury. After
the jury had left the courtroom, Volini asked that Haas be instructed to cease asking questions
concerning the agreement and that the jury be "instructed to disregard it." Arnold Kanter, counsel
50 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
for the defendants, asserted that Haas should be denied the opportunity to ask more questions
concerning such agreements because the witness had already asserted there were none. The
judge did not rule on these motions, nor did he wait to hear from plaintiffs' counsel. He called the
jury back and said, "The last question is stricken. You will disregard it." Haas then resumed his
questioning of Hanrahan:
271
Mr. Haas: Mr. Hanrahan, do you know how it was that Leonard Treviranus knew on April 8th that
the Grand Jury
272
Mr. Kanter: Objection.
The Court: Now, Mr. Haas
273
Mr. Haas: Wait a minute.
274
The Court: we just got through out of the presence of the jury. You will not go into that subject
matter any further.
275
Mr. Haas: I didn't even get to argue it. Well, Judge, the deal
276
The Court: I said you will not go into it any further.
277
Mr. Haas: Judge, we can't cover up the coverup.
278
Mr. Witkowski (attorney for defendants): Your Honor
279
Mr. Haas: That is part of our complaint, that they covered up, Judge.
Mr. Coghlan: If the court please
280
The Court: Mr. Haas, you are now held in contempt of court for the last remark directed to the
Court, and I will prepare an order accordingly.

51 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Mr. Taylor: May the jury be excused
281
The Court: The Court will take a recess, and we will prepare an order holding you in contempt.
282
Mr. Haas: All right, Judge. I think all the people who have spoken the truth have always ended up
in contempt, and the coverup goes on and on and on.
283
Mr. Taylor: And Mr. Treviranus testified on Friday, Judge.
284
The Court: I will hold you in contempt and I will now turn you over to the custody
285
Mr. Haas: O.K., Judge.
286
The Court: of the U. S. Marshal for contempt, and hold you in custody until tomorrow morning at
9:00 o'clock.
Mr. Haas: All right, Judge, I would just
287
Mr. Taylor: There is a document right here that says there was
288
The Court: Court now stands in recess.
289
Haas was taken into custody by the United States Marshal and ordered held until the following
morning. An order was entered by the judge that day finding that Haas' "statements and actions
in the presence of the Court are serious and that it resulted in the obstruction of the
administration of justice . . . ." The judge referred to no specific language, but did recite "certain
statements in open court in the presence of the jury as set forth in the transcript of the Court
proceedings certified by the court reporter and attached hereto made a part hereof." The court
denied a motion for appeal bond, and Haas remained in jail until the next morning. On the
following day the judge reversed his ruling and heard extensive testimony from Hanrahan about
the alleged arrangement.
290
Unquestionably, a court has the power to punish summarily contemptuous conduct which occurs
52 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
in the presence, sight, or hearing of a presiding judge. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04, 9
S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). For example, that the contumacious refusal of a witness to testify,
"may so directly obstruct a court in the performance of its duty as to justify punishment for
contempt is so well settled as to need only statement." Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 382, 39
S.Ct. 337, 339, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919).
291
The power of a federal court to punish immediately and summarily for "direct contempt" is
codified in 18 U.S.C. 401 which provides that:
292
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion,
such contempt of its authority, and none other, as
293
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice . . . .
294
The Supreme Court, commenting on this statute in In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233-34, 82
S.Ct. 1288, 1291, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962), explained that this provision was enacted by Congress
"in order to correct serious abuses of the summary contempt power that had grown up . . .
revealing 'a Congressional intent to safeguard Constitutional procedures by limiting courts . . . to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." ' " The Court in McConnell then
defined the issue:
295
Thus the question in this case comes down to whether it can "clearly be shown" on this record
that the petitioner's statements while attempting to make his offers of proof actually obstructed
the district judge in "the performance of judicial duty."
296
Id. at 234, 82 S.Ct. at 1291.
297
In the case before us, paraphrasing the above-quoted language, the question comes down to
whether it can "clearly be shown" on the record that the respective conduct of Haas and Taylor
actually obstructed the district judge in the "performance of judicial duty." We are convinced that
their conduct cannot be so characterized.
298
The Taylor episode must be viewed against the background of the events leading up to it: The
trial judge's erroneous accusation before the jury that Haas had deliberately and wilfully misread
the statement about the stipulation; the judge's repeated denials to permit the inspection of the
53 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
court's transcript for verification that Haas had not "misread the statement"; the judge's refusal to
correct the record immediately, but in lieu thereof giving the defendants ten days to respond.
These combined circumstances apparently caused Taylor to reach the "breaking point" of his
patience and forbearance. We also must take into consideration that the episode occurred while
the court was recessed, and that the judge permitted the fallen pitcher and broken glass to
remain on the floor after the jury returned to the courtroom.
299
While we do not intend to condone Taylor's gesture of anger, we are convinced, in the words of
Judge Duffy in his dissent in McConnell, ". . . there was no interference with the conduct of the
trial. There was no obstruction in the administration of justice." Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin,
294 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1961). And the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Duffy's appraisal in
that case.
300
What we have said about Taylor's complained-of conduct applies to Haas' conduct as well. Haas
was held in contempt for saying "we can't cover up the coverup." After saying this, he tried to
explain: "That is part of our complaint, that they covered up, Judge." The judge, however, took
the remark as personally directed at him. In the context of what had happened before, the judge,
in our opinion, had no reason to interpret the remark in that manner, and should have given Haas
the benefit of every doubt. This court's statement in In re Dellinger is pertinent:
301
While McConnell cannot be read as an immunization for all conduct undertaken by an attorney in
good faith representation of his client, it does require that attorneys be given great latitude in the
area of vigorous advocacy. Appellate courts must ensure that trial judges (or the jury on remand)
are not left free to manipulate the balance between vigorous advocacy and obstructions so as to
chill effective advocacy when deciding lawyer contempts. Admittedly, the line defies strict
delineation (Goldfarb, The Contempt Power, 172 (1971)), but by our resolving doubts in favor of
advocacy, an independent and unintimidated bar can be maintained while actual obstruction is
dealt with appropriately.
302
Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point
of appearing obnoxious, when acting on their client's behalf. An attorney may with impunity take
full advantage of the range of conduct that our adversary system allows.
303
461 F.2d 389, 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, we find that the contempt citations are
unwarranted when considered in their factual setting.
XII. CONCLUSION
304
The contempt judgments are reversed. In addition, the directed verdicts are reversed and the

54 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
judgments of dismissal vacated, except for the claims against Purtell, Koludrovic, Sorosky, and
Meltreger and all but the section 1986 claims against Ervanian and Kukowinski. The judgments
of dismissal with respect to these claims are affirmed. The judgments for costs against plaintiffs
are reversed. Costs on appeal and attorneys' fees are awarded to plaintiffs against all
nonprevailing defendants.
305
The cause is remanded to the district court for a new trial. As an administrative matter, the district
court is directed to reassign this case under the provisions of Circuit Rule 18 and, because of its
age, to direct the judge to whom it is assigned to give the retrial high priority.
306
FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, concurring.
307
I concur in the opinion written by Judge Swygert except as qualified by the following
observations.
308
I agree that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor, a jury verdict for them on one or more theories of liability
could be sustained. I am sure that no more is meant by the frequent references in the opinion to
a "prima facie" case. Because so much depends upon the fact-finder's choice among inferences,
there was never any stage of this case (with the possible exception of the case against the
shooters) at which the evidence compelled a verdict for plaintiffs unless rebutted.
309
I have some problem in analyzing the impact on plaintiffs' case of the several possible findings
with respect to a conspiracy. The main objective of plaintiffs appears to be recovery of damages
arising from the events of the raid. Undeniably there was loss of life, loss of liberty (including
bodily injury), and invasion of privacy. The 1983 claim for those damages must rest upon
establishing that life and liberty were taken without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (or that privacy was invaded in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments). If the search warrant was valid and if the force used was not excessive under the
circumstances, that 1983 claim (and any corresponding 1985(3) claim) must fail.
310
I agree that the jury could properly find a conspiracy by federal and state defendants to discredit
and hamper BPP in its political activity and thus impair First Amendment rights. But it would not
follow, without more, that the search, if found to be unconstitutional, or the use of force, if found
to be excessive, was within the objects of that conspiracy. The activity of the federal defendants
in surveillance of a group from whom violent, unlawful conduct was expected, and in informing
state officers of the floor plan and possession of weapons could be found to have been legitimate
activity and cooperation in law enforcement, and not wrongful acts pursuant to a conspiracy,
even though the jury also found a conspiracy to disrupt or discredit BPP politically. In my view,
55 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
there could be no recovery of damages, arising from the raid, based solely on a conspiracy
theory, unless the jury was satisfied that the unlawful raid or the use of excessive force in
carrying out a lawful raid was within the objects of the conspiracy.
311
In the discussion of immunity, Judge Swygert suggests that certain defendants may be liable for
damages resulting from the generation of post-raid publicity misrepresenting the facts. Whatever
course may be followed on retrial with respect to such a claim, it seems clear that plaintiffs
cannot recover damages for injury to reputation, without more. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).
312
I do not join in directing the imposition of sanctions under F.R.Civ.P. 37(b) (2), although I would
favor directing the district court to give consideration to doing so, on remand.
313
I would limit the holding that a prosecutor is not entitled to full immunity while performing
"investigative" functions to the investigative functions of the prosecutor defendants described in
this case.
314
PELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part, concurring in part.
315
It has been difficult for me to place this case in a proper perspective, but following the effort to do
so I am convinced that the opinion written by Judge Swygert reaches an incorrect result in a
substantial number of instances. Therefore while concurring in that opinion wherein it affirms the
district court's judgment and with regard to the reversal as to one group of defendants on one
issue, I otherwise respectfully dissent, all as set forth hereinafter.
316
The initial difficulty in acquiring a proper perspective, indeed any kind of an overall view, of the
case comes from the sheer volume of material it has generated. To begin with, the mass of
documents, which is what this court basically has to go on to make its decision, includes some
37,000 pages of evidence, plus exhibits which we can only view visually as a cold record but
which was presented audibly to the district court bit by bit, painstakingly and tediously, over the
approximate eighteen months that this civil case jury trial took. Next we have before us the
contentions of the parties in the so-called briefs, occupying more than 800 pages. At this point,
the accumulation of additional paper might appear to be drawing to a welcome close. There is
virtually no dispute as to the basic law applicable to the appellate treatment of directed verdicts.
At the risk of over-simplification, they are not favored by the law and the judgments based
thereon will be reversed when the evidence reflects that reasonable persons in a fair and
impartial exercise of their judgment may draw different conclusions therefrom. Thus it would
seem that if the 37,000 pages reasonably exhibited a basis for different conclusions, the resulting
decisional opinion, unless it were designed to serve some other purpose than its primary one of
56 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
disposing of the case, could be of fairly short length. Alternatively, of course, if there is difficulty in
finding a solid base in the monumental record we have here for different conclusions under the
applicable law, the effort to reverse might necessarily achieve extensive proportions. In any
event, Judge Swygert's opinion has added to the bulk more than 125 typed pages.
317
The matter of a proper perspective is further made difficult by the diverse approaches of the
parties which I might have assumed before becoming involved in the case was to recover
monetary damages for claimed wrongs visited upon them by the state and federal defendants.
From my evaluation of their briefs and oral arguments, however, there is not this singleminded
pursuit. One group of plaintiffs, whom for convenience of reference I will call the Hampton
plaintiffs, consists of the Administratrix of the Fred Hampton estate, Hampton's girlfriend and the
mother of his posthumously born child, and two other persons. Of the four Hampton plaintiffs,
three were present in the apartment at the time the raid occurred and two of the three were
wounded. The fourth Hampton plaintiff is the personal representative of one of the two persons
killed in the raid.
318
While the compact original brief filed by the attorney for the Hampton plaintiffs does purport to
incorporate by reference most of the issues and supporting arguments advanced by the
remaining plaintiffs (with the exception of those dealing with the bias and prejudice of the trial
judge and his failure to recuse himself), this brief "relates to the directed verdict granted,
following the dismissal of the jury as distinguished from the (earlier) directed verdict regarding the
Federal and certain State defendants." While the reply brief of the Hampton plaintiffs does
advance some argument as to the conspiracy and liability vis-a-vis the federal defendants, it
appears abundantly clear to me that the prime thrust of the Hampton plaintiffs both in briefing
and oral argument is toward the most vulnerable underside of this litigation, the directed verdict
as to the defendant raiders who engaged in shooting in the apartment. This appears to me to be
a realistic evaluation of this civil damage case and one best designed to achieve the purpose of
the case, that of expeditiously collecting damages from claimed wrongdoers without undertaking
once again the agonizingly extended trial of extraneous political issues. I can only assume that
the Hampton plaintiffs' attorney is pursuing that which his clients most desire, compensation for
the wrong which they feel they suffered.
319
The remaining five plaintiffs, designated for convenience as the Anderson plaintiffs, includes the
Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Clark and two more of those who were wounded. While all of
these people no doubt will not spurn any recovery that might be made in their behalf, I come
away from an examination of this case with the distinct sensation that the Anderson plaintiffs'
lawyers, although equally willing for and desirous of a substantial money recovery, are fervently
bent on attempting to demonstrate the existence of a widespread and sinister conspiracy among
top law enforcement officials, state and federal, serving in the Chicago area in 1969, to kill Fred
Hampton and other functionaries of the Black Panther Party. Their wide-ranging and vociferous
charges indicate that the conspiracy was racially motivated to put down and destroy people
associated with a political movement. But, the tenor and scope of their assertions is best
illustrated by these quotations from their brief's Introduction and Statement of the Case:

57 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
320
In response to this challenge to white supremacy, the F.B.I. mobilized to stop this political
movement. They implemented and refined illegal, unconstitutional counterintelligence tactics
designed to neutralize and destroy these organizations with special, violent emphasis on those
leaders and organizations such as the B.P.P. who sought the liberation of black people. This
program, implemented and run in Chicago by the F.B.I. Defendants, solicited and obtained the
willing assistance of State's Attorney EDWARD HANRAHAN who was himself anxious to gain
political prominence by exploiting racism. HANRAHAN and his special political police force, in
conspiracy with these F.B.I. Defendants, planned and executed the murderous December 4th
raid at the apartment of the Plaintiffs. . . . After Hampton and Mark Clark were killed, a
concentrated effort was launched by City, County and Federal officials to cover up both the true
nature of the political assassination as well as their involvement in it. They manipulated the
judicial system at every turn to accomplish this end. HANRAHAN used his power as State's
Attorney to falsely charge the survivors, and to prosecute them for six months to mask his
culpability and that of his police. Richard Nixon's Justice Department, in cooperation with the
F.B.I., used a Federal Grand Jury investigation to cover up the F.B.I. involvement in the raid and
subsequently entered into an agreement with HANRAHAN which saved him from indictment in
exchange for HANRAHAN's continued silence concerning the F.B.I. involvement. The Justice
Department then attempted to put the controversy to rest in the public eye by releasing a report
which was critical of both the police and the Panthers. . . . By the fall of 1975, pretrial discovery,
because of Defendants' obstructions, served little purpose except to frustrate the search for truth,
the Court's prejudice having similarly frustrated this search. . . . January 1976, the Plaintiffs went
to trial in front of a Judge determined to defeat their claims and with much of the evidence which
proved the F.B.I. Defendants' involvement in the raid still being concealed by the Defendants and
their attorneys. . . . After 15 months of treachery to the Plaintiffs' claims the District Court, four
days before the mayoral primary in which HANRAHAN was a candidate, directed verdicts for all
the Defendants except those seven raiders who admitted to firing their weapons at the
apartment. . . . Plaintiffs appeal, but they seek not only reversal of these grossly unfair and illegal
verdicts, but sanctions and fees against the parties and their attorneys who knowingly obstructed
justice in the Court below, and appropriate orders to assist them to finally obtain the discovery to
which they are entitled, and strong rebuke to the trial Court who completely abused his power,
trammelled the Constitution and nullified the Civil Rights Act.
321
Thus it seems although they are not charged as unindicted co-conspirators that the entire
officialdom of government from the President to the federal district judge were intent upon
bringing about the elimination of a small group of people who simply desired to achieve the
desirable and constitutionally required status of racial equality.
322
The Introduction and Statement of the Case of the Anderson plaintiffs' brief set the tone which
was followed through their 247 pages of overstated characterizations. Thus, initially, supposedly
by way of background they move on the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an endeavor to
demonstrate that the FBI's counterintelligence program insofar as it was directed toward the
Black Panther Party was a basis for a reasonable inference that FBI officials in reality were
conspiring to implement the program by resorting to homicide of the local Black Panther leader.
Conspicuously absent in the development is any reference to the fact that the program was
58 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
directed toward an organization which had announced it would achieve its objectives by violent
means.
323
The intemperance of the Anderson plaintiffs' approach is particularly demonstrated in the some
75 or more pages devoted to denigrating the district court judge. Thus, typically:
324
. . . the Court, ignoring the merits of Plaintiffs' claim, denied the Motion "as not well taken." . . .
The Court refused to declare them hostile witnesses or allow them to be impeached or cross
examined by Plaintiffs' counsel. . . . The Court repeatedly refused to hear the motions, and
angrily postponed hearing the contempt and sanctions motions until after the trial. . . . the court
(in sustaining a specious objection by Defendant . . . the Court grasped at various straws in
attempting to justify his baseless and punitive ruling. . . . The Court's arbitrary refusal to allow
discovery concerning GROTH's alleged informant and his obstruction of meaningful cross-
examination. . . . The Court, in essence, scuttled the entire Plaintiffs' rebuttal case . . . . The
entire record demonstrates that the trial judge was not an impartial judge representing the
impersonal authority of the law, but was both an advocate from the bench for the Defendants'
cause, and an "activist seeking combat" with Plaintiffs' counsel . . . Despite this powerful
evidence of racism and prejudice against the Plaintiffs, the Court refused to allow lawyer voir
dire. . . . The Court tightly controlled the voir dire, and attempted to select a jury which he could
manipulate to agree with his view of the case and return a verdict for the Defendants . . . In stark
contrast to the treatment afforded the Plaintiffs and their evidence, the trial court aided the
Defendants and supported their cause throughout the trial, in its rulings and remarks from the
bench . . . unduly restricted questioning in key areas . . . using the pretext that they hadn't been
questioned with the sketch on direct . . . The Court, on its own added to the prejudicial
information imparted to the jury during the course of the trial. . . . He (the judge) repeatedly
threatened contempt in order to discourage Plaintiffs' right to be heard and to make a record. . . .
Defendants' lawyers were allowed almost free reign in the Courtroom. . . . Constant interruption
from the Bench, and frivolous objections from the Defense counsel (encouraged by the Court's
obvious attitudes) diluted the strength of Plaintiffs' evidence. The atmosphere of intimidation
generated from the bench made an effective presentation of the evidence against Defendants
difficult, if not impossible. The Court's arbitrary and ever-shifting rules made cross-examination of
Defendants a perilous task, with Summary Contempt lurking behind each question. Merely rising
to object was fraught with danger and likely to evoke a strong rebuke from the Court. Plaintiffs'
counsel were confronted with a hostile, powerful adversary in the District Court; the damage
inflicted on Plaintiffs as a result of the intimidation and belittlement of Plaintiffs' counsel by the
District Court of itself requires reversal. . . . Both in specific instances, and as a whole, the court's
charge to the jury revealed its bias in favor of the defendants, and constituted reversible error. . .
. He (the judge) used his judicial power as well as the resources and bullying of defense counsel
to harass and attack the Plaintiffs when they attempted to recuse him. (Footnotes omitted.)
325
I do not mean to suggest that the multi-page portions of the brief from which the above extracts
were taken is not replete with specific instances purporting to show the asserted unbridled bias
and prejudice of the trial judge. A close analysis of these supportive instances reflects, however,
that many of them pertained to rulings in evidentiary matters as to which the trial judge is
59 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
accorded substantial discretion. Any trial lawyer of any competence is aware that he doesn't
prevail on every ruling of the court but that his failure to do so is no ground for a legitimate claim
of bias and prejudice. Such a lawyer also is sufficiently perceptive to realize the scope of the
judge's rulings and that to attempt another tack on the same forbidden subject may well occasion
a rebuke. Nevertheless, the Anderson plaintiffs' trial counsel pursued such a course and then
when rebuked claimed this to be another example of the unfairness of the judge. I find the claim
of unfair limitation of the presentation of their case to be virtually frivolous. A year and a half of
trial and 37,000 pages of testimony scarcely is supportive of a restrictive evidentiary limitation.
Nor can I find any real indication in this record that the ebullient trial counsel were intimidated by
the judge. In this circuit, voir dire of the jury is conducted by the trial judge. Yet in this civil case,
failing to get special treatment, the plaintiffs claim they were treated unfairly.
326
If there is merit in claims of incorrect judicial rulings, those rulings should speak for themselves in
requiring reversal and they do not need to be sandwiched in a desperate collage of conclusory
overstated characterizations. Even though it often might seem that heaping abuse on public
officials is now a favorite public pastime, it does appear to me that the proper place for this
steam-venting is other than in the area of appellate review. We have here the matter of the
propriety of directed verdicts. I should think that while hyperbolic and cynical character
castigations might create an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, even though unfounded, it
does not upon examination provide a case or controversy to go to a jury. I do not, I hasten to
add, mean to suggest that history has not recorded corrupt governments, or public officials who
have intentionally deprived citizens of those rights which are given to them by our constitution.
When, however, the charge is a broadside condemnation of the entire fabric of law enforcement
in a large metropolis, we at the very least ought to examine most carefully the underlying facts to
see if the charges are reasonably inferable or are nothing more than fanciful conjectures.
327
Chief Judge Fairchild observes in his concurring opinion that the main objective of the plaintiffs
appears to be the recovery of damages arising from the events of the raid. I agree with him
insofar as the Hampton plaintiffs are concerned but, as I have already indicated, it appears to me
that the Anderson plaintiffs have a secondary objective, indeed, one which may well be a primary
objective in view of their emphasis on it, and that is to use this litigation as an exposition ground
for political philosophy and the courtroom as a political forum. If law enforcement or other
government officials are demonstrated by evidence as having deprived citizens of their
constitutional rights and in the process of such litigation those officials get smeared with the
brush of villainy then it must be so; it is simply that I think the process should not go in reverse.
328
I regret to do so, but feel compelled in candor to add, that it appears to me that Judge Swygert's
opinion, although I would question whether it was so intended, lends aid and succor to the
political espousal objective of the Anderson plaintiffs. I come away from each reading of the
opinion, despite occasional references therein to the requirement that plaintiffs to recover must
prove their case to the trier of fact, with the feeling that the author of the opinion thinks that the
case has already been convincingly proven in many respects.
Thus, on a random basis, I note:

60 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
329
Plaintiffs' prima facie case offers a number of constitutional deprivations to accompany their
conspiracy allegations . . . Plaintiffs' evidence in the instant case indicates that the federal and
state defendants share in instigating and preparing for the raid . . . The BPP was a black
organization with a distinct political ideology and a variety of politically-oriented programs. FBI
documents offered by plaintiffs demonstrate that certain FBI activities directed against the BPP
transcended mere "law enforcement." . . . Without the information the federal defendants
furnished the state defendants, the state defendants could not have acted in furtherance of the
purpose which plaintiffs contend the state and federal defendants share inflicting injury to the
BPP. . . . In granting the directed verdicts, the trial judge repeatedly usurped this (the jury's)
function. . . . Despite their awareness of conflicting stories, Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders
continued to circulate reports to justify the continuation of plaintiffs' detention. . . . The evidence
shows that a jury could find that Johnson's testimony before the grand jury was false and
misleading and concealed the involvement of FBI headquarters and the roles of Piper, Mitchell,
and O'Neal in the planning of the raid. . . . And during the pretrial discovery in this suit, the
federal defendants continued to engage in dilatory and obstructive tactics to conceal evidence of
their involvement in the planning of the raid. . . . His (Sadunas') examination resulted in a crucial
misidentification which would have remained uncorrected absent Zimmers' subsequent tests and
conclusions. . . .
330
Because of the high esteem in which I hold my brother Swygert, it is with considerable regret that
I feel compelled to observe that had I not had an acquaintanceship with the case as a member of
the panel prior to reading Judge Swygert's opinion I could, upon the completion of the lengthy
process of reading it, well have entertained the idea that the case involved a group of political
idealists who had been subjected to a cleverly orchestrated governmental persecution designed
not just to neutralize their effectiveness1 but to remove them from the American scene physically.
It is time, it seems to me, to look realistically at the group to which the local authorities directed
their activities pursuant to a judicially authorized search warrant.
331
The state defendants have summarized from the record of this case the matters pertaining to the
Black Panther Party which undoubtedly engaged the attention of law enforcement agencies.
Because this factual information does not appear to be subject to challenge as to accuracy I note
some of the salient aspects thereof.
332
The Black Panther Party was a militant, black, extremist, paramilitary, uniformed organization
formed in Oakland, California in 1966. It was a violent, revolutionary organization, which by party
edict required its members to own and know how to use weapons and to have access to more
than one weapon. The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party proclaimed that a class
struggle in this country required the leadership of an armed revolutionary party, and that the
Black Panther Party was simultaneously a military organization and political organization with
leaders holding both military and political rank.
333

61 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Black Panther publications called for killing policemen. The party's policy was that if at least one
shot was not fired by a member being arrested, then the party would not stand behind that
member. Black Panthers were called on to "revolt," "to arm themselves," to "dynamite," to "kill the
pigs everywhere," to "not dissent from American government, we will overthrow it," and were
admonished that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Black Panthers published a
"Destruction Kit" which described how to make and use incendiary bombs and other similar
devices.
334
Much emphasis is placed in the record on the social service to the community provided by the
Black Panther Party particularly with regard to their "Breakfast for Children Program." However,
the record also reflects that drawings were made on blackboards instructing children to "Kill the
Pigs." At these breakfasts there was distributed a "Black Panther Coloring Book" depicting in
cartoons pictures of children killing policemen. At one similar Black Panther Breakfast program
the children were given revolutionary posters entitled "Free Huey, In Revolution One Lives and
One Dies, and Off The Pig." A report concerning the FBI raid of Panther headquarters on
Madison Street on June 4, 1969 reflects that the material seized therein included posters which
advocated violent overthrow of the government, numerous weapons, both handguns and long
guns including stolen weapons, and press releases promoting Panther propaganda. The Black
Panther Publications during 1969 contained quotations of various of their leaders such as
335
Huey P. Newton When the people move for liberation, they must have the basic tool of liberation
the gun . . . The blood, sweat, tears and suffering of Black people are the foundation of the
wealth and power of the United States of America. We were forced to build America, and if
forced to we will tear it down. The immediate result of this destruction will be suffering and
bloodshed. But the end result will be perpetual peace for all mankind.
336
In one exhibit there appears a description of a "Plan for the Complete Breakdown of the State of
Illinois Power Structure." This plan documents the Panthers advocating the bombing and
destruction of buildings and public systems as well as the killing of government leaders.
337
There had been numerous shooting confrontations and clashes between the Black Panthers and
police prior to December 4, 1969, both nationally and locally. Several policemen had been
wounded and there had been shooting with Chicago police at the Black Panther Party
headquarters a block from the apartment in question on July 31, 1969, and October 4, 1969. On
November 13, 1969, two Chicago police officers were killed in a shootout with Spurgeon Jake
Winters. Winters was killed in the incident and seven other Chicago police officers were
wounded. The Black Panthers boasted of the killing of these police officers by Winters and
claimed Winters as a member.
338
Hampton's own propensities as a leader in the Black Panther Party were evident from his
proposal to murder a state trooper who was approaching his car stalled on a highway on a trip to
62 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Rockford, his conviction by a jury for robbery in May 1969, his kidnapping and torturing of a party
member who is accused of stealing a Panther weapon, his use of weapons during a shootout of
the Panthers with the Blackstone Rangers in Robbins, Illinois, and his often-quoted statement, "If
you kill one pig, you get a little satisfaction, if you kill some more pigs you get more satisfaction, if
you kill all the pigs, you get complete satisfaction." Others of the plaintiffs who were at the
apartment in question had criminal records and all had familiarity with handling firearms.
339
Finally, on the matter of the Black Panthers being a political party it must be remembered that the
nine people who occupied this relatively small apartment on the morning in question were in the
midst of a private arsenal consisting of 19 unregistered weapons, including 12 shotguns and
rifles, among which were a stolen Chicago Police Department riot gun and 2 sawed-off shotguns,
7 handguns and several hundred rounds of ammunition. The occupants were not without
knowledge in the use of the weapons and were members of an organization that advocated use
of the weapons when a confrontation with police was involved.
340
This brings me to a final difficulty in placing this case in a proper perspective and that is the role
of martyrdom in which many now regard Hampton and Clark. Irrespective of whether that shroud
of martyrdom is misconceived, I cannot imagine that prior to December 4, 1969, this
posthumously acquired respectability would have been accorded by many persons, either black
or white, other than those subscribing to ochlocracy even though many persons, both black and
white supported the goal of equal recognition and treatment for black people. The emotionalism
of the plaintiffs' sinister conspiracy presentation should not obliterate the fact that there were
ample grounds for regarding Hampton and those in the apartment with him as law violators.
341
Perhaps this is not in keeping with the time in which we live, but I cannot believe simply because
a minority group, even one composed of people who have been rather consistently repressed
and denied equal treatment before the law, calls itself a political party and espouses a
commendable purpose, that there is created some sort of an irrebuttable presumption that it is
above the law, or that it can accomplish its goals by violence or other illegal means.
342
In saying the above I am not ignoring the fact that in our system of jurisprudence every law
violator is guaranteed the full scale of rights provided for by law, including the constitution,
statutes, and case law. I am simply endeavoring to put this case into the perspective in which it
clearly was viewed by law enforcement officials in 1969, that there was a group of people who
were dangerous to the law-abiding citizens of the community. Also, this case concerns itself with
the Black Panther Party as it existed and functioned in 1969 and what its subsequent direction or
conduct may have been is immaterial.
343
Turning then to my views on the disposition of the various components of this case, as I have
already indicated, I concur in the relatively limited portions of Judge Swygert's opinion in which
the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
63 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
344
Judge Swygert's opinion directs that sanctions should be imposed, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
37(b)(2), against the federal defendants and counsel representing them at the first trial for
repeatedly disobeying court orders to produce documentary material. I do not agree with the
premise. This was a trial in which the judge told the jury on the first day that it would last many
weeks, "possibly as much as three months," but which in fact continued some six times that long.
The district judge was on a day-by-day basis aware of the extreme difficulties of complying with
the every-nook-and-cranny discovery demands of the plaintiffs, was in an excellent position to
gauge the good faith of the defense efforts to comply with those orders, and also knew that these
government files were not at the beck and call of former employees, were monumental in nature,
contained much information not pertinent to the present lawsuit but which involved national
security and which in any event was duplicative of that which had already been furnished. I
cannot believe that this respected trial judge, who for the most part patiently continued presiding
over a trial that was stretching beyond the wildest preliminary estimates, would have, in the
words of Judge Swygert, "repeatedly exonerated the federal defendants," if in his position to
observe there had been reason to support Judge Swygert's basis for sanctions that the federal
defendants, other than O'Neal and their counsel "deliberately impeded discovery and actively
obstructed the judicial process." It flies in the face of reason to think that the judge would not
have reacted promptly to any defense obstructionist tactics which were further lengthening the
time of this tediously long trial.
345
For these reasons I would see no necessity for the imposition of sanctions. Nevertheless,
because the case is going back and so that the mandate of this court is clear, I will join Chief
Judge Fairchild with regard to a direction to the district court to giving consideration to the matter,
rather than requiring it to impose sanctions.
346
There is one other matter not mentioned in Judge Swygert's opinion to which the district judge on
remand might properly give some attention. As one reads Judge Swygert's summary of the
seventeen counts of the amended complaint, of which twelve will remain viable as to most
defendants on remand, it seems rather obvious that the plaintiffs were fractionalizing what was at
most five basic issues, possibly following the school of thought that a shotgun charge is more
likely to hit something than would a rifle bullet. The federal jurisdictional issues, four in number,
as I see them, allegedly arise from (1) the raid, (2) the conspiracy concerning the raid, (3) the
post-raid activities of obstruction and malicious prosecution, and (4) the conspiracy regarding the
post-raid activities. All of these have the common underpinning of claimed violations of
constitutional rights and the post-Civil War civil rights statutes. The fifth issue would concern the
pendent state jurisdictional claims.
347
It is true that Rule 8(e)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., permits the statement of separate counts which here
would seem to be utilized to the maximum. On the other hand, it would seem to me that the new
trial judge pursuant to Rule 16 could use pre-trial procedure to good effect to accomplish a
fundamental simplification of the issues as an aid to the jury's comprehension of what was
involved. Although Rule 16 speaks of the pre-trial order limiting the issues for trial to those not

64 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel, "it has been pointed out that that is an
understatement, since the pre-trial judge does not merely eliminate uncontroversial issues but
also formulates the remaining issues to show the real contentions of the parties." (Footnote
omitted.) 3 Moore's Federal Practice P 16.18 at 1129 (1978). As another text has stated, "Rule
16 calls for a pretrial conference, which can produce a pretrial order that supersedes the
pleadings, . . . ." 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 1189 at 28 (1969).
348
Perhaps a simplification of the issues would also help avoid a repeat performance of the same
length.
349
Turning then to the various issues as applicable to the various defendants, I will first treat the
situation as to the remaining thirteen policemen and their liability herein insofar as the raid is
concerned. It appears necessary here to consider separately the actual activity of the raid and
the conspiracy and likewise consider separately the shooters and nonshooters. In my opinion a
directed verdict was proper on all aspects of the raid itself and the conspiracy as to the
nonshooters and as to the conspiracy with regard to the shooters with the possible exception of
Groth.
350
Relying on Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972), Judge Swygert's opinion holds that the
directed verdicts in favor of the nonshooters regarding their activities in the raid were improperly
granted by the trial court. As indicated, I disagree. The holding of impropriety is based upon the
factual premise that the nonshooters were in the apartment at the time the occupants were being
mistreated and did nothing to protect them. In my view, there is no need to reach the Byrd
question as there appears to me to be a complete lack of proof of the factual premise stated
above. The Hampton plaintiffs' brief does not touch at all upon this matter. The Anderson
plaintiffs' brief in its argument portion, relying upon a case of gross negligence, stated with regard
to the nonshooters only the following, "Similarly culpable is the conduct of the raiders who did
nothing to stop the use of excessive force, or the beating and mistreatment which followed. See
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972)." In the Summary of Evidence portion of their brief,
after describing in two paragraphs, with frequent transcript citations, the mistreatment of the
occupants following the shooting, the brief then contained the following which is the first
reference to the presence of the nonshooters:
351
All 14 raiding police officers were present inside the apartment during the beatings and abuse,
participated in them and did nothing to try to stop them. FRED HAMPTON was still lying
unattended on the floor in the dining room. All 14 police officers then ransacked the apartment,
turning beds and dressers over and emptying their contents throughout the apartment, and
destroying and mutilating evidence of what had occurred. (Pl # 553 PL. 410 1SSGJ84-5) All 14
police officers saw FRED HAMPTON lying on the floor with blood coming from his head, but
none did anything to try to determine if he was alive and could be helped. At no time did any of
the officers seek to determine the nature of Plaintiffs' injuries, or to assist or protect them in any
way.

65 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
352
There is no reference at all to any portion of the transcript of the evidence with regard to any
nonshooter officer even being in the apartment. The only two citations at all to the record are to
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 553 and 410. Exhibit 553 is a photograph showing no people but showing
drawers out of a dresser, clothing on the floor, and beds turned over. Exhibit 410 is a partial
transcript of testimony by nonshooter defendant Lynwood Harris. Three of the pages, 77, 78, and
203 appear to be from a deposition of Harris and the balance of the pages are from his
appearance before the grand jury at the time Barnabas Sears was appearing as the special
prosecutor. This exhibit is somewhat difficult to read because of its disjointed nature, it being only
a part of a complete transcript. The exhibit was 33 pages of the grand jury testimony but the first
page of the exhibit is numbered 57 and the last 157. It is clear, however, that it contains no
evidence of any of the outside nonshooters going into the apartment immediately following the
shooting. Harris apparently did go in at some later time when the firearms were being laid out on
a mattress. At the time of the shooting he heard the noise of the shots. When asked what
happened next after he heard the second round of shooting, Harris, Who was not in uniform at
the raid, responded:
353
Well, actually from that point on, I was really concerned with myself because cars were beginning
to arrive in response to the policeman's call. And I was concerned in letting those officers arriving
know that I was a police officer standing here. And this was a constant cry by me, police officer.
354
While Harris subsequently was asked "who else was there other than the fourteen State's
Attorney's Police Officers, when you got back to the apartment?" he mentioned officers from
other units, a photographer, an evidence technician and other officers making sketches. The
question does not, of course, confine the 14 officers to the inside or outside of the apartment and
obviously, in any event, the time referred to is obviously after the occupants had been removed
when Lynwood Harris, himself, was helping by carrying out some of the firearms. When the
raiders went inside, it was understandable in this neighborhood that others would be posted
outside to prevent interference with the operation. The continuance of that guard duty clearly
would have become more important after the actual shooting. In sum, I find no basis for even an
inference that the nonshooters were inside when any occupant of the apartment was allegedly
mistreated, and certainly not to support the inference suggested in Judge Swygert's opinion that
they "callously chose to watch."
355
I must assume that the plaintiffs' counsel have advised us of all of their record support for their
assertion that all fourteen officers were inside and certainly this court is under no duty to search
37,000 pages of transcripts plus voluminous documents to see if there is some other reference to
any of the nonshooters being present in the apartment before the occupants had been
removed.2
356
Even if we were to assume arguendo that some of the nonshooters were present when an
occupant was mistreated, on the record we have here, I would not find Byrd applicable. That
66 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
case on which I was a member of the panel, and the opinion of which was authored by Judge
Swygert, reversed a judgment based upon a directed verdict which reversal was predicated upon
the fact that the jury could have found nonfeasance, either negligent or intentional, on the part of
officers of a particularly egregious nature. In the later case of Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565
(7th Cir. 1976), negligence was eliminated from the picture. In that case, the plaintiff relied upon
Byrd, and in the en banc opinion written by Judge Cummings, Judge Swygert dissenting, the
significance of Byrd was circumscribed to "purposeful nonfeasance." Id. at 568. "Thus
defendants' failure to act in Byrd can be properly characterized as 'intentional.' " Id. at 569. I find
absolutely no basis for a viable claim of proof of purposeful nonfeasance on the part of the
nonshooters.
357
As to the conspiracy count pertaining to the raid insofar as the nonshooters are concerned, even
if we were to assume that the sinister conspiracy with the object of using excessive force and
killing some of the occupants existed among the federal defendants and the higher-ups of the
state defendants, I find no basis for saying that the nonshooters, and indeed the shooters with
the possible exception of Groth, were a part of the conspiracy. If there had been such a
conspiracy, these men, five of whom including three of the shooters being black, were not doing
anything except pursuing the often unhappy lot of a policeman of carrying out orders of
superiors. Lynwood Harris, for example, found out he was to go on a raid when he left work the
evening before. He reported at 3:45 a. m. and he along with the others was given an assignment
by Groth. They were simply carrying out their duty of serving a judicially issued search warrant. If
subsequent to learning that this might be a very dangerous assignment involving a local leader of
the Black Panther Party, while it might not be surprising if those entering the premises
overreacted in view of the knowledge that they were entering as "pigs," some of their colleagues
having been allegedly killed by a Black Panther Party member, the fact of the subsequent
overreaction would not bear upon the existence of a conspiracy on their part.
358
At this point, it is appropriate to refer to one point of emphasis both on the part of the plaintiffs
and in Judge Swygert's opinion with regard to the existence of a conspiracy and this is applicable
to all of the defendants who are charged with conspiracy in connection with the raid. That point
was that Groth planned the raid for 4:00 a. m. and there was no discussion of the use of tear gas,
sound equipment, bull horns, or of any equipment besides guns; and that there was no
discussion of alternative ways of gaining entry to the apartment, including telephoning the
occupants.
359
To anyone with a realistic regard to the circumstances existing at the time it might seem
unnecessary to point our the foolishness of these various proposed alternatives if the purpose of
serving a particular warrant was to search for and seize an arsenal of illegal weapons in a
probably unfriendly neighborhood and to arrest those who were found to be possessors of those
weapons. Nevertheless, because the nature of the raid has been given significance, it is
necessary to analyze the existing situation.
360
In settling upon the early morning hour as the appropriate time for making the raid, Groth, as the
67 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
commanding officer of the group, complied with Illinois law which provided that a search warrant
may be served at any time of the day or night. 108-13, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 38 (1969). As the state
defendants point out the key factor in that decision was to surprise the occupants while hopefully
they would be asleep, thus avoiding, if possible, any use of force or resistance, and that the
possessors of those illegal weapons would most likely be present subject to arrest at the early
morning hour. The apartment was located in a residential area and police arriving in any force at
the scene during a daylight hour, even during working time, would attract a crowd and in the
event of any shooting the lives of nearby citizens would be in danger.
361
The police had a right to anticipate the possibility that the guns in the apartment might be used
against them particularly in view of the well-known attitude of the Black Panther Party on the
subject of the dispensability of policemen.
362
As the Supreme Court stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968):
363
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in their
performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and
every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more are wounded.
364
One of the occupants, Anderson, indeed said that he was searching trying to find his shotgun
which he had loaded before going to bed with deer slugs and .00 shells and the pistol which he
had loaded and placed between the beds, but he could not find them because there was
shooting although he would have used them had he found them.
365
To have gone to the apartment in the early evening of December 3 might well have attracted
reinforcements from the Panther Party headquarters only a short distance away. During daylight
hours snipers could reasonably be anticipated from the buildings in the area. To have brought
equipment such as bullhorns or to have telephoned the occupants or to have thrown strong
searchlights on the apartment and ordered the occupants to come out could have reasonably
been anticipated to precipitate a battle royal. The use of tear gas at this point might have been
appropriate if the battle royal had policemen shooting from the outside and Black Panther Party
members shooting from the inside. To have used it as an initial matter, however, would have
given the real possibility of other types of damage to the occupants. Expert testimony in this trial
was that tear gas should be avoided in residential districts such as this one. Further, it is noted
that gas masks were reported to be stored at the apartment which would have been effective
against the use of tear gas by the police. A telephoning or other type of communication would
only have given the occupants time to set up their counter-attack and the time to fire the
weapons which the plaintiffs contend were never fired. To have used bullhorns, spotlights, or loud
speakers in this residential area would have only exacerbated the situation by attracting crowds
68 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
and thereby exposing more persons to a potentially dangerous situation.
366
One only has to recall the gun battle occurring when the police were involved with the
Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles a few years ago to realize that the police chose a
wise and prudent course in attempting to serve their warrant by way of surprise when the
purpose of seizing the weapons could be accomplished with the least likelihood of harm to
anyone. As to why this did not go as planned will ultimately apparently have to be determined by
a jury but there seems to be little dispute that someone fired a shot and thereafter the shooting
inside the apartment occurred rapidly. All of this, however, does not negative the fact that the
timing and manner of the raid was prudently planned as opposed to all alternatives and the
timing of the raid and carrying of the weapons are, in my opinion, no evidence whatsoever of the
existence of a conspiracy.
367
Turning next to the shooters, what I have said with regard to the conspiracy as to the raid itself is
applicable to them with, as I have previously indicated, the possible exception of Groth. If there
was such a sinister conspiracy, or putting it in the context of this case, if there was evidence in
the case sufficient to require the conspiracy-raid issue to go to the jury, then the jury should also
have the opportunity of deciding whether he was a party to the conspiracy. As will be indicated
hereinafter I do not think there was a jury issue developed.
368
With regard to the non-conspiracy raid activity case against the shooters, the state defendants'
brief presents a persuasive case to the effect that these officers who were acting pursuant to a
judicial warrant did not fire a weapon until there had been firing at them. It seems fairly certain
that some of the officers who went in, negligently thought that the occupants were firing at them
and thereupon returned the fire. This could well result in a jury verdict for some of the shooting
officers and against others. Insofar as the case before us is concerned, however, there is
testimony from which a jury could reasonably find that the shooters overreacted and used
excessive force. See Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1978). Where evidence is to be
weighed, that is not the function of this court but that of the trial court trier of fact. I think the
district judge, although understandably satiated with this long drawn-out trial which was not going
to come to a final decision because of a hung jury, mistakenly directed a verdict on the raid issue
as to the shooting officers.
369
Going next to the conspiracy-raid issue as to the remaining state defendants and the federal
defendants, I cannot agree that there was a basis for reasonable inferences that there was any
kind of an agreement among them, express or implicit, to cause a raid to be made with the object
of killing or wounding various Black Panther Party members. It is true that at the time in question,
the federal authorities thought it would be in the public good to neutralize the Black Panther Party
so that it could not carry out its avowed purpose, among others, of killing policemen. Indeed, the
idea perhaps could have been entertained by some, if not all, of those defendants who were
engaged in law enforcement work that the community would be a safer place for law-abiding
citizens to live and work in if Fred Hampton and his cohorts were not on the scene. This human
feeling is far removed from a basis for an inference that they deliberately set a course to
69 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
accomplish that by violence.
370
In our jurisprudence a person cannot be convicted of a traffic offense unless proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even though the present case is of the civil variety, I cannot believe
that the law should permit a determination that any person has deliberately planned a homicide
on nothing more than speculative conjecture or mere suspicion. The hard basic reasonable
inference-creating facts just did not exist in this case.
371
What I have said about the conspiracy-raid is also applicable to the non-conspiracy counts
concerning the planning and participation in the raid by the federal defendants and the state
defendants. The shooters, as I have previously indicated, remain in the case not because they
planned a raid with the objective of attempted homicide, but because of the excessive force
question. As I have stated previously I do not regard the carrying of the firearms or the time and
manner of the raid as being the basis of an inference of a plan to use excessive force.
372
An aspect that is directly involved in the result of the decision in this appeal is, in my opinion, a
potentially disastrous curtailment on necessary exchanges of information between law
enforcement and agencies. The rising need for effective law enforcement cannot but be
substantially chilled if there should be the prospect of becoming a defendant in a suit for
monetary damages whenever information concerning law violations is communicated by one
agency or official to another agency or official having primary jurisdiction over the crime.
373
At this point in the preparation of this dissent, I have become confronted with an increasingly
compelling necessity to turn to other cases of this court with which I am concerned, many of
which have statutory priority over this civil case, notwithstanding Judge Swygert's concluding
admonition that upon remand this case should be given "high priority." I have not requested, nor
have I been given, a respite from a full calendar of sitting accompanied as that must be by the
necessity of preparing opinions or orders on at least one-third of the cases on which I have sat.
Therefore, while not doing so happily because of my belief that sending virtually the complete
case back for another extended trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice and a misuse of the
federal judicial facilities, I will endeavor simply to outline as briefly as possible my remaining
observations on this case.3
374
1. Post-raid prosecutorial matters. An initial difficulty for the plaintiffs here is that the occupants
were in possession of illegal firearms and were subject to prosecution. In any event, under Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), most of the post-raid direct
prosecutorial activities of the state's attorney and his assistants provided to them absolute
immunity from civil liability. It is true that the Imbler Court expressly left open the question of
whether absolute immunity extended to a prosecutor in the role of an administrator or
investigative officer rather than an advocate. Here charges were being made following the raid
that the police and Hanrahan were guilty of murder and genocide. Demonstrations occurred and
70 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
there was tension in the community. Under these circumstances it appears to me to have been
well within the prosecutorial authority and duty of this public official charged with the enforcement
of the criminal law in his county to take the steps that he did in defense of the system of law
administration. Hanrahan's concept of this duty was thus stated:
375
I had a public responsibility as the chief prosecuting officer in Cook County to do everything
possible to preserve the peace and to prevent an outbreak of violence. I saw that coming as a
result of what I described as the press orgy, the accusations of murder and unlawful conduct, and
I did not feel that there had been clear and accurate reporting of the accounts given by the
officers.
376
Vociferous denunciations of the police conduct by those supporting the Panthers, as an

aftermath of the raid does not mean that Hanrahan was not entitled to believe those who were
involved in the law enforcement activities of the county. It appears to be a frequent practice today
when steps are taken to enforce the law that the one charged attempts to divert attention from
his own malfeasance by asserting that his constitutional rights have been violated.
377
The involvement here in public statements and media publicity was of a far less egregious nature
than that which has been involved in cases of absolute immunity where prosecutors were
engaged directly in the prosecutorial process. The conduct here was so intimately interrelated
with the prosecutorial process that it should have the same protection. As the Court pointed out
in Imbler, at 425, 96 S.Ct. at 992, "Frequently acting under serious constraints of time and even
information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims
of constitutional deprivation." That is what has happened here in my opinion, and, again quoting
the Court, at 426, 96 S.Ct. at 993, "The affording of only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor
also could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system." In the
present case, the counterattack to the publicity was for the purpose of avoiding such an adverse
effect.
378
It is the state authorities who prosecute, and irrespective of whether the federal defendants may
have thought prosecution was proper, I fail to see a jury case of malicious prosecution against
them. One, of course, does not have to be in the prosecutor's office to be chargeable with
malicious prosecution but he should have some connection with bringing about the wrongful
prosecution more than just thinking that the defendant should be prosecuted.
379
2. Claimed obstructionism. Under my view the matter of the raid would only remain in litigation as
to the shooters. Without the issue of conspiracy as to the raid, the post-hoc claimed acts of
obstructionism, upon which the Anderson plaintiffs particularly rely, have not been, it seems to
me, demonstrated to have harmed the plaintiffs. As Chief Judge Fairchild has pointed out in his
concurrence, it seems clear that plaintiffs cannot recover damages for injury to reputation,
without more. If the defendants have engaged in the obstruction of justice or perjury the criminal
71 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
courts not this civil suit are the proper place for their consideration.
380
Indeed, the history of criminal proceedings in the area with which we are concerned during the
past decade testifies to the fact that high office or powerful position does not provide a shield
against successful prosecution for violations of the law.
381
I find it almost incredible that Sadunas, who made a mistake in identifying one of many guns he
examined from which a shell had been fired, is being left in the case. This is particularly true
because he is paying a penalty for honesty by promptly acknowledging his mistake when he
made a reexamination and because this is not a case of a rifle or pistol cartridge where the rifling
in the barrel gives a much more distinctive basis for identification than in the shotgun shell casing
here involved.
382
Other charges of obstructionism upon which the plaintiffs rely amount to nothing more than
nonfeasance, or failure to act.
383
Again, the fragmentation of the complaints creates difficulties. These matters are all interrelated
and when they are viewed in the light of a nonsupportable claim of conspiracy as to the raid, the
prosecutorial immunity, the nonexistence of claims based upon mere negligence, the existence
of law violations in the illegal possession of firearms and the fact that the plaintiffs who were
offered an opportunity to appear and participate in the post-raid investigations declined to do so, I
find no merit in the claim that the charged obstructionism was the basis for an action against the
defendants.
384
3. Groth's informant. I must confess that I fail to comprehend the considerable emphasis given to
this matter. I have no idea whether Groth did or did not have his own informant; but I cannot
agree with Judge Swygert's conclusion that the lack of or unreliability of the informant, or the
furnishing of incorrect information by the informant, would, on the facts of this case, place the
search warrant in any serious jeopardy. I do know that a knowledgeable and reliable informant
known to be such to a law officer provided information which was passed through a reliable chain
of law enforcement officers into an application for a search warrant and the information so
furnished was correct. And it was on this judicially issued search warrant that the police officers
acted as they had to do.
385
At one point in their brief, the Anderson plaintiffs say they are seeking to learn the identity of the
informant in order to "try and find" evidence of illegality. Mere speculation or suspicion that an
informant might be of some assistance should not be sufficient to overcome the public interest in
the protection of an informant's identity.

72 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
386
The matter of protecting the identity of a confidential informant, in my opinion, is one of extreme
importance in law enforcement. Perhaps if this were the best of all worlds, spying would not be
tolerated because there would be no place for it. The said fact, however, is that this is not the
best of all worlds and crime, whether it is caused by poverty, economic inequality, psychological
maladjustment, or other causes for which society may be responsible, does continue to exist,
and at the present moment appears in no way to be declining. Particularly with regard to those
who have consciously embarked upon a criminal career, one of the most effective ways of
learning of their activities and curtailing them is through the use of confidential informants.
387
I would let the matter rest upon the determination of Judge Perry, who had the opportunity to see
and evaluate Groth's credibility. The fact that Groth declined to reveal the informant's identity to
Judge Perry in camera is a strong indication of the truth of his assertion that the informant's life
would be endangered by his identification. O'Neal's identity could be revealed even though his
usefulness as an informant was thereby ended because he was no longer associated with the
Black Panther Party. There is ample basis for belief that if Groth's informant were still in such an
association he would be in a position of retributive jeopardy.
388
I cannot conceive that the scope of our appellate review is such as to permit us to conclude, as
Judge Swygert's opinion does, that upon remand the identity of the informer must be disclosed.
The matter, if it really is of significance, which I doubt on the facts of this case, should be
reexamined carefully in the light of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d
639 (1957). By this court deciding as a matter of law that the identity of the informer is not
entitled to protection, we are deciding a factual matter in much the same way as that which the
majority faults Judge Perry for doing.
389
4. Discovery matters. I have already earlier in this dissent expressed my views on this subject.
This was not in trite parlance "a fine-tooth-comb" operation but was a time-wasting and harassing
"fishing expedition."
390
5. Evidentiary rulings. I find no basis for a reversal in this respect. The Anderson plaintiffs' claims
for the most part relate either to instances where the judge sustained objections to improper
questions, barred testimony on an irrelevant area, made non-damaging comments or clarifying
remarks to the jury, explained the pertinent law or himself asked questions of the witness, all of
which were well within his discretion. United States v. Pellegrino, 470 F.2d 1205, 1206-08 (2d Cir.
1972), Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 1556, 36 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973); United States v.
Curcio, 279 F.2d 681, 682 (2d Cir. 1960), Cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824, 81 S.Ct. 59, 5 L.Ed.2d 52.
391
Insofar as the complaints of the Anderson plaintiffs that Judge Perry disparaged their evidence or
that he engaged in acrimonious exchanges with their lawyers are concerned, I regard these as
73 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
nothing more than instances in which the judge either lamented the irrelevant and repetitive
nature of appellants' counsel's questions, instructed the jury on a relevant point of law, or aptly
described improper questions by plaintiffs' counsel.
392
The exchanges which did occur between court and counsel were, it appears to me, the result of
repeated improper questioning and, on the whole, resulted from the rude and insulting behavior
on the part of the Anderson plaintiffs' lawyers. Thus, frequently, counsel would persist in asking
improper questions, in interrupting, in making improper statements in front of the jury, and in
continuing to argue and object after the judge had made a ruling. It is well settled that the judge
may admonish counsel for unnecessary and improper questions or for failing to comply with the
rules of the court. Miley v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 473 F.2d 856, 857 (5th Cir. 1973), Cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 871, 94 S.Ct. 93, 38 L.Ed.2d 89 (1974); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8,
17 (2d Cir. 1968), Cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 126 (1969); Pacific
Coast Cheese, Inc. v. Wirtz, 314 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1963), and the judge did nothing more
than that here.
393
As the court stated in Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 445 (1st Cir.
1966), Cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919, 87 S.Ct. 230, 17 L.Ed.2d 143:
394
It is inappropriate for counsel to complain of treatment that he has invited, particularly when that
treatment is well within responsive limits. We have said before, and we repeat, such claims
should not be made at all unless they are very sound. The proposition that counsel can disregard
the court's instructions, obtain a rebuke, and then preserve the incident as insurance in the event
the case is lost, does not sit well.
395
It appears to me that Judge Perry displayed wisdom and patience in a vigorously contested case
with contentious counsel and that his rulings followed the governing rules of evidence, producing
a fair trial for the plaintiffs.
396
6. The Contempts. The authority of a federal judge to punish summarily for conduct constituting
contempt committed "in the actual presence of court" as well as the procedure to be followed, is
established by Rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 42(a) reads:
397
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by
the judge and entered of record.

