Hemphill Combined File 1

Case: 25CI1:14-cr-00422-JAW Document #: 1 Filed: 06/11/2014 Page 1 of 1
INDICTMENT conv. fel. p/firearm CIRCUIT COURT NO.

97-37-5
Habitual offender 99-19-81
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Circuit Court

D
FIRST DISTRICT, HINDS COUNTY MAY Term, A.D., 2014
FIRST Judicial District of
BARBARA DUNN, Cl CUlT ClERK
Hinds County.
B""--------+--__!)....r
The Grand Jurors for the State of Mississippi, taken from the body of good an
lawful persons of Hinds County, in the State of Mississippi, elected, impaneled, sworn an
charged to inquire in and for said District, County and State aforesaid, in the name and by th
authority of the State of Mississippi, upon their oaths present: That
LORENZO HEMPHILL
(while acting in concert with and/or aiding, abetting, assisting or encouraging
another or others, to-wit: Raymond Lamar Echols)
in said District, County and State, on or about the lOth day of April, 2014
did wilfully, unlawfully, have in his/her possession a certain firearm, to-wit: Barretta .2
caliber pistol, serial number DAA015258,
he the said Lorenzo Hemphill, having been previously convicted of a felony, to-wit: the crim
of possession of firearm on school property in the First Judicial District of Hinds Coun ,
Mississippi, in cause number 11-0-343, on 03-20-2012, In violation of Section 97-37- ,
Mississippi Code, 1972, as amended,
he, the said Lorenzo Hemphill, having been previously convicted of felonies, to-
wit: the crime of possession of firearm on school property in the Circuit Court of
the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, on 03-20-2012, in Cause
number 11-0-343 in said Court, and the crime of possession of cocaine in the
Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, on 11-06-
2013, in Cause number 13-1-275-02 in said Court, each of said felony
convictions being upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate
incidents at different times, and upon each of said convictions, the said Lorenzo
Hemphill, was sentenced to and did serve separate terms of one year or more in
penal institution of the above-named state, this indictment being returned
pursuant to the provisions of Section 99-19-81, Mississippi Code, 1972, as
amended, and
contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace an
dignity of the State of Mississippi.
ASST. DISTR~Ci1rt"TORNEY
/ Case: 25CI1:14-cr-00422-JAW Document #: 20 Filed: 06/15/2016 Page 1 of 2
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS 1BfTY, MISSISSIPPI

