You are on page 1of 7

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Faculteit Bio-Ingenieurswetenschappen

Academiejaar 2015-2016

Assignment #3: Part 2

Storage of butadiene

Course:
Safety of Chemical and Biological Products
Team F:
Riet Cornelissen, Hannelore Brocatus, Laure De Cock, Toon van Dael, Bernd Willaert
1. Risk assessment
A HAZOP study has been executed for two deviations on the standard operation procedure: a higher
pressure than normal and a higher butadiene level than normal. The HAZOP worksheet can be found in
Appendix 1.

1.1. Pressure elevation

The butadiene is stored in a pressurized storage tank at 10C (relative pressure = 2 barg). The pressure is
obtained by adding N2 gas at 9 bar to the tank. Normally the pressure in the tank is kept constant by
pressure regulation. If butadiene is pumped out of the tank, N2 is added via the N2 supply line
(073.098.1) to keep the pressure stable. If butadiene is pumped into the tank from the plant (547.001.3)
or from a ship (052.003.1), extraction of the vapor to the vapor recovery line (051.017.1) will take place.

Insufficient control of the pressure can have severe consequences. If the pressure in the tank becomes
too high (8 barg), bursting of the tank can occur with release of butadiene into the environment as a
result. When butadiene comes in contact with oxygen, explosive peroxides are formed, which can lead to
an explosion.

The most obvious cause for an increased pressure is failure of the pressure regulation system, either by
supplying too much N2 or by extracting too little of the gas mixture in the tank. This can occur when one
of the ball valves fails and the pressure isnt adjusted when the amount of butadiene changes. The
temperature should also remain 10C because if temperature rises, the pressure in the tank will rise
according the ideal gas law. This increased pressure can lead to the aforementioned explosion. Another
effect of a higher temperature is possible polymerization, which can cause a volumetric increase.

Another cause of a too high pressure can be a flaw in the pressure measurement of the N2 inflow (i.e. the
pressure in the inflow is higher than expected and so there is more gas going in than is supposed to).
Finally, an unnoticed obstruction in the export line can also cause a rise in pressure if the N2 feed is
added without the butadiene leaving the storage tank.
1.2. Level deviation of butadiene

A level deviation can be the result of continued feed of butadiene from the production process without
any butadiene leaving towards the client. Two possible reasons can be thought of for this case. A first
reason is the uncontrolled filling of product coming from the production process. A second reason is the
absence of product being sent to the client. Causes for this problem could be failure of the pumps or
obstruction of the pipeline.

A possible consequence of a higher level of butadiene in the tank is that there can be overflow and
contact of butadiene with air which can, as explained in the paragraph above, cause an explosion.
Another possible consequence is that butadiene could enter the pipeline used for pressure control.

2. Layers of protection

Protection can happen on two main levels; prevention and mitigation. The goal in the first case is to
prevent the occurrence of an accident and the goal of mitigation is to limit the consequences of that
accident. It is clear that prevention must be preferred above mitigation. There is also a third main level,
the basic level. This level considers the inherent safety of the design of the plant and the process. We do
not take into account this level because the plant is already there, so we cannot really change the design
of the process.

2.1. Prevention layer

Several indicators are installed in the system for operators to control the stability of the process. There
are three parallel pressure indicators in the tank (P3170-P3171-P3172), that give a signal to the
operators at both high and low pressure levels. The same applies to temperature indicator T3170, which
also gives an alarm when the temperature in the tank rises above or drops below a certain value. Finally,
there are two parallel level indicators (L3170-L3171) which give a signal as well in case of a high level
inside the tank. All of the indicators above are connected to switches so when a threshold is reached,
certain safety procedures will start (for example: the filling of the tank will automatically stop).

2.2. Mitigation layer

If the pressure rises too much, the pressure release valves will be opened, releasing the pressure (Y3130-
Y3131). There are also passive forms of mitigation, for instance the check valves that prohibit air from
entering the tank in case of vacuum.
The last layer of protection is the emergency response layer. An emergency plan has to be designed that
needs to be followed when all the previous layers were insufficient. The main objective in the plan would
be to evacuate everyone in the installation to prevent as much as possible any human harm.

3. Mitigating measures for detecting and preventing leakages

The occurrence of leakages needs to be prevented, since contact with oxygen/air results in the formation
and accumulation of explosive peroxides, which can lead to an explosion. Several measures can be taken,
such as sealless pumps and bellow sealed valves. Due to their specific design, they both ensure no
leakage of the product and a complete fluid containment. In addition, a double containment can be
installed around the existing tank. Since contact with oxygen has to be avoided, the double containment
should also be filled with N2. This extra tank should be connected to the N2 recovery pipe, so that the N2
can escape when this extra tank is filling with butadiene, preventing the build up of pressure.