74 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
398
The authority to punish summarily applies to behavior of counsel. Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). See also United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95
S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). In Sacher the issue arose from a nine month trial, one-half
the length of the present case. During the Sacher trial defense counsel, in the presence of the
trial judge and in the face of repeated warnings from him that their conduct was regarded as
contemptuous, persisted in a course of conduct that was highly contemptuous and that tended to
disrupt and delay the trial and possibly to cause a mistrial. Upon receiving the verdict of the jury
at the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge, without further notice or hearing, immediately filed a
certificate under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure summarily finding such
counsel guilty of criminal contempt and sentencing them to imprisonment.
399
The decisive issue in the Sacher case was whether Rule 42(a) applied at the end of the case. Of
significance to the present case is the fact that the Court in Sacher took it as conceded that there
was no substantial issue when, as in the present case, the judge acted promptly. By way of
summary, the Supreme Court stated at 13-14, 72 S.Ct. at 457:
400
But that there may be no misunderstanding, we make clear that this Court, if its aid be needed,
will unhesitatingly protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every duty
pertaining to the office of the advocate on behalf of any person whatsoever. But it will not equate
contempt with courage or insults with independence. It will also protect the processes of orderly
trial, which is the supreme object of the lawyer's calling.
401
It is clear in the present case that Judge Perry properly followed the procedures set forth in Rule
42(a). The conduct clearly was not committed outside "the actual presence of the court" nor is it
contended that the judge did not see or hear such conduct. Also, the judge promptly signed and
entered an order reciting the facts.
402
It is to be noted before taking up the individual contempt orders that both Haas and Taylor were
counsel for the Anderson plaintiffs.
403
Taking up the Haas incident first, this incident developed very shortly after Haas had been
reprimanded for directing a derogatory statement towards the judge. Thereafter, the jury was
excused because of argument regarding the propriety of a question. When the jury returned the
judge struck the last question and told the jury to disregard it. Haas resumed his examination of
Hanrahan and upon objection the judge told Haas that they had just gotten through that out of
the presence of the jury and "you will not go into that subject matter any further." Haas
responded that he did not even get to argue it and the court repeated, "I said you will not go into
it any further."

75 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
404
Upon this Haas responded, "Judge, we can't cover up the cover-up." Haas continued that that
was part of their complaint, that they covered up. The judge immediately held him in contempt of
court. All of the above was in the presence of the jury. After the jury retired Haas continued:
405
All right, Judge. I think all the people who have spoken the truth have always ended up in
contempt, and the cover-up goes on and on and on.
406
It appears obvious to me, as it must have to the jury, that Haas in his first statement about a
cover-up was not referring to something which had happened back in the early 1970's but was
referring to the court participating in a further cover-up. His meaning was made clear by his
subsequent statement that the cover-up goes on and on and on. A charge in the presence of the
jury that the presiding judge is participating in a "cover-up" is particularly damaging during the
course of a trial. On the one hand the jury may come to the conclusion that the judge thinks there
is no merit in the answer which counsel is attempting to elicit and therefore he is curtailing the
pursuit. On the other hand, the jury may think just the opposite, i. e., that the trial judge is
improperly covering up for the defense, in which case the judge's necessary authority in further
trial matters such as instructions is diminished. In either event a fair trial is hampered.
407
A charge that the trial judge engaged in a cover-up made in the presence of the jury is clearly an
affront to the court and disruptive to the administration of justice and the order of contempt as to
Haas should be affirmed. See United States v. Wilson, supra; United States v. Sacher, supra.
408
The case as to Taylor is closer although possibly with some significance it was Haas who was
examining the witness but it was Taylor who engaged in the conduct charged as being
contemptuous. The case is closer because it simply should not have occurred in the first place.
This all began because defense counsel objected to a question which included the word "raid"
and said that the defendants had never entered into a stipulation using that word. He accused
Haas of a "deliberate, willful, and intentional intent to prejudice the jury." The defense was
incorrect because the word "raid" had been used in the stipulation and indeed I am at a loss as to
why this type of objection would have been made as there could be little doubt in my mind, and I
have so characterized it herein, that the service of the search warrant on the morning of
December 4, 1969, was a raid within the common dictionary definition of that word. The situation
no doubt became more distressing to plaintiff's counsel when the judge told the jury that Haas
had deliberately and willfully misread a statement and subsequently, after a transcript had been
obtained, did not upon the request of Haas advise the jury that Haas' statement was not a
misrepresentation.
409
At this point Taylor for some reason got into the act and as he slapped papers on the table his
hand knocked off the pitcher which broke onto the floor. The glass lining of the pitcher was
76 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
broken. In dealing with this incident in the Anderson plaintiffs' brief, typical of the hyperbole
throughout the brief was the reference to defense counsel's bringing to the attention of the judge
that a water pitcher was broken which caused the brief writer to characterize the defense counsel
as "the snitch."
410
The appellants' brief concedes the judge's action finally got them good and mad by refusing to
hear them and that they returned to their table flinging down their papers in anger and frustration.
At a further point the brief indicates that, "Taylor, by contrast, gave the judge grist for his mill, by
letting him get his goat, to mix metaphors. In a case without such pervasive bias and unremitting
provocation by the Court, some rebuke might arise on such a gesture. . . ."
411
I have no reason for believing that Taylor deliberately knocked the pitcher off onto the floor. On
the other hand one cannot safely predict the consequences of uncontrolled anger which should
not occur, or at least which should not be exhibited in the courtroom by counsel.
412
Under all of the circumstances, I would affirm the contempt orders as to both Taylor and Haas.
413
7. Other contentions and issues. Judge Swygert's opinion correctly holds that the matter of
whether plaintiffs should recover attorneys' fees must be deferred until the final outcome of the
litigation but does allow such fees for the appellate work. Because of my position on the merits of
the appeal I would only allow the appellate work fees commensurate with the work involving the
shooter defendants which would be the full reasonable amount for the Hampton plaintiffs but
which would be substantially curtailed for the Anderson plaintiffs.
414
Judge Swygert's opinion also directs the district court judge to whom the case is reassigned on
remand "to give the retrial high priority." I assume that this can only mean all possible priority and
that we are not directing the district court to disregard the numerous types of litigation which
might have statutory priority over this civil suit. I should think, for example, that cases under the
so-called Speedy Trial Act would have precedence over the instant litigation.
415
Because of the multiplicity of the claimed errors, at least in the Anderson plaintiffs' briefs, it is
somewhat difficult to be sure that all significant claims have been addressed. I am not aware,
however, of any, including any of the various elaborating fragmentations, which cause me to think
that a new trial is indicated as to any of the defendants except to the extent herein indicated.
416
8. Conclusion. It has not been a happy task to disagree to the extent to which I have felt
compelled with the opinion of an esteemed brother judge but I consider that this case has
important overtones of unbridled denigrating attacks on governmental officials. I hope I have
77 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
made it clear that I do not entertain the idea that government officials should not have to answer
in some forum for abuse of power. I would agree that, individual governmental officials who do
not have absolute immunity should anticipate that they will be held accountable for monetary
damages to those whom they have injured when they have discharged their duties of office in a
way that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they
should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule. The result would be the same
where the actions were manifestly beyond their line of duty.4
417
I am saying, however, that a wide-ranging witch-hunting type of assault on public servants across
the board should receive the most careful judicial attention.5 I don't think the present case can
withstand that scrutiny, the focus of which must be on the situation as it existed at the time of the
events in question.
In June 1972 the death of Fred Howard, one of the police officers, was suggested on the record
and the cause was dismissed as to him
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.Ill.1972)
We summarized our action as follows:
Insofar as the district court's order of February 3, 1972, dismissed the charges against the City of
Chicago and the County of Cook, it is reversed with respect to the Brewer complaint and affirmed
as modified with respect to the Johnson complaint; insofar as it dismissed the charges against
Mayor Daley and Superintendent Conlisk, it is affirmed; insofar as it dismissed the charges
against defendants Hanrahan, Jalovec, Mulchrone, Ervanian, Meade, Kukowinski, Purtell,
Koludrovic, Sadunas, Sorosky and Meltreger, it is reversed. The case is remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hampton I, supra, 484 F.2d 602 at 611.
Judge Perry elected to provide the parties with a Summary of the evidence approximately one
month after the trial's conclusion. Although the judge stated in a letter attached to the Summary
that it was not intended to be an official memorandum in the case, we see no reason why the
Summary is not a part of the record and therefore properly before us
The organizations originally the subject of COINTELPRO included the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and
the Nation of Islam
6
78 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Further, the trial court's restrictions on discovery and its questionable evidentiary rulings
hampered the plaintiffs' ability to marshall evidence to substantiate their contentions. See infra,
pp. 639-642
For example, in Southern California the FBI mounted a covert operation to escalate a "gang war"
between the BPP and an organization called the "United Slaves." This gang war resulted in the
killing of four Panthers by members of United Slaves and numerous beatings and shootings
From January 1969 to June 1970, O'Neal's monthly pay for his services as an FBI informant
ranged from $100 to $500
Testimony differed as to whether Winters was a member at the time of the shootout or whether
he had been expelled from the Party prior to the incident. In any event, he was close to the
Panthers and was eulogized by Hampton as a fallen comrade
10
Mitchell, however, never mentioned these federally illegal weapons in writing until eight days
after the December 4 raid on the apartment
11
The SPU also was informed about the presence of a large quantity of weapons at 2337 West
Monroe Street
12
From late November to December 4, 1969, Mitchell had five to seven conversations with Jalovec
13
The plaintiffs question whether Groth's informant in fact ever existed. The trial court did not
require Groth to disclose the identity of his informant. See infra, pp. 635-639
14
The FBI document refers to action planned by "Chicago police." This, however, does not
necessarily indicate that the local FBI thought that the Chicago Police Department planned an
action and that it was unaware of the action planned by the SPU of the State's Attorney's Office.
The officers detailed to the SPU were, in fact, Chicago police officers. More importantly, other FBI
documents indicate that the local FBI at other times referred to police actions of the SPU as
actions taken by Chicago police. For example, a December 10 counterintelligence memorandum
sent from Johnson's office to Washington stated that Hampton was killed by "Chicago police."
15

79 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Plaintiffs introduced the expert testimony of Eleanor Berman, chief toxicologist of Cook County
Hospital, indicating that Hampton was drugged at the time of the raid. On the basis of blood
samples extracted from his body, she concluded that secobarbital was present in Hampton's
system at the time of his death in an amount which would make it difficult for him to awaken. Bell
and O'Neal testified that Hampton was not a drug user
16
For example, Officer Kelly stated:
A Yes, I have two questions. Am I charged with any crime?
Q You are not charged with any allegations, no.
A My second is not a question, it is a statement. I have known Sergeant Groth personally for
approximately eight or more years. I have never seen him act in any manner other than that
which would bring praise and credit to the Chicago Police Department. That is it.
Officer Jones said:
I am Black and proud of being Black and a member of the Chicago Police Department. I have
worked with these officers, both black and white for over six months and consider them to be of
highest professional caliber and a real credit to the Department. The courage they exhibited that
night made me even prouder of my associates. I feel strongly about the advancement of Blacks
on the Chicago Police Department and deeply sorry that criminal elements are using this incident
to attempt to destroy mutual understanding and respect.
17
Plaintiffs attempted to join Leonard as a coconspirator-defendant in December 1975 after

receiving certain discovery materials. The court denied the motion and plaintiffs have not raised
the ruling on appeal. The record fails to reveal whether Treviranus was intended to be named as
a defendant in the motion
18
The teletype stated:
AAG Jerris Leonard, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, at Chicago, advised SAC
Marlin Johnson in strictest confidence that no indictments of police officers are planned in
captioned matter. AAG Leonard has a firm commitment to meet with Edward V. Hanrahan,
State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, within one week, whereupon, on basis of Federal District
Court order Hanrahan will receive testimony of State's Attorney's Police before FGJ.
The above is based upon an agreement whereby Hanrahan will dismiss the local indictments
against the BPP members. Hanrahan is to be given thirty days to dismiss the local indictment
which will be based upon the change of testimony of John Sidunas (sic) of the Chicago Police
Department Crime Lab.
Subsequent to this dismissal, BPP victims will then be subpoenaed before the FGJ for their
testimony in this case.

80 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
19
Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims are based on 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3)
20
It should be noted that when we refer to a conspiracy among defendants, we are not passing on
the ultimate validity of plaintiffs' claims. We merely are commenting on plaintiffs' claims and
evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer that a conspiracy or conspiracies existed
21
The federal defendants make no contention that, because they are not state actors, they are not
subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of the statute. Section 1985(3) clearly was intended
to provide redress for victims of a conspiracy to violate civil rights whether or not the conspiracy
was under color of state law. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338
(1971)
22
Discrimination on the basis of political beliefs or affiliations has been found to be actionable
under section 1985(3). See, e. g., Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied,
424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899
(6th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 280, 46 L.Ed.2d 258 (1975). See also Griffin,
supra, 403 U.S. at 102 n. 9, 91 S.Ct. 1790, n. 9; Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil
Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1721, 1728 (1977) ("the legislative history behind section 1985(3) points
unmistakably to the conclusion that discrimination on (the basis of political beliefs or affiliations)
was intended to be actionable"). One of the foremost concerns of the drafters of the original
section 1985(3) was discrimination against individuals whose political affiliations were imbued
with racial implications. See Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 St. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967)
23
This evidence is examined in more detail. See, esp. Supra at pp. 608-612
24
If the evidence were to demonstrate that the federal and state defendants merely agreed to help
each other enforce the law and prevent violence by the BPP through lawful means, the
agreement, of course, would not have violated plaintiffs' civil rights
25
Defendants urge that plaintiffs be denied relief on the ground that negligent conduct is not
cognizable under section 1983. We are not persuaded by this argument. Defendants are correct
that "mere negligence" is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d
565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978). In
Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1977), Chief Judge Fairchild articulated the
standard for a constitutional cause of action: "The plaintiff must show that (the police officers')
misbehavior was either intentional or in reckless disregard of his constitutional rights," citing

81 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Bonner v. Coughlin, supra. The evidence offered by plaintiffs, however, viewed in the light most
favorable to them, satisfies this test. Plaintiffs' case rests on evidence of excessive force, assault,
battery, and wrongful death which a jury could conclude constituted reckless disregard of
plaintiffs' civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct.
473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1960); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79, 80 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1975)
Judge Pell states in dissent that the directed verdicts in favor of the nonshooters were proper
because there is "no basis (in the record) for even an inference that the nonshooters were inside
when any occupant of the apartment was allegedly mistreated, and certainly not to support the
inference suggested in Judge Swygert's opinion that they 'callously chose to watch.' " Infra, p.
658
The record demonstrates that the dissent's position is incorrect. Louis Truelock testified before
the state grand jury that there were "fifteen or twenty officers in the kitchen," some in uniform and
some in plainclothes, when the firing ceased and Groth ordered that the bodies be brought into
the kitchen. Plaintiffs' Exhibit LT # 7, pp. 27-28. (The shooters wore black on the raid;
nonshooters wore police uniforms.) Additionally, testimony of several of the nonshooters
themselves establishes that they were inside the apartment before the survivors were taken
away. Officer Kelly testified at the Coroner's inquest that he entered the apartment in the midst of
the firing. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 417, p. 109. See also Federal Grand Jury testimony, Plaintiffs' Exhibit
574B, p. 152. And Officer Marusich testified at the Coroner's inquest that he entered the
apartment "a couple of minutes" after the last shot was fired. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 421, p. 1236.
This evidence demonstrates that at least some, if not all, nonshooters were in the apartment at
the time the occupants allegedly were being abused. The question whether nonshooters are
liable under section 1983 for purposeful nonfeasance, under the rule of Byrd, is one for the jury
to determine.
26
In Count 4 of their complaint, plaintiffs allege under section 1986 that Hanrahan, Jalovec, the
raiders, and the federal defendants neglected to prevent the wrongs perpetrated in violation of
section 1985(3). Section 1986 states in part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or
aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act
be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages
caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.
On the basis of our examination of the evidence supporting plaintiffs' conspiracy claim, we
conclude that plaintiffs established a prima facie case of section 1986 liability.
27
We read Counts 6 and 8 of plaintiffs' complaint as describing the post-raid conspiracy
28

82 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
In Count 7 plaintiffs charge Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants (except
O'Neal) with failing to prevent the post-raid conspiracy in violation of section 1986. Plaintiffs have
presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case on this theory of liability.
Additionally, in Count 11 of their complaint, plaintiffs allege that Hanrahan, Jalovec, Groth,
O'Neal, Mitchell, Johnson, and Piper conspired to obstruct justice in violation of 42 U.S.C.
1985(2). Section 1985(2) states:
. . . if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or
defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to
any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing,
or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of
the laws. . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages,
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
We conclude, on the basis of our review of the evidence supporting plaintiffs' conspiracy claims,
that plaintiffs established a prima facie case of a section 1985(2) violation.
29
In summary, a prima facie case has been made out against defendants as follows:
Counts 1-4: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants.
Count 5: Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders.
Count 6: Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders.
Count 7: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, Johnson, Piper, and Mitchell.
Count 8: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, Johnson, Piper, Mitchell, Sadunas, Meade, and
Mulchrone.
Count 9: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, Johnson, Piper, Mitchell, Sadunas, Meade, and
Mulchrone.
Count 10: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, Johnson, Piper, Mitchell, Sadunas, Meade, Mulchrone,
Ervanian, Kukowinski, Sorosky, and Meltreger.
Count 11: Hanrahan, Jalovec, Groth, and the federal defendants.
Count 14: Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants.
30
Our recent decision in Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978), is not to the contrary. In
Daniels we held that the prosecutor's actions were within his "quasi-judicial" functions and, for
that reason, were absolutely immune from liability. Id. at 68-69
31
Today we hold that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence against Sorosky and Meltreger to
warrant submission of the conspiracy claims against them to a jury. We do hold, however, that
83 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
there was sufficient evidence supporting the section 1986 claims against them. While Imbler
expressly discusses only section 1983, its reasoning applies to the 1871 civil rights statutes
generally, See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 369, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), and
thus should be applied to claims brought against prosecutors pursuant to section 1986
32
The Butz Court held that a federal official's exposure to civil liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971), should be the same as a state official's exposure under section 1983. In the instant case,
the plaintiffs not only are seeking damages from the federal defendants under Bivens, but also
are alleging that the federal defendants, by conspiring with state officials to violate the plaintiffs'
civil rights, violated section 1983. We see no reason, given the Court's reasoning in Butz, to give
different official immunity treatment to federal violators of section 1983 than to state violators
33
The suppression of plaintiffs' political speech through harassment, intimidation, and subversion
part of plaintiffs' case against the defendants would constitute violation of a clearly established
right
34
An illegal entry based on a falsified warrant is a violation of clearly established Fourth

Amendment protections
35
Killing and wounding the inhabitants of an apartment without cause, placing the survivors in jail,
and subjecting them to trial based on spurious charges is a patently obvious violation of an
individual's right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
36
There is no need to examine the second branch of the doctrine to determine whether the
defendants acted with the requisite intent to deprive them of the benefits of their qualified
immunity. Either branch of the doctrine independently can deprive a defendant of the immunity.
We note, however, that plaintiffs in the instant case have presented sufficient evidence to require
a trial court to submit the issue of the defendants' intent to a jury if it were necessary to
determine whether the defendants could avail themselves of qualified immunity
37
The identity of Jalovec's "informant" has already been disclosed. In fact, Jalovec did not have an
informant who saw the weapons in the apartment. Instead, Jalovec was told about the weapons
by Mitchell, who in turn had learned about the weapons from his informant, O'Neal. O'Neal's
identity was disclosed several years after these events by the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois in an unrelated criminal case
38
The credibility of the affidavit to the warrant has already been undermined by the evidence that
84 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
Jalovec did not have an informant and was relying on information which Mitchell had received
from O'Neal. And the sufficiency of O'Neal's information alone as the basis for a warrant is
questionable. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). See
also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); United States v.
Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (En banc )
39
The trial judge, in his "Summary," never mentioned Roviaro. In fact, he cited only a Missouri
appellate court criminal case, Ex parte McClelland, 521 S.W.2d 481 (Mo.App.1975), to support
his conclusion that Groth was not required to disclose the identity of his informant. Apart from the
judge's obvious failure to apply the appropriate controlling precedent, his analysis and reliance
on McClelland is not entirely accurate. There is a factual similarity between McClelland and the
instant case: in both, a police officer refused to identify his informant. More importantly, though,
McClelland recognized that the decision to compel disclosure or not should be based on a
balancing test. And the two factors which the McClelland court said would justify disclosure,
when translated for application in the civil context, are present in the instant case: The informant
may have been a witness, if not a participant, to the conspiracy which constitutes the basis of the
action, and the reasonableness of the law enforcement officers' conduct is dependent upon the
reliability of the informant. See id. at 485. Thus, even under McClelland, disclosure would have
been appropriate
40
The determination of the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant has been characterized as
qualitatively more significant than civil litigation, thus justifying a higher threshold of justification
for exceptions to the privilege in civil cases. However, the difference in "significance" of criminal
and civil cases simply should be considered another factor in the Roviaro balancing test. Further,
the proposition that all civil cases are less significant and therefore require a higher level of
justification for the disclosure of the identity of the informer than all criminal cases is a dubious
one. It would seem impossible to conclude absolutely that every criminal misdemeanor case is
"more significant" than civil actions to redress, for example, egregious violations of an individual's
rights
41
And, conversely, the relevance to the establishment of a cause of action
42
The danger that law enforcement officials, protected by the informer's privilege, may, and have
misrepresented themselves on affidavits for warrants, saying that informers have provided
information which they have not provided, has been recognized by the courts. See, e. g., McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316 n. 2, 86 S.Ct. 1575, 16 L.Ed.2d 546 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting
); United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960)
43
In March 1977 the trial judge changed his position and refused to permit plaintiffs to reexamine
Johnson and Mitchell

85 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
44
The federal defendants contend that since the documents in question are official FBI documents,
they had no control over them and should not be held responsible for the obstructive tactics
regarding their production in the course of discovery. Neither federal defendants nor their counsel
(provided by the federal government) said at trial, however, that the delays in producing the
relevant documents were caused by their lack of control over the documents; instead, the record
is replete with statements by the federal defendants and their counsel suggesting that documents
which were discovered later never existed
45
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) states in relevant part:
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing
to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
46
The state defendants argued in a motion to strike the "Anderson" reply brief that plaintiffs'
request for attorneys' fees is not a proper subject for consideration because the request was not
raised in plaintiffs' opening brief. Plaintiffs, however, did assert the statutory basis for attorneys'
fees in their main brief although the argument was directed to the federal defendants
Whatever the situation may now be, or should be, it is doubtful that in 1969 attempts to discredit
groups thought to be presenting a clear and present danger of violence was a violation of First
Amendment rights
A footnote has been added to Judge Swygert's opinion with regard to the point in my dissent that
the nonshooters were entitled to a directed verdict because they were not even in the apartment
at the time the plaintiffs claim the occupants were mistreated. I attempted to make it clear that I
assumed that plaintiffs' counsel would give us all of the record support available to demonstrate
the presence of the nonshooters in the apartment at the time in question and that upon analysis
they gave no such support. Judge Swygert's added footnote, however, refers to other items of
evidence on the question
I see no reason, however, for receding from the position I took on this issue in my dissent. Judge
Swygert's added footnote gives significance to there being fifteen or twenty officers in the kitchen
some of them being in police uniforms. If the number was twenty, this, of course, was six more
officers than were in the raiding party and would seem to indicate that the presence in the kitchen
related to a time substantially subsequent to the cessation of the shooting when other officers
had answered the call. Further, Officer Harris at least, upon whom the Anderson plaintiffs rested
the matter, was in plain clothes although a nonshooter. The fact that two of the nonshooters
Entered the apartment at or about the time of the shooting, if that indeed is a fact, does not place
them there at the time of the alleged mistreatment of any of the occupants. While this is a
86 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
situation in which reasonable inferences are permitted to be drawn, there should be something
more than Judge Swygert's added footnote demonstrates to say that there was something to go
to the jury on the matter of purposeful nonfeasance on the part of any of the nonshooters.
The incentive toward continuing a fuller discussion is not encouraged by the realities of the
situation being that there is very little probability this case will not go back for retrial. Two of the
active judges of this court (Judges Bauer and Wood) have disqualified themselves, two more, of
course, are in the majority of the present panel, and all four of the remaining would have to vote
to rehear the case En banc. Insofar as the Supreme Court of the United States is concerned, the
small percentage of the heavy volume of petitions for certiorari which can be granted minimizes
the likelihood in any case of being successful in the pursuit of certiorari
Nor, I should add, do I intend anything said herein to minimize the importance of lawyers
accepting unpopular civil cases. Accepting such employment often requires a solid exercise of
courage, but I regard doing so as one of the obligations assumed by a person who has been
admitted to the practice of law
The pendulum has taken a far swing from the days of McCarthyism but the extremes of the
swing seem to me to be equally undesirable for the good of the country. Unfortunately many who
decried the excesses of McCarthyism do not seem equally concerned by the development of the
extremity of present day witchhunting directed toward law enforcement officials
Source URL: http://openjurist.org/600/f2d/600/hampton-v-hanrahan

87 of 87 12/5/2016 5:25 AM
















































































































COINTELPRO
Published by the
USEDADVANCED
TO OBSTRUCT
MEDIAJUSTICE
GROUP
%
!"" # $
&! ! '" !
((( &&" " ! & )#

# *& !" #
+,+-../-0,.1
'$ ! #
2 3
/14 '" ! $ 5
5 6! & $ 07414-777,
80709 10:-1777
; << = ; = < 5 = = = 2 = =
= > < < =
! " # # $ % & " & ! & " & % & '

" ! " ! ( " ) # !" ' ( ' #
$ ' $ ' & * + , &( & * - *
& % . /0 1. $ % $ " 2
= < 3 ( & $ $ % & = <' # # 4 ! %

$ '' # ' 5 65 6 ( 7 $& $ " , $ $ ' 8& & %
# 3 8 4 $ & '' # %' # $ $ # $ $ &( # $ ( ' '
# 9 *5 6
8 $ " ! " . /0 1. & #$ # &( $ $
$& ' " " 8
$ $ & 5:6 '&$ # -; < # 9 % " ' 1 #"
+ 8' ) ! 3 *#* + & " = # >* $ " 8' ) " 4
% # 9 - ' ' 3 & " & 1 $ ( $ # &( ' )
" ? & # $ 4 $ % # 9 " ! ( % " $ ! %*
8 >* 0$# @ & $ $ # # . /0 1. $ # 8 #
A B( &( $ $ $ $ & '9 " ! ' A " % "
$ ( '' " ' $ *5 65 6 , $ @ " # " # % . /0 1.
! < '' * &'' *5 6 C ' 1 * = $ ( '' &" 9 $ %
" ( # *5 6 ' " &#" = $ ' # ! (( '% ' $! (( # % = #D
(" A ' % " A 5E6 @ B $ $ " ' " !
A& " )' $A ' )% $ % = #D ' % " $ $ ! " *5 6
# ! ? !# $ % $ " ' $ " $ & 2

3 4 <" ) '' ( ) '' " ( ! " ' # ( %
3 4 " $ % ! ( %% '( $ # #
$ $ & " 7 ( $& $ ! %% '( $ #F
384 ( $ # ' ! % %% % ' # " ( '
LETTER to Director
COINTELPRO CASEComey,
LAW - FRED
FBI HAMPTON Page
Page
471
1 of 538
481
5 Monday
MondayNovember
December28,
5, 2016
. / 0 / ' 0
) 3
& 4
&
6 7 )
&) 8&9&
' ) 7 )
: & 4
&
' 8&9& ' ) 7 )
: ;
1 & % < < 1 6 . 5

5 = ; 3 &' $ 7& #- - + ' & 0++ >?)@ A
(
7 ) &> = & B +, 7& + + ' & +,,,
> ?
A @
" 7 ) ?&@> &
2 ) & % = = 2 ; )'/8 &
) $#, 7& - , # ' & 0+ >4
7 ) A
&> &
3 & % ) ) ' 3 6 =
< 1 1 < = * 2 ; 7 &
' 9 7& $ - , ' & +,, 7
)
) & / C 7 & ) A" C 1 & ++(+# 0+ 2/
0 $# 0 , ' &) &+ 0+ 7 )
&
4 ) & % ) 7 3 ; 9 &'
' + 7& + + ++ ' & 000 >4 7 )
&> &
4 ) D 9 ' 1 E "
5 &7 D 1 & )( ,+0(+04 1&E& ) &D &9 & + 0+
7 ' A &
= 1 E 7 9
1 F ' 7 )
&
F % &
) 8&9& ' ) 7 )
> > G & B '
$ 7& - $+($ ' & 0+0 9 &6 7 & ) A" - - ' & 00,
% " & 7 8
9 D E 7 )
8&9&
7 ) &9 9 &B
' . D A 1 & +;++( (0 ---(BF/ D& < & 9 = E +0 0+ &
Stan J. Caterbone Case Law Library Page 2437 of 2664 Friday December 23, 2016
3054( 5 1 ! ! 305 )
! 6 ) ' % H
;
&
7 4" ' !!
- ' % ) ' #
(
+ )
& 6
" !
&
) !
#0-
;
D &
&6
) 3
) 3
%
! #+
) 3
& 6
"
& 4
! & =
!
% %
(
& 1
! " " &
7
&
.
. F <
) ;
"
!
.
F < )
&
)
&
)
9 F
&
$ .
&
# )
"
&)
> > > > > > > > > "
> D +0 +,# .&/&- 1 & -#
8 8 / . /
&
- )
&
, )
;
#+#
&
)
&
+0 ) ;
;
)
B
' !
D
;
) $ ' ) +, - 9 & ++0 # 8&9&'& I
B " #0 ' ) +, #
8&9&'& I $0 #0 # 8&9&'& I $0
"
&
++ * !
!
&
+ ) !
;
;
)
B
;
)
B &
+ ) D
' 9
;
4 D '
9
;
) B
&
B 8
&
' 4
&
9 ( D '
&
.
&
4 D '
9 &
+ )
;
4
;
) B
&
B 8
&
' 4
&
9 (
&
.
&
4
&
+ 4
& )
! &8 !
7 9
&
+$ ) #
;
)
&
) ;
)
B " A
'
#0$ "
&
) > >
. 9 .
. &'&9& ' & + 9 &D &
) ! % ) ) ,
8 9 / : , 9 3 9; < % 5 / ) = ) 8 9
% !!
' !! ' !!
!! ! ) ' ) )
! ) ! ' ' !
+- )
# . &'&9& I +0
;
4
&
F
A &
4
( ! &
4
&
E +0 +,-+ .&/& # 1 &# & $0 D & +,-+ .&/& , 1 &+# & $0 * & +
+,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 9 & $ +,, + 9 &9 & .&/&+0 $ 1 & 0 & $0
D & +, +,,$ .&/&+ - 1 &+-$ & $0 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & E ++
00 .&/& $# 1 & & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0 7 & 0+
.&/& + 1 &,
, 7 ! ! ) , & +$ & +- $0 &

+$ &
, , ! ! ) 0 & + + B + B
& +# &
88* ! ! ) +, & & & , &
+ &
88; ! ! ) +-$ & & + &
88 ! ! ) 0 + 9 &9 & & + &
5 & 9 #0 #0 #0$ #+# # 0 # +&+ #
# # # , #- ,0+ 4 0 7 ,0+ 4 3 &
' 5 & 9 #0, #0 #+ &+ #+ &+ &
! "
# ! $ %
!! % % & !! % !
' '! ' ' ' '
% " (
% !! ' !!
!! ' !! ) *
$ % !! +
! " "
#
$ "
%
&
' &(()
% !
%
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
'6).4F5 #
2=5F4)..=13 )1D F/F'45*1=' 985JF=//)1'F
9
)& 3 .
B& 2 F * '
'& 9 2 F ' 4
5 )
D& < 4 D
F& . 5 4 4 D 4 = =
D
7& <
4 ! . ' # * +,#- .&/&- + 1 &+$ $0

&
/ / ) 7 ' # D
$ +,# .&/&+ - 1 & * +,#- .&/&- + 1 &+$ $0 &
& . ' # + 4 )
# 4 E E . &
98B'6).4F5 )
3F1F5)/ .5*J=9=*19
9 &
#0+& 9 &
#0 & D &
2 ' > 4 9 ) * + +,-- .&/&+000

1 &++ &
I #0+& 9 &
4 >2 F 9
' ) &>
I #0 & D &
)
" ;
? ) ? )
&
? ? )
&
?& !! !! ? )
&
?& !! ) ? )
&
?& !! !? ) (
! &
?& ? )
&
?& ? 4 9 ' & 7 9 '
&
?& ! ) ? ) ;
+ ) ;
< 0 &
J 0
0$
#0 +
,0+ &+
+ + "
+ " "
+ &+ "
+
0 0+
0 +
#0+ +
#0 &
= ,
&
5 ,
&
' ,0+
,0
,0
&
) ! +
'
% &
?4 !! ? )
( " ;
+ D &
) &
) ( &
) &
?4 !! ) ? D &
?4 !! !? D &
?4 ! ) ? )
;
+ ) !
&
)
&
F! #0 +
" &
>F &>
+ )
&
)
&
?> ! ? 4
" &
?- ? 4
&
?- ? ) !
& 4
&4 !
) 3
) 3
&
?- ) ) % ! ? ) 8 9
'
! %
&
?@ ? 2 %
9 B
% 9 ' &
?A ' !! < ! ? =
&
?0 !? )
A
" &
?0 !! ? ) "
% %
" &4 &
>* &>
+ 4
% ;
&
?/ ? )
&4
"
&4
&
?/ ? ) 8 9
% &
?. ' ' ? )
;
+
!
(
! # '75 . # D F 7 ,
! . #
" " (
&
?. ! ! ) ? 4
&
?2 % ? )
& 4 !
&
?2 ? ) 8 9 D ' ' .
5 8 9 &
?2 ! ) ? )
#0,
#0,
#0, &
?5 !! ) ? ) !
&
?5 < ) ? )
% &
?5 ) ? )
&4 =D " =D
&
? ? ) ;
+
&
?B !! ? )
&
D & +,-+ .&/& , 1 &+# & $0 * & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +-
+,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & D & , 00 .&/&+ 0 1 &+$ & $0 * & 0+
.&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & > > > > >

> & > > > > >
> > > > >
& > > > &>
, , ! ! ) +$ & > &>
88* ! ! ) +, & > > >
> > > > > >% > >
> > > & > > > >
> &>
& . 9 #0 ,++ ,0 $ + &
98B'6).4F5 B
2=5F F/F'45*1=' *5 *5)/ '*<<81=')4=*1
9 &
#0 & = &
#0 & F" &
#0 & .
&
#0$& F"
&
#0#& 9 &
#0-& * &
#0,& ) &
#+0& 3 &
#++& . &
#+ & = &
#+ &+& 4 ( &
#+ & F &
#+ &+& F &
#+ & 5 &
#+ & 9 &
#+$& 9 &
#+#& =
&
#+-& = &
#+,& 8 " &
# 0& 9
&
# +& 9 5 &
# +&+& F &
# & 5 % &
# & ) ) 3 &
# & 4 &
# & '
&
# $& ) &
# #& F" 5 &
# -& = % &
2 ' > 4 9 B * + +,-- .&/&+000

1 &++ &
& . 9 B #0 &
I #0 & = &
F" ;
+
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
I #0 & F" &
= ! ;
+ )
& 6
" !
&
) !
#0-
;
D &
&6
) 3
) 3
%
! #+
) 3
& 6
"
& 4
! & =
!
% %
(
& 1
! " " &
7
&
.
. F <
) ;
"
!
.
F < )
&
)
&
)
9 F
&
$ .
&
# )
"
&)
> > > > > > > > > "
> D +0 +,# .&/&- 1 & -#
8 8 / . /
&
- )
&
, )
;
#+#
&
)
&
+0 ) ;
;
)
' !
D
;
) $ ' ) +, - 9 & ++0 # 8&9&'& I
B " #0 ' ) +, #
8&9&'& I $0 #0 # 8&9&'& I $0
"
&
++ * !
!
&
+ ) !
;
;
)
B
;
)
B &
+ ) D
' 9
;
4 D '
9
;
) B
&
B 8
&
' 4
&
9 ( D '
&
.
&
4 D '
9 &
+ )
;
4
;
) B
&
B 8
&
' 4
&
9 (
&
.
&
4
&
+ 4
& )
! &8 !
7 9
&
+$ ) #
;
)
&
) ;
)
B " A
'
#0$ "
D
&
) > >
. 9 .
. &'&9& ' & + 9 &D &
+# ) ) + +, .&/&+ #
1 & $+ 4 . D ) +,
&
+- )
# . &'&9& I +0
;
4
&
F
A &
4
( ! &
4
&
E +0 +,-+ .&/& # 1 &# & $0 D & +,-+ .&/& , 1 &+# & $0 * & +
+,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 9 & $ +,, + 9 &9 & .&/&+0 $ 1 & 0 & $0
D & +, +,,$ .&/&+ - 1 &+-$ & $0 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & E ++
00 .&/& $# 1 & & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0 7 & 0+
.&/& + 1 &,
, 7 ! ! ) , & +$ & +- $0 &

+$ &
, , ! ! ) 0 & + + B + B
& +# &
88* ! ! ) +, & & & , &
+ &
88; ! ! ) +-$ & & + &
88 ! ! ) 0 + 9 &9 & & + &
& . 9 #0 #0 #0$ #+# # 0 # +&+
# # # # , #- ,0+ 4 0 7 ,0+ 4 3 &
I #0 & .
&
F" #0$ "
;
+ =
&
=
&
=
&
=
&
= &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
I #0$& F"
&
% ) = ;
+
8 9 '
8
9 '
8 9
'
&
5 &((
+ F" ) 3
#0 +
" #+
#+ #+ &+
&
4 . 9 .
!
#
#0 + #+ #+ #+ &+ &
6
#0 + #+ #+ #+ &+
) 3 )
3
&
2 ) 3
#+ &+
#0 + #+ &+&
4 . 9 . !
#0 +$ & 4 !
. B &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & E ++
00 .&/& $# 1 & & & D &, 00 .&/&+ 0 1 &+$ & $0
, , ! ! ) & ) +$ & &

& . 9 #0$ #0 #0 &
I #0#& 9 &
)
' &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
I #0-& * &
4 ) 3 ) 3
) 3
9 ' %
;
+ 8 ;
9 ,++
9 0+
9 0
9 0
9 #0
9 #0$
9 #0,&+
9 #+$
9 ,0+
9 0++
9 0+
9 + +
9 + "
9 + &+ "
9 +
9 0+
9 0
9 0
9 #0+
9 , +
9 ,
9 , "
9 #0+
9 #0
9 + &
9 + &
9 +
9 +$
9 $ +-
8
;
9 ,+0
9 #0, $ #
9 ,
9 , $
9 , # !
9 ,
9 +0-
9 +0, "
9 ++#
9 0
9 ,0 %
9 ,0,
9 ,++
9 ,
9 ,
9 +0+
9 +++
9 + +
9 ,0
9 ,0 "
9 # + " 7
8 < +,#+ .&/&$ 1 & 4 " 5 ' +,#+
;
9 + #
9 + #
9 + #
) + ) + +,# .&/& 1 &$
4 ' 9 D D ' )
+ + &
) 1 + +,# .&/&+ # 1 & # &
$ ) &
# 8 1 +,,- .&/&-# 1 &++0 < J '
9 = * ) . ) &
D & +,- .&/& - 1 &$# & & * & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +,,0
.&/& 1 & & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & D & + +,,- .&/&+0-$ 1 &+
& $0 E - 00 .&/& -+ 1 &- & $0 1 & 0 00 .&/&++0 1 &+ & $0
D & , 00 .&/&+ 0 1 &+$ & $0 D & , 00 .&/&+# , 1 & +- & $0
1 & , 00$ .&/&+ 0 1 &+ , & $0 E 0+ .&/&, 1 &+0 & $0
, 7 ! ! ) +0 & + &
, , ! ! ) - & + ) + & + ) +$
) +- & + &) +$ )
+ ) +- ) + +$
" #0-&
4 ) = ) E 0 00 7 # 00 #0-
) + ;
I #0-& * &
4 ) 3 ) 3
) 3
9 ' %
;
+ 8 ;
9 ,++
9 0+
9 0
9 0
9 #0
9 #0$
9 #0,
9 #+$
9 ,0+
9 + +
9 + "
9 + &+ "
9 +
9 0+
9 0
9 0
9 #0+
9 , +
9 ,
9 , "
9 #0+
9 #0
9 + &
9 + &
9 +
9 +$
9 $ +-
8
;
9 ,+0
9 ,
9 , $
9 , # !
9 ,
9 +0-
9 +0, "
9 ++#
9 0
9 ,0 %
9 ,0,
9 ,++
9 ,
9 ,
9 +0+
9 +++
9 + +
9 0
9 ,0
9 ,0 "
9 # + " 7
8 < +,#+ .&/&$ 1 & 4 " 5 ' +,#+
;
9 + #
9 + #
9 + #
) + ) + +,# .&/& 1 &$
4 ' 9 D D ' )
+ + &
) 1 + +,# .&/&+ # 1 & # &
$ ) &
# 8 1 +,,- .&/&-# 1 &++0 < J '
9 = * ) . ) &
. 5 " 4 1 + +,# .&/&+ # 1 & #
D - +,#0 .&/&-# 1 & #$ 4 .
' * ) +,#0 D $ +,# .&/&+ -
1 & &4 % ,++ 4 +-&
9 , &
9 0 &
& . 9 #0- #0 #+0 #+ # &
I #0,& ) &
F
) 3
;
+ ) &
) !
&
)
% ;
4
&
4 &
4 &
)
&
4
&
) !
&
)
&
2 "
"
&
)
&
$ ) % &
# 9 %
! &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & D &, 00 .&/&+ 0 1 &+$ & $0
& . 9 #0, #0 #+ &+ #+ &+ &

I #+0& 3 &
8 % "
!
' %
" ;
+
#0-
! " "
#
$ "
%
&
' & ' ) ) )
% !
%
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
& . 9 #+0 #+ # +&+ &

I #++& . &
1
&
I #+ & = &
$ )
;
+ 4
&
4
&
4
&
)
&
4
&
' 5! ! 1
"
& F !
& =
"
&1
" 0 &4 0(
&
F" 0
& 1 "
% ! #+0
&
. ' 4 ! ) 3
&
/ 2
! %
% &
4 % ! &
1 2
&
)
!
& 4
=D "
=D
#
! (
&4
! '
' &4
#
& 4
!
# & )
"
& 4
&
4 ' % ! )
!
- &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * &
0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & & & &

88* ! ! ) +, & &
& . 9 #+ #0$ #+ &+ #+ &+ # +&+
&
I #+ &+& 4 ( &
5 % 4 ! #+
#0, ;
+ =
;
4
&
4 % &
=
;
4
A
&
4 % ! &
' 2 ! 7 ( %
!
;
+ 4
&
4
&
! )
;
+ 4
&
4
&
4
&
)
&
)
&
5! ! ) "
#+ &
. ' 4 ! ) 3
&
/ = !
%
% & 4
% ! &
1 =
&
) &((
+ )
!
&
4
# !
(
&
)
"
&
)
&
4 ' % ! )
!
+
;
+ 4 &
4 %
- &
* & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 #+ &+&
I #+ & F &
2 ) 3
) 3
" #0-
-
& 9
&=
&
' 1 =
#+$
!
&9 #+
"
#
& =
&F
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & D &, 00
.&/&+ 0 1 &+$ & $0
, , ! ! ) +$ & &
& . 9 #+ #0$ #+ &+ #+$ # +&+ # #
&
I #+ &+& F &
= 4 ) 3
&
' / )
" !
&)
#0, -
&=
& 8 !
#+ & =
&=
#+$
& 4
#+ &
= )
!
! &
= )
;
>F &> ) ;
+ %
&
>9 &>
+ 7
#
&
7 ) 3 . 9 .
#
' . 9 . ;
. 9 . &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * &
0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
88* ! ! ) +, & &
8** ! ! ) ++ #+ &+&
& . 9 #+ &+ #0$ #+$ # +&+ &
I #+ & 5 &
. ! )
& 4
& 2
#
;
+ 4 &
4 &
4 &
) &
' 2 = " "
A
% & '
& 4 "
&D
#+#
&4
" !
#+# &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
& . 9 #+ #0 #+ # , ## &
I #+ & 9 &
)
A
"
& 4
% "
A
8
9 "
& =
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
I #+$& 9 &
2 ) ) 2 ,0
"
#+ #+ &+
%
;
+ 1 #+
#+ &+&
4 #+
#+ &+&
4 &
4 &
' / ! * " %
! 0 &
) 0 "
% &
- 4
A
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
& . 9 #+$ #+ #+ &+ &

I #+#& =
&
: % ! )
&+ &+
"
&
! )
" &
' 4) )
' 8
9 7 % % &
' & ! ) #0 +#
"
"
&
* &((
+ F"
7 3
' &
4 7
3
7 3 &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * &
0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & & &+ &

& . 9 #+# #0 #+ #+- # +&+ # ,
&
I #+-& = &
2
#+#
& 9
' 8 9 7
% % !
& 9
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
I #+,& 8 " &
F"
"
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
I # 0& 9
&
4
'
#0
"
&4 !
% &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
2 ' & . 9 # 0 . 5 E '

. 1 & -00 + ) + 00 5 0 B $
( % &
9 # 0 . 5 ' . 1 & ++0+
< + 000 5 1 & # # 0
5 1 & # B + &
I # +& 9 5 &
88* . 3 9 # + 7 +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+,

&
I # +&+& F &
D &((
+ F"
' &
)
%
#+#
! (
'
8 9 7 % % &*
&
1
"
&
' A " )
' "
;
+ 8 " #0 "
#+
#+
#+ &+ &
4 #+
#+ #+ &+
#+0 + &
4 #+ &
4 ! &
2 #0
' &
$ 2 ! #0
&
. &((
+ 4
& 4
&
= "
#+0 % #+0
&
4
" &
2 " +
&
2 " $
&*
#0 &
$ F "
' "
' " &
= '
"
&
4 4 %
% &
4" ) ! 4
%
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
88* ! ! ) +, # +&+&
& . 9 # +&+ # , &
I # & 5 % &
2 0 " "
% ) * . '
;
+ 4 " &
4 &
4 &
4
" &
4 " &
$ 4
&
# 4
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
I # & ) ) 3 &
@ = ! 4 +- 8&9&'&
I +, %
) * . ' & 4
% ;
+ 4 &
4 &
4 &
4 &
4 &
$ 4 &
# 9 ) * . '
! &
' = !
4 +- 8&9&'& I +, ) 3
) * . ' E '
9 6 5 &4 ) 3
+- 8&9&'& I +, &
= F ) 3
) 3 &
0 4 ' E 9 ' ) 3
3 3 )
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
I # & 4 &
4 ) 3 ' . 9 .
'
& 4 . 9 .
&
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
& . 9 # #0 #0$ #+0 #+ &+ #+ # ,

&
I # & '
&
& )
;
+ ) ! K+00
K+ 000 &
. &
) A &
' B ) ) !! 4 " '
&
= =
&
E +0 +,-+ .&/& - 1 &# & $0 * & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
& . 9 # #+ &
I # $& ) &
& )
' '
A A A
& =
&
' = =
&
E +0 +,-+ .&/& - 1 &# & $0
I # #& F" 5 &
8** . 3 9 # # * + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++

&
I # -& = % &
2
) 3
' ' % & 4
% '
&)
. 5 ' . "
. 5 ' . &
* & + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ & &
8** ! ! ) ++ # -&
98B'6).4F5 '
94*5FD 2=5F )1D F/F'45*1=' '*<<81=')4=*19
)1D 45)19)'4=*1)/ 5F'*5D9 )''F99
9 &
# +& 8 &
# & D &
# & 5 ! &
# & B &
# & D &
# $& ' &
# #& ' &
# -& F" &
# ,& 5 &
4 ! 9 ' * + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ &
I # +& 8 &
0 F"
;
+
" A &
. &((
+ =
% ;
K 0 000
K 0 000
! &
= % K 000
" &
4" 9
;
+
# ! #
&
I # & D &
/ ' F" ;
+ )
;
*
&
9
&
)
;
*
&
9
&
)
&
' 4" ) ;
+
#0 +
#0-
#
$ ;
2 &
) &
4" ! )
;
+ )
&
) ;
) # &
4 ! &
) ! !
&
)
&+ & 4
# &
1
' '
&
9 %
7 7
&
&+ * &((
+ )
&
4
&
4
&
)
&=
&
* &, 00- .&/&+ 0 1 &+++ & &
, * ! ! ) +++ & & &

& &+ &
& . 9 # # $ &
I # & 5 ! &
& !! =
!
;
+ * .
5 ' . &
< +-0 &
' &((
+ = !
;
!
. 5 ' .
;
) %
B
" # &
. +
;
*
&
9
&
5 &((
+ D &
)
%
. 5 ' .
&
)
! &
. # ! )
&)
!
!
&
3 ) ! '
1
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * &, 00- .&/&+ 0 1 &+++ & & * & 0+
.&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
, * ! ! ) +++ & + &
88* ! ! ) +, & &
& . 9 # #+ #+ &+ # + # #
# # $ # # &
I # &+& ) &
) &((
+ =
"
" ;
4 !
;
) 4 ) 3 &
B ) ) 3 &
' ) &
D ) &
)
;
) ! # !
A
B !
&
) !
&
= + B
' &
.
# &
4 ;
F"
&
4 ! &
$ ) + ! &
# 2
"
,0 &
- ) !
&
' 2 ) 4 ;
+ ) +-
&
9
&
9
%
;
) &
) &
)
' &
4
&
4 ! 4 ;
+ 4 ) 3
% ;
4 % &
4 % &
4 ! )
3
& )
& ) %
' &
-!! ! ) ' 1 9
'
&
4
;
+ * ) +
" ) 3
E ' 9 E
' 6 5 &4 ) 3
;
4 &
4 &
4 # &
4
&
4
&
* < +
"
) 3 +
) 3 &
4" 4 " D + 0+#&
= )
;
?0 ) ) " " ' ? )
+- ;
+ ' , &
' 0 &
' + " &
9 $ + " &
9 $ +- &
$ 9 $ 0 " " &
* & 0+ .&/& 1 &+ + & $0
, 7 ! ! ) + + # &+&
I # & B &
B &((
+ ) #
! !
!
& 2
&
4
&
1
# &
4
;
A &
4 !
+ A
;
A !
! &
) !
+
# "
& 4 %
&
' &((
+ 2 +
!
&)
& ) !
& 4
;
A
!
&
9
&
7 > >
. 5 ' . &
= +
& =
A
& )
A &
=
!
!
& =
!
! &
)
&4 '
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
88* ! ! ) +, & &

& . 9 # # + # $ &
I # & D &
D &((
+ ) #
! ;
!
! # " ,0 !
"
%
! # " ,0
"
"
&
) + ;
% &
4
+ &
F" # ,0
% &
8 " +
! ;
!
;
)
! !
!
B
'
D &
$ ) > >
!
A !
! A ! &
' / ' ) ! )
# !
# + "
"
& 4
"
;
+
% &
& . 9 # # # &
I # $& ' &
/ ! F"
# # !
#
& 5
&
' ! 4
&
' 4 !
# & 4
!
&
. 4 ) 3 &
* &, 00- .&/&+ 0 1 &+++ & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
, * ! ! ) +++ & &
I # #& ' &
& F" # !
&
' . = ;
+ !
&
= ! 4
K+ 000&
= ) ;
+ %
! #+
#0 +0 "
&
:! )
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * & 0+ .&/& 1 &+ + & $0
, 7 ! ! ) + + & &
88* ! ! ) +, & &
I # -& F" &
4 %
&
I # ,& 5 &
. 4
#0 +$ "
+ &)
#0 +$ ,0
;
+ 4 & F"
,0
& )
#+ "
# &
4
#+#
# +&+
& )
#+ " # &
)
0
& 4
&
)
0
&4
&
4 &
' = = #+# # +&+
;
+ 8 !
. 5 ' . . 5 F
8
&
= )
;
>' &> 4 ;
+
. 9 .
&
>/ &> ) . 9 .
! . &'&9& ' & + 9 & D
&
E ++ 00 .&/& #0 1 & & &
, , ! ! ) # ,& 9 ) # ,
+- . &'&9& I #0 & ) 00 E ++ 00
+- . &'&9& I
#0 &
. 5 " 4 > > & + & > >
& ' . 9
. &
& . 9 # , #- &
98B'6).4F5 D
<*B=/F 45)'G=13 DFJ='F9
9 &
#$+& < &
4 ! 9 D * + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ &

I #$+& < &
*
&
' @ *
' & 4
% &
2 )
& F
&4 ;
+
% "
&
3 4 #
&
5 ! $ )
,0 &)
" ,0 &
. ! ) ) 2
" & =
" &
A ) ! ) <
" "
&
* &, 00- .&/&+ 0 1 &+++ & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
98B'6).4F5 F
.F1 5F3=94F59 45). )1D 45)'F DFJ='F9
)1D 4F/F'*<<81=')4=*1 =DF14=7=')4=*1
=14F5'F.4=*1 DFJ='F9
9 &
##+& 3 " &
## & ) &
## & = &
## & ) &
## & 5 &
4 ! 9 F * + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ &

2 ' > 4 9 F 7 +- +,,- .&/&+0
1 &+, &
& . 9 F #0 &
I ##+& 3 " &
F"
##
&
' 4" 4
;
+
&
' :! )
&
/ 2
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
& . 9 ##+ ## &

