Encyclopedia of SOCTAT. THEORY VOLUME JI EDITOR niversity of Maryland, College Park A SAGE Reference PublicationEquation 5 together with the initial conditions for coercive relations to calculate C’s payoffs. When Q = 3 as it does in Figure 3, P= 3.37 and P, = -3.37. Ordering ‘The order in which exchanges must oecur, though not a type of connection, is a power condition. If A of Figure 3 must exchange with B, before B, and with B, before B,, then A is most disadvantaged in the frst exchange, ess so in the second, and exchanges at equipower in the third. In act, power effects in ordering are identical to those of inclision, bat in reverse, and Equation 4 applies. Ordering explains why gatekeepers, who control access to valued things they donot own, can gain fees from clients. Examples range from the patrons of antiquity to corrupt officials today. Inclusive-Exclusive Connection ‘The 3-branch of Figure 3 is the smallest network in which inclusive-exclusive connection can occur. Called Br322, A exchanges at most with two Bs and must com- plete both to benefit from either. Since A has three oppor- tunities to exchange and must make only two, the first exchange is not affected by inclusion. With the completion of that exchange, Q = 1 and inclusion does not affect the second exchange. By contrast, exclusion affects three exchanges. Thus, in Br322 and all inclusive-exclusively connected networks, A is high power and gains maximally exactly like the exclusively connected A. An inclusive- exclusively connected coercer, such as C in Figure 4, is also ‘unaffected by inclusion and benefits maximally. Inclusive-Null Connection ‘The 3-branch of Figure 3 is also the smallest network in ‘hich inclusive-null connection can occur. Called Br332, A can exchange with all three Bs and must complete so exchanges to benefit from either. Since A has three opportis- nities to exchange and must make only two, the first ‘exchange is not affected by inclusion. With the completion of that exchange, Q = I and inclusion does not affect the second exchange or third exchange. Thus, A is equipower with the Bs exactly like any A that was mull connected, An inclusive-null-connected coercer, such as C in Figure 4, is also unaffected by inclusion and gains payotts wholly as a consequence of threats to transmit negatives in each elation. EXPERIMENTS AND OTHER APPLICATIONS With one exception, resistance predictions for structures discussed above have survived experimental tests. The Elias, Norbert 239 ‘exception is the impact of inclusion on coercive structures that has yet to be studied. Whereas elementary theory is an ‘evolving theory, that evolution has now reached the point that with the exception just noted, experimentally tested theory covers all structural power conditions thus far dis- ‘covered. Models for those power conditions now form a set Of tools awaiting use in the natural settings of institutional ‘and historical-comparative investigations. In those natural settings, investigators cannot empirically sort one structural power condition from another. Thus, it is important that experiments have already studied structures where multiple power conditions are present. — David Willer See also Exchange Networks; Graph Theoretic Measures of Power; Network Exchange Theory; Power, Power-Dependence Relations; Rational Choice: Social Exchange Theory FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES Bell, Richard, Henry Walker, aad David Wille. 2000. “Power, Influence and Legitimacy in Organizations: Implications of ‘Thee Theoretical Research Programs” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 17:131-77. Corra, Mamadiand David Willer. 2002. “The Gatckeopet.” Sociological Theory 20:180-205, ‘Willer, David. 1987. Theory and the Experimental Investigation of ‘Social Structures. New York: Gordon & Breach, ed. 1999, Network Exchange Theory. Westport, CT: Pracger Willer, David and Bo Anderson, eds. 1981. Networks, Exchange, ‘and Coercion. New York: Elsevier. ELIAS, NORBERT Norbert Elias (1897-1990) was born in Breslau, Germany, in 1897. After studying medicine and philosophy at Breslau University, Elias turned his atention tothe prob Jem of long-term changes in what was assumed to be the constancy of human emotions and affects. He left Germany in 1933 as a refugee from the Nazi regime and continued his research, first in France and then in London. The result of this research was The Civilizing Process, which was pub- lished in 1939. After World War Il, he worked as a sociolo- gist in Uganda and at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom, He died in Amsterdam, Netherlands, in 1990, leaving a rich legacy of conceptual innovations that contin- us to be developed, usually under the terms of eivilizing and decivtizing processes, and figurational sociology. In The Civilizing Process, Elias argued that changing patterns of manners and emotional cconomies in the European Middle Ages were connected to transformations200 Ellas, Norbert in power