ART. III SEC.
1
Republic v Sandiganbayan
Immediately following the EDSA revolution, then President Cory issued
EO No. 1 which created the Presidential Commission on Good Govt
(PCGG). The PCGG was tasked to recover all ill gotten wealth of
former president Marcos, his immediate family, relative, subordinates
and close associates. EO No. 1 gave PCGG the power to conduct
investigations and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry
out its purpose.
The PCGG accordingly created the AFP Anti-graft Board to (1) execute
the mandate with regard to AFP personnel, both in active service and
retired, (2) investigate on matters that the President may direct them to.
The AFP Board conducted investigations on Major General Ramas. In
1987, the AFP board issued a resolution consisting of its findings and
evaluation and the resolution disclosed that a certain Elizabeth
Dimaano was Ramas mistress and that the raiding team confiscated
from Dimaano various communications equipment, Php 2.87M and
$50,000 aside from the weapons exclusively and solely specified in the
search and seizure warrant. A case was then filed against Ramas and
Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Complaint claiming ownership
over the monies, communications equipment, jewelries and various
land titles that were confiscated by the raiding team.
In the case before the Sandiganbayan, the Republic filed for many
postponements seeking time to gather more evidence. In 1991, the SB
rendered a resolution dismissing the Amended Complaint, citing as
ground, among others, that there was an illegal search and seizure of
the items confiscated. After denial of its MR with herein respondent,
petitioner raised this present motion, averring that the respondent erred
in declaring the seized items from Dimaano as inadmissible in evidence
as these were illegally acquired. It was argued that Dimaano cannot
invoke the exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights for there was no
Constitution at the time the search and seizure was done.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights under the 1973 Constitution
2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the ICCPR and
the UDHR remained in effect during the interregnum.
Held:
1. NO. The EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution and the resulting government
was thus a revolutionary government that was bound by no
Constitution. The Bill of Rights was therefore not operative during
the period of interregnum and at the time, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited
the extent and scope of such directives and orders. A person can
therefore not invoke any exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights.
2. YES. The revolutionary government of President Aquino, as the
de jure government in the Philippines, was bound by treaty
obligation assumed under international law. The government was
then bound by both the ICCPR and the UDHR which requires the
signatory states to insure that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property. During the interregnum, the directives and orders
issued by the government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted by the revolutionary
government and this includes adherence to the ICCPR and the
UDHR.
The raiding team therefore had no legal basis to confiscate the
communications equipment, jewelries, monies and land titles
found in the possession of Dimaano. The seizures were therefore
illegal and the items not specified in the warrant should be
returned. The Court heavily notes that it does not declare
Dimaano as the lawful owner of the items, merely that the search
and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold the items from the possessor.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. Inc. Petitioner is a labor Union composed of employees of
the respondent, PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, and it decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang to protest against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
The Union informed the respondent company of the intended
demonstration.
The company did not stop them but warned the Union that the workers,
without leave of absence who fail to report for work, shall be dismissed
for violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the CBA
The company eventually filed charges against petitioner with violation
of the CBA
The COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ruled in favor of the
company and found the Union guilty for having bargained in bad faith
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal was in contravention to the Bill of Rights
Tupas v CA
Doctrine: Both substantive and procedural rights go hand-in-hand;
neither one is given priority over the other.
Petitioner Tupas received a copy of the RTC decision on April 3, 1989,
to which he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 14 days
thereafter, on April 17, 1989. The motion for reconsideration was
denied on May 3, 1989 and was received by the petitioners counsel on
May 9, 1989. It subsequently filed its petition for review with the CA on
May 23, 1989, 14 days upon its receipt of the copy of the decision. The
petition was deemed tardy by the CA, as the 15-day reglementary
period had already lapsed on May 10, 1989. Petitioner assails that the
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners were not demonstrating against the management;
thus it is not a strike. PBMs assertion is based on on property
right only. Primacy of human rights over property rights, which
includes: right to freedom of expression, right to peaceful
assembly and right to petition for redress of grievances.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the right of free expression and
the right of assembly occupy a preferred position
For a law that restricts or impairs property rights to be