I ## & ) &
4 ) 3
) 3
" ##
! %
9 ' %
&
' & ) ;
+ 4
&
)
&
)
" ## &
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
88* ! ! ) +, & &
& . 9 ## ## &
I ## & = &
- 8 ##
"
'
& = " "
& 4
# A &
' & ) ;
+ 9 ;
4
&
4
&
4 % &
=
&
)
&
D !
##+
" &
=
#+ +
&
4 " &((
+ )
" $0 &
F"
## % ! &4 "
" 0 &
3 " )
!! ) )
;
+ 4 &
4
"
"
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & * & 0+ .&/&+$ 1 & 0 & $0
, , ! ! ) 0 & &
& . 9 ## ##+ ## ## &
I ## & ) &
/ 8 !
##
&
' 5 ) 8 !
## & 8
&
& ! )
"
&
3 ) !
' 1
&
= )
&
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
I ## & 5 &
4 ) 3 ) *
. '
' &
' = F ) 3
) 3 &
7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & &
98B'6).4F5 7
<=9'F//)1F*89
9 &
#-+& F" &
#- & 5 &
4 ! 9 7 * + +,-- .&/&+000 1 &++ &

I #-+& F" &
4 " D + 0+- " &
D & + +,, .&/&+ - 1 &+ - & & 7 & +- +,,- .&/&+0 1 &+, & & 1 & ,
00 .&/&+ , 1 &+# & & * & , 00- .&/&+ 0 1 &+++ & & 1 & # 0+
.&/&++ # 1 &+0 & &
I #- & 5 &
4 . 9 . ) 3
#0 +$ "
# ,
#0 +$ &
E ++ 00 .&/& #0 1 & & &
, , ! ! ) #- & 9 ) #-
+- . &'&9& I #0 & ) 00 E ++ 00
+- . &'&9& I
#0 &
ATTORNEY H. NASIF MAHMOUD
1 SBN: Ill. 0173345
2 Application Pending Pro Hac Vice
MCKINNEY, WILLS & MAHMOUD
3 Mail Only: 8717 Forest Avenue, Gary IN 46403
P. (219) 381-0859
4 Email: mwmlawoffices@aol.com
Local Counsel: ALFRED W. SLOAN II, SBN: 230432;
5 THE SLOAN FIRM, P.C.
Attorney for the Plaintiff
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7 (BAKARFIT), "THE LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS FOR THE BOKHARY, CASE NO:CV07- 07198 CAS (PLAX)
8 ASGHAR, KHWAJA AND RICHARDSON FAMILY
IRREVOCABLE TRUST; ROCK OF GIBRALTOR LLC; FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
9 DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR:
Plaintiff(s)
10 v. 1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1970, RICO
11 NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION; DLJ 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1) (A (1) (B) et. seq.
MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC; OCWEN LOAN 18 U.S.C. 1962 (c)
SERVICING LLC; SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a)
12 INC., NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING 18 U.S.C. 1962 (b)
CORPORATION; FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL, 18 U.S.C. 1962 (d)
13 INC., FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE GROUP; FIRST 18 U.S.C. 1964 (a)
AMERICAN LENDERS ADVANTAGE; FIRST 18 U.S.C. 1965 (a) and (b) et seq.
14 AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY AS
ATTORNEY IN-FACT; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 2. QUIET TITLE
15 INSURANCE COMPANY; ALLIANCE TITLE 3. CANCELLATION OF DEED OF TRUST
INSURANCE CORPORATION; STATE FARM 4. BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY
16 INSURANCE; MOBILE STORAGE GROUP; KERN 5. ACCOUNTING VIOLATIONS FOR
COUNTY CALIFORNIA; KERN COUNTY FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH (CFLL)
17 TREASURER TAX COLLECTOR; CITY OF 22000 et seq.
BAKERSFIELD; PIMA COUNTY ARIZONA; PIMA 6. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
COUNTY TREASURER TAX COLLECTOR; CITY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
18 TUCSON; CHRISTOPHER R. PERRY, AS AN 7. NEGLIGENCE
INDIVIDUAL, AND TRUSTEE FOR STARRPASS 8. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
19 MASTER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., AN EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ARIZONA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION; (MASTER 9. INFRINGEMENT ON THE PLAINTIFFS
20 HOA) STARRPASS MASTER HOMEOWNERS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE
ASSOCIATION, INC., AN ARIZONA NON-PROFIT PROCESS RIGHTS
21 CORPORATION, DEVCON; FRANK ST. CLAIR, ST. 10. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD
CLAIR DEVELOPMENT ST., CLAIR INVESTMENT,
ST.CLAIR REALTY; DEBBIE BANDUCCI; MARVIN [Concurrently filed with petition and application for
22 temporary and permanent injunction; application for
CHAMBERS; KENYON TERRACE HOA; PERI temporary restraining order in support thereof
23 ELIZABETH LOCKLEAR; COMMISSIONER ERREA declaration for declaratory judgment; Notice of Motions
OF KERN COUNTY; JUDGE MICHAEL ALFRED OF for Removal & Consolidation of related Kern County
PIMA COUNTY; SUCCESSORS, ASSIGNS; JOHN Cass S-1500-CL-216249 and Pima County Case C2006-
24 DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1- 6461 pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) and Title 18
10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE ENTITIES 1-10; U.S.C. 1965(a), (b)].
25 DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10 AND
INDIVIDUAL DOES 1- 10, INCLUSIVE, DEMAND FOR TRIAL B Y JURY
26 Defendant(s)
27 1 First Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief
28
1 PLAINTIFF (hereinafter separately and collectively referred to as Plaintiff or
2 (BAKARFIT)) THE LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS FOR
3 THE BOKHARY, ASGHAR, KHWAJA AND RICHARDSON FAMILY
4 IRREVOCABLE TRUST" and ROCK OF GIBRALTOR, LLC, (ROCK) on
5 behalf of themselves and all similarly situated beneficiaries and members, allege and
6 complain collectively against defendants, and each and every one of them, as follows:
8 INTRODUCTION
9 1. This is a Federal action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Racketeer

10 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), Title 18 U.S.C.
11 1961, et seq., and nine (9) other causes of action, by plaintiffs, on behalf of
12 themselves, separately and collectively and similarly situated, individual
13 beneficiaries and members of the respective Trust and LLC, against defendants
14 New Century Mortgage Corporation; DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc; Ocwen Loan
15 Servicing LLC; Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., National Default Servicing
16 Corporation; Fidelity National Financial, Inc., Fidelity National Title Group; First
17 American Lenders Advantage; First American Title Insurance Company As
18 Attorney In-Fact; First American Title Insurance Company; Alliance Title

19 Insurance Corporation; State Farm Insurance; Mobile Storage Group; Kern County
20 California; Kern County Treasurer Tax Collector; City Of Bakersfield; Pima
21 County Arizona; Pima County Treasurer Tax Collector; City Of Tucson;
22 Christopher R. Perry, as an individual, and Trustee For StarrPass Master
23 Homeowners Association, Inc., An Arizona Non-Profit Corporation; (Master
24 HOA) StarrPass Master Homeowners Association, Inc., An Arizona Non-Profit
25 Corporation, DevCon; Frank St. Clair, St. Clair Development St., Clair
26 Investment, St. Clair Realty; Debbie Banducci; Marvin Chambers; Kenyon Terrace
28
1 HOA; Peri Elizabeth Locklear; Commissioner Errea Of Kern County; Judge
2 Michael Alfred Of Pima County; Successors, Assigns; John Does 1-10; Jane Does
3 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; Doe
4 Governmental Units 1-10 And Individual Does 1-10, Inclusive.
5 2. Plaintiffs seek damages, injunctive and other appropriate relief from defendants
6 violations of RICO; quiet title; cancellation of deed of trust; breach of statutory
7 duty; accounting violations for failure to comply with (CFLL) 22000 et seq.;
8 intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligent infliction of
9 emotional distress; infringement on the plaintiffs constitutional and due process
10 rights; conspiracy to defraud as alleged more fully below.
11 3. Through the period of the federal action, as defined below, the defendants and each
12 of them with the exception of the Honorable Judge Harrington and Honorable
13 Commissioner Errea (who are limited to restraining order) conspired to extort
14 millions from plaintiffs and their beneficiaries and members by first intercepting
15 them from making payments by embezzlements and theft of their Bank accounts,
16 rents and mortgage payments, the forcing them to pay enormous penalties, and then
17 refusing them their right to close escrow and obtain title insurance or invest and/or
18 reinvest their earning in the boom real estate market, so that Plaintiffs may make up
19 the losses suffered by embezzlement, thus forcing plaintiffs to pay enormous
20 penalties, unrelated to any actual damages, for purported unauthorized causes for
21 interception of national escrow, insurance, title and banking services, to plaintiffs
22 with pristine credit causing them to pay enormous penalties, padded HOA bills,
23 forged and duplicative global bill, repeatedly, because even after payment the bills
24 would remain on the title and credit report generally committing acts involving
25 arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, enjoining at will randomly and callously
26 properties of innocent plaintiffs, with the aid and supervision of Fidelity National
28
1 Financial, Inc., Fidelity National Title Group; ( hereinafter referred to as Fidelity
2 and First American Lenders Advantage; First American Title Insurance Company
3 as Attorney In-Fact; First American Title Insurance Company; (hereinafter referred
4 to as FATCO, together they originated, designed, implemented, and executed a
5 policy, a form of established pattern of practice and/or course of conduct, by and
6 through which they bribed co-conspirators and confederates and inter-alia
7 associates-in- fact, who would and could transmit use the interstate offices federal
8 corporations to conduct grand deed and warranty deed theft fraud, via federal
9 interstate wires, including electronic messaging (email), and federal mails,
10 backed by a series of Demand Letters, unsigned and signed settlement statements
11 and threats to and by escrow companies, to friends and business associates of
12 Plaintiffs, business associates and tenants whose names, identity and existence
13 had been ascertained within the scope of the Title and escrow core business
14 privileges in order to commit non-core illegal acts.
15 4. The purpose and intent of these demand letters, threats and duplicative bills, notices
16 and intimidating messaging was to coerce and/or extort and defraud, and/or attempt
17 to extort and defraud, payments of money from these, escrows, associates, tenants,
18 family members as victims, by threatening to initiate and prosecute suits against

19 these individuals, if they were associated to plaintiffs, and if they were buyers
20 brought in to replace plaintiffs buyers, all of them together facilitated the false
21 demand letters, with one goal in mind and that goal was not to allow any funds to
22 be released to plaintiff, their beneficiaries or friends on their legally owned
23 properties, with threats of suits lingering after official record showed properties
24 sold for less than cost leaving plaintiffs to pay the bills created by defendants, while
25 defendants and their associates-in-fact would walk away with the property and
26 profits, allowing poverty to disable protection for plaintiffs against the initiation of
28
1 prosecution against their innocent self and victims who were being framed and
2 enjoined from their own earning so that they could not fight deep pockets without
3 access to legal representation, leaving the victims without their constitutional rights
4 to protection against piracy and extortion if they dared to challenge payment.
5 5. Defendants mutually agreed to accomplish their illegal objectives, by and through a

6 scheme or artifice to defraud, employing various material misrepresentations and/or
7 material and or fraudulent non-disclosures and causing general and specific injury
8 to plaintiffs, their beneficiaries and members, in their interests in business and/or
9 property.
10 DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
11 6. The Nature of this case calls for discovery pursuant to Freedom Of Information Act
12 5 U.S.C. 552 be conducted against the defendants to flush out the guilty in instant
13 and concurrent actions, (with ongoing harassment now being initiated in Central
14 District areas governed by Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. Section V. DEPOSITIONS AND
15 DISCOVERY invoking R.26; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 36; 37 and applicable
16 discovery allowed against the enterprise and their affiliate for seeking information
17 and outlets of destination for extorted gains. (Breached title policies and contracts
18 exhibit marked 6.)
19
20 JURISDICTION
21 7. Title 28U.S.C. 1441(a) for original jurisdiction; title 28 U.S.C. 1367(a)
22 applicable for concurrent supplement cases; Title 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) applicable for
23 corporate defendants doing business in California; Racketeer Influenced and
24 Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (hereinafter, RICO), Title 18 U.S.C.
25
1961(1)(A)(B)(D); 1961(6) et seq., and selected 1961 sub-section 1334(a) for
26
Title 11 crimes to invoke conditions requiring Title 28 U.S.C. 1915 conditions
28
1 upon natural and non natural plaintiffs, involving, section 201 (relating to bribery),
2 section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification
3 documents), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with
4 access devices), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
5 fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1503 (relating to
6 obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
7 investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law
8 enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an
9 informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an

[1]
10 informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
11 extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1957 (relating to
12 engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
13 activity); for filing and taking of wrongful taxes from victim/plaintiff, where there
14 is no other remedy for relief from state taxes without invoking the provisions of
15 title 18; of the United States Codes; section 1956 (relating to taxation of laundered
16 monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions
17 in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 2319 (relating to

18 criminal infringement of a copyright), Title 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a)(b)(c)(d);
19 1964(a), Title 18 U.S.C. 1965(a) and (b), et seq., Title 28 U.S .C. 1331for
20 federal Question of Law; Title 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1)Diversity of citizenship;
21 amount in controversy exceeding the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
22 and costs; F. Rule Civ. P. 60(b) violations; F. R. Cv. P. 65 et seq violations; Title 28
23 U.S.C. 1335(a)(1),(2)(b); Interpleader actions; Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
24 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., Truth In Lending Act, Home Ownership and Equity
25 Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605 (RESPA) requiring the application of Title 42
26 U.S.C. 1982 invoking FOIA 552 controlling original and concurrent similar
28
1 violations of California debt Collection acts and California Finance Lenders Law
2 (CFLL), 22000 et seq.) in instant and concurrent matters; Title 28 U.S.C.
3 1341for unauthorized and third party state tax collections; AR.S. Rule 13-
4 2301(d)(4); A.R.S. 13-2312; A.R.S. 13-2314(f); 13-2301(D)(4); A.R.S 13-
5 2312;A.R.S. 13-2314(F); Title 28 U.S.C. 1915 conditions imposed by malice
6 and artifice under conditions defined by Title 18 U.S.C.1961(6) fraudulent debt
7 application; interest of justice and fairness statutes.
8
9 VENUE ALLEGATIONS
10 8. Competent subject matter jurisdiction and venue exists, in whole and/or in part,
11 over original and supplement and/or concurrent matters pursuant to 1964 (a), and
12 1965 (a), (b) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970
13 (hereinafter, RICO); pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); Title
14 28 U.S.C.1337 (regulation of commerce); pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.
15 1391(b)(3),(d)(Venue); Title 18U.S.C. 1334(a) for alleged fraud under color of
16 Bankruptcy Proceedings and Title 18 U.S.C.1961 (1) (D) subsections governing
17 offenses, false claim and collection of unlawful debt through the misuse of Title 11
18 claims and such claims arising out of Central District Venue applicable for original
19 matter pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) and concurrent matters pursuant to
20 1367(a) governing Supplemental jurisdiction.
21 (a)controlling Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be
22 instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides,
is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
23 (b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United States in
which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district
24 be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for
that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal
25 thereof.(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on
26 any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs..
28
1 1V
2 THE PARTIES
3 PLAINTIFFS
4 9. PLAINTIFF, (BARARFIT) "THE LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT

5 OF HAPPINESS FOR THE BOKHARY, ASGHAR, KHWAJA AND
6 RICHARDSON FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST", at all times mentioned
7 herein was and is an irrevocable Trust based in California, (hereinafter referred to
8 separately and collectively as (BAKARFIT), with a service mailing address
9 located at 11909 Palm Ave. Bakersfield, CA 93312, County of Kern, State of
10 California, conducting business within the jurisdictional district of this Court. The
11 trust has its principle place of business in Los Angeles, California.
12 10. PLAINTIFF, ROCK OF GIBRALTOR, LLC (hereinafter referred to as

13 ROCK), is and was at all times mentioned herein ROCK; a Limited Liability
14 Company conducted Business in the Jurisdiction of Los Angeles, California. Its
15 current mailing address is 11909 Palm Ave. Bakersfield, CA 93312.
16 DEFENDANTS:
17 11.DEFENDANT, NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION (Hereinafter

18 referred to as NEW CENTURY). New Century Mortgage is, and at all relevant
19 times, has been a corporation conducting business in California. New Century
20 Mortgages main office is located at 18400 Von Karman, Suite 1000, Irvine,
21 California 92612, with an additional address as principal place of business listed as
22 follows: New Century Mortgage Corporation D/B/A Home123 14750 NW 77th
23 Court, Ste. .... 6399 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 812, Los Angeles, CA 90048.
24 12.DEFENDANT DLJ MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC; (Hereinafter referred to as
25 DLJ,) is, and at all relevant times, has been a corporation conducting business in
26 California DLJ as a successor trustee for New Century, with offices in New
28
1 York and Utah; the latter shared with Defendants Fidelity Title and other
2 defendants, as the address for process of service located at: 3815 SW Temple, Salt
3 Lake City, UT 84115. Tel. 801-293-1883, Fax 801-293-2555.
4 13.DEFENDANT, OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC, formerly OCWEN

5 FEDERAL BANK FSB; OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, and at all
6 relevant times, has been a corporation conducting business in Arizona and
7 California collectively and/or separately its Core Business and Non-Core
8 Businesses included: Federal Banking, Residential Loan Servicing, Commercial
9 Assets, Ocwen Technology Xchange ("OTX"), Affordable Housing, Ocwen Realty
10 Advisors ("ORA"), Subprime Finance, Ocwen Recovery Group, Business Process
11 Outsourcing, Commercial Servicing amongst other items of revenue and expense
12 in their corporate items and segments based on strategy to focus on fee-based
13 earnings to maximize the long-term value of the Company with the non-core
14 residential discount loan business and commercial finance business involved the
15 acquisition of non-performing loans at a discount to par value in order to increase
16 its value by selling it at a profit. At all times relevant OCWEN, New Century,
17 GMAC acted as agents or servicers for each other and for other Banks like
18 Wells Fargo etc, sharing the same business locations, attorneys and or local
19 brokers. OCWEN principal place of business is: 1675 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd.,
20 Ste. 1000, West Palm Beach, Fl., 33401-2129.
21 14.DEFENDANT, SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., a Utah
22 Corporation, (Hereinafter referred to as SELECT) and at all relevant times, is a
23 successor trustee of Defendant Fidelity Title organized under Federal Rules of
24 United States to act as an agent of financial and Title Insurance Entities or doing so
25 without such license. At all relevant times SELECT shares its business address
26 3815 SW Temple, Salt Lake City, UT 84115. Tel. 801-293-1883, Fax 801-293-
28
1 2555, with Defendant Fidelity National Group and multiple Corporations
2 including Chicago Title; First American Title as Attorney-in-Fact for Loanstar,
3 and multiple named defendants, subject of offer of proof by discovery.
4 15. DEFENDANT, NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING CORPORATION,

5 (Hereinafter referred to as NDSC) NDSC, at all relevant time has a legal
6 standing to do Business in California and Arizona, is an agent of agent of
7 Defendant Fidelity National Title, New Century and named defendants
8 according to proof operating under the umbrella of Fidelity Title offices located
9 at 3815 SW Temple, Salt Lake City, UT 84115. Tel. 801-293-1883, Fax 801-293-
10 2555, per defendants notices mailed through U.S. Mail.
11 16. DEFENDANT FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL, Inc., a Delaware

12 corporation, at all times relevant operating, doing business with Chicago Title
13 Insurance Corporation and multiple other known and unknown affiliates and
14 subsidiaries inclusive of FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE GROUP; FIDELITY
15 NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, (Hereinafter collectively referred
16 to as Fidelity or Fidelity Title). At all relevant times Fidelity as a national
17 and/or international Corporation is/was wholly or majority owned/run by CEO
18 William Foley II, doing business under the Laws of The United States of America
19 as a Title Corporation by and through owner William Foley of Foley Vineyards.
20 Has its offices loctaed in Los Angeles, at 601 S. Figueroa St, Suite 2130 Los
21 Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 689-9301 (800) 611-6161, fax (213) 689-9330 and
22 process of service address located at: 3815 SW Temple, Salt Lake City, UT 84115.
23 Tel. 801-293-1883, Fax 801-293-2555, an address that provides umbrella to
24 multiple defendants.
25
26
10 First Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable
27 Relief
28
1 17.DEFENDANT FIRST AMERICAN LENDERS ADVANTAGE; FIRST
2 AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY AS ATTORNEY IN-FACT;
3 FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, the largest
4 subsidiary of The First American Corporation (NYSE: FAF) (Hereinafter referred
5 to as FATCO), at all relevant times Defendant is based in United States with
6 nationwide offices located at: 550 South Hope Street, LA, CA 90071; 1 First
7 American Way Santa Ana, CA 92707-5913 located at and Overseas Head Office
8 Title House 33-39 Elm field Road Bromley Kent BR1 1LTTel: +44 (0)20 8315
9 1300, Fax: +44 (0)20 8315 1339. Email: info@firsttitle.eu.
10 18.DEFENDANT ALLIANCE TITLE, (Hereinafter referred to as Alliance) at all

11 relevant times is/was a California Escrow and Title Corporation operating under the
12 umbrella of FATCO (www.alliancetitleco.com with Offices in Los Angeles and
13 Kern County 5060 California Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93309 (661) 862-5712.
14 19.DEFENDANT STATE FARM INSURANCE, (Hereinafter referred to as State

15 Farm) at all relevant times is/was a national insurance Corporation, organized and
16 doing business under the laws of The United States of America; operating
17 nationally and international as an Insurance Carrier, hired to insure plaintiff on a

18 Commercial Policy 93-C3-0734-5 and to provide an Umbrella Fire Policy in
19 California and Arizona, from or prior to 1998 onwards, and according to proof and
20 discovery defendants breached both policies. State Farm Insurance Head Office is
21 located at One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL. 61710. (309)7663635.
22 20. DEFENDANT MOBILE STORAGE GROUP (Hereinafter referred to as
23 Mobile Storage) at all relevant times is a business organized in Burbank
24 California doing business in Arizona with or without a license located at 7590 N.
25 Glenoaks Blvd. Burbank, CA 91504. Tel. (818) 253-3200 Fax: (818)253-3293,
26
27 Relief
28
1 with its officers and owners, whose verified email contacts is listed as follows:
2 ChaCha Pina at Email address:CPina@MOBILESTORAGE.com, PastyGodinez@
3 818-253-3231,pgodinez@mobilestorage.com,Lisa@quintero@ mobilestorage.com
4 21.DEFENDANT KERN COUNTY AND KERN COUNTY TREASURER TAX

5 COLLECTOR, (hereinafter collectively referred to as KC), at all relevant times
6 operated collectively and separately as a government unit, by and through its
7 offices, employees and agents whose actions allegedly caused multiple unlawful
8 activities, for which KC), may be served at: Administrative Center 1115 Truxtun
9 Ave. Fourth Floor Bakersfield CA 93301. Fax. (661)868-3805. Tel. (661)868-3818.
10 22.DEFENDANT CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, (Hereinafter referred to as

11 Bakersfield, at all times relevant a government agency and doing the business of
12 Bakersfield with a process of service address located at: offices of the City
13 Attorney, 1115 Truxtun Ave., 2nd Floor, and Bakersfield, California 93301-4640.
14 23.DEFENDANT PIMA COUNTY, AND PIMA COUNTY TREASURER TAX

15 COLLECTOR; (Hereinafter collectively referred to as PC), at all relevant times
16 operated collectively and separately as a government unit, by and through its
17 offices, employees and agents whose actions allegedly caused multiple unlawful
18 activities; wherefore service is made C/o County Counsel: 32 N. Stone, 21st Fl.,
19 Tucson 85701. Fax: (520)740-5600, Tel. (520)740-5750.
20 24.DEFENDANT CITY OF TUCSON, (Hereinafter collectively referred to as
21 TUCSON,) at all times relevant defendant is named as a State organization who
22 maybe served for alleged violations by service upon Senior City Counsel. Josh
23 Mendelelsohn, Bldg. 201 N. Stone Ave. Tucson AZ. 85726-7210 or by service
24 upon, City Clerk City of Tucson, P.O. Box. 2031. Tucson Arizona 85775-0240.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 25.DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER R. PERRY, as an individual, and Trustee For
2 StarrPass Master Homeowners Association, Inc., An Arizona Non-Profit
3 Corporation; (Master HOA) StarrPass Master Homeowners Association, Inc., An
4 Arizona Non-Profit Corporation, DEVCON; with its principals, affiliates and
5 subsidiaries shall be referred to with its principals and inclusive of DESERT PASS
6 REALTY, (Hereinafter shall be collectively and separately referred to as
7 DEVCON at all times relevant, DEVCON is a Canadian corporation doing
8 business in the United States of America by and through CEO Christopher Ansley
9 with one of its offices located at 3654 W. Starr Pass Blvd. Tuc. AZ 85745.
10 26.DEFENDANT FRANK ST. CLAIR, ST. CLAIR DEVELOPMENT ST.

11 CLAIR INVESTMENT; ST. CLAIR REALTY (Hereinafter collectively and
12 separately shall be referred to as St. Clair), at all times relevant St. Clair is
13 owned by Real Estate Broker/Developer Frank St. Clair, who operates under
14 various names and unknown subsidiaries and entities, with and/or without
15 Developer Bryan Whitfield with his principal place of business located at: 3401
16 Wible Rd. Bakersfield CA. 93309. (661)434-0604; (661)834-4202; (661) 834-4219.
17 27. DEFENDANT DEBBIE BANDUCCI, (Hereinafter referred to as Banducci)

18 at all times relevant was/is an individual and a California Real Estate Agent
19 operating collectively and /or separately as an individual and a Real estate agent
20 under two separate Brokers during the pendency of these actions, lists as her current
21 business address: 3955 Coffee Rd, Bakersfield, CA 93308. (661) 334-4300.
22 28.DEFENDANT MARVIN CHAMBERS, (Hereinafter referred to as
23 Chambers), at all times relevant Chambers is/was an individual residing at:
24 5405 Fairfax Ave. Bakersfield, CA 93307 and alleged to be a RICO person for
25
multiple acts committed separately and or collectively for the alleged enterprise and
26
27 Relief
28
1 allegedly rewarded and punished for disclosing the same to plaintiffs.
2 29.DEFENDANT KENYON TERRACE HOA ITS SUCCESSORS AND

3 ASSIGNS, (Hereinafter referred to as K.T.), was/is at all times relevant a
4 Homeowners Association and has/had as its agent an attorney named Tanis Duncan
5 whose service address is located at: 548 E. Speedway, Tuc., AZ 85705.
6 30.DEFENDANT PERI ELIZABETH LOCKLEAR; (Hereinafter she shall be

7 referred to as LOCKLEAR), is/was at all times relevant a convicted felon for
8 committing crimes against Plaintiffs and its beneficiaries; and later referred to as an
9 alleged RICO person residing in Kern County or Los Angeles, upon whom
10 service can be made by service upon CCCOE Adult Correctional Education
11 Department for Parolees located at 3400 Sillect Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93308.
12 31.DEFENDANT FOR ONE SPECIFIC RESTRAINING ACTION,

13 HONORABLE COMMISSIONER ERREA OF KERN COUNTY (Hereinafter
14 shall be referred to as ERREA), at all relevant times, a commissioner presiding
15 in limited State Court of Kern County (CV07-06757) named as a defendant to
16 restrain his honor from presiding over S-1500-CL-216249 despite statutory,
17 constitutional and procedural challenges sans jurisdiction and standing where
18 amounts in controversy is governed by 281331, 1332 and venue controlled by

19 1367(a) for like issues and facts raised in original and supplement cases, and
20 service may be made upon: County Counsel, Administrative Center 1115 Truxtun
21 Ave. 4th Fl., Bakersfield CA 93301. Fax. (661)868-3805. Tel. (661)868-3800.
22 32.DEFENDANT FOR ONE SPECIFIC RESTRAINING ACTION,
23 HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL ALFRED, (Hereinafter shall be referred to
24 as Alfred at all relevant times, a Pima County Judge (CV07-06750) named as a
25 defendant for purpose to restrain his honor from proceeding in C2006-6164 Pima
26
27 Relief
28
1 County State Court case controlled by 1367(a) for matters controlled by interstate
2 conversion; Title 281331 and 1332, service address located at: 110 West
3 Congress, 9th Floor, Tucson, Arizona, 85745.
4 33.Plaintiff are ignorant of the true names and capacity of the defendants DOES 1-10,
5 JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10,
6 DOE ENTITIES 1-10; DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, and INDIVIDUAL
7 DOES 1-10, inclusive, and therefore sues such defendants by their fictitious names,
8 seeking leave of court per local and federal rules to update names and capacities of
9 said defendants as ascertained.
10 V
11 PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS
12 The Prior Criminal Trials
13 34.Throughout the relevant period as defined below, defendants who own Title and
14 Escrow services and their agents and affiliates conspired to extort millions of
15 dollars from plaintiff Trust, its beneficiaries and from plaintiff LLC, and its
16 members leaving both plaintiffs, its private family beneficiaries and husband and
17 wife members insolvent, by a scheme of framing plaintiffs with false debt
18 obligations belonging to a convicted felon and for acts committed by defendants
19 themselves then bribed defendants later identified as RICO persons to falsely
20 declare that those false debts were owned by Plaintiff, in return of promises to levy,
21 abstracts of judgments against plaintiffs family estate regardless of ownership to
22 force Plaintiff into insolvency by forcing plaintiff to pay these false, enormous and
23 global abstracts, liens and penalties, unrelated to any actual debt or damages, which
24 led to purported unauthorized interception of any and all of Plaintiffs business
25
relationships and real estate escrows and rental business transactions, alleged more
26
27 Relief
28
1 fully below; with the aid of and assistance of a Law Firm called Caswell Bell and
2 Hillison ( hereinafter enterprise or enterprise agent CB&H whose appearance
3 on behalf of multiple defendants both corporate, state and individual defendants
4 is/was designed, implemented, originated and executed a policy, a form of
5 established practice and/or course of conduct, (subject of Title 5552 FOIA) by and
6 through which; enterprise, principals, godfathers, affiliates, co-conspirators and
7 confederates would transmit, via federal interstate communication services, wires
8 including mail, messaging email services and or fax, series of demand letters or
9 abstracts of Judgments without actual foundations (1999 to 2007 ongoing) to all
10 those persons whose names had been obtained through the tracking system devises
11 controlled by the Title and escrow section of the enterprise, spread across state
12 lines, with one or more specific scheme, inclusive of stopping and disabling
13 innocent victim/plaintiff (as set forth by 1961(3)), transactions and ability/s to pay
14 disputed and undisputed debts according to the definition of 1961(6) regardless of
15 controversy, so as to allow enterprise to continue this charade of non-payment of
16 debt for Plaintiffs lifetime. (See 1136 S. little Buck Loop, Tucson, Arizona list of
17 intercepted buyers to force foreclosure, offered as a sample, exhibit marked 1.)

18 35.The purpose and intent of sending those demand letters and contaminated Title
19 Reports with wild writ enforcement practices is alleged to have been implemented
20 to coerce, extort and defraud, and/or attempt to coerce, extort and/or defraud,
21 victims; and to threaten initiation of suit, designed to be won without jury trial or by
22 default; if victims responded or filed a cross complaint calling them mad and
23 vexatious, so as to continue with interstate piracy of grant and warranty deed real
24 property. Defendants mutually agreed to accomplish their objectives, by employing
25 Title Corporations as the vehicle for collections of unjust gain with attorneys on
26
27 Relief
28
1 standby to provide hired litigants based on material misrepresentations (CV07-
2 06757 & CV07-06750) and/or material non disclosures, causing multi-million
3 dollars worth of injury to plaintiffs, their family members, beneficiaries, business
4 associates, and members interest in business and/or property. (See list of wrongful
5 taking of property and or/intercepted sales, exhibit marked 2).
6 36.From time to time Defendants impersonated Plaintiffs as sellers of properties listed

7 in exhibit 2, the title arm of the enterprise would ensure title in the commission of
8 theft, or walked it in to a local commissioner or a person of authority and obtained
9 an after the fact cover-up as security against money laundering of equity theft
10 allegations.
11 37.Occasionally enterprise paid other associate/defendants in return for making false

12 declarations, allegations of debt, or claim to persons of authority so as to obtain
13 friendly verdicts; such as offering false low value on a property then setting up an
14 LLC to buy the same property at the initial loan amount, and collecting rent for
15 years but allowing taxing to continue in plaintiff name for monies earned by
16 defendants, then finally taking over title to house, through local developers/real
17 estate agents, profiteering from huge equities laundered under Plaintiffs name
18 showing zero gain to defendants and false claim of profit to plaintiffs, causing false
19 assessments and taxation to an innocent party and backed by false declarations
20 under color of experts by the use of a series of federal interstate demands, claims
21 and ownership allegations transmitted by federal mail, wire, e-mail, (see sample
22 BANDUCCI and St. Clair racket in California and DevCon and Coldwell
23 Banker mirror image racket in Arizona without plaintiff authority exhibit
24 marked 3.)
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 38.Defendants knew that plaintiffs are holder in trust of its beneficiaries estate, and as
2 non individual entities would require an attorney to file any action for relief, so first
3 the potential plaintiff was financially marginalized and if that failed to obstruct an
4 attorney from coming in, each attorney Plaintiff retained at great cost to themselves
5 and/or with borrowed monies, was systemically intimidated, threatened and given a
6 carrot and stick approach to abandon plaintiff; with the sole aim of obstructing
7 Plaintiffs from the following: discovery against defendants, leading to investigation
8 that may expose criminality by defendants, affecting local and State local law
9 enforcement proceedings, that could expose obstruction of justice and witness
10 tampering. When all else failed, enterprise uses alleged henchmen/agents, or
11 enterprise agent CB&H to perform preemptive tried and tested unlawful acts in
12 targeted venues as retaliation to silence plaintiffs/victim attorneys, witnesses, juries
13 and or informants adverse to defendants.
14 39.In the current climate of national crises of foreclosures, plaintiffs found it slightly
15 easier to expose how a daisy chain of subprime financial Institutions and Insurance
16 carriers formed an enterprise that ran as standard operating practice a business of
17 hiring persons and entities for illegal acts for the Corporate deep pockets in return
18 for kickbacks and bribery; exposed by State of California Vs. First American Title
19 et al; State of New York Vs. First American Title et al; State of California Vs.
20 Fidelity Title; State of Colorado Vs. First American Title; State of Colorado Vs.
21 Fidelity Title and related institutions listed in below mentioned web sites; three of
22 which are specifically identified for their likeness to instant and related cases as
23 exhibit marked 4) containing three third party controlling complaints of similar
24 violations across state lines in Guzman Vs. Ocwen; Corporate Commissioner Vs.
25 New Century; Hanson Vs. Ocwen;
26
27 Relief
28
1 40.On May 03, 2007 defendant arbitrarily changed the Title of the roof over Plaintiffs
2 head, which is their farm, office and source of income for the last two decades, and
3 now their sole income over and above a homesteaded roof (CV07-06757), with an
4 equity of $800,000 to I million dollars, if the money credited from missing funds
5 taken from multiple escrows is credited back to plaintiffs.
6 41.On November 06, 2007 a limited court commissioner is going to preside over this
7 matter despite plaintiffs challenges, fully aware of the Federal Questions of law;
8 the existence of federal claims and controversy and the entry of a third party
9 appraisal confirming the value to eviscerate any foreclosure and or eviction
10 proceedings, for lack of legal standing of the alleged plaintiffs in the state court
11 case controlled by CV07-6757 to bring such an action, and for lack of jurisdiction
12 of the court to hear this matter by withholding of right to proceedings in an
13 unlimited federal court in front of a jury of peers.
14 42.a. CV07-06757 involves plaintiffs beneficiary Sammye Richardsons million

15 dollar homesteaded roof over her head KC S-1500-CL-216249 controlled by the
16 same non enforceable lien/writ so as to help justify lack of equity by court.
17 b. CV07-06750 involves like practices against homesteaded home of Beneficiary

18 Michael Richardson by the same financial group of defendants as CV07-06757 in
19 Pima County C2006-6164 where the same unenforceable lien/writ was used to
20 incept sale to cause foreclosure where no such debt exists.
21 43.This is a Complex Suit, based on multi-district crimes and violations adverse to
22 plaintiffs where discovery may prove to require the invoking of Title 28 1407(a)
23 (b) (c) (d) over and above 1367(a).
24
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 44.Before the entrapment by defendants plaintiff had pristine credit; until 1999 when a
2 false debt of a third party was imposed upon the plaintiffs, (See Title report
3 prepared by defendants Cause of action 1-9 exhibit marked 5.)
4 45. It is an undisputed fact that in 2004-2006 without the Enterprises lien of $1.3
5 million and unauthorized debts by agents of FATCO, City of Bakersfield, and
6 individual defendants using Caswell Bell and Hillison, hereinafter enterprise or
7 enterprise agent CB&H, as its counsel was valued by comparable prices at an
8 approximate value of forty (40) million dollars, which debts were claimed were
9 recorded against said estate and alleged not collected. These debts are not imposed
10 for economic reason alone but to malign, intimidate, silence and ruin the targeted
11 victim so that no one would listen to a marginalized victim/plaintiff. (See samples
12 of acts of bribery/incentives to ruin victim exhibit marked 6.)
13 46.RICO activities were under way before Plaintiffs became unwitting victims of the
14 alleged enterprise by corporate defendants in 1995, only plaintiff dared to report
15 the activities to the Arizona Attorney General who indicted and convicted
16 representatives of the alleged Godfather to the Enterprise i.e. First American Title
17 FATCO for state RICO charges based on Plaintiffs beneficiaries complaint along
18 with an approximate one hundred victims; undeterred FATCO repeatedly
19 continued the same criminal activities of hiring and paying for illegal acts despite
20 additional multi-million dollar fines levied across state lines upon it from, 1994,
21 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by more than five states.
22 47.In retaliation the enterprise imposed a blanket lien over their approximately (40)
23 forty million dollar estate in complete violation of CCP699.010-701-830
24 statutory authority governing debt collection 9.1, 9.2 scope and controlling
25 guidelines governing writ enforcement; exemptions over homesteaded properties.
26
27 Relief
28
1 48.US District Judge John F. Walter recently presided over a similar case of hired
2 Litigants, (Milberg Weiss) and rendered judgment that Plaintiffs believe is
3 applicable here, Plaintiff offer that this case has all the elements of the Milberg
4 case, involving the hiring of litigants spread across state lines of California,
5 Arizona, Utah, Colorado, New York from 1994 for the purpose of this complaint.
6 49.Plaintiffs allege discovery against defendants is material to any remedy for relief
7 and treble damages;
8
9 50. Plaintiff swear under penalty of perjury that they are verified victims of crimes of
10 extortions; embezzlement and fraud in accordance with Arizona and California
11 State Bill of rights guaranteeing Plaintiff beneficiaries the status of crimes
12 committed by indicted and convicted felons and a portion of instant case is filed for
13 civil damages for those convictions.
14 51.Plaintiff alleges they are verified victims of a multi-million dollar continual serial
15 extortion crime spree by and through an enterprise, that makes core and non-core
16 profit as defined under RICO specifications that meet both definitions of RICO
17 structure, i.e. organized and/or loose, in the daily operational structure of the
18 enterprise varying upon the discretion of the enterprise.
19 52. Plaintiff confirms the undisputed fact that on each occasion where Plaintiff had
20 money to hire counsel in the states of California and Arizona; its testimony caused
21 the indictment leading to conviction of three separate agents of the enterprise, with
22 plaintiff listed victims.
23 53. Plaintiff offers that on at least five or more occasions principal corporate
24 defendants referred to as an Enterprise were themselves fined by state
25 governmental units for like crimes to ones mentioned in said complaint in an
26
27 Relief
28
1 amount exceeding thirty million dollars effective 1994 to 2007. These same acts are
2 the foundation of this complaint.
3 54.Plaintiff offers courts review of facts and discovery shall reveal a structure that
4 meets the legal burden imposed by the multiple Appellate Districts for
5 qualifications to establish an Enterprise:
6 Case record shows at least three circuits appear to recognize that an enterprise
7 consisting solely of a corporation and its subsidiaries and agents, fails to meet
8 RICOs well established distinctiveness requirement;
9 With ninth circuit and two other circuits appearing to permit allegation of
10 Enterprise claims involving association-in-fact, composed solely of entities and
11 agents within a corporate family;
12 And with four other circuits holding that a RICO person and its subsidiaries or
13 agents sometimes constitute an enterprise;
14 55.Plaintiffs alleges servicers, financial institutions, associates, entities, assigns and

15 successors collaborate to gain unjust enrichment that meet the distinctive and inter-
16 alia requirement of enterprise in instant and concurrent matters as required by
17 each circuit guidelines, whether the relationship is inter alia, where the enterprise
18 consists of no more than a Corporation, its subsidiary hospitals and agents or

19 between two or more corporations and third party RICO persons unlawful on-going
20 acts in return for promise and/or actual payment of unjust financial gains taken by
21 extortion from victim through acts that involve two or more corporate defendants
22 who have committed two or more acts over a period of multiple years and used
23 federal interstate communications and commerce as established by the
24 distinctiveness requirement factor to allege enterprise; whereby Plaintiffs can
25 allege the proper construction of the RICO statute liability provision, that makes it
26
27 Relief
28
1 unlawful for a person to be associated with an enterprise, engaged in a
2 pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) (b) (c) and or (d).
3 56. Plaintiffs alleges instant enterprise is a sophisticated, elaborate and affective

4 structure lasting over a continuous decade without a break, run by a mob like
5 alternative where in lieu of the alleged Godfather Corporate bosses based out of
6 Los Angeles California and Salt Lake City Utah control actions taken that are
7 adverse to RICO victims, through creative, wrongful, and alleged money laundering
8 schemes by liquidating third party grant and warranty deed real property into cash
9 or exchanges enabling the re-cycling of equities and washing of profits.
10 57.Plaintiffs alleges RICO persons are mostly recycled over and over again with the
11 only exception being if a enterprise member is caught, like Nancy Walsh, Peri
12 Locklear and or Richard Romero in instant cases or turns out to be a wild card like
13 Marvin Chambers and or Michael Underwood. In these cases these RICO persons
14 generally remain on the take, with incentives to appear at arms length, and while
15 their unwritten job description may vary the duties invariably include showing up at
16 foreclosure sales, giving false declarations of value of targeted properties, incepting
17 buyers, character assassination of the victim; public and business maligning of
18 victim; making false debt claims; initiating fraudulent debt collection actions;
19 calling governmental agencies to file false charges against victim; circle the
20 wagons around the victim to separate it from its earnings by threats, legal actions,
21 framing victim for crimes committed by Enterprise and most importantly
22 certifying that no discovery ever takes place against enterprise and no attorney
23 lasts to dare to represent victims ethically; and if that fails closed door sessions with
24 such attorneys to chastise them from representing victim, followed by offers of jobs
25 and incentives to breach retainer agreements continual in persistence until the
26
27 Relief
28
1 attorney buckles down in the face of such unwanted pressure of deep pocket
2 enterprise who appear infallible despite being caught red handed by states for
3 bribery, kickbacks or other corrupt acts.
4 58.Plaintiffs allege Defendants do not want to see a repeat of the same mistake twice,
5 whereby the affording of attorneys from 1998 -2001 allowed plaintiff/as witnesses
6 to testify against defendants and its unknown and known agents which led to three
7 convictions of enterprise agents. (See group exhibits from California District
8 attorney and Arizona District attorney marked Peri Locklear, Nancy Walsh as
9 manager for FATCO and Richard Romero RICO person for FATCO
10 exhibits marked 8).
11 59. Plaintiffs offer, a one page correspondence from trustee Zipf for convicted felon
12 Richard Romero signed by Zipf, forced to return the estate to plaintiffs after the
13 Arizona attorney general rendered (exhibit marked (8) initiating the start of
14 revenge by the enterprise (See Zipf correspondence, to be supplemented with
15 declarations of destruction of estate by Zipf before turnover, exhibits
16 marked 9) This revenge has lasted ten years and in those ten years California,
17 Arizona, Utah, Colorado, New York Insurance Commissioners, and or attorney

18 generals have confirmed FATCO, Fidelity and associates pay kickbacks and
19 bribe as a standard course of doing business in return for unlawful activities,
20 confirming Plaintiffs allegations.
21 60.Plaintiffs offers it inadvertently fell into the role of thwarting this racket run across
22 state lines by the enterprise and unfortunately for the enterprise its actions with
23 prime and subprime lenders taking over as servicers has now re-opened this racket
24 to the national forefront coming back to haunt this nation as a national foreclosure
25 epidemic.
26
27 Relief
28
1 61.Plaintiff allege, had they been afforded the right to redress their Government for
2 relief, the Nation could have been saved from this national crises of foreclosures
3 because of exposure of the unethical business relationship of financial institutions
4 to Title and escrow Corporations.
5 62.Plaintiff contends, its access to facts and history allows it to raise extortion of
6 itself by FATCO bribing co-defendants and agents to falsify statements to
7 falsely incriminate Plaintiff as a means to marginalize plaintiff before its targeting
8 by RICO persons like St. Clair and other Kern County Does who inflicted
9 duplicative paid off liens despite accepting payments in full backed by public
10 record, yet filed electronic notices from 1999 to 2007 against Exhibit 2 until the
11 entire estate was lost. In return for these liens and false claims exceeding five
12 thousand dollars per action involving mail fraud from 1999-2007 three RICO
13 persons Juliann Sanchez; Michael Underwood, Marvin Chambers gained or
14 caused a loss to plaintiffs of multi-million dollars and according to their own
15 statements they were motivated by incentives from FATCO, who unchecked
16 from 1994, used its standard operating practice of bribery in 1999, then again from
17 2001 to 2002, 2002 -2004 and 2004-2007(according to state records and Plaintiff
18 held record) invoking 1961(1) (A) robbery, bribery, extortion.
19 63. Plaintiff alleges corporate defendants financial institution and/or beneficiary of
20 enterprise New Century was licensed by Los Angeles based California
21 Corporation Commissioner to conduct Business as a Mortgage Lending Institution
22 in Multiple Districts of United States, two years after year 2000 when New
23 Century refinanced 11909 Palm Ave Bakersfield CA 93312.
24 64.Plaintiff offers New Century status from 2000 to 2002 in California is unknown.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 65. Plaintiff contend the same California Corp. Commissioner who licensed New
2 Century revoked its licenses for failure to comply with any (CFLL) code 22712,
3 guidelines in the following words:
4 66.Having determined that (New Century Mortgage or Company) has engaged

in, or is engaging in, or is about to engage in, acts or practices constituting
5 violations of the CFLL (Financial Code sections 22000 et seq.) and applicable
6 regulations and hereby issued the following Findings of Fact and Desist and
Refrain Order Pursuant to (Financial Code 22000 et seq) and applicable
7 regulations.
8 67.Plaintiffs are informed believe and thereon allege that DLJ was appointed
9 successor Trustee for New Century to appear as if it were a separate entity prior
10 to the May 03, 2007 extortion attempt (See pleading paper entered with Notice of
11 Motion for Removal of Cv07-06757, contradicting the shoes under which
12 DLJ took title to the roof over Plaintiffs head as third party buyer marked
13 exhibit 12) On or about August 26, 2000.DLJis a successor in interest to
14 New Century when alleging their status in CV07-06757 controlling Address:
15 11909 Palm Ave. Bakersfield, California. 93312 Family Farmhouse;
16 68.Findings of fact and conclusions of law that order New Century to desist and
17 refrain control its successors from committing like acts (See Michael Richardson
18 declaration supporting attachments in CV07-06757 exhibit marked 11)
19 69.Plaintiff offers despite the controlling order marked exhibit 11, DLJ falsified
20 material facts between March 2007 through August 27, 2007, through September
21 05, 2007 to initiate conversion and a vexatious action in front of a back pocket
22 venue of choice and this confirmed by two packages mailed to multiple parties by
23 the use of federal communications systems involving multiple allegations all for the
24 amount over $800,000.00 dollars and each contradicting the others contents with an
25 additional approximate (121) pages of exhibit in concurrent related CV07-06757
26
27 Relief
28
1 served electronically and or by mail to Attorney Sloan and such mailing followed
2 by September 05, 2007 threat to the same attorney in front of Commissioner Errea
3 to remove himself from the case in an exparte session witnessed by the
4 Commissioner. When these acts took place the property and equity being extorted
5 from was declared to be valued at: (See Appraised value lowered from 2004 of
6 1.2 to over eight hundred thousand dollars in 2007, exhibit marked 13.)
7 70. Plaintiff contends had New Century $276,000.00 Deed of Trust been valid with
8 no plaintiffs allegations of missing escrowed funds; the exhibit 13 marked
9 appraisals would confirm an approximate five hundred thousand plus equity in the
10 homesteaded farm controlled by instant and concurrent case CV07-06757.
11 71. Plaintiff alleges it was then DLJ and FATCO together as an enterprise
12 rehired Lawyers on stand-by i.e. enterprise or enterprise agent CB&H to re-
13 impose an unauthorized lien first imposed as of $1.3 Million and re-imposed as
14 $900,000.00 slightly more than the claimed equity against an innocent property
15 where no such lien ever existed against the plaintiff (See the use of the same tactic
16 by the same firm on January 18, 2001 confirmed by a California Attorney
17 Andreessen referencing this wrongful practice of the same law Firm in 2001...,
18 identifies property well over one million ,.the value for the real property to be
19 covered by the order was not to exceed $300,000.00, (Attorney Andreessen
20 raises constitutional rights/unlawful debt collection underlying causes material
21 to leading plaintiffs beneficiaries to financial ruin/BK, exhibit marked 14)
22 72. Plaintiff alleges such material facts in instant and concurrent matters to show how
23 extortion led to the dissipation of their multi-million dollar estate.
24 73.Plaintiff alleges DLJ opened the door to evidentiary hearings and discovery
25 against itself and the enterprise by the entry of altered and false approximate
26
27 Relief
28
1 (121) plus exhibits it mailed to multiple sources including State Court Case S-
2 1500-CL-216249 record, for disputed facts of material issues evidentiary in nature
3 requiring Rule 60(b) discovery controlled by evidentiary hearings
4 74. Court is moved to take Judicial Note of Title Conversion the act of May 03, 2007
5 claim of ownership by DLJ controlled by Title 18 1961(1)(B) sub-section
6 section 1341 , section 1343, section 1344 , control each mailing for an amount
7 greater than five thousand dollars as one count of mail fraud in instant and
8 concurrent related actions and note DLJs own offering to eviscerate its standing
9 to claim in CV07-06757: Plaintiff obtained Title to the premises and right to
10 possession thereof by its purchase at a foreclosure sale validly held in compliance
11 with civil code subsection 2924 the particulars of which areMay 03, 2007, in the
12 face of its contradictory offering:On or about August 26, 2000.DLJis a
13 successor in interest to New Century
14 75. DLJ standing to bring CV07-06757 controlled action must be barred by

15 California Financial code 22712, and the taking of property by impersonation
16 declared a RICO 1964(a) governed offence.
17 76. Court must further take judicial notice of the actions taken by the New York Stock
18 Exchange NDYE for the further barring and revoking of New Centurys right
19 to negotiate stocks in New York States Stock Exchange effective on or around the
20 time of Foreclosure proceedings were initiated under DLJ name by and through a
21 consensual hierarchy of managing members, lawyers, attorneys, partners, managers,
22 directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives that formulate and implement
23 policies relative to the provision of legal services, including but not restricted to,
24 unlawful debt collection practices, under each others cover better known as
25 OCWEN; ERBEY; LITTON; MOSS, CODILIS; MOSS, PITE;
26
27 Relief
28
1 SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, NDSC; GMAC; FIDELITY
2 and FATCO making up defendants core and non-core profits is material to the
3 demand for turnover of Titles back to its legal owners.(See approximately 100
4 violated Title Policy/ies to be entered as exhibit marked 15).
5 77.Court is moved by Plaintiffs to review the facts and related actions for the
6 application of similar citations in instant and concurrent matters where the same
7 group of defendants, controlled in like manner properties through the same
8 unauthorized title transfers, sample of one title transfer in exhibit marked 16), by
9 which alleged scheme defendants like OCWEN; New Century and GMAC
10 by relying on each other, agents/assignees and enterprise made millions just from
11 these plaintiffs.
12 78.Third party cases like (Guzmans v. OCWEN; Kweku Hanson et al v. Ocwen

13 Federal Bank et al Docket #.3:02CV960 (CFD) and the Corporate
14 Commissioner v. New Century, listed as exhibit marked 11), merely support an
15 ongoing serial, systemic pattern of State and federal racketeering in violation of
16 statutory and constitutional rights of consumers across state lines (Exhibit 2).
17 79.Plaintiff alleges when they asked Defendant Select to provide accounting of

18 missing funds Select wrote a letter with an alleged copy to FBI threatening
19 victims of Selects own fraud by the use of intimidation through the mentioning
20 of FBI. (Letter on Select letter head as successor for Fidelity followed
21 by the same request resulting in threats against Plaintiff Counsel in the
22 presence of Errea making Errea witness to RICO crime of tampering
23 court proceedings. exhibit marked 17 as proof of thereof).
24 80.Plaintiff alleges the production of documents itemizing settlement statements and
25 Demands for pay-off on at least eighty of exhibit marked 2; properties shall expose
26
27 Relief
28
1 that the lien over CV07-06757 controlled property for $276,000 could have been
2 paid off ten times over and a substantial equity left over for Plaintiffs.
3 81.Yet NDSC commenced foreclosure proceeding on the roof over Plaintiffs

4 beneficiaries head located at 11909 Palm Ave., Bakersfield, California 93312
5 without service of notice of foreclosure with intent to ignore Plaintiff multiple
6 requests for accounting based on contention that payment has been collected on a
7 Contract Breached by Lender New Century; NDSCS, principal Defendant New
8 Century and its agents refused any accounting and threatened law suits.
9 82.Once confronted with non service an after the fact photograph of a posting on
10 Plaintiffs front door, claiming posting to have taken place on February 14, of 2007,
11 was entered on record. For the record Valentine date is a celebrated event in
12 Plaintiff Household, whereby no posting could have taken place, as there was an
13 historic event taking place at the house where all times plaintiffs were in an around
14 the house, where such a picture would have resulted in the capturing of movement
15 and festivities and it did not.
16 83.Defendant New Century further ignored Plaintiff numerous requests for an

