CHED FACULTY TRAINING FOR THE TEACHING OF THE NEW GENERAL EDUCATION(GE)

CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

I. Title: GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHY

II. Learning Objectives:

At the end of the chapter/lesson, students should be able to:

compare the global demography before and after transition;

analyze current population pyramids to predict future population trends;
evaluate how population cartograms influence perspective of geographic
regions;
summarize connections between multiple quality of life indicators for low,
middle, and high income countries; and
draw conclusions from each of the demographic transition stages;

III. Introduction:

Before the start of the demographic transition, life was short, births were
many, short, births were many, growth was slow and the population was young.
During the transition, mortality declined and then fertility declined causing
population growth rates to accelerate and then slow down moving toward low
fertility, long life and an old population. The transition began around 1800 with
declining mortality in Europe. It has now spread to all parts of the world and is
projected to be completed by 2100.

The unfolding of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT)presents the

theory since it was first formulated in 1986. It further addresses the issue of
whether the SDT has spread or is currently doing so in industrialized Asian
countries.

IV. Content:
Before the Demographic Transition
Global demographic transition has brought momentous changes, reshaping
the economic and demographic life cycles of individuals and restructuring
populations. Since 1800 global population size already increased by a factor of 6

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and will rise by factor of 10 by 2100. There will then be 50 times as many elderly,
but only 5 times as many children; thus, the ratio of elders to children will have
risen by a factor of 10. The length of life which has risen by more than double will
have tripled while births per woman will have dropped from 6 to 2. In 1800, women
spent about 70 % of their adult years bearing and rearing young children but that
fraction has decreased in many parts of the world to only about 14% due to lower
fertility and longer life.

According to an essay of Thomas Malthus, slow population growth was no

accident. It was held in equilibrium with the slowly growing economy. Faster
population growth would depress wages causing mortality to rise due to famine,
war or diseasemisery. Malthus called this mortality response the positive
check. Depressed wages also cause postponement of marriage resulting in
prostitution, vices, and the use of contraceptionthis Malthus called the
preventive check. Since population can potentially grow rapidly than the
economy, it was always held in check be misery and vice.
In Western Europe, centuries before 1800 marriage required the resources
to establish and maintain a separate household so age at first marriage for women
was late averaging around 25 years and a substantial number of women who never
married. (Flinn, 1981, 41, p. 84; Livi-Bacci, 2000, pp. 99-107)
Fertility was high within marriage, the total fertility rate (TFR)was moderate
overall at 4 to 5 births per woman (Livi-Bacci, 2000, p. 136). Mortality was
moderately high, life expectancy at birth between 25 and 35 years (Flinn, 1981,
pp. 92-101; Livi-Bacci, 2000, pp. 61-90) but was heavily influenced by high
mortality in infancy and childhood.
In the late 19th century, Indias life expectancy averaged in the low 20s and
was highly variable while fertility was 6 or 7 births per woman (Bhat, 1989). In the
third world, TFR was 6 or higher decades after World War II.
The contraceptive effects of prolonged breastfeeding often combined with
taboos on sex while breastfeeding led to long birth intervals and reduced fertility.
Abortion and the practice of coitus interruptus have an important effect. In some

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settings, marriage patterns also limited fertility although not as strongly as in

Western Europe.

Stages of the Demographic Transition

Mortality Decline
The beginning of the worlds demographic transition occurred in northwest
Europe where mortality began a secular decline around 1800. It was due to
reductions in contagious and infectious diseases that are spread by air or water.
The development of the smallpox vaccine, public health measures, effective
quarantine measures, and improved personal hygiene with the germ theory of
disease, which became more widely known and accepted, improvements in
storage and transportation led to improved nutrition as income rose.

High-income countries of the world have largely attained the potential

mortality reductions due to reductions in chronic and degenerative diseases,
notably heart disease and cancer (Riley, 2001). Publicly organized and funded
biomedical research, the human genome project and stem cell research have
played an increasingly important part.
Many low-income populations did not begin the mortality transition until
sometime in the 20th century. In India, life expectancy rose from around 24 years
in 1920 to 62 years today, a gain of .48 years per calendar year over 80 years. In
China, it rose from 41 in 1950-1955 to 70 in 1995-1999, a gain of .65 years per
year over 45 years.
For a closer look at mortality trends, More Developed Countries with 1.2
billion people include all of Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand. The Least Developed Countries with .7 billion include most of sub-
Saharan Africa, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and few other countries. All other
countries are Less Developed with 4.2 billion people including India, China, and
the bulk of the worlds population.