valid, there has to be a reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its purpose
that the law is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or oppressive
For a constitutional infringement of human rights, there has
to be a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil
that the State has the right to prevent
o In this case, there was none
The SC also held that it was the company that was guilty of unfair
labor practices for restraining its employees from exercising their
rights
The decision of the CIR was reversed and the employees were
reinstated.
HELD: NO. In Lacsamana v CA, the court held that if a motion for
reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court,
the movant has only the remaining period within which to file a
petition for review. Hence it may be necessary to file a motion with
the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for
review.
In the case at bar, petitioner Tupas filed his motion for
reconsideration 14 days after his receipt of the RTC decision. As
such, the 14 days from the initial 15-day reglementary period had
already been consumed, thus leaving him only 1 day to file a
respondent court committed reversible error in its Resolution and that
they have been denied the right to due process.
ISSUE: W/N respondent CA erred in dismissing the petition for review
for being tardy and as such denying petitioner of his right to due
process.
petition for review with the CA. Given this, the filing for the petition
for review with the CA should have taken place on May 10, 1989;
however, petitioner Tupas filed it on May 23, 1989, another 14
days upon his receipt of the decision denying his motion for
reconsideration. Such petition for review is thus clearly tardy.
Petitioners counsel could have also filed a motion for extension,
but failed to do so. As such, they are deemed to have forfeited
their right to appeal and cannot therefore claim that they been
denied due process.
Rules of Procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and protection of substantive rights in
judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due
process. Both substantive and procedural rights go hand-in-hand;
neither one is given priority over the other.
Petitioners argument that they should not be prejudiced by the
mistakes of their counsel is also unacceptable. If such argument is
granted, there would be no end to litigation as every shortcoming
of any counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client
through another counsel, which could go on ad infinitum. Court
proceedings would thus be rendered indefinite, tentative, and
subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of
replacing counsel.
Banco Espanol-Filipino v Palanca
Palanca was indebted to BANCO and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt.
Due to the failure of Palanca to make his payments, Banco executed
an instrument to foreclose on the mortgage of Palancas property.
But Palanca left for China and he never returned until he died.
Since Palanca is a nonresident, Banco has to notify Palanca about their
intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. Also, the
lower court further orderd the clerk of court to furnish Palanca a copy
and that it would be sent to Amoy, China.
However in an affidavit signed by an employee of the attorneys for the
bank, stated that the envelope was addressed to Palanca in Manila.
A judgment was taken against Palanca by default for not having
appeared in court and the court eventually granted Bancos petition to
execute Palancas property.
After 7 years, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Palance as his
administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. He averred that
there had been no due process as Palanca never received the
summons.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Court had jurisdiction over the person and property of the
defendant
2. W/N the proceedings were conducted in such manner as to
constitute due process of law
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court had jurisdiction over the property.
Jurisdiction over the person - acquired by the voluntary
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority,
or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person
Jurisdiction over the property - from a seizure of the property
under legal process whereby it is brought into the actual custody
of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective, in which case
the property may never be taken into custody at all
In this case, jurisdiction over the person was not acquired since
the original defendant, Engrancio, never appeared before the
court in the duration of the proceeding. However, jurisdiction over
the property was acquired since it had followed the conditions and
considerations based on the power, which under the law, it
possesses over the property. Jurisdiction over the person in this
case is non-essential.
2. Yes. Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely;
(a) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding;
(c) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) judgment must be heard upon lawful hearing. Notification of
foreclosure proceedings to the defendant is a necessity.
The law recognizes this and requires the publication of the
proceedings in a newspaper and, usually in addition to this, the
mailing of the notice to the defendant, if his residence is known.
There is, however, no assurance that the absent owner will
receive the notification. It should be noted that the law does not
 absolutely require the notice be sent by mail in every event, but
only when the address is known.
The failure of the clerk to mail the notice is a mere irregularity and
will not affect the decision. Since jurisdiction has already been
established, all that due process of law requires is an opportunity
to be heard.