17 accounting that exceed ten properties sold by and through New Century and/or
18 assignees and those ten plus properties that were sold by and through New
19 Century or their assignees had a market value that exceeded Five Million dollars
20 with mortgage debt of no more than $40,000 to $70,000 dollars per property.
21 84.Plaintiff are further informed, believe and thereon allege that defendant St. Clair
22 as a major Kern County Developer was working as an insider with Defendants and
23 each of them (exception Arizona Defendants) and gave low ball appraised value on
24 said real property/s without being licensed to do so. The goal was to purchase these
25 properties at low ball prices and resell them at huge profits under specially set up
26
27 Relief
28
1 fronts like Foundation Ventures LLC, a partnership commenced on May 30, 2002
2 with Legal status presently cancelled.
3 85.Plaintiff are informed believe and thereon allege that Fidelity had abused its
4 Fiduciary responsibility to plaintiff, in over a dozen cases and is the umbrella and
5 the enterprise by which remaining defendants are able to receive safety and shelter
6 from exposure for violations of numerous Federal Statutes governing Mortgage
7 Lending Institutions. Besides CV07-06757 and CV07-06750 Hall of record,
8 FATCO and Fidelity Title hold proof that KC S-1500-CV 253558; S-1500-
9 CL 190453; Civ. S 1500- 250894 were vexatious in nature and allowed as the
10 Enterprise alleged to be run by FATCO and Fidelity by and through and
11 RICO persons Frank St. Clair, Banducci, and legal agents for the enterprise
12 enterprise or enterprise agent CB&H so as to walk away with over $75,000.00
13 in stolen equity belonging to plaintiff per property.
14 86.Ironically the RICO enterprise did not record the same lien against 5311 Glacier
15 Springs Bakersfield, CA 93313 after its Title was altered in favor of a Jason
16 Lowe while the assessments and bills against the property were lumped together
17 against Plaintiffs names and three other properties of plaintiffs which it was
18 attempting to sell held in escrow, because of these global Les Pendens and Liens
19 imposed by the same agents of defendants enterprise or enterprise agent
20 CB&H who are on standby to file suits and actions as they did in Kern County
21 suit S-1500-CV 253558 through ready and willing litigants to extort money from
22 plaintiffs who did so under duress though escrows held at Alliance run by the
23 enterprise.
24 87.Plaintiff are further informed and believe that Fidelity in consort with St.
25 Clair New Century; GMAC Mortgage Corporation Pa; Assignee Norwest
26
27 Relief
28
1 Mortgage Inc.; OCWEN; First American Lenders Advantage; First
2 American Title Insurance Company As Attorney in-fact; their agents,
3 subsidiaries and employees continues to violate RICO 1961(1)(A) robbery,
4 bribery, extortion and selective RICO 1961(1) (B) violations, wherefore
5 Plaintiff can safely allege all charges and claims levied against FATCO for
6 above and below listed violations are applicable to this defendant. The actions of
7 this defendant have forced Plaintiff to be sued for Tax Liens, HOA Foreclosures
8 and Mortgage Foreclosures for its own benefit and the benefit of its affiliates and
9 partners in crime as identified in this instant action.
10 88.Plaintiffs are informed believe and thereon allege that Plaintiffs are not alone in
11 this plight imposed upon them by the Godfathers of the enterprise Fidelity and
12 FATCO. Listed below is a record of third party web sites to offer a pattern:
13 89.http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2005/02/21/daily8.html
14 90. http://www.firstam.com/content.cfm?id=2498
91.http://www.colorado.gov/governor/press/february05/insurance.html
15
92.http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/taxesandinsurance/20050301-draper.html
16
93..http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/19991108_firstamtitle.htm
17
94.http://www.ins.state.ny.us/invstcomp.htm#ra
18
95.Plaintiff contends First American abused its Fiduciary Duty based on its issued
19
First American's Eagle Protection Owner's Policy and violated the same policies
20
from an approximate period of 1996 to 2007 (see attached group of Title Policies
21
where Fiduciary violations let to direct and indirect abuses against Plaintiffs
22
by FATCO and Fidelity Title and Escrow Companies working under their
23
Licenses and/or under each others influence, attached hereto group exhibit
24
marked 20)
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 96.Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Alliance is protected under FATCO
2 umbrella. Plaintiff alleges that on more than one property Alliance is abusing the
3 same fiduciary Duties to its clients and Parties in Interest as its predecessor
4 (FATCO) and has failed to pay taxes and or give Title Insurance on properties
5 located in Kern County after charging Title Fees, to Consumers.
697.Plaintiff alleges Alliance over paid Kern County (hereinafter KC) and KC
7 Attorneys, because the same attorneys represent Alliances Umbrella protection
8 First American Title hereinafter FATCO all through 2004-2006

998.Plaintiff contend that despite being offered proof of false billing in the face of their
10 own official record in 2004 KC remained silent and allowed its attorneys
11 enterprise or enterprise agent CB&H filed an actual suit and collect predatory fees
12 from innocent escrows upon receiving pay-off demand by plaintiffs and Alliance in
13 2004 insisted on paying the duplicative global fees:
14 Address: 711 Las Colinas Street, Tehachapi, California

Address: 733 Las Colinas Street, Tehachapi, California
15
Address: 5303 Glacier Springs Drive, Bakersfield, California
16 Address: 5307 Glacier Springs Drive, Bakersfield, California
17 99. Foreclosure proceedings are underway for another such mistake by Alliance
18 against 711 Las Colinas Street, Tehachapi, California and 733 Las Colinas Street,
19 Tehachapi, California, again in 2007 that need to be restrained; BAKARFIT is
20 owed a difference of $65,000 in these properties but may lose this right to collect
21 due to breach of Title Insurance and intentional non-payment of tax liens by
22 Alliance after it issued and got paid for a clear Title report.
23 100. State farm is responsible for making good claims under one commercial and
24 one Fire Policy to this plaintiff.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 101. Claim# 03-H165-281 under Policy #03-C3-6175-5 (see attached letter from
2 State Farm avoiding and circumventing Insurance policy on a house now
3 rendered subject to disclosure according to Plaintiff hired two non attached
4 separate engineers report marked Exhibit 21) since September 15, 2003 State
5 Farm has used mother against daughter to conspire with the alleged enterprise to
6 deprive Plaintiff to reside at 1091 South Bill Martin Drive Tucson, Arizona 85745,
7 after the enterprise took a commercial caterpillar truck and ransacked structure of
8 the above property.
9 102. Factual Issues of damages arise out of Arizona sub-divisions controlled by

10 DEVCON and KT (See attached list of properties in Sub-divisions
11 controlled by DEVCON exhibit marked 2 listed under StarrPass with
12 declarations by Arizona Realtor Patsy Andrews before she was threatened
13 Exhibit marked 2 and 22) Plaintiffs themselves narrowly escaping death threats
14 and gunfire after saving 1091 Bill Martin Drive Tucson, Arizona 85745, from
15 New Century, GMAC, OCWEN, FATCO Fidelity Title;
16 DEVCON collective efforts to foreclose only to be faced by an agent of
17 DEVCON called BALDWIN ramming a caterpillar truck into the same

18 property, then using David McEvoy who filed CV07-06750 against Plaintiff equity
19 to authorize Mobile to remove around two hundred thousand dollars worth of
20 furniture; Federal lawsuits papers, cell phones, Turkish carpets foreign artifacts
21 telephones and items from the marginalized 1091 S. Bill Martin Drive home and
22 while they were at it additional swipes were made in neighboring 1136 South Little
23 Buck loop Tucson, Arizona 85745 around the same time with David McEvoy at the
24 heart of each controversy arising out of DEVCON controlled sub-divisions.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 103. Over and above Plaintiffs insurance State Farm was instructed not to pay
2 replacement costs, which started a chain of suits and threats by David McEvoy to
3 fix the house, which he had levied with liens and despite Plaintiff spending
4 thousands of dollars to get engineering and expert reports verifying collateral and
5 structural damage, the insurance company would not pay replacement costs.
6 104. Upon information, belief and trust in this belief plaintiffs allege Defendants
7 BALDWIN as an agent of Canadian concern defendant DEVCON moving
8 party of C2006-6164, encouraged defendant named defendant(s) MOBILE
9 through David McEvoy, after the failed foreclosure attempt by the defendants to
10 take away 1091 S. Bill Martin Drive Tucson, Arizona on September 12, 2003,
11 whereby DEVCON agents Baldwin ran a Caterpillar Truck into the same
12 house on September 15, 2007 (exhibit marked 23).
13 105. Then David McEvoy asked MOBILE to remove all of the damaged and
14 restored items so plaintiff would be left without proof of damages, the same were
15 removed in a copy cat pattern of removal of contents from: 6352 Vuelta Tajo unit
16 160 Tucson, Arizona; 1091 South Bill Martin Drive Tucson, Arizona; 1136 South
17 Little Buck Loop Tucson, Arizona and 1120 South Little Buck Loop Tucson,
18 Arizona; where RICO 1961 et seq inclusive of (1) (B) sections 2314 and 2315 is
19 applicable for Grand theft, break-in forced entry under color of authority .
20 106. KC caused multiple foreclosures (See tax claims by KC on intercepted
21 sales by the Enterprise godfathers FATCO & Fidelity exhibit marked 24).
22 107. City of Bakersfield ongoing attempts at intimidation and alleged conspiracy
23 with developers and FATCO attorneys enterprise or enterprise agent
24 CB&H is part of ongoing request for discovery for damages. Liability has
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 already been established by public records to be produced during Trial, it is the
2 extent of damages that need to be explored through discovery.
3 108. Current damage estimated are estimated at over two million and ongoing
4 pending Trial by Jury, City officials including a Mr. Newell supposed to be
5 handling such claims was notified multiple times between 2004 through 2006 and
6 failed to stop this criminal activity by City officials through cronyism.
7 109. City of Bakersfield continued to restrain Plaintiff opened escrows, by liens
8 imposed and refusal to acknowledge fault from its unlawful Les Pendens obtained
9 from a local Judge by false offerings obtained through hired litigants (See
10 enterprise or enterprise agent CB&H attorneys, false injunction against
11 innocent Plaintiffs from 1999 and the hiring of the same attorneys to impose
12 another Les Pendens to stop payment of taxes, in order to obtain another set of
13 properties through a new lien; (See Letter by real Estate Company called
14 Watson realty confirming interception by defendants from 1999 and see
15 contents of case referred to as Civ. S-1500-CV-250894 exhibit marked 25)
16 110. St. Clair; Fidelity and unknown government and corporate does,
17 participated with the city of Bakersfield to benefit under color of office of the City
18 manager who hired by his own offer FATCO firm enterprise or enterprise
19 agent CB&H, without precedence to sue Plaintiffs unlawfully imposed false and
20 padded global injunction and Les Pendens vexatious in nature, Kern County
21 Civ.#S-1500-CV 250894, as a means to launder money collected under
22 Richardson name and through attorney fees multiple times the amount of the
23 actual assessments according to the City/s own record.
24 111. False liens, lawsuit threats and global Les Pendens offences against Plaintiffs
25 5311 Glacier Springs Bakersfield, California 93311 controlled by RICO act 1961
26
27 Relief
28
1 (D), led a title 11; section 1956, section 1957 takeover through the actions of then
2 unlicensed agent Banducci impersonating California Real Estate Agent
3 controlled by 1343 for false advertisements and electronic releases encouraging
4 scheme and/or artifice to defraud, obtain money or property by means of false or
5 fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmittals, wires, electronic
6 communication in the facilitation of interstate commerce, and the use of writings,
7 signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
8 artifice, is subject to fines and/or imprisonment of not more than 20 years, or both.
9 If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more
10 than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. (Debbie Banducci,
11 Frank St. Clair and attorneys for Bakersfield; enterprise or enterprise agent
12 CB&H) prepared documents, les Pendens, claims and transmittals designed to
13 collect unlawful gain is controlled by Title 18 sections collectively affecting each
14 and every Property made part thereof exhibit 2 and specifically the below listed:
15 Address: 5915 Winter Grove Drive, Bakersfield, California

Address: 5311 Glacier Springs, Bakersfield, California
16
Address: 3225 Sherrell Way, Bakersfield, California
17
112. Plaintiff allege collectively Defendants KC and PC and agents collected
18
thousands of dollars by the above scheme of conversion, specifically affecting
19
above and below listed properties over and above properties listed in exhibit 2:
20
21 Address: 1120 South Little Buck Loop Tucson, Arizona 85745;
Address: Lot 369 in Oro Valley Arizona
22 Address: 1136 South Little Buck Loop, Tucson, Arizona 85745;
Plus (20) twenty properties located in sub-division of KT including plaintiff
23
developer rights.
24
113. Developer and international corporate conglomerate Canadian group
25
DEVCON is the same party who is claiming the status of plaintiffs in C2006-
26
27 Relief
28
1 6164 and suing us again on the same house 1136 S. Little Buck Loop, Tucson
2 Arizona 85745, whose locks were replaced by DEVCON and house rented
3 barring us from entering into our own home for almost three years, while charging
4 us for HOA dues, taxes, mortgage payments and upkeep. This practice took away
5 a sub-division and at least (49) other properties that belonged to us including but
6 not limited to grant and warranty deeds to property and development rights to
7 Antelope Point aka Paradise Point as reward for conspiracy to defraud and for
8 further fraudulent conspiracy; (See recorded instrument Registration DM99-
9 020748 and the subsequent address change to an agent of DEVCON on a
10 recorded instrument without our authority exhibit marked 26). (RICO
11 1961(1) (B) section 2319 for criminal infringement of Plaintiffs copyrighted
12 name Paradise Point and the theft of the cashiers check intercepted from
13 payment to the Copyright department to intercept copyright claim to Paradise
14 Point owned by Plaintiff, after FATCO as the alleged enterprise hosted a
15 fund raiser and marketed the Public event at Desert Pass realty grounds owned by
16 DevCon to profit DevCon flying in the face of instructions by the Insurance
17 commissioners who had distinctively instructed FATCO and Fidelity that

18 they could not indulge in payment of incentives, kickbacks, promotional events
19 and or bribes to benefit Real estate agents and or developers.
20 114. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege as a continuation of
21 this practice another Arizona Home Owners sub-division called KT caused
22 false billing and global padded HOA liens, with intent to harm plaintiffs.
23 115. This act of false and padded collective billing led to multiple suits and adverse
24 actions and sale interceptions (See samples of interceptions by defendants thru
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 discovery marked exhibit 27) with known and unknown principals and assigns
2 who intercepted Plaintiffs sales at will with intent to destroy rental income.
3 116. A Commercial Liability Policy Claim CWO44606 is ready to issue Plaintiff
4 a check for losses it suffered in KT currently being intercepted by enterprise to
5 the detriment of the Plaintiffs.
6 117. Initial imposition of false and padded liens acted as a tracking device to
7 intercept plaintiff opened escrows in their effort to secure their own estate.
8 118. The current imposition of the same false liens continuing to haunt plaintiff in
9 this financial stage is to tract and destroy plaintiffs ability to rehabilitate with full
10 knowledge plaintiff is insolvent, with one goal in mind that Plaintiff should be
11 rendered homeless at all costs!
12 119. Plaintiff alleges that ST. CLAIR is one of the largest benefactor of extortion
13 under RICO (See group of recorded Title changes on multi-million dollar
14 estate that blows the lid off of any argument by Defendant that Kern County
15 Local Developer/Real Estate Agent was in fact was an insider targeting
16 custom built homes of designers/Trustee and beneficiary of instant Plaintiff
17 and taking over said properties under alter egos to conceal ST. CLAIR
18 identity after it provided financial institutions and adverse parties with false
19 low values on targeted properties to the benefit of other named defendants
20 and unknown does and Attorneys exhibit marked 28).
21 120. Plaintiffs allege and believe enterprise agents enterprise or enterprise agent
22 CB&H are the designated henchmen whose actions constitute the longest
23 running tracking device to intercept each and every transaction, relationship and
24 business of the plaintiffs.
25
121. Plaintiffs allege St. Clair Chambers and Banducci and Does
26
27 Relief
28
1 benefitted richly with other RICO persons benefitted in return for their collective
2 actions, misrepresentations and participation in the mailing of false and altered
3 notices, publications, for affectively tampering with a Federal Jury and offering
4 false values to different courts and benefitted the Enterprise in the millions.
5 122. All through 1999-2007 the enterprise imposed false liens under the color of
6 Marvin Chamber and Juliann Sanchez which caused a fire sale (80) plus properties
7 including the below listed without any reduction in the alleged unlawful debt.
8 (See allegation of fraudulent interception by California Attorney Joel
9 Andreessen, regarding this lien as a constitutional issue whether the lien
10 caused the insolvency of the Plaintiffs exhibit marked 29)
11 123. In 2004 Banducci sold plaintiffs custom home without authority of plaintiffs
12 proclaiming seeing is believingin one of her many advertisements while
13 promoting the unauthorized sale of the below listed custom home, without a
14 license to sell at the time she was promoting the unauthorized sale, after falsely
15 declaring to the court it valued at $165,000 and reselling it for approximately
16 $400,000.00 leaving the taxes, assessments and related bills to be paid by plaintiff:
17 Address: 5311 Glacier Springs Bakersfield, California. In like manner in 2003 to

18 date, multiple demands were sent to GMAC also known as Loanstar because a
19 sale was pending on 4304 Cyclone Drive Bakersfield, CA., but Frank St. Clair
20 threw the caretaker out of the house and advising them that St. Clair not
21 plaintiff is to collect rent and is going to be the new owner, then bought the
22 property valued at 0ver $215,000.00 for $89,000.00 dollars with full knowledge of
23 the third party sale pending escrow for over $246,000.00 on June 15, 2004 and
24 took the property nonetheless without payment of a dime to plaintiff, later as
25 plaintiff started asserting their rights to HUD, KC Civ. CASE# S-1500-CV
26
27 Relief
28
1 253558 appeared but not by then owner St, Clair nor by GMAC or Wells Fargo
2 but their alter ego Loanstar to force Plaintiff to accept one third of what they
3 were owed and even that was forced paid with half the amount with deductions for
4 their attorneys who intercepted plaintiffs sale in the first instance after Plaintiff
5 Real estate agent Rebecca Green was threatened not to sell plaintiff properties by
6 St. Clair, as was Tammy Watson of Watson Realty to name a few.
7 124. Locklear actions led her to be indicted and convicted for theft of rent,
8 mortgages and income she took from plaintiff. Information obtained since then has
9 confirmed her as an accessory to the enterprise, convicted for grand theft, false
10 endorsements and multiple counts of Fraud. Subpoenas by Kern County
11 California District Attorney to just one Bank exposed theft of $47,000
12 approximately from plaintiff by Locklear.
13 125. Losses show $250,000 USD dollars were taken by Locklear from Plaintiffs
14 rents and mortgage payments through Grand theft. Plaintiff allege Defendant
15 opened post office box located at Camino Del Oeste Post office in Bakersfield,
16 California and diverted mail, rent, foreclosure notices, tax refunds upon
17 instruction from someone other than plaintiff. Defendant stole and sold Plaintiffs
18 identity and removed trashed documents, then altered the same for the benefit of
19 the deep pockets corporate defendants in return for incentives. Plaintiffs have
20 information and undisputed proof that monies from plaintiffs account were
21 removed from Northwest account taken over by Wells Fargo Bank before the
22 Bank closed plaintiffs credit line without cause, Exhibit marked 20 (see a copy of
23 check from Norwest Financial bought by Wells Fargo Bank released funds to
24 this criminal and others by allowing non parties to use altered checks as can
25 be seen with Peri Locklear written on the face of hundreds of checks sent by
26
27 Relief
28
1 first class mail by Northwest Bank at the time of its sale to Wells Fargo, and
2 based upon which check cashing Wells Fargo closed down the Four hundred
3 thousand dollar line of credit to Plaintiff, attached as exhibit marked 30). For
4 the record Wells Fargo allowed Convicted Felons, Peri Locklear, in California
5 and Arizona and convicted felons Nancy Walsh Escrow Manager for First
6 American Title Insurance and Richard Romero to embezzle and falsely endorse to
7 remove hundreds of thousands of dollars from Plaintiff accounts without
8 permission.
9 126. Plaintiff alleges defendants that form the alleged enterprise violated
10 RICO 1961(1) (B) by actions which are indictable under any of the following
11 provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 relating to bribery, section,
12 section 659 relating to theft from interstate shipment of warranty and grant deeds
13 and Title of property to residents it solicited from Alaska and multiple states and
14 for their role in the removal and sale of personal information and federal records
15 that plaintiff needs in the implementation of this suit (See breaking in and taking
16 of Rock of Gibraltor LLC home office in the most prized resort of Tucson,
17 Arizona exhibit marked 31): plaintiff alleges enterprise removed assets, tools
18 and documents from 6352 Vuelta Tajo Tucson, Arizona 85712; 1136 South Little
19 Buck Loop Tucson, Arizona 85745; 1120 South Little Buck Loop Tucson,
20 Arizona 85745 and content worth over one hundred and fifty thousand dollars
21 from 1091 South Little Buck Loop Tucson, Arizona 85745; from Arizona and
22 moved some of the contents to Northridge California with the help of defendant
23 and Does whose very acts when proven at Trial are indictable under section 659 as
24 felonious, section 1029 for identity theft, section 1341 for the federal mailing of
25 settlement statements, demands and checks back and forth between states
26
27 Relief
28
1 involving 1343 for related wire fraud), and section 1344 for fraud by financial
2 institutions, and together they all benefitted by the application of 1503 relating to
3 obstruction of justice, whereby none of these actions may have been possible to
4 continue over a continual period of 1996-2001 and 2002-to 2007 after Plaintiff as
5 a witness was successful in bringing three agents of defendants to justice, had
6 plaintiffs not been intercepted from hiring an attorney.
7 127. Based on such information and belief in such information Plaintiff alleges that
8 FATCO and certain Defendants and unknown Does may have invoked RICO
9 1961(1 (B) section 1510, relating to obstruction of criminal investigations in
10 known cases like that of Peri Locklear and may have paid for her legal
11 representation and to overturn the conviction but also in unknown case where
12 FATCO actions invoked section 1511, relating to the obstruction of State or
13 local law enforcement in the matter of criminal investigation of a Bakersfield
14 attorney and attempted filing of false claims through their agents against plaintiff.
15 128. Additionally based on ongoing investigation Plaintiffs allege FATCO and
16 Fidelity are the Godfathers of the enterprise RICO 1961 (1)(D) for offenses
17 involving fraud connected to Title 11 matters for claiming and using federal mail
18 to assert such legally fraudulent proof of claims that are punishable under any law
19 of the United States.
20 129. Plaintiff alleges FATCO, Fidelity and known and unknown enterprise
21 invoked RICO 1961(1) (E) by committing any act indictable under the Currency
22 and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act., where the following may apply:
23 a. RICO sections relating to: extortion, fraud and related activity/s with identification
24 documents; fraud and related activity connected to communication; fraud related
25 to mail fraud; fraud related to obstruction of justice; fraud related to obstruction of
26
27 Relief
28
1 criminal investigations; fraud related to obstruction of State or local law
2 enforcement; fraud related to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant;
3 fraud related to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant; fraud related
4 to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion; fraud related to racketeering;
5 fraud related to the laundering of monetary instruments; fraud related to engaging
6 in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity;
7 fraud related to interstate transportation of stolen property; fraud related to
8 criminal infringement of copyright; fraud related to false endorsements and
9 embezzlement; activity related to forced entry, break in, in the commission of
10 committing burglary or collection of unlawful earnings or any offense involving
11 fraud connected with a case under title 11; collection of unlawful debt or the
12 business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or
13 Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate; fraud
14 including the removing of documentary material which includes any book,
15 paper, document, record, recording, or other material; committed or intended to
16 commit prohibited activities; taking of unlawful earning by any person receiving
17 any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
18 or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as

19 a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
20 invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
21 income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
22 enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
23 foreign commerce or to benefit wrongdoer/perpetrator/s estate, family and
24 members of his organized or unorganized businesses and/or accomplices in any
25 manner which is unlawful or acquiring or maintaining, directly or indirectly, is
26
27 Relief
28
1 unlawful as it is carried out as interstate commerce such enterprise and the pursuit
2 of it is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,
3 controlling individuals, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity
4 and/or any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
5 entity having successfully performed at least two like acts by definition of
6 1962(a) to be a pattern of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
7 1970 and the last of which to have occurred within ten years (excluding period of
8 imprisonment of convicted defendants) after the commission of a prior act of
9 racketeering activity; discovery is designed to offer proof of actual damages
10 caused from the commission of such conduct of racketeering activity alleged to be
11 facilitated by conspiracy by and between 1961(4) defined participants for
12 economic or non economic reasons that otherwise meet the requirements of 1962
13 provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) and thus invoke all rights under 1964(a).
14 130. Therefor; collaborative allegations against defendants and each one of them
15 listed in paragraphs 1 through 128, must be incorporated with general allegations
16 recording collaborative efforts of defendants and each of them, with each other to
17 render plaintiff homeless by and through a court where the statutes and law
18 provides, that the amount of controversy and scope can challenge a commissioner
19 right to hear a case in a limited courtroom maybe challenged who with all due
20 respect, plaintiffs allege to call as a material witness for activities committed from
21 August 2007 through September 05, 2007 by defendants that are defined
22 specifically under statutory and RICO violation listed in Paragraph 130 adverse to
23 person/s listed in paragraph 129.
24
25
26
27 Relief
28
1
2
RICO PERSONS
3 (victim)
4 [RICO TITLE 18 UNITED STATES CODE 1961(3)]
5 131. Plaintiff Rock of Gibraltor, LLC ROCK with its members and holding Trust
6 (BAKARFIT) and its beneficial owners Sammye Richardson and Michael
7 Richardson collectively (BAKARFIT) incorporate allegations contained in
8 paragraphs 1 through 129, inclusive at all times and made material herein by
9 themselves offering that they are residents of the State of California engaged in
10 legal activities of building and purchasing single family homes for the purpose of
11 running a family rental business in Arizona and California making Plaintiff a
12 person, (victim) as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO and
13 the enterprise (perpetrators) became defendants as defined in paragraph 130.
14 RICO ENTERPRISE
15 (godfather/perpetrators/arms)
16 [RICO TITLE 18 UNITED STATES CODE 1961(4)]
17 Named Defendants are at all times material herein as residents, citizens and or
18 corporations based in California, Arizona, Multi-districts of the United States and/or
19 incorporated in California, multi-districts and foreign states engaged in prohibited
20 activities, which render unlawful for any person or entity to participate in, or for any
21 person/entity to have derived any direct or indirect income from, whereby Arizona
22 Rule or its federal counterpart may apply a person or enterprise who acquires any
23 property through an offense included in the definition of racketeering in 13-
24 2301(d)(4), or through a violation of 13-2312 is an involuntary Trustee holds
25 the property in constructive trust for the benefit of the persons entitled to remedies
26
27 Relief
28
1 pursuant to a racketeering offense. See A.R.S. 13-2314(f)13-2301(D)(4), ..or
2 through a violation of 13-2312 is an Involuntary Trustee and holds property in
3 constructive trust for the benefit of the persons entitled to remedies pursuant to a
4 racketeering offense.
5 132. as a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
6 which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2,
7 title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
8 income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
9 establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
10 of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce; whereby defendants New
11 Century; DLJ; Ocwen; Select; NDSC; Fidelity; FATCO; Alliance;
12 State Farm; Mobile Storage; KC; Bakersfield; PC; Tucson;
13 DevCon; St. Clair; Banducci; Chambers; KT; Locklear; Successors,
14 Assigns; John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe
15 Corporations 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; Doe Governmental Units 1-10 And
16 Individual Does 1-10, Inclusive are alleged to form a, is a enterprise, as that term
17 is defined pursuant to Section 1961(4) of RICO enterprise which includes any
18 individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
19 or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;
20 V11
21 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
22
133. Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action the allegations contained in
23
paragraphs 1 through 130, inclusive;
24
134. Plaintiffs allege Corporate Defendants are working with each other and
25
enterprise organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of
26
27 Relief
28
1 partners, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives that
2 formulate and implement policies that are relative to silencing victims of crimes.
3 135. The genesis of this law suit originates as a defensive mechanism by the plaintiff
4 on behalf of its members and beneficiaries like the named plaintiffs, who were
5 defrauded and/or extorted into force paying and did pay a sum of money to
6 defendants who benefitted from this non-core business practice under umbrella
7 protection of the enterprise.
8 VII1
9 CAUSES OF ACTION
10 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
11
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT OF
12 1970, RICO (brought for the quiet title turnover of properties listed in exhibit
2., taken from plaintiff by definition of 1962(a) and part thereof exhibit 2).
13
14 136. The allegations of paragraphs 1-133 are incorporated herein by reference as
15 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of general allegations hereinafter listed as
16 paragraphs 131-133 in support of quiet title, cancellation of deeds; fiduciary and
17 statutory breaches, accounting.
18 137. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy for turnover of stolen assets and their
19 investment properties, income from which was supposed to pay off the roof over
20 their head. Plaintiff seek the invoking of 1962(a) as relief which allows the injured
21 party of unlawful taking by any person who has received any income derived,
22 directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
23 of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
24 meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to be doing so within the
25 definition of RICO 1961(4) and all remedies of 1964(a) to apply. Material issues
26 of evidence and Public record offer verified proof that an enterprise is
27 Relief
28
1 involved in the active continual collection of false debt through levies, liens,
2 abstracts and claims based on false claims to indebtedness as defined by 1961(6),
3 and is doing so with intent to harm and render plaintiff incapable of earning a
4 living and to be declared forced Bankrupted, this has lasted over a continual
5 period of more than seven years without relief some of the activities controlled by
6 Title 11 restraints and verified Rule 60(b) and RICO subsections controlling
7 Title 11 violations.
8 RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962 (C) OPERATION OF ENTERPRISE THROUGH

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
9
10 140 The allegations of paragraphs 1-139 are incorporated herein by reference as
11 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 133-134.
12 Defendants and each of them are alleged to be participating in the unlawful taking
13 of property at will by and through person employed by or associated with a
14 enterprise actively engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
15 foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in its conduct
16 and for the enhancement of its bad faith affairs, through a pattern of racketeering
17 activity or collection of unlawful debt. Plaintiffs seek to have the same acts
18 exposed and declared unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
19 provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. Affectively laying the
20 groundwork for quiet title cancellation of deeds for fiduciary and statutory
21 breaches and accounting violations followed by concurrent move to ask for
22 declaratory relief; temporary restraining order; permanent injunction; and damages
23 on the basis of 1-9 causes of action for violation of 18 U.S.C 1961 (1) (A), (B),
24 (D) And (2) Et Seq; Conspiracy To Violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(a)(b)(c)(d) Et Seq;
25 1964(a) Invoking Of 1965 et seq as justification as if fully set forth herein.
26
27 Relief
28
1 141 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendants and each of them for
2 relief in the first cause of action against each defendant and for actions committed
3 in association with each other, and engaged in by and through conduct that
4 constitutes a RICO pattern of racketeering activity and for which each of the
5 following configurations constitutes of RICO enterprise, as that term is defined
6 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq applies:
7 a).RICO Enterprise 1: First American Title Corporation., is a RICO enterprise,

8 organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of partners,
9 managers, directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives that formulate
10 and implement policies relative to the provision of escrow and Title Insurance
11 requirements programming to clientele and customers, both domestically and
12 internationally. Plaintiffs allege that Marvin Chambers, Debbie Banducci, Peri
13 Locklear, Nancy Walsh, Richard Romero, Frank St Clair, Bryan Whitfield,
14 FATCO and KC agents Caswell Bell & Hillison, David McEvoy, Dev Con,
15 State Farm, New Century, DLJ are entities who are included in the meaning of
16 1961(4) for acting in concert therewith, are employed by and associated with said
17 RICO enterprise that is engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or
18 foreign commerce, and that said RICO enterprise agents act like arms of the
19 enterprise in concert therewith, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
20 the conduct of such RICO enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of
21 racketeering activity.
22 b) RICO Enterprise 2: Fidelity Title is a RICO enterprise, organized and
23 maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of partners, managers,
24 directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives that formulate and
25
implement policies relative to the provision of Title and escrow programming to
26
27 Relief
28
1 clientele and customers, domestically. Plaintiffs allege that Frank St. Clair,
2 Debbie Banducci, FATCO and KC et al agents Caswell Bell & Hillison,
3 Marvin Chambers, defendant Financial Institution CEOs and persons acting in
4 concert therewith, are employed by and associated by said RICO enterprise that is
5 engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, and that
6 said RICO enterprise and entities acting in concert therewith, conduct or
7 participate in, directly or indirectly, to facilitate the conduct of such RICO
8 enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity.
9 c) RICO Enterprise 3: Defendants New Century, Ocwen Federal, DLJ, NDSC,
10 GMAC and named Financial institutions and lawyers are part of a RICO
11 enterprise, organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of
12 managing members, lawyers, attorneys, partners, managers, directors, officers,
13 supervisors, and/or representatives that formulate and implement policies relative
14 to the provision of legal services, including but not restricted to, debt collection
15 practices, on behalf of clients, and such services are offered both interstate and
16 internationally. Plaintiffs allege that several California and Arizona Attorneys
17 acted as carriers without any disclosed relationship to enterprise in their official
18 capacity which could be determined to assert an attorney client privilege and

19 turned over monies and properties in a manner where the definition of 1961 et
20 seq and 1962 (a) can be invoked to define those activities over and above
21 1961(6) and 1961(9). Defendants, Does and unknown governmental agents
22 listed under the description of 1961(4) alleged FATCO; Fidelity and KC
23 agents to benefit chosen financial institutions. Such entities and RICO arms,
24 agents and successors shall be better identified by their actions and how much
25 money they helped squander and launder by their participation and the amount of
26
27 Relief
28
1 damage caused by these fraudulent activities including but not limited to: false
2 claims, duplication of recorded, non recorded, docketed non docketed but merely
3 alleged to cast doubt upon plaintiffs character, false declarations, false standing,
4 impersonation, ID theft under color of authority given by false claims to any court
5 or authoritative figure to obtain favorable rulings, bribery, incentives, alteration of
6 grant and warranty deeds to render plaintiff destitute with full knowledge that
7 plaintiff is/was at all times innocent of the premeditated false charges levied
8 against it by defendants; document alteration and false insinuation that plaintiff
9 may have altered said document, when the evidence and historic facts are as clear
10 as can be defined under California Evidence Code Section 450, 451 et Seq. and
11 452(d), where certain facts and propositions of generalized knowledge are so
12 universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute; and such
13 altered documents are then mailed by the use of federal communication system to
14 cause demands for payments, claims of payments by defendants and does on
15 behalf of plaintiff or their beneficiaries/members that defendants never made and
16 yet claimed, liens and abstracts levied to cause the padding of debts against the
17 names of Plaintiff/s Beneficiaries/members so as to render the entire family and its
18 Trust incapable of earning a living and the use of color of offices governmental
19 and or office of authority to levy these claims, demands, and false liens and
20 character assassination through cut and pasted abstracts of Judgments promoted
21 through advertisements, public recording, and multiple uses of the federal
22 communications system to facilitate and the amount of false claims damages for
23 which shall be determined by discovery for 1961(1) et seq inclusive of
24 (A)(B)(D)(E); 1961(2) et seq and 1961(6) and selected portion of 1961(6)(b)
25 for activities committed controlled by this Title and against persons acting in
26
27 Relief
28
1 concert therewith, or who are employed by and/or associated with said RICO
2 enterprise and whatever it is engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or
3 foreign commerce, and that said RICO enterprise entities and persons acting in
4 concert therewith, conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
5 such RICO enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity
6 according to discovery for proof of the extent of damages, involvement and
7 motivation other than economic.
8 d. RICO Enterprise 4: First American Title and Fidelity Title as a group who
9 own one half of the national and international Title, Escrow and credit markets is a
10 RICO enterprise along with deep pocket financial institutions, organized and
13 implement policies relative to the provision of escrow, title, credit and financial
14 programming to clientele and customers, both domestically and internationally,
15 whereby by local Managers like FATCOS convicted felon Nancy Walsh is
16 alleged not to have acted alone in her acts of embezzlement and theft of escrowed
17 funds but state governmental unit subpoenas proves that CEO of FATCO
18 Parker Kennedy and next in Command Gary Kermitz were at all times involved
19 as was the CEO of Fidelity Title, and each and every financial institution in the
20 corruption of developers and realtors like Frank St. Clair and Debbie Banducci to
21 act in concert therewith, and agree to be loosely employed by and/or associated
22 with said RICO enterprise engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or
23 foreign commerce, and that said RICO persons, and persons acting in concert
24 therewith, conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
25 RICO enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity.
26
27 Relief
28
1 e). RICO Enterprise 5: St Clair Real Estate and St Clair Development, ReMax
2 Golden Empire, and FATCO with Fidelity Title is a RICO enterprise,
3 organized and maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of partners,
4 managers, directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives that formulate
5 and implement policies relative to the provision of real estate escrow, sale,
6 insurance programming to clientele and customers, both domestically and
7 internationally. Plaintiffs allege that Banducci, St. Clair, and each and every
8 defendant entities acted in concert therewith, or/are employed by and associated
9 with said RICO enterprise that is engaged in, or activities of which affect,
10 interstate or foreign commerce, and that said entities and persons acting in concert
12 RICO enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity.
13 f).RICO Enterprise 6: First American Title Insurance; Fidelity Title
14 Insurance; City of Bakersfield; Kern County; Kern County Treasurer Tax
15 Collector; City of Tucson; Pima County; Pima County Treasurer; Dev Con;
16 Baldwin Construction and rogue employees is a RICO enterprise, organized and

19 implement policies relative to the provision of Real estate, escrow, title insurance
20 HOA programming to clientele and customers, both domestically and
21 internationally. Plaintiffs allege that RICO persons David McEvoy and Tanis
22 Duncan and all named defendant persons acting in concert therewith, who
23 benefitted are employed by and associated with said RICO enterprise that is
24 engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, and that
25 said RICO persons, and persons acting in concert therewith, conduct or
26
27 Relief
28
1 participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such RICO enterprises affairs
2 through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity.
3 g).RICO Enterprise 7: An unnamed entity and/or Defendant constituted an
4 association in fact by his/her/its employment or association by actions to the
5 alleged RICO enterprise; preponderance of the evidence bears witness by the acts
6 and omissions that an organized and loose structure was maintained by and
7 through knowledge as a consensual hierarchy controlled by partners, managers,
8 directors, officers, supervisors, and/or representatives of financial institutions
9 licensed under federal law to formulate and implement policies relative to the
10 provision of satellite programming to clientele and customers, both domestically
11 and internationally. Plaintiffs allege that all of the named defendants and persons
12 were acting in concert therewith, in some meaningful way some time during the
13 relevant period are RICO persons, and are employed by and associated with said
14 RICO enterprise that is engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or
15 foreign commerce, and that said RICO persons, and persons acting in concert
17 RICO enterprises affairs through a RICO pattern of racketeering activity. This
18 association in fact had a common or shared purpose. That purpose led to the
19 mailing and record of fraudulent liens in a scheme to track plaintiffs sales and
20 efforts of securing their properties with the ultimate goal that after the sales or
21 security attempt was aborted by defendants, RICO persons would buy up the
22 properties for initial loan amounts, taxes, HOA fees or assessments and then resell
23 the same at a profit or add to defendants portfolio, with the ultimate goal that
24 plaintiff should be left homeless and declared mad and vexatious, use of
25 defendants to improve such estate through free labor continued as a unit by
26
27 Relief
28
1 defendants with a core membership, over a substantial period of time and was an
2 ongoing organization established for an economic motive and non economic
3 motives. The association in fact remains viable and active at the time of filing of
4 this complaint.
5 142 Defendants engaged in racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

6 1961 (1) by engaging in the acts set forth above, and below aiding and abetting
7 the commission of the foregoing acts, and/or conspiring to commit the foregoing
8 acts, in violation of the following laws:
9 143 California Penal Code sections 518, 519, 520 and 523, relating to the crime of
10 extortion and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
11 a) 18 U.S.C. 1341 relating to mail fraud;

b) 18 U.S.C. 1343 relating to wire fraud;
12 c) 18 U.S.C. 1951, 18 U.S.C. 875 and 18 U.S.C. 876 relating to extortion;
d) 18 U.S.C. 1952 relating to racketeering;
13 e) 18 U.S.C. 1956 relating to money laundering;
f) 18 U.S.C. 1957 relating to criminally derived property;
14 g) 18 U.S.C. 2314 and 2315 relating to interstate transportation or receipt of
transported property obtained by fraudulent means;
15
16 144 Plaintiffs allege that the aforementioned activities and/or conduct engaged in by
17 defendants constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, as that term is defined
18 in 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). Plaintiffs further allege that the activities and/or conduct
19 engaged in by defendants were related as to the modus operandi engaged in by
20 defendants which entailed fraudulent third party bill and debt imposition and
21 collection, harassment notices, continuous inasmuch as the activities and/or
22 conduct engaged in by defendants exhibited a realistic, long term threat of
23 continued future injury to plaintiffs since 1999 through today.
24 145 Plaintiffs have sustained damages and/or injuries to their interests in business
25 and/or property as a result of defendants activities and/or conduct, in an amount
26 according to proof. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages, said

27 Relief
28
1 sum to be trebled, in an amount according to proof. Plaintiffs are also entitled to
2 recover an award of exemplary and punitive damages. Plaintiffs are entitled to
3 recover attorneys fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.
4 146 Defendants engaged in the fraudulent or extortionate activities that constitute the
5 RICO pattern of racketeering activity; b) defendants are members of the RICO
6 conspiracy designed and intended to contravene RICO Section 1962, subdivisions
7 (a) and (c); c) defendants engaged in activities in furtherance of advancing and
8 promoting the RICO conspiracy designed and intended to contravene RICO
9 Section 1962, subdivisions (a) and (c); d) defendants were members of the RICO
10 conspiracy at and during the time frame the fraudulent and extortionate activities
11 were committed that constitute the RICO pattern of racketeering activity; and, e)
12 the offense is within the scope of unlawful agreement and could reasonably have
13 been foreseen to be a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
14 147 Defendants used or invested the income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern
15 of racketeering activity, as set forth above, in the establishing or operation of the
16 enterprise(s) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a).
17 148 Monetary payments obtained earlier in the Demand Letter campaign were used to
18 expand the enterprise(s) such as by hiring additional servicers and investigators
19 and associating law firms to pad illegal, HOA and tax/assessments etc bills.
20 149 Plaintiffs have sustained damages and/or injuries to their interests in business and/or
21 property as a result of defendants activities and/or conduct that was assisted by the
22 reinvesting of sums, in an amount according to proof. Plaintiffs are entitled to
23 recover compensatory damages, said sum to be trebled, in an amount according to
24 proof. Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover an award of exemplary and punitive
25 damages.
26
27 Relief
28
1 150 Defendants are conspiratorially liable and members of the RICO conspiracy
2 designed and intended to contravene RICO Section 1962, subdivisions (a) and (c);
3 Defendants engaged in activities in furtherance of advancing and promoting the
4 RICO conspiracy designed and intended to contravene RICO Section 1962,
5 subdivisions (a) and (c); d) defendants were members of the RICO conspiracy at and
6 during the time frame the fraudulent and extortionate activities were committed that
7 constitute the RICO pattern of racketeering activity; and, e) the offense fell within
8 the scope of the unlawful agreement and could reasonably have been foreseen to be a
9 necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
10 RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962 (d) CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a)

11 and (c) AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS (Third cause of action)
12 151 The allegations of paragraphs 1- 150 are incorporated herein by reference as
13 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 133-134 for
14 underlying cause of quiet title, cancellation of deeds; for 1-9 causes of action
15 controlled by fraud.
16
152 Defendants are associated with the aforementioned enterprise(s), and they have
17
agreed and conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a) and (c) as each has agreed
18
to participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of the enterprises affairs
19
through a pattern of racketeering activity, and to use or invest the income derived
20
directly or indirectly from the pattern of racketeering activity to establish or
21
operate the enterprise.
22
153 Defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962 (a) and (c) is a violation of 18
23
U.S.C. 1962 (d) and then conspired to cover-up the conspiracy by
24
marginalizing Plaintiff credibility specific tactics.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 154 Defendants violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962 (d) by means of overt acts that are
acts of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO injured plaintiffs and
2 class members in an amount to be shown according to proof, said sum to be
3 trebled.
4 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

5 QUIET TITLE
6
7 155 The allegations of paragraphs 1-154 are incorporated herein by reference as
8 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 1 -154 of the
9 Preliminary Allegations as if fully set forth herein.
10 156 Plaintiffs seek to quiet title against the following claim of Defendants NEW
11 CENTURY MORTGAGE, GMAC, OCWEN and SPS, DLJ etc and each of
12 them, who are, or were at one time the beneficiary of the note and deed of trust.
13 To the extent the obligation owed to said Defendants, and each of them, has
14 been satisfied, Defendants lien claim to Plaintiffs real property is without merit
15 and Defendants, and each of them, have no right, title, lien or any other interest
16 in Plaintiffs real property.
17 157 Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against the following claim of Defendant Fidelity
18 Title who is the current co-owners and trustee of the deed of trust. To the
19 extent the obligation owed to New Century et al has been satisfied, Defendant
20 DLJ May 03,2007 lien claim to Plaintiffs real property is without any legal
21 merit as a third party and must be dissolved without any other interest in
22 Plaintiffs real property.
23 158 Plaintiff seeks to quiet title as of may 03, 2007.
24 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
25 CANCELLATION OF DEEDS OF TRUST
159 The allegations of paragraphs 1 - 158 are incorporated herein by reference as
26
27 Relief
28
1 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 154 -156 of
2 the First Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
3 160 The Deed of Trust recorded on September 1, 2000, although valid on its face, is
4 void in that Plaintiffs Beneficiaries and/or predecessor has fully satisfied the
5 obligation which is secured by the Deed of Trust.
6 161 Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the Deed of Trust
7 remains of record by virtue of a mistake of fact on the part of Defendants NCM,
8 GMAC, OCWEN SPS and NDSC, DLJ and each of them. Defendants and each
9 of them have been advised by Plaintiffs Beneficiaries and/or predecessor that
10 the obligation has been satisfied in full and failed to properly credit the note in
11 such a manner as to keep the Deed of Trust on record.
12 162 There is a reasonable apprehension that the continued existence of the Deed of
13 Trust, combined with the May 03, 2007 conversion of Title by DLJ New
14 Century successor in trust will continue to deprive Plaintiff their enjoyment and
15 possession of the roof over their head. (See exhibits attached to the Removal
16 Notice of Motion CV07-06757)

17 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
18 BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY
19
though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 154 - 156
20
for quiet title, cancellation of deeds; for fiduciary and statutory breaches,
21
accounting violation, declaratory relief; temporary restraining order; permanent
22
injunction; and damages of the First Cause of Action; paragraphs 159 - 160 of
23
the Cancellation of Deed of Trust under first cause of action as if fully set forth
24
herein.
25
164 Defendants initiating foreclosures, are required within ten days following the
26
27 Relief
28
1 recordation of the notice of default, deposit or cause to be deposited in the United
2 State mail an envelope, sent registered or certified mail with postage prepaid a
3 copy of the recorded notice of default to Plaintiffs, pursuant to CALIFORNIA
4 Civil Code, section 2924b (b) (1).
5 165 Plaintiff alleges in most cases Defendants failed to comply with this mandatory
6 provision of Civil Code, section 2924b(b)(1), in that Plaintiff was not, within ten
7 days following the recordation sent registered or certified mail with postage
8 prepaid a copy of the recorded notice of default.
9 166 Defendants in the process of filing legitimate foreclosures not governed by issues
10 of interception of sales, breaches of contract etc, and each of them, are required
11 to post a copy of the notice of sale, in a conspicuous place on Plaintiffs property
12 at lease twenty days before the sale date, pursuant to Civil Code, section 2924f
13 (b) (1).If the property is a single-family residence the posting shall be on the
14 front door of the residence.
15 167 Plaintiff alleges Defendants New Century et al and each of them, failed to
16 comply with the mandatory provision of Civil Code, section 2924f (b) (1), in that
17 no notice of sale was posted in a conspicuous place on Plaintiff property nor
18 was there posting on the door of the residence.

19 168 As a proximate result of Defendants, New Century, DLJ and each of their, failure
20 to comply with the mandatory provision of Civil Code, section 2924b (b) (1),
21 2924f (b) (1) and 2941 foreclosure proceedings commenced against Plaintiffs
22 home/office have caused Plaintiffs damages in the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED
23 THOUSAND ($800,000.00) to ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00)
24 plus according to proof.
25 169 As a further proximate result of Defendants and each of their failure to comply
26
27 Relief
28
1 with the mandatory provision of Civil Code governing Financial, Title and
2 Escrows guidelines and for alleged violations of (California Financial Code
3 sections 22000 et seq.) Section 2924b (b) (1), 2924f (b) (1) and 2941; Plaintiff
4 had to incur attorneys fees and cost in an amount according to proof.
5 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
6 ACCOUNTING VIOLATION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH

(CFLL)22000 et seq, and applicable (CFLL)rules
7 The allegations of paragraphs 1 - 169 are incorporated herein by reference as though
8 set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs; inclusive of allegations
9 in paragraphs 154 - 156 for quiet title, cancellation of deeds; for statutory breaches
10 inclusive of Fiduciary abuses, for application of desist and refrain order pursuant to
11 California financial code section 22712 and statement of facts in support thereof for
12 accounting violation, declaratory relief; temporary restraining order; permanent
13 injunction; and damages under definition of First Cause of Action pursuant to 1964(a)
14 for paragraphs 159 - 160 of the Cancellation of Deed of Trust under first cause of
15 action, paragraph 163-164 of the Breach of Statutory and Fiduciary Duty under First
16 cause of action as if fully set forth herein.
17
170 The amount of monies paid to defendants by Plaintiffs is unknown and cannot
18
be ascertained without release of escrow settlement statements, appraisals of
19
comparable values in 2004-2006 of stolen properties and equities.
20
171 Plaintiffs alleges that during the course of the loan, demands were made on
21
Defendants New Century NCM, GMAC, OCWEN, SPS and DLJ to account
22
for the taking of equities and profits from concealed escrows by and through the
23
help of Title Corporations, Fidelity Title Group and FATCO but said
24
Defendants, and each of them has failed, refused and continue to refuse rendering
25
accounting.
26
27 Relief
28
1 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

3
though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 154 - 156
4
for quiet title, cancellation of deeds; for fiduciary and statutory breaches,
5
accounting violation, declaratory relief; temporary restraining order; permanent
6
injunction; and damages of the First Cause of Action; paragraphs 159 - 160 of
7
the Cancellation of Deed of Trust under first cause of action, paragraph 163-164
8
of the Breach of Statutory and Fiduciary Duty under First cause of action,
9
paragraph 170-171 for accounting violations of finance lenders law, (CFLL)
10
22000 et seq. and applicable regulations under first and fifth cause of action, as if
11
fully set forth herein in 1-10 causes of action.
12
173 The actions of Defendants as alleged above were done in a deliberate and
13
intentional manner.
14
174 Defendants knew that commencing wrongful foreclosure action on each
15
Plaintiffs roof would cause distress and result in severe emotional and mental
16
trauma yet continued to proceed with intent and when Plaintiffs beneficiaries
17
complained, defendants mocked them as mad and vexatious to intimidate them
18
from exercising their constitutional right of redress.
19
175 As a proximate result of the Defendants acts, Plaintiffs suffer severe emotional
20
and mental distress including, but not limited to, nervous breakdown symptoms
21
of fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation,
22
indignity, embarrassment, sleeplessness, headaches, worth damages in an amount
23
according to proof and proof of sufferings substantial or enduring quality that no
24
reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 176 The above-mentioned acts of Defendants were intentional, willful, wanton,
2 malicious and oppressive and outrageous, justifying an award of punitive damage
3 in an amount greatly in excess of the minimal jurisdictional amount of this Court.
4 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
5 NEGLIGENCE
177. The allegations of paragraphs 1 - 176 are incorporated herein by reference as
6
though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 154 - 156 for
7
quiet title, cancellation of deeds; for fiduciary and statutory breaches, accounting
8
violation, declaratory relief; temporary restraining order; permanent injunction;
9
and damages of the First Cause of Action; paragraphs 159 - 160 of the
10
Cancellation of Deed of Trust under first cause of action, paragraph 163-164 of
11
the Breach of Statutory and Fiduciary Duty under First cause of action, paragraph
12
170-171 for accounting violations of finance lenders law, (CFLL) 22000 et seq.
13
and applicable regulations under first cause of action, paragraph 173 -174 of
14
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under first cause of action as if fully
15
set forth herein.
16
178. Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff to ensure that any foreclosure
17
proceeding commenced against Plaintiff was proper and justified.
18
179. Corporate Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff by
19
commencing and continuing foreclosure proceedings after breaching contracts.
20
180. As a proximate cause of Defendants conduct, as set forth in detail above, Plaintiffs
21
continue to suffer severe emotional, mental and physical injuries and damages and
22
as such, damage is due in an amount in excess of jurisdictional limits of this court.
23
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
24
25 NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
26
27 Relief
28
1 181.The allegations of paragraphs 1 - 180 are incorporated herein by reference as
2 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 133-134 of
3 general allegations and each paragraph listed for 1-9 cause of action as if fully set
4 forth herein.
5 182. At all material times and in doing the things alleged herein, Defendants knew or
6 should have known that Plaintiffs were susceptible to suffering severe emotional
7 distress if Defendants proceeded with a foreclosure sale on Plaintiffs real property
8 which is not proper and justified.
9
10 183. As a proximate result of the above-mentioned acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs have
11 and continue to suffer severe emotional and mental distress including, but not limited
12 to, highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety,
13 worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, sleeplessness,
14 headaches and other psychological damage in an amount according to proof. Said
15 emotional distress was of a substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable
16 person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.
17 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

18 INFRINGEMENT ON THE PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL and DUE
19 PROCESS RIGHTS (Inclusive of First, Seventh and Fourteenth
Amendment)
20 184. The allegations of paragraphs 1-183 are incorporated herein by reference as
21 though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs 133-34 of the
22 general allegations and for 1-9 causes of action in support of concurrent
23 Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary and Permanent as if fully set forth
24 herein.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 185. Judgment for Plaintiffs as victims of a common plan, scheme or motive continual
2 in pattern not to allow plaintiff to close an escrow, resulted in the taking and/or
3 interception of exhibit marked 2, described herein, after plaintiffs were used for
4 free labor to improve real estate, with superior knowledge of the scheme that
5 Plaintiff would not be allowed to profit from their labor, nor to seek relief in a
6 court of Law; and the same invokes claims under first, second and third cause of
7 actions.
8 186. Plaintiffs notified defendants of its intent to exercise its option to demand an
9 accounting of missing earnings resulting in denial of right to secure, refinance or
10 earn a living from its own real estate, and faced retaliatory threats of acceleration.
11 187. Defendants and each one of them has failed, and continues to fail, to turn over lost
12 funds, properties and revenues from Plaintiffs estate.
13 188. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendants and each of them for
14 relief in the second cause of action for the sum due under the Loan contracts for
15 the principal balance of $40 million dollars in grand total on the entire estate
16 and/or the appraised value of each property on 2004 appraised values, rent, plus
17 unpaid interest, late charges, foreclosure fees and costs, and any other legal, theft
18 and travelling costs according to proof.