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CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

Global trends in life expectancy since 1950 and U.N. projections to 2050 for
the Least Developed Countries, life expectancy rises from 35.7 years in 1950-1954
to 48.7 years in 1995-1999, or .29 years per year. For the Less Developed
Countries, the increase is from 41.8 to 65.4 years, or .52 years per year. In the
More Developed countries, the increase is from 66.1 to 74.8, or .19 years per year.
Stagnation in mortality gains for the Least Developed Countries in the 1990s
reflects increasing mortality from HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. In the past 20
years, more than 60 million people have been infected with HIV/AIDS worldwide,
of whom 40 million are still alive. Of these, only 6% are in More Developed
Countries while in sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS has become the leading cause
of death. In some African countries, more than two-thirds of children aged 15 years
in 2000 will become infected with HIV/AIDS before they reach 50 years of age
(United Nations, 2002). For the 35 most affected countries in Africa, life
expectancy at birth has been reduced on average by 6.5 years in the late 1990s,
an effect projected to rise to 9.0 years in 2000-2005.
Male life expectancy in the Russian Federation is now 60 years, equal to its
level in the early 1950s (United Nations, 2002) and similar to that of India; Russian
women have done somewhat better.
As longevity has increased, female life expectancy has also risen. In the
More Developed Countries, the sex gap in life expectancy also increased from 5.0
years in the early 1950s to 7.4 years today. This trends are explained by women
who smoke. A reversal of the growing gap is expected where smoking-related
deaths in women were rapidly rising from 1975-1995 while they fell rapidly in men
in the U.S. In Less Developed countries, it has grown 1.7 years to 3.6 years today.
The sex difference in life expectancy causes an increasing ration of women
to men at older ages and combined with a younger female age at marriage, causes
a disproportionate number of widows. There are 76% more women than men at
ages 80-89 and there are 5 times as many women as men over 100 (United
Nations, 2002, p.196)

Fertility Decline

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CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

Between 1890 and 1920, marital fertility began to decline in most European
countries with a median decline of about 40% from 1870 to 1930 (Coale and
Treadway, 1986, p.44)

Most economic theories of fertility start with the idea that couples wish to
have a certain number of surviving children rather than births. Issues on parental
investment in children suggest that fertility is also influenced by how economic
change influences the cost and benefits of childbearing.

Bearing and rearing children is time intensive. Technological progress and

increasing physical and human capital make labor more productive, raising the
value of time in all activities thus, making children costly relative to consumption
goods. Since women have had primary responsibility for childbearing and rearing,
variations in the productivity of women have been particularly important. In effect,
children become more expensive, their economic contributions are diminished by
school time and educated parents have higher value of time which raises the
opportunity costs of childbearing. Furthermore, parents with higher incomes
choose to devote more resources to each child, and since this raises the costs of
each child, it then leads to fewer children (Becker, 1981; Willis, 1974, 1994)

More highly developed markets and governments can replace many of the
important economic functions of the traditional family and household like the risk
sharing and provision of retirement income further weakening the value children.

United Nations projections to 2050 on fertility shows that the transition in

the More Developed Countries reflect their baby booms and busts after World War
II followed by what is called the second fertility transition as fertility fell far below
replacement level in many industrial nations (Van de Kaa, 1987). The Less
Developed Countries began the fertility transition in the mid-1960s.

Fertility transitions since World War II have been more rapid than those for
the current More Developed Countries with fertility reaching replacement in 20 to
30 years after those countries have completed the transition. In east Asia, fertility
transitions have been early and rapid while those in south Asia and Latin America

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CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

have been slower. (Casterline, 2001). Between 1965 and 1990, their total fertility
rate fell from 6 children per woman to 3. The Least Developed Countries started
slightly higher and started the transition later.

Currently, 60 countries with 43% of the worlds population have fertility rates
below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. 43 of these are More
Developed Countries and 17 are Less Developed Countries. TFR has fallen well
below replacement for almost all the industrialized countries and for many
countries of east Asia including Taiwan, south Korea and China

When fertility declines, it does most in the youngest and oldest ages and
becomes concentrated in the 20s and early 30s. At present, two-thirds of
childbearing occurs between 20 and 35 in the Least Developed Countries whereas
80% occurs in this age range in the More Developed Countries as in the Least
Developed Countries and only one-fifth as high below age 20.

U.N. fertility projections show a continuing slow transition in sub-Saharan Africa

and the other Least Developed Countries while fertility decline for the Less
Developed Countries decelerates as it approaches replacement level and imply
that the demand for children will continue to decline in the future.