Ang Tibay v CIR HELD: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations more an
Doctrine:
Requisites for administrative proceedings:
1. Right to hearing including right to present case and submit evidence
2. Tribunal must consider evidence presented
3. Decision must have something to support itself
4. Evidence must be substantial reasonable evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate support to a conclusion
5. Decision must be based on evidence presented or at least
contained in the record
6. Tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration
7. Board or body must render its decision in a manner where parties
can know the various issues and the reason for decision.
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio fired some of the members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU
questioned the validity of said lay off as the employees laid off were
members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National
Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU and
also claims that such lackage is not true and Teodoro was guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against NLU and Inc and unjustly
favoring NWB.
CIR ruled in favor of NLU. SC reversed decision for lack of substantial
evidence. MR filed by CIR and Motion for new trial was filed by NLU.
ISSUE: W/N the NLU is entitled to a new trial
Shu v Dee
Doctrine: The functions of NBI are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasijudicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine
probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are
merely recommendatory.
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a
complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging
the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage
submitted to Metrobank. Both deeds of real estate mortgage were
allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other
was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation.
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are
far more comprehensive and expensive.
However, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
Case REMANDED to CIR
HELD: No. The respondents were not denied their right to due
process; SC held that there is no merit in the respondents claim
that they were denied due process when they were not informed
by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioners
appeal.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its
absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a
party is given a chance to be heard through his MR.
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of
Makati (city prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of
forgery and falsification of public documents.
The respondents argued in their counteraffidavits that they were denied
their right to due process during the NBI investigation because the
agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard
sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison.
City Prosecutor ruled in favor of the Petitioner. Secretary of Justice
reversed the city prosecutors findings. The CA granted the petition and
annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE: W/N respondents were denied of their right to due process
GMA v COMELEC
Doctrine: COMELEC is also a quasilegislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication
should not have been then ignored.
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC relative to the conduct of the 2013
national and local elections dealing with political advertisements.
Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations
placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010,
COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6
of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a
candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per station."
For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing
the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime
limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station"
basis, to a "total aggregate" basis.
Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615 provides for
respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a MR of her
resolution. Any defect in due process was cured by the remedy
the respondents availed of.
On the respondents allegation that they were denied due process
during the NBI investigation, we stress that the functions of this
agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has
no judicial or quasijudicial powers and is incapable of granting any
relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The
NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find
that no denial of the respondents due process right could have
taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the
prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of
finding the existence of probable cause.
GRANTED Petition
Held: Yes. Resolution no. 9615 needs prior hearing before
adaptation as a matter of due process.
While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and
not a mere administrative agency under the Executive
Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be deemed
to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative
convenience but as a dictate of due process.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon
the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds
to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
COMELEC is also a quasilegislative authority. The due
a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a
proper computation of "aggregate total" airtime, and violates the equal
protection guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and purpose of R.A.
No. 9006.
Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or
political party's "right to reply," is likewise assailed to be unconstitutional
for being an improper exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers;
for constituting prior restraint and infringing petitioners' freedom of
expression, speech and the press; and for being violative of the equal
protection guarantee.
In addition to the foregoing, petitioner GMA further argues that the
Resolution was promulgated without public consultations, in violation of
petitioners' right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to due process was
violated
Government of HK v Olalia
Doctrine: Extradition Proceedings is not a criminal proceeding but
administrative. Deprivation of bail is only allowed in criminal
proceedings. Thus due process must be observed by providing bail and
he must prove that with clear and convincing evidence that he is not a
flight risk.
Respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3
counts of bribery and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of
arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong
DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The DOJ
forwarded the request to the NBI. The NBI filed for the provisional
arrest with the RTC, which issued the order.
Respondent filed with the CA questioning the validity of the order, which
the CA declared void.
The DOJ filed with the SC a petition praying that the CA decision be
reversed, which was granted, sustaining the order of arrest.
Hong Kong filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of the
respondent. In the same case, the petitioner was denied bail given that
no law granting bail in extradition cases existed and that the
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication should not have been then ignored.
For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with
Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the
new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and
ineffectual.
Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.
HELD: No. Article III, Section 13 provides that the right to bail
shall not be impaired, except in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua. In US v. Purganan, the Court held that bail does not
apply to extradition proceedings, but only to criminal proceedings.
The right to bail comes from the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused.
However, the Court notes the trends in international law, where
primacy is placed on the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed the
right to life, liberty, and other fundamental human rights, has been
adopted by the UN General Assembly, which are now recognized
as customarily binding upon members of the international
community. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, in granting bail to a
deportee, held that the principles of the UDHR are part of the law
of the land.
In light of this, a reexamination of Purganan is in order. The
exercise of the State power to deprive one of his liberty is not
limited to criminal proceedings. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only
respondent was a flight risk.
In a motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge, to whom the
case was raffled to, granted the motion for bail.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC committed GADLEJ when it granted bail to the
respondent?
RCBC v BDO
RCBC entered in to a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with BDO
(formerly Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc,) to buy 67% (226.46M shares) of
Bankards Capital Stock. Pursuant to such agreement, RCBC paid
such as in administrative proceedings.
If bail has been granted in deportation cases, there is no
justification why it cannot be allowed in extradition cases.
Extradition is sui generis, tracing its existence to treaty obligations.
It is not a trial to determine guild. It is not a civil proceeding but is
merely administrative in character. Though administrative, it bears
the earmarks of the criminal process. An extradite may be
subjected to arrest, a restraint on liberty. The respondent has
been detained for over two years. While our extradition law does
not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
The standard of due process however should not be the same in
criminal proceedings. In extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. The
extraditee then has the burden of proving he is not a flight risk.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The petition is DISMISSED. The case is REMANDED to the trial
court to determine whether the respondent is entitled to bail on
clear and convincing evidence.
HELD: YES. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of
partiality which requires a showing that a reasonable person
would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other
party to the arbitration. Such interest or bias, moreover, must be
BDO P1.78B.
However, three (3) years later, RCBC claimed that in such transaction
there was an overpayment of shares which resulted from an alleged
overstatement of valuation of accounts, amounting to P478M, violating
their SPA warranty.
Because the two parties subsequently failed to arrive at a settlement,
RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the International
Chamber of Commerce-International Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA).
A certain Ian Barker was appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman of the
Arbitration Tribunal. Upon the Tribunal requiring both parties to pay
$350,000 each as advance costs pursuant to Article 30(3) of ICC
Rules, RCBC paid its share but Respondent BDO did not pay its
respective $175,000 worth of advance costs.
Instead, BDO applied for separate advances on costs in place of the
computed equal shares for a fairer allocation since RCBCs total claim
is substantially higher (40 times higher) than their own counterclaims.
Unfortunately, ICC-ICA denied BDOs application and even after being
granted numerous extensions, respondents still relentlessly refused to
pay.
Chairman Ian Barker issued a letter stating that: the Tribunal has no
power (under the ICC Rules) to order Respondent to pay the advance
costs or to give the Claimant any relief against Respondents refusal to
pay. Under the ICC Rules, the most that the tribunal could do is
suspend its work and upon expiration of the suspension, withdraw all
claims and counterclaims.
So if the Claimant (RCBC) still wishes to proceed, RCBC must pay all
sums requested (including BDOs share). Subsequently, Tribunal
interprets the Claimants latest letter as an application by the Claimant
for the
issue of a partial award against the respondents in respect of their
failure to pay.
Chairman Barker subsequent letter attached a copy of an Article by
Matthew Secomb specifically dealing with remedies not expressly
allowed by the ICC Rules but in practice has been resorted to by
parties in International Arbitration Proceedings.
direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote,
uncertain, or speculative. When a claim of arbitrators evident
partiality is made, the court must ascertain from such record as is
available whether the arbitrators conduct was so biased and
prejudiced as to destroy fundamental fairness.
Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in finding
that Chairman Barkers act of furnishing the parties with copies of
Matthew Secombs article is indicative of partiality such that a
reasonable man would have to conclude that he was favoring the
Claimant, RCBC. Even before the issuance of the Second Partial
Award for the reimbursement of advance costs paid by RCBC,
Chairman Barker exhibited strong inclination to grant such relief to
RCBC, notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the Arbitration
Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to order the
Respondents to pay the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to
give the Claimant relief against the Respondents refusal to pay.
That Chairman Barker was predisposed to grant relief to RCBC
was shown by his act of interpreting RCBCs letter, which merely
reiterated its plea to declare the Respondents in default and
consider all counterclaims withdrawn as what the ICC Rules
provide as an application to the Arbitration Tribunal to issue a
partial award in respect of BDOs failure to share in the advance
costs. It must be noted that RCBC in said letter did not
contemplate the issuance of a partial order, despite Chairman
Barkers previous letter which mentioned the possibility of granting
relief upon the parties making submissions to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Indeed, fairness dictates that Chairman Barker refrain from
suggesting to or directing RCBC towards a course of action to
advance the latters cause by providing it with legal arguments
contained in an article written by a lawyer who serves at the ICC
Secretariat and was involved or had participation insofar as the
actions or recommendations of the ICC in the case. Though
done purportedly to assist both parties, Chairman Barkers act
clearly violated Article 15 of the ICC Rules declaring that in all
cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and
ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its
case. Having pre-judged the matter in dispute, Chairman Barker
had lost his objectivity in the issuance of the Second Partial
Award.
In response to Barkers letter, RCBC confirmed the Arbitral Tribunals
interpretation which applied them for a partial award against the
