Taliban 2.

0: Dissension and Regeneration

VARUN VIRA

In recent months the idea of engaging the more “moderate Taliban

elements” has grown in popularity as coalition recalibration in Afghanistan
fails to yield the immediate dividends that some were hoping for. This notion
however fails to account for the structural shifts ongoing amongst militant
cadres and the rise of a new generation of militants, more radical, more
violent and less amenable to any political dialogue than their predecessors.

In the face of this radicalization, old guard factions have begun to lose ground
even as Al Qaeda re-orients its strategy to serve as an inspirational resource
catering to these new jihadi elements. While this dissension may conceivably
provide an opening for counterinsurgents, it will also result in a wider
targeting scope leading militant outfits to support attacks beyond their
traditional regional competencies. This is seen in the TTP ‘s first attempted
international strike on Times Square in May 2010. Furthermore with this
generational shift gaining momentum, it is likely that any negotiations will be
a poisoned chalice for any militant leader seeking compromise, regardless of
his jihadi credentials.

Historically, the prevailing belief has been that militant groups in the tribal
areas of Pakistan despite their diversity generally operate together in a
“broad-based ideological movement,”1 and despite the considerable
autonomy afforded to local commanders, operate under the loose command
structure headed by Mullah Omar. Others such as Steven Walt have theorized
that the linkages between the various militant outfits are less an ideologically
inspired alliance than “balance of power politics” incentivized by the
advantages of working together to oppose the foreign presence in the
region.2

Nonetheless the general consensus has been that these organizations have
coexisted in relative harmony, often sharing resources and expertise. It has
also traditionally been believed that while most AfPak militant groups have
paid lip service to jihad further afield, it has always been peripheral to their
core focus. For some that focus was Afghanistan as with the Quetta Shura
Taliban and Haqqanis, for others Pakistan as with the Tehrik-i-Taliban and the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and for yet others India as with groups such as Lashkar-e-
Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.

The emerging generational divide among militants however has profound

repercussions on these traditional beliefs. The ‘old guard’ of militants, such
as Mullah Omar and the Kashmir-focused jihadi groups, came of age with the
support of the ISI and have acted at least partly on behalf of the Pakistani

1
David Rohde, “Terrorists without borders” The New Republic, February 23, 2010. Available at
http://tinyurl.com/2ccovg7
2
Steven M. Walt, “Birds of a feather: Flocking together or flying apart?” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2009. Available
at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/28/birds_of_a_feather_flocking_together_or_flying_apart
state. However today after almost a decade of war in the AfPak region, a new
guard has emerged, more often than not composed and led by brash, young
and ultra-aggressive militants such as the 21 year old master suicide bomber
trainer Qari Hussain3 and the late 20s current leader of the Pakistani Taliban,
Hakeemullah Mehsud.

These men have spent a large portion of their formative militant careers
hunted by Pakistani and American forces. They have had little to no formal
contact with the Pakistani establishment, both visible and invisible, and have
shown little regard for traditional Pakistani structures, including mainstream
political parties, intelligence agencies and tribal structures. Instead they have
associated the Pakistani state as a puppet of the United States and actively
sought its overthrow. This has had a ‘splintering’ effect on traditional militant
structures where “older, more established groups are rejected in favor of
newer, more radical groups “each further removed from their original ISI
puppet masters.” 4

This trend has been noticed across the spectrum of jihadi groups. According
to a senior Afghan Taliban commander, 80% of its fighters are in their late
teens or early 20s and this composition has led to a recklessness and
contempt for authority that is like “earth and sky” when compared to their
predecessors who fought the Russians. A young fighter best explains their
disdain for their leadership based out of Pakistan, commenting after the
capture of Mullah Baradar, “We are here on the ground with our Kalashnikovs
and RPGs and we live and die by our own quick judgments. We don’t need to
listen to anyone who is not out here putting his life on the line.”5

This emerging divide is also reflected in the Haqqani network in North

Waziristan, known to be Pakistan’s strategic asset of choice for a post-
American Afghanistan. Jalaluddin, the Haqqani patriarch has explicitly stated
that attacking Pakistan “is not our policy. Those who agree with us are our
friends and those who do not agree and continue to wage an undeclared war
against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our
ranks.”6

The group owes much of its strength to its relationship with the ISI, allowing it
a sanctuary in North Waziristan and the ability to stay ahead of American
drone strikes.7 In return the Haqqanis have worked with the ISI to attack