ratios and the monopolization of violence in the ‘context of state formation. In so arguing, Elias established the themes and conceptual structure that would be elabo- rated and built on in subsequent works, including The Established and Outsiders; The Society of Individuals; Time: ‘An Essay; Mozart: Portrait of a Genius; The Germans; and What Is Sociology? This thematic elaboration included the problems of restraint, a relational theory of power, and the formation and transformation of groups and their identities, all of which also contained a critique of the underlying assumptions of the classical sociological tradition. His critique of this tradition begins this discus- sion of his work, ELIAS'S CRITIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY ‘The historical analysis ofthe emergence of the concept of civilization in Norbert Elas's work is underpinned by a ‘complex three-sided theoretical strategy that emerges under his formalation of civilizing processes. Elias introduces the notion of civilizing processes as a comective to three images and intellectual paradigms that have dominated the human and social sciences, whether they are imbedded in philosophy. sociology, or psychology. These three images and intellectual paradigms are methodological individual- ism, systems theoretic approaches, and units of analysis that place the emphasis on the investigation of the immedi- sate present. Elias develops a thiee-dimensional counter- paradigm of civilizing processes that concentrates on the following aspects of human association: relational and power interdependence between social actors, which dis- solves the distinction between individval and society; the interrelation between processes a the levels of social devel- ‘opment and psychologically located drives and affects; and change and innovation over time. Before presenting Elias's paradigm of civlizing processes in more detail, it is worth presenting an outline of his critiques of the three images and intellectual paradigms mentioned above. Epistemologica individualism is formed on the basis of the position ofan individual “I” who either establishes for himself or herself the principles through which knowledge is formed (Descartes) or has these principles structured jmmanently within, often in an unknown way (Kent) In these cases ofthe philosophy of the subject, the principle remains the same: Knowledge, perceptions, or ations stem from an act of individual effort on the part of the social actor, who is perceived as a self-contained wnit. lias terms this image of self-sufficient containment “homo clausus” (lias 1991:18, 196-202; 1994:xii. ‘Whilst systems theory approaches often draw on this image of homo clausus in order to present a social system 48 a self-contained unit from which it develops its own system-generating capactics, it portrays an added dimen- sion—that of social abstraction. To be sure, as Elias (1978a) sakes clear, “Itis the task of every sociological theory to clarify the characteristics that all human societies have in common?” (pp. 227-28). However, a systems analysis, and here lias has Parsons’s work in mind, is faced with a double problem. The first problem involves the core functions that are attributed to a social system by the social theorist ‘hich become the “motor” o first principle, and gives tis, system its coherence. The second problem stems from the first. First principles and core functions become static con- cepts that are applied to all societies, imespective oftheir histories and specific social dimensions. This type of static application has the effect of redacing. societies 1 the actions and relations between chemical-like. properties ‘Social theory becomes social chemistry, in which theoreti- cally derived abstract principles are applied to all societies at the cost of an understanding ofthe specific conditions of a particular society (Elias 1978a:227-28; 1987a:223~47) This ahistorical approach is related to another problem in sociological research in which the time horizon, if not extracted altogether, concentrates on immediate and present conltions. This “retreat of sociologists into the present," or “odiocentrism,” as Elias terms it, generates an arbitrary temporal cleavage between past and present, and draws on the immediate present for the solution of problems from the ‘vantage point of short-term trends. According to Ihas, this retreat either truncates a more informed understanding or views the present as a sufficient and self-contained condi- tion. It is the temporal form of homo clausus (Elias 19874:223-24), Elias responds to these thre intellectual currens and self-images in thee interconnected ways. Insead of an image of homo clausus, Elias develops a counterimage of “*homines ape” or open human interdependency (Elias 19786:125, 135). In response to systems theoretic approaches of which Parsons’s work is paradigmatic, Elias posts & multidimensional approach whereby a number of functions are identified by him as