Respondents.
In compliance, RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of
Advance on Costs Paid, praying for the issuance of a partial award. On
the other hand, BDO filed their Opposition to the said application
alleging that the Arbitration Tribunal has lost its objectivity in an
unnecessary litigation over the payment of Respondents share in the
advance costs, pointing out that RCBCs letter made no mention of any
partial award and merely asked that Respondents be declared as in
default.
RTC of Makati confirmed RCBCs First Partial Award and denied
Respondents motion to vacate and motion for reconsideration. This
was followed by the issuance and confirmation of the Second Partial
Award and the Final Award respectively by the Tribunal and Makati City
RTC (both of which were in favor of RCBC). Subsequently, BDO
countered by filing separate motions to Vacate Second Partial Award
and Final Award in two different branches of the Makati City RTC. Upon
denial of BDOs motion to vacate the second award by the RTC, BDO
filed in the CA a petition for review. The CA reversed the RTCs denial
to vacate the second partial award, after which, the RTC vacated the
Final Award in favor of BDO. Consequently, RCBC filed a motion for
review on certiorari in the SC, claiming that Chairman Barkers alleged
partiality/bias is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the Respondent BDOs right to due process is violated by the
Tribunals alleged evident partiality.
ADMU v Capulong
Doctrine:
Minimum standards for imposition of disciplinary sanctions in schools
(Guzman v NU Case):
1. Informed in writing of the nature of the accusation
2. Right to answer charges, optionally with counsel
3. Right of accused to be informed of evidence against them
4. Right to adduce own evidence
5. Evidence must be considered by the investigating body
It is important to clarify, however, that absent cases of evident
partiality, the Courts have nothing to do with arbitration
proceedings. And so, the merits of the parties arguments as to the
propriety of the issuance of awards are not in issue here. Courts
are generally without power to amend or overrule merely because
of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the
arbitrators. They will not review the findings of law and fact
contained in an award, and will not undertake to substitute their
judgment for that of the arbitrators. A contrary rule would make an
arbitration award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. It
is the finding of evident partiality which constitutes legal ground for
vacating the Second Partial Award and not the Arbitration
Tribunals application of the ICC Rules adopting the contractual
approach tackled in Secombs article.
Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs like arbitration,
mediation, negotiation and conciliation are encouraged by this
Court. By enabling parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they
provide solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less
confrontational, and more productive of goodwill and lasting
relationship. Institutionalization of ADR was envisioned as an
important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and
declog court dockets.
The most important feature of arbitration, and indeed, the key to
its success, is the publics confidence and trust in the integrity of
the process. For this reason, the law authorizes vacating an
arbitral award when there is evident partiality in the arbitrators.
HELD: No. The SC held that all of these requirements were duly
met by the school, and that the right to cross-examine was not a
requisite for due process.
Regarding the issue on the dismissal of the students, the SC held
that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
leaning. This includes:
1. Who may teach
2. What may be taught
3. How it is taught
Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries after the initations rites of
the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Respondent students were dismissed from
Ateneo Law School wherein they were found guilty of the anti-hazing
policy of the school. Respondents aver that they were denied due
process by not being given the right to cross-examination.
ISSUES: W/N respondent students were deprived of due process.
Go v Colegio de San Juan de Letran
Minimum standards for imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
schools (Guzman v NU Case):
1. Informed in writing of the nature of the accusation
2. Right to answer charges, optionally with counsel
3. Right of accused to be informed of evidence against them
4. Right to adduce own evidence
5. Evidence must be considered by the investigating body
Letran discovered that they had four students who were neophytes of
the Tau Gammu fraternity after sustaining physical injuries. They
reported that Kim Go was a senior member of the said fraternity. At the
parents-teachers conference, the teacher informed Kims mother,
Angelita Go, that students had identified her son as a frat member. The
same teacher asked Kim to explain his side to which Kim replied with a
written statement denying his alleged membership. On the same day,
the teacher asked Kims parents to attend a conference to address the
issue of their sons membership. Both parents did not attend the
conference.
Letran found that 29 of their students, including Kim, were fraternity
members. They found substantial basis in the neophytes system.
Based on their rules, they recommended the enumerated members for
dismissal from the high school department rolls. Such sanction was
stated in a letter addressed to the petitioner spouses Go.
The spouses refused to accept the finding and filed before the RTC of
Caloocan a case claiming that the respondents had unlawfully
dismissed Kim. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses on the grounds that
4. Who is admitted to study- according to this, they may expel
students who violate school rules and regulations.
The SC also held that there should be a balance between
academic freedom and right to education. In the case at bar, the
decision of the school was affirmed since what was been
committed is against the rules of Ateneo.
Petition GRANTED.
HELD: Yes, due process was observed.
On the issue of due process, petitioners insist that the question
be resolved under the guidelines of Ang Tibay v CIR. The court
held that Guzman v National University and not Ang Tibay is the
authority on procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. It
held that disciplinary cases may be summary and cross-
examination is not required. It also laid down the minimum
standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
And the respondents were able to comply through:
The first requirement when Spouses and Kim were sent written
notices given to them for attending the conferences on Jan 8
and 15 with regard to Kims possible suspension
The second and fifth requirement when they allowed Kim to
answer his charges through a written statement, and also
when they were informed through the PTA meeting of the
charge given. Although the PTA meeting notice was not
written, it does not matter because form is not that important.
The third requirement was complied with when they were
informed in the PTA meeting of the evidence against Kim,
which was the statement of the neophytes.
Petition DISMISSED.
the respondents failed to observe the basic requirement of due process
and that their evidence was utterly insufficient. Moreover, it held that
Letran had no authority to dismiss students for fraternity membership.
CA reversed this ruling and held that the petitioners were given ample
opportunity to be heard.