It is recommended to install an extra tank so that in the case of leakage, the remaining product can be
conducted to this tank to reduce further leakage. If a leakage occurs, the formed vapours are heavier
than air, which causes them to remain close to the surface. Therefore, it might be advisable to install a
dike preventing vapours to travel long distances.

Several methods can be applied for leakage detection. To begin with, the installation of gas detectors in
the areas surrounding the tank and pipelines is suggested. Next, pressure and level measurements
should be closely followed up to detect disturbances of the expected flow pattern. An advanced and
expensive method to detect leakage in the pipelines is fibre optic leak detection, which relies on the fact
that the temperature around the pipelines changes when leakage occurs [1].

The equipment used by the employees in the different ATEX zones should be adapted to the zone it is
used in to prevent ignition when there is a leakage. An evacuation plan should be provided for workers
at the site, inhabitants and companies in the surrounding areas. In case of leakage, the production
should be stopped immediately and the evacuation procedure should be started, additionally also the
traffic should be redirected. Next, a measurement of the explosibility has to be carried out in order to
identify the severity of the explosion risk. It is important that employees and fireworkers are aware that
fire should not be extinguished, but allowed to burn out. Indeed, when flames are accidentally
extinguished, explosion re-ignition could occur.
4. ATEX guidelines

The term ATEX applies to atmospheres that are potentially explosive because of the possible presence of
gasses, dusts or vapors that are likely to ignite or explode. Directive 94/9/EC deals with this phenomenon
and has the objective to eliminate or minimize the associated risks. To verify whether the regulations
apply at this process involving butadiene storage, it has to be checked if it complies to all of following
conditions.

An explosive atmosphere for the purposes of Directive 94/9/EC is defined as a mixture

i) of flammable substances in the form of gases, vapours, mists or dusts


ii) with air
iii) under atmospheric conditions
iv) in which, after ignition, the combustion spreads to the entire unburned mixture (It has to be
noted that sometimes (mainly with dusts) not always the whole quantity of the combustible
material is consumed by the combustion).

An atmosphere, which could become explosive due to local and/or operational conditions, is called a
potentially explosive atmosphere. It is only this kind of potentially explosive atmosphere which products
falling under the Directive 94/9/EC are designed for (see as well chapter 4.3 Risk Assessment). [2]

All above mentioned conditions are fulfilled, which means that this application is subjected to the ATEX
guidelines. The following zones can be identified. The loading and unloading facilities are identified as
Zone 0, since in this area an explosive gas atmosphere is continuously present. This is because in this
area, there is a high risk of butadiene to mix with air. All entries and exits to the tank as well as the valves
and pumps in the pipelines are considered as Zone 1, since an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to exist
under normal operation. The area surrounding the storage tank is identified as Zone 2, because only in
case of a leakage an explosive atmosphere is likely to exist.
References

[1] Walder R. Fiber optic leak detection in process and chemical plants. SMARTEC SA, Nova Metrix,
Manno; 2014.

[2] Guidelines on the application of directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the
approximation of the laws of the members states concerning equipment and protective systems
intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, 4th edition, 2012.
Appendix 1
Table 1: HAZOP

Parameter Guide Possible causes Possible consequences Measures/existing Action, questions or


words facilities safeguard recommendations
Pressure More 1. Increase in flow of 1. Bursting and explosion 1. Three parallel pressure 1. Breather valve to release
nitrogen of the storage tank indicators overpressure

2. Decrease in flow of 2. Two release valves in 2. Is there an extra cooling


gas extraction case there is overpressure system in case the regular
cooling system fails?
3. Temperature indicator
3. Temperature increase
in the vessel due to 4. there are check valves to
insufficient cooling prohibit air from entering
the tank in case of vacuum
4. Obstruction of feed to
client
Less 1. decrease in flow of 1. suction of air into tank
nitrogen => explosion

2. increase in flow of gas


extraction

3.Temperature decrease
in the vessel
Level More 1. Uncontrolled filling of 1. overfilling 1. 2 parallel level indicators 1. Foresee level high interlock
the tank with Butadiene 2. Butadiene in Nitrogen
supply =>leakage 2. foresee an overflow tank
for butadiene (no contact
2. Failure of pump for
with air)
butadiene to client

You might also like