Population Growth
Demographic transition represent a gain in life expectancy with little change
in fertility and a movement to a higher population growth then a movement toward
the simultaneous decline in fertility and mortality toward lower rates of growth.

India had higher initial fertility and mortality than Europe, as did the Least
Developed Countries relative to the Less Developed Countries in 1950 which in
turn had far higher mortality and fertility than the More Developed Countries. All
indicate moderate (for Europe) to rapid (for Least and Less Developed Countries)
population growth except India but all these indicate that mortality decline
preceded by fertility decline cause population growth to accelerate to about 3% for
the Less and Least Developed Countries. Europe briefly attains 1.5% population
growth but fertility then plunges. A decline picked up after 1950 ending with
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CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

population decline at 1% annually. However, the actual European population

growth rate is very near zero: slightly higher than hypothetical steady-state growth
rate due to changes in the age distribution and in immigration. All three groups
are projected to approach zero-growth by 2050.

There has been rapid global convergence in fertility and mortality among
nations over the past 50 years, this is in contrast to per capita GDP, which has
tended to diverge between high-income and low-income countries during this time.
Population growth rates in More Developed Countries rose about a half percent
above those in the Less Developed Countries in the century before 1950. Long-
term U.N. projections suggest that global population growth will be close to zero
by about 2100.

The central current projections from the United Nations which are consistent
with some other global projections, anticipate that global population will reach 8.9
billion by 2050 and just below 9.5 billion by 2100a 50% increase from its current
size.

The National Research Council (2000, p.213) concluded that there is a 95%
probability that the actual population in 2050 will fall between 8.2 and 10.2 billion.

United Nations high-low range extends over a very wide interval from 5.2 to 16.2
billion. This great uncertainty must be kept in mind when considering all the
projections of fertility, mortality, and population size for the 21st century.

Population projection for More Developed Countries is nearly flat with

population decrease in Europe and Japan, but offset by population increase in the
U.S. and other areas. Most of the projected population increase takes place in the
Less Developed Countries which gain 1.8 billion or 43%. The greatest proportional
gain comes from the Least Developed Countries with higher fertility and more rapid
growth. These countries gain 1 billion or 151%. The relative shares of the three
groups will change a good deal over the next 50 years.

Shifts in Age Distribution

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CORE COURSES: SECOND GENERATION TRAINING

The patterns of change in fertility, mortality and growth rates over the
demographic transition are widely known and understood. Less well understood
are the systematic changes in age distribution that are an integral part of the
demographic transition and that will continue long after the other rates have
stabilized. These shifts can be seen in the dependency ratios, which take either
the younger or the older population and divide by the working age population.

For example, the child dependency ratio is the population aged 0-14 the
population aged 15-64. The old age dependency ratio is usually defined as the
number of those 65 and older the population aged 15-64. The oldest old
dependency ratio looks at those 85 years and older the working age population.

Finally, the total dependency ratio takes the sum of the population under 15 and
over 65 and divides it by the population in the intermediate range of 15-64.

In the first phase of the transition, mortality begins to decline while fertility
remains high, mortality declines most at the youngest ages causing an increase in
the proportion of children in the population and raising child dependency ratios.
Thus, mortality decline initially makes populations younger rather than older in a
phase that can last many decades. During this phase, families have increasing
number of surviving children. Both families and governments may struggle to
achieve educational goals for the unexpectedly high number of children.

As fertility declines, child dependency ratios decline and soon fall below
their pre-transition levels. The working age population grows faster than the
population as a whole so the total dependency ratio declines. This may last 40 or
50 years. Some analysts worry that the rapidly growing labor force might cause
rising unemployment and falling capital labor ratios (Coale and Hoover, 1958).
Others have stressed the economic advantages of having a relatively large share
of the population in its working years calling these a demographic gift or bonus
(Williamson & Higgins, 2001; Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 2000).

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In the third phase, increasing longevity leads to a rapid increase in the

elderly population while low fertility slows the growth of the working age population.
The old age dependency ratio rises rapidly, as does the total dependency ratio.
This will last longer if mortality decline will not cease. If the elderly are supported
by transfers (either from adult children or from public sector pension system from
tax revenues), then a higher total dependency ratio means a greater burden on the
working age population.

At the end of the full transitional process, mortality will continue to decline
so that the process of individual and population aging will continue. No country in
the world has yet completed this phase of population aging. Even the
industrialized countries are projected to age rapidly over the next three or four
decades.