19 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
20 DAMAGES
189. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-188 are incorporated herein by
21
reference as though set forth in full herein, inclusive of allegations in paragraphs
22
133-34 of the general allegations and inclusive of applicable 1-10 causes of action
23
in support of concurrent Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary and
24
Permanent as if fully set forth herein.
25
26
27 Relief
28
1 190. Due to wrongful disclosures, non disclosures and fraudulent concealment,
2 breaches of contracts, and breaches of California arbitrations clauses, and
3 allegations raised in instant complaint and concurrent matters displaying gross
4 negligence and total disdain for the law, defendants, their agents, hierarchy;
5 employees, and attorneys have caused plaintiffs and their members, the members
6 of the public and this family and beneficiaries of plaintiff the loss of their entire
7 estate and relationship within family, friends tenants and attorneys exceeding forty
8 million dollars, hard cash (exhibit 2) In addition Beneficiaries/members Michael
9 and Sammye Richardson cannot continue with their rental business and garment
10 business, as the only business they know, due to the evil stuff listed on their
11 credit report that belongs to convicted felons Richard Romero. Nancy Walsh
12 and Peri Locklear. Given the conduct of the defendants and the power of the
13 enterprise, organized and pattern after the mafia structure including the strong-
14 arming of victims, witnesses and whistle-blowers with this plaintiff as a prime
15 example with intentional malice in mind and intentional disregard for the
16 welfare of the plaintiffs and its innocent beneficiaries, plaintiffs must be afforded
17 California and Arizona victims rights as verified victims under the California and
18 Arizona bill of rights and restitution made for abuse of victim as allowed by state
19 bill of rights over and above federal bill of rights, and additional punitive damages
20 plaintiffs are entitled to, over and above equitable relief. Plaintiff seeks an amount
21 in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court from defendants and
22 the enterprise based on concurrent complaint for actions 1-10.
23 PRAYER FOR RELIEF FOR FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS FOLLOWS:
24 191.1 For judgment in favor of Plaintiffs The allegations of paragraphs 1-189 are
25
incorporated herein by reference as though set forth in full herein, inclusive of
26
27 Relief
28
1 allegations in paragraphs 133-134 of general allegation and 1-10 causes of action
2 seeking relief as outlined under concurrent Declaratory Relief and restraining
3 orders for violation causes of action 1-10 inclusive of relief for 18 U.S.C 1961
4 (1) (A), (B), (D) And (2) Et Seq; Conspiracy To Violate 18 U.S.C.
5 1962(a)(b)(c)(d) Et Seq; 1964(a) Invoking Of 1965 et seq violations in the
6 operation of enterprise through racketeering activity for plaintiff BAKARFIT
7 its victimized beneficiaries and members and owners of Rock of Gibraltor, LLC
8 with all rights effective as of May of 1998, Exhibit marked 2 AND/OR recorded
9 as:
10 ARIZONA DOCKET 10802; PAGE 666 MAY 22, 1998
11 CALIFORNIA DOCKET DATED MAY 28, 1998 DOCUMENT #.

12 019869158
13 Face value, relief for party defined by 1961(3), with reservation of waiver of
14 any exception to fraudulent withholding of transfer of official titles in favor of
15 Plaintiff listed in original case by entities defined in original case by 1961(4) or
16 defendants and such fraudulent withholding commissioned in the execution of
17 the enterprise.
18 192.2 Defendants, or assigns and each one of them, have no interest in the real
19 property/s and development rights and earnings that are currently held by
20 Defendants or in persons name who are adverse to Plaintiff;
21 192.3 That the Deed of Trust dated on or about August 26, 2000 and recorded on
22 September 1, 2000, in the Official Records in the Office of the Recorder of Kern
23 County, as Document Number 0200110469, be declared void and of no force and
24 effect along with the may 03, 2007 deed of ownership of 11909 Palm Ave
25 Bakersfield, California 93312.
26
27 Relief
28
1 192.4 That Defendants and each of them be ordered to produce all Grant and warranty
2 deeds of original purchase listed in exhibit 2.
3 192.5 Defendants re-convey properties listed in CV07-06757, and CV07-06750 herein

4 to Plaintiff Rock of Gibraltor, LLC.
5 192.6 Defendants, and each of them, be ordered to cancel the specific Deed of Trust
6 against 11909 Palm Ave., Bakersfield and deliver it to Plaintiff or the Clerk of
7 this Court for cancellation;
8 192.7 For compensatory damages in the sum in excess of EIGHT HUNDRED

9 THOUSAND ($800,000.00) to ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00) and
10 according to proof;
11 192.8 For the statutory penalty pursuant to Civil Code, section 2941(d) in the sum of
12 FIVE-HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00);
13 192.9 For accounting damages pursuant to findings of wrongdoing against New

14 Century for (Financial Code sections 22000 et seq.) and applicable regulations
15 (CFLL), and Financial Code Section 22712.
16 192.10 For an accounting pursuant to findings of missing funds from multiple escrows
17 where New Century and its affiliates were involved in the taking of equities from
18 Plaintiffs through the help of the Title Companies and each of the named
19 defendants, which could result in the payments on Plaintiffs loan/s;
20 192.11 For compensatory damaged in the sum in excess of EIGHT HUNDRED
23 192.12 For special and consequential damages according to proof on CV07-06757 and
24 CV07-06750 and properties listed in exhibit 2, according to proof;
25 192.13 For punitive damages in an amount according to proof;
26
27 Relief
28
1 192.14 For compensatory damaged in the sum in excess of EIGHT HUNDRED
4 192.15 For special and consequential damages

5 192.16 For compensatory damages in the sum in excess of EIGHT HUNDRED
6 THOUSAND ($800,000.00) to ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00)
7 and according to proof;
8 192.17 That this court declare and determine rights and liabilities of the parties,
9 properties and funds as court applies these same prayers for exhibit marked 2.
10 192.18 Wherefore court is moved to declare void all defaults under any Deed of Trust
11 and by defendants, and each of them, restraining them from proceeding with any
12 further alleged unjust enrichment effort from estate marked exhibit 2.
13 PRAYER FOR RELIEF FOR SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS FOLLOWS:
14 192.19 Judgment for Plaintiffs for the taking away of Plaintiffs constitutional rights to
15 hire counsel; taking away plaintiffs right to claim their legal rental business
16 earnings, denying plaintiff the right to close an escrow, taking away plaintiffs
17 right to obtain Title Insurance and or to obtain relief through legal representation
18 or be allowed discovery and a trial by Jury.
19 192.20 Turnover by Quiet title, Warranty and Grant Deeds, taken pursuant to activities
20 controlled by a person or enterprise who acquires any property through an offense
21 included in the definition of racketeering in 13-2301(d)(4), or through a violation of 13-
2312 is an involuntary Trustee holds the property in constructive trust for the benefit of the
22
persons entitled to remedies pursuant to a racketeering offense. See A.R.S. 13-2314(f)
23
including deed dated may 03, 2007 based on trust deed dated August 26, 2000
24
and recorded on September 1, 2000, in the Official Records of the Recorder of
25
Kern County, as Document Number 0200110469, be declared void and of no
26
27 Relief
28
1 force and effect; core enterprise and each of the defendants to, be ordered to re-
2 convey real property/s described in exhibit marked 2, back to Plaintiffs; and
3 Defendant, and each of them, ordered to compensate Plaintiffs for interception of
4 plaintiffs constitutional rights to own, sell and profit from legally earned fruits of
5 their own labor effective 1999 continuing on without a break up until today and
6 compensation set forth herein until the resolution of Jury Trial proceedings.
7 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON ALL SECTIONS OF THE THIRD CAUSE OF
8 ACTION AS FOLLOWS
9 192.20. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment on all causes of action governed by
10 the racketeering Act of 1970 against defendants as follows:
11 192.21. Defendants concede to a default judgment for the full amount of damages on
12 the entire complaint in the event of failure to answer this complaint.
13 192.22. For an order declaring this case as a complex case.

14 192.23. For a declaration of compensation equal to the values of 2004-2006 at
15 defendants expense by a third party to document loss of property per Public
16 record for purpose of Liability.
17 192.24. For a declaration of the rights and liabilities of the parties;

18 192.25. For an immediate monetary relief to plaintiffs from CV07-06750.
19 192.26. For a certification of complex case.
20 192.27. For a certification of RICO status.
21 192.28. For a certification of the existence of an enterprise run by Godfather to the
22 Enterprise First American title Insurance FATCO and all its affiliates and
23 alter egos and Fidelity Title Insurance Group and all its affiliates and alter egos
24 Fidelity and the same be declared guilty of violating their agreements not to
25 bribe, and offer incentives to financial institutions, builders, developers and
26
27 Relief
28
1 Real estate Brokers, agents etc order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1964 (a) and
2 immediately dissolving the aforementioned RICO enterprise inasmuch as said
3 enterprises are mere subterfuges and alter ego vehicles for the aforementioned
4 defendants to engage in corrupt, violent, and illegal conduct restrained, as
5 alleged herein;
6 192.29. For an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1964 (a) commanding the immediate and
7 permanent expulsion of all RICO defendants from further participatory
8 management, direction, and control of the identified RICO enterprises;
9 192.30. For an order pursuant to FRCP Rule 65 and 18 U.S.C. 1964 (a), to
10 immediately cause issuance of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to
11 restrain and prohibit all defendants and their respective attorneys, accountants,
12 agents, consultants, counselors, designees, employees, servants, deputies,
13 nominees, representatives, directors, officers, trustees, partners, both general
14 and limited, and any one acting pursuant to any power of attorney, general or
15 limited, from dissipating and/or otherwise disposing exhibit 2, including cash
16 collected from rents in their possession or control, pending resolution of trial
17 proceedings;
18 192.31. For compensatory damages, said sum to be trebled pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

19 1964 (a) for criminal profiteering; Title 18 U.S.C.A. 2314; 2315) and/or 18
20 U.S.C. 1341 conspiracy.
21 192.32. For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof;
22 192.33. For prejudgment and post-judgment interest;
23 192.34. For reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1964 (a);
24 192.35. For costs of suit incurred herein;
25 192.36. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
26
27 Relief
28
1 192.37. Plaintiff incorporate herein by this reference all preceding paragraphs of their
2 complaint as if fully set herein,
3 192.38. Defendants engaged in racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

4 1961 (1) by engaging in the acts set forth above, aiding and abetting the
5 commission of the foregoing acts, and/or conspiring to commit the foregoing
6 acts, in violation of the following laws:
7 192.39. Defendants activities invoke 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) (b) (c) (d) governed relief for
8 plaintiff.
9 REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL
10 192.40 Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on original and removed cases.

11 FOR ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
12 192.41 Plaintiff incorporate herein by this reference all preceding paragraphs of their
13 complaint as if fully set herein,
14 192.42 For court to make a ruling that all forms of actions and entry of public record
15 adverse to plaintiff that led to conversion; act as a offer of proof against
16 defendant and stayed forthwith; with the simultaneous disclosure ordered
17 against defendants for a debtors examination as a prelude to the turnover of
18 monies and/or proceeds derived from the conversion of exhibit 2, taken by the
19 use of malicious and/or fraudulent demand Letters, which instruments released
20 to court and if exceeding $5,000, when delivered by U.S. Mail; Electronic
21 Service across state lines, leading to conversion of Plaintiff estate, all applicable
22 damages for acts of racketeering and piracy based on both active and passive
23 elements of RICO enterprise; court suspend any use by the enterprise of
24 interstate Federal Financial Institutions; Interstate Wires; Federal Highways;
25
Federal Mail; Federal Transportation and Commerce for the facilitation of
26
27 Relief
28
1 moving stolen monies, assets, goods, original grant and warranty deeds and
2 associated real property; and declare all holders of stolen properties;
3 involuntary trustee holding third party assets in trust for legal owners.
4 192.43 Plaintiff on their own and through Counsel notified core enterprise to Cease
5 and Desist subversive actions adverse to plaintiffs, yet defendants persist in
6 harassing, intercepting plaintiff and its attorney client relationship such the
7 intentional bad faith continuance is cause for prayer for a refund of all damages
8 and payments to intercepted attorneys from 1999-2007 or as court deems fair.
9 192.44 For an Abstract of Judgment and injunctive stay against the holdings of the
10 Enterprise and RICO persons engaged in criminal profiteering by and through
11 the use of federal mail and federally licensed financial institutions to
12 circumvent Plaintiffs their constitutional right to own real estate and access
13 their earnings.
14 192.45 For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
15 Respectfully submitted by Attorney; Henry Nasif Mahmoud
16 Dated: October 18, 2007
17
18 ________________________________________
19 Attorney H. Nasif Mahmoud (SBN. Ill. 0173345)
Admitted Pro Hac ViKinney, Wills & Mahmoud
20 8717 Forest Avenue, Gary IN 46403
21 Email: mwmlawoffices@aol.com
Local Attorney Drop Box:
22 8350 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 200
23 Beverly Hills, CA 90211
Attorneys for Plaintiff
24
25 (BAKARFIT), "THE LIFE, LIBERTY AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS FOR THE
26
27 Relief
28
1 BOKHARY, ASGHAR, KHWAJA AND
RICHARDSON FAMILY IRREVOCABLE
2 TRUST ROCK OF GIBRALTOR LLC;
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
VERIFICATION
20
21 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
22
192.46 I, SAMMYE A. RICHARDSON, am the 50% percent owner of Rock Of
23
Gibraltor, LLC; ROCK, one of the Trustees for (BAKARFIT), The Life,
24
Liberty And The Pursuit Of Happiness For The Bokhary, Asghar, Khwaja And
25
26 Richardson Family Irrevocable Trust and the same status controls CV07 06757 and
27 Relief
28
1 CV07-06750; as such I affirm that each Plaintiff has been rendered insolvent by the
2 imposition of a false debt in the millions that dissipated an entire estate while it
3 stands due and payable.

192.47
4 I have read the foregoing Complaint to Quiet Title; Cancellation of Deed; Breach of
5 Statutory Duty; Accounting; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
6 Negligence; Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Declaratory Relief;
7 Temporary Restraining Order; Permanent Injunction; Constitutional violations and
8 RICO claims for Damages and know its contents.

192.48
9 Currently I maintain my home office in Kern County and am financially unable to
10 move my offices to Los Angeles area causing daily and weekly commute.
192.49 I know Plaintiff is being blackballed by defendants for the past nine years.
11
192.50 I am personally knowledgeable, informed and believe in that information to allege
12
13 grounds to state that the forgoing documents are true and correct.
192.51 I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing account is filed to the best
14
15 of my knowledge and belief in that knowledge that the foregoing is true and correct.
16 Executed before October 18, 2007 at Los Angeles County.
17 ____________________________
18 SAMMYE A. RICHARDSON
Trustee and member of Plaintiffs
19 (BAKARFIT) and ROCK
20 (SEE EXHIBIT 2.
21 LIST OF PROPERTIES CONTROLLED BY RICO 1961(4) AND 1962(a) DEFINATION
FOR ACTIVITIES COMMITTED BY DEFENDANTS WHERE RELIEF IS SOUGHT
22 THROUGH ACTIONS 1-10 AS DEFENSIVE MECHANISM ON THE PART OF THE
PLAINTIFFS FOR RELIEF.
23 RECORD OBTAINED FROM OFFICIAL RECORD OF SAID COUNTIES OF LOST OR
DAMAGED ESTATE RECORDED IN THE NAME OF ROCK OF GIBRALTOR, LLC
24 HELD IN TRUST BY BAKARFIT BY INSTRUMENTS LISTED BELOW:
25
ARIZONA BY DOCKET , 10802 PAGE 666 MAY 22, 1998.
26
27 Relief
28
CALIFORNIA DOCKET DATED MAY 28, 1998 DOCUMENT # 019869158
1
TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
2
3 Property and inventory removed from 1091 S. Bill Martin Dr. Tucson Arizona by Mobile storage to
be turned over to plaintiff.
4 [See letter from Mobile Storage] who broke-into said premises to perform illegal search and
seizure against Plaintiff and its innocent family which opened the door for Arizona attorney
5 David McEvoy by his own admission to start a chain of suits to throw the Plaintiffs out of
6 Pima County. And the following ensued: Pima County Court Case Starr Pass Master
Association V Elena Richardson, David McEvoy Civ. Case C20050322; Pima County
7 Court case Starr Pass Master Association V Elena Richardson, Civ Case C20053405;
again by and through David McEvoy after forty nine properties were diverted to his group,
8 referred to as DevCon; followed by a chain of suits against plaintiff after it restrained
Plaintiff from doing the act it was asking it to do, such as fix 1091 S. Bill Martin Drive,
9 Tucson, AZ.; when his principals agents assaulted the house with a Caterpillar truck and
10 abandoned from the pre-meditated bankruptcy Estate, based on a guarantee of
foreclosure then intercepted payment for replacement for insured leading to the removal of
11 Furniture and contents from the garage and containers defendant by Mobile storage for
alleged non-payment by State Farm.
12 TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
Address: 1091 South Little Buck Loop Tucson, Arizona
13 Type of Property: Office and Single family residence furniture and Federal Evidence and heirlooms.
14 Legal Description and date of removal. Between September 15, 2003 through May 24, 2005 by
Mobile storage, Baldwin Construction et al, Starr Pass group of participants collectively known as
15 DevCon., by and through the combined financial and crony resources of Hired by FATCO First
American Title Insurance Companys Law Firm of Caswell Bell and Hillison, CB&H et al;
17 Address: 6001 Winter Grove Drive Bakersfield, California
18 Type of Property: Single family residence
Legal Description Lot 66 of Tract 5652 in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
19 California, as per Map Filed December 22, 1993, in Book 40, Pages 195, 196 and 197 of Maps, in
the office of the County Recorder of said County and as corrected by a Certificate of Correction
20 Recorded July 24, 1998 as Instrument 0198099580 Official Record Assessors Parcel :499-172-02-
00-6 innocent Serena Richardson and Rock property clouded first by RICO without jurisdiction.
21
TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTIONS, REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
22 Address: 7800 Westfield Road # 38. Bakersfield, California 93309
23 Type of Property: Single family residence.
24 California, as per Map Recorded November 21, 1983, in Book 32, Pages 193, and 194 of Maps, in
the office of the County Recorder of said County Official Records
25 Assessors Parcel: 502-320-16-00-9
26
27 Relief
28
TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTIONS REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
1 Address: 12102 Kingfisher Avenue. Bakersfield, California 93312
Legal Description: Lot 31 of Tract 5669 Unit A, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
3 California, as per Map Recorded May 13, 1994 in Book 41, Pages 48 and 49 of Maps, in the Office
of the County Recorder of Said County Assessors Parcel : 462-202-02-00-6.
4
5 Address: 8319 Charles Place California City, California
Legal Description Lot 33 of tract 5179, in the City of California City, County of
7 Kern, State of California, as per Map Recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of
Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel: 213-481-33-00-5
Address: 21727 Olivo Court. California City, California
10 Legal Description: Lot 75 of Tract 5179, in the City of California City, County of Kern, State of
California, as per Map Recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps in the Office
11 of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel: 213-482-31-00-6
Address: 3225 Sherrell Way, Bakersfield, California
13
Type of Property: Single family residence
14 Legal Description: Lot 45 of Tract 4519, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
California, as Per Map Recorded February 20, 1986 in Book 35, Pages 18 through 22, inclusive, of
15 Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of Said County
Assessors Parcel: 132-203-01-00-4
16
Address: 5408 Ilene Court, Bakersfield, California.
Legal Description: Lot 11 of Tract 4686, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
19 California, as per Map Recorded March 27, 1984 in Book 33, Pages 57 and 58 of Maps, in the
Office of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel : 412-171-11-00-2.
21 Address: 5305 Lime Street, Bakersfield California.
22 Legal Description: Lot 20 of Tract 4686, in the City of Bakersfield, County Of Kern, State of
California, as per Map Recorded March 27, 1984 in Book 33, Pages 57 and 58 of Maps, in the
23 Office of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel 412-171-20-00-8.
24 TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY.
25 Address: 7509 Indian Gulch Street Value $700,000; Bakersfield, California
Fidelity Title stepped in after First American Title; FATCO was exposed for the racket of selling
26
27 Relief
28
properties without authority, causing a loss of multi-millions to plaintiff. With St. Clair as the
1 beneficiary of alleged Title 28, 152 (5); Fed.R.Civ.P 2465 and fed, R.Civ.P.157 (d) (5) acts over and
2 above Title 281367(a).
Bakersfield, California
Legal Description: Lot 14 of Tract 4902, Unit B, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State
4 of California, as per Map Recorded February 12, 1992 in Book 39, Pages 35 and 36 of Maps, in the
Office of the County Recorder of said County
5 Assessors Parcel: 498-202-02-00-7.
6
7 Address: 1103 Sioux Creek Drive. Bakersfield California Value
8 Legal Description Lot 55 of Tract 5544, Phase A, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, and
State of California, as per Map Recorded May 21, 1993 in Book 40, Page 109 of Maps, and In the
9 Office of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel: 500-063-12-00-9. Serena
10 Richardson and Rock property clouded without jurisdiction.

Address: 8331 Charles Place Bakersfield California,
Legal Description: Lot 34 of Tract 5179 in the City of California City, County Kern, State of
13
California, as per Map Filed March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps, in the office of
14 the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel : 213-481-34-00-8.
15 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LISTED BY SUB-

DIVISION.
16 1. WINTER GROVE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIA
17 2. CALIFORNIA CITY CALIFORNIA
3. LOOSE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTIES SPREAD OVER
18 MULTI SUB-DIV. INCLUDE (12) PROPERTIES
ORIGINALLY FINANCED BY UNION BANK OF
19 CALIFORNIA SOLD BY ALLEGED ENTERPRISE
THROUGH CONVERSION AND HELP FROM
20 ALLEGED RICO PERSONS.
21 Homesteaded family farm and sole income:
Address: 11909 Palm Ave. Bakersfield, CA. 93312. Type of Property: Richardson Family Farm;
22 Legal Description: Property 5 of Tract 4274, in the unincorporated area of the County of Kern, State
of CA., as per Map recorded November 6, 1984 in Book 34, Page 18 of Maps, in the Office of the
23 County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 496-160-05-2
24 Homesteaded Family residence
25 Address: 1136 South Little Buck Loop, Tucson, Arizona
26
27 Relief
28
Legal Description Lot 4 of Antelope Point, according to the Plat of Record in the Office of the
1 County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68. Assessors
2 Parcel No.:116-27-51009-0150.

Type of Property: Residential lot
4 Legal Description: Lot 34 of Tract 4878 in the City of Tehachapi, County of Kern, State of
California, as per Map recorded October 30, 1991 in Book 38, Pages 197 and 198 of Maps in the
5 office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 416-470-34-00-7.
6
Address: 733 Las Colinas Street, Tehachapi, California
7 Type of Property: Residential lot
Legal Description: Lot 35 of Tract 4878 in the City of Tehachapi, County of Kern, State of
8 California, as per Map recorded October 30, 1991 in Book 38, Pages 197 and 198 of Maps in the
office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 416-470-35-00-0.
9
Address:
10 5303 Glacier Springs Drive, Bakersfield, California
11 Type of Property: Residential Lot
Legal Description: Lot 72 of Tract 5652 in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
the office of the County Recorder of said County and as corrected by a Certificate of correction
13 Recorded July 24, 1998 as Instrument 0198099580 Official Records. Assessors Parcel: 499-173-
04-00-9 a.k.a. APN 499-173-02-00
14
15 TURNOVER OF FUNDS TAKEN BY KC AND FATCO ATTORNEYS CB&H
UNDER DURESS FROM PROPERTY MARKED
16 Address: 5307 Glacier Springs Drive, Bakersfield, California
17 Legal Description: Lot 71 of Tract 5652 in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
03-00-6.
20
TURNOVER ONLY OF FUNDS REMOVED UNDER DURESS FROM SALE OF
21 PROPERTY
23 Legal Description Lot 65 of Tract 5652 in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
California, as per Map Filed December 22, 1993, in Book 40, Pages 195, 196 and 197 of Maps, in
24 the office of the County Recorder of said County and as corrected by a Certificate of Correction
Recorded July 24, 1998 as Instrument 0198099580 Official Records Assessors Parcel: 499-172-01-
25 00-3
26
27 Relief
28
1 TURNOVER AND STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
Address: 11909 Palm Avenue, Bakersfield, California
3 Legal Description: Lot 5 of Tract 4274, in the unincorporated area of the County of Kern, State of
California, as per Map recorded November 6, 1984 in Book 34, Page 18 of Maps, in the Office of
4 the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 496-160-05-2.
5 TURNOVER OF LOSSES FOR DISTRESSED SALE TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR

PROPERTY
6 Address: 3512 Sonoita Drive; Bakersfield, California
Legal description: Lot 43 of Tract 4277, Unit 6, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
8 California, as per Map recorded October 13, 1981 in Book 31, Pages 91 and 92 of Maps, in the
office of the County Recorder of said County Assessors Parcel : 385-341-29-00-7
9 TURNOVER OF PROPERTY
Address: 4304 Cyclone Drive, Bakersfield, California
11 Legal Description Lot 7 of Tract 4898-2, in the city of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
California, as per Map recorded January 18, 1988, in Book 36, Page 98 of Maps, in the office of the
12 County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 515-151-07-00-5.
Address: 7800 Westfield Road # 40, Bakersfield, California
14 Type of Property: Condominium
Legal Description: Lot 40 of Tract 4647, In the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
15
California, as per Map recorded November 21, 1983 in Book 32, Pages 193 and 194 of Maps, in the
16 office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 502-320-18-7.
TURNOVER OF LOSS FROM DISTRESSED SALE DUE TO HARRASEMENT AND
17 INTERFERENCE OVER PROPERTY
Address: 8331 Charles Place, California City, California
19 Legal Description: Lot 34 of Tract 5179 in the City of California City, County Kern, State of
California, as per Map Filed March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps, in the office of
20 the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 213-481-34-00-8.
21 TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS PROPERTY

Address: 8403 Charles Place, California City, California
22 Type of Property: Residential lot
Legal Description: Lot 40 of Tract 5179 in the unincorporated area, county of Kern, State of
23 California, as per Map recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps in the office
24 of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 213-481-40-00-5
TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS PROPERTY
25
Address: 8301Olivo Drive, a.k.a 21726 Olivo Court, California City, California
26
27 Relief
28
1 Legal Description: Lot 82 of Tract 5179 in the unincorporated area, county of Kern, State of
2 California, as per Map recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps, in the office
of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 213-482-38-3.
3
TURNOVER OF PROPERY FREE OF LIENS PROPERTY
7 TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS PROPERTY
Address: 5914 Winter Grove Drive, Bakersfield, California
Recorded July 24, 1998 as Instrument 0198099580 Official Records. Assessors Parcel: 499-171-
15 19-7.
Address: 5311 Glacier Springs, Bakersfield, California
17
20 02-00-3 a.k.a 499-173-02-00.
Address: 6000 Winter Grove Drive, Bakersfield, California
22
25 18-9
26
27 Relief
28
TURNOVER OF PROPERTY
4 Recorded July 24, 1998 as Instrument 0198099580 Official Record. Assessors Parcel: 499-172-02-
00-6
5
03-00-9
10
04-00-2
15
TURNOVER OF LOSSES FROM FORCED SALE DUE TO INTERFERNCE IN BUSINESS
16 RELATIONSHIP PROPERTY
Address: 5315 Glacier Springs Drive
17 Bakersfield, California
19
01-00-0
21 TURNOVER OF LOSSES FROM DISTRESSED SALE CAUSED FROM INTERCEPTION
OF SALE OF PROPERTY
22 Address: 7800 Westfield Road # 38
23 Bakersfield, California 93309
California, as per Map Recorded November 21, 1983, in Book 32, Pages 193, and 194 of Maps, in
25 the office of the County Recorder of said County Official Records. Assessors Parcel: 502-320-16-
00-9
26
27 Relief
28
TURNOVER OF LOSS FROM THEFT BY LOCKLEAR FROM PROPERTY SOLD
1 UNDER DURESS DUE TO INTERFERENCE LOCATED
2 Address: 9519 Sea beck Avenue, Bakersfield, California
3 Legal Description Lot 41 of Tract 5445 Phase 2, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State
of California, as per Map Recorded November 12, 1992, in Book 40, Pages 13 and 14 of Maps, in
4 the office of the County Recorder of said County Official Records. Assessors Parcel: 451-302-08-
00-3
5
Address: 1103 Sioux Creek Drive, Bakersfield, California
Legal Description Lot 55 of Tract 5544, Phase A, in the City of Bakersfield,
8 County of Kern, State of California, as per Map Recorded May 21, 1993 in Book 40,
Page 109 of Maps, In the Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 500-
9 063-12-00-9
10
11 Address: 8319 Charles Place, California City, California
12 Legal Description Lot 33 of tract 5179, in the City of California City, County of
Kern, State of California, as per Map Recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of
13
Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 213-481-33-00-5.
14
15 Address: 21727 Olivo Court, California City, California
16 Legal Description: Lot 75 of Tract 5179, in the City of California City, County of Kern, State of
17 California, as per Map Recorded March 17, 1993 in Book 40, Pages 77 and 78 of Maps in the Office
of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 213-482-31-00-6
18
19 Address: 3225 Sherrell Way, Bakersfield, California
21 California, as Per Map Recorded February 20, 1986 in Book 35, Pages 18 through 22, inclusive, of
Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of Said County. Assessors Parcel: 132-203-01-00-4.
22
TURNOVER OF LOSS FROM DISTRESSED SALE OF PROPERTY
23 Address: 10903 Galway Bay Drive, Bakersfield, California
24 Legal Description: Lot 5 of Tract 5598A, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State of
25 California, as per Map Recorded June 15, 1992 in Book 39, Pages 115,116, and 117 of Maps, in the
Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 394-171-05-00-4
26
27 Relief
28
1 TURNOVER OF LOSS FROM DISTRESSED SALE OF PROPERTY
2 Address: 424 Corte Gismo, Bakersfield, California
Type of Property: residential Lot
3 Legal Description: Lot 90 of tract 5084, Phase 2, in the City of Bakersfield,
County of Kern, State of California, as per Map Recorded July 10, 1992 in Book 39, Pages 132
4 through 135, inclusive, of Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of said County, and as
corrected by Certificate of Correction Recorded July 24, 1992 in Book 6704, Page 2236 of Official
5 Records. Assessors Parcel: 409-232-16-00-7
6
7 Address: 5408 Ilene Court, Bakersfield, California
9 Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 412-171-11-00-2.
10
11 Address: 5305 Lime Street, Bakersfield, California
12 Legal Description: Lot 20 of Tract 4686, in the City of Bakersfield, County Of Kern, State of
13
Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel 412-171-20-00-8.
14
15 Address: 12102 Kingfisher Avenue, Bakersfield, California
16 Legal Description: Lot 31 of Tract 5669 Unit A, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State
17 of California, as per Map Recorded May 13, 1994 in Book 41, Pages 48 and 49 of Maps, in the
Office of the County Recorder of Said County Assessors Parcel : 462-202-02-00-6.
18
19 Address: 7509 Indian Gulch Street, Bakersfield, California
20 Legal Description: Lot 14 of Tract 4902, Unit B, in the City of Bakersfield, County of Kern, State
21 of California, as per Map Recorded February 12, 1992 in Book 39, Pages 35 and 36 of Maps, in the
Office of the County Recorder of said County. Assessors Parcel: 498-202-02-00-7.
22
TURNOVER OVER OF KENYPON TERRACE PROPERTIES CONTROLLED BY
23 ARIZONA DOCKET, 10802 PAGES 666 MAY 22, 1998;
24 TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS
25 Address: 7574 E. Kini Drive, Tucson, Arizona [SAR-22]
26
27 Relief
28
Legal Description Lot 26 through 28, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
1 According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the Office of the County Recorder of Pima
2 County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; And as Amended by
Declaration of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in Docket 6645 at Page 669.
3 Assessors Parcel:

5 Address: 7612 E. Kini Drive, Tucson, Arizona [SAR-22]
6 Legal Description Lot 36, 37 and 38, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County,
Arizona, According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the Office of the County Recorder of
7 Pima County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; And as Amended by
8 Declaration of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in Docket 6645 at Page 669.
Assessors Parcel: 134-173-09 A.
9
TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS
10 Address: 725 S. Julie Avenue, Tucson, Arizona [SAR-22]
11 Legal Description Lot 43 and 44 of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the Office of the County Recorder of Pima
Assessors Parcel: 134-173-16 A
14
16 Legal Description Lot 45 and 46 of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
17
County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; And as Amended by
Assessors Parcel: 134-173-18-A.
21 Legal Description Lot 47 and 48, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County,
Arizona, According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the Office of the County
22 Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof;
And as Amended by Declaration of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in Docket 6645 at
23
Page 669. Assessors Parcel: 134-173-20 A
24
26
27 Relief
28
Legal Description Lot 49 and 50 of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
3 Assessors Parcel: 134-173-22 A.

Address: 631 S. Julie Avenue, Tucson, Arizona [SAR-22]
5 Type of Property: residential Lot
Legal Description Lot 53 and 54, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
Declaration of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in
8 Docket 6645 at Page 669. Assessors Parcel: 134-173-26 A.

Address: 711 E. Cynthia Avenue, Tucson, Arizona [SAR-22]
13 Assessors Parcel: 134-174-22 A
14 TURNOVER OF PROPERTY FREE OF LIENS.
Address: 745 S. Julie Ave., Tucson, Arizona [Paid as Retainer to Counsel and sale intercepted]
16
According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the office of the County Recorder of Pima
17 County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; and as Amended by Declaration
of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in Docket 6645 at Page 669. Assessors Parcel:
18 134-173-12 A
21
23 Assessors Parcel: 134-173-14 A
26 Legal Description Lot 51 and 52, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
27 Relief
28
1 County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; And as Amended by declaration
2 of Scriveners Error Recorded October 28, 1981, in Docket 6645 at Page 669. Assessors Parcel:
134-173-24 A
3
4 Address: 625 S. Julie Ave., Tucson, Arizona [Paid as Retainer to Counsel and sale intercepted]
8
Type of property: residential Lot
13
16
18
21
24 Address: 719 E. Cynthia Ave., Tucson, Arizona [Paid as Retainer to Counsel and sale intercepted]
25 Legal Description Lots 147 and 148, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
26
27 Relief
28
2 Assessors Parcel: 134-174-20 A.
3
Address: 7600 E. Kini Dr., Tucson, Arizona [Paid as Retainer to Counsel and sale intercepted]
Legal Description Lot 33, 34 and 35, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
7 Assessors Parcel: 134-173-0.

Address: 704 South Cynthia Kenyon Terrace Tucson, Arizona home lost due to Tanis Duncan;
9 Arizona Dept. R.E. and Caswell Bell et als culpable Acts and direct interference.
Type of Property: residential Townhouse
10 Legal Description: Lot 145 and 146, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
Assessors Parcel:
Address: 716 South Cynthia Kenyon Terrace Tucson, Arizona, lost due to direct interception of
14 Tanis Duncan; Arizona Dept. R.E. and Caswell Bell et als culpable Acts.
15
Legal Description: Lot 142, 143 and 144, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County,
16 Arizona, According to the Map or Plat Thereof of Record in the Office of the County Recorder of
Pima County, Arizona, in Book 33 of Maps and Plats at Page 65 Thereof; And as Amended by
Assessors Parcel:
18
19 Address: 7583 E. Cynthia Kenyon Terrace Tucson Arizona lost due to direct interception of Tanis
Duncan; Arizona Dept. R.E. and Caswell Bell et als culpable Acts.
20
21 Legal Description: Lot 135 and 136, of Kenyon Terrace, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona,
23 Assessors Parcel:
24
VENTANA CANYON SUB-DIVISION TUCSON ARIZONA
Address: 6452 Desert Wind Circle, VENTANA CANYON ESTATES, Tucson, Arizona (a main
26
27 Relief
28
retirement residence) 1st hole on golf course, current value 2 million dollars and going up; title
1 changed without payment to rightful owner Rock of Gibraltor LLC; and in spite of fraudulent
2 transfer (all who participated in this scam made money but the owner Richardson entity Rock of
Gibraltor LLC)
3 Type of Property: Single family residence to be built
Legal Description: Lot 27 of VENTANA CANYON ESTATES, A Subdivision of Pima County,
4 Arizona According to the Map or Plat of Record in the Pima County Recorders Office in Book 37
of Maps and Plats at Page 79. Assessors Parcel: *114-03-0350
5
6 DevCon CONTOLLED SUB-DIVISION CALLED STARRPASS
AND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS OF PARADISE POINT A.K.A ANTELOPE POINT
7
9 Legal Description Lot 1 of Antelope Point, according to the Plat of Record in the Office of the
County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68. Assessors
10 Parcel: 116-27-50701-0150.
14 Parcel: 116-27-50804-0150.
Address: 1140 South Little Buck Loop, Tucson, Arizona
16
18 Parcel: 116-27-50907-0150.
21
22 Parcel: 116-27-51009-0150.

Address: 1132 South Little Buck Loop, Tucson, Arizona.
25 County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68.Assessors
26 Parcel: 116-27- 51102-0150.
27 Relief
28
4 Parcel: 116-27-51205-0150.

8 Parcel: 116-27-51308-0150

Parcel: 116-27-51401-0150
12
13 Address: 1093 South Antelope Meadows Loop, Tucson, Arizona
Legal Description: Lot 25 of Antelope Point, according to the Plat of Record in the Office of the
15 County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68.Assessors
Parcel: 116-27-53100-0150.
16
17 Address: 1097 South Antelope Meadows Loop, Tucson, Arizona
18
Parcel: 116-27-53203-0150
20
21
Address: 1105 South Antelope Meadows Loop, Tucson, Arizona
24 Parcel: 116-27-53409-0150
25
26
27 Relief
28
Parcel: 116-27-53502-0150
6 Parcel: 116-27-53605-0150
9 Parcel: 116-27-5150.
Parcel: 116-27-5160.
13
County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68.Assessors
16 Parcel: 116-27-5170-0.
Parcel: 116-27-51803-0150.
22 Legal Description: Lot 13 of Antelope Point, according to the Plat of Record in the Office of the
23 Parcel: 116-27-51906-0150
24 Address: 1083 South Bill Martin Drive, Tucson, Arizona
26
27 Relief
28
1 Parcel: 116-27-5290-5.
Address: 1091 South Bill Martin Drive, Tucson, Arizona (Daughters Residence Destroyed by
3 FATCO et al)
County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, recorded in Book 46 of Maps, Page 68.Assessors
5 Parcel: 116-27-53007-0150
Address: 917 South Bill Martin Drive, Tucson, Arizona
Legal Description: Lot 26 of Canyon View, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona, according to
8 the Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, in
Book 47 of Maps and Plats at Page 32 Thereof. Assessors Parcel No: 116-27-5770
10 Address: 947 South Bill Martin Drive, Tucson, Arizona
11 Legal Description: Lot 27 of Canyon View, a Subdivision of Pima County, Arizona, according to
the Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, in
12 Book 47 of Maps and Plats at Page 32 Thereof. Assessors Parcel: 116-27-5780.
TURNOVER AND STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY
13
Address: 3477 West Tiny Bird Court, Tucson, Arizona
Legal Description: Lot 40 of Quail Ridge, a Subdivision Of Pima County, Arizona, according to the
15 Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County Recorder of Pima County, Arizona, in
Book 46 of Maps and Plats at Page 8 thereof; and as amended by Declaration of Scriveners Error
16 recorded in Docket 9853 at Page 414 and in Docket 10562 at Page 661.Assessors Parcel: 116-27-
4700.
17
TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR COMMON AREA
18 OWNED AS DEVELOPER BY PLAINTIFF

Address: Tucson, Arizona (Rocks owned common areas in a sub-division of Starr Pass)
20 Property Type: residential Common Areas for Paradise point unlawfully changed to antelope Point.
Legal Description: Antelope Point common area an open space [sic] 3610 East 22nd Street, tax code
21 book 116-map 27 parcel54604.area code 0150.
23 Address: Tucson, Arizona (Rocks owned common areas in a sub-division of Starr Pass)
Property Type: residential Common Areas for Paradise point unlawfully changed to antelope Point.
24 Legal Description: [sic] Antelope Point common area and private street 1173 Carnegie Drive,
Tucson. Assessors number book 116, map 27. Parcel 54707. Area code 0150.
25
ORO VALLEY CONTROLLED SUB-DIVISION
26
27 Relief
28
1 TURNOVER AND STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY 45
2 Address: 1710 East Moonshroud Drive, Tucson, Arizona (Oro Valley)
3 Legal Description: Lot 368 of Catalina Shadows Estates Phase 4, a subdivision of Pima County,
Arizona, according to the Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County recorder of Pima
4 County, Arizona, in Book 46 of Maps and Plats at Page 1 thereof. Assessors Parcel: 220-05-
7910.TURNOVER AND STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY 46
Legal Description: Lot 369 of Catalina Shadows Estates Phase 4, a subdivision of Pima County,
7 Arizona, according to the Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County recorder of Pima
County, Arizona, in Book 46 of Maps and Plats at Page 1 thereof Assessors Parcel: 220-05-7920.
Address: 1649 East Moonshroud Drive
9 Tucson, Arizona (Oro Valley}
Address: 1598 East Moonshroud Drive
13
Tucson, Arizona (Oro Valley)
16 TURNOVER & STAY OF ALL TRANSACTION REQUEST FOR PROPERTY 49
Property Type: residential Lot
18 Legal Description: Lot 377 of Catalina Shadows Estates Phase 4, a subdivision of Pima County,
Arizona, according to the Map or Plat thereof of record in the Office of the County recorder of Pima
19 County, Arizona, in Book 46 of Maps and Plats at Page 1 thereof Assessors Parcel: 220-05-8000.
LA PALOMA COUNTRY CLUB CONDOMINIUMS SUB-DIVISION
20 TUCSON ARIZONA
Address: 6352 Vuelta Del Tajo, Tucson, Arizona (Rocks main Home Office)
22 Property Type: residential Condominium
Legal Description: Unit 160 Garage 60 of the Condominium At La Paloma, a subdivision of Pima
23 County, Arizona, according to the Map of record in the Pima County Recorders Office in Book 37
of Maps and Plats at page 100; Together with an undivided interest in the common Elements As set
24 forth in the Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime recorded September 25, 1984 in Docket
25 7375, Page 1006.
Assessors Parcel: 108-121050.
26
27 Relief
28
1 PHOENIX ARIZONA PARADISE MOUNTAIN SHADOWS 8 LOTS
2 Loss subject of Title fraud by First American Title Insurance Corp. and its convicted felon Manager
Nancy Walsh in Tucson, Arizona; and money filtered to purchase 4464 East Broadway Tucson,
3 Arizona. 85701 in the name of Convicted Felon Richard Romeros entity subject of civil restitution
for criminal offense, the same to be examined under this trial.
4
5
6 SEE CONCURRENT DOCUMENTS FOR EXHIBITS AND ATTACHED CASES LAW
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 Relief
28
< . < < .. '?# = 0+ 10 .. < << = / <+ = ?# + ? << < < . < <+= A
"# $ %&''" '() %'*
%&''" '() %'*
, # --. // #* ) +< . < <
0+ 7 , ) + (8.< .<<!
( =
, (' 12134 5&6'1)1 12134 $&71$8
% 99&)4 71)'16 :"'3&)4 &))"1 39"8%
5&''164 %" 1) 2 '1 9;8+ &+* ") +4 &13
8%$&(;% <<*
- # # . // +
>
7 - * * # * ? 5? @ +
% '?# = * // #@ * // = - = (# 3 7 # ?/ // , # - =
8 #= ? 7 , A #@ = # ?/ // - - ? / ? + 8= 7 , - ?# = 9 +
'?# = # = @# = # // # - A # - = ? + + $+
7 # + ,+ B<< 4 < = + 7 , '+$+ B<< . + ? = A * 9 + '?# = - - A # -
# / + <= + 7 , '+$+ B< B. + #@ * = ? C ?= ?# +
$+ 7 # + ,+ B<< # <= + 7 , '+$+ B< B. A = - - ? / ? + : -- A
= 7 ,D A# # = A # # # 9 + '?# = D A # /
+
&# A * << * = # ?/ ? # # A #@ # 0 / #@ ?@=

9 + '?# = + 9 + '?# = - A # - // = 7 , ? = # # A/ #
= E? - #@ # #@ - + 3= ? E? # - # // # , : = ? , / A #
- * = = = ? # +
: =# # - - #@ # - // * # // # 7 # ?/ $? B<<
- = = - = # ?/ ? @# # - = A # ? # = #
- ! < < 9
< . < < .. '?# = 0+ 10 .. < << = / <+ = ?# + ? << < < . < <+= A
A #
- = ? / # + + $+ 7 # + ,+ B<< + 7 , $? B< B. - E? # // #
- A # - # / =# # - # = = // = # = =
7 ,* = # / - A # = = 7 ,* = = 0 + 8= 7 , ? # = =
// = # # - = - #@ # - 5 #? <* << * - A # - #
/ * @# # - * # A # - ? + 8= # C/ # 9 + '?# = - -
= E? / / +
8= 7 , # ) - - # # & 3= ? * E? #@ 9 + '?# = - A #
- # / /? ? # <= + 7 , '+$+ B< B. 4 - / - = @# # - #
# = 7 # ?/ $? B<< 4 # - / - = A # - ? # # =
7 # ?/ $? B<< + 8= 7 , # A # # 9 + '?# = = - ? A/ = = ?
? ? # A - = // + 9 + '?# = # / # + #@ * = 7 , A
= // - - ? / ? + 9 + '?# = = # - A # = 7 ,D A # * = = =
? # + 8= // - +
: 0 A - - ? / ? ?# # ? - # # + *
+ * <= + - # #@ # ? - # # A #@ # ?/ // -
- ? @# # // * - ? - A # - ? * # - ? - A
-+
8= ? = - ? A ? / # - -/ ? #= @ # # # #
F #= # / *F @ 0 # # ? ? ? = # # 0 # ? A # @
= # -- = 0 = # C/ ? / # - +
* < (+3+ * <. + A - - ? / ? = ? A/

# - -? C - G? #+ * + !< * !< <= +
+) # = * A # // / / # @ # / = @ ? #
- / E? ? ? + ! " # $ ! " %& * (+3+ *
. +
8= 7 , = = ?= # A // / * # ? #@ A * # / # 9+
'?# = D - ? A/ = ? # = / ? A # = 7 # ?/ $? + + $+
7 # + ,+ B<< + 9 + '?# = # /? = - ? A/ = = // ? -
/ ? # - = // + 3= = # / = E? - #@ # #@ - + 8= A # - #
/ * @# # - * # A # - ? = 0 # #- +9 0 * 9 + '?# =
# = = 7 , -- 0 # = - = / - A # ? # - = ) -
- # # & 3= ? # 5 #? * << + / +7 + . +
9 + '?# = D # # # - = ? = = 7 ,D A - = // 0 - # -
G? #+ 3= / - = = 7 , G? # 0 = // ? = # ?/
? G? # # = A #@ = 0 / #@+ 9 + '?# = D
G? # @?A # - + ,? ? # B (+3+ + H !B * = 7 , = G? # 0 9 + '?# = D
// + 8= # ?/ ? D / -= 0 / #@ # -# ? G
// + B (+3+ + H !B +' * 9 + '?# = # # = 7 ,D G? # - #@ A
# - // # - #@ = 0 = // = ? + B (+3+ + H !B 4 +
$+ 7 # + ,+ B<< 4 < = + 7 , '+$+ B<< . + "# ?A* = 7 , = G? # 0 9 + '?# = D // +
/ A? - = // ? -- / ? +! ' * + <*
<= + 4 * + + 8= 7 , # ? # # A #@ 9 + '?# = D
// +
= # 0 * 9 + '?# = D A # / #
- ! < < 9
< . < < .. '?# = 0+ 10 .. < << = / <+ = ?# + ? << < < . < <+= A
= 7 ,D A - - ? / ? +
1)81$1 &$ 8%1 &($8
3 /= # +3 A ?
(# 3 ? 5? @
- # #?A ?# / # #@ # # = C+
>+
- C A # #@ // #D - # = // * = / # = A # ?# # A ? =
@?A # ? # A = A# # - = // + + $+ //+ ,+ # <=
+ $+ + ; +
( $ % )* + , - -
' ( ./% .**/
!0$ 1 .**/% ' " -
' ( (22 )* - - 2 2.**/2*32*/4/*/*
- ! < < 9
6:26 P.M. Stan J. Caterbone, AMICUS, November 30, 2016
Appeal Docket Sheet Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Docket Number: 3576 EDA 2016
Page 1 of 3
December 21, 2016
CAPTION
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v.
Kathleen Granahan Kane
Appellant
CASE INFORMATION
Initiating Document: Notice of Appeal
Case Status: Active

Case Processing Status: November 30, 2016 Awaiting Original Record
Journal Number:
Case Category: Criminal Case Type(s): Perjury
CONSOLIDATED CASES RELATED CASES
Docket No / Reason Type

3575 EDA 2016 Related
Same Case - Diff Docket
SCHEDULED EVENT
Next Event Type: Original Record Received Next Event Due Date: January 23, 2017
COUNSEL INFORMATION
Appellant Kane, Kathleen Granahan

Pro Se: No
IFP Status: No
Attorney: Lock, Joshua D.
Law Firm: Goldberg Katzman, P.C.
Address: Goldberg Katzman PC
4250 Crums Mill Rd Ste 301
Harrisburg, PA 17112-2889
Phone No: (717) 234-4161 Fax No:
Amicus Caterbone, Stanley J.

Pro Se: Yes
IFP Status:
Pro Se: Stanley J. Caterbone
Address: 1250 Fremont St
Lancaster, PA 17603
Case J.
Stan No.Caterbone
3576 EDACase Neither
2016Law
COMM. the Appellate
Library
v. K KaneCourts nor thePage
Administrative
Page
2601 1 Office
3 of Pennsylvania Courts assumes
of 2664 any Friday
liability December 21,
Wednesday 23, 2016
for inaccurate or delayed data, errors or omissions on the docket sheets.

Page 2 of 3
December 21, 2016
COUNSEL INFORMATION
Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Pro Se: No
IFP Status:
Attorney: Steele, Kevin R.
Address: Montgomery County District Attorney's Office
PO Box 311
Norristown, PA 19404-0311
Phone No: (610) 278-3098 Fax No:
Attorney: Falin, Robert Martin

Law Firm: Montgomery County District Attorney's Office
Address: P.O. Box 311
Norristown, PA 19404
Phone No: (610) 278-3102 Fax No: (610) 278-3841
FEE INFORMATION
Fee Dt Fee Name Fee Amt Receipt Dt Receipt No Receipt Amt

11/22/2016 Notice of Appeal 85.50 11/30/2016 2016-SPR-E-002064 85.50
AGENCY/TRIAL COURT INFORMATION
Court Below: Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas

County: Montgomery Division: Montgomery County Criminal Division
Order Appealed From: October 24, 2016 Judicial District: 38
Documents Received: November 30, 2016 Notice of Appeal Filed: November 22, 2016
Order Type: Judgment of Sentence
OTN(s): T6863802 T7090322
Lower Ct Docket No(s): CP-46-CR-0006239-2015 CP-46-CR-0008423-2015
Lower Ct Judge(s): Demchick-Alloy, Wendy
Judge
ORIGINAL RECORD CONTENT
Original Record Item Filed Date Content Description
Date of Remand of Record:
BRIEFING SCHEDULE
None None
DOCKET ENTRY
Filed Date Docket Entry / Representing Participant Type Filed By

November 30, 2016 Notice of Appeal Docketed
November 30, 2016 Docketing Statement Exited (Criminal)

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
November 30, 2016 Application for Leave to File Amicus Brief

Amicus Caterbone, Stanley J.
Case J.
Stan No.Caterbone
2016Law
COMM. the Appellate
Library
Administrative
Page
2602 2 Office
of 2664 any Friday
Wednesday 23, 2016

Page 3 of 3
December 21, 2016
DOCKET ENTRY
Filed Date Docket Entry / Representing Participant Type Filed By

December 9, 2016 Other
Eldridge, Lisa A.
Document Name: Per TC Judge's chambers - Extension of time granted through 1/6/17 to file 1925(b) statement
Comment: Opinion will be filed by 3/6/17.
December 16, 2016 Docketing Statement Received (Criminal)

December 21, 2016 Order

Per Curiam
Comment: Upon consideration of the Petitioner's "Request The Courtesy Of The
Court To Appear Pro Se And To File An Amicus Curaie [sic] Brief In Support
Of The Following," filed by "Stan J. Caterbone," the petitioner shall not be
permitted to present oral argument.
Case J.
Stan No.Caterbone
2016Law
COMM. the Appellate
Library
Administrative
Page
2603 3 Office
of 2664 any Friday
Wednesday 23, 2016
Table of Statutes http://www.zbad.net/frames/OSBMonopoly.htm
Table of Statutes, Rules, Cases, and Authorities Dealing with the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
Legal Services for the Poor, Unbundling Legal Services, The Legal Profession, etc.
Oregon State Bar
Ethics Opinion 1994-137
Unlawful Practice of Law Committee Rules

(Board of Governors Policies 9.70 As Amended through July 25, 1998)
OSB-UPL case no. 99-14 sub nom In re: Honorable Judge Carlson and Honorable
Judge Velure v. SOS Documents.
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted effective January 1, 1996)
JR -102 (D), JR 2-106 (A) (1), JR 2-110 (B), JR 4-101 (A).
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure
Council on Court Procedures -- ORCP Handbook 1990

Liberal Construction Rule 12(A), and Disregarding Error Rule 12(B)
Equitable Remedy after Judgment Rule 71 (C)
Oregon Constitution
Article I section 21 (ex-post facto law forbidden)
Article III (Judicial Department)
Oregon Statutes
1 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Chapter ( Practice of Law: Membership in the Bar

ORS 9.160 Unlawful Practice of Law
See also Oregon Laws 1920, ch V 1093-1, p. 949 (Spec. Sess) (first Oregon UPL
Statute and Oregon Laws 1920, ch V 1093-2, p. 949 (Spec. Sess.) defining the
practice of law. See especially OR Laws 1937, ch 343 2 repealing the definition of
the practice of law.
ORS 9. 164-166 (1) (injunctive process/procedure)

ORS 9.320 (in-court appearance by corporation must be made by attorney)
ORS 14.250 Judicial Disqualification

ORS 14.260(3) No disqualification after rulings on matters of substance
14.260(5) Not more than two judges can be disqualified in any cause or action by a party
or
attorney.
Chapter 183 (Administrative Procedures for Quasi-Judicial Actives and Rule Making by State
Agencies)
ORS 260.005(10) Defining collective persons.
State Supreme Court and State Bar Unlicensed, Unauthorized, or Unlawful Practice of Law
Rules
Arkansas: In Re: Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law

1994 Ark. LEXIS 436 (1994)
California:
Florida:
Supreme Court Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Chapter 10Rules Governing the
Investigation and Prosecution of the Unlicensed Practice of Law.
2 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Rule 10-2.1(a) Unlicensed Practice of Law (not the unlicensed practice of law for non lawyers to
engage in limited communication to assist a person to fill out a legal form approved by the
Supreme Court of Florida.) (effective Jan. 1, 1993 as per 605 So.2d 252).
Montana; In The Matter of the Commission on Unauthorized Practice of Law

246 Mont. 1 (1990)
Washington State Limited Practice Rules
3 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Cases
Oregon Cases
Service Lumber Co. V. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., . 81 Ore. 32, *; 158 P. 175 (1916) (Stockholders of defunct corporation real parties in interest
and able to appear on behalf of their tenancy-in-common of the residual property of the former corporation).
Oregon Peaceworks Green PAC v. Secretary of State, 103 Ore. App. 323, 797 P.2d 386
(1990) rev den, (Political Action Committee, although a collective person (ORS 260.005(10)) is
not a corporation and can appear through a non-lawyer representative).
State of Oregon v. Anthony Lee Garza, 125 Ore. App. 385, 865 P.2d 463 (1993) (necessity of
disqualification of judge for cause invokes equitable remedies notwithstanding failure to comply
with disqualification statute).
State ex rel Dave Frohnmayer v. Douglas Low, aka Johnny Ted Nash, 105 Ore. App. 357, 804
P.2d 1217 (1991) (Rule 71 and equitable remedies to set aside judgments with Council on
Court Procedure Commentary).
Administrative Standards (Megdal cases)
John B. Cochran, Ph.D. V. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 171 Ore. App. 311, 15 P.3d 73
(2000).
Loomis v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 152 Ore. App. 466, 954 P.2d 839 (1998), Spray
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 50 Ore. App. 311, 624 P.2d 125, mod on recons 51 Ore.
App. 773, 627 P.2d 25, rev den 291 Ore. 117, 631 P.2d 341 (1981).
Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Ore. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980).
Unlawful Practice of Law cases
Oregon State Bar v. Robin Smith, 149, Ore. App. 171, 942 P.2d 793 (1997).
Oregon State Bar v. Fowler, 278 Or. 169, 563 P.2d 674 (1977).
Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975).
State Bar v. Miller and Co, 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 233 Ore. 80, 377 P.2d 334 (1962).
4 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Oregon State Bar v. Johnston, 158 Ore. 52, 74 P.2d 395 (1937).
Federal Cases (by date of decision)
U.S. Supreme Court Cases
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142 at 148. (1907). (access to court
guaranteed by U.S. Constitution)
NRLB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1959) (administrative rulemaking by adjudication).
Ferguson, et al v. Skrupa dba Credit Advisors, 372 U.S. 726 (1962) (14th Amendment due
process inapplicable to state action regarding the practice of law).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). (1st Amendment collective right to legal services)
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1965). (1st Amendment collective right to legal services).
UMW District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (1st Amendment collective right to legal services).
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (access to court and right to non-lawyer assistance to
effectuate right of court access for prison inmates).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to court for divorce as fundamental right).
California Motor Transport Company et al v. Trucking Unlimited et al, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)
NRLB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (administrative rulemaking by adjudication).
Goldfarb et ux v. Virgina State Bar et al, 421 U.S. 733 (1975) (State Bar not beyond reach of
Antitrust laws, minimum fee schedules are anticompetitive)
5 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1975) at 612-614 (compelling the production of ordinary business records of a sole proprietor which are
not themselves subject to the 5th Amendment. Is a testimonial act that is in violation of the 5th Amendment).
Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 719 (1980)
(State Court as legislator and/or holder of inherent power over the legal profession).
Florida State Bar v. Went For It, Inc., and John T. Blakely, 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Cases
th
Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc., 571 F.2d 205 (4 Cir., 1978)
(advisory opinions of Virginia State Bar violate Sherman Antitrust Act).
Lawline v. American Bar Association 962 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992) (ABA, Illinois State Bar,
U.S. District of Illinois Court Rules do not violate Sherman Antitrust Act because of State
Action exception and right of individuals or organizations to petition government for action.)
th
David A. Nowicki and Robert B. Bland v. Clair H. Hoss, 1196 U.S. App. LEXIS 30369 (7
Cir., 1996) (paralegal not permitted to accompany client to interview because it would amount to
unauthorized practice of law)
Serena Dunn et al individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals v. The Florida
Bar and Florida Supreme Court et al, 889 F.2d 1010 (11 Cir., 1989) (Florida Bar surrender on
allowing paralegals to provide advice and information in divorce cases).
Federal District and Bankruptcy Court Cases
Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc, 431 F.Supp. 298 (E.D. Virg., 1977).
(boycott created by Virginia Bar advisory opinion violated McCarran-Ferguson Act condemming
boycotts).
6 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Lenders Service, Inc. v Dayton Bar Association et al, 758 F. Supp, 429 (1991)
In re: Christopher Bachmann, Charlene Rae Bachmann, Debtors, 113 Bankruptcy Reporter
769 (1990).
Memorandum Opinion of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon in In re United States Trustee v. Barry L. Taub,
Adversary Proceeding no. 601-6022-fra dated August 21, 2001
Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., No.