necessary forthe functional repro- duction of any given society. Moreover, he also argues thet this multdimensionality dovetails with the psychological formation of social subjects. Furthermore, Elias argues that long-term studies often articulated in centuries rather ‘than in years or decades, yield understandings about both the continuity and dovetaling of social and psychological processes and their change overtime. According to Elias ‘only long-term process sociology of this type can yield knowledge concerning the complex interactions betwe ‘any present and its past. However, for Elis, the unit time analysis is not the most fundamental issue. Rathe: for him, studies of the longue durée are indicative o ‘human imbeddedness in its rich and constitutive histocie~ ity. His analyses of social processes are studies directed to this historicity and the changes that occur to it overtime This radical historicism is infused into Blias’s overall approach,For Bia, human association isthe outcome of figurations ‘hat entail transformations in powcr struggles and strategies of inclusion and exclusion between groups, and changes in the regime of affects overtime. In fnking figurations, trans formations of power, and transformations of affects together, Elias develops an integrated theoretical strategy termed the “eivilizing process" which addresses the socio- Jogical and psychological dimensions of human lf that are themselves imbedded in long historical networks of human imterdependence (Elias 1978, 1982). The following discus- sion will concentrate on the human self-image of homines pert orfigrational forms, and on the civilizing processes that these figurational forms both give shape to and are, in ‘turn, shaped by. CHAINS OF INTERDEPENDENCE Elias effects paradigm shift from an image of a closed, self-contained individualism (homo clausus) to an image of human beings imbedded in open relations, or what are posited by him as open social figurations (homines apert). Every buman being, for Elias, is already imbedded in a double form of opening; on one hand, “every human indi- vidual is from birth to death part of a figuration” that, on the ‘other hand, he or she “co-determines in various and chang- ing ways” (Amason 1987:444). This image of a mutually determining openness is the core aspect of Elias’s theory of ‘ivilizing processes and the theory of social and psycho- logical formation that is internal to it. “These open figurations mean that for Elias, each social actor is connected to other social actors by virtue of “invis- ible” chains of social interdepenclence, which are general ‘and specific. They are general in that these chains denote functionally orientated and derived interdependencies as social actors move in and out of social roles and social functions. As Elias (1991) states, Each individual, even the most powerful, even a bal chief, an absolute monarch, oF a dictator, is part of (2 chain of interdependence, the representative of a func- tion which is formed and maintained only in relation to ‘other functions which ean only be understood in terms of the specific structures and the specific tensions in this total context. (pp. 14-15) AS this quote indicates, they are specific in that social actors are born into particular chains of interdependency, with their own specific historicities and interlinkages, and without which he or she could never become fully human. Ina manner similar to Emile Durkheim in “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Condition.” Elias (1991) argues that “only in relation to other human beings does the wild helpless creature which comes into the world become the psychologically developed person with the character oF Elias, Norbert 241 an individual and deserving the name of an adult human being” (p. 21). Chains of interdependency, then, denote both socializa- tion and_individualization. Social actors are bor into chains of functional interdependencies in which their habits and self-perceptions are shaped by the others around them. However, in so moving around these interdependent social networks, they become known as particular social actors with particular roles and histories, and as such also shape the particular figurations in which they are located. For Blas, this double-sided capacity for both being shaped and shaping denotes the essential dynamic capacity of social actors. It also denotes their capacity for power. Rather than viewing power as something that belongs to someone or to a social system and can be one-sidedly imposed by this person ‘r social system simply as domination, Elias (1991) argues that power is intrinsic to the capacity of social actors them- selves to “influence the self-regulation and the fate of other people” (p. 52), who, in tum, are doing likewise. Chains of interdependence are simultaneously forms and chains of power. In this sense, figurations are constituted as power ratios or balances between social actors or groups with their relative strengths and