3
Brian Wolfe, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Suicide Bomber Trainer: A Profile of Qari Hussain Mehsud” American
Enterprise Institute, May 25, 2010. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/pakistani-talibans-suicide-
bomber-trainer-profile-qari-hussain-mehsud-may-25-2010
4
Nicholas Schmidle, “In a ditch,” The New Republic, May 4, 2010. Available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/ditch
5
Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html
6
Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North
Waziristan” New America Foundation, April 2010.
7
Mark Mazetti and Eric Shmitt, “Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan help, US aides say” New York Times, March
25, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html
Indian targets in Afghanistan.8 Despite this symbiotic relationship even the
Haqqanis have not proven immune to the growing radicalization process. An
interesting anecdote by New York Times journalist David Rohde who was
captured and held by the Haqqanis describes how his young guards shattered
his misconception that the Haqqanis were “Al Qaeda lite” with little ambition
outside their Afghan campaign. Instead he claims that their contact with
other militants has led many of their young fighters to truly seek to “create a
fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al Qaeda that spanned the Muslim
world.”9

This phenomenon can be traced back to the Army’s storming of Islamabad’s

ultra-radical Red Mosque in 2007. Anger over the operation diverted the
traditional focus on Western targets in Afghanistan, giving way to a new
breed of militants equally interested in the overthrow of the “near enemy.”
The most prominent proponents of this strategy were the Tehrik-i-Taliban
(Pakistani Taliban) formed 5 months after the operation. Their relentless
wave of attacks inside Pakistan heralded the birth of the new phase of the
militancy that left no aspect of the Pakistani establishment safe.

The ISI came under direct attack with its headquarters bombed in both
Peshawar and Lahore. The Pakistani Army witnessed a dramatic escalation
when militants moved beyond attacking its outposts in the tribal provinces to
attacking the seat of its power, the Army GHQ in Rawalpindi. The Jamaat
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a key supporter of militant groups in the Afghan jihad
period and traditionally seen as the political face of the Taliban, witnessed its
leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman being targeted with rockets fired at his house
and his name allegedly discovered on a Taliban hit list. 10 More recently
another senior leader, Maulana Mirajuddin was killed by unknown gunmen.11
He had helped broker peace deals between the government and the Pakistani
Taliban in 2005 and was currently working with the government to help
residents of South Waziristan return to their homes after the fighting.

But nowhere has this shift in targeting priority been more dramatically
illuminated than by the April 2010 capture of former ISI alums Khalid Khawaja
and Sultan Amir Tarar by a hitherto unknown group calling itself the Asian
Tigers. The subsequent execution of Khawaja by the Tigers came as a
surprise to many observers given the sterling jihadi credentials of both men.
Tarar was widely known in Pakistan as Colonel Imam, an honorific bestowed
upon him by the Afghan Taliban for the training camps he established and
ran as an ISI officer during the Soviet jihad. His students included Mullah
Omar to whom he was reputedly very close.

8
“Haqqani Network” Institute for the Study of War. Available at
http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani-network
9
David Rohde, “7 Months, 10 Days in Cptivity,” New York Times, October 17, 2009. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?_r=1
10
Nicholas Schmidle, “Next-Gen Taliban,” New York Times, January 6, 2008. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06PAKISTAN-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
11
“Gunmen kill ‘peace broker’ in NW Pakistan,” Voice of America, May 20, 2010. Available at
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Gunmen-Kill-Influential-Peace-Broker-in-NW-Pakistan-94433779.html
Khawaja who was booted from the ISI for a critical letter he penned to
President Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s was a braggart compared to Imam’s
mujahid credentials but was known to many Western journalists for his
extensive militant connections. Khawaja claimed to have set up meetings
between Osama Bin Laden and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. His
organization, the Defense of Human Rights has been extremely active in
supporting militant causes including filing a petition with the Lahore High
Court blocking the extradition of Mullah Baradar and other top Quetta Shura
members detained by Pakistani security services.12 Khawaja also came under
suspicion of involvement in the kidnapping and execution of Wall Street
Journal reporter Daniel Pearl13 and was briefly detained after storming of the
Red Mosque.