3:97-CV-2859, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 2, 1999) (Quicken legal self-help software
engages in the unauthorized practice of law. Injunction later vacated by 5th Circuit after new
statute specifically exempted software from unauthorized practice statute.)
Cases other states (alphabetic by State

Arizona
State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land and Title Company, 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961).
(Traditional or customary activity as definition of practice of law)
Arkansas
Pope County Bar Association v. Suggs, 624 S.W. 2d 828 (Ark., 1981)
California
Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 469 P.2d 353, 86 Cal. Rptr 673 (1970).
People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922) (defining practice of
law at 535, 365 by citing Eley v Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837 (1893))
Mickel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. Aapp.2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957) (scrivening generally not the
practice of law).
People v. Landlords Professional Service, 178 Cal. App. 3d 68, 223 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1986).
(tenant eviction service engaged in the unauthorized practice of law)
7 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Colorado
Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 391 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1964)
(independent paralegal engaged in unauthorized practice of law)
Colorado Bar Association v. Miles, 557 P.2d 1202 (Colo.1976) (scrivening generally not the
practice of law).
People v. Fry, 875 P.2d (Colo. 1994) (censuring Defendant attorney for failure to supervise
paralegal and therefore aiding unauthorized practice of law).
Florida
Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 1.31(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration 2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So.2d 800 (Fla., 1990)
Florida State Bar v. Furman, 451 So.2d 808 (fla., 1984) (contempt re injunction), 469 U.S. 925
(1984) (dismissed for lack of any substantial Federal question)
Florida State Bar v. Furman, 376 So.2d 378) (Fla., 1979) (UPL injunction), 444 U.S. 1061
(1980) (dismissed for lack of any substantial Federal question)
Florida State Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (Fla., 1978) (limited Stupica to forms sold
with instructions)
Florida State Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974) (any printed legal forms sold are the
unauthorized practice of law)
Michigan
State Bar of Michigan v. Virginia Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W. 2d 1 (1976) (per curiam )
and (Levin J. dissenting)
Nevada
State Bar of Nevada v. Johnson, No. CV89-5814 (Nev. Dist. Ct. April. 12, 1990) (District court
guidelines for nonlawyer practice in family law and bankruptcy) (later used by most other Nevada
Courts as basis for notice to paralegals about what would be viewed as unauthorized practice
of law)
New Jersey
In Re Opinion No. 33 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice Of Law,160 N.J. 63, 733 A.2d 478 (N.J., 1999) (balancing test of
public interest in a variety of legal services and public interest in quality of legal services provided by having members of the State Bar meet
minimum standards.)
In Re Opinion No. 26 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice Of Law, 654 A.2d 1344
(N.J.. 1995) (per curiam) (refinement of balancing test)
8 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
In Re Opinion No. 24 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice Of Law, 602 A.2d 962
(N.J. 1992). (announcement of balancing test)
Cape May County Bar Association v. John Ludham, 45 N.J. 121, 211 A.2d 780 (N.J., 1965).
(third generation conveyancer held to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law while
conveying real property to purchasers).
New Mexico
State Bar of New Mexico et al v. Guardian Abstract and Title Co., 91 N.M. 434 (1978), 575
P.2d 943 (1978)
New York
N.Y. County Lawyers Association v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (App. Div., 1967), (Stevens, J.
Dissenting) revs and dissenting opinion adopted, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y.,
1967)
(mere sale of legal self-help book not unauthorized practice but establishment of individualized
relationship with purchasers is unauthorized practice).
Ohio
In Re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Cuyahoga County, and In Re Brown, Weiss and Wohl,
et al, 175 Ohio St. 149 (1963), 192 N.E. 2d 54 (Ohio, 1963)
South Carolina
In Re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 422 S.E.2d
123 (S.C. 1992)
Texas
Palmer v. Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App. 1969)
Washington State
Wha Young and Kelly Kim personally and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Desert
Document Services, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1216, (wash., 2000)
State of Washington v. Jerry Nathan Hunt, 880 P.2d 96 (Wash., 1994)

Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630 (Wash., 1985)
9 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Benjamin, Van Camp, Hagen and Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730 (Wash. ,1981)
(en banc)
Washington Bar Association v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association, 586 P.2d 870
(Wash. 1978)
10 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Scholarly Works
American Jurisprudence
7 Am. Jur.2d
Attorney at Law
2 (1997)
118 (1997)
Sale of Books or Forms 119 (1997)
American Bar Association
Center for Professional Responsibility
Survey and Related Materials on the Unauthorized Practice of Law/Nonlawyer Practice (1996)
Commission on Nonlawyer Practice:
Nonlawyer Activities in Law-Related Situations (1995) (not available locally, we obtained a copy through
inter-library loan from the Univ. of Washington Law Library. Xerox copy available from Defendants for references to
text. Excellent summary of the UPL history as well as their three part balancing test on whether the public interest is
better served by permitting or forbidding particular legal activities by nonlawyers.))
State Legislature Clearinghouse Briefing Book: Unauthorized Practice of Law
(1992).
Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law:
Compendium on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, (1942).
American Bar Foundation, Justine Fischer and Dorothy Lachmann, eds., Unauthorized Practice
Handbook: A Compilation of Statutes, Cases, and Commentary on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law (1972).
Alpert, Thomas ,The Inherent Power of the Courts To Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 Buffalo Law Review 526
(1983).
11 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Andrews, Thomas, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who has the Gold Really Make the Rules, 40 Hastings Law Journal 577
(1989).
Barry, Margaret Martin, Access to Justice: On Dialogues With the Judiciary (2002), 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1089.
Bradlow, Julie M., Procedural Due Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants (Spring 1988) , 55 University of Chicago Law Review 659.
Brickman, Lester, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48
N.Y. Univ. Law Review 595 (1973).
Brockmyer, Michael F., and A. Bradley Parham, Client Protection: Enforcing the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 24 M.D. Bar Journal (1991)
California State Bar, Report of the Public Protection Committee (April, 1988)
Christenson, Barlow, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good NeighborsOr Even Good Sense, 159 Amer. Bar
Found. Res. Jou. 1980.
Cramton, Roger C., Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case Western Reserve
Law Review 531 (1994).
Denckla, Derek A., Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham Law
Review 2581 (1999).
Engler, Russell, And Justice for AllIncluding the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham Law
Review 1987 (1999).
Florida State Bar, Report of the Special Committee on Non-Lawyer Practice (1994)
Fordham Law Library Reference Staff, Bibliography to the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons: Professional
and Ethical Issues (April, 1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2731.
French, Steve, Note and Comment: When Public Policies Collide . . . Legal Self Help Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27
Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 93 (2001)
Goldschmidt, Jona, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues, May 1997, ABA Conference Annual Meeting.
Harris, George C., and Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What we can Learn form the Medical
Professions Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 Fordham Law Review 775 (2001).
Healey, Paul, Pro Se Users, Reference Liability. And the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Twenty-Five Selected Readings (Winter, 2002), 94
12 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Law Library Journal 133.
Holmes, Elizabeth S., What is the Unauthorized Practice of Law and How is it Regulated? 76 Michigan Bar Journal 580 (June 1997)
Hunter and Klonoff, A Dialogue on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 Villanova Law Review 6 (1979-80).
Hurder, Alex J., Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham Law Review 2241 (1999)
Hurst, J.W., The Growth of American Law, (1950).
Hyman, A., and Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trap, 11 Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics 950 ( ).
Johnstone, Quintin, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Powergroups, 4 Kansas Law Review 1 (1955).
Justice, Kathleen Eleanor, Note, There Goes the Monopoly, The California Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 Vanderbilt
1979 (1991).
Katsh, Ethan, Digital Lawyers: Orienting the Legal Profession to Cyberspace, 55 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1141 (Summer 1994).
Kim, Helen B., Legal Education for the Prto se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to be Heard, (1987), 96 Yale Law Journal 1641.
Lamkin, Patricia Jean, Annotation, Sale of Books or Forms Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results Without Assistance of
Attorney as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 71 A.L.R. 3rd 1000 2 (1999).
Llewellyn, Karl, The Bars Troubles, and PoulticesAnd Cures?, , 5 Law and Contemporary Problems 104 (1938).
Lock, Marcus J., Increasing Access to Justice: Expanding the Role of Nonlawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Coloradans,
72 U. Colorado Law Review 459 (Spring, 2001)
McCulloch, Elizabeth, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses And Client Power (1996), 48 Florida Bar Review 481
McKnight, Maureen, Dealing with the Unrepresented Opponent (1996), unpublished manuscript prepared for the Oregon Family Law
Conference 1996.
McNeal, Mary Helen, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance
(April, 1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2617.
Marks, Merton E., The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizonas Experience, 49 ABA Journal 139 (1963).
13 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Michaelman, Elizabeth, The Invisible Hand, The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 Pepperdine Law
Review 1 (1994)
Morgan, Thomas D., The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 415.
Mund, Hon. Geraldine, Paralegals: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly (1994), 2 Bankruptcy Institute Law Revenue 337.
Munro, Meredith Ann, Deregulation of the Practice of Law: Panacea or Placebo?, 242 Hastings Law Journal 203 (1990).
Morrison, Alan,
Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 Nova L. J. 363 (1980).
Breaking Up the Legal Monopoly, 1 New Directions in Legal Services 113 (1976).
Nuffer, David, The Future of Legal Systems, the Legal Profession and the Rule of Law: A Paraddigm for a Season of Change, 13 Utah Bar
Journal 9 (May, 2000)
Podgers, James
Chasing the Ideal: As More Americans Find Themselves Priced Out of the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice
for All, 80 American Bar Association Journal 56 (1994)
Crumbling Fortress: Legal Profession Faces Rising Tide of Nonlawyer Practice, 79 ABA Journal 51 (Dec. 1993)
Quigley, William P., The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 19 Southern University Law Review 273 (1992).
Ries, Robert R., The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 60 Texas Bar Journal 37 (Jan. 1997)
Rhode, Deborah L.
Legal Ethics, 3rd ed., with David Luban (2001)
Opening Remarks: Professionalism (Spring, 2001), 52 South Carolina Law Review 458.
Professionalism in Perspective: Alternate Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 1 Journal of the Institute for the Study of Lethal
Ethics 197 (1996)
The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 209 (1990).
The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Maryland Law Review 274 (Winter, 1986)
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stanford
Law Review 1 (1981).
14 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
Project: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 The Yale Law Journal 104 (1976).
Romagnoli, Joseph, Note: What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity, 53 Fordham Law Review 1503 (1985).
Sales, Bruce D., Connie J. Beck, and Richard K. Haan, Is Self-Representation A Reasonable Alternative To Attorney Representation In
Divorce Cases? (1992), 37 Saint Louis University Law Journal 553.
Sell,_______, Pro Se Divorce: A Low Cost Alternative to the High Cost of Leaving, 3 New Directions in Legal Services 163 (1978).
Seven, Kay Hennessy, and Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matters of Arons: Construction of the IDEAs Lay Advocate Provision too Narrow?, 9
Georgetown Journal of Poverty Law and Policy 193 (Winter 2002).
Talamante, Ryan J., We Cant all be Lawyersor Can We? Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona, 34 Arizona Law Review
873 (1992).
Revised: October 28, 2002 .
15 of 15 6/25/2008 3:20 PM
CLD - 1 7 0 M a r ch 2 7 , 2 0 0 8
UN I TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH E TH I RD CI RCUI T
C.A. N o. 0 7 - 4 4 7 4
STAN LEY J. CATERBON E

v.
LAN CASTER COUN TY PRI SON , e t a l.
( E.D . Pa . Civ. N o. 0 5 - cv- 0 2 2 8 8 )
Present : AMBRO, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges

Subm it t ed ar e:
( 1) By t he Clerk for possible dism issal due t o a j urisdict ional defect ;
( 2) By t he Clerk for possible dism issal under 28 U.S.C. 1915( e) ( 2) or

for possible sum m ary act ion under I .O.P. 10.6;
( 3) Appellant s j urisdict ional response;
( 4) Jurisdict ional response of Appellee, Fult on Bank;
( 5) Mot ion by Appellee, Manheim Township Police Depart m ent , t o

dism iss appeal; and
( 6) Appellant s m ot ion for appoint m ent of counsel

in t he above - capt ioned case.
Respect fully,
Clerk
MMW/ JSN/ clc
CLD- 170 March 27, 2008
Page 1 of 11
STANLEY J. CATERBONE
v .
LANCASTER COUNTY PRI SON, et al.
C.A. No. 0 7 - 4 4 7 4
Pa ge 2
______________________________________
ORDER
The quest ion of j ur isdict ion, and t he m ot ion t o dism iss for lack of j ur isdict ion, ar e r efer r ed t o t he m er it s
panel. See I .O.P. 10.3.5. We do not dism iss t he appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1915( e) or t ak e sum m ar y act ion
under I . O. P. 10. 6. The Cler k is dir ect ed t o issue a br iefing schedule. We not e, how ev er , t hat t his or der
does not r epr esent a finding of appellat e j ur isdict ion in t his m at t er . As in all cases, t he panel of t his Cour t
t hat r ev iew s t he appeal on it s m er it s w ill m ak e a final det er m inat ion of appellat e j ur isdict ion. I n addit ion
t o any ot her issues t he par t ies w ish t o r aise in t heir br iefs, t he par t ies shall addr ess w het her t he Dist rict
Cour t er r ed in dism issing t he case w it hout addr essing t he fact or s set for t h in Poulis v . St at e Far m Fir e &
Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 ( 3d Cir . 1984) .
The m ot ion for appoint m ent of counsel is denied.
By t he Cour t ,
/ s/ Julio M. Fuent es
Cir cuit Judge
Dat ed: April 22, 2008
clc \ cc: Mr . St anley J. Cat er bone

Chr ist opher S. Under hill, Esq.
George M. Gowen, I I I , Esq.
Rober t W. Hallinger , Esq.
Page 2 of 11
UN I TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH E TH I RD CI RCUI T
07- 4474
Cat erbone v. Lancast er Ct y Prison, et al
05- cv - 02288
BRI EFI N G AN D SCHEDULI N G ORDER
I t is ORD ERED t hat t he br ief for Appellant ( s) and t he j oint appendix shall be filed and ser v ed
on or before 0 6 / 0 2 / 2 0 0 8 .
I t is FU RTH ER ORD ERED t hat t he br ief( s) for Appellee( s) shall be filed and ser v ed
w it hin t hirt y ( 30) day s of ser v ice of Appellant 's ( Appellant s') br ief.
I t is FU RTH ER ORD ERED t hat a r eply br ief, if any, shall be filed and ser v ed w it hin
four t een ( 14) day s of ser v ice of Appellee's ( Appellees') br ief( s) .
I t is FU RTH ER ORD ERED t hat in t he ev ent of default by Appellant in filing t he brief and
appendix as dir ect ed, t he appeal m ay be dism issed w it hout fur t her not ice.
I t is FU RTH ER ORD ERED t hat if Appellee fails t o file a br ief w it hin t he t im e dir ect ed,
t he m at t er w ill be list ed on Appellant 's br ief only and Appe llee m ay be subj ect t o such sanct ions
as t he Cour t deem s appr opr iat e.
I t is n ot e d t h a t , w h e r e a p p lica b le , p a r t ie s m u st com p ly w it h 3 r d Cir . LAR 3 1 . 2 w h ich

pr ov ide s: A local, st at e or feder al ent it y or agency , w hich w as ser v ed in t he dist r ict cour t and
which is t he appellee, m ust file a br ief in all cases in w hich a br iefing schedule is issued unless
t he cour t has gr ant ed a m ot ion seeking per m ission t o be excused fr om filing a br ief. The r ule
does not apply t o ent it ies or agencies t hat ar e r espondent s t o a pet it ion for r eview unless t he
ent it y or agency is t he sole r espondent or t o ent it ies or agencies w hich act ed solely as an
adj udicat ory t ribunal.
This Cour t r equir es t he filing of br iefs by counsel in bot h elect r onic and paper for m at . 3r d Cir .
LAR 31.1( b) . Pr o se lit igant s ar e ex em pt fr om t he elect r onic filing r equir em ent . Appendices ar e
not r equir ed t o be filed elect r onically.
Checklist s r egar ding t he r equir em ent s for filing a br ief and appendix ar e available on t he Cour t 's
w ebsit e at w w w .ca3.uscour t s.gov .
For t he Cour t ,
Mar cia M. Waldr on, Cler k
Dat ed: April 22, 2008
cc: St ephanie Car fley , Esq.

George M. Gowen I I I , Esq.
Rober t W. Hallinger , Esq.
William H. Howard, Esq.
Chr ist opher S. Under hill, Esq.
Mr . St anley J. Cat er bone, Esq.
Page 3 of 11
747 F.2d 8 63
40 Fed.R.Ser v .2d 313

Left er i POULI S and At hena Poulis, his w ife, Appellant s,
v.
STATE FARM FI RE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.
No. 83- 5600.
Un it e d St a t e s Cou r t of Appe a ls, Th ir d Cir cu it .
Argued April 3, 1984.
Decided Nov. 5, 1984.
George Ret os, Jr. ( Argued) , Ret os, Held & Associat es, Washingt on, Pa., for appellant s.
Paul K. Geer ( Argued) , Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace, Pit t sburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before GI BBONS, SLOVI TER, Circuit Judges, and BI SSELL, Dist rict Judge * .
OPI NI ON OF THE COURT
SLOVI TER, Cir cuit Judge.

1
This appeal, as well as anot her decided t oday involving t he sam e at t orney and dist rict court
j udge, Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, is brought from a final order dism issing t he
com plaint wit h prej udice due t o counsel's failure t o m eet court -im posed deadlines and ot her
procedural requisit es.
I.
Background
Left eri and At hena Poulis filed suit against St at e Farm Fire and Casualt y Com pany ( St at e
Farm ) in Novem ber 1981, in t he Court of Com m on Pleas of Washingt on Count y, Pennsylvania, t o
recover under an insurance policy aft er fire dam aged t heir hom e. St at e Farm rem oved t he case
t o t he Unit ed St at es Dist rict Court for t he West ern Dist rict of Pennsylvania based on diversit y of
cit izenship. I n it s answer, it denied liabilit y, assert ing t hat plaint iffs had int ent ionally caused t he
fire, had concealed and m isrepresent ed inform at ion, and had not filed t heir act ion in t im e.
On March 12, 1982, t he dist rict court ordered t hat discovery would close June 14, 1982; t hat
plaint iffs' pre -t rial st at em ent would be due July 5; and t hat defendant 's st at em ent would be due
July 26. A pre -t rial conference was set for August 13. The do cket reveals no act ion by plaint iffs
seeking discovery. On April 15, St at e Farm filed not ice of service of int errogat ories on plaint iffs.
No answers t o t hese int errogat ories were or have ever been filed, and plaint iffs did not file t heir
pre -t rial st at em ent by July 5 as required. Therefore defendant filed it s pre -t rial st at em ent first ,
on July 28, t oget her wit h a m ot ion t o com pel answers t o int errogat ories. A m em ber of t he
dist rict j udge's st aff advised plaint iffs' counsel, George Ret os, Jr., t hat t he st at em ent was
overdue and Ret os prom ised t o subm it a st at em ent by t he next day. He neit her did so nor
request ed any ext ension. On August 5 t he dist rict court , sua spont e, dism issed t he case wit h
prej udice for plaint iffs' failure t o com ply wit h t he orders t o file the pre-t rial st at em ent .
Page 4 of 11
4
Ret os filed a pre -t rial st at em ent on August 9, t oget her wit h a m ot ion under Rule 60( b) t o
reconsider and set aside t he dism issal, alleging t hat an illness prevent ed him from working
bet ween July 6 t hrough July 17; t hat ot her at t orneys could not have t aken over because only
Ret os spoke Greek and could com m unicat e wit h plaint iff Left eri Poulis; t hat Ret os' pregnant wife
went int o false labor on July 29 and 30, and t hat he had " inadvert ent ly set aside t he required
work for t he inst ant case on July 29, 1982, due t o his concern for his wife" and was "render[ ed]
unable t o prepare t he necessary Pre -Trial St at em ent ; " t hat on his ret urn t o work ot her t asks had
backlogged; and t hat alt hough he had dict at ed a st at em ent on August 4, it had been m ailed on
August 6 when it was t yped and ready.
The dist rict court denied reconsiderat ion. On appeal, t his court vacat ed t he order of dism issal.
Poulis v. St at e Farm Fire & Casualt y Co., 714 F.2d 124 ( 3d Cir.1983) ( Poulis I ) ( per curiam ) . We
not ed t here was " no allegat ion t hat plaint iffs, as dist inguished from t heir counsel, were in any
way responsible for t he failure t o com ply wit h t he court 's order." We recognized t hat in Nat ional
Hockey League v. Met ropolit an Hockey Club, I nc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct . 2278, 49 L.Ed.2d 747
( 1976) , a dism issal was upheld where plaint iffs had act ed in "flagrant bad fait h" and counsel
" had behaved wit h 'callous disregard' of [ his] responsibilit ies," id. at 643, 96 S.Ct . at 2781, but
observed t hat "[ t ] he case at hand is not as ext rem e."
We point ed out t hat in an earlier opinion, Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d
339, 342 ( 3d Cir.1982) , we had st at ed t hat " dism issal is a drast ic sanct ion and should be
reserved for t hose cases where t here is a clear reco rd of delay or cont um acious conduct by t he
plaint iff." However, because Ret os' excuses failed t o account for m any days on which a pre -t rial
st at em ent could have been filed, we observed t hat som e sanct ion was "am ply j ust ified."
Accordingly, w e vacat ed t he dism issal and rem anded t o perm it t he dist rict court t o consider
alt ernat ives t o dism issal, st at ing, " Alt ernat ives are part icularly appropriat e when t he plaint iff has
not personally cont ribut ed t o t he delinquency."
On rem and, t he dist rict court ordered t he part ies t o file briefs on appropriat e alt ernat ive
sanct ions. Plaint iffs' brief, filed four days lat e, st at ed t hat such sanct ions would be cost s,
at t orneys' fees, and m onet ary penalt ies im posed on him , but argued t hat " [ s] ince t he Third
Circuit has specifically assessed t he cost s of t he appeal in t his m at t er against plaint iffs' counsel
personally, it has ruled on t he sanct ions which are t o be applied in t he inst ant m at t er [ and]
alt ernat ive sanct ions are now inappropriat e." App. at 10 -11.
I n it s brief St at e Farm t ook a m ore reasonable posit ion. I t not ed t hat "[ i] n t his case t he
defendant has been m ore prej udiced by plaint iffs' failure t o answer int errogat ories t hen [ sic] by
it s counsel's failure t o file t he Pre -Trial St at em ent on t im e." App. at 16. St at e Farm urged t he
court t o reopen discovery so t hat it could " have t he opport unit y t o exam ine plaint iffs' Answers t o
I nt errogat ories, conduct furt her invest igat ion if necessary, and depose t he plaint iffs or ot her
wit nesses known t o plaint iffs if such act ion is deem ed necessary and appropriat e." App. at 15.
St at e Farm suggest ed, "I f discovery is reopened, St at e Farm believes t here would be no need t o
ut ilize t he som ewhat harsh rem edy of lim it ing or rest rict ing plaint iffs' wit nesses at t rial." App. at
16 ( em phasis added) . I n light of t his court 's order, St at e Farm request ed an award of $750.00 in
Page 5 of 11
at t orneys' fees which it incurred because of t he dism issal and appeal, and sought a prospect ive
lim it at ion on int erest due should it ult im at ely be held liable on plaint iffs' claim .
Significant ly, in it s brief St at e Farm furt her st at ed, " St at e Farm st rongly believes t hat t he m ost
expedit ious m anner of disposing of t his case can be provided by ruling on t he Defendant 's
Mot ion t o Dism iss which was filed on July 7, 1982," approxim at ely t hree weeks following t he
close of discovery and which was denied by t he dist rict court because of it s policy not t o consider
m ot ions t o dism iss filed m ore t han t wo weeks aft er t he close of discovery. App. at 16.
10
Not wit hst anding t he defendant 's subm ission, t he dist rict court reinst at ed it s sua spont e
sanct ion of dism issal, st at ing t hat t here was no appropriat e alt ernat ive:
11
There are no cost s which can be charged t o plaint iffs' counsel at t his point . Furt her, t his was
not a sit uat ion in which defense counsel was forced t o m ake an unnecessary t rip t o court
because of plaint iffs' counsel's failure t o appear. The defendant has only been required t o incur
fees in an am ount t hat would have been incurred if t he case norm ally proceeded t o t his point .
Thus, t his is not an appropriat e case for at t orney's fees. Finally, t he court finds no aut horit y for
levying a fine against plaint iffs' counsel as a penalt y. Rat her t han im posing fines and cost s of
[ sic] ot her sanct ions prior t o dism issal, plaint iffs' counsel was afforded m any opport unit ies t o
cure t he problem s, but he has failed t o do so. Sanct ions not being appropriat e, t he court has no
alt ernat ive but dism issal t o m ot ivat e plaint iff's counsel t o com ply wit h deadlines.
12
App. at 3-4 ( foot not es and cit at ion om it t ed) . The dist rict court int im at ed it s displeasure wit h
t he rem and in Poulis I but it was unequivocal in it s disagreem ent wit h t he rem and in a sim ilar
case from anot her dist rict , Tit us v. Mercedes Benz of Nort h Am erica, 695 F.2d 746 ( 3d
Cir.1982) . The dist rict court st at ed: "Judge Gart h's dissent in Tit us, indicat es t hat deliberat e,
dilat ory act ion is a basis for dism issal, even under Donnelly, and furt her indicat es t hat t he Circuit
Court should only reverse such a decision for abuse of discret ion.... [ T] his Court finds Judge
Gart h's dissent persuasive and adopt s his dissent , and t he cases cit ed t herein, as furt her support
for t his decision." App. at 5 ( em phasis added) .
13
We t reat t his ext raordinary st at em ent at t he out set . What ever m ay be the personal views of
t he dist rict court as t o t he m erit s vel non of a decision of t his court , t he dist rict court is not free
t o " adopt " t he dissent . This court is st rict in it s adherence t o t he precedent of it s earlier opinions.
Our own I nt ernal Operat ing Procedures are explicit and provide,
14
I t is t he t radit ion of t his court t hat report ed panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc
considerat ion is required t o overrule a published opinion of t his court .
15
Page 6 of 11
I nt ernal Operat ing Procedures of t he Court of Appeals for t he Third Circuit , Chapt er 8.C. I f t he
j udges of t his court are bound by earlier panels, a fort iori dist rict court j udges are sim ilarly
bound. Recognit ion of t he hierarchical nat ure of t he federal j udiciary requires no less.
16
Moreover t he report ed decisions of t his court over t he past t wo years evidence t he consist ency
of t his court 's rulings em phasizing t he ext rem e nat ure of a dism issal wit h prej u dice or default
j udgm ent . See Hrit z v. Wom a Corp., 732 F.2d 1178 ( 3d Cir.1984) ; I n re MacMeekin, 722 F.2d
32 ( 3d Cir.1983) ; Madesky v. Cam pbell, 705 F.2d 703 ( 3d Cir.1983) ; Gross v. St ereo
Com ponent Syst em s, I nc., 700 F.2d 120 ( 3d Cir.1983) ; Tit us v. Merce dez Benz of Nort h
Am erica, 695 F.2d 746 ( 3d Cir.1982) ; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653 ( 3d
Cir.1982) ; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761 ( 3d Cir.1982) ; Donnelly v. Johns- Manville Sales
Corp., 677 F.2d 339 ( 3d Cir.1982) .1
17
We recognize t hat recent lit erat ure exhort ing t he dist rict j udges t o m ove lit igat ion
expedit iously by t aking firm cont rol and t he 1983 am endm ent s of t he Federal Rules of Civi l
Procedure wit h t heir num erous references t o sanct ions m ay have cont ribut ed t o prem at ure
dism issals or default s. Alt hough sanct ions are a necessary part of any court syst em , we are
concerned t hat t he recent preoccupat ion wit h sanct ions and t he use of dismissal as a necessary
" weapon" in t he t rial court 's " arsenal" m ay be cont ribut ing t o or effect ing an at m osphere in
which t he m erit orious claim s or defenses of innocent part ies are no longer t he cent ral issue. I t
does not furt her t he goal of a court syst em , t hat of delivering evenhanded j ust ice t o lit igant s, t o
suggest , as did t he dist rict court here, t hat t he plaint iffs would have a rem edy by suing t heir
counsel for m alpract ice, App. at 5, since t his would only m ult iply rat her t han dispose of
lit igat ion.
18
We reit erat e what we have said on num erous occasions: t hat dism issals wit h prej udice or
default s are drast ic sanct ions, t erm ed "ext rem e" by t he Suprem e Court , Nat ional Hockey
League, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct . at 2781, and are t o be reserved for com parable cases.
II.
Analysis
19
I n exercising our appellat e funct ion t o det erm ine whet her t he t rial court has abused it s
discret ion in dism issing, or refusing t o lift a default , we will be guided by t he m anner in which
t he t rial court balanced t he following fact o rs, which have been enum erat ed in t he earlier cases,
and whet her t he record support s it s findings: ( 1) t he ext ent of t he part y 's personal
responsibilit y; ( 2) t he prej udice t o t he adversary caused by t he failure t o m eet scheduling orders
and respond t o discovery; ( 3) a hist ory of dilat oriness; ( 4) whet her t he conduct of t he part y or
t he at t orney was willful or in bad fait h; ( 5) t he effect iveness of sanct ions ot her t han dism issal,
which ent ails an analysis of alt ernat ive sanct ions; and ( 6) t he m erit oriousness of t he claim or
defense.
20
We t urn t o apply t hese fact ors in t he circum st ances of t his case.
21
Page 7 of 11
1. The ext ent of t he part y's personal responsibilit y.
22
There has been no suggest ion by any part y or by t he dist rict court t hat t he Poulis plaint iffs are
personally responsible for t he lat e pret rial st at em ent , which was t he basis for t he dism issal.
I ndeed, Ret os has acknowledged t he delays were his responsibilit y and assigned as t he reason
his illness from July 6 t hrough 17 and t he subsequent false labor of his wife on July 29 and 30.
23
This is t herefore unlike t he Nat ional Hockey League case where t he Suprem e Court upheld t he
" ext rem e sanct ion of dism issal" aft er not ing t hat t here had been " flagrant bad fait h" on t he part
of t he plaint iffs as w ell as " ca llous disregard" by t heir counsel of t heir responsibilit ies. 427 U.S.
at 643, 96 S.Ct . at 2781. However, t he Poulis' lack of responsibilit y for t heir counsel's dilat ory
conduct is not disposit ive, because a client cannot always avoid t he consequences of t he act s or
om issions of it s counsel. See Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S.Ct . 1386, 1390,
8 L.Ed.2d 734 ( 1962) .
24
2. Prej udice t o t he adversary.
25
As t he dist rict court st at ed, t here has been prej udice t o t he defendant by t he plaint iffs'
counsel's conduct . The int errogat ories were never answered nor were obj ect ions filed; defense
counsel was obliged t o file a m ot ion t o com pel answers, and was obliged t o file it s pret rial
st at em ent wit hout t he opport unit y t o review plaint iffs' pret rial st at em ent which was due t o be
filed first . App. at 4. The court 's finding t hat " defendant encount ered lack of cooperat ion from
t he plaint iff in areas where t he plaint iff should cooperat e under t he spirit of t he federal
procedural rules," id., is support ed by the record.
26
3. A hist ory of dilat oriness.
27
As not ed above, t his lit igat ion has been charact erized by a consist ent delay by plaint iffs'
counsel. Unlike t he Donnelly case, for exam ple, where t here was only one failure t o com ply in a
t im ely m anner, i.e. in obt aining local counsel, in t his case t here has been a pat t ern of
dilat oriness. Tim e lim it s im posed by t he rules and t he court serve an im port ant purpose for t he
expedit ious processing of lit igat ion. I f com pliance is not feasible, a t im ely request for an
ext ension should be m ade t o t he court . A hist ory by counsel of ignoring t hese t im e lim it s is
int olerable.
28
4. Whet her t he at t orney's conduct was willful or in bad fait h.
29
Alt hough t he dist rict court concluded t hat " plaint iffs' counsel's conduct [ was] of such a dilat ory
and cont um acious nat ure t o require dism issal," App. at 5, t here is not hing in t he record t o
Page 8 of 11
support t he " cont um acious" finding. Not hing in t he court 's discussion preceding t his conclusion is
direct ed t oward t he willfulness issue but only t oward dilat oriness. There has been no suggest ion
or indicat ion t hat counsel's illness during July 1982 and his wife's lat e pregnancy and false labor
at t he end of t hat m ont h did not occur as he represent ed.
30
I n t he appellant s' brief, counsel charact erizes his conduct as "excusable neglect " and seeks t o
explain t he dist rict court 's charact erizat ion of his conduct as "deliberat e" and "cont um acious" as
t he result of a " personalit y conflict " bet ween counsel and t he dist rict j udge. Appellant s' brief at
8. He refers us t o four recent appeals in which he allegedly " clashed" wit h t he sam e dist rict
j udge.2 However, even in t hose cases in which we vacat ed t he d ism issal, t he record showed t hat
counsel failed t o com ply wit h t he rules and deadlines im posed by t he dist rict court . Thus, while
som e disaffinit y has apparent ly been engendered bet ween t he dist rict j udge and counsel we see
no basis t o hold t he dist rict j udge responsible. Nonet heless, as not ed at t he beginning of t his
sect ion, we also find no basis for t erm ing counsel's conduct in t his case "cont um acious".
31
5. Alt ernat ive sanct ions.
32
The dist rict court concluded t hat it had "no alt ernat ive but dism issal" because no ot her
sanct ions were appropriat e. The dist rict court st at ed t hat t here was no aut horit y for levying a
fine against plaint iffs' counsel as a penalt y. See Gam ble v. Pope & Talbot , I nc., 307 F.2d 729 ( 3d
Cir.) ( in banc) , cert . denied, 371 U.S. 888, 83 S.Ct . 187, 9 L.Ed.2d 123 ( 1962) .3 However, t he
court also st at ed t hat " t here are no cost s which can be charged t o plaint iffs' counsel at t his
point ." This finding was erroneous. Defendant 's counsel had asked t he court t o im pose as a
sanct ion t he $750 at t orney fee which it had incurred in defending t he appeal in Poulis I . The
dist rict court apparent ly assum ed t hat t he cost s of t hat appeal had already been charged t o
plaint iffs' counsel. However, we had not assessed any at t orney's fee as part of our im posit ion of
appeal cost s on plaint iffs' counsel personally. 4 The dist rict court also could have im posed on
plaint iffs' counsel t he cost s, including at t orney's fees, of preparing t he m ot ion t o com pel answers
t o int errogat ories and t he brief on alt ernat ive sanct ions, all of which were incurred because of
t he dilat oriness of plaint iffs' counsel.
33
Under t he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and t he 1983 am endm ent s, t he dist rict court is
specifically aut horized t o im pose on an at t orney t hose expenses, including at t orneys' fees,
caused by unj ust ified failure t o com pl y wit h discovery orders or pret rial orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
16( f) , 37( a) ( 4) , 37( b) , 37( d) and 37( g) . See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927. The m ost direct and
t herefore preferable sanct ion for t he pat t ern of at t orney delay such as t hat which t he dist rict
cour t encount ered in t his case would be t o im pose t he excess cost s caused by such conduct
direct ly upon t he at t orney, w it h an order t hat such cost s are not t o be passed on t o t he client ,
direct ly or indirect ly. This would avoid com pelling an innocent part y t o bear t he br unt of it s
counsel's derelict ion. Dism issal m ust be a sanct ion of last , not first , resort .
34
6. Merit oriousness of t he claim .
35
I n considering whet her a claim or defense appears t o be m erit orious for t his inquiry, we do not
purport t o use sum m ary j udgm ent st andards. A claim , or defense, will be deem ed m erit orious
when t he allegat ions of t he pleadings, if est ablished at t rial, would support recovery by plaint iff
Page 9 of 11
or would const it ut e a com plet e defense. See Unit ed St at es v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728
F.2d at 195; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d at 657; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d at
764.
36
I n t his case, t he defendant suggest ed t o t he dist rict court t hat t he m ost expedit ious way t o
process t his lit igat ion was t o rule on it s m ot ion t o dism iss plaint iffs' claim as unt im ely because it
was not brought wit hin a year of t he loss, as required by t he policy. The dist rict court 's denial of
t hat m ot ion because of it s " policy ... not t o consider m ot ions t o dism iss filed m ore t han t wo
weeks aft er t he close of discovery," Order of August 2, 1982, appears t o conflict wit h
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12( h) ( 2) which perm it s a defense of failure t o st at e a claim upon which relief can be
grant ed t o be raised by m ot ion as lat e as at t he t rial on t he m erit s. Since t he m ot ion was t im ely
under Rule 12( h) because it was pleaded in t he answer, it s considerat ion by t he dist rict court
m ight have avoided t he ent ire cont roversy regarding t he pret rial proceedings and t he t wo
appeals t o t his court , and could have given t he part ies a disposit ion on t he m erit s.5
37
Cert ainly, t he defense t hat t he plaint iffs' claim m ust fail because it has not been brought
wit hin t he one year lim it at ion provision of t he policy is, on it s face, com pelling. See Schreiber v.
Pennsylvania Lum berm an's Mut ual I ns. Co., 498 Pa. 21, 444 A.2d 647 ( 1982) . I n t heir com plaint
plaint iffs m ade no allegat ion t hat would avoid t his facial unt im eliness by invoking Pennsylvania's
law of waiver of t he t im e lim it set fort h in an insurance policy. See Com m onwealt h v.
Transam erica I ns. Co., 462 Pa. 268, 341 A.2d 74 ( 1975) . Moreover, plaint iffs filed no answer t o
t he m ot ion t o dism iss. For t he purpose of evaluat ing t he facial validit y of t he claim or defense,
we cannot rely on t he vague and nonspecific st at em ent s in plaint iffs' pret rial m em orandum t hat
t hey would produce wit nesses t o show t hat defendant led t hem t o believe t hey would not be
bar r ed fr om filing an act ion on t he claim m ore t han 12 m ont hs from t he dat e of t he fire. While
we express no opinion on whet her sum m ary j udgm ent or dism issal would have been warrant ed
on t his gr ound, t he exist ence of a pr im a facie defense is a fact or t o be w eighed along w it h t he
foregoing fact ors.
III.
Conclusion
38
The above fact ors should be weighed by t he dist rict court s in order t o assure t hat t he
"ext rem e" sanct ion of dism issal or default is reserved for t he inst ances in which it is j ust ly
m erit ed. I n t his case, alt hough t here was no co nt um acious behavior, t he pat t ern of dilat ory
behavior is com pounded by t he plaint iffs' failure t o file any answers t o int errogat ories, defendant
was com pelled t o file it s pret rial st at em ent wit hout such answers and wit hout seeing plaint iffs'
pret rial st at em ent , and t here is a prim a facie defense t o t he claim . Under t hese circum st ances,
alt hough we m ight not have reached t he sam e result as did t his dist rict court j udge, we cannot
say t hat t he dist rict court abused it s discret ion in ordering t he dism issal. Therefore, we will
affirm t he j udgm ent of t he dist rict court .
*
Hon. John W. Bissell, Unit ed St at es Dist r ict Cour t for t he Dist r ict of New Jer sey , sit t ing by designat ion
1
We believ e it im por t ant t o point out t hat w e hav e not hesit at ed t o affir m t he dist r ict cour t 's im posit ion of
sanct ions, including dism issals in appr opr iat e cases, cf. Unit ed St at es v . $55,518.05 in U.S. Cur r ency , 728
F.2d 192 ( 3d Cir .1984) ( default j udgm ent ) ( in w hich Judge Gar t h dissent ed on t he gr ound t hat t he disput e
Page 10 of 11
w as pr em at ur ely ended w it hout being r ev iew ed on t he m er it s) , alt hough under our pr ocedur es t hat is
oft en done by j udgm ent or der affir m ance
2
I n t w o of t hese cases, t his one and Scar bor ough v . Eubank s, also decided t oday , 747 F.2d 871 ( 3d
Cir . 1984) , t he dist r ict cour t dism issed t he com plaint , and in t he t hir d, t he cour t ent er ed a default
j udgm ent against Ret os' client , Miller v. Blow er , No. 82- 0757 ( W.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 1983) , v acat ed and
r em anded, 732 F. 2d 146 ( 3d Cir . 1984) ( unr epor t ed) . The four t h case, Unit ed St at es v . Golna, No. 81- 179
( W. D. Pa. ) aff'd, 714 F. 2d 125 ( 3d Cir . 1983) ( unr epor t ed) , w as not appealed on t he basis of any sanct ions
im posed by t he dist r ict cour t
3
This issue is pr esent ly pending befor e t his cour t in Eash v . Riggins Tr uck ing, I nc. , No. 83- 5664 ( or der for
in banc consider at ion filed Oct . 11, 1984)
4
I t w as a non sequit ur for plaint iff t o hav e ar gued in his br ief on alt er nat iv e sanct ions filed w it h t he dist r ict
cour t t hat since w e specifically assessed t he cost s of t he appeal against him per sonally , w e alr eady r uled
on t he sanct ions t o be applied. I f so, t her e w ould hav e been no basis for us t o hav e r em anded for
pr ecisely t his pur pose
5
I n t his connect ion w e not e t he com m endable pr ocedur e follow ed by Judge Gr ady of t he U.S. Dist r ict Cour t
for t he Nor t her n Dist r ict of I llinois, w ho has found t hat at t ent ion t o som e of t he legal issues dur ing a
discov er y confer ence called under Rule 26( f) has subst ant ially r educed t he need for discov er y . See Gr ady ,
Finding Our Way Thr ough t he Discov er y Jungle, 21 The Judges' Jour nal 4, 42- 43 ( 1982) .
CC | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG
Page 11 of 11
747 F.2d 8 63
40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 313
Lefteri POULIS and Athena Poulis, his wife, Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.
No. 83 -560 0 .
U n ite d State s Co u rt o f Ap p e als , Th ird Circu it.
Argued April 3, 1984.
Decided N ov. 5, 1984.
George Retos, Jr. (Argued), Retos, Held & Associates, Washington, Pa., for appellants.
Paul K. Geer (Argued), Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before GIBBONS, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges, and BISSELL, District Judge * .
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

