Jerbee F.

Albutra

2016 Cases

Gov. Exequiel B. Javier v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 215847 (January 12, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that no less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the
dates of the election period. Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the default election period.
The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election
period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a
statutory but a constitutionally granted power of the Commission. The Commissions act of
fixing the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The
Commission did not prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already
defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act and other pertinent
election laws.

The court also ruled that there is no merit in petitioners argument that the extended
election period only applies to pre-election activities other than the determination of
administrative or criminal liability for violating election laws. Neither the law nor the
Constitution authorizes the use of two distinct election periods for the same election. The law
does not distinguish between election offenses and other pre-election activities in terms of the
applicable election period. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should this Court.

Vice mayor Marcelina S. Engle v. COMELEC en banc and Winston B. Menzon, G.R. No.
215995 (January 19, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) may be filed on the exclusive ground
of false material representation in said COC. The false representation which is a ground for a
denial of due course to and/ or cancellation of a candidates COC refers to a material fact relating
to the candidates qualification for office such as ones citizenship or residence.

The court also ruled that the COMELEC is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so
as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of elections. However, it is a long standing
principle in jurisprudence that rules and regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory
before the election but when they are sought to be enforced after the election, they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. Over time, the court has
qualified this doctrine to refer only to matters of form and cannot be applied to the substantial
qualifications of candidates.

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares v. COMELEC and Estrella S. Elamparo, G.R. No.
221697 (March 8, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that the COMELEC virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates
all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the
United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much
as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at petitioner's "sworn declaration in
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, petitioner fails to meet the
residency requirement for President". This conclusion ignores the standing jurisprudence that it
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of
compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores
the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for
the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner. It ignores, above all else, what the court considers as a primary reason
why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was
not even considered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal as an issue against her eligibility for
Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a
resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator
which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral
arguments before the court that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did
not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was
never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy.
There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such
other facts of residence have never been proven to be false. It was arbitrary for the COMELEC to
satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to
consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
Bagumbayan VNP Movement, Inc. and Richard J. Gordon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 222731
(March 8, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that Article XI (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the
Commission of Elections to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is
Republic Act No 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated
election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.

Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current vote-counting
machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the
Commission on Elections act of rendering inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law
required this feature in the first place. Under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, it is considered
a policy of the state that the votes reflect the genuine will of the people.

The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436,
as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the
transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.

The court also ruled that there is no reason why voters should be denied the opportunity
to read the voter's receipt after casting his or her ballot. There is no legal prohibition for the
Commission on Elections to require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt, he or she is
to leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct. Definitely, the availability of all the
voters' receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.

Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 216607 (April 5, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that the remedies of a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of
candidacy and a petition for disqualification have different grounds and periods for their filing.
The remedies have different legal consequences.

A person files a certificate of candidacy to announce his or her candidacy and to declare
his or her eligibility for the elective office indicated in the certificate. Under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the Commission may deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy through a verified petition filed exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.

A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides for grounds in filing a petition for disqualification.
 What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on petitioner. If the false
material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification,
petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with the
requirements under the law.

The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728 (July 5, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that petitioners are not candidates. They are asserting their right to
freedom of expression. The urgency posed by the circumstances during respondents issuance of
the assailed notice and letter also rendered compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as unreasonable.

The tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that "primarily advocates a stand on a
social issue, only secondarily-even almost incidentally-will cause the election or non-election of
a candidate". It is not election propaganda as its messages are different from the usual declarative
messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression with political consequences and "this
court's construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of
censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker's viewpoint or the
content of one's speech".

Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. v. COMELEC and Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr., G.R. No. 212615 (July
19, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that the petition for disqualification filed by respondent in no way
qualifies as a pre-proclamation controversy, having absolutely nothing to do with any matter or
ground pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns.

The COMELEC en banc resolution should be struck down for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Juliet B. Dano v. COMELEC and Marie Karen Joy B. Digal, G.R. No. 210200 (September 13,
2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by COMELEC is not
ordinarily reviewed in a petition for certiorari. In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC's action oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, this Court is not only obliged but constitutionally mandated to intervene.

This case is one such instance in which this Court has to intervene. Here, instead of
evaluating the probative value of the evidence presented by petitioner, COMELEC abruptly
concluded that she had failed to reestablish her domicile in Sevilla, simply because she was
admittedly absent from the municipality for four months. The court reminds the commission that
the summary nature of proceedings under Section 78 only allows it to rule on patent material
misrepresentations of facts, not to make conclusions of law that are even contrary to
jurisprudence.

COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully appreciate petitioner's
evidence and fully explained absence from Sevilla. Instead, it made a legal conclusion that a
candidate who has been physically absent from a locality for four out of the twelve months
preceding the elections can never fulfill the residence requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code (LGC). In addition, COMELEC cancelled petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) without any prior determination of whether or not she had intended to deceive
or mislead the electorate. This omission also constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

H. Sohria Pasagi Diambrang v. COMELEC and H. Hamim Sarip Patad, G.R. No. 201809
(October 11, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that if the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is void ab initio, the candidate
is not considered a candidate from the very beginning even if his COC was cancelled after the
elections.

Respondents disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice. It does not
matter that the disqualification case against him was finally decided by the COMELEC En Banc
only on 14 November 2011. His COC was void ab initio. As such, petitioner, being the first-
placer among the qualified candidates, should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. However, due to supervening
events, petitioner can no longer hold office.
Lim-Bungcaras v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209415-17 (November 15, 2016)

Ruling: The court ruled that to appeal the trial court's decision in a municipal election contest,
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC require the filing of a notice of appeal and the
simultaneous payment of a P1, 000.00 appeal fee to the trial court that rendered judgment. With
respect to the payment of the COMELEC appeal fee, an appellant is also required to pay an
additional amount of P3, 200.00 under Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
as amended by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130.

The Court finds that the COMELEC First Division erred in disregarding COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486. The justification of the COMELEC therefor is illogical and uncalled for.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 remains applicable to this day, until the same is repealed or
modified accordingly. The additional P3, 200.00 appeal fee may be paid to the COMELEC Cash
Division within 15 days from the filing of the notice of appeal pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486.