That men with such obvious sympathies with militants in Pakistan would be
targeted is a startling indicator of the extent to which Pakistani militants have
severed ties with all they consider agents of the state. However even more
worrying are the insights revealed by an examination of the obviously
orchestrated ‘confession’ released by Khawaja’s captors. In it, the bitterness
felt by militant groups targeted by the Pakistani Army towards old guard
factions that continue to draw support and sanctuary by the Pakistani
establishment is apparent, particularly in the naming of well established
groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, Jamatiul Mujahideen and al-Badr, all of whom Khawaja claimed
continue to operate and fundraise freely in Pakistan with explicit ISI support.

Statements released by the media arm of the Taliban after the execution of
Khawaja also confirm this trend. Mohammed Omar, a spokesman for the
Punjabi Taliban told a Pakistani journalist that Khawaja was executed because
he would call the Punjabi Taliban, i.e. those who mount attacks inside
Pakistan “terrorists” while referring to the Afghan Taliban as “mujahideen.”14
Usman Punjabi, the leader of the Asian Tigers himself clarified on the
militant’s declaration of war claiming "For us Colonel Imam was not a
mujahid. If he was assumed in the past as the father of the Taliban, he did
that as a government employee - being an army officer. He still receives a
pension from the Pakistan army. To us he is their man”15

The true identity of the Asian Tigers remains shrouded in mystery but the
general consensus has been that they represent splinter elements of the
Pakistani Taliban and/or Kashmir-oriented militant groups, operating
potentially with the tacit knowledge of senior Pakistani Taliban commanders.

12
Bill Roggio, “Khawaja’s petition blocks extradition of Mullah Baradar, Quetta Shura leaders,” Long War Journal,
February 26, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2010/02/khawajas_petition_blocks_extra_1.php
13
B. Raman, “The mysterious case of Arif Qasmani,” Outlook India, July 4, 2009. Available at
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?214668
14
Arif Jamal, “The Asian Tigers – the new face of the Punjabi Taliban” Jamestown Foundation, May 20, 2010.
Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36398&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=c029bd42c8
15
Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Militants in no mood to talk” Asia Times, March 11, 2010. Available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE11Df01.html
This is supported by the released transcript of a conversation between Hamid
Mir, a top TV anchor known to be sympathetic towards the militancy, and an
unidentified militant. The transcript provides damning evidence that Mir
sealed Khawaja’s fate. He alleged that Khawaja worked for the CIA and Indian
agencies and detailed his alleged role in arranging the humiliating capture of
Red Mosque leader Abdul Aziz, who was captured by Pakistani security
services disguised in a burqua. The transcript also alludes that Khawaja and
Tarar’s captor is Tariq Afridi, a known Pakistani Taliban commander in Darra
Adam Khel and that the capture is being orchestrated under the directives of
Hakeemullah Mehsud.16

Khawaja’s son has a slightly different take blaming Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for his
father’s execution.17 The name Usman Punjabi is also shared with the driver
of Ilyas Kashmiri, leading to suspicion of his involvement. Kashmiri’s group
the Harkatul Jihadul Islami (HUJI) is known to be feuding with other Kashmir-
centric jihadi groups since they continue to be supported by the ISI while
Kashmiri has been declared a wanted fugitive.18

Whoever the true mastermind behind the operation is, the episode reveals
troubling evidence of growing collusion between splinter factions of Punjabi
militant groups who have traditionally composed the mainstay of Pakistan’s
strategic proxies, and the Pakistani Taliban drawn from the tribal provinces. 19
This process is generally believed to have begun in the aftermath of the Red
Mosque incident when some Punjabi militant commanders shifted their bases
from Azad Kashmir into the tribal provinces, and came into contact with the
TTP and Al Qaeda. Their ranks have been burgeoned by the inclusion of
sectarian Punjabi groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi. This fracturing of the Punjabi militant organizations and the
formation of what is generally referred to as the Punjabi Taliban by way of
distinction is of significant concern20 given their access and experience in the
Punjab as well as their generally higher levels of technological and
operational expertise.21 The recent coordinated attack on Ahmadi mosques in
Lahore on May 28, 2010 that killed over 70 individuals is just the most recent
example of their potential for extreme violence deep inside Pakistan.22
Another worrying possibility is these groups’ ability to strike into India, using
the escalation of regional war as a means to distract Pakistani attention from