weaknesses, strategies, and counter- strategies. However, Elias does not view power simply as a strategy oa series of rational choices made by social actors in a zero-sum game. Rather, his model of power also subtly builds inthe forms of self-perceptions and definitions that are internalized by groups and projected upon others as a code- ‘crmining, nonrational, and noncalculative dimension. In developing and deploying these perceptions and definitions of self and other, social actors and groups attain a coberent tity that forms and maintains a boundary between “us” “them,” or “established” and “outsiders” In Elias’s view, the ‘development of perceptions that form and maintain identity of both self and other is an integral part of any figurational form. lias 1994, 1996), ‘The outcome of these ratios of power with their identity- securing aspects is the formation of monopoly mechanisms (Elias 1982:104-116). Elias does not necessarily equate power only with the development of state forms, even though these are a fundamentally crucial monopoly innova- tion at the level of social institutions, as The Civilizing Process suggests. Rather, for him, monopoly mechanisms potentially take shape in all areas where interweaving ‘occurs: throughout the human life cycle and in all social domains. Moreover, these figurations develop over time and in often unforeseen ways. The greater the number of actors or groups within any one figuration, and thus the “longer” or more complex the figurational chains, the more indeterminate and unpredictable the outcome of the bal- ances of power—if one can speak of outcome at all. It is ‘more appropriate here to speak of increasing shifts in these balances over time as the figurations become increasingly ‘more complex.242 Ellas, Norbert POWER AND CONTROLS, INVOLVEMENTS AND DETACHMENTS: CIVILIZING PROCESSES Tn light of the above remarks, power is not a “thing” or ‘an instrument for Blias. As a concept, itis a shorthand and, as he points out, often a rigid way of capturing the major characteristic of all human relationships (Elias 1978b:74). Instead of speaking about power externally imposed, Elias proposes that we speak of figurations, ratios, and balances that are internal features of any social relation. Nor is power blunt. The very fact that human beings are caught up and are constituted through human figurations entails, for him, that ratios of power occur both socially, through the inven- ‘tions of institutions through which power can be monopo- lized and wielded more effectively, and psychologically, in the way habits and dispositions are internalized to histori cally mold instinets and emotions. lias’s basic thesis is that there is a Tink between the long-term structural development of societies and changes in people's psychology and their habituses. His basic proposition is as follows: If in this or that region the power of central authority grows, if over a larger or smaller area the people are forced to live in peace with each other, the molding of affects and the standards of the drive economy are very gradually changed as well. (Elias 1978a:165; Rundell and Mennell 1998:26) Elias explores this basic thesis through what e terms the “triad of basic controls.” and these apply to all societies no matter what their condition of material or cultural life. These three aspects of basic human social contols refer to, first, ‘The extent ofits contol-chances over non-human com- plexes of events ... [second], by the extent of its con- trols-chances over interpersonal relationships... [and third] by the extent to which cach of its members has control over himself as an individual.” (Elias 1978b:156) ‘The first two control mechanisms are the basic feature of| society's sociogenesis, whilst the third is the social actor’s psychogenesis. Sociogenesis emphasizes the overall struc- ture of a social field or figuration, rather than “society” ‘This social Field can be terrtorially defined, for example, through the formation of states; but it can also refer to par- ticular social relations between groups and actors within a field, for example, between classes, between sexes, between those who are “inside” and those who are “out side.” and between those who specialize in the formation of knowledge (Elias 1982, 1987a, 1994). Furthermore, and importantly, Flias emphasizes not only the social field but also its long-term historical genealogy, development, and transformation. The aspect of psychogenesis emphasizes the balances, tensions, and conflicts between malleable hhuman drives and those drive controls that become ingrained and learned during the development ofthe human personality. In other words, interactions between human ‘beings necessarily transform drives through the develop- ment of regimes of drive control and self-restraint. There is thus an intersection between sociogenesis and psychogene- sis: Sociogenesis entails that psychological transformations are themselves both historical and structural. Internal