ISSUE: W/N due process was observed in Kims suspension

Lao Gi v CA
Doctrine: Deportation proceeding is the power to deport an alien is an
act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good.
Elements of Due Process in a Deporting Proceeding
1. Preliminary Investigation- to determine if they are aliens and to
charge them with deportation
2. Rules of Criminal Procedure should be followed - warrant of Arrest
issued after finding of just cause
3. Charges against an alien must specify the acts complained of
stated in ordinary and concise language
4. Private prosecutors should not be allowed to intervene; summary
procedure right to be heard and present evidence upon lawful
hearing (to avoid possibility of oppression and harassment)
The Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion 191, finding Lao Gi alias
Chia, Sr. a Filipino citizen, but the Opinion was subsequently revoked
because it was found that said citizenship was obtained via fraud
HELD: No, the petitioner was deprived of due process. SC held
that although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied.
Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
The SC ordered the CID to continue hearing the deportation case
against petitioners and thereafter, based on proper evidence
before it, resolve the issue of citizenship Chia, Sr. and his family.
In this case, the initial decision of the CID was rendered without
proper evidence
Petition GRANTED.

A charge for deportation against Chia and his entire family was filed
with the COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (CID)

Lao Gi et al. filed a motion to dismiss with the CID, but this was
opposed by the private prosecutor

The CID set the deportation case in motion and ordered the registration
of Chia, Sr. and his family as aliens.

Lao Gi et al. filed a case with the SC, alleging that no evidence had yet
been presented to support the charges of fraud in the acquisition of
citizenship.
ISSUE: W/N due process was accorded to the petitioners

Maceda v ERB
Doctrine: Price Fixing- a relaxed procedure is followed in
administrative bodies, such as the ERB which, in matters of rate or
price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-
judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the
strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.
HELD: No. SC held that such a relaxed procedure is especially
true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of
rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasilegislative,
not quasijudicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings.

2 Powers of Government Bodies: SC also concedes with ERB's authority to grant the provisional
1. Quasi- Legislative- general rules, which will affect everybody in a increase in oil price.
certain class. No form of notice, hearing or cross-examination required.
2. Quasi-judicial- applies exclusively to a specific entity or person. Any Petition DIMISSED.
change must be made after due notice and hearing.

Petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board

(ERB) Orders dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the
hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did
not allow him substantial cross examination, which in effect was a
denial of due process.

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict, private respondents filed
with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. A
provisional increase of 1.42 pesos per liter was granted. When
petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify the
provisional increase, the Court dismissed the petition, because ERB
had the authority to grant provisional increase without prior hearing.

In the same order authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the
applications for hearing to all interested parties. Petitioner failed to
appear at the first and second hearings. The ERB set another date for
continuation of the hearing. However, this was postponed upon written
notice of Maceda. On the hearing for the presentation of the evidence-
in-chief, ERB deferred the cross-examination of Caltexs witness. The
ERB wanted to have all evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first
before cross-examination.

Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his
right to finish his crossexamination of Petron's witnesses and denied
him his right to crossexamine each of the witnesses of Caltex and
Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of
due process.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied of due process
Corona v UHPAP
Doctrine: Regulation of Profession- a professional license becomes
a property right after its issuance.- Cannot be taken away without due
process, notice or hearing.
The PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY issued AO 04-92, limiting the
term of appointment of harbor pilots to 1 year, subject to yearly renewal
or cancellation, as opposed to the previous rule that once license has
been acquired, said pilots may exercise the profession until age 70,
unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical incapacity
Respondents filed an appeal with the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
but Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Corona, dismissed
the appeal. According to Corona, although the exercise of ones
profession falls within ambit of property rights, the AO was not a
wrongful deprivation of the same, but merely a regulation
Respondents filed a case with the RTC and the latter ruled in their
favor, reversing the decision of the Office of the President, because due
process was not properly accorded. Petitioners then elevated the case
to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N due process was accorded.
HELD: No. SC was convinced that AO 04-92was issued in
disregard of respondents right against deprivation of property
without due process of law.
The SC held that due process involves two matters:
1. Procedure the manner by which the law is enforced
2. Substance requires that the law is fair, reasonable, and just
The SC also held that in terms of procedure, due process was
observed because the respondents were able to question the AO
four times before reaching the SC
Jurisprudence holds that as long as a party is given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, then he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law
because the opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
procedural due process
Moreover, due process is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action complained of
The SC further held that as a general rule, the requirements of
notice and hearing as the requirements of procedural due process
are essential only when an administrative body exercises quasi-
judicial functions
In this case, the PPA exercised its quasi-legislative
function
However, the SC held that in terms of substantive due process,
the AO was unreasonable and superfluous, amounting to
deprivation of property without due process of law
The license granted to harbor pilots is a vested property
right and the AO restricts the harbor pilots from enjoying
their profession before their compulsory retirement, despite

Salaw v NLRC
Doctrine: Right to counsel is a right even in civil and administrative
proceedings. The Labor Code expressly grants the right to counsel.
Dismissal in Private Sector
1. Must be for a valid reason
2. Must be given the opportunity to be heard, due process
3. Any evidence derived from confession w/o counsel is inadmissible.
The petitioner was employed by respondent bank as a credit
investigator-appraiser. The Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary extracted from the petitioner, without the
assistance of counsel, a sworn statement revealing his illegal actions
for acquiring money together with a co-employee by selling 20 sewing
machines and electric generators which had been foreclosed by the
Bank for P60,000.00, and dividing the proceeds thereof in equal shares
between the two of them. On December 5, 1984, petitioner requested
to appear before the banks Personnel Discipline and Investigation
Committee. His request was granted. However, the committee added
that Salaw must come without counsel. On April 1, 1985 Salaw was
terminated for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and
fraud. Subsequently, he filed a complaint of illegal dismissal with the
NLRC. Labor arbiter Villarente, Jr. rendered the decision that Salaw
was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner by private
respondents was legally justified?
People v Nazario
Nazario was charged for violating municipal ordinances of the
municipal council of PAGBILAO, QUEZON
The said ordinances impose a P3.00 tax per square hectare of
fishpond, which starts 3 years from the approval by the Bureau of
Fisheries, or starting from the year 1964 in case it operated before the
said year
Nazario assails the ordinances for being ambiguous and uncertain, as
going through a rigid process before acquiring a license
Petition DISMISSED.
HELD: No. Under the Labor Code, for a dismissal to be legal, it
must follow the 2-fold requirements, which are substantive and
procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid cause as
provided by law, but the rudimentary requirements of due process
- notice and hearing must also be observed.
The petitioner was terminated without due process of law because
he was not given the right to a proper hearing. He was denied of
his constitutional right when his subsequent request to refute the
allegations against him was granted and a hearing was set
without counsel or representative.
As stated in section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If a person cannot afford the service of counsel,
he must be provided with one.
The right to counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due
process, has to be observed. Indeed, the rights to counsel and to
due process of law are two of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the 1987 Constitution to any person under investigation, be the
proceeding administrative, civil, or criminal.
well as vague insofar as the date of payment

Nazario also claims that, being a lessee, he is neither owner nor

manager within the scope of the definition of the law