16
Bill Roggio, “Pakistani journalist aids in murder of ISI officer,” Long War Journal, May 16, 2010. Available at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/05/pakistani_journalist_aids_in_m.php
17
Kashif Abbasi, “LJ killed my father: Usama Khalid,” The Nation, May 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/01-May-2010/LJ-killed-my-father-
Usama-Khalid
18
“HuJI chief behind ex-ISI man’s killing,” Times of India, March 2, 2010. Available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/HuJI-chief-behind-ex-ISI-mans-killing/articleshow/5882004.cms
19
Sabrina Tavernise, Carlotta Gall and Ismaili Khan, “In shift, Pakistan considers attack on militant lair,” New York
Times, April 30, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/world/asia/30pstan.html
20
“Adnan R. Khan, “Ex-Spy’s slaying spreads fear in Pakistan,” AOL News, May 1, 2010. Available at
http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/slaying-of-ex-pakistan-spy-khalid-khawaja-spreads-fear/19461393
21
Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Pubjabi Taliban network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 4. (April 2009).
22
Omar Waraich, “Sectarian attacks on Lahore mosques kill more than 80” Time Magazine, May 28, 2010. Available
at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1992630,00.html
operations in the tribal provinces, and degrading the state’s monopoly on
violence against India as a strategic tool.

Operating outside the moniker of their parent organizations offers these

militants greater autonomy and freedom of action, but they may have grown
increasingly disillusioned by the restrained ideologies of their former leaders.
In particular it is startling that police have felt it necessary to beef up their
security presence for Hafeez Saeed, the leader of the notorious anti-India
group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, after reports emerged that the TTP had
threatened his life in the wake of his condemnation of suicide bombings
within Pakistan against civilian targets.23

The LeT has long been considered one of the most extremist and tactically
capable of Pakistani militant groups and as of yet has remained scrupulously
loyal to the Pakistani establishment. The threats on Saeed’s life are the first
indicator that its firewall from the Taliban may be under siege. Terrorism
experts such as Rohan Gunaratne have also warned that Musharaff’s ending
of LeT infiltration into Indian Kashmir has eroded ISI control and allowed “Al
Qaeda to make inroads.” The group’s current idling mode provides the
danger that “if it is not rehabilitated, more of its members will join the
Taliban.”24Other ISI proxies such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed may already have
succumbed to this pressure with elements of their militants already believed
to have joined the Punjabi Taliban and their leader Maulana Masood Azhar
named in Khawaja’s confession as a militant commander who retains links to
the ISI.

This extent of the challenge extended to old guard factions is seen in the
Asian Tigers’ willingness to defy even Mullah Omar. It is known that Mullah
Omar has sent a jirga to North Waziristan to petition for the release of
Colonel Imam. Some journalists have even reported that he personally
traveled to North Waziristan, exposing himself to considerable danger to
organize the release.25 This is unlikely but the fact that his explicit directive to
free Colonel Imam has failed is a damning indicator of the independence with
which new factions are willing to operate.

It has also been reported that the Asian Tigers sought not the release of
Mullah Baradar and other Afghan Taliban leaders but rather a transfer of
custody potentially as a result of Baradar’s alleged intentions to enter into
negotiations with the Americans and the Karzai government. Interestingly in
this vein it is also reported that one of their key demands centered around
the rescinding of Khawaja’s petition to the Lahore High Court seeking to block

23
Amir Mir, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan threatens LeT founder Hafiz Mohammed Saeed,” Daily News and Analysis
India, May 20, 2010. Available at http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-threatens-let-
founder-hafiz-mohammad-saeed_1385192
24
Kamal Siddiqi and Pramit Pal Chaudhari, “Rise of Punjabi Taliban” Hindustan Times, October 25, 2009. Available
at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Rise-of-Punjabi-Taliban/Article1-468938.aspx
25
Brigadier General Shaukat Qadir, “Will the new Punjabi Taliban provoke a war in North Waziristan?” The
National, May 9, 2010. Available at http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20100510/OPINION/705099963/1080
the extradition of captured Quetta Shura members to American custody.26