FIRST JUDICIALJ)jfi T
,\..--~
~
'
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI t\\\\ ' PLAINTIFF
\U~ \ ~ ~~ c.:J:.'-~
VERSUS ~ J c~'-cu "t. Cause No:14-0-422
uJ-"~ u.
~~~
LORENZO HEMPHILL ~ DEFENDANT
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL
COMES NOW, the defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, by and through
counsel, and files this, his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial or alternatively Demand
for a Speedy Trial, and for cause would respectfully show unto the Court the following:
1. Defendant was Indicted on June 11, 2014, for the offense of felon in possession of
a firearm.
2. Defendant has been incarcerated at the Hinds County Detention Center since
April14, 2014.
3. The Defendant has been unable to secure an affordable bond.
4. A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by
Article 3, 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368,
375 (Miss. 2000).
5. In addition, Miss.Code Ann. 99-17-1 (2000) creates a statutory right to a speedy
trial and states "Unless good cause be shown, all offenses for which indictments
are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270)
days after the accused has been arraigned.

6. Defendant would show unto the Court that since his arraignment, well over two
hundred seventy days has passed.
7. And for other reasons to be shown at a hearing in this matter, Defendant would
show unto the Court his rights to a speedy trial have been violated.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioner requests that the Court would
immediately set a court date for him or alternatively, dismiss the proceedings against him.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 1Oth day of June, 2016.
~;T~EFENDANT
Damon R. Stevenson
Damon R. Stevenson
Miss. Bar No. 102945
Stevenson Legal Group, PLLC
P.O. Box 1922
Jackson, MS 39215
Tel: 769-251-0207
Fax: 601-608-7872
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Damon R. Stevenson, the attorney for the above named defendant hereby certify that I
have this day mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing to:
Brad McCoullough
Assistant District Attorney
PO Box 22747
Jackson, MS 39225
This the lOth day of June, 2016.

/It/
Damon R. Stevenson
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI PLAINTIFF
V. S Cause No 14-422
LORENZO HEMPHILL DEFENDANT
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through counsel, and moves the Court to
suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop and seizure and would show
unto the Court, as follows:
1. Defendant was arrested and charged by the Jackson Police Department in the
instant matter.
2. The discovery provided reveals Officer Billy Smith stopped the vehicle that my
client was driving due to a violation of traffic ordinance. The discovery does not
reveal what traffic offense the officer observed prior to my client being stopped.
Further, the discovery reveals my client was taken into custody for violations related
to not having a valid drivers license, nor proof of insurance. Such violations would
not be offense that an officer could observe prior to a traffic stop.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section
23 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that an individual has the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Dies v. State, 926 So.2d 910, 917- 18( 21)
(Miss.2006). Evidence, however relevant and trustworthy, obtained from an illegal
arrest or detention is inadmissible at trial. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724, 89
S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).

4. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure
of persons' within the meaning of this provision." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 809- 10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
5. In Gonzales v. State, 963 So.2d 1138, 1142 ( 14) (Miss.2007), the Mississippi
Supreme Court stated:
To determine whether the search and seizure were unreasonable, the inquiry is
two-fold: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2)
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In
order to satisfy the first prong, the law enforcement officer must be able to point
to " specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
6. The discovery fails to offer any valid reason for the officer stopping the vehicle
of my client. Therefore, said stop constitutes a violation of state and federal law.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Court to enter its order suppressing
from evidence:
(a) Any and all intangible items acquired by the State of Mississippi as a result
of a search of the defendant and/or his property subject to his control;
(b) Any and all tangible items and/or purported admissions acquired from the
defendant or his personal possessions at the time of or subsequent to any search made
as a result of an arrest of the defendant and/or interrogatories of the defendant or
statements made by others;
(c) Any and all statements made by or taken from the defendant;
(d) Any and all statements made by any person or persons, law enforcement or
otherwise, at the time of or subsequent to the search and/or arrest of the defendant;
and
(e) Any and all other information, items or evidence of all kinds and character,
wherever situated, taken or acquired, either directly or indirectly from the defendant
or as a result of the search and/or arrest of the defendant, if any.
Respectfully submitted,
LORENZO HEMPHILL, DEFENDANT
/s/ Damon R. Stevenson
DAMON R. STEVENSON, MSB NO. 102945

Post Office 1922, Jackson, MS 39215-1922
T: (769) 251-0207, F: (601) 608-7872
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Damon R. Stevenson, attorney for the defendant, do hereby certify that I have
delivered via MEC, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Honorable Brad
McCoullough, 327 East Pascagoula Street, Jackson, MS 39201
THIS the 11th day of January, 2017.
/s/ Damon R. Stevenson


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Case: 25CI1:14-cr-00422-JAW Document #: 1 Filed: 06/11/2014 Page 1 of 1

INDICTMENT conv. fel. p/firearm CIRCUIT COURT NO.

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Circuit Court

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS 1BfTY, MISSISSIPPI

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL

3. The Defendant has been unable to secure an affordable bond.

4. A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by

Article 3, 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368,

375 (Miss. 2000).

5. In addition, Miss.Code Ann. 99-17-1 (2000) creates a statutory right to a speedy

days after the accused has been arraigned.

hundred seventy days has passed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 1Oth day of June, 2016.

This the lOth day of June, 2016.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI PLAINTIFF

LORENZO HEMPHILL DEFENDANT

unto the Court, as follows:

not be offense that an officer could observe prior to a traffic stop.

(Miss.2006). Evidence, however relevant and trustworthy, obtained from an illegal

S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).

4. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the

806, 809- 10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Supreme Court stated:

whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

of a search of the defendant and/or his property subject to his control;

as a result of an arrest of the defendant and/or interrogatories of the defendant or

statements made by others;

or as a result of the search and/or arrest of the defendant, if any.

/s/ Damon R. Stevenson

DAMON R. STEVENSON, MSB NO. 102945

THIS the 11th day of January, 2017.

/s/ Damon R. Stevenson

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