1
This appeal, as well as another decided today involving the same attorney and district court judge,
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, is brought from a final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice
due to counsel's failure to meet court- imposed deadlines and other procedural requisites.
I.
Background
Lefteri and Athena Poulis filed suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty Com pany (State Farm) in
November 1981, in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, to recover under an
insurance policy after fire damaged their home. State Farm removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania based on diversity of citizenship. In its answer, it denied
liability, asserting that plaintiffs had intentionally caused the fire, had concealed and misrepresented
information, and had not filed their action in time.
On March 12, 1982, the district court ordered that discovery would close J une 14, 1982; that plaintiffs' pre-
trial statement would be due J uly 5; and that defendant's statement would be due J uly 26. A pre-trial
conference was set for August 13. The docket reveals no action by plaintiffs seeking discovery. On April 15,
State Farm filed notice of service of interrogatories on plaintiffs. No answers to these interrogatories were or
have ever been filed, and plaintiffs did not file their pre-trial statem ent by J uly 5 as required. Therefore
defendant filed its pre-trial statement first, on J uly 28, together with a motion to compel answers to
interrogatories. A member of the district judge's staff advised plaintiffs' counsel, George Retos, J r., that the
statement was overdue and Ret os promised to submit a statement by the next day. He neither did so nor
requested any extension. On August 5 the district court, sua sponte, dismissed the case with prejudice for
plaintiffs' failure to comply with the orders to file the pre-trial statem ent .
Retos filed a pre-trial statement on August 9, together with a motion under Rule 60 (b) to reconsider and set
aside the dismissal, alleging that an illness prevented him from working between J uly 6 through J uly 17; that
other attorneys could not have taken over because only Retos spoke Greek and could communicate with
plaintiff Lefteri Poulis; that Retos' pregnant wife went into false labor on J uly 29 and 30 , and that he had
"inadvertently set aside the required work for the instant case on J uly 29, 1982, due to his concern for his wife"
and was "render[ed] unable to prepare the necessary Pre-Trial Statement;" that on his return to work other
tasks had backlogged; and that although he had dictated a statement on August 4, it had been mailed on August
6 when it was typed and ready.
The district court denied reconsideration. On appeal, this court vacated the order of dismissal. Poulis v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 714 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.1983) (Poulis I ) (per curiam). We noted there was "no
allegation that plaintiffs, as distinguished from their counsel, were in any way responsible for the failure to
comply with the court's order." We recognized that in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2278, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), a dismissal was upheld where plaintiffs had acted in
"flagrant bad faith" and counsel "had behaved with 'callous disregard' of [his] responsibilities," id. at 643, 96
S.Ct. at 2781, but observed that "[t]he case at hand is not as extreme."
We pointed out that in an earlier opinion, Donnelly v. J ohns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d
Cir.1982), we had stated that "dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those cases where there
is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff." However, because Retos' excuses failed to
account for many days on which a pre-trial statement could have been filed, we observed that some sanction
was "amply justified." Accordingly, we vacated the dismissal and remanded to permit the district court to
consider alternatives to dismissal, stating, "Alternatives are particularly appropriate when the plaintiff has not
personally contributed to the delinquency."
On remand, the district court ordered the parties to file briefs on appropriate alternative sanctions. Plaintiffs'
brief, filed four days late, stated that such sanctions would be costs, attorneys' fees, and monetary penalties
imposed on him, but argued that "[s]ince the Third Circuit has specifically assessed the costs of the appeal in
this matter against plaintiffs' counsel personally, it has ruled on the sanctions which are to be applied in the
instant matter [and] alternative sanctions are now inappropriate." App. at 10-11.
In its brief State Farm took a more rea sonable position. It noted that "[i]n this case the defendant has been
more prejudiced by plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories then [sic] by its counsel's failure to file the Pre-
Trial Statement on time." App. at 16. State Farm urged the court to reopen discovery so that it could "have the
opportunity to examine plaintiffs' Answers to Interrogatories, conduct further investigation if necessary, and
depose the plaintiffs or other witnesses known to plaintiffs if such action is deemed necessary and
appropriate." App. at 15. State Farm suggested, "If discovery is reopened, State Farm believes there would be
no need to utilize the somewhat harsh remedy of limiting or restricting plaintiffs' witnesses at trial." App. at 16
(emphasis added). In light of t his court's order, State Farm requested an award of $750 .0 0 in attorneys' fees
which it incurred because of the dismissal and appeal, and sought a prospective limitation on interest due
should it ultimately be held liable on plaintiffs' claim.
Significa ntly, in its brief State Farm further stated, "State Farm strongly believes that the most expeditious
manner of disposing of this case can be provided by ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which was
filed on J uly 7, 1982," approximately three weeks following the close of discovery and which was denied by the
district court because of its policy not to consider motions to dismiss filed more than two weeks after the close
of discovery. App. at 16.
10
Notwithstanding the defendant's submission, the district court reinstated its sua sponte sanction of
dismissal, stating that there was no appropriate alternative:
11
There are no costs which can be charged to plaintiffs' counsel at this point. Further, this was not a situation
in which defense counsel was forced to make an unnecessary trip to court because of plaintiffs' counsel's failure
to appear. The defendant has only been required to incur fees in an amount that would have been incurred if
the case normally proceeded to this point. Thus, this is not an appropriate case for attorney's fees. Finally, the
court finds no authority for levying a fine against plaintiffs' counsel as a penalty. Rather than imposing fines
and costs of [sic] other sanctions prior to dismissal, plaintiffs' counsel was afforded many opportunities to cure
the problems, but he has failed to do so. Sanctions not being appropriate, the court has no alternative but
dismissal to motivate plaintiff's counsel to comply with deadlines.
12
App. at 3-4 (footnotes and citation omitted). The district court intimated its displeasure with the remand in
Poulis I but it was unequivocal in its disagreement with the remand in a similar case from another district,
Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir.1982). The district court stated: "J udge Garth's
dissent in Titus, indicates that deliberate, dilatory action is a basis for dismissal, even under Donnelly, and
further indicates that the Circuit Court should only reverse such a decision for abuse of discretion.... [T]his
Court finds J udge Garth's dissent persuasive and adopts his dissent, and the cases cited therein, as further
support for this decision." App. at 5 (emphasis added).
13
We treat this extraordinary statement at the outset. Whatever may be the personal views of the district court
as to the merits vel non of a decision of this court, the district court is not free to "adopt" the dissent. This court
is strict in its adherence to the precedent of its earlier opinions. Our own Internal Operating Procedures are
explicit and provide,
14
It is the tradition of this court that reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no
subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to
overrule a published opinion of this court.
15
Internal Operating Procedures of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Chapter 8.C. If the judges of this
court are bound by earlier panels, a fortiori district court judges are similarly bound. Recognition of the
hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary requires no less.
16
Moreover the reported decisions of this court over the past two years evidence the consistency of this court's
rulings emphasizing the extreme nature of a dismissal with prejudice or default judgment . See Hritz v. Woma
Corp., 732 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir.1984); In re MacMeekin, 722 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.1983); Madesky v. Campbell, 70 5
F.2d 70 3 (3d Cir.1983); Gross v. Stereo Component Systems, Inc., 70 0 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.1983); Titus v.
Mercedez Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir.1982); Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653
(3d Cir.1982); Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.1982); Donnelly v. J ohns-Manville Sales Corp., 677
F.2d 339 (3d Cir.1982).1
17
We recognize that recent literature exhorting the district judges to move litigation expeditiously by taking
firm control and the 1983 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their numerous references
to sanctions may have contributed to premature dismissals or defaults. Although sanctions are a necessary part
of any court system, we are concerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of dismissal as
a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which
the meritorious claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue. It does not further the
goal of a court system, that of delivering evenhanded justice to litigants, to suggest, as did the district court
here, that the plaintiffs would have a remedy by suing their counsel for malpractice, App. at 5, since this would
only multiply rather than dispose of litigation.
18
We reiterate what we have said on numerous occasions: that dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic
sanctions, termed "extreme" by the Supreme Court, National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781,
and are to be reserved for comparable cases.
II.
Analysis
19
In exercising our appellate function to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in
dismissing, or refusing to lift a default, we will be guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the
following factors, which have been enumerated in the earlier cases, and whether the record supports its
findings: (1) the extent of the party 's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or
defense.
20
We turn to apply these factors in the circumstances of this case.
21
1. The extent of the party's personal responsibility.
22
There has been no suggestion by any party or by the district court that the Poulis plaintiffs are personally
responsible for the late pretrial statement, which was the basis for the dismissal. Indeed, Retos has
acknowledged the delays were his responsibility and assigned as the reason his illness from J uly 6 through 17
and the subsequent false labor of his wife on J uly 29 and 30 .
23
This is therefore unlike the National Hockey League case where the Supreme Court upheld the "extreme
sanction of dismissal" after noting that there had been "flagrant bad faith" on the part of the plaintiffs as well as
"callous disregard" by their counsel of their responsibilities. 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781. However, the
Poulis' lack of responsibility for their counsel's dilatory conduct is not dispositive, because a client cannot
always avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of its counsel. See Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S.
626, 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390 , 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962).
24
2. Prejudice to the adversary.
25
As the district court stated, there has been prejudice to the defendant by the plaintiffs' counsel's conduct.
The interrogatories were never answered nor were objections filed; defense counsel was obliged to file a motion
to compel answers, and was obliged to file its pretrial statement without the opportunity to review plaintiffs'
pretrial statem ent which was due to be filed first. App. at 4. The court's finding that "defendant encountered
lack of cooperation from the plaintiff in areas where the plaintiff should cooperate under the spirit of the
federal procedural rules," id., is supported by the record.
26
3. A history of dilatoriness.
27
As noted above, this litigation has been characterized by a consistent delay by plaintiffs' counsel. Unlike the
Donnelly case, for example, where there was only one failure to comply in a timely manner, i.e. in obtaining
local counsel, in this case there has been a pattern of dilatoriness. Time limits imposed by the rules and the
court serve an important purpose for the expeditious processing of litigation. If compliance is not feasible, a
timely request for an extension should be made to the court. A history by counsel of ignoring these time limits
is intolerable.
28
4. Whether the attorney's conduct was willful or in bad faith.
29
Although the district court concluded that "plaintiffs' counsel's conduct [was] of such a dilatory and
contumacious nature to require dismissal," App. at 5, there is nothing in the record to support the
"contumacious" finding. Nothing in the court's discussion preceding this conclusion is directed toward the
willfulness issue but only toward dilatoriness. There has been no suggestion or indication that counsel's illness
during J uly 1982 and his wife's late pregnancy and false labor at the end of that month did not occur as he
represented.
30
In the appellants' brief, counsel characterizes his conduct as "excusable neglect" and seeks to explain the
district court's characterization of his conduct as "deliberate" and "contumacious" as the result of a "personality
conflict" between counsel and the district judge. Appellants' brief at 8. He refers us to four recent appeals in
which he allegedly "clashed" with the same district judge.2 However, even in those cases in which we vacated
the dismissal, the record showed that counsel failed to comply with the rules and deadlines imposed by the
district court. Thus, while some disaffinity has apparently been engendered between the district judge and
counsel we see no basis to hold the district judge responsible. Nonetheless, as noted at the beginning of this
section, we also find no basis for terming counsel's conduct in this case "contumacious".
31
5. Alternative sanctions.
32
The district court concluded that it had "no alternative but dismissal" because no other san ctions were
appropriate. The district court stated that there was no authority for levying a fine against plaintiffs' counsel as
a penalty. See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 30 7 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888, 83
S.Ct. 187, 9 L.E d.2d 123 (1962).3 However, the court also stated that "there are no costs which can be charged
to plaintiffs' counsel at this point." This finding was errone ous. Defendant's counsel had asked the court to
impose as a sanction the $ 750 attorney fee which it had incurred in defending the appeal in Poulis I. The
district court apparently assumed that the costs of that appeal had already been charged to plaintiffs' counsel.
However, we had not assessed any attorney's fee as part of our imposition of appeal costs on plaintiffs' counsel
personally.4 The district court a lso could have imposed on plaintiffs' counsel the costs, including attorney's
fees, of preparing the motion to compel answers to interrogatories and the brief on alternative sanctions, all of
which were incurred because of the dilatoriness of plaintiffs' counsel.
33
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 1983 amendments, the district court is specifically
authorized to impose on an attorney those expenses, including attorneys' fees, caused by unjustified failure to
comply with discovery orders or pretrial orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(a)(4), 37(b), 37(d) and 37(g). See
also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927. The most direct and therefore preferable sanction for the pattern of attorney delay
such as that which the district court encountered in this case w ould be to impose the excess costs caused by
such conduct directly upon the attorney, with an order that such costs are not to be passed on to the client,
directly or indirectly. This would avoid compelling an innocent party to bear the brunt of its counsel's
dereliction. Dismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.
34
6. Meritoriousness of the claim.
35
In considering whether a claim or defense appears to be meritorious for this inquiry, we do not purport to
use summary judgment standards. A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the
pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense.
See United States v. $ 55,518.0 5 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d at
657; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d at 764.
36
In this case, the defendant suggested to the district court that the most expeditious way to process this
litigation was to rule on its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim as untimely because it was not brought within a
year of the loss, as required by the policy. The district court's denial of that motion because of its "policy ... not
to consider motions to dismiss filed more than two weeks after the close of discovery," Order of August 2, 1982,
appears to conflict with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2) which permits a defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted to be raised by motion as late as at the trial on the merits. Since the motion was timely
under Rule 12(h) because it was pleaded in the answer, its consideration by the district court might have
avoided the entire controversy regarding the pretrial proceedings and the two appeals to this court, and could
have given the parties a disposition on the m erits.5
37
Certainly, the defense that the plaintiffs' claim must fail because it has not been brought within the one year
limitation provision of the policy is, on its face, compelling. See Schreiber v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's
Mutual Ins. Co., 498 Pa. 21, 444 A.2d 647 (1982). In their complaint plaintiffs made no allegation that would
avoid this facial untimeliness by invoking Pennsylvania's law of waiver of the time limit set forth in an
insurance policy. See Commonwealth v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 462 Pa. 268, 341 A.2d 74 (1975). Moreover,
plaintiffs filed no answer to the motion to dismiss. For the purpose of evaluating the facial validity of the claim
or defense, we cannot rely on the vague and nonspecific statements in plaintiffs' pretrial memorandum that
they would produce witnesses to show that defendant led them to believe they would not be barred from filing
an action on the claim more than 12 months from the date of the fire. While we express no opinion on whether
summary judgment or dismissal would have been warranted on this ground, the existence of a prima facie
defense is a factor to be weighed along with the foregoing factors.
III.
Conclusion
38
The above factors should be weighed by the district courts in order to assure that the "extreme" sanction of
dismissal or default is reserved for the instances in which it is justly merited. In this case, although there was
no contumacious behavior, the pattern of dilatory behavior is compounded by the plaintiffs' failure to file any
answers to interrogatories, defendant was compelled to file its pretrial statement without such answers and
without seeing plaintiffs' pretrial statement, and there is a prima facie defense to the claim. Under these
circumstances, although we might not have reached the same result as did this district court judge, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal. Therefore, we will affirm the
judgment of the district court.
*
H on . J oh n W. Bissell, Un ited States District Court for th e District of New J ersey, sittin g by design ation
We believe it im portan t to poin t out th at we h ave n ot h esitated to affirm th e district court's im position of san ction s,
in cludin g dism issals in appropriate cases, cf. Un ited States v. $ 55,518 .0 5 in U.S. Curren cy, 728 F.2d 192 (3d Cir.198 4)
(default judgm en t) (in wh ich J udge Garth dissen ted on th e groun d th at th e dispute was prem aturely en ded with out bein g
reviewed on th e m erits), alth ough un der our procedures that is often don e by judgm en t order affirm an ce
2
In two of th ese cases, th is on e an d Scarborough v. Euban ks, also decided today, 747 F.2d 8 71 (3d Cir.198 4), the district
court dism issed th e com plain t, an d in th e th ird, the court en tered a default judgm en t again st Retos' clien t, Miller v.
Blower, No. 8 2-0 757 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 198 3), vacated an d rem an ded, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.198 4) (un reported). Th e fourth
case, Un ited States v. Goln a, No. 8 1 -179 (W.D.Pa.) aff'd, 714 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.198 3) (un reported), was n ot appealed on th e
basis of an y san ction s im posed by th e distr ict court
This issue is presen tly pen din g before this court in Eash v. Riggin s Truckin g, In c., No. 8 3 -5664 (or der for in ban c
con sider ation filed Oct. 11, 198 4)
It was a n on sequitur for plain tiff to have argued in his brief on altern ative san ction s filed with the district court that sin ce
we specifically assessed th e costs of th e appeal again st h im person ally, we already ruled on th e san ction s to be applied. If
so, th ere would h ave been n o basis for us to h ave rem an ded for precisely th is purpose
In this con n ection we n ote th e com m en dable procedure followed by J udge Grady of th e U.S. District Court for th e
North ern District of Illin ois, wh o h as foun d th at atten tion to som e of th e legal issues durin g a discovery con feren ce called
un der Rule 26(f) h as substan tially reduced the n eed for discovery. See Grady, Fin din g Our Way Through the Discovery
J un gle, 21 The J udges' J ourn al 4, 42 -4 3 (19 8 2)
CC | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-1499
TERESA NEUMEYER; LARRY NEUMEYER,

Appellants
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, in his official capacity as

Secretary of the PA DOC; KENNETH KYLER, in
his official capacity as Superintendent of SCI at Huntingdon
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02152)
District Judge: Hon. James M. Munley
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 11, 2005
Before: SLOVITER and McKEE, Circuit Judges,

and FULLAM,* District Judge
(Filed: August 25, 2005)
*
Hon. John P. Fullam, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
Teresa Neumeyer, Pro Se
Larry Neumeyer, Pro Se
P.O. Box 172
Chesaning, Michigan 48616
Appellants Pro Se
Gerald J. Pappert
Attorney General
Francis R. Filipi
Senior Deputy Attorney General
Calvin R. Koons
Senior Deputy Attorney General
John G. Knorr, III
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Appellate Litigation Section
Office of Attorney General
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Attorneys for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Acting pro se, Plaintiffs/Appellants Teresa and Larry

Neumeyer brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983
seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendants/Appellees
Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, and Kenneth Kyler, the Superintendent of the State
Correctional Institute at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (hereafter
prison officials), that the practice of subjecting prison visitors
vehicles to random searches violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
rejected this claim as a matter of law and thus entered summary
judgment in favor of Defendants. Neumeyer v. Beard, 301 F.
Supp. 2d 349 (M.D. Pa. 2004). The Neumeyers appeal.1
I.
Teresa Neumeyers father (prisoner) is a prisoner

incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon
(SCIH), an institution managed by the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (DOC). Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp.
2d at 350. Mr. and Ms. Neumeyer, who are citizens of
Michigan, make fairly regular trips to visit the prisoner at the
SCIH.
The SCIH maintains a parking lot for use by visitors such

as the Neumeyers while they are visiting the facility. Notably,
some inmates have outside work details and such inmates may
have access to visitors vehicles parked at the prison. 301 F.
Supp. 2d at 353.
Prison officials have posted large signs at all

entranceways to the prison and immediately in front of the
visitors parking lot. In part, these signs read:
THIS IS A STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION.

ALL PERSONS, VEHICLES AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY ENTERING OR BROUGHT ON THESE
GROUNDS ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH. DRUG
DETECTION DOGS AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES
MAY BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.
Kyler Decla. 8. The signs further inform visitors that anyone

caught bringing prohibited items onto the SCIHs property will
be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Under SCIH/DOC policy, prison visitor vehicles parked

on facility grounds are subject to random searches after the
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1331; this court has jurisdiction over the District Courts final order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
owner or operator signs a pre-printed Consent To Search
Vehicle form. 301 F .Supp. 2d at 350. If an individual refuses
to sign this form, SCIH/DOC officials simply refuse the would-
be visitor entry to the prison, ask the visitor to leave the
premises, and do not pursue further action. As found by the
District Court: If a prison visitor refuses to provide written
consent permitting SCIH corrections officers to search his or her
vehicle, then the visitor will not be allowed to enter the prison to
visit any prisoner on that day. Id. Compare with Spear v.
Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1995) (Spear [a visitor to
the prison] claims that [prison] officials told her that she could
either consent to the search, or that she would be detained while
they secured a warrant and then she would be forcibly searched
if necessary.). If, however, the search proceeds and the
SCIH/DOC officials uncover contraband or evidence of
illegality, they will notify the Pennsylvania State Police.
The SCIH/DOC policy does not require corrections

officers to possess a search warrant, probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion before they may seek to search a vehicle
parked on prison grounds. In addition, the SCIH/DOC officials
do not seek permission to search the vehicle of every visitor who
parks in the lot. As found by the District Court, [t]here are no
written standards as to how the searches are to be conducted; in
general, they are conducted randomly as time and complement
permit. Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
The Neumeyers have visited the prisoner at the SCIH on

approximately ten occasions. On May 28, 2001, and again on
May 27, 2002, several SCIH/DOC correctional officers searched
the Neumeyers vehicle. 301 F. Supp. 2d at 350. Prior to these
searches, Ms. Neumeyer signed the written consent form. Id.
According to evidence submitted by the Neumeyers, once the
SCIH/DOC officers select a vehicle for inspection and obtain the
requisite signature, they require the operator and any passengers
to exit the vehicle and open passenger compartments and the
trunk for inspection.
The record shows that the two searches of the

Neumeyers automobile did not uncover any contraband or
evidence of illegal activity. Indeed, there does not exist any
information or allegations in any SCIH/DOC records or reports
indicating that the Neumeyers have brought or attempted to
bring unlawful contraband into the SCIH or possessed the
same in their vehicle.
On November 26, 2002, the Neumeyers filed a Complaint

seeking a declaratory judgment and an order enjoining further
searches of their vehicle. The Complaint contended that,
inasmuch as the Neumeyers planned to continue to visit their
incarcerated relative at the SCIH, they possessed a reasonable
fear that SCIH/DOC officials would continue to infringe upon
their rights in the future absent judicial intervention. See
generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983). The Complaint did not seek damages.
Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The District Court adopted the report and
recommendation of a magistrate judge, filed a Memorandum
Opinion, and entered summary judgment in favor of the prison
officials. Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 353. This appeal
followed.
II.
This court reviews the District Courts grant of summary

judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the District
Court. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co.,
293 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is
appropriate where there are no genuine issues as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment, however,
must not be granted where there is a genuine dispute about a
material fact, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Fasold v.
Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Here, there are
no disputed issues of material fact and resolution of this matter
turns solely on interpretations of law.
III.
Section 1983, the federal civil rights statute here at issue,

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but [rather] a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). To establish liability
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must show that the
defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiffs
federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the
complained of injury. Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d
Cir. 2005). Here, the Neumeyers Complaint averred that the
prison officials violated their rights under the Fourth
Amendment as made applicable to state actors by operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). Specifically, the Neumeyers Complaint
contended that the prison officials program has violated and
will continue to violate their constitutional rights because it
allows SCIH/DOC correctional officers to conduct vehicle
searches without any individualized suspicion.2
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV.
Typically, in order to be reasonable under the Fourth
2
The case at bar involves only vehicle searches; thus, we
need not address the question of whether and when the
suspicionless search of a prison visitors person would be
constitutional. See generally Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1277
(5th Cir.1985) (holding that Constitution requires correctional
officers to have reasonable suspicion before subjecting prison
visitors to strip search); Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th
Cir. 1982) ([W]e conclude that the Constitution mandates that a
reasonable suspicion standard govern strip searches of visitors to
penal institutions.); Deserly v. Mont. Dept of Corr., 995 P.2d
972, 978 (Mont. 2000) (While prison visitors can be subjected to
some searches, such as pat-downs or metal detector sweeps, merely
as a condition of visitation, absent any suspicion, more intrusive
searches, such as strip searches, require more.).
Amendment, a search must be supported by a warrant, unless the
search is supportable under one or more of the specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement. United States v. Brightwell, 563 F.2d 569, 574 (3d
Cir. 1977) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the
prison officials argue that the SCIH/DOC policy is supportable
under both the consent exception and the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement. We first consider whether
this case falls within the special needs exception.
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained

that [n]either a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed any
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable
component of [Fourth Amendment] reasonableness in every
circumstance. Natl Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). Rather:
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth

Amendment intrusion serves special government
needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the
individuals privacy expectations against the
Governments interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context.
Id. at 665-66 (emphasis added). In other words, there are

instances when a search furthers a special governmental need
beyond that of normal law enforcement such that the search,
although not supported by the typical quantum of individualized
suspicion, can nonetheless still be found constitutionally
reasonable. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995); Mich. Dept of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990). But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001) (finding unconstitutional state hospitals suspicionless
performance of diagnostic test to obtain evidence of pregnant
patients drug use and holding that states interest in using threat
of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using
cocaine did not qualify as special need); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that suspicionless
seizures at highway checkpoints, conducted for interdiction of
illegal drugs, was indistinguishable from [Indianapolis]
general interest in crime control and hence violative of Fourth
Amendment).
Because the government need not show probable cause or

even reasonable suspicion to support a search under the special
needs doctrine, the government must prove instead that its search
meets a general test of reasonableness. Under this standard,
the constitutionality of a particular search is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests beyond that of typical law enforcement. Wilcher v.
City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The ready applicability of the special needs doctrine to

the prison context is evident. As noted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:
The penal environment is fraught with serious

security dangers. Incidents in which inmates have
obtained drugs, weapons, and other contraband are
well-documented in case law and regularly receive
the attention of the news media. Within prison
walls, a central objective of prison administrators
is to safeguard institutional security. To effectuate
this goal prison officials are charged with the duty
to intercept and exclude by all reasonable means
all contraband smuggled into the facility.
Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982); see also
State v. Manghan, 313 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1973).
Given these concerns, we conclude that, considering the

relatively minor inconvenience of the searches, balanced against
the SCIH/DOC officials special need to maintain the security
and safety of the prison that rises beyond their general need to
enforce the law, the prison officials practice of engaging in
suspicionless searches of prison visitors vehicles is valid under
the special needs doctrine. See Spear, 71 F.3d at 632-33 ([W]e
have made it clear that a government official does not need
probable cause to conduct every search and that a prison visitor
search falls into a special category.); Romo v. Champion, 46
F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1995) (The public interest in
keeping drugs out of prisons and maintaining prison security is
substantial . . . . The stop of plaintiffs vehicle therefore did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.); Commonwealth v. Dugger,
486 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1985) (A prison setting involves unique
concerns and security risks, thereby necessitating more leeway in
allowing searches than might be found in a non-penal
environment.); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d
496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding airport searches reasonable
and hence constitutional).
The Neumeyers argue that the searches at issue cannot

fall under the special needs doctrine due to the fact that
SCIH/DOC officials notify the police if they uncover
contraband. Thus, argue the Neumeyers, the purpose of the
searches is to further the goals of ordinary law enforcement. We
reject this argument. The mere fact that a search may result in
arrest and criminal prosecution, and thus have the ancillary
effect of furthering ordinary law enforcement concerns, does not
negate the applicability of the special needs doctrine. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless search programs
even when the program at-issue results in arrests. See Sitz, 496
U.S. at 447. We thus decline to hold unconstitutional the vehicle
search program simply because SCIH/DOC officials report any
uncovered illegality to the police. Cf. United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (Of course, routine airport
screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and
apprehension of law violators. This practical consequence does
not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening
process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional.).
One final point bears mention. The record shows that

SCIH officials employ no written standards as to which vehicles
are to be searched or how the searches are to be conducted;
rather, the DOC/SCIH correctional officers conduct the searches
randomly as time and complement permit. 301 F. Supp. 2d at
350. The Neumeyers thus complain that the vehicle-search
program vests too much discretion in the hands of the officers in
the field and consequently is not reasonable. See generally
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (holding
unconstitutional Delawares random automobile stop and
detention program in part because it vested ultimate decision of
what vehicles to stop in the unbridled discretion of law
enforcement officials . . . in the field).
Although the lack of standards or constraining

mechanisms in the SCIH/DOC program raises the specter of
arbitrariness, we find the Neumeyers argument ultimately
unavailing. As Professor LaFave has commented:
If not all visitors to a jail or prison are subjected to

screening . . . then there arises the potential for
arbitrariness. . . . While an inspection system
extended to all visitors is consequently not
accusatory in nature, a contributing factor to
finding it reasonable, it does not follow that a more
selective scheme is unreasonable. If personnel or
other limitations make a screening of all visitors
impracticable, it is certainly proper to conduct
searches at random, but it would be otherwise if
certain individuals were singled out upon an
improper basis.
5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment 10.7(b), at 326 (4th ed. 2004).
The Neumeyers have not argued, and the record contains

no evidence, that SCIH/DOC officers have selected search
targets on an improper basis (such as race). Stated otherwise,
although the SCIH/DOC search program certainly has more
potential for abuse than, for instance, a program whereby all
vehicles entering the prison were searched, there is no evidence
that SCIH/DOC officers have in fact abused the program. In
light of the substantial deference this court gives to prison
officials, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987), we
10
decline to hold the SCIH/DOC vehicle-search program
unreasonable simply because it vests the decision of which
vehicles are to be searched in the random discretion of the
officers in the field.
IV.
In sum, we hold that the SCIH/DOC policy of subjecting

prison visitors vehicles to random searches is reasonable,
supportable as a special needs search, and hence constitutional
despite the lack of individualized suspicion. We will thus affirm
the District Courts entry of summary judgment.3
3
In light of our decision, we need not reach the prison
officials alternate argument that the SCIH/DOC policy is
supportable under the consent exception to the warrant
requirement.
11
Police Misconduct and Civil Rights - Findlaw for the Public - http://public.findlaw.com/civil-rights/more-civil-rights-topics/police-mis.
Fin dLa w | For t h e Pu blic | For Sm a ll Bu sin e ss | For Le ga l Pr ofe ssion a ls | Fin d a La w ye r Search Public
Overview Race Gender Disabilit y Em ploym ent Housing Enforcem ent More Laws and
Discrim inat ion Discrim inat ion Discrim inat ion Discrim inat ion Discrim inat ion Topics Resources
Br ow se Civil Righ t s FindLaw > Public > Civil Right s > More Topics
My current locat ion: La n ca st e r , PA | Ch a n ge loca t ion
Ove r vie w
Ra ce D iscr im in a t ion
Ge n de r D iscr im in a t ion Fe a t u r e d At t or n e ys
D isa bilit y
D iscr im in a t ion Fin dLa w La w ye r D ir e ct or y
Em ploym e n t Search FindLaw's database of 1,000,000 lawyers to find attorneys in your area.
D iscr im in a t ion
H ou sin g D iscr im in a t ion
En for ce m e n t
M or e Topics
Police Misconduct and Civil Rights
Age D iscr im in a t ion
Am e r ica n I n dia n s & Police officers generally have broad powers to carry out their duties. The Constitution and
Ala sk a N a t ive s other laws, however, place limits on how far police can go in trying to enforce the law. As
Cit ize n s a n d t h e
the videotaped beating of motorist Rodney King, in Los Angeles and several recent cases in
Police
Civil Libe r t ie s New York have illustrated, police officers sometimes go too far, violating the rights of
Cr e dit / Le n din g citizens. When this happens, the victim of the misconduct may have recourse through
D iscr im in a t ion federal and state laws. A primary purpose of the nation's civil rights laws is to protect
Cr im in a l Civil Righ t s citizens from abuses by government, including police misconduct. Civil rights laws allow
Viola t ion s
D isa st e r Vict im s a n d
attorney fees and compensatory and punitive damages as incentives for injured parties to
Civil Righ t s enforce their rights.
Edu ca t ion a n d
D iscr im in a t ion Overcoming Immunity
Se x u a l Or ie n t a t ion
D iscr im in a t ion Being stopped and questioned by police in connection with a crime is an unsettling
H a t e Cr im e s
experience for most anyone. As long as the officer is performing his job properly, however,
H I V / AI D S Pa t ie n t s
I m m igr a n t s
there is no violation of a suspect's rights. In fact, police are immune from suit for the
I n st it u t ion a lize d performance of their jobs unless willful, unreasonable conduct is demonstrated. Mere
Pe r son s negligence, the failure to exercise due care, is not enough to create liability. Immunity
M e dica l Pa t ie n t s therefore means that in the typical police-suspect interaction, the suspect cannot sue the
N a t ion a l Or igin
police. Civil rights remedies come into play for willful police conduct that violates an
Police M iscon du ct
individual's constitutional rights.
Pu blic
Accom m oda t ion s Civil Rights Laws and Police Misconduct
Righ t s
Re ligiou s A statute known as Section 1983 is the primary civil rights law victims of police
D iscr im in a t ion misconduct rely upon. This law was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
Se x u a l H a r a ssm e n t
La w s a n d Re sou r ce s
1871, which was intended to curb oppressive conduct by government and private
individuals participating in vigilante groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan. It is now called
Section 1983 because that is where the law has been published, within Title 42, of the
Fin d A La w ye r
United States Code. Section 1983 makes it unlawful for anyone acting under the authority

Se le ct t ype of pr a ct ice :
of state law to deprive another person of his or her rights under the Constitution or federal
Civil Rights
law. The most common claims brought against police officers are false arrest (or false
En t e r Cit y or Zip: imprisonment), malicious prosecution, and use of excessive or unreasonable force.
Lancaster
Pennsylvania Page 1 of 3 Next Page
Fin d
Br ow se Lawyers by St at e
M or e Spon sor e d Se r vice s
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP Page 14 of 16 04.07.2007
1
Police Misconduct and Civil Rights - Findlaw for the Public - http://public.findlaw.com/civil-rights/more-civil-rights-topics/police-mis..
Ove r vie w
D isa bilit y
En for ce m e n t
M or e Topics
Am e r ica n I n dia n s & False Arrest
Ala sk a N a t ive s The claim that is most often asserted against police is false arrest. Persons bringing this
claim assert that police violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
Police
Civil Libe r t ie s seizure. If the officer had probable cause to believe the individual had committed a crime,
Cr e dit / Le n din g the arrest is reasonable and the Fourth Amendment has not been violated. Police can arrest
D iscr im in a t ion without a warrant for a felony or misdemeanor committed in their presence. (Some states
Cr im in a l Civil Righ t s also allow warrantless arrests for misdemeanor domestic assaults not committed in the
Viola t ion s
officer's presence.) Even if the information the officer relied upon later turns out to be false,
Civil Righ t s the officer is not liable if he believed it was accurate at the time of the arrest. To prevail on
Edu ca t ion a n d a false arrest claim, the victim must show that the arresting officer lacked probable cause,
D iscr im in a t ion that is, facts sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been
Se x u a l Or ie n t a t ion committed.
H a t e Cr im e s
Malicious Prosecution
I m m igr a n t s A malicious prosecution claim asserts that the officer wrongly deprived the victim of the
I n st it u t ion a lize d Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty. To win this type of claim, the victim must show
Pe r son s four things: 1) the defendant police officer commenced a criminal proceeding; 2) the
M e dica l Pa t ie n t s proceeding ended in the victim's favor (that is, no conviction); 3) there was no probable
cause; and 4) the proceeding was brought with malice toward the victim. As with false
Police M iscon du ct arrest, this claim will fail if the officer had probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings.
Pu blic
Accom m oda t ion s Excessive Force
Righ t s Excessive force claims receive the most publicity, perhaps because the results of excessive
Re ligiou s
force seem the most outrageous, involving serious physical injury or death. Whether the
officer's use of force was reasonable depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances.
La w s a n d Re sou r ce s The officer's intentions or motivations are not controlling. If the amount of force was
reasonable, it doesn't matter that the officer's intentions were bad. But the reverse is also
Fin d A La w ye r true: if the officer had good intentions, but used unreasonable force, the excessive force
claim will not be dismissed.

Se le ct t ype of pr a ct ice :
Civil Rights
En t e r Cit y or Zip: Page 2 of 3 Prev Page Next Page
Lancaster
Pennsylvania M or e Spon sor e d Se r vice s
Fin d Wills, Divorce, I ncorporat ion & More: Fast and friendly service from LegalZoom , t he # 1 online legal docum ent service.
1
Police Misconduct and Civil Rights - Findlaw for the Public - http://public.findlaw.com/civil-rights/more-civil-rights-topics/police-mis...
Ove r vie w
D isa bilit y
En for ce m e n t
M or e Topics
Am e r ica n I n dia n s & Failure to Intervene
Ala sk a N a t ive s Officers have a duty to protect individuals from constitutional violations by fellow officers.
Therefore, an officer who witnesses a fellow officer violating an individual's constitutional
Police
Civil Libe r t ie s rights may be liable to the victim for failing to intervene.
Cr e dit / Le n din g
D iscr im in a t ion The Qualified Immunity Defense
Cr im in a l Civil Righ t s
Viola t ion s Defense attorneys representing a police officer for any of these claims will raise a defense
of qualified immunity. This defense exists to prevent the fear of legal prosecution from
Civil Righ t s
Edu ca t ion a n d
inhibiting a police officer from enforcing the law. The defense will defeat a claim against
D iscr im in a t ion the officer if the officer's conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional or
Se x u a l Or ie n t a t ion statutory right. In other words, the specific acts the officer prevented the individual from
D iscr im in a t ion engaging in must be legally protected, otherwise there is no civil rights violation. In order
H a t e Cr im e s
to win a civil rights claim, an individual bringing a police misconduct claim must prove that
I m m igr a n t s
the actions of the police exceeded reasonable bounds, infringed the victim's constitutional
I n st it u t ion a lize d rights, and produced some injury or damages to the victim.
Pe r son s
M e dica l Pa t ie n t s Police Misconduct: If You've Been Affected
D iscr im in a t ion Civil rights claims are an important part of our legal system, providing a balance between
Police M iscon du ct
Pu blic
the duty of law enforcement to uphold the laws, and the rights of individuals to be free from
Accom m oda t ion s police misconduct. Yet cases against police officers can be difficult. Officers may be
Righ t s immune from suit, even though an individual feels he or she was mistreated. Claims against
Re ligiou s police departments can also be expensive to bring because a lot of evidence must be
D iscr im in a t ion secured, including records, statements of police, statements of witnesses, and various other
La w s a n d Re sou r ce s
documentation, to prove the misconduct.
The evidence supporting your claim is the most important element in a police misconduct
Fin d A La w ye r
suit. If you feel you've been the victim of police misconduct, contact a Civil Rights

Se le ct t ype of pr a ct ice : Attorney promptly so that valuable evidence does not disappear. Take photographs of any
Civil Rights injuries or damage caused by the police, and set aside clothing or other objects that was
En t e r Cit y or Zip: torn or stained with blood from the incident. Try to get the names and addresses or
Lancaster telephone numbers of anyone who may have witnessed the incident. Also, write down
Pennsylvania exactly what happened as soon as you can, so that you don't forget important details.
Fin d
Page 3 of 3 Prev Page
!
"
#
# $%&'%&( )* & +,
-
# . &) !/ 0 /1 . !
! "# !$ %&&#'()*+ !, !- %&&#'()*+ !
..-/ 0 - - !1 -., . 2 (34) !
. 5%6417 " 48'4) ,
, 7 9 :, 0
, 7 9 :,
- 33426 5)"8 &+4 )14) 2&41 (6; !, !, "<=4&41 (6; >,

!, %? &+4 "()& "5 "88"? 642# "5 642)5%461 "(?&;, )%8%?26, "
!@! @ 33426 5)"8 &+4 )14) 2&41 (6; !, !, "<=4&41 (6;
>, !, %? &+4 "()& "5 "88"? 642# "5 642)5%461 "(?&;, )%8%?26,
" !@! !@
> 945")47 94<=, A466;, 2?1 "5582?,
/ (&+")7 A466;
3%?%"? 9 A , 7
+%# 233426 2#=# (# &" 14&4)8%?4 B+4&+4) &+4 1%#&)%<&

2&&")?4; 2336%41 &+4 3)"34) #&2?12)1 %? 2##4##%?* 2?1 1%#233)" %?*
2334662?&C#, %<+2)1 4'4)6%?*C#, 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# 2?1
B+4&+4) &+4 &)%26 <"()& 3)"34)6; 5"(?1 &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C#
+2?16%?* "5 &+%# 82&&4) B2# 5)44 5)"8 2?; %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<& "5
%?&4)4#& 334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# 2664*41 2 +"#& "5
<)%8%?26 "554?#4# 2*2%?#& &B" 3"6%<4 "55%<4)# %? <"??4<&%"? B%&+ &+4%)
&4#&%8"?; 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+ 2*2%?#& 2334662?&C# B%54, )#
4'4)6%?*, '45")4 2 D(); &+2& <"? %<&41 +4) "? <+2)*4# "5 )4#%#&%?*
2))4#& 5&4) 2 <2)45(6 )4 %4B "5 &+4 34)&%?4?& 62B 2# 2336%41 &" &+4
52<&# +4)4%?, B4 255%)8 &+4 1%#233)" 26 "5 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4
<)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# 2?1 2*)44 &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 1%#3"#%&%"?
"5 &+4 82&&4) B2# 5)44 5)"8 2?; %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<& "5 %?&4)4#&
4 3)452<4 "() )42#"?%?* B%&+ &+%# #(882); "5 &+4 )464 2?&
52<&# 2?1 3)"<41()26 +%#&"); ? 4<48'4) >, , )# 4'4)6%?* B4?&
&" &)%26 '45")4 2 D(); "? &+4 <+2)*4 "5 )4#%#&%?* 2))4#& )""34) ();
5%641 &+4 <+2)*4 2*2%?#& )# 4'4)6%?* 2?1 &4#&%5%41 2& &)%26 "6%<4
+%45 (&64) 26#" &4#&%5%41 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+ 2& &+4 &)%26,
<"?<4)?%?* )# 4'4)6%?*C# <"?1(<& "? 4')(2); !!, B+%<+ *2 4
)%#4 &" &+4 <)%8%?26 <+2)*4 "5 )4#%#&%?* 2))4#& +4 D(); 5"(?1 )#
4'4)6%?* *(%6&; 2# <+2)*41
! +4 )464 2?& 52<&# 5)"8 )# 4'4)6%?*C# 2))4#&, &)%26 2?1

<"? %<&%"?, )462&% 4 &" &+4 %?#&2?& 3)"<441%?*#, 2)4 2# 5"66"B#
)""34) (); 3(6641 )# 4'4)6%?*C# 4+%<64 " 4) &" &+4 #%14 "5 &+4
)"21 "? (6; , // )""34) (); 3)"<44141 &" *% 4 )# 4'4)6%?* 2
<%&2&%"? 5") 52%6%?* &" +2 4 2 26%1 )4*%#&)2&%"? 5") &+4 /$ "1*4
2? #+4 B2# 1)% %?* )# 4'4)6%?* #('#4E(4?&6; 52%641 &" 32; &+4
5%?4# 2?1 <"#&# 2##"<%2&41 B%&+ &+4 (6; , // <%&2&%"? (4 &"
&+%# "8%##%"?, &+4 55%<4 "5 &+4 %#&)%<& (#&%<4 %66%28 2%#+4)
%##(41 2 B2))2?& 5") )# 4'4)6%?*C# 2))4#& )""34) (); #&"3341
)# 4'4)6%?* "? 4')(2); !!, 5") &+4 3()3"#4 "5 #4) %?* &+4
B2))2?& +%45 (&64) 2##%#&41 )""34) (); 2& &+4 #<4?4 ? 4')(2);
!-, , )""34) (); 5%641 2 <+2)*4 "5 )4#%#&%?* 2))4#&F5? 2*2%?#&
)# 4'4)6%?* 5") +4) 56%*+& "? 4')(2); !!, , 2664*%?* &+2& )#
4'4)6%?* 645& &+4 #<4?4 %? 2 82??4) <)42&%?* 2 #('#&2?&%26 )%#= "5
'"1%6; %?D(); &" )""34) ();
? 2)<+ ! , , &+4 1%#&)%<& D(#&%<4 +42)1 &4#&%8"?; ';

)""34) (); 2?1 1454?#4 B%&?4##4# 2& 2 #(882); +42)%?* 5&4)
)4 %4B%?* &+4 4 %14?<4, &+4 1%#&)%<& D(#&%<4 5"(?1 3)"'2'64 <2(#4 &"
)4E(%)4 )# 4'4)6%?* &" #&2?1 &)%26 "? &+4 <+2)*4 "5 )4#%#&%?*
2))4#& ? 4<48'4) >, , )# 4'4)6%?* B2# &)%41 '45")4 2 D();,
B+%<+, 25&4) +42)%?* 266 &+4 4 %14?<4 3)4#4?&41 '; &+4 "88"?B426&+
2?1 &+4 1454?#4, )4&()?41 2 *(%6&; 4)1%<&
. ('#4E(4?& &" )# 4'4)6%?*C# &)%26 2?1 <"? %<&%"?,

2334662?&, )# 4'4)6%?*C# #3"(#4, 5%641 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&#
2*2%?#& )""34) (); 2?1 +%45 (&64), 2664*%?* 8%#<"?1(<& "? &+4 32)&
"5 &+4 "55%<4)# 2# )462&41 &" )# 4'4)6%?*C# &)%26 2?1 <"? %<&%"?
+4 2664*2&%"?# "5 8%#<"?1(<& %?<6(141 G 4)D();, 26#4 B42)%?*,
?#B")? 26#%5%<2&%"? &" (&+")%&%4#, 26#4 43")&# &" 2B
?5")<484?&, '#&)(<&%?* 18%?%#&)2&%"? "5 2B, 55%<%26 33)4##%"?,
2834)%?* B%&+ ('6%< 4<")1# 2?1 )%8%?26 "?#3%)2<; G 334662?&C#
9)%45 2& % 34<%5%<266;, &+4 2664*41 8%#<"?1(<& <4?&4)41 2)"(?1
1%#3(&41 &4#&%8"?; <"?<4)?%?* &+4 ")%4?&2&%"? "5 &+4 &B" 3"6%<4
<)(%#4)# 2?1 )# 4'4)6%?*C# 4+%<64 )462&% 4 &" &+4 )"21B2; B+4?
55%<4) (); 2&&483&41 &" #4) 4 &+4 2))4#& B2))2?& "? 4')(2); !!,
& &)%26, &+4#4 &B" 3"6%<4 "55%<4)# &4#&%5%41 &+2& )#
4'4)6%?*C# 4+%<64 B2# 34)34?1%<(62) &" 2?1 52<%?* 2B2; 5)"8 &+4
)"21B2;, #" &+2& #+4 +21 &" 82=4 2 #+2)3 (@&()? %? ")14) &" )4@4?&4)
&+4 #&)44& )# 4'4)6%?*C# &4#&%8"?;, 4<+"41 '; "?4 4;4B%&?4## 5")
&+4 1454?#4, 2##4)&41 &+2& +4) 4+%<64 B2# 32)26646 &" &+4 )"21B2;
92#41 "? &+%# 1%#<)432?<; %? &+4 &4#&%8"?; "5 &+4 32)&%4#C B%&?4##4#,
2334662?& 2&&483&41 &" 5%64 +%# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?& 2*2%?#& &+4
"55%<4)#
$ 9; 64&&4) 12&41 2)<+ ., !, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;

1%#233)" 41 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <"8362%?&# +4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C#
1%#233)" 26 B2# #(33")&41 '; &+4 <)41%'%6%&; 2?1 52<& 14&4)8%?2&%"?#
8214 2& &+4 D(); &)%26, <"(3641 B%&+ &+4 2##4##84?& &+2& &+4
"88"?B426&+ <"(61 ?"&, B%&+ &+4 4 %14?<4 2##4)&41 '; 2334662?&, 3)" 4
%&# <2#4 '4;"?1 2 )42#"?2'64 1"('&
- "66"B%?* 1%#233)" 26 '; &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;, 2334662?&

5%641 +%# <"8362%?&# B%&+ &+4 &)%26 <"()& #44=%?* 2 )4 %4B "5 &+4
1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 1%#233)" 26 "5 &+4 <"8362%?&# 3()#(2?& &"
2 )%8 ' ! 334662?& 26#" #"(*+& 2 <"()& 14&4)8%?2&%"? "5
B+4&+4) &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# %? "6 484?& %? &+4 233)" 26 3)"<4##
)43)4#4?&41 2? %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<& "5 %?&4)4#& 5&4) &+4 D(1*4# "5
&+4 "()& "5 "88"? 642# "5 642)5%461 "(?&; 1%#E(26%5%41 &+48#46 4#
5)"8 &+4 )4 %4B 3)"<4##, &+4 "?")2'64 A4%&+ 9 H(%*64; "5 4));
"(?&; #34<%266; 3)4#%141 " 4) &+4 )4 %4B 3)"<4## 2?1 <"?<6(141 &+2&
&+4)4 B2# ?" *)"## 2'(#4 "5 1%#<)4&%"? ") <"?56%<& "5 %?&4)4#& 3)4#4?&
%? &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 1%#233)" 26 <<")1%?*6;, &+4 1%#233)" 26
"5 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# B2# 255%)841 +%# &%846;
233426 5"66"B41 F5?!
+4 3)"34) 3)"<41()4 5") #44=%?* 233)" 26 "5 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26

<"8362%?&# %# #4& 5")&+ %? 2 )%8 2# 5"66"B#7
2 +4? &+4 255%2?& %# ?"& 2 62B 4?5")<484?& "55%<4) 2?1 &+4 "554?#4 # <+2)*41 %?<6(14 #
2 8%#14842?") ") 546"?; B+%<+ 1"4# ?"& %? "6 4 2 <642) 2?1 3)4#4?& 12?*4) &" 2?; 34)#"? ") &"
&+4 <"88(?%&;, &+4 <"8362%?& #+266 '4 #('8%&&41 &" 2? 2&&")?4; 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+, B+" #+266
233)" 4 ") 1%#233)" 4 B%&+"(& (?)42#"?2'64 1462;
' 5 &+4 2&&")?4; 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+
33)" 4# &+4 <"8362%?&, &+4 2&&")?4; #+266 %?1%<2&4 &+%# 14<%#%"? "? &+4 <"8362%?& 5")8
2?1 &)2?#8%& %& &" &+4 %##(%?* 2(&+")%&;0
! %#233)" 4# &+4 <"8362%?&, &+4 2&&")?4; #+266 #&2&4 &+4 )42#"?# "? &+4 <"8362%?& 5")8
2?1 )4&()? %& &" &+4 255%2?& +4)425&4) &+4 255%2?& 82; 5%64 &+4 <"8362%?& B%&+ 2 D(1*4 "5 2 "()& "5
"88"? 642# 5") 233)" 26 ") 1%#233)" 260
"4# ?"& 233)" 4 ") 1%#233)" 4 B%&+%? 2 )42#"?2'64 34)%"1 "5 &%84, &+4 255%2?& 82; 5%64
&+4 <"8362%?& "? 2 #432)2&4 5")8 B%&+ &+4 %##(%?* 2(&+")%&;, ?"&%?* &+4)4"? &+2& 2 <"8362%?& %#
34?1%?* '45")4 2? 2&&")?4; 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+ +4 %##(%?* 2(&+")%&; #+266 14&4)8%?4 B+4&+4)
2 )42#"?2'64 34)%"1 +2# 4623#41, 2?1 B+4? 233)"3)%2&4, #+266 1454) 2<&%"? &" 266"B &+4 2&&")?4;
5") &+4 "88"?B426&+ 2? 211%&%"?26 34)%"1 "5 &%84 &" )4#3"?1
? 14&4)8%?%?* B+4&+4) &" 233)" 4 ") 1%#233)" 4 2 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&, &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4; 82; )46; "? 4%&+4) 2 64*26 2##4##84?& "5 &+4 <"8362%?&, ") B+"66; 1%#<)4&%"?2); 82&&4)#
"5 3"6%<; "88"?B426&+ 94?I$! 2 ! , $-$ !1 >-. / +4? &+41%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;
)4#&# &+4 1%#233)" 26 "5 2 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?& "? B+"66; 1%#<)4&%"?2); 82&&4)# "5 3"6%<;, &+%#
"()& B%66 ?"& 1%#&()' &+2& 14&4)8%?2&%"?, 2'#4?& 2 *)"## 2'(#4 "5 1%#<)4&%"? "88"?B426&+
)%&<+2)1,. / 2 (34) !! , $ - !1 /!> 44 26#" ? 4 ""1, 2 (34) $ >,
- !, ./! !1 , - /$ E("&%?* "88"?B426&+ %#482??, !>- 2 (34) $. , .
!1 $ / 3)"#4<(&")%26 1%#<)4&%"? 82; 1434?1 "? 3"6%<; 82&&4)# B+"66; 232)& 5)"8 &+4
4J%#&4?<4 ") ?"?@4J%#&4?<4 "5 3)"'2'64 <2(#40 <"()&# 2)4 B2); "5 #(34) %#%?* 4J4)<%#4 "5 #(<+
1%#<)4&%"? +4? &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; '2#4# 2 1%#8%##26 #"646; "? 2 62<= "5 4 %14?<4,+"B4 4), &+%#
"()& B%66 2336; 2 14 ?" " #&2?12)1 "5 )4 %4B '4<2(#4 #(<+ 2 14<%#%"? %# ?"& 4?&%&641 &" &+4 #284
1454)4?<4 255")141 2 3"6%<; 14<%#%"? ?"& &" 3)"#4<(&4, 4 4? B+4)4 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 4J%#&#
"88"?B426&+ 94?I, #(3)2 2& ! / ? .,$-$ !1 2& >-> ? . +4 #34<%26 1454)4?<4 4J&4?141 &"
2 3"6%<; 14<%#%"? ?"& &" 3)"#4<(&4 2)%#4# 5)"8 &+4 1454)4?<4 2<<")141 &+4 1%#<)4&%"?2); (#4 "5
4J4<(&% 4 3"B4)# <"?54))41 %? &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 1 +4 3"B4) &" 233)" 4 ") 1%#233)" 4
3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# *)2?&41 (?14) 2 )%8 &" &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; %# <"?#%#&4?&
B%&+ &+4 2(&+")%&; B+%<+ &+2& "55%<4 )4*(62)6; 4J4)<%#4# %? 14<%1%?* &" %?%&%2&4 ") 1%#<"?&%?(4
3)"#4<(&%"?# ? )4 4&%&%"? "5 %#<2?%",! $ 2 (34) . , . ., .. !1 -$/, -- >$ +4
)4E(%)484?&# 5") &+4 %##(2?<4 "5 3)"<4## 3()#(2?& &" 2 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?& 2)4 3)" %141 %?
2 )%8 .
+4 <"8362%?& +2# '44? 3)"34)6; <"8364&41 2?1 4J4<(&410
! +4)4 %# 3)"'2'64 <2(#4 5") &+4 %##(2?<4 "5 3)"<4##, %? &+4 5")8 "5 2? 255%12 %&0 2?1
+4? 3)%") #('8%##%"? &" 2? 2&&")?4; 5") &+4 "88"?B426&+ %# )4E(%)41, &+2& 2?
2&&")?4; +2# 233)" 41 &+4 <"8362%?&
334662?&C# 5%)#& 2##4)&%"?, &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 2336%41 &+4 B)"?* #&2?12)1 B+4?
)4 %4B%?* 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&#, B2))2?&# <"?#%14)2&%"? +4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;
#&2&41 &+2& &+4 2334662?&C# <"8362%?&# 5466 #+")& "5 4#&2'6%#+%?* #(55%<%4?& 4 %14?<4 &" 3)" 4 +%#
2664*2&%"?# '4;"?1 2 )42#"?2'64 1"('& 334662?& 82%?&2%?#, +"B4 4), &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;
8(#& %4B &+4 4 %14?<4 3)" %141 2<<")1%?* &" 2 G3)"'2'64 <2(#4GF5? #&2?12)1
5 &+4 "88"?B426&+ %?&4?1# &" 3)"<441 B%&+ 3)"#4<(&%"?, %& 8(#& 3)"1(<4 4 %14?<4
4?"(*+ &" 4#&2'6%#+ 2& 642#& 2 3)%82 52<%4F5?. <2#4 &+2& 2 <)%84 +2# '44? <"88%&&41 2?1 &+2& &+4
2<<(#41 %# 3)"'2'6; &+4 34)34&)2&") "88"?B426&+ "D12=, $ ! 2 $ , .-- !1
/ 0 "88"?B426&+ (664?, .- 2 -, !1 >$$ >$ 0 "88"?B426&+ 2) %?,
.- 2 (34) $>$, $ !1 / /$ "B4 4), &+4 (6&%82&4 14&4)8%?2&%"? "5 &+4 #(55%<%4?<;
"5 &+2& 4 %14?<4 %# 2 &)%26 <"()& D(1*84?& 2& B+%<+ &%84 &+4 &)%4) "5 52<& )4 %4B# &+4 )4<")1 52<&# &"
2#<4)&2%? B+4&+4) 2?1 &" B+2& 4J&4?& &+4 3)"#4<(&%"? +2# #2&%#5%41 %&# G'4;"?1 2 )42#"?2'64
1"('&G '()14? "5 34)#(2#%"? F5?$ "88"?B426&+ +2 4), $ 2 ->, .- !1 >.! /
+4 3)4&)%26 3)"<4##, "? &+4 <"?&)2);, )4E(%)4# &+4 2336%<2&%"? "5 B+2& %# =?"B? %? <)%8%?26 62B 2#
&+4 3)"'2'64 <2(#4 #&2?12)1 ") 2 3)%82 52<%4 #&2?12)1 44 2 )%8 .0 "88"?B426&+
2) %?, #(3)2 "88"?B426&+ +2# '()14? &" 4#&2'6%#+ 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 2& &+4 3)46%8%?2);
+42)%?* '(& ?441 ?"& 3)" 4 2<<(#41C# *(%6& '4;"?1 2 )42#"?2'64 1"('& %? ")14) &" '%?1 2<<(#41
" 4) 5") 3)"#4<(&%"?
! "?&%?(41 5)"8 3)4 %"(# 32*4 962<=C# 2B %<&%"?2);, $&+ 1 >
?#&2?&6;, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; "5 642)5%461 "(?&; #&2&41

%? +%# %#233)" 26 &2&484?& 3()#(2?& &" 2 )%8 7
G <<")1%?*6;, &+4 2664*2&%"?# '; &+4 255%2?& <2??"& '4 3)" 4? '4;"?1 2
)42#"?2'64 1"('& 2?1 2)4 +4)4'; 1%#233)" 41 3()#(2?& &" (64 G ?
#" #&2&%?*, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 2336%41 2? %?233)"3)%2&4 64*26
#&2?12)1 &" &+%# 2#34<& "5 &+4 3)4&)%26 3)"<4## +%# #&2?12)1 2#
2336%41 B"(61 )4E(%)4 3)% 2&4 <"8362%?2?&# &" 3)" 4 &+4%) <2#4# &" &+4
1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;, B+4)4, %? 52<&, &+4 <"8362%?& ?441 "?6; 2 4)
4 %14?<4 #(55%<%4?& &" 8"(?& 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 <<")1%?*6;, B4
<"?<6(14 &+2& &+4 3)"34) #&2?12)1 &" '4 2336%41 B+4? )4 %4B%?* 3)% 2&4
<)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# %# B+4&+4) &+4 <"8362%?& 4#&2'6%#+4# 2 3)%82 52<%4
<2#4 "? 266 &+4 46484?&# "5 &+4 <+2)*4 <"?&2%?41 %? &+4 <"8362%?&
")4" 4), '4<2(#4 &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 4J4)<%#41 2 64*26 D(1*84?&, B4
2)4 )4E(%)41 &" )4 %4B &+4 233)"3)%2&4?4## "5 +%# 14<%#%"? 44
"88"?B426&+ 94?I, #(3)2 2& ! /@ ,$-$ !1 2& >->@-/ B+4)4 &+4
"88"?B426&+ 14<%14# ?"& &" 3)"#4<(&4 5") 62<= "5 4 %14?<4 #(55%<%4?&
&" 4#&2'6%#+ 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4, &+4 <"()& %# )4E(%)41 &" )4 %4B &+4
233)"3)%2&4?4## "5 &+2& 14<%#%"?, 2?1 #(<+ 2 )4 %4B "5 &+2& 64*26
D(1*84?& %# ?"& 2? %?&)(#%"? (3"? 3)"#4<(&")%26 1%#<)4&%"?
334662?& 2##4)&# &+2& &+4 3)"3"#41 &4#&%8"?; "5 2 #4<"?1
4;4B%&?4## B"(61 <"))"'")2&4 &+4 &)%26 &4#&%8"?; 5") &+4 1454?#4 &+2&
)# 4'4)6%?*C# 4+%<64 B2# %?1441 32)26646 &" &+4 )"21B2; 1()%?* &+4
4')(2); ! , %?<%14?& +4 &+)(#& "5 2334662?&C# <"8362%?& %#
&+2& &+4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)C# &4#&%8"?; 2& )# 4'4)6%?*C# &)%26 B2#
%?<"?#%#&4?& B%&+ &+4 1454?#4 B%&?4##4#C &4#&%8"?; +4 3)"3"#41
&4#&%8"?; "5 2 #4<"?1 4;4B%&?4##, <"?<6(14# 2334662?&, 4#&2'6%#+4# 2
3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 2*2%?#& &+4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)# "? 42<+ "5 &+4 4%*+&
"554?#4# <+2)*41F5?- %? +%# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?& 4 1%#2*)44
5") &+4 5"66"B%?* )42#"?#
! %)#&, &+4 &)%4) "5 52<& %# &" )4#"6 4 2?; 4J%#&%?*

%?<"?#%#&4?<%4# 2?1 <2? '46%4 4 266, 32)&, ") ?"?4 "5 &+4 &4#&%8"?;
3)4#4?&41 "88"?B426&+ ());, / 2 (34) . , .-$ !1 --
/ +4 D(); 26)421; +42)1 &+4 #('#&2?<4 "5 2334662?&C# 3)"3"#41
B%&?4##C &4#&%8"?; 2 %?* 26)421; B4%*+41 &+4 4 %14?<4 2334662?&
2##4)&# %? #(33")& "5 +%# 3)% 2&4 <"8362%?&, &+4 D(); )42<+41 &+4
<"?<6(#%"? &+2& )# 4'4)6%?* )4#%#&41 2? 2))4#& 94<2(#4 &+4 B4%*+&
2<<")141 &+4 4 %14?<4 '; 2 D(); %# ?"& 2 82&&4) "5 82&+482&%<26
3)4<%#%"?, &+4 52<& &+2& "?4 8")4 34)#"? <2? #2; &+2& )# 4'4)6%?*C#
2? B2# 32)26646 &" &+4 )"21B2; 1"4# ?"& ?4<4##2)%6; %? 26%12&4 &+4
D();C# 5%?1%?*# "5 <)41%'%6%&;
4<"?1, 2 <"662&4)26 2&&2<= "? 2 52<& 5%?14)C# <)41%'%6%&;