Part of the willingness to defy the Afghan Taliban may stem from anger at
their insistence on remaining regionally focused. In a speech released at the
end of 2009, Mullah Omar appeared to publicly distance himself from Al
Qaeda’s global war strategy and announce his goal to engage in friendly
bilateral relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors while purging rogue elements
from Taliban ranks who do not adhere to their codes of conduct. Omar has
also consistently stated his aversion to attacks on Pakistani targets
characterizing them as “bringing a bad name to Mujahideen, and harming the
war against US and Nato forces in Afghanistan.”27To many Salafi jihadists this
has been seen as a form of retreat and unacceptable compromise with regard
to Western countries as well as “infidel-ruled” Islamic and Arab states.28

There have also been inklings of growing disenchantment between the

Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Los Angeles Times recently quoted U.S.
military and counter-terror officials as claiming that Afghan Taliban militants
are beginning to distance themselves from Al Qaeda, refusing sanctuary and
assistance even for payment in an effort to ease the pressure from Pakistani
intelligence agencies and American drone strikes.29 Accounts have also
emerged suggesting that relations between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar may
have been significantly overstated and instead been rocky from the outset. A
document penned by Egyptian jihadist Mustafa Hamid claims that Al Qaeda’s
global ambitions and antagonism of the United States constituted a direct
threat to the authority of Mullah Omar and details the alleged reluctance of
Bin Laden to pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar as was customary.30

Notable is that these allegations have been published by the Afghan Taliban’s
media outlets hinting towards some level of endorsement. Omar Bin Laden,
the now estranged son of Osama has echoed these sentiments claiming that
both Mullah Omar and Osama were always “happier” with members of their
own organizations and that “if there were no more enemies left on earth”
they would “fight each other.”31 As a caveat it is important to note that
analysts have suggested an operational convergence between elements of
the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda particularly in the
wake of their joint operation against the CIA’s Khost base in December
2009.32 However it is important to note that this convergence has centered
around Afghan operations. Having provided support, it is not inconceivable
26
Amir Mir, “Killers of ISI official wanted custody of Afghan Taliban, not release,” The News, May 2, 2010.
Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=237109
27
Mazhar Tufail, “Mullah Omar Orders Halt to Attacks on Pak Troops,” The News, February 24, 2009. Available
through Lexis Nexis.
28
Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Jihadis debate growing rift between al-Qaeda and the Taliban,” Jamestown Foundation,
December 15, 2009. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35831&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=173d41ac96
29
David S. Cloud and Julian S. Barnes, “Some US officials see a growing Taliban-Al Qaeda rift,” Los Angeles Times,
May 11, 2010. Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/11/world/la-fg-extremist-wedge12-2010mar12
30
Vahid Brown, “The Façade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s dubious pledge to Mullah Omar,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3,
Issue 1, (January 2010).
31
“William MacLean, “Bin Laden’s son: No “love” among Qaeda-Taliban,” Reuters, January 26, 2010. Available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60P4A320100126
that Pakistani-centric militants are now demanding the same type of
cooperation for their domestic operations.

The Haqqanis also appear to be following suit in distancing themselves from

Al Qaeda and other ambitious militant groups that have expanded their
horizons beyond the Afghan insurgency. Sirajuddin Haqqani has publicly
urged a distinction between his group and Al Qaeda stating in May 2009 “It is
a mistake to think that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are pursuing the same aim.
Al Qaeda is trying to spread its influence throughout the world. This does not
interest us. The Taliban’s aim is to liberate Afghanistan from foreign
troops.”33

Part of this distancing may stem from the degradation of Al Qaeda’s utility to
the Haqqanis as they are pushed increasingly underground by drone strikes
as well as the notoriety and attention Al Qaeda militants bring with them.
Contact with militants from the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban who fled to North
Waziristan in the aftermath of Pakistani Army operations in South Waziristan
may also be exacerbating tensions. The presence of these militants has
drawn unwelcome attention to the province, creating significant pressure on
the Pakistani Army to intervene militarily. In this vein the Haqqanis are likely
to have been involved in helping Hafiz Gul Bahadur, another Afghan-focused
commander in North Waziristan, persuade TTP militants to withdraw back to
South Waziristan.34 It is uncertain as to whether this constituted an expulsion
or not but Bahadur and his shura were known to have been upset at the
massive influx of Mehsud militants and their ability to act as spoiler elements
for their peace deal with the Pakistani Army.35

While the Afghan Taliban may be moving away from Al Qaeda, there is
significant evidence to suggest that other Pakistani Taliban groups are
moving closer. For Al Qaeda strategic planners this linkup provides an ideal
opportunity. Already possessing a defined global jihad ideology and a strong
militant brand, the greatest weakness for Al Qaeda has been its operational
and logistical degradation in the face of withering drone strikes.36 ‘Infecting’
or co-opting Pakistani outfits who already have manpower and logistics in
place allows Al Qaeda to reconstitute its relevance as an inspirational
resource on the jihadi stage. It is thus in its favor that generational shifts
have provided a much more receptive audience whose own beliefs are better
synced with Al Qaeda’s expanded targeting scope and extreme radicalization.