trans- formation and molding occurs, for Elias, in the context of reestablished historical settings. Elias conceptualizes the ‘combination of sociogenesis, psychogenesis, and the triad of basic controls under the more general and extensive for- ulation of civilizing processes. Changes at the level of social structures or institutions, brought about by transformations in the balances of power ‘between human groups create tensions within this structure ‘and also effect the balance of self-control or self-restraint of| those individuals within the given social field. This tension is conceptualized by Elias in terms of involvement and detachment, or in terms of lesser or greater degrees of con- tvol, especially atthe level of cognition and identity forma- tion. In Elias’s view, “involvement” denotes an unreflected self-centeredness in terms of the solipssti construction of human knowledge tothe point of self enclosure and affects the forms of knowledge that may develop. Involved knowi- ‘edge, according to Elias is typified by high levels of phan- tasization of the natural world through the imaginative figurations of human “reality” upon it in the form of magic and myth. It efers to “beliefs and practices which indicate that human persons experience themsclves as directly involved and participating in {natural] processes” (Elias 1987b:102, 35, 97-103). Here, human figurations and power do not dissolve, nor do they fail to exist, Rether, according to Elias, they are sub sumed to the dynamic of undifferentiated identification with, and emotional partisanship for, the “we; often in the form of club, a party, a fuehrer, ora nation-state. Here, the figuration is constituted through the movement between gratification, self-esteem, and devotion to a collective. In conditions of involvement, all social relations are constituted as undifferen- tiated states of singular immersion in a continuum of identity. In other words, an involved condition is an undifferentiated one, characterized by a lack of emotional detachment by those 6 the inside and a fixed and hostile position toward these ‘ho are “outside” (Elias 1987b, 1996). Even worse, accord- ing to Fis, ican become pathological, in which another can- ‘not even begin to enter. In this latter condition, patems of interaction are exemplified by self-enclosure or encasement ‘on each side of the interaction, in which reactive, mutual hos tility erupts. Here, viokene is an outcome of a set of inereas- ingly enclosing social relations between self and other, rather than a precondition for these social relations.LL, Detachment is the process through which the circle of ‘mutual encasement, or what Elias terms “encystment,” is broken. In this sense, Elias's notion of detachment is a theory of reflexivity in which he brings together increasing capacities for objectification with increasing capacities for figurational, cognitive, and psychological differemtiation. It thas the following characteristics: increasing orientations toward reality and control of objects qua objects and thus what he terms “autonomous valuation,” as distinct from het- ‘eronomous evaluation; increasing capacities for distance or perspective; increasing differentiation at the level of both go formation and ego identity, such that the ‘ate and develop distinct from alter; the recor and a capacity for self-observation (Elias 1987b:116). Its thus internal to increasing the scope Of the chains of interdependency, as we shall see below, Moreover, according to Elias, the capacity for detach- ‘ment and the form of reflexivity to which it gives rise rely on increasing forms of restraint. From the side of the evelopment of sociogenesis, Blias argues that two social institutional complexes were historically invented that engendered new patterns of social restraint, which led to increased detachment and social interdependence. These ‘new institutions were the state and the towns. There are some affinities with Max Weber's theory of state formation. Both argue that the state is a social form that has control over territory on the basis of monopolizing the use of force, which is accompanied by a Iegitimating claim. However, for Elias, the figurational forms of the occidental courts of the great feudal lords and the later courts of the absolutist. states are paradigms for an analysis of the historical devel- ‘opment of civilizing processes. They are internally related. to the development of detached or more “rational” forms of thinking and the transformation of the regime of affects and ‘emotions. Increasing territorial control became homolo- increasing internalized self-control (Elias 1978a, 1982), Moreover, state formation and the internal pacification of a territory that it facilitated through its monopolization of violence (in the form of war) and money (in the form of tax- ation) enabled individuals to become enmeshed in larger ‘and wider social networks, institutions, and patterns of interaction, including the division of