Consequences of the Demographic Transition

Three centuries of demographic transition from 1800 to 2100 will reshape

the worlds population in a number of ways. The rise in total population from 1
billion in 1800 to around 9.5 billion in 2100 highly uncertain due largely to
uncertainty about future fertility. The average length of life increases by a factor
of 2 or 3, and the median age of the population doubles from the low 20s to the
low 40s. Many More Developed Countries already have negative population
growth rates, and the United Nations projects that the population of Europe will
decline by 13% between now and 2050.

At the level of families, the number of children born declines sharply and
childbearing becomes concentrated into a few years of a womans life. When this
change is combined with greater longevity, many more adult years become
available for other activities. The joint survivorship of couples is greatly increased
and kin networks become more inter-generationally dense. Parents with fewer
children are able to invest more in each child, reflecting the quality-quantity
tradeoff, which may also be one of the reasons parents reduced their fertility
(Becker, 1981; Willis, 1974).

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The processes that lead to longer life may also alter the health status of the
surviving population. Years of life added by declining mortality are mostly healthy
years and that at any given age, the health and functional status of the population
are improving (Costa, 2002; Manton, Corder and Stallard, 1997; Freedman, Martin
and Schoeni, 2002).

Generous public pension programs permitting early retirement, combined

with heavy implicit taxes on those who continue working, have played an important
role in causing earlier retirement in industrial nations since the 1960s (Gruber and
Wise, 1999). The growing ratio of retirees to workers is bringing various policy
responses. So-called parametric reforms tinker with pay-as-you-go defined
benefit programs, reducing benefits, raising taxes and eliminating the incentives
for early retirement.

Population aging together with the growth of age-related public transfer

systems for pensions, education and health, creates massive positive fiscal
externalities to childbearing. In aging high-income nations with generous support
for the elderly, the net present value of future taxes minus benefits for an
incremental birth may be several hundred thousand dollars (Lee, 2001), giving
governments a powerful incentive to encourage childbearing. In developing
countries with younger populations and public programs focused on children, the
fiscal externalities and incentives run in the opposite direction (Lee and Miller,
1990)

At the international level, there are intriguing issues about the extent to
which the flow of people and capital across borders may offset these demographic
pressures. As population growth has slowed or even turned negative in the More
Developed Countries, it is not surprising that international migration from third-
world countries has accelerated. Net international migration to the More
Developed Countries has experienced a roughly linear increase from near-zero in
the early 1950s to around 2.3 million per year in the 1990s.

Dramatic population aging is the inevitable final stage of the global

demographic transition, part and parcel of low fertility and long life. It will bring
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serious economic and political challenges. Nevertheless, life in aging, capital-

intensive and culturally diverse high-income countries should be pleasant,
provided our institutional structures are sufficiently flexible to allow us to adapt our
life cycle plans to the changing circumstances and provided we are willing to pay
for the health care and the extended retirement that we apparently want.

V. Activity/Assessment:
Individual Student Reading Activity (Human Population an Introduction)
Small Group Activity (5 members/group) Population Squared
Illustrating Birth & Death Rates
Exploring the Pyramids
Land Use Squared
Development in Motion
Life in Numbers

VI. References:
Becker, Gary. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press
Bloom, David, et al. 2000. Demographic Change and Economic Growth in Asia,
in Population Change in East Asia, Transition, a supplement to Volume 26
of Population and development Review. Cyrus Chu and Ronald Lee, Eds.
New York: Population Council, pp.257-90

Casterline, John. 2001. The Pace of Fertility Transition: National Patterns

in the Second half of the Twentieth Century,: in Global Fertility Transition, a
supplement to Volume 27 of Population and Development Review. Rodolfo
Bulatao and John Casterline eds. New York: Population council, pp.17-52

Coale, Ansley J. and Roy Treadway. 1986. A Summary of the Changing

Distribution of Overall Fertility, Marital Fertility, and the Proportion Married in the

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Provinces of Europe, in The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Ansley J. Coale and

Susan Cotts Watkins, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.31-181.

Costa, Dora. 2002. Changing Chronic Disease Rates and Long-Term

Declines in Functional Limitation among Older Men. Demography. February,
39:1, pp.119-38

Flinn, Michael W. 1981. The European Demographic System, 1500-1820.

Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Freedman, Vicki A., Linda G. Martin and Robert F. Schoeni. 2002. Recent
Trends in Disability and Functioning among Older Adults in the United States: A
Systematic Review. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288:24, pp.
3137-146

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