This growing “lockstep” between Al Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups is

seen in the attempted Times Square bombing which marked the TTP’s first

32
Bruce Riedel, Edward Luce and Martin Indyk, “The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future,”
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., March 9, 2010. Transcript of lecture available from
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0309_al_qaeda.aspx
33

34
Bill Roggio, “Hakeemullah’s pullout from North Waziristan an ‘excuse’ for Pakistan not to move” Long War
Journal, May 26, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/hakeemullahs_pullout.php
35
Mustaq Yusufzai, “Mehsud militants agree to leave NWA” The News, May 25, 2010. Available at
http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=241101
36
Steve Coll, “The Paradoxes of Al Qaeda” New America Foundation, January 27, 2010. Available at
http://newamerica.net/publications/resources/2010/the_paradoxes_of_al_qaeda
tangible international foray in the post-Beitullah period. As Brian Fishman of
the New America Foundation notes, even if the TTP did not “operationalize
this particular attack, they want all of us to think that they did. That's a big
deal, and it aligns very closely with al-Qaeda's core priorities."37 Punjabi
militant outfits have also had fairly extensive links with Al Qaeda dating back
a few years. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi shares an extreme distaste for Shias and
has often been described as “the eyes, ears and operational arm of Al
Qaeda.”38 The Lashkar-e-Taiba has been accused of close affiliations with Al
Qaeda and is believed to be “increasingly placing the West in its sights.”39
Groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed are also believed to have converged
towards Al Qaeda and provided safe houses and limited tactical expertise.40

The phenomenon of increased radicalization and militant convergence has

not gone unnoticed but it has generally been seen as a positive development,
potentially exacerbating tensions within the militant movement and providing
an opening for American and Pakistani forces to exploit. However the idea
that dissension will lead to overt intra-militant warfare is an optimistic
outcome. More likely the result will be an extension of what we have already
witnessed, i.e. the slow siphoning off of support and resources towards the
new, more radical groups at the expense of older groups as the Afghan
Taliban.

Should this transfer of leadership materialize, it will make complicate

matters. Negotiation with weaker parties is meaningless from a strategic
viewpoint while negotiations with the stronger parties may become near
impossible given their ideological intransigence. Convergence also affords a
significant expansion of tactical ability as noted by Tariq Pervez, head of
Pakistan’s National Counterterrorism Authority who observed that ““ideas,
logistics, cash [come] from the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians and Saudis,
are on hand to provide the chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists plot the
attacks, while the Pakistani Taliban provides the martyrs.”41

Convergence may also profound outcomes on the aftermath of an American

withdrawal. Some proponents of withdrawal have pointed to the Soviet
experience, noting that militants did not “follow them home”42 but should Al
Qaeda inspired groups gain the upper hand and seize the militant leadership
mantle, the results could be catastrophic. In that event we are likely to
continue to see attacks on the Pakistani state continue with renewed vigor

37
Brian Fishman, Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria, “Jihadists and Time Square” Council on Foreign Relations, May
6, 2010. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22058/jihadists_and_times_square.html
38
Kamal Siddiqi and Pramit Pal Chaudhari, “Rise of Punjabi Taliban” Hindustan Times, October 25, 2009. Available
at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Rise-of-Punjabi-Taliban/Article1-468938.aspx
39
Steven Tankel, “Terrorism out of Pakistan” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 27, 2010. Available
at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40867
40
Ryan Mauro, “Part Time Allies” Front Page Magazine, May 19, 2010. Available at
http://frontpagemag.com/2010/05/19/part-time-allies/
41
Aparna Pande, “The Fight for Pakistan” Hudson Institute, January 29, 2010. Available at
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=6727
42
Steven Walt, “The Safe Haven Myth” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2009. Available at
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth
and the potential that the Afghan vacuum be exploited for the training of
militants focused on the international jihad.