14&4)8%?2&%"? %# ?"& B2))2?&41 (?64## &+4 211%&%"?26 4 %14?<4 2##4)&41
B2# ?"& 1%#<" 4)2'64 2& &+4 &%84 "5 &+4 <)41%'%6%&; 14&4)8%?2&%"?,
! %# ?"& 84)46; 5") <(8(62&% 4 ") %8342<+84?& 3()3"#4#, 2?1 &+4
?4B 4 %14?<4 <"8346# 2 1%554)4?& "(&<"84 "88"?B426&+ +28'4)#,$!/
2 $$/, $ !1 - , <4)&%")2)% 14?%41, , ! &
!! , 1 !1 ! . ! ?26"*"(#6;, &+4 3)"3"#41 &4#&%8"?;
+4)4%? B2# 2 2%62'64 &" &+4 1454?#4 2& )# 4'4)6%?*C# &)%26 '(& B2#
?"& (&%6%I41 ")4" 4), &+4 3)"3"#41 &4#&%8"?; 2##4)&# ?"&+%?* &+2&
&+4 D(); 1%1 ?"& 26)421; +42) %?266;, &+4 3)"3"#41 &4#&%8"?; 1"4#
?"& ?4<4##2)%6; <"8346 2 1%554)4?& )4#(6&, ?") 1"4# &+4 4 %14?<4 %?
&+4 2334662?&C# <"8362%?& )2%#4 4 4? 2? %?54)4?<4 &+2& &+4 D();C#
4)1%<& B2# 3()4 #34<(62&%"? +4)45")4, B4 <"?<6(14 &+2&, '2#41 "?
&+4 3)"3"#41 &4#&%8"?; B+%<+ %# 84)46; <(8(62&% 4 "5 &+2& &4#&%8"?;
+42)1 2& &)%26, 2334662?& +2# ?"& 4#&2'6%#+41 4 4? 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4
"? &+4 <+2)*4# 2664*41 2*2%?#& &+4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)# 44 "88"?B426&+
()"#=%, $! 2 (34) $, $ - !1 ! /- 4? '2?< 2
3)% 2&4 <"8362%?2?&C# 1(&; %# &" 3)" %14 &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; B%&+
4?"(*+ 52<&# &" 4?2'64 2? %?5")841 14<%#%"? "? B+4&+4) &" <"884?<4
<)%8%?26 2<&%"? 334662?&C# 2664*2&%"?# "5 <"66(#%"?, <"?#3%)2<; 2?1
526#4 #B42)%?* )4E(%)4 8")4 52<&(26 #(33")& &+2? B+2& +4 +2# "554)41
'; B2; "5 64*26 <"?<6(#%"?# <<")1%?*6;, B4 2*)44 B%&+ &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4;C# 5%?26 14<%#%"? &" 1%#233)" 4 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26
<"8362%?&# 2?1 +"61 &+2& &+4 "()& "5 "88"? 642# <"))4<&6; 255%)841
&+2& 1%#233)" 26
. 334662?&C# 5%?26 <"?&4?&%"? )4#&# %? &+4 2##4)&%"? &+2& &+4

+2?16%?* "5 &+%# 82&&4) '; &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; "5 642)5%461 "(?&;
<"?#&%&(&41 2? %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<& "5 %?&4)4#& %# <"8362%?&#,
2 4)# 2334662?&, #+"(61 ?"& +2 4 '44? )4 %4B41 '; &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4; ") 2?; 848'4) "5 +%# #&255 5") &B" )42#"?# %)#&, &+4
1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# %? "6 484?& %? &+4 <)%8%?26 3)"#4<(&%"? *% %?*
)%#4 &" &+4 5%6%?* "5 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# #+"(61
'2) %? "6 484?& %? &+4 )4 %4B 3)"<4## "5 &+"#4 <"8362%?&# 4<"?1,
2?"&+4) 848'4) "5 &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# "55%<4 23342)41 5") &+4
"88"?B426&+ 2& 2? 4 %14?&%2); +42)%?* 2##"<%2&41 B%&+ &+4 233426 "5
&+4 ")%*%?26 <)%8%?26 <2#4 2*2%?#& )# 4'4)6%?* 334662?& <"?<6(14#
&+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# "55%<4 %#, &+4)45")4, %? "6 41 %? &+4
)43)4#4?&2&%"? "5 32)&%4# 21 4)#4 &" 2334662?& 2?1 %# ?"& %? 2 3)"34)
3"#%&%"? &" 233)" 4 ") 1%#233)" 4 <+2)*4# 2)%#%?* 5)"8 &+4 ")%*%?26
<)%8%?26 <2#4
$ +4 "88"?B426&+ %# &+4 32)&; 362%?&%55 %? 2 <)%8%?26

3)"#4<(&%"? "88"?B426&+ 266";, . 2 (34) ! >, .$ !1 -/
/! +4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 5(?<&%"? %# &" )43)4#4?& &+4
"88"?B426&+ %? &+4#4 3)"<441%?*# 1 2& !@ , .$ !1 2& - ! &
%# %? &+4 <232<%&; 2# &+4 "88"?B426&+C# 2&&")?4; &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4; 5(65%66# &+4 "'6%*2&%"? &" %? 4#&%*2&4 2?1 3)"#4<(&4 <)%84
? 4 4&%&%"? "5 %#<2?%", #(3)2 2& . ., .. !1 2& -- +4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4; 4J4<(&4# +%# 1(&; "5 4 26(2&%?* <"8362%?&# &" 14&4)8%?4
B+4&+4) 2?1 B+4? &" 3)"#4<(&4, <"?&%?(4 ") 1%#<"?&%?(4 2 <2#4, %? &+4
?284 "5 &+4 "88"?B426&+, ?"& &+4 %<&%8 1 0 "88"?B426&+ 266";,
#(3)2 2& ,.$ !1 2& -
- ?#&2?&6;, 2334662?& )46%4# "? (64# > 2?1 "5 &+4 9

"146 (64# "5 )"54##%"?26 "?1(<& B+%<+ %? 34)&%?4?& 32)& 5")'%1 &+4
)43)4#4?&2&%"? "5 21 4)#4 <6%4?& %?&4)4#&# +4 %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<&
"5 %?&4)4#& B+%<+ 2334662?& 2##4)&# 2)%#4# 5)"8 2334662?&C#
8%#34)<43&%"? &+2& &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; )43)4#4?&41 &+4 3"6%<4
"55%<4)# %? &+4 ")%*%?26 <)%8%?26 <2#4 2*2%?#& )# 4'4)6%?*
%? "6 %?* &+4 <+2)*4 "5 )4#%#&%?* 2))4#& +4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)#,
+"B4 4), B4)4 B%&?4##4# 5") &+4 3)"#4<(&%"? "5 )# 4'4)6%?*, ?"&
<6%4?&# "5 &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; # #(<+, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;
<2??"& '4 #2%1 &" +2 4 4?*2*41 %? &+4 )43)4#4?&2&%"? "5 21 4)#4 <6%4?&
%?&4)4#&# (?14) 4%&+4) (64 > ") 21 2334662?& 3)4#4?&41
#(55%<%4?& 52<&# &" 148"?#&)2&4 &+2& &+4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)#C &4#&%8"?;
B2# 526#4 "? 2 82&4)%26 82&&4) 2?1 &+2& &+4 "55%<4)# =?4B ") '46%4 41
&+2& &+4%) #&2&484?&# B4)4 526#4 B+4? 8214 (?14) "2&+, &+4
"88"?B426&+C# 2&&")?4; <"(61 )42#"?2'6; 3)"<441 B%&+ 2? 2<&%"?
2*2%?#& &+4 "55%<4)# B%&+"(& *% %?* )%#4 &" 2? %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<&
"5 %?&4)4#& " &"", 82; &+4 "88"?B426&+C# 2&&")?4; )45(#4 &" 3)"<441
2*2%?#& &+4#4 "55%<4)# B+4)4 &+4 2334662?& 3)"554)41 "?6; <(8(62&% 4
4 %14?<4 B+%<+ #+41 ?" 6%*+& "? &+4 82&&4) 2664*41
> +4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 2?1 &+4 &)%26 <"()& +2 4 2

)4#3"?#%'%6%&; &" 3)4 4?& &+4 8%#(#4 "5 3)"#4<(&")%26 2?1 D(1%<%26
)4#"()<4# ? 4 ""1, #(3)2 2& - ,./! !1 2& > E("&%?*
"88"?B426&+ %#482??, #(3)2 2& $.-@.>, . !1 2& $ +4)4, 2#
+4)4, 2 &)%26 14&4)8%?2&%"? "? &+4 <)41%'%6%&; "5 &+4 B%&?4##4# +2#
26)421; "<<())41, 2334662?& <2??"& '4 34)8%&&41 &" )46; "? 3)"554)41
&4#&%8"?;, B+%<+ B2# 2 2%62'64 2& &+2& &)%26, &" 4?*2*4 %? 2 5(&%64
2&&483& &" 1%#&()' &+"#4 <)41%'%6%&; 5%?1%?*#
/ ? &+%# "88"?B426&+, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 4?D";# B%14

62&%&(14 B+4? 14<%1%?* B+4&+4) &" 1%#233)" 4 2 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26
<"8362%?&, 2?1 82; 1" #" 5") 3"6%<; )42#"?# B+"66; 232)& 5)"8 2
3)46%8%?2); 2##4##84?& "5 &+4 4 %14?<4 4? &+"(*+ 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4
82; 4J%#& "? &+4 52<4 "5 &+4 <"8362%?&, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; %# ?"&
'"(?1 &" 3)"#4<(&4, 2?1 82;, %? 2 3)"34) 4J4)<%#4 "5 1%#<)4&%"?, #&%66
1%#233)" 4 &+4 <"8362%?& B+"66; 5") 3"6%<; )42#"?# (<+ 2 3"6%<;
14<%#%"? %# #('D4<& "?6; &" 2? 2'(#4 "5 1%#<)4&%"? #&2?12)1 '; &+4
)4 %4B%?* <"()& 44 "88"?B426&+ 94?I, #(3)20 "88"?B426&+
)%&<+2)1, #(3)2 +4)4, 2# +4)4, &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 1%#233)" 26
%# '2#41 "? 2 64*26 2##4##84?& "5 &+4 4 %14?<4 <"?&2%?41 %? &+4
<"8362%?&, &+4 233)"3)%2&4 64*26 #&2?12)1 5") 2##4##%?* &+2& 4 %14?<4
%# B+4&+4) 4?"(*+ 52<&# 2)4 2664*41 %? &+4 <"8362%?& &" 4#&2'6%#+ 2
3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 "? &+4 <+2)*4# <"?&2%?41 &+4)4%? 2?1 ?"& B+4&+4) &+4
52<&# #4& 5")&+ <2? '4 3)" 4? '4;"?1 2 )42#"?2'64 1"('& 4 <"?<6(14
&+2& &+4 1%#233)" 26 "5 2334662?&C# <"8362%?&# '; &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4; 2?1 &+4 "()& "5 "88"? 642# B2# <"))4<& &" &+4 4J&4?& &+2&
&+4 52<&# 2664*41 %? &+4 <"8362%?& 1%1 ?"& 4#&2'6%#+ 2 3)%82 52<%4
<2#4 %?266;, 2# &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; )43)4#4?&# &+4 "88"?B426&+ %?
<)%8%?26 3)"#4<(&%"?#, ?" %834)8%##%'64 <"?56%<& "5 %?&4)4#& 2)"#4 2#
2 )4#(6& "5 &+4 1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4;C# 4J4)<%#4 "5 +%# 1(&; &" )4 %4B &+4
<)%8%?26 <"8362%?&# %? &+%# <2#4 <<")1%?*6;, B4 255%)8 &+4
1%#233)" 26 "5 2334662?&C# 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?&#
)14)# 255%)841
. %#3"#%&%"?
. 55%)841
3%?%"? ""&?"&4#
.! F5? / 2 K$ .
4#%#&%?* 2))4#& ") "&+4) 62B 4?5")<484?& 34)#"? <"88%&# 2

8%#14842?") "5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 %5, B%&+ &+4 %?&4?& "5 3)4 4?&%?* 2
3('6%< #4) 2?& 5)"8 4554<&%?* 2 62B5(6 2))4#& ") 1%#<+2)*%?* 2?; "&+4)
1(&;, &+4 34)#"? <)42&4# 2 #('#&2?&%26 )%#= "5 '"1%6; %?D(); &" &+4
3('6%< #4) 2?& ") 2?;"?4 46#4, ") 4836";# 842?# D(#&%5;%?* ")
)4E(%)%?* #('#&2?&%26 5")<4 &" " 4)<"84 &+4 )4#%#&2?<4
. F5?! 44 ? 4 ""1, 2 (34) $ >, ./! !1 /.

+"61%?* &+2& 2 3)% 2&4 34)#"? +2# #&2?1%?* &" 233426 B+4)4 &+4
1%#&)%<& 2&&")?4; 1%#233)" 4# &+4 3)% 2&4 <)%8%?26 <"8362%?& 2?1 &+2&
14<%#%"? %# )4 %4B41 '; 2 "()& "5 "88"? 642#, 3()#(2?& &"
2 )%8 9 %% , 21 4)#46; &" &+4 3)% 2&4 <"8362%?2?& 0
2<<")1 "88"?B426&+ ()"#=%, $! 2 (34) $, $ - !1 ! /-
4? '2?< "832)4 "88"?B426&+ 266";, . 2 (34) ! >, .$
!1 -/ /! +"61%?* &+2& &+4 %<&%8 "5 2? 2664*41 <)%84 62<=# &+4
2(&+")%&; 2?1 3"B4) &" 233426, B%&+"(& &+4 <"?#4?& "5 &+4 1%#&)%<&
2&&")?4;, 2 D(1%<%26 14&4)8%?2&%"? 1%#8%##%?* 2 <"8362%?& 5") 52%6()4
"5 &+4 3)"#4<(&%"? &" 4#&2'6%#+ 2& &)%26 2 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4
.. F5? )"'2'64 <2(#4 %# 145%?41 2#7
42#"?2'64 <2(#40 +2 %?* 8")4 4 %14?<4 5") &+2? 2*2%?#& )42#"?2'64

*)"(?1 5") '46%45 %? &+4 4J%#&4?<4 "5 52<&# B2))2?&%?* &+4 3)"<441%?*#
<"8362%?41 "5 ? 2332)4?& #&2&4 "5 52<&# 5"(?1 &" 4J%#& (3"?
)42#"?2'64 %?E(%); &+2& %#, #(<+ %?E(%); 2# &+4 *% 4? <2#4 )4?14)#
<"? 4?%4?& 2?1 3)"34) , B+%<+ B"(61 %?1(<4 2 )42#"?2'64 %?&466%*4?&
2?1 3)(14?& 82? &" '46%4 4, %? 2 <)%8%?26 <2#4, &+2& &+4 2<<(#41
34)#"? +21 <"88%&&41 &+4 <)%84 <+2)*41, ") %? 2 <% %6 <2#4, &+2& 2
<2(#4 "5 2<&%"? 4J%#&41 962<=C# 2B %<&%"?2);, $&+ 1 >
.$ F5?. G 3)%82 52<%4 <2#4 <"?#%#&# "5 #(55%<%4?& 4 %14?<4 %?

&+4 &;34 "5 <2#4 &" *4& 362%?&%55 32#& 2 8"&%"? 5") 1%)4<&41 4)1%<&
%? 2 D(); <2#4 ") 8"&%"? &" 1%#8%## %? 2 ?"?@D(); <2#4 G 962<=C# 2B
%<&%"?2);, .&+ 1 >
.- F5?$ +4 &4)8 G'()14? "5 3)""5G 4?<"832##4# &B" #432)2&4

'()14?#0 &+4 '()14? "5 3)"1(<%?* #2&%#52<&"); 4 %14?<4 "5 2 32)&%<(62)
52<& %? %##(40 2?1 ! &+4 '()14? "5 34)#(21%?* &+4 &)%4) "5 52<& &+2&
&+4 52<& 2664*41 %# %?1441 &)(4 < ")8%<= "? %14?<4 K - 2& .!$@!-
.&+ 1 ! ? 2 <)%8%?26 &)%26, &+4 3)"#4<(&%"? +2# &+4 '()14? "5
34)#(21%?* &+4 52<& 5%?14) "5 &+4 <)%8%?26 1454?12?&C# *(%6& '4;"?1 2
)42#"?2'64 1"('& 1 K . 2& ..$
.> F5?- +4 255%2?& )4E(4#&41 &+2& 2 B2))2?& "5 2))4#& '4 %##(41
5") &+4 3"6%<4 "55%<4)# "? &+4 5"66"B%?* <+2)*4#7
/ 2 K . ! 4)D(); 2 554?#4 145%?41 @@ 34)#"? %#

*(%6&; "5 34)D();, 2 546"?; "5 &+4 &+%)1 14*)44, %5 %? 2?; "55%<%26
3)"<441%?* +4 82=4# 2 526#4 #&2&484?& (?14) "2&+ ") 4E(% 264?&
255%)82&%"?, ") #B42)# ") 255%)8# &+4 &)(&+ "5 2 #&2&484?& 3)4 %"(#6;
8214, B+4? &+4 #&2&484?& %# 82&4)%26 2?1 +4 1"4# ?"& '46%4 4 %& &" '4
&)(4 / 2 K. 26#4 #B42)%?* 2 26#4 #B42)%?* %?
"55%<%26 82&&4)# @@ 34)#"? B+" 82=4# 2 526#4 #&2&484?& (?14) "2&+ ")
4E(% 264?& 255%)82&%"?, ") #B42)# ") 255%)8# &+4 &)(&+ "5 #(<+ 2
#&2&484?& 3)4 %"(#6; 8214, B+4? +4 1"4# ?"& '46%4 4 &+4 #&2&484?& &"
'4 &)(4 %# *(%6&; "5 2 8%#14842?") "5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 %57 &+4
526#%5%<2&%"? "<<()# %? 2? "55%<26 3)"<441%?* / 2 K
. . ?#B")? 526#%5%<2&%"? &" 2(&+")%&%4# 2 ? *4?4)26 @@ 34)#"?
<"88%&# 2 8%#14842?") "5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 %5, B%&+ %?&4?& &" 8%#6421
2 3('6%< #4) 2?& %? 34)5")8%?* +%# "55%<%26 5(?<&%"?, +47 82=4#
2?; B)%&&4? 526#4 #&2&484?& B+%<+ +4 1"4# ?"& '46%4 4 &" '4 &)(40
/ 2 K . - 26#4 )43")&# &" 62B 4?5")<484?& 2(&+")%&%4#
2 26#46; %?<)%8%?2&%?* 2?"&+4) @@ 34)#"? B+" =?"B%?*6; *% 4#
526#4 %?5")82&%"? &" 2?; 62B 4?5")<484?& "55%<4) B%&+ %?&4?& &"
%836%<2&4 2?"&+4) <"88%&# 2 8%#14842?") "5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 '
%<&%&%"(# )43")&# @@ 34)#"? <"88%&# 2 8%#14842?") "5 &+4 &+%)1
14*)44 %5 +47 )43")&# &" 62B 4?5")<484?& 2(&+")%&%4# 2? "554?#4 ")
"&+4) %?<%14?& B%&+%? &+4%) <"?<4)? =?"B%?* &+2& %& 1%1 ?"& "<<()0 ")
/ 2 K$ '#&)(<&%?* 218%?%#&)2&%"? "5 62B
34)#"? <"88%&# 2 8%#14842?") "5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 %5 +4
%?&4?&%"?266; "'#&)(<&#, %832%)# ") 34) 4)&# &+4 218%?%#&)2&%"? "5 62B
") "&+4) *" 4)?84?&26 5(?<&%"? '; 5")<4, %"64?<4, 3+;#%<26
%?&4)54)4?<4 ") "'#&2<64, ')42<+ "5 "55%<%26 1(&;, ") 2?; "&+4)
(?62B5(6 2<&, 4J<43& &+2& &+%# #4<&%"? 1"4# ?"& 2336; &" 56%*+& '; 2
34)#"? <+2)*41 B%&+ <)%84, )45(#26 &" #('8%& &" 2))4#&, 52%6()4 &"
34)5")8 2 64*26 1(&; "&+4) &+2? 2? "55%<%26 1(&;, ") 2?; "&+4) 842?#
"5 2 "%1%?* <"836%2?<4 B%&+ 62B B%&+"(& 255%)82&% 4 %?&4)54)4?<4 B%&+
*" 4)?84?&26 5(?<&%"?# / 2 K$ 55%<%26 "33)4##%"?
34)#"? 2<&%?* ") 3()3")&%?* &" 2<& %? 2? "55%<%26 <232<%&; ") &2=%?*
21 2?&2*4 "5 #(<+ 2<&(26 ") 3()3")&41 <232<%&; <"88%&# 2 8%#14842?")
"5 &+4 #4<"?1 14*)44 %5, =?"B%?* &+2& +%# <"?1(<& %# %664*26, +47
#('D4<&# 2?"&+4) &" 2))4#&, 14&4?&%"?, #42)<+, #4%I()4, 8%#&)42&84?&,
1%#3"##4##%"?, 2##4##84?&, 6%4? ") "&+4) %?5)%?*484?& "5 34)#"?26 ")
3)"34)&; )%*+&#0 / 2 K )%8%?26 <"?#3%)2<; 2
45%?%&%"? "5 <"?#3%)2<; @@ 34)#"? %# *(%6&; "5 <"?#3%)2<; B%&+
2?"&+4) 34)#"? ") 34)#"?# &" <"88%& 2 <)%84 %5 B%&+ &+4 %?&4?& "5
3)"8"&%?* ") 52<%6%&2&%?* %&# <"88%##%"? +47 2*)44# B%&+ #(<+
"&+4) 34)#"? ") 34)#"?# &+2& &+4; ") "?4 ") 8")4 "5 &+48 B%66 4?*2*4
%? <"?1(<& B+%<+ <"?#&%&(&4# #(<+ <)%84 ") 2? 2&&483& ") #"6%<%&2&%"?
&" <"88%& #(<+ <)%840 ") ! 2*)44# &" 2%1 #(<+ "&+4) 34)#"? ")
34)#"?# %? &+4 362??%?* ") <"88%##%"? "5 #(<+ <)%84 ") "5 2? 2&&483&
") #"6%<%&2&%"? &" <"88%& #(<+ <)%84 - "(?&#
Case 3:03-cv-06113-SRC-TJB Document 11 Filed 10/21/2004 Page 1 of 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
|
GEORGE ALLEN WARD, Pro Se, |
|
Plaintiff, | Civ. No. 03-6113 (SRC)
v. |
| OPINION
ARM & HAMMER and the |
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., |
|
Defendant. |
____________________________________|
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Church & Dwight Co., Inc.s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
grant Defendants motion and dismiss Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.
BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff Ward is currently serving a 200 month sentence in the Petersburg Low Federal
Institution in Virginia for the distribution of crack cocaine.
Plaintiff filed this civil action against Defendant Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (Church &
Dwight), the manufacturer of Arm & Hammer baking soda. Plaintiff asserts that Church &
Dwight should be held liable for failing to include a warning on the package regarding the
consequences of criminally misusing baking soda with cocaine to manufacture crack cocaine.
Plaintiff contends that in addition to the five (5) warnings currently on boxes of Arm &
Hammer baking soda, Church & Dwight should have included a warning to the effect that the
use of baking soda with illegal drugs is prohibited and punishable by law.1 Plaintiff further
contends,I feel [that] if I was forewarned by this company that Id never [have] used this
product like I was charged with .... (Pl. Complaint at 2).
DISCUSSION:
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) all
allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc.,
v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); Robb v. Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286,
290 (3d Cir. 1984). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
court may consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public
record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the plaintiffs claims are based upon those
documents. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993). If, after viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which
could prove consistent with the allegations, a court shall dismiss a complaint for failure to state
a claim. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Zynn v. ODonnell, 688 F.2d 940,
941 (3d Cir. 1982).
In the case of a pro se litigant, the court must find that it is clear beyond doubt that the
1
Plaintiffs suggested warnings are, the use of this product with illegal drugs is
punishable by law and is prohibited and the use of this product with illegal drugs is punishable
by enhanced penalties by the laws of the United States of America. (Pl. Complaint at 3)
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Zynn v. ODonnell, 688 F.2d 940, 941 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
521 (1972)).
B. Duty to Warn of the Consequences of Criminal Misuse of Products
Nowhere in his complaint or response brief does Plaintiff assert that he was unaware that
distribution of crack cocaine was unlawful or that ingestion of crack cocaine was harmful.
Indeed, Plaintiff in his response brief implies that it is common knowledge that misuse of baking
soda with cocaine may be harmful.2 Furthermore, under New Jersey law, citizens are charged
with knowledge of the law, including the criminal laws. See, e.g., State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 9
(1955). It follows that Church & Dwight had no duty to warn Plaintiff of that which he knew,
and that which the law already charged him with knowing.
Additionally, the law is clear that manufacturers have no duty to warn of the potential
consequences for criminal misuse of their products. As the Third Circuit stated in Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., manufacturers have no duty to prevent a
criminal misuse of their products which is entirely foreign to the purpose for which the product
was intended.3 Plaintiff himself acknowledges and concedes that baking soda is not a product
that its primary designed, is intended for the production for illegal drug use or distribution. [sic]
2
See, e.g., Pl. Response Br. at 14 (Crack Cocaine is still the most crazy and dangerous
street drug labeled by society today known to man.); Pl. Response Br. at 15 (The word when it
comes to baking soda is, yea he crazy he got Soda in him that means Cracked out! Thats the
image, so the gesture that Baking Soda is a quote, benign product is Old Archaic. [sic])
3
189 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999).
(Pl. Complaint at 2)(emphasis added). Plaintiff contends though, that it can not be said that the
use of this product to make Crack Cocaine is foreign anymore, this is well established knowledge
that is a commercial product now for years. (Pl. Response Br. at 11). However, the court in Port
Authority stated that the manufacturer of a raw material or component part that is not itself
dangerous has no legal duty to prevent a buyer from incorporating the material or part into
another device that is or may be dangerous. 189 F.3d at 313.
To require Church & Dwight to warn customers of potential criminal consequences for
the intentional misuse of baking soda would be analogous to requiring that all automobile
manufacturers place warnings on their products to the effect that you may be subject to
punishment if you use the cars for illegal drag-racing. Although the manufacturers in both
instances may be aware of the products potential for misuse, this itself does not give rise to a
duty to warn of the criminal consequences of such unintended activities.
CONCLUSION:
Having taken into account the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, the
Court is satisfied nonetheless that it is clear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.4 For the foregoing reasons, the
4
In addition to Plaintiffs failure to state a claim, the complaint must be dismissed as
untimely under the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury products liability claims.
See, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-2. Plaintiff pleads in his complaint that he was sentenced for distribution of
crack cocaine on March 7, 1995. (Pl. Complaint at 1). This lawsuit was filed on or about
December 18, 2003. It is of no avail that Plaintiff avers in his response brief that it was just a
year or so [ago] when it was revealed to the plaintiff that it is not the cocaine hydrochloride
powder that was causing the harm and wrong the silent party that is responsible is Arm &
Hammer Baking Soda Co. (Pl. Response Br. At 8). Under New Jersey law, a cause of action
accrues when an injured person discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of
Court will grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim with prejudice.
s/
Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.
Dated: October 21st, 2004
reasonable diligence and intelligence, that he might have a basis for an actionable claim against
another person. The statute of limitations begins to run once an individual has knowledge or
should have knowledge that he has sustained an injury which is or may be attributable to the fault
of another. Wade v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 746 F.Supp. 493, 499 (D.N.J.
1990)(internal citations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs actual time of discovery of his alleged
basis for this action is immaterial, and the lawsuit was therefore time-barred.
! " ! ! # ! !
# " $ ! " " " " %
! " & ! !! " "
" "
! ' " "( )* * + , *

- !! " # $ ! " . !
" # . # . #
! " ! "
$ $ )) ) / 0 / 1 2 !!
/ *) 3 ),) ++ 4 5 , ) /
! ' ' " ! !$
/ 6 " 7 " "

" %5 # ! ! 8 " # "
& 1 3 7 " # # ,
) 91 99 " " ! : %5 . . # ! !
" ! . ! " ;&
' ! ! !!< "

" . .# / 6 " 7 "
" " %5 # ! ! 8 " #
" & 1 3 7 " #
# , ) 9 1 99 " " ! : %5
. . # ! ! " ! . !
" ;&
0 ,* $ " ,3 " ! : %' #

! " ! " " " !
" . ! ! " !
" " " !! "
! ! ( . " . " !
! ! " ! "
! ! ! " & , 3 00 9 9 = 3 >
)*= * 9 ) ) 0 : 9 3 00 , ? , ,)
,, 1 $ " $ , 3
/ " ' ( # ) 1 *) "
%@ ! " ! 0 ,*
# ! $ .#
@!! " < . ! #
!! " $ 9 3 0 ,*
$" 0 *9 0 ,) / / 4 ' - 1 1
"#
/ " ! 3 "( *, 1 **, "

. # ! " " .# ! :
%2 " " . " "# "
" < ! # . 8 " " "
" "# " " !! . !! "
!! . " " ! " ! & '
# ! , " "# " ? # /
A " . "
3 # 4 " "# # . .# " " "

.# " " " " !! " ! "
! " . . ! ! ! " ! ! "
6 "( B 6 - * ) 1 / "
! : % <
< " !! " " " " " "#
! < " .# .C " .
! " " " " !! "
" ) ++ 9
++ ! " ( . " #&
' " " " "# " # 4
/ " ! " " "# " ! "

# 4 !!
" . ! ! " ! "
.# ! ! ! " C D
# . / " !3 "( *, 1
**, " . # ! " " .#
! : %2 " " . " "#
" " < ! # . 8 "
" " " "# " " !! . !!
" !! . " " ! " !
&
0 ,* $ " ,3 " ! : %' #

! " ! " " " !
" . ! ! " !
" " " !! "
! ! ( . " . " !
! ! " ! "
! ! ! " & , 3 00 9 9 = 3 >
)*= * 9 ) ) 0 : 9 3 00 , ? , ,)
,, 1 $ " $ , 3
' 1 " ?' ' )

! 1 / ?' " !!
C # C #
" " ! C #
!! = !!< . " #
!! # " . . . #
! ! " # 1 E / " B 5 ' #
7 . / " 7 E 9 )
$ * * : %3 ! # #
. ! # ! # ! !! #
" # "
# " #. C " " " &
' ! ! " # $ %& %" ' " #
! 3 ! " !
8 ! " " ! ! "
F $/ @ " .# " + ! @ F
" ! + . 4 B ?9) ,9 @" ) + $/ @
" ! ! ' , ! 3 , 3 0
,3 0 ,
/ . " " # " #
! " " !
G$ " G ' ! ! . 2 $ . - ( # ! " !
# H I
" '
#
$/ @ !! !
*6 $/ @ .
91 "
)$ ! "
58 (
(( )
3 $/ @ " # ! *) " J !
" , " J +?# ! 3
# . " " "
" . " "( ' ! # ! "( " .
! K ) +++ D " + # /
"( ! ! ? #.
! G "( " #G ' " " " "
!! ! 6 3 # " "
$/ @ ! ( ?
C " ! ! # ! ! . #
L ! ! " . '
! " ! # . ! " ' !
G . #G "
G "( G ' . G G ' !
!
' . ! ! "! .
! ' ( 1 " " (
" 1 " :DD ? F " D 8 M
" N9,
" ' ' !! % % %" '
% $ %*% ) :
# " . ( .. # . . #
8 . " " . "
" " ! " + ! . " " "
" . . .# ! # =
# " " " . # ! "!" ! , !
3 . . # ! ! . FF
! . " . " ! C " # "( .
# " ! ?! ? " # " " " .
3 " , "
# . F " )+ "
. FF ! ! # !! ! " " "
8" " " ) ! ! !
" ! ! " " " "
. # " . " " "
! " + ! . " " . #
! 3 # " " " . "# 1
' " $ " # " " " . /
B # " " 9 - . "
" " 3
" , ! ! ! "
" . " " ! " " " ! ! ! "
# " " . # " ** . )
- =
" % $ %*% ) L " ! "( " #
! " "" ! !! " ! " ! "
"" # 8" # ! !
" ! " ! "( " #=
+ ,' (%$+ - ## % !
! $/ @ " " 8 . "( !
"" ! " ! $/ @ . . # "
" ! . " "
" . ! " ! "
" " ' $/ @ " . " "
" " . " !
" ( ! "
" ! " " !
? 4 " . " " " .
" . . ! # .# "
F " . "
" O " $/ @ " . ! " . #
D " " " . " " " !" "
# . ! . . . !
" ' # " !" # . !
(" ' ' '

@ B . ,+ 1 ( G1 FG ' ! B . .
" " $/ @ " / ,, ! 1 ' / " / "
# 1 " ! L * !
! $ "( P " 7 L C
" $/ @ "
" " # /$ /$
! ! !! . ! ! ! /$ ! C
# ! . .# 3 E # " " .#
" " !E . ! 1 P B 7 "
! 1 " ! " # " ! " F !
! O ! " )
! # 2
# ! /$ ""
" " . ! " " " / ++
! # ! E Q 58 . . ! "
$/ @ " E C 4 - . " - !
58 P !! # 4 " 4 . # "
! . ! ! /! ! #
E C 4 - . " . ! . ! K*++
' "
! # "" ! # 58 O 6 " "
/ # . ! "
6 ( " ' .# !
4 ! 1 E " !" ! " .
! 6 ! 58
. " !! " # " " ( # !! $/ @
" " "
C " ? . " # " # . "( ""
. " " / ++) ' # ! @
. ! ! " $ " .# $/ @
$/ . " " "
" 8 ! " " @ @
++ E ( / / " 6 "
" " !" ! " ! $/ @ E (/
# ! $/ @ ' " "
E ( / " " " O O
" . " $/ @
'
$/ @ :DD " D D " # D " :
7 " . ++9 $ ++ ?+*?
. % '
$/ @ " ! 3 #O 3 .
:DD " D " D D " ,D "R R+ R ,R +R/R +R
7 !' # O " "$ "
:DD " # . " D ++)D +D ? ? " ?! ?
. "(? $ !
:DD ( D ( D$ "( R/ ! " R R R@ F R "
: " S3 ! S@ F
" #
/ 0
' .# ! " L / " $" " " '
L . " L ! " !
" " / ! " ! $/ @ "
.# ! " :
%( " .%' % + -' " %(% %*% )1 '
# " " : " > $/ @ '
" 8 !" $/ @ " 5 # $/ @ " . . !
! " , 3 0 ' $/ @ " ! " "
" # "( " # $/ @ " " . . . " !
" " . ( " ! " " ! .
" # . ! ! " " #
" " ' . $/ @ " " . .
! " ! ' !
# . " # ""
! . .# ! " !" #
# " ! " . " !" " "
" /! $/ @ " . # !
! " ( # .C " " "
" # ( ! .# $/ @ " . "
. " . . # ( "(. "( 8 . " ! C " " #
" " " .# !
!! '' ' " $ (2 " " '+" 2 %(% %*% )1 B #

$/ @ " . . " " # . " " "
G G ! " " # " " ? " " "
" " . " $/ @
" ' 3
" " " G G # ! #
" / . G G " " "
! " " .
! #. !! " #" ! " "
"" . ! ! !
' ! ! " ? =
! ? "" # ! # . C .#
" " # $/ @ " " " !
! " " # " %( ( ) - - ! -) + ' "
%(% %" ' % )" !%' "* ! " '" - ) '+" ! + * !%' "* ! )"
% 3 ) " " (" ) ' $"1 E # ( " $/ @ "
.C " ! ' ! "
! $/ @ " . 3
! ?# ! "
$/ @ " $" O ! . "
" .# " C # E # .
! # " " " ?
@ " " . ! C # "
! # " ! " .
" " ! ! ! ! " !( C
' . L . " #
! ! /! ! ! #
" " ! " " O . #
! ! #. / " ! " G! #
/O ( # G # ! !
" . ! " " " .
" O " . ! ! ! !
! ! "( "
C # # C
@! " # " #
! " !# " " $/ @ "
/
+ ! ' %('
'/'45 * E@B5T B7 1/B B 5
3-'/'45 /// 1/B B / 4 E B 25E5B'
'5$ * 4 /E
3- '5$ /// 4 /E 2 /B ' ' 5 3B/'57 ' '5 2@U5$BE5B'
* 3 0* ?**
0* 1 "
0 * *+ " ! ! "
0* * 1 " "
0* * 1 " C "
0 * **
0* 1 "
4 . #! " " # ??
( # " . !! " # !
3 2 . ! 1 " ! 3
! ! " ! # =
( # ( " . ! "
! ! " .# 2 =
* " ! 2 .# ! ! "
=
9 " # " ! # # . .#
2 ! 2 ! # " "
# " . # !
" " " !" " =
) F ( " " !# " ! #
. .# 2 ! 2 (
" " #( ! "
=
( # . # " ! . . . " #
! !! " # ! 2 . ! 1 "
! # # #=
( # ( " . ! "
" " " . # #
# 2 . 3 2 ! "
# ! K) +++ K + +++ *
! " 2 . " ! " ! 8"
! " ! J
" ! . " ! !! " !
3 . ! ! " !
( " . *+ # ! "
! ! . ! =
- " ! # " # 2 ! "
=
" ! 3 ! .
" " " " "
" " " "
" ( ! 8 " ! " =
" # ! "
2 . " ! " !
. " . . 3 2 ! " ! "
" . " # " #
. V ( # ! 1 ! "
G( G G( #G " ! ??
" ( ! ! =
" . " ! ! # ! ! =
* " "( ! ! # ! ! !
! "!"
! L
" ! 1 ! " G" G " # L
" " ! # # "
" "
" ! 3 2 # ! #
# " L ! 2 . "
" " " ! # ! # #
" L
58 ! " # ! ! .
! . " . 8 ! " " )) ! )
58" ' " # " "
/ $ ! ,
0 * *+ " ! ! "
$ . ! # 2 ' # 2 #
" * /! # 2 !
" * # 2 # .
" " "
. " .#
# . " " ! ! " * !
! 3 2 ' " . . !
2 '
" # . # ! " # 2
" ! "
" # ! " " ! . #
" ! . 2
$ 9 9 ! 1 $ ! " ' "
. ! " ! + # .
! " ' 2 # "
" " + # ! " .
" " !
* ' 2 # ! " " ! 8 !
" " # " #

. .# !! . " ' !
. L # " ! " + # !
"
! $ 9 ! 1 $ ! "
9 - ! 8 ! +? # # 8 .
*
2 ??
" " " " " . " " .#
2 =
- !# " " ( " " "
.
" " " "
) 6 . " . "
2
# . " . ! " #
"
" $ ! L "
/! 2 " " #
. # ! " " . . .# " !
. " " " #
" .C " !
' 2 # " .C " !
" ! . ! .# 2 !
! ! " #!
- ' 2 # " !
.C " ! " ! " !
! L .
" " " 3 ! " " #. "
3 .# 2 " "
" ! .# " !
# # 2 O " ! " .
! ! " # "
O " " ??
. ! #" =
! # ! " =
O " ? 8 ! =
" .#
7 3 .# ! " "
" ! .# " . ! !
" ! . " # 8
" # " .#
* /! 2 " " "
" " " " /! 2 L
. " ! ! " .
" ! " 2 O 8 6
" " " !
" # 2
! "
9 6 2 " " .#
2
" " ! " # .# " !
2 O " ! " "
! ! " " # # " " # ! !
+ # " . " " " ' " #
8 +? # !
" 2 " "
" . " # " # " "
!
" " "
) B . " . 2 # " "
# # . 2 " #
" " # # /! # "
# " "
" " " ! "
" " #! !! " " " !
" " . " ! . " "
" " 1 ! " "
! " " ! ! . ! #
" ! 3 ! ! ! "
" ! " " 8 ! ! " "
.C " C "
L !!
/! 2 " " . .# . "
. " .C " " " ! "
) " .
) " ! " ! " ! "
8 " . # " .
" ! " 6 " " " ! . .
# " ! "!" ! ! .#
. " " "
" " 2
H2 I "" @!! " !
" # " " . "
+ " ! " ( "" !" " !
! !
. " " " # #
! " " ! . ! " #

" " ! . 8 " "
! . " # " . # O! "
" 8 ! " . !
/! 2 " " "
. " " " " "
" . ! " " " # '
. ) " *+ " ! " !
" . ! " " "
" ! . 8 " " ! .
" # " . # O ! " " 8
! " . !
* 6 2 " " ! " !
" . .# ! "
* " " . " # 8 "
" " ! " ! " "
" ! . " (
"" ! " " #
" " " /! . "
" " ! " " " ! ! "
* . ! " " " #
! " ! " " C " !
3 " " .# 7 !P "
9 /! 2 " " .
" " " " " # ! .
# O ! 8 ! ! " "
! " ! . " " # ! " #
8 . #! !
" .
B " C " " . .# !
. ! ! " . " . ! " .
! ! " ! " O " ! "
B " C " " . . " .
E . ! . ! C " # 8 "
. " !! " ! " . " ! (
2 " .
- 1 ! G 8 " . " !! " G #
!! " # , ! " + ! !
5 " 2 " !
, )3
* / # . " . " . " .
" " .C " ! "
" # # " " 2 #
#
9 B " C " " " .
. " " ! " " "
" 2 H2 I
"" @!! " !
" . .# # 2 .
" " ! !
- 1 ! G " G
" ( ! ! "
. #
! 2 . ! ! " "
" . !
! 2 . ! " 8 ' 2 . !
8 " " . " "
1 8 ! / " " .
" .# 3 ! " 9 ! , #
# # "
# " " !
# .# # . " ! ! " .# #
. ! ! # ! " ! " "
" ! ! #! " " !
. ! " . ! " # (
# " ! " #
" # . ! "
! . "( # . "( # " ! # "
! " " " .
# O ! # # . " " " !
3 ! ! . " 0 * * 1 "
"
. H . I L " !
" " " * *+ ! # . # " 3
. " " " * *+ # . . ??

# ! " ! " *
"
* # ! ! " ! "
( .# . ( .# !! " ! 3
" . # " " " " . +
# ! " " " ""
" / # " . " * *+ 3 . L
! " ! " " .#
" ! "
B # ! 1 $ !
" 1 $ ! 5 " ! C ! !
3 # " " " ! !
" ! !
# " ! ! #
! !! # " " "
" " " . . " . ! "
* *+
0* * 1 " C "
" " * *+ # " " * *+ # . .
#C " " " ! " ! ! #
! " . ! " . " # "
" . .# " * "" L .# 1 $ !
" . .# " " #
" 3
. ' " " C " # "
. ! # ! " # !! .# "
! " ! " "" " "
. " * *+ 0 * **
/
/ " " 6 # 2 .
# #. " # " ! # " #
! ! " # 2 #
. ! " " " " " * *+ ! "
" . " "
L " ??
" " " # ! " " #
- " " " #
!
#" " " " # !
7 ! #" . ! " #
' # 2 # # "
. " 6 " 8
! # " ! " # # 2 7 # #
2 # 2 " . #
F .# " " # ! " !
" # . !# "
! " " " #
5 " "
! " " " ! ! " "
" . ! .
- /! " ! " ! " # ?
" . " " ! " # . " "
! " # " . ! # ! =
" . ! " " " " .
! " # . .
. ! " " # =
!# ! " " .
.
/! " ! ??
! "!" # . =
" . " .
. =
!# ! " " .
.
7 /! " ! ! # ??
" . " " # . " " =
!# ! " " " 8
" " ! " 8 . . =
" !# " " # " # " " !
=
!# " ! . "" .#
# #
=
" . ! " .
! # " # ! L # " .
(
5 # " " " 8
! # " ! " # . . +
# ! " # ! " . !
" # .
1 ' " . ! " " ! # "
" . "
# ! " " #2
#2 .# #2
8" " " " " " " ! "
# !
2 ' #2 F " " !
" ! # .#
L # 2 !
! ! #
" # ' # 2 # " ) + ! ,
F ! " .# # !! " # "# ! #
! " #2 .
. " !
/ " . " #
L " ! # " # . ! #
! # # ! "
# . " ! " ??
" . . . " " .#
" ! 3 C # =
- " . " # L 1 $ !
" 8 " ! " # "
" ! "
5!! " # " " 8
! # " ! " # # "
! " " ! "
" ! " # # 7 " ! # " ! " #
# " 8 " ! #
" ( " " # . (
" # !
" " =C "
-# #" . " #
. .# ! " .# 3
# #
" C " ! #" ! 3
" ! " # " # !
. " C #. # !
C " ! # " ! 3 " 1 $ !
" " . ! " ! " # ' 8
" ! 3 " C " # " "
" 3 7 " ! 7 " ! .
C " ( # " " " " "
.# # " " " ! " #
C " ! " "
"
4 " ! # " . "
! # ! . " C # .
" " # .#??
8 " " # ! " # 8 "
!! " ! "
" # # F .# .#
" " ! " . ! ! " " "
#=
- 8 " " # ! " " !! "
" !. ! " " #=
8 " " # ! " 3
.# " ! " L
" " " # " !! " " !
.
B " ! # " #. #
.#??
8 " " # ! " =
- 8 " " # ! " 3
.# " ! " L
O " " !! " " !.
! ! " ! .# # "
. " # ! . " C
! ! " " . ! ! " " / " ! "
.# " ! " . "" .#
!! " " ! # ! "
! 7 " #
" !" ' " ! " # "
" .
" !" " ! .#??
" ! "
- " ! (
! ! " " " " " " F "
. ! ! " ' " !" ! " #
L .# " # " !
" . " . !
" !
" ! # # "
! " ! " # . "
( " . ! " " # ! "
! " " " ! . ! "
" " ! "
! # " . " # "
. " C " . .
"! " " ! "
# " . " # .
! " . " ! !
# ! "
/ 5 " # "
" . # ! # .
. " !" " ! .#??
" ! "
" !
. ! " # /! # # .C "
! .C " . " !" ! '
" !" ! L .#
" # " ( !
" . . ' 8 # ! !
! . ! ! " #
# ! !
@ 8
" ' 8 ! # "
! # " . ( . ! !! "
F !! .# ! 3
! " 8 ' !! " . ! #
. ( !! # .#
" " ! !! " !! " O " "
# ! ' # . ( " #
. " . 6 # ! # " . !! " . !
# ( # " # ! " ! #
" ' . " " ( ! # .# #
F .# " 1 $ !
"
' ! " " " 8
8" ! " 8 8"
# # ! # !
# #! 2 # #
. .# # ! 2
# !! " . ! # . ( #
( " #
* 6 # ( ' # ! # (
" " . ( C "
" ! 3 " " ! "
. " " # . .# ! "
" " 8 "
9 ' " ! # 6 # ! # " . ! "
!! " . ! # ( !!
# . "" .# " . # 8
" " 8 .#
# " ! . " " (
. ! " .# !! " ! "
! .# ! ( "
" ' " . .#
" . ! ! /! "
.# *+ # ! . !! .
# 8 !! " ! "
" ! " ! . " !
! ! # !
) !" # " ' !! " . ! #
( " !# " .# !! "
" " ! # .#
!! " ! " # "
" .# " ! "
1 " ! " .# 3 # ! .
" ! ! " ! " # !
" # 8" #2 7 # #
2 #2 # ! " "
" ! !! " " ! O #
" ! #
# " ! # "
. " #. ""
.# " # " " ! " " #
L ( ! " " " # .C " "
#L . !# ! " !
.C " .C " # . " "
" " ! L
! # " "
!? " " # .C "
! # L # " # "
8 /! " ! # L
#. ! " " ! 3 . " C
! " " " L
- /! " ! # L !
!? " # ! " # . "
"" " ! U ! ,H ,3 00 ++ LI
, 6 ! " # ! #
" . " .
! " " " " ! 3
! " "
7 ' # 2 ! "
" ! " #
" ! # " " "
! " # 2 !
. " # "
$ . #! = "
! " " # " #
" ! # "
" ' " ( # " ! "
" . . ! ! !
! " # 9
- ' " # " ! " " ! " " #
" ! # # .
L ! !! " .# # ! " !! "
# ! 7 ! P " F ! "
" # 2 "
" #. .# # " F ! "
!! " # " " ( ! #
"
58" . " " #
" ! # " !
! " . . ! 8 .# #
! " !! " # !
7 !P " F . - ' .
" " . # ! "
# ! " .# " "
" " ! # " ! " # "
8 ! " " .# !
" # . B .
" " # " ." !
# "# ! 3 ! .# " "#
! " ! # . 7 " ! ! # "
"# . # " .# # 2
3 " " . ! !
! .# " "# ! " ! # .
7 6 ! " " .
" #2 " . ??
" # . . !
8 .# " " .#
! F .# 8 "
=
" ! # . . ! 8 .#
" " # .# ! F .#
8 " "
* 3 ! " " 6 #
# ! 7 ! P " . . ! #
" C # 1 "# #" " " ! #
" # " ! #
" " # " # "
" ! !! " " " # " " " "
# . L 3 " ! # " "
" " # " # "
" " " ! " "
C # "# " " ! " "
"
9 ! ! /! # " # . "
.# # " ! # ! " "
" ??
# " " . ! " C # ! "
# " . ! # 1 "# "
. "
- " " " " #. . " "
. ! " ! 8 # !
" # ! . " ! "
" L ! "
" " # " " !
! " . " ! !
7 !P " - " "
! #" C # "# " " ! " "
"
) ! "" " / ! . #
! " 7 ! P " ! " ! #
" # " ! #
" " "
! !! " ! ! " " ! . # ! " # "
! " " #2 #??
! " " ! "
"
- " "
# " ! # ! ""
# . ""
" "
. .# " O "
!! " 8" "" . . ! # !
" " "" . !
C P " "
! ! " 6 # ! " # # "
. " ! " # " #
" ! # L " " . "
! " # 2 # !
" " ! 3 ! # C " " " "
! " . " !
! " " ! ! " ! "
!#
# " "
. " # ! " " ! 3 ! C "
" " " ! " .
! " ! " !
! " !# "
/ " ! 8 ! # " !
" # !# " #. . #
" " ! 3 ! C " " " "
" " " # . #
. . ! ??
+ # ! ! " ! "
# . ! "! "
" #. " . .# #! "
!
- ' " !# " " (
! .
#. . #! ! " #
! " #" !
"
7 "# ! " " # #
! ! " "
8" ! " # # !
. !
* !# ! " ! " #
/ " ! #" . " "
8 ! # " ! " # ! "
" # . # ! " " ! 3 !
C " " " " " " " # .
# ! " !
" ! ! ! " "
!# ! L " ! # "
" ! " # # . . ! ??
+ # ! ! " ! " #
. ! "! "
" #. " . .# #! "
!
- ' " !# " " (
! . #. . #! ! !
! " ! " # ! "
# " ! 7
"# ! " # # " "
! ! " "
9 L ! " .# " ! # "

# " " # " ! # " #
" " ! # .# #
" " # " . " "
" ! 8 ! # " ! " #
! " " # . #! " " !
3 ! C " " " !! " ! " "
" " ! ! " "
L ! " .# " ! # # " .#
"
) P " 6 # ! # " " ! 3
. " " " C "
" # . L
" # ! " #! . .C "
" ! , # . " ! # !
" .# #" . " ! "
" . # ! 1 $ ! " ' 1 $ !
" # # . " 8 "
" ! "
( 7 " 8 # " #
# # "
. " . 8 ! " " )) !
)
7 ! 1 ! " ??
G! " G ??
" " * * * =
- # " ! " ! ! " ! "
H " @" , I " . ( . 3
# " ! 3 # " # " # ! "
. . # ! " ! # !! " # ! 3 =
G! " G # L # " " .# #
! " ! ! " #
. # ! ! " =
* G! " G # #
# .# 7 !P " " # ! ! "
" # !! " # ! " # !! " # ! 3
" " ! " #
" " ! " =
9 G G # "
" # " # " . !
=
) G " # G " # " # ! # . (
" " " . "
" " "" . "
! # "
" # " " # " ! " #=
G" G " # # "
.# #2 . " =
G " ! " #G " ??
" ! # # "
! " ! # 8 "
. .# # ! " # # C " " !
=
- # # " " ! #
.
=
# 8 ! "" # .

Case No. 17-01233 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Appeal BRIEF PER ORDER OF MAY 26, 2017 Filed On June 7, 2017

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case No. 17-01233 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Appeal BRIEF PER ORDER OF MAY 26, 2017 Filed On June 7, 2017

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Stan J.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

CASE NO. 17-01233

BRIEF FOR APPEAL AS PER NOTICE OF MAY 26, 2017

In Re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006)

THE PURPOSE OF THIS REORGANIZATION AND DISCLOSURE PLAN IS TO FORMALIZE

The Debtor, STAN J. CATERBONE, PRO SE, is AN INDIVIDUAL, A CORPORATION, A

This Plan of Reorganization (the Plan) under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Stan J. Caterbone/Advanced Media Group Biography

Present - Advanced Media Group, President, Owner, and Founder.

In 2005 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner began a philanthropic endeavor by spending our

In 2000 to 2002 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner developed an array of marketing and

In 1999 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner developed a comprehensive business plan to develop

In 1999 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner contributed to the debate, research, and

In 1993 Stanley J. Caterbone, Petitioner was retained by Pflumm Contractors, Inc., as

ACTIVE COURT CASES

Published on OpenJurist (http://openjurist.org)

600 F2d 600 Hampton v. Hanrahan

600 F.2d 600

Iberia HAMPTON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 and 77-1370.

United States Court of Appeals,

Argued Aug. 14, 1978.

John O. Tuohy, Camillo F. Volini, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 272 of 538

At 4:30 a. m. on December 4, 1969, fourteen

During the trial, Jeffrey H. Haas and G. Flint

The principal issue on appeal is whether the

William O'Neal Paid informant for the FBI.

Cook County State's Attorney's Office

Edward Hanrahan Cook County State's Attorney.

James Meltreger Assistant State's Attorney.

Sheldon Sorosky Assistant State's Attorney.

Chicago Police Crime Laboratory

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 275 of 538

John Koludrovic Supervising officer of the Mobile Crime Laboratory Unit.

John Sadunas Firearms examiner.

Chicago Police Department Internal Investigations Division ("IID")

Harry Ervanian Captain, Chicago Police Department, director of IID.

John Meade Sergeant, Chicago Police Department.

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 276 of 538

II. DIRECTED VERDICT

1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups . . . .

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups . . . .

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 281 of 538

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 284 of 538

A series of investigations and inquests followed the December 4 raid. On December 12

Does Groth's statement describe what occurred at the apartment?

Did you use excessive force in effecting these arrests?

III. CONSPIRACY CLAIMS

C. Hanrahan and Jalovec

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 297 of 538

V. CLAIMS OF LIABILITY FOR POST-RAID ACTS

A. Hanrahan, Jalovec, the raiders, and the federal defendants

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 298 of 538

B. Purtell, Koludrovic, and Sadunas

C. Participants in the IID Investigation

Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 836-37.

A. State Defendants: Absolute Immunity

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 303 of 538

COINTELPRO CASE LAW - FRED HAMPTON Page 304 of 538