labor, trade, monetary exchanges, and bureaucracies. In other words, the history of civil society, or what emerged in Marxian terms as the development of capitalism, according to Elias was reliant upon the internal pacification of territory, which only the formation of the absolutist state could provide. This places the social field of the state atthe center of theories of capi- {alist development, rather than viewing it as derivative force. The result is an image of historical development—for the modem West at least—that is multidimensional, as Social forces interweave with each other, producing cumu- lative effects at both the social and psychological levels. Elias, Norbert 243 In this way, chains of interdependence between the Participants in social figurations, whether these be trade, War, or intimate conduct, simultaneously become both ‘more centralized and controlled, and more extensive and functionally differentiated. The “monopoly mechanism” does not lead to a decrease in the variety and forms of inter- actions within a given social field. Quite the opposite According to Blias (1982), a paradoxical movement occurs in social fields that are structured in terms of detached ‘figurations: There are “diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties” (p. 251). From the side of the institutional ‘organization of social power, a functional “simplicity” emerges through the monopolization of means and functions, espe- cially in terms of martial and fiscal control, that assists the stabilization of social conduct, At the same time, though, distancing between social actors increases the scope for experimentation, differentiation, and variety of social eon. ‘uct, because social relations become predictable given that the propensity for violence outside socially prescribed and ritualized forms of conduct is minimized. ‘Moreover, this monopolization of physical violence also creates a pacified social space in which “the moderation of Spontaneous emotions, the tempering of affects, the exten- ‘sion of mental space beyond the moment into past and future” could occur (Flias 1982:236). Elias exemplifies this Social space by the court, and he terms its new economy of affects “courtly rationality.” Courtly rationality involves @ shift from involved physical and cmotional interaction in Which a propensity to violence is always present, and not simply just below the surface, to detached, symbolic inter- action that also might be termed mannered and representa- ‘ional or symbolizing interaction (Elias 1982a:281; 19874:339-61), Elias argues that as webs of interdependence become denser and more extensive, a shift gradually takes place in the balance from extemal constraints imposed by others to constraints imposed by oneself. The Civilizing Process begins with the development of social conventions con. ‘corning activities such as eating, washing, and toileting in order to show that as pattems of interdependence become more stabilized, each of these “natural acts” become increasingly subject to external and internal stylization and self-restraint. For Elias, this is mot merely a matter of socialization; socialization itself belongs to a long history of affect control that cannot be separated from the histories of the way in which violence and affect regimes are grate ally restrained and “civilized.” ‘This historical development of new, detached forms of self-constraint can be highlighted, for example, through Elias’s discussion of the emotional economy of love. What he perceptively terms “aristocratic romanticism,” rather than courtly love, isin his view, one of the outcomes of the Tong process formation of court society as it develops out Of the knightly clite. In his view, the emergence of the| i 20a __Blias, Norbert European form of courtly love is symptomatic of the double shift toward detached interdependence and self- ‘constraint. Whilst courtly love refers to the sexual balance ‘of power within the figuration of the courtly elite, Elias argues that this form of love emerges out of a figuration of ‘power between three forms of knightly existence that begin to become distinguishable between the cleventh and twelfth centuries: Knights of lower status who ruled small amounts of territory, a smaller number of knights of high status who ruled over great territories, and a middle strata with litle or ro land, who put themselves in the service of the higher- status knights. The tradition of vassalage and the trouba- dour knight—the Minnesingers who sang at court and rected his erotic attention toward the wife of the noble- rman, the lady—was formed out of this dependent relation ‘and in the direction of ritualized and constrained patterns of interaction. In this context, aristocratic romanticism became reliant on representational and symbolizing forms in the style of lyric poetry and Minnesang and, later, the romantic novel. According to Elias, aristocratic romanticism is in ‘part the outcome of a concealed resentment by those on the periphery of the court who yearn nostalgically for an ideal- ized past (lias 1982:66-90; 1983:214-67).. ‘THE HUMAN SELF-IMAGE OF RESTRAINT ‘The central image that emerges in Elias's construction of the eiviizing process is one of constraint. This is the way in which he, for example, portrays aristocratic romanticism: It is a movement “toward a greater conversion of external to intemal compulsions” (Elias 1983:221). However, it is ‘more than simply a constraint from the use of physical vio- lence, especially if this constraint is viewed as imposed by structural or institutional means. Rather, asthe quote imme- diately above implies (as well as the brief discussion of the sociogenesis of aristocratic romanticism above), there is also a reorganization in the intemal pattern of self- ‘constraint and a movement from involvement to detach- ‘ment. A pattern emerges typified as an active sef-diseiplining and self-constraint or internal participation, in which short- term impulses are subordinated to middle or more distant goals. As Elias notes (1982), “These self-constraints tend toward a more even moderation, a more continuous restraint, a more exact control of drives and effects in accor- dance With the more differentiated pattern of social inter- weaving” (p. 243). Furthermore, for Elias, self-constraint entails a developed capacity for hindsight and foresight, in other words, reflexive detachment from others. As indicated ‘above, this is the primary indicator of detached relations 10 the world and to the self Elias does not draw on the language of repression, with its reliance on a metapsychological image of a naturalistic substratum of drives, to enact this constraint. Rather, for him, the model is a developmental one in which a reciprocal process of maturation and learning occurs. In Fliass view, the biological propensity for maturation within the human animal cannot be separated from a leaming capacity through which “unlearned forms of steering conduct ‘become subordinated to learned forms,” to the point where forthe human being, genetic rigidity gives way to not only ‘malleability but also learning. Learning becomes, for the fuman being, the sole requisite and means for survival (lias 19872:345), Moreover, this learning occurs only in the context of other human beings. Only through learn situations in the context of human groups can “the natural ‘human structures which remain dispositions... fully func- tion” (Elias 19872:347), ‘As Elias points out, the biological process of maturation, ‘and the social process of leaming dovetail, but not always in a straightforward manner, without scars and. painful memories (Elias 1982:244-45). In an argument that is at times quite close to Jean Piaget's, Elias posits that learn takes place in specific social contexts and intersects matu- ‘ational plateaus within the human aninval, which can either be blocked or advanced, depending on the nature and the context of the learning. There is a tension here atthe inter- section between psychogenesis and sociogenesis, which plays itself out in terms of a tension between forms of involvement and forms of detachment. ‘There ae, then, two background presuppositions that are anchored firmly and deeply within Elias’s work. First, Elias argues that a permanent question mark must always be placed over the survival of human beings and groups, espe- cially in civilizational terms. In Elias’s (1988) terms, the civilizing process is always under threat; it “is never com pleted and constantly endangered” (p. 177). In this context. lias locates violence, including war, with its own tech- nologies and logic or way of thinking, in a sociological con- text in which human aggression is the result of chains of interdependency. Against classical Freudianism, Elias argues that conflicts trigger aggression, rather than the other way around, and that these conflicts are aspects of figurations between human beings that become institution alized 2s social structures. From this perspective, the ‘monopolization of violence by the state is a “socio-technical invention of the human species” (p. 179), and for Elias arguably the most important one. ‘Yet as Elias points out, human beings do live together in situations of relative peace. While the logic of the human “anthropos is violence, civilization, in Elias's view, is not ‘constant war. Rather, as the preceding analysis has implies, according to Elias, human sociability has been achieve through, in the frst instance, civilization processes that al societies and social actors undergo, and in more complex contexts through an institutional innovation at the level oF social structures where the state, especially, has monopo- Tized the use of violence. This monopolization becomes th basis for a transformation in patterns of interaction, whiLL themselves are shaped by pattems of restraint. Extemal 'monopolization of violence is accompanied by an internal pacification. ‘The task, though, for Bias is not only to investigate the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of violence but also to posit a “hinge” through and around which they combine and mutually interconnect. Processes of sociogenesis and Psychogenesis go hand in hand with a principle of coordi nation or steering. In Elias's view, this principle of eoordi nation is fear. [tis the conduit “through which the structure of society is uansmitted to individual psychological functions... without the lever of these men-made fears the young human animal would never become an adult” (Elias 1982:328), Moreover, this economy of fear isa broader and deeper explanatory device than models that rely on or emphasize the rationality of social interactions and social forms (no ‘matter how this rationality may be theorized). In this way, rationality and societal rationalization are outcomes that develop from a prerational basis of fear. Elias goes on to argue that the strength and the combinations of internally and externally derived fears are not only socially deter mined; in being 0, they determine the fate of social individuals. ‘The emotional economy of fear is the hermeneutical glue that binds Flias’s civilization paradigm together. Constraint, and thus detachment, grows out of fear. Human #88 become human only inasmuch as they are located i webs of interdependency, and fear is the means that main- tains and extends the interdependent webs. This is what every human being or group learns through. It also propels human beings and groups into figurational actions — John Rundell See also Civility; Civilizing Processes; Culture and Civilization; Figurational Sociology: Habitus; Power FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES Amasog, Johann, P. 1987. "Figurational Sociology as a Counter Paradigm.” Theory, Culture and Society 4(2-3)46, lias, Norbert, 19783. The Civilicing Process. Vol. 1, The Development of Manners. Translated by Edmund Jepheot. [New York: Urizen 1978. What 1s Sociology? Translated by Stephen “Meonelt and Grace Morsissey. New York: Columbia University Press 1982. The Civilicing Process. Vol. I, State Formation and Civilization. Translated by Fimund Jephoott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, —— 1983. The Cours Society. Translated by Edmund Fephcot. Oxford, UK: Blackwell —— 1987, “Norbert Elias and Figurational Sociology” (Special issue). Theory, Culture & Society 42-3). Emergence 245 — 19810. molvement and Detachment Edited by Miche] Schriter: Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. —— 1988. “Violence and Civilization: The State Monopoly of Physical and Is Infringement” Pp, 177-98 in Civil Society ‘and the State, edited by John Keane. London: Verso, 1981. The Society of Individuals. Edited by Michael Schroter, Translated by Edmund Jepheott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell ——— With John L. Scotson. 1994. The Established and Outsiders: A Sociological Study into Community Problems. 2d.ed. London: Sage. —— 1996. The Germans’ Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Edited by Michael Schroter, Translated by Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell. Cambridge, UK: Polity, Mennell, Stephen. 1989. Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, Rundell, John and Stephen Mennell, eds. 1998. Classical ‘Readings in Culture and Chviliation. London; Routledge. EMERGENCE Emergence is social process that results in global system Properties that are based in individuals and ther interaetions but cannot be explained or predicted from a full and com. plete knowledge of these individuals and ther interactions. The bird flock isa classic example of emergence, When wwesee the “V" shape overhead, we typically assume that one bird is the leader and the other birds have taken position behind the leader, intentionally forming a “V" shape. However, omithologists have recently discovered this is not the case: Each bird is only aware of the immediately con- tiguous birds, and each bird follows a simple set of rules, adjusting his flight based on the movements of the nearby birds. No bird isthe leader, and no bird is aware that a *V" shape exists. The “V” shape emerges out of the local deci- sions of each bird. he bird flock is self-organizing, with Control distributed throughout the system. This simple phe- nomenon demonstrates the key features of emergence: Higher-level phenomena emerge atthe group level; interac. tion among individual components is a central factor inthis ‘emergence; and multiple levels of analysis must be taken into account, including a component level and a system level Emergence is a contemporary approach to one of the most fundamental issues in sociological theory: the rela- tionship between the individual and the collective. This relationship was a central element in the theorizing of the ninetcenth-century founders of sociology, including Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Marx, and was central, if implicit, in many twentieth